Duke Energy Florida, Inc., 75595-75597 [2014-29656]
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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 243 / Thursday, December 18, 2014 / Notices
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Patricia D. Rausch,
Advisory Committee Management Officer,
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing an
exemption in response to a July 17,
2013, request from Duke Energy Florida,
Inc. (DEF or the licensee), from certain
regulatory requirements. The exemption
would remove the requirement that a
licensed senior operator approve the
emergency suspension of security
measures for Crystal River Unit 3
Nuclear Generating Plant (CR3) during
certain emergency conditions or during
severe weather.
DATES: December 18, 2014.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2014–0266 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly available
information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2014–0266. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol
Gallagher; telephone: 301–287–3422;
email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For
technical questions, contact the
individual listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may access publicly
available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then
select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC’s Public
SUMMARY:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards Renewal
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Notice of renewal of the Charter
of the Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards (ACRS).
AGENCY:
The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has determined that
renewal of the charter for the ACRS
until December 4, 2016, is in the public
interest in connection with the statutory
responsibilities assigned to the ACRS.
This action is being taken in accordance
with the Federal Advisory Committee
Act.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Andrew L. Bates, Office of the Secretary,
NRC, Washington, DC 20555; by
telephone: (301) 415–1963, or email at
ALB@NRC.GOV.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards was established by Section
29 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of
1954, as amended. Its purpose is to
provide advice to the Commission with
regard to the hazards of proposed or
existing reactor facilities, to review each
application for a construction permit or
operating license for certain facilities
specified in the AEA, and such other
duties as the Commission may request.
The AEA as amended by PL 100–456
also specifies that the Defense Nuclear
Safety Board may obtain the advice and
recommendations of the ACRS.
SUMMARY:
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
[FR Doc. 2014–29194 Filed 12–17–14; 8:45 a.m.]
Duke Energy Florida, Inc.
BILLING CODE 7510–13–P
19:23 Dec 17, 2014
Dated: December 8, 2014.
Andrew L. Bates,
Advisory Committee Management Officer.
[Docket No. 50–302; NRC–2014–0266]
[FR Doc. 2014–29624 Filed 12–17–14; 8:45 am]
VerDate Sep<11>2014
Membership on the Committee
includes individuals experienced in
reactor operations, management;
probabilistic risk assessment; analysis of
reactor accident phenomena; design of
nuclear power plant structures, systems
and components; materials science; and
mechanical, civil, and electrical
engineering.
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75595
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The
ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced in this document
(if that document is available in
ADAMS) is provided the first time that
a document is referenced.
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
purchase copies of public documents at
the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Michael Orenak, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation; U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington DC
20555–0001; telephone: 301–415–3229;
email: Michael.Orenak@nrc.gov.
I. Background
Duke Energy Florida, Inc., is the
holder of Facility License No. DPR–72.
The license provides, among other
things, that the facility is subject to all
rules, regulations, and orders of the NRC
now or hereafter in effect.
The facility consists of a permanently
shutdown and defueled pressurized
water reactor located in Citrus County,
Florida.
By letter dated February 20, 2013
(ADAMS Accession No. ML13056A005),
DEF submitted to the NRC the
certification in accordance with
§§ 50.82(a)(1)(i) and 50.82(a)(1)(ii) of
Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) indicating it
permanently ceased power operations
and that the CR3 reactor vessel was
permanently defueled.
II. Request/Action
On July 17, 2013 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML13204A397), the licensee
requested an exemption from
§§ 73.55(p)(1)(i) and 73.55(p)(1)(ii),
pursuant to § 73.5, ‘‘Specific
exemptions,’’ which requires, in part,
that a licensed senior operator approves
the suspension of security measures
during certain emergency conditions or
during severe weather. Portions of the
letter dated July 17, 2013, contain
sensitive unclassified nonsafeguards
information (security-related) and,
accordingly, have been withheld from
public disclosure. The regulations in
§§ 73.55(p)(1)(i) and 73.55(p)(1)(ii),
respectively, specify that the suspension
of security measures must be approved
by, as a minimum, a licensed senior
operator, or a licensed senior operator
with input from the security supervisor
or manager.
The exemption request relates solely
to the licensing requirements specified
in the regulations for the staff directing
suspension of security measures in
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75596
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 243 / Thursday, December 18, 2014 / Notices
accordance with §§ 73.55(p)(1)(i) and
73.55(p)(1)(ii). Section 73.55(p)(1)(i)
requires that ‘‘suspension of security
measures must be approved as a
minimum by a licensed senior operator
before taking this action;’’
§ 73.55(p)(1)(ii) requires that
‘‘suspension of security measures must
be approved, as a minimum, by a
licensed senior operator, with input
from the security supervisor or manager,
before taking this action.’’
This exemption would remove the
requirement for a licensed senior
operator to provide the approval.
Instead, the licensee intends that
suspension of security measures to be
authorized by a certified fuel hander
(CFH), as defined by § 50.2,
‘‘Definitions.’’
III. Discussion
Historically, the Commission’s
security rules have long recognized the
potential need to suspend security or
safeguards measures. In 1986, in its final
rule, ‘‘Miscellaneous Amendments
Concerning the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Power Plants’’ (51 FR 27817;
August 4, 1986), the Commission
promulgated § 73.55(a), stating in part:
In accordance with § 50.54(x) and (y) of
Part 50, the licensee may suspend any
safeguards measures pursuant to § 73.55 in
an emergency when this action is
immediately needed to protect the public
health and safety and no action consistent
with license conditions and technical
specification that can provide adequate or
equivalent protection is immediately
apparent. This suspension must be approved
as a minimum by a licensed senior operator
prior to taking the action.
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Later, in Proposed Rule,
‘‘Decommissioning of Nuclear Power
Plants,’’ July 20, 1995; 60 FR 37379, the
Commission made a number of
proposed rule changes to address
decommissioning. Among the changes
were new regulations that affected
§§ 50.54(x) and (y) by allowing a nonlicensed operator called a ‘‘Certified
Fuel Handler,’’ in addition to a licensed
senior operator, to authorize protective
steps. Specifically, when proposing the
rule addressing the role of the CFH
during emergencies, the Commission
stated:
The Commission is proposing to amend 10
CFR 50.54(y) to permit a certified fuel
handler at nuclear power reactors that have
permanently ceased operations and
permanently removed fuel from the reactor
vessel, subject to the requirements of
§ 50.82(a) and consistent with the proposed
definition of ‘‘Certified Fuel Handler’’
specified in § 50.2, to make these evaluations
and judgments. A nuclear power reactor that
has permanently ceased operations and no
longer has fuel in the reactor vessel does not
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19:23 Dec 17, 2014
Jkt 235001
require a licensed individual to monitor core
conditions. A certified fuel handler at a
permanently shutdown and defueled nuclear
power reactor undergoing decommissioning
is an individual who has the requisite
knowledge and experience to evaluate plant
conditions and make these judgments.
In the final rule (61 FR 39298; July 29,
1996), the Commission added the
following definition to § 50.2: ‘‘Certified
fuel handler means, for a nuclear power
reactor facility, a non-licensed operator
who has qualified in accordance with a
fuel handler training program approved
by the Commission.’’ However, the
Decommissioning Rule did not propose
or make parallel changes to § 73.55(a),
and did not discuss the role of a nonlicensed certified fuel handler.
In the final rule, ‘‘Power Reactor
Security Requirements’’ (74 FR 13926;
March 27, 2009), the NRC relocated and
split the security suspension
requirements from § 73.55(a) to
§§ 73.55(p)(1)(i) and (p)(1)(ii). The CFHs
were not discussed in the rulemaking,
so the requirements of § 73.55(p) to use
a licensed senior operator remains, even
for a site that otherwise no longer has
an operating reactor.
However, pursuant to § 73.5, the
Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR part 73 as it
determines are authorized by law and
will not endanger life or property or the
common defense and security, and are
otherwise in the public interest.
A. Authorized by Law
The exemption from §§ 73.55(p)(1)(i)
and 73.55(p)(1)(ii) would remove the
requirement that a licensed senior
operator approve the suspension of
security measures, under certain
emergency conditions or severe
weather. The licensee intends to align
these regulations with § 50.54(y) by
using the authority of a non-licensed
CFH in place of a licensed senior
operator to approve the suspension of
security measures during certain
emergency conditions or during severe
weather.
Per § 73.5, the Commission is allowed
to grant exemptions from the regulations
in 10 CFR part 73 as authorized by law.
The NRC staff has determined that
granting of the licensee’s proposed
exemption will not result in a violation
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, or other laws. Therefore, the
exemption is authorized by law.
B. Will Not Endanger Life or Property or
the Common Defense and Security
Removing the requirement to have a
licensed senior operator approve
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suspension of security measures during
emergencies or severe weather will not
endanger life or property or the common
defense and security for the reasons
described below.
First, § 73.55(p)(2) continues to
require that ‘‘[s]uspended security
measures must be reinstated as soon as
conditions permit.’’
Second, the suspension for nonweather emergency conditions under
§ 73.55(p)(1)(i) will continue to be
invoked only ‘‘when this action is
immediately needed to protect the
public health and safety and no action
consistent with license conditions and
technical specifications that can provide
adequate or equivalent protection is
immediately apparent.’’ Thus, the
underlying purpose of § 73.55(p)(1)(i)
will still be to protect public health and
safety even after the exemption is
granted.
Third, the suspension for severe
weather under § 73.55(p)(1)(ii) will
continue to be used only when ‘‘the
suspension of affected security
measures is immediately needed to
protect the personal health and safety of
security force personnel and no other
immediately apparent action consistent
with the license conditions and
technical specifications can provide
adequate or equivalent protection.’’ The
requirement to receive input from the
security supervisor or manager will
remain. The underlying purpose of
§ 73.55(p)(1)(ii) will continue to be to
protect the health and safety of the
security force.
Additionally, by letter dated June 26,
2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14155A181), the NRC approved
DEF’s CFH training and retraining
program for the CR3 facility. The NRC
staff found that, among other things, the
program addresses the safe conduct of
decommissioning activities, safe
handling and storage of spent fuel, and
the appropriate response to plant
emergencies. Because the CFH is
sufficiently trained and qualified under
an NRC-approved program, the NRC
staff considers a CFH to have sufficient
knowledge of operational and safety
concerns such that there will be no
adverse effects or undue risk to the
public health and safety as a result of
the suspension of security measures
during the emergencies or severe
weather.
In addition, the exemption does not
reduce the overall effectiveness of the
physical security plan and has no
adverse impacts to DEF’s ability to
physically secure the site or protect
special nuclear material at CR3, and
thus would not have an effect on the
common defense and security. The NRC
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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 243 / Thursday, December 18, 2014 / Notices
staff has concluded that the exemption
would not reduce security measures
currently in place to protect against
radiological sabotage. Therefore,
removing the requirement for a licensed
senior operator to approve the
suspension of security measures in an
emergency or during severe weather so
that suspension of security measures
can be authorized by CFH does not
adversely affect public health and safety
issues or the assurance of the common
defense and security.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
C. Is Otherwise in the Public Interest
The DEF’s proposed exemption would
remove the requirement that a licensed
senior operator approve suspension of
security measures in an emergency
when ‘‘immediately needed to protect
the public health and safety’’ or during
severe weather when ‘‘immediately
needed to protect the personal health
and safety of security force personnel.’’
Without the exemption, the licensee
cannot implement changes to its
security plan to authorize a CFH to
approve temporary suspension of
security regulations during an
emergency or severe weather
comparable to the authority given to the
CFH by the Commission when it
promulgated § 50.54(y). Instead, the
regulations would continue to require
that a licensed senior operator be
available to make decisions for a
permanently shutdown plant, even
though CR3 no longer requires a
licensed senior operator. It is unclear
how the licensee would implement
emergency or severe weather
suspensions of security measures
without a licensed senior operator. This
exemption is in the public interest for
two reasons. First, without the
exemption, there is uncertainty on how
the licensee will invoke temporary
suspension of security matters that may
be needed to protect public health and
safety or the safety of the security forces
during emergencies and severe weather.
Additionally, the consistent and
efficient regulation of nuclear power
plants serves the public interest by
assuring consistency between the
security regulations in 10 CFR part 73
and the operating reactor regulations in
10 CFR part 50, and the requirements
concerning licensed operators in 10 CFR
part 55. Accordingly, the NRC staff
concludes that the exemption
requirements to obtain approval from a
licensed senior operator, who is not
otherwise required for a permanently
shutdown and defueled reactor, before
taking steps to protect the public health
and safety, or to protect the safety of the
security force, is in the public interest.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
19:23 Dec 17, 2014
Jkt 235001
D. Environmental Considerations
The NRC approval of the exemption
to security requirements belongs to a
category of actions that the Commission,
by rule or regulation, has declared to be
a categorical exclusion, after first
finding that the category of actions does
not individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human
environment. Specifically, the
exemption is categorically excluded
from further analysis under
§ 51.22(c)(25).
Under § 51.22(c)(25), granting of an
exemption from the requirements of any
regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a
categorical exclusion provided that (i)
there is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant
change in the types or significant
increase in the amounts of any effluents
that may be released offsite; (iii) there is
no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure; (iv) there is no
significant construction impact; (v)
there is no significant increase in the
potential for or consequences from
radiological accidents; and (vi) the
requirements from which an exemption
is sought involve: safeguard plans, and
materials control and accounting
inventory scheduling requirements; or
involve other requirements of an
administrative, managerial, or
organizational nature.
The Director, Division of Operating
Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, has determined that
approval of the exemption request
involves no significant hazards
consideration because removing the
requirement to have a licensed senior
operator approve the security
suspension at a defueled shutdown
power plant does not (1) involve a
significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously
evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of
a new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated; or
(3) involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. The exempted security
regulation is unrelated to any
operational restriction. Accordingly,
there is no significant change in the
types or significant increase in the
amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; and no significant
increase in individual or cumulative
public or occupational radiation
exposure. The exempted regulation is
not associated with construction, so
there is no significant construction
impact. The exempted regulation does
not concern the source term (i.e.,
potential amount of radiation in an
accident), nor mitigation. Thus, there is
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75597
no significant increase in the potential
for, or consequences of, a radiological
accident. The requirement to have a
licensed senior operator approve
departure from security actions may be
viewed as involving either safeguards,
materials control, or managerial matters.
Therefore, pursuant to §§ 51.22(b) and
51.22(c)(25), no environmental impact
statement or environmental assessment
need be prepared in connection with the
approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that, pursuant to § 73.5, the
exemption is authorized by law and will
not endanger life or property or the
common defense and security, and is
otherwise in the public interest.
Therefore, the Commission hereby
grants DEF exemption from the
requirements of §§ 73.55(p)(1)(i) and
73.55(p)(1)(ii), which otherwise would
require suspension of security measures
during emergencies and severe weather,
respectively, to be approved by a
licensed senior operator. The exemption
is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day
of December 2014.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michele G. Evans,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2014–29656 Filed 12–17–14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[NRC–2014–0178]
Standard Review Plan for Conventional
Uranium Mills and Heap Leach
Facilities
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Draft NUREG; request for
comment.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing for public
comment a draft NUREG, NUREG–2126,
‘‘Standard Review Plan for
Conventional Uranium Mills and Heap
Leach Facilities.’’ The NRC has
developed draft NUREG–2126 to
provide guidance for NRC staff reviews
of applications to develop and operate
conventional uranium mills and heap
leach facilities and to ensure a
consistent quality and uniformity of
staff reviews.
DATES: Submit comments by March 18,
2015. Comments received after this date
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\18DEN1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 243 (Thursday, December 18, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 75595-75597]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-29656]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-302; NRC-2014-0266]
Duke Energy Florida, Inc.
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an
exemption in response to a July 17, 2013, request from Duke Energy
Florida, Inc. (DEF or the licensee), from certain regulatory
requirements. The exemption would remove the requirement that a
licensed senior operator approve the emergency suspension of security
measures for Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant (CR3) during
certain emergency conditions or during severe weather.
DATES: December 18, 2014.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2014-0266 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2014-0266. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-287-
3422; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced in this document
(if that document is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time
that a document is referenced.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Orenak, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3229; email: Michael.Orenak@nrc.gov.
I. Background
Duke Energy Florida, Inc., is the holder of Facility License No.
DPR-72. The license provides, among other things, that the facility is
subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the NRC now or
hereafter in effect.
The facility consists of a permanently shutdown and defueled
pressurized water reactor located in Citrus County, Florida.
By letter dated February 20, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML13056A005), DEF submitted to the NRC the certification in accordance
with Sec. Sec. 50.82(a)(1)(i) and 50.82(a)(1)(ii) of Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) indicating it permanently ceased
power operations and that the CR3 reactor vessel was permanently
defueled.
II. Request/Action
On July 17, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13204A397), the licensee
requested an exemption from Sec. Sec. 73.55(p)(1)(i) and
73.55(p)(1)(ii), pursuant to Sec. 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' which
requires, in part, that a licensed senior operator approves the
suspension of security measures during certain emergency conditions or
during severe weather. Portions of the letter dated July 17, 2013,
contain sensitive unclassified nonsafeguards information (security-
related) and, accordingly, have been withheld from public disclosure.
The regulations in Sec. Sec. 73.55(p)(1)(i) and 73.55(p)(1)(ii),
respectively, specify that the suspension of security measures must be
approved by, as a minimum, a licensed senior operator, or a licensed
senior operator with input from the security supervisor or manager.
The exemption request relates solely to the licensing requirements
specified in the regulations for the staff directing suspension of
security measures in
[[Page 75596]]
accordance with Sec. Sec. 73.55(p)(1)(i) and 73.55(p)(1)(ii). Section
73.55(p)(1)(i) requires that ``suspension of security measures must be
approved as a minimum by a licensed senior operator before taking this
action;'' Sec. 73.55(p)(1)(ii) requires that ``suspension of security
measures must be approved, as a minimum, by a licensed senior operator,
with input from the security supervisor or manager, before taking this
action.''
This exemption would remove the requirement for a licensed senior
operator to provide the approval. Instead, the licensee intends that
suspension of security measures to be authorized by a certified fuel
hander (CFH), as defined by Sec. 50.2, ``Definitions.''
III. Discussion
Historically, the Commission's security rules have long recognized
the potential need to suspend security or safeguards measures. In 1986,
in its final rule, ``Miscellaneous Amendments Concerning the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Power Plants'' (51 FR 27817; August 4, 1986), the
Commission promulgated Sec. 73.55(a), stating in part:
In accordance with Sec. 50.54(x) and (y) of Part 50, the
licensee may suspend any safeguards measures pursuant to Sec. 73.55
in an emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect
the public health and safety and no action consistent with license
conditions and technical specification that can provide adequate or
equivalent protection is immediately apparent. This suspension must
be approved as a minimum by a licensed senior operator prior to
taking the action.
Later, in Proposed Rule, ``Decommissioning of Nuclear Power
Plants,'' July 20, 1995; 60 FR 37379, the Commission made a number of
proposed rule changes to address decommissioning. Among the changes
were new regulations that affected Sec. Sec. 50.54(x) and (y) by
allowing a non-licensed operator called a ``Certified Fuel Handler,''
in addition to a licensed senior operator, to authorize protective
steps. Specifically, when proposing the rule addressing the role of the
CFH during emergencies, the Commission stated:
The Commission is proposing to amend 10 CFR 50.54(y) to permit a
certified fuel handler at nuclear power reactors that have
permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the
reactor vessel, subject to the requirements of Sec. 50.82(a) and
consistent with the proposed definition of ``Certified Fuel
Handler'' specified in Sec. 50.2, to make these evaluations and
judgments. A nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased
operations and no longer has fuel in the reactor vessel does not
require a licensed individual to monitor core conditions. A
certified fuel handler at a permanently shutdown and defueled
nuclear power reactor undergoing decommissioning is an individual
who has the requisite knowledge and experience to evaluate plant
conditions and make these judgments.
In the final rule (61 FR 39298; July 29, 1996), the Commission
added the following definition to Sec. 50.2: ``Certified fuel handler
means, for a nuclear power reactor facility, a non-licensed operator
who has qualified in accordance with a fuel handler training program
approved by the Commission.'' However, the Decommissioning Rule did not
propose or make parallel changes to Sec. 73.55(a), and did not discuss
the role of a non-licensed certified fuel handler.
In the final rule, ``Power Reactor Security Requirements'' (74 FR
13926; March 27, 2009), the NRC relocated and split the security
suspension requirements from Sec. 73.55(a) to Sec. Sec.
73.55(p)(1)(i) and (p)(1)(ii). The CFHs were not discussed in the
rulemaking, so the requirements of Sec. 73.55(p) to use a licensed
senior operator remains, even for a site that otherwise no longer has
an operating reactor.
However, pursuant to Sec. 73.5, the Commission may, upon
application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant
exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 73 as it determines are
authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common
defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest.
A. Authorized by Law
The exemption from Sec. Sec. 73.55(p)(1)(i) and 73.55(p)(1)(ii)
would remove the requirement that a licensed senior operator approve
the suspension of security measures, under certain emergency conditions
or severe weather. The licensee intends to align these regulations with
Sec. 50.54(y) by using the authority of a non-licensed CFH in place of
a licensed senior operator to approve the suspension of security
measures during certain emergency conditions or during severe weather.
Per Sec. 73.5, the Commission is allowed to grant exemptions from
the regulations in 10 CFR part 73 as authorized by law. The NRC staff
has determined that granting of the licensee's proposed exemption will
not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
or other laws. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law.
B. Will Not Endanger Life or Property or the Common Defense and
Security
Removing the requirement to have a licensed senior operator approve
suspension of security measures during emergencies or severe weather
will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security
for the reasons described below.
First, Sec. 73.55(p)(2) continues to require that ``[s]uspended
security measures must be reinstated as soon as conditions permit.''
Second, the suspension for non-weather emergency conditions under
Sec. 73.55(p)(1)(i) will continue to be invoked only ``when this
action is immediately needed to protect the public health and safety
and no action consistent with license conditions and technical
specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is
immediately apparent.'' Thus, the underlying purpose of Sec.
73.55(p)(1)(i) will still be to protect public health and safety even
after the exemption is granted.
Third, the suspension for severe weather under Sec.
73.55(p)(1)(ii) will continue to be used only when ``the suspension of
affected security measures is immediately needed to protect the
personal health and safety of security force personnel and no other
immediately apparent action consistent with the license conditions and
technical specifications can provide adequate or equivalent
protection.'' The requirement to receive input from the security
supervisor or manager will remain. The underlying purpose of Sec.
73.55(p)(1)(ii) will continue to be to protect the health and safety of
the security force.
Additionally, by letter dated June 26, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14155A181), the NRC approved DEF's CFH training and retraining
program for the CR3 facility. The NRC staff found that, among other
things, the program addresses the safe conduct of decommissioning
activities, safe handling and storage of spent fuel, and the
appropriate response to plant emergencies. Because the CFH is
sufficiently trained and qualified under an NRC-approved program, the
NRC staff considers a CFH to have sufficient knowledge of operational
and safety concerns such that there will be no adverse effects or undue
risk to the public health and safety as a result of the suspension of
security measures during the emergencies or severe weather.
In addition, the exemption does not reduce the overall
effectiveness of the physical security plan and has no adverse impacts
to DEF's ability to physically secure the site or protect special
nuclear material at CR3, and thus would not have an effect on the
common defense and security. The NRC
[[Page 75597]]
staff has concluded that the exemption would not reduce security
measures currently in place to protect against radiological sabotage.
Therefore, removing the requirement for a licensed senior operator to
approve the suspension of security measures in an emergency or during
severe weather so that suspension of security measures can be
authorized by CFH does not adversely affect public health and safety
issues or the assurance of the common defense and security.
C. Is Otherwise in the Public Interest
The DEF's proposed exemption would remove the requirement that a
licensed senior operator approve suspension of security measures in an
emergency when ``immediately needed to protect the public health and
safety'' or during severe weather when ``immediately needed to protect
the personal health and safety of security force personnel.'' Without
the exemption, the licensee cannot implement changes to its security
plan to authorize a CFH to approve temporary suspension of security
regulations during an emergency or severe weather comparable to the
authority given to the CFH by the Commission when it promulgated Sec.
50.54(y). Instead, the regulations would continue to require that a
licensed senior operator be available to make decisions for a
permanently shutdown plant, even though CR3 no longer requires a
licensed senior operator. It is unclear how the licensee would
implement emergency or severe weather suspensions of security measures
without a licensed senior operator. This exemption is in the public
interest for two reasons. First, without the exemption, there is
uncertainty on how the licensee will invoke temporary suspension of
security matters that may be needed to protect public health and safety
or the safety of the security forces during emergencies and severe
weather. Additionally, the consistent and efficient regulation of
nuclear power plants serves the public interest by assuring consistency
between the security regulations in 10 CFR part 73 and the operating
reactor regulations in 10 CFR part 50, and the requirements concerning
licensed operators in 10 CFR part 55. Accordingly, the NRC staff
concludes that the exemption requirements to obtain approval from a
licensed senior operator, who is not otherwise required for a
permanently shutdown and defueled reactor, before taking steps to
protect the public health and safety, or to protect the safety of the
security force, is in the public interest.
D. Environmental Considerations
The NRC approval of the exemption to security requirements belongs
to a category of actions that the Commission, by rule or regulation,
has declared to be a categorical exclusion, after first finding that
the category of actions does not individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human environment. Specifically, the
exemption is categorically excluded from further analysis under Sec.
51.22(c)(25).
Under Sec. 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that (i) there is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought
involve: safeguard plans, and materials control and accounting
inventory scheduling requirements; or involve other requirements of an
administrative, managerial, or organizational nature.
The Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has determined that approval of the
exemption request involves no significant hazards consideration because
removing the requirement to have a licensed senior operator approve the
security suspension at a defueled shutdown power plant does not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The
exempted security regulation is unrelated to any operational
restriction. Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types
or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; and no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure. The exempted
regulation is not associated with construction, so there is no
significant construction impact. The exempted regulation does not
concern the source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation in an
accident), nor mitigation. Thus, there is no significant increase in
the potential for, or consequences of, a radiological accident. The
requirement to have a licensed senior operator approve departure from
security actions may be viewed as involving either safeguards,
materials control, or managerial matters.
Therefore, pursuant to Sec. Sec. 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to Sec.
73.5, the exemption is authorized by law and will not endanger life or
property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants DEF exemption
from the requirements of Sec. Sec. 73.55(p)(1)(i) and 73.55(p)(1)(ii),
which otherwise would require suspension of security measures during
emergencies and severe weather, respectively, to be approved by a
licensed senior operator. The exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day of December 2014.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michele G. Evans,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2014-29656 Filed 12-17-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P