Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.; Kewaunee Power Station, 65715-65727 [2014-26292]

Download as PDF Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices The comment period for the draft EIS (79 FR 49820; August 22, 2014) has been extended to December 6, 2014. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods: • Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC–2014–0149. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301–287–3422; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. • Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Office of Administration, Mail Stop: 3WFN–06–A44M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001. For additional direction on obtaining information and submitting comments, see ‘‘Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments’’ in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Allen Fetter, Office of New Reactors, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001, telephone: 301–415–8556, email: Allen.Fetter@ nrc.gov. DATES: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES A. Obtaining Information Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2014– 0149, when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may obtain publicly-available information related to this action by the following methods: • Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for NRC Docket ID NRC–2014–0149. • NRC’S Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc. gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301– 415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@ nrc.gov. The draft EIS and an accompanying reader’s guide are available in ADAMS under Accession No. ML14219A304. • NRC’s PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:42 Nov 04, 2014 Jkt 235001 White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. • Project Web site: The draft EIS can be accessed online at the PSEG ESP specific Web page at https://www.nrc. gov/reactors/new-reactors/esp/ pseg.html. • Salem Free Public Library: The draft EIS is available for public inspection at 112 West Broadway, Salem, New Jersey, 08079. B. Submitting Comments Please include Docket ID NRC–2014– 0149 in the subject line of your comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make your comment submission available to the public in this docket. The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact information in comment submissions that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at https://www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment submissions into ADAMS, and the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove identifying or contact information. If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove such information before making the comment submissions available to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS. II. Discussion The application submitted by PSEG Power, LLC, and PSEG Nuclear, LLC (PSEG), for an ESP was submitted by letter dated May 25, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101480484), pursuant to Part 52 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. A notice of receipt and availability of the application, which included the environmental report, was published in the Federal Register on June 18, 2010 (75 FR 34794). A notice of acceptance for docketing of the ESP application was published in the Federal Register on August 13, 2010 (75 FR 49539). A notice of intent to prepare a draft environmental impact statement (EIS) and to conduct the scoping process was published in the Federal Register on October 15, 2010 (75 FR 63521). On August 22, 2014, the NRC and USACE published for public comment the draft EIS in the Federal PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 65715 Register (79 FR 49820). The purpose of this solicitation was to obtain public comments on the draft EIS for NRC staff to consider in preparing the final EIS. The public comment period was to have ended on November 6, 2014. Extensions to the 75-day comment period may be provided at the discretion of the NRC staff if special circumstances are present. The NRC staff has determined that special circumstances exist that support extending this comment period. Those special circumstances include the recent identification of some individuals and organizations with special knowledge and expertise in the area of environmental justice that had not been aware of the original notice and other outreach efforts. In order to gain additional information on any minority or low-income populations that might be disproportionately affected, the NRC has determined that it is prudent, in this instance, to extend the public comment period on this document until December 6, 2014, to allow more time for members of the public to submit their comments. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of October, 2014. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Frank Akstulewicz, Director, Division of New Reactor Licensing, Office of New Reactors. [FR Doc. 2014–26301 Filed 11–4–14; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. 50–305; NRC–2014–0219] Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.; Kewaunee Power Station Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Exemption; issuance. AGENCY: Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) is a decommissioning nuclear power reactor that permanently shut down on May 7, 2013, and permanently defueled on May 14, 2013. In response to a request from Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK or the licensee), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is granting exemptions from certain emergency planning (EP) requirements. The exemptions will eliminate the requirements to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and reduce the scope of the onsite emergency planning activities at the Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) based on the reduced risks of accidents that could result in an offsite radiological SUMMARY: E:\FR\FM\05NON1.SGM 05NON1 65716 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices release when compared to operating power reactors. The exemptions will continue to maintain requirements for onsite radiological emergency planning and include provisions for capabilities to communicate and coordinate with offsite response authorities. The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness at KPS given its permanently shutdown and defueled status, and that there is reasonable assurance that adequate offsite protective measures can and will be taken by State and local government agencies, if needed, in the event of a radiological emergency at the KPS facility. Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2014–0219 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may obtain publicly-available information related to this document using any of the following methods: • Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC–2014–0219. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301–287–3422; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. • NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC Library at https://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS Accession number for each document referenced in this document (if that document is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is referenced. • NRC’s PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES ADDRESSES: FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Huffman, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415– 2046; email: William.Huffman@nrc.gov. VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:42 Nov 04, 2014 Jkt 235001 I. Background The KPS facility is a decommissioning power reactor located on approximately 900 acres in Carlton (Kewaunee County), Wisconsin, 27 miles southeast of Green Bay, Wisconsin. The licensee, DEK, is the holder of KPS Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR–43. The license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in effect. By letter dated February 25, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13058A065), DEK submitted a certification to the NRC indicating it would permanently cease power operations at KPS on May 7, 2013. On May 7, 2013, DEK permanently shut down the KPS reactor. On May 14, 2013, DEK certified that it had permanently defueled the KPS reactor vessel (ADAMS Accession No. ML13135A209). As a permanently shutdown and defueled facility, and in accordance with § 50.82(a)(2) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), KPS is no longer authorized to operate the reactor or emplace nuclear fuel into the reactor vessel. Kewaunee Power Station is still authorized to possess and store irradiated nuclear fuel. Irradiated fuel is currently being stored onsite in a spent fuel pool (SFP) and in Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) dry casks. During normal power reactor operations, the forced flow of water through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes heat generated by the reactor. The RCS, operating at high temperatures and pressures, transfers this heat through the steam generator tubes converting non-radioactive feedwater to steam, which then flows to the main turbine generator to produce electricity. Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety analysis reports (USARs) for operating power reactors involve failures or malfunctions of systems which could affect the fuel in the reactor core, which in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at KPS and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such accidents are no longer possible. The reactor, RCS, and supporting systems are no longer in operation and have no function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable. PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 Since KPS is permanently shutdown and defueled, the only design basis accident that could potentially result in an offsite radiological release at KPS is the fuel handling accident. Analysis performed by DEK showed that 90 days after KPS permanently shutdown, the radiological consequence of the fuel handling accident would not exceed the limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary. Based on the time that KPS has been permanently shutdown (approximately 17 months), there is no longer any possibility of an offsite radiological release from a design basis-accident that could exceed the EPA PAGs. The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ‘‘Emergency plans,’’ and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, ‘‘Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities,’’ continue to apply to nuclear power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that is permanently shutdown and defueled from a reactor that is authorized to operate. In order for DEK to modify the KPS emergency plan to reflect the reduced risk associated with the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of KPS, certain exemptions from the EP regulations must be obtained before the KPS emergency plan can be amended. II. Request/Action By letter dated July 31, 2013, ‘‘Request for Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E’’ (ADAMS Accession No. ML13221A182), DEK requested exemptions from certain EP requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 for KPS. More specifically, DEK requested exemptions from certain planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and offsite radiological emergency plans for nuclear power reactors; from certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that require establishment of plume exposure and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power reactors; and from certain requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, which establishes the elements that make up the content of emergency plans. In a letter dated December 11, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13351A040), DEK provided responses to the NRC staff’s request for additional information (RAI) concerning the proposed exemptions. In a letter dated January 10, 2014, DEK E:\FR\FM\05NON1.SGM 05NON1 mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices provided a supplemental response to the RAI (ADAMS Accession No. ML14016A078), which contained information applicable to the SFP inventory makeup strategies for mitigating the potential loss of water inventory due to a beyond design-basis accident. The information provided by DEK included justifications for each exemption requested. The exemptions requested by DEK will eliminate the requirements to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans, reviewed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the requirements of 44 CFR Part 350, and reduce the scope of onsite emergency planning activities. DEK stated that application of all of the standards and requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E is not needed for adequate emergency response capability based on the reduced risks at the permanently shutdown and defueled facility. If offsite protective actions where needed for a very unlikely accident that could challenge the safe storage of spent fuel at KPS, provisions exist for offsite agencies to take protective actions using a comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) under the National Preparedness System to protect the health and safety of the public. A CEMP in this context, also referred to as an emergency operations plan (EOP), is addressed in FEMA Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, ‘‘Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans.’’ Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local emergency planning in the United States. It promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and decision making and helps planners at all levels of government in their efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-hazards, allthreats emergency plans. An EOP is flexible enough for use in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be coordinated. A comprehensive emergency management plan is often referred to as a synonym for ‘‘all hazards planning.’’ III. Discussion In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ‘‘Specific exemptions,’’ the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:42 Nov 04, 2014 Jkt 235001 CFR Part 50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. As noted previously, the current EP regulations contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 apply to both operating and shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and removed fuel from the reactor vessel is significantly lower, and the types of possible accidents are significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor. However, EP regulations are silent with regard to the fact that once a power reactor permanently ceases operation, the consequences of credible emergency accident scenarios are reduced. The reduced risks generally relate to a decrease in the potential for any significant offsite radiological release based on the preclusion of accidents applicable to an operating power reactor and on the reduced decay heat, and the decay of short-lived radionuclides as spent fuel ages. NUREG–1738, ‘‘Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,’’ dated February 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors bounded by the assumptions and conditions in the report, the risk of offsite radiological release is significantly less than for an operating power reactor. Similar to the EP exemptions requested by DEK, prior EP exemptions granted to permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors did not relieve the licensees of all EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled status. Specifically, precedent for the approval of the exemptions from certain EP requirements for previous permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors were based on demonstrating that: (1) The radiological consequences of design-basis accidents would not exceed the limits of the EPA PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 65717 PAGs at the exclusion area boundary, and; (2) in the unlikely event of a beyond design-basis accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat transfer from the fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite authorities to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and safety of the public. With respect to design-basis accidents at KPS, the licensee provided analysis demonstrating that 90 days after KPS was permanently shutdown, the radiological consequences of the only remaining design-basis accident with potential for offsite radiological release (the fuel handling accident) will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, because KPS has been permanently shutdown for approximately 17 months, there is no longer any design-basis accident that would warrant an offsite radiological emergency plan meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. With respect to beyond design-basis accidents at KPS, the licensee analyzed the two bounding beyond design-basis accidents that have a potential for a significant offsite release. One of these beyond design-basis accidents involves a complete loss of SFP water inventory, where cooling of the spent fuel would be primarily accomplished by natural circulation of air through the uncovered spent fuel assemblies. The licensee’s analysis of this accident shows that by October 30, 2014, air cooling of the spent fuel assemblies will be sufficient to keep the fuel within a safe temperature range indefinitely without fuel damage or offsite radiological release. The other beyond design-basis accident analysis performed by the licensee could not completely rule out the possibility of a radiological release from a SFP. This more limiting analysis assumes an incomplete drain down of the SFP water, or some other catastrophic event (such as a complete drainage of the SFP with rearrangement of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the addition of rubble to the SFP), that would effectively impede any decay heat removal through all possible modes of cooling. The licensee’s analysis demonstrates that as of October 21, 2014, there would be at least 10 hours after the loss of all cooling means considered in the analysis for the described beyond design-basis accident, before the spent fuel cladding would reach a temperature where the potential for a significant offsite radiological release could occur. This analysis conservatively does not consider the period of time from the initiating event E:\FR\FM\05NON1.SGM 05NON1 mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 65718 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all cooling means are lost. The NRC staff has verified DEK’s analyses and its calculations. The analyses provide reasonable assurance that in granting the requested exemption to DEK, there is no design-basis accident that will result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the site boundary. In the unlikely event of a beyond design-basis accident affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via all modes of heat transfer, there will be at least 10 hours available before an offsite release might occur and, therefore, at least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were projected to occur under this unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and safety of the public. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee’s justification for the requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a), in addition to considering the basis for prior EP exemption requests as discussed above, to determine whether the exemptions should be granted. After evaluating the exemption requests, the staff determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR50.12(a) are met, and that the exemptions should be granted. Assessment of the DEK EP exemptions is described in SECY–14–0066, ‘‘Request by Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements,’’ dated June 27, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14072A257). The Commission approved the NRC staff’s intention to grant the exemptions in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) to SECY–14–0066, dated August 7, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14219A366). Descriptions of the specific exemptions being granted to DEK, with the NRC staff’s basis for granting each exemption, are provided in SECY–14–0066 and summarized in a table at the end of this document. The staff’s detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the specific EP exemptions being granted to DEK are provided in the NRC staff’s safety evaluation enclosed in NRC letter dated October 27, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14261A223). A. Authorized by Law The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:42 Nov 04, 2014 Jkt 235001 Appendix E, Section IV, that would allow DEK to revise the KPS Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the station. As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee’s proposed exemptions will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the Commission’s regulations. Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by law. B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety As stated previously, DEK provided analyses that show the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, offsite radiological emergency plans required under 10 CFR Part 50 are no longer needed for protection of the public beyond the exclusion area boundary based on the radiological consequences of designbasis accidents still possible at KPS. Although very unlikely, there are postulated beyond design-basis accidents that might result in significant offsite radiological releases. However, NUREG–1738 confirms that the risk of beyond design-basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled reactors. The staff’s analyses in NUREG–1738 concludes that the event sequences important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative to operating power reactors where typically a large number of different sequences make significant contributions to risk. Per NUREG–1738, relaxation of offsite EP requirements under 10 CFR Part 50 a few months after shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk. The report further concludes that the change in risk due to relaxation of offsite EP requirements is small because the overall risk is low, and because even under current EP requirements for operating power reactors, EP was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness in the severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. All other sequences including cask drops (for which offsite radiological emergency plans are expected to be more effective) are too low in likelihood to have a significant impact on risk. Therefore, granting exemptions eliminating the requirements of 10 CFR PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and reducing the scope of onsite emergency planning activities will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety. C. Consistent With the Common Defense and Security The requested exemptions by DEK only involve EP requirements under 10 CFR Part 50 and will allow DEK to revise the KPS Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the facility. Physical security measures at KPS are not affected by the requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of offsite radiological emergency plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite emergency planning activities at KPS will not adversely affect DEK’s ability to physically secure the site or protect special nuclear material. Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent with the common defense and security. D. Special Circumstances Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, is to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants, and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite radiological emergency plans. The standards and requirements in these regulations were developed by considering the risks associated with operation of a power reactor at its licensed full-power level. These risks include the potential for a reactor accident with offsite radiological dose consequences. As discussed previously, because KPS is permanently shutdown and defueled, there is no longer a risk of offsite radiological release from a design-basis accident and the risk of a significant offsite radiological release from a beyond design-basis accident is greatly reduced when compared to an operating power reactor. The NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks at KPS by comparing the generic risk assumptions in the analyses in NUREG–1738 to site specific conditions at KPS and determined that the risk values in NUREG–1738 bound the risks presented by KPS. Furthermore, the staff has E:\FR\FM\05NON1.SGM 05NON1 mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices recently concluded in NUREG–2161, ‘‘Consequence Study of a BeyondDesign-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor,’’ dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365), that, consistent with earlier research studies, SFPs are robust structures that are likely to withstand severe earthquakes without leaking cooling water and potentially uncovering the spent fuel. The NUREG– 2161 study shows the likelihood of a radiological release from the spent fuel after the analyzed severe earthquake at the reference plant to be about one time in 10 million years or lower. The licensee has analyzed sitespecific beyond design-basis accidents to determine the risk of a significant offsite radiological release. In one such analysis, DEK determined that if all the normal cooling systems used to cool the SFP were lost and not restored for the duration of the postulated accident, then as of September 20, 2014, the SFP at the KPS would take 120 hours before it would begin to boil and, due to the loss of SFP water level from the resulting boil off, it would take 26 days for the water inventory to lower to a level of three feet from the top of the fuel. Additionally, DEK analysis shows that as of October 30, 2014, in the event of a complete SFP drain down due to a loss of water inventory, assuming natural circulation of air through the spent fuel racks was available, then the peak fuel clad temperature would remain below 1049 °F (565 °C), the temperature at which incipient cladding failure may occur. Therefore, in this postulated accident, fuel cladding remains intact and an offsite radiological release would not take place. The only beyond design-basis accident analysis that reached a condition where a significant offsite release might occur involved a scenario where the SFP drained in such a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be unavailable. This results in an adiabatic heat-up of the spent fuel. DEK analysis of this beyond design-basis accident shows that as of October 21, 2014, a minimum of 10 hours would be available between the time the fuel is uncovered (at which time adiabatic heat-up begins), until the fuel cladding reaches a temperature of 1652 °F (900 °C), the temperature associated with rapid cladding oxidation and the potential for a significant radiological release. VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:42 Nov 04, 2014 Jkt 235001 Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR 50 have previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly reaches the zirconium rapid oxidation temperature. The staff concluded in its previously granted exemptions, as it does with the DEK requested EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, or if needed, for offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP approach, then offsite radiological emergency plans, required under 10 CFR Part 50, are not necessary at permanently shutdown and defueled power reactor licensees. Additionally, DEK committed to enhanced SFP makeup strategies in its letter to the NRC dated August 23, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13242A019). The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include: Using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; supplying water through hoses to a spool piece connection to the existing SFP piping; or using a dieseldriven portable pump to take suction from Lake Michigan and provide makeup or spray to the SFP. These strategies will continue to be required as a license condition. DEK further provides that the equipment needed to perform these actions will continue to be located onsite, and that the external makeup strategy (using a diesel driven portable pump) is capable of being deployed within 2 hours. Considering the very low probability of beyond design-basis accidents affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide defensein-depth and time to provide makeup or spray to the SFP before the onset of any postulated offsite radiological release. For all the reasons stated above, the staff finds that the licensee’s requested exemptions to meet the underlying purpose of all of the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), and requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) and Appendix E, acceptably satisfy the special circumstances in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the greatly reduced risk of offsite radiological consequences associated with the permanently shutdown and defueled state of the KPS facility. PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 65719 The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness at KPS and, if needed, that there is reasonable assurance that adequate offsite protective measures can and will be taken by State and local government agencies using a CEMP approach in the event of a radiological emergency at the KPS facility. Since the underlying purposes of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even with the elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR Part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and reduction in the scope of the onsite emergency planning activities at KPS, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist. E. Environmental Considerations In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment as discussed in the NRC staff’s Finding of No Significant Impact and associated Environmental Assessment published October 7, 2014 (79 FR 60513). V. Conclusions Accordingly, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), that DEK’s request for exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, and as summarized in the table at the end of this document, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants DEK exemptions from certain EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the staff’s safety evaluation dated October 27, 2014. The exemptions are effective as of October 30, 2014. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of October, 2014. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Michele G. Evans, Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. E:\FR\FM\05NON1.SGM 05NON1 65720 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices IV—TABLE OF EXEMPTIONS GRANTED TO DEK NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR 50.47(b) ....................................................................................... The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require offsite emergency response plans. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 10 CFR 50.47 In the Statement of Considerations (SOC) for the final rule for emergency planning (EP) requirements for independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) and for monitor retrievable storage installations (MRS) (60 Federal Register (FR) 32430; June 22, 1995), the Commission responded to comments concerning offsite EP for ISFSIs or an MRS and concluded that, ‘‘the offsite consequences of potential accidents at an ISFSI or a MRS would not warrant establishing Emergency Planning Zones [EPZ].’’ In a nuclear power reactor’s permanently defueled state, the accident risks are more similar to an ISFSI or MRS than an operating nuclear power plant. The EP program would be similar to that required for an ISFSI under Section 72.32(a) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) when fuel stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP) has more than 5 years of decay time and would not change substantially when all the fuel is transferred from the SFP to an onsite ISFSI. Exemptions from offsite EP requirements have previously been approved when the site-specific analyses show that at least 10 hours is available from a partial drain-down event where cooling of the spent fuel is not effective until the hottest fuel assembly reaches 900 °C. The technical basis that underlied the approval of the exemption request is based partly on the analysis of a time period that spent fuel stored in the SFP is unlikely to reach the zirconium ignition temperature in less than 10 hours. This time period is based on a heat-up calculation which uses several simplifying assumptions. Some of these assumptions are conservative (adiabatic conditions), while others are non-conservative (no oxidation below 900 °C). Weighing the conservatisms and non-conservatisms, the NRC staff judges that this calculation reasonably represents conditions which may occur in the event of an SFP accident. The staff concluded that if 10 hours were available to initiate mitigative actions, or if needed, offsite protective actions using a comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP), formal offsite radiological emergency plans are not necessary for these permanently defueled nuclear power reactor licensees. As supported by the licensee’s SFP analysis, the NRC staff believes an exemption to the requirements for formal offsite radiological emergency plans is justified for a zirconium fire scenario considering the low likelihood of this event together with time available to take mitigative or protective actions between the initiating event and before the onset of a postulated fire. The Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK) analysis has demonstrated that 90 days after shutdown, the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary. These analyses also show that after the spent fuel has decayed for 17 months, for beyond-design-basis events where the SFP is drained, air cooling will prevent the fuel from reaching the lowest temperature where incipient cladding failure may occur (565 °C). In the event that air cooling is not possible, 10 hours is available to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite protective actions using a CEMP from the time the fuel is uncovered until it reaches the auto-ignition temperature of 900 °C. DEK has also furnished information on its SFP inventory makeup strategies for mitigating the loss of water inventory. The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SPF include: using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; supplying water via hoses to a spool piece connection to the existing SFP piping; or using a diesel-driven portable pump to take suction from Lake Michigan and provide makeup or spray to the SFP. DEK also stated that the tools and equipment needed to perform these actions are located on site and that the external makeup strategy (using a diesel driven portable pump) was able to be deployed within 2 hours. DEK believes these diverse strategies provide defense-in-depth and ample time to provide makeup or spray to the SFP prior to the onset of zirconium cladding ignition when considering very low probability of beyond design-basis events affecting the SFP. Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1) .................................................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the need for Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs). VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:42 Nov 04, 2014 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\05NON1.SGM 05NON1 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 65721 IV—TABLE OF EXEMPTIONS GRANTED TO DEK—Continued 10 CFR 50.47 NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) .................................................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the need for an Emergency Operations Facility. Decommissioning power reactors present a low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in a radiological release together with the time available to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite protective actions using a CEMP between the initiating event and before the onset of a postulated fire. As such, an emergency operations facility would not be required. The ‘‘nuclear island,’’ control room, or other onsite location can provide for the communication and coordination with offsite organizations for the level of support required. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Decommissioning power reactors present a low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in a radiological release together with the time available to take mitigative or if needed, offsite protective actions using a CEMP between the initiating event and before the onset of a postulated fire. As such, formal offsite radiological emergency response plans are not required. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 99–01, ‘‘Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors’’ (Revision 6), was found to be an acceptable method for development of emergency action levels (EALs) and was endorsed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in a letter dated March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12346A463). NEI 99–01 provides EALs for non-passive operating nuclear power reactors, permanently defueled reactors, and ISFSIs. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) .................................................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require reference to formal offsite radiological emergency response plans. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) .................................................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require early notification of the public and a means to provide instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6) .................................................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require prompt communications with the public. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) .................................................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require information to be made available to the public on a periodic basis about how they will be notified and what their initial protective actions should be. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) .................................................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the capability for monitoring offsite consequences. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) ................................................................................ The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would reduce the range of protective actions developed for emergency workers and the public. Consideration of evacuation, sheltering, or the use of potassium iodide will no longer be necessary. Evacuation times will no longer need to developed or updated. Protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ will not need to be developed. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) .................................................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the establishment of a 10 mile radius plume exposure pathway EPZ and a 50 mile radius ingestion pathway EPZ. VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:42 Nov 04, 2014 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 4703 Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). In the unlikely event of an SFP accident, the iodine isotopes, which contribute to an off-site dose from an operating reactor accident, are not present, so potassium iodide distribution would no longer serve as an effective or necessary supplemental protective action. The Commission responded to comments in its SOC for the final rule for emergency planning requirements for ISFSIs and MRS facilities (60 FR 32435), and concluded that, ‘‘the offsite consequences of potential accidents at an ISFSI or an MRS would not warrant establishing Emergency Planning Zones.’’ Additionally, in the SOC for the final rule for EP requirements for ISFSIs and for MRS facilities (60 FR 32430), the Commission responded to comments concerning site-specific EP that includes evacuation of surrounding population for an ISFSI not at a reactor site, and concluded that, ‘‘The Commission does not agree that as a general matter emergency plans for an ISFSI must include evacuation planning.’’ Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\05NON1.SGM 05NON1 65722 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 1 ..................................................... The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require onsite protective actions during hostile action. The EP Rule published in the Federal Register (76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011) amended certain requirements in 10 CFR Part 50. Among the changes, the definition of ‘‘hostile action’’ was added as an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel. This definition is based on the definition of ‘‘hostile action’’ provided in NRC Bulletin 2005–02, ‘‘Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events.’’ NRC Bulletin 2005–02 was not applicable to nuclear power reactors that have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been removed from the reactor vessel. The NRC excluded non-power reactors from the scope of ‘‘hostile action’’ at the time of the rulemaking because, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a non-power reactor is not considered a nuclear power reactor and a regulatory basis had not been developed to support the inclusion of non-power reactors within the scope of ‘‘hostile action.’’ Similarly, a decommissioning power reactor or an ISFSI is not a ‘‘nuclear reactor’’ as defined in 10 CFR Part 50. A decommissioning power reactor also has a low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. For all of these reasons, the staff concludes that a decommissioning power reactor is not a facility that falls within the scope of ‘‘hostile action.’’ Similarly, for security, risk insights can be used to determine which targets are important to protect against sabotage. A level of security commensurate with the consequences of a sabotage event is required and is evaluated on a site-specific basis. The severity of the consequences declines as fuel ages and, thereby, removes over time the underlying concern that a sabotage attack could cause offsite radiological consequences. Although, this analysis provides a justification for exempting KPS from ‘‘hostile action’’ related requirements, some EP requirements for security-based events are maintained. The classification of securitybased events, notification of offsite authorities and coordination with offsite agencies under a CEMP concept are still required. Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 2 ..................................................... The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language concerning the evacuation time analyses within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for the licensee’s initial application 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 3 ..................................................... The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require use of NRC-approved evacuation time estimates (ETEs) and updates to State and local governments when developing protective action strategies. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 4 ..................................................... The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require licensees to develop evacuation time estimates based on the most recent census data and submit the ETE analysis to the NRC prior to providing it to State and local government for developing protective action strategies. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 5 ..................................................... The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require licensees to estimate the EPZ permanent resident population changes once a year between decennial censuses. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 6 ..................................................... The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to submit an updated ETE analysis to the NRC based on changes in the resident population that result in exceeding specific evacuation time increase criteria. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.1 .................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from the word ‘‘operating’’ in the requirement to describe the normal plant organization. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.3 .................................................. The NRC is granting exemption to the requirement to describe the licensee’s headquarters personnel sent to the site to augment the onsite emergency response organization. VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:42 Nov 04, 2014 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 4703 Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. Based on the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the reactor, a decommissioning reactor is not authorized to operate under 10 CFR 50.82(a). Because the licensee cannot operate the reactors, the licensee does not have a ‘‘plant operating organization.’’ The number of staff at decommissioning sites is generally small but is commensurate with the need to safely store spent fuel at the facility in a manner that is protective of public health and safety. Decommissioning sites typically have a level of emergency response that does not require response by the licensee’s headquarters personnel. Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\05NON1.SGM 05NON1 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 65723 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A. 4 ................................................ The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to identify a position and function within its organization which will carry the responsibility for making offsite dose projections. Although, the likelihood of events that would result in doses in excess of the EPA PAGs to the public beyond the owner controlled area boundary based on the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the reactor is extremely low, the licensee still must be able to determine if a radiological release is occurring. If a release is occurring, then the licensee staff should promptly communicate that information to offsite authorities for their consideration. The offsite organizations are responsible for deciding what, if any, protective actions should be taken based on comprehensive emergency planning. The number of staff at decommissioning sites is generally small but should be commensurate with the need to operate the facility in a manner that is protective of public health and safety. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A. 5 ................................................ The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement for the licensee to identify individuals with special qualifications for coping with emergencies. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.7 .................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require a description of the assistance expected from State, local, and Federal agencies for coping with a hostile action. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.8 .................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement to identify the State and local officials for ordering protective actions and evacuations. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.9 .................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement for the licensee to provide an analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel are not assigned responsibilities that would prevent them from performing their assigned emergency plan functions. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV B.1 .................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require offsite emergency actions levels and offsite protective measures and associate offsite monitoring for the emergency conditions. In addition, the NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require emergency action levels based on hostile action. VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:42 Nov 04, 2014 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 4703 Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1. Offsite emergency measures are limited to support provided by local police, fire departments, and ambulance and hospital services, as appropriate. Due to the low probability of design basis accidents or other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs, protective actions such as evacuation should not be required, but could be implemented at the discretion of offsite authorities using a CEMP. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). Responsibilities should be well defined in the emergency plan and procedures, regularly tested through drills and exercises audited and inspected by the licensee and the NRC. The duties of the onshift personnel at a decommissioning reactor facility are not as complicated and diverse as those for an operating power reactor. The NRC staff considered the similarity between the staffing levels at a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor and staffing levels at an operating power reactor site. The minimal systems and equipment needed to maintain the spent nuclear fuel in the SFP or in a dry cask storage system in a safe condition requires minimal personnel and is governed by Technical Specifications. In the EP final rule published in the Federal Register (76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011), the NRC concluded that the staffing analysis requirement was not necessary for non-power reactor licensees due to the small staffing levels required to operate the facility. The NRC staff also examined the actions required to mitigate the very low probability beyond design-basis events for the SFP. Additionally, DEK also furnished information on its SFP inventory makeup strategies for mitigating the loss of water inventory. The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include: using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; supplying water via hoses to a spool piece connection to the existing SFP piping; or using a diesel-driven portable pump to take suction from Lake Michigan and provide makeup or spray to the SFP. DEK further provided that the tools and equipment needed to perform these actions are located on site and the external makeup strategy (using a diesel driven portable pump) was demonstrated to be capable of being deployed within 2 hours, significantly less time than the 10 hours that would be available for ad hoc response. DEK believes, and the NRC staff agrees, that these diverse strategies provide defense-in-depth and ample time to provide makeup or spray to the SFP prior to the onset of zirconium cladding ignition when considering very low probability beyond design-basis events affecting the SFP. NEI 99–01, ‘‘Development of Emergency Action levels for Non-Passive Reactors’’ (Revision 6), was found to be an acceptable method for development of EALs and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12346A463). No offsite protective actions are anticipated to be necessary, so classification above the alert level is no longer required, which is consistent with ISFSI facilities. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1. Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\05NON1.SGM 05NON1 65724 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV C.1 ................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require emergency actions levels based on operating reactor concerns, such as offsite radiation monitoring, pressure in containment, and the response of the emergency core cooling system. In addition, the NRC is striking language that would otherwise require offsite emergency action levels of a site area emergency and a general emergency. Containment parameters do not provide an indication of the conditions at a defueled facility and emergency core cooling systems are no longer required. Other indications, such as SFP level or temperature, can be used at sites where there is spent fuel in the SFPs. In the SOC for the final rule for EP requirements for ISFSIs and MRS) facilities (60 FR 32430), the Commission responded to comments concerning a general emergency at an ISFSI and an MRS, and concluded that, ‘‘. . . an essential element of a General Emergency is that a release can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines exposure levels off site for more than the immediate site area.’’ The probability of a condition reaching the level above an emergency classification of alert is very low. In the event of an accident at a defueled facility that meets the conditions for relaxation of EP requirements, there will be available time for event mitigation and, if necessary, implementation of offsite protective actions using a CEMP. NEI 99–01, ‘‘Development of Emergency Action levels for Non-Passive Reactors,’’ (Revision 6) was found to be an acceptable method for development of EALs and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12346A463). No offsite protective actions are anticipated to be necessary, so classification above the alert level is no longer required. In the EP rule published in the Federal Register (76 FR 72560), nonpower reactor licensees were not required to assess, classify and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes. An SFP and an ISFSI are also not nuclear power reactors as defined in the NRC’s regulations. A decommissioning power reactor has a low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. For these reasons, the NRC staff concludes that a decommissioning power reactor should not be required to assess, classify and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes. Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV C.2 ................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.1 ................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to reach agreement with local, State, and Federal officials and agencies for prompt notification of protective measures or evacuations and the associated titles of officials to be notified for each agency within the EPZs. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.2 ................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement for the licensee to annually disseminate general information on emergency planning and evacuations within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The need for signage or other measure to address transient populations is also being struck. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.3 ................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to have the capability to make notifications to State and local government agencies within 15 minutes of declaring an emergency. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.1. While the capability needs to exist for the notification of offsite government agencies within a specified time period, previous exemptions have allowed for extending the State and local government agencies’ notification time up to 60 minutes based on the site-specific justification provided. DEK’s exemption request provides that the KPS will make notifications to the State of Wisconsin, to the local county (Kewaunee) and the NRC within 60 minutes of declaration of an event. In the permanently defueled condition of the reactor, the rapidly developing scenarios associated with events initiated during reactor power operation are no longer credible. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3 regarding the alert and notification system requirements. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.4 ................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement for the licensee to obtain FEMA approval of its backup alert and notification capability. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.8.a.(i) .......................................... Due to the low probability of design-basis accidents or other credible The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that events to exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the available would otherwise require the licensee to have an onsite technical suptime for event mitigation at a decommissioning reactor and, if needport center and emergency operations facility.. ed, to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP, an emergency operations facility (EOF) would not be required to support offsite agency response. Onsite actions may be directed from the control room or other location, without the requirements imposed on a technical support center (TSC). VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:42 Nov 04, 2014 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\05NON1.SGM 05NON1 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 65725 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.8.a.(ii) .......................................... The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to have an onsite operational support center. NUREG–0696, ‘‘Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities,’’ provides that the operational support center (OSC) is an onsite area separate from the control room and the TSC where licensee operations support personnel will assemble in an emergency. For a decommissioning power reactor, an OSC is no longer required to meet its original purpose of an assembly area for plant logistical support during an emergency. The OSC function can be incorporated into another facility. Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.8.b. and subpart Sections IV E.8.b.(1)–E.8.b.(5). The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements related to an offsite emergency operations facility location, space and size, communications capability, access to plant data and radiological information, and access to coping and office supplies. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.8.c. and Sections IV E.8.c.(1)– E.8.c.(3). The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements to have an emergency operations facility with the capabilities to obtain and display plant data and radiological information; the capability to analyze technical information and provide briefings; and the capability to support events occurring at more than one site (if the emergency operations center supports more than one site). 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.8.d ............................................... The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements to have an alternate facility that would be accessible even if the site is under threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging area for augmentation of emergency response staff. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.8.e ............................................... The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement regarding the need for the licensee to comply with paragraph 8.b of this section 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.9.a ............................................... The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to have communications with State and local governments that are within the plume exposure pathway EPZ (which is no longer required by the exemption granted to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)) but are not contiguous with or bordering on the licensee site boundary. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.9.c ............................................... The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements for communication and testing provisions between the control room, the onsite technical support center, State/local emergency operations facilities, and field assessment teams. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.9.d ............................................... The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require provisions for communications from the control room, onsite technical support center, and emergency operations facility with NRC Headquarters and appropriate Regional Operations Center. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.1 and Section IV F.1. v.iii ........... The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to provide training and drills for the licensee’s headquarters personnel, Civil Defense personnel, or local news media. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2 .................................................. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require testing of a public alert and notification system. VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:42 Nov 04, 2014 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 4703 Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1 regarding hostile action. Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). Communications with State and local governments that are not contiguous with or bordering the site boundary will no longer be required. However, the contiguous State and the local governments in which the nuclear facility is located will still need to be informed of events and emergencies, so lines of communication must be maintained. Because of the low probability of design-basis accidents or other credible events that would be expected to exceed the EPA PAGs and the available time for event mitigation and, if needed, implementation of offsite protective actions using a CEMP, there is no need for the TSC, EOF, or offsite field assessment teams. Also refer to justification for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). Communication with State and local emergency operation centers is maintained to coordinate assistance on site if required. The functions of the control room, EOF, TSC, and OSC may be combined into one or more locations due to the smaller facility staff and the greatly reduced required interaction with State and local emergency response facilities. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Decommissioning power reactor sites typically have a level of emergency response that does not require additional response by the licensee’s headquarters personnel, Civil Defense personnel, or local news media. Therefore, the NRC staff considers it reasonable to exempt the licensee from training and drill requirements for these personnel. Because of the low probability of design basis accidents or other credible events that would be expected to exceed the limits of EPA PAGs and the available time for event mitigation and offsite protective actions from a CEMP, the public alert and notification system will not be used and, therefore, requires no testing. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\05NON1.SGM 05NON1 65726 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.a. and Section IV F.2.a.(i) through IV F.2.a.(iii). The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements for full participation exercises and the submittal of the associated exercise scenarios to the NRC. Due to the low probability of design basis accidents or other credible events that would be expected to exceed the limits of EPA PAGs, the available time for event mitigation and, if necessary, implementation of offsite protective actions using a CEMP, no formal offsite radiological emergency plans are required. The intent of submitting exercise scenarios at an operating power reactor site is to ensure that licensees utilize different scenarios in order to prevent the preconditioning of responders at power reactors. For decommissioning power reactor sites, there are limited events that could occur, and as such, the previously routine progression to general emergency in an operating power reactor site scenario is not applicable. The licensee would be exempt from 10 CFR. Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a.(i)–(iii) because the licensee would be exempt from the umbrella provision of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. The low probability of design basis accidents or other credible events that would exceed the EPA PAGs, the available time for event mitigation and, if necessary, implementation of offsite protective actions using a CEMP, render a TSC, OSC and EOF unnecessary. The principal functions required by regulation can be performed at an onsite location that does not meet the requirements of the TSC, OSC or EOF. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.b ............................................... The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to submit scenarios for its biennial exercises of its onsite emergency plan. In addition, the NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that requires assessment of offsite releases, protective action decision making, and reference to the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.c. and Sections IV F.2.c.(1) through F.2.c.(5). The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements regarding the need for the licensee to exercise offsite plans biennially with full participation by each offsite authority having a role under the radiological response plan. The NRC is also granting exemptions from the conditions for conducting these exercises (including hostile action exercises) if two different licensees have facilities on the same site or on adjacent, contiguous sites, or share most of the elements defining co-located licensees. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.d ............................................... The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements to obtain State participation in an ingestion pathway exercise and a hostile action exercise, with each State that has responsibilities, at least once per exercise cycle. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.e ............................................... The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to allow participation exercise in licensee drills by any State and local Government in the plume exposure pathway EPZ when requested. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.f ................................................ The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require FEMA to consult with the NRC on remedial exercises. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that discuss the extent of State and local participation in remedial exercises. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.i ................................................ The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to drill and exercise scenarios that include a wide spectrum of radiological release events and hostile action. 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.j ................................................ The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements regarding the need for the licensee’s emergency response organization to demonstrate proficiency in key skills in the principal functional areas of emergency response. Additionally, the NRC is granting exemption during an eight calendar year exercise cycle, from demonstrating proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to such scenarios as hostile actions, unplanned minimal radiological release, § 50.54(hh)(2) implementation strategies, and scenarios involving rapid escalation to a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:42 Nov 04, 2014 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 4703 Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency is responsible for evaluating the adequacy of offsite response during an exercise. No action is expected from State or local government organizations in response to an event at a decommissioning power reactor site other than onsite firefighting, law enforcement and ambulance/medical services support. A memorandum of understanding should be in place for those services. Offsite response organizations will continue to take actions on a comprehensive emergency planning basis to protect the health and safety of the public as they would at any other industrial site. Due to the low probability of design basis accidents or other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs, the available time for event mitigation and, if needed, implementation of offsite protective actions using a CEMP, the previously routine progression to general emergency in power reactor site scenarios is not applicable to a decommissioning site. Therefore, the licensee is not expected to demonstrate response to a wide spectrum of events. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1 regarding hostile action. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2. Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\05NON1.SGM 05NON1 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV I ...................................................... The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements regarding the need for the licensee to develop a range of protective action for onsite personnel during hostile actions. [FR Doc. 2014–26292 Filed 11–4–14; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Structural Analysis; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Structural Analysis will hold a meeting on November 17, 2014, Room T–2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The entire meeting will be open to public attendance. The agenda for the subject meeting shall be as follows: mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES Monday, November 17, 2014—8:30 a.m. Until 12:00 p.m. The Subcommittee will review and discuss the methodology used for uncertainty in seismic hazard curve development. The Subcommittee will hear presentations by and hold discussions with the NRC staff and other interested persons regarding this matter. The Subcommittee will gather information, analyze relevant issues and facts, and formulate proposed positions and actions, as appropriate, for deliberation by the Full Committee. Members of the public desiring to provide oral statements and/or written comments should notify the Designated Federal Official (DFO), Maitri Banerjee (Telephone 301–415–6973 or Email: Maitri.Banerjee@nrc.gov) five days prior to the meeting, if possible, so that appropriate arrangements can be made. Thirty-five hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided to the DFO thirty minutes before the meeting. In addition, one electronic copy of each presentation should be emailed to the DFO one day before the meeting. If an electronic copy cannot be provided within this timeframe, presenters should provide the DFO with a CD containing each presentation at least thirty minutes before the meeting. Electronic recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the meeting that are open to the public. Detailed procedures for the conduct of and participation in ACRS meetings were VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:02 Nov 04, 2014 Jkt 235001 Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.d. published in the Federal Register on October 13, 2014 (79 FR 59307–59308). Detailed meeting agendas and meeting transcripts are available on the NRC Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/acrs. Information regarding topics to be discussed, changes to the agenda, whether the meeting has been canceled or rescheduled, and the time allotted to present oral statements can be obtained from the Web site cited above or by contacting the identified DFO. Moreover, in view of the possibility that the schedule for ACRS meetings may be adjusted by the Chairman as necessary to facilitate the conduct of the meeting, persons planning to attend should check with these references if such rescheduling would result in a major inconvenience. If attending this meeting, please enter through the One White Flint North building, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD. After registering with security, please contact Mr. Theron Brown (Telephone 240–888–9835) to be escorted to the meeting room. Dated: October 29, 2014. Cayetano Santos, Chief, Technical Support Branch, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. [FR Doc. 2014–26291 Filed 11–4–14; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability & PRA; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability & PRA will hold a meeting on November 19, 2014, Room T–2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The meeting will be open to public attendance. The agenda for the subject meeting shall be as follows: Wednesday, November 19, 2014–1:00 p.m. Until 5:00 p.m. The Subcommittee will discuss the containment protection and release reduction (CPRR) rulemaking risk evaluation and scoping study of human error probabilities. The Subcommittee PO 00000 Frm 00113 65727 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 will hear presentations by and hold discussions with the NRC staff and other interested persons regarding this matter. The Subcommittee will gather information, analyze relevant issues and facts, and formulate proposed positions and actions, as appropriate, for deliberation by the Full Committee. Members of the public desiring to provide oral statements and/or written comments should notify the Designated Federal Official (DFO), John Lai (Telephone 301–415–5197 or Email: John.Lai@nrc.gov) five days prior to the meeting, if possible, so that appropriate arrangements can be made. Thirty-five hard copies of each presentation or handout should be provided to the DFO thirty minutes before the meeting. In addition, one electronic copy of each presentation should be emailed to the DFO one day before the meeting. If an electronic copy cannot be provided within this timeframe, presenters should provide the DFO with a CD containing each presentation at least thirty minutes before the meeting. Electronic recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the meeting that are open to the public. Detailed procedures for the conduct of and participation in ACRS meetings were published in the Federal Register on October 13, 2014 (79 FR 59307– 59308). Detailed meeting agendas and meeting transcripts are available on the NRC Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/acrs. Information regarding topics to be discussed, changes to the agenda, whether the meeting has been canceled or rescheduled, and the time allotted to present oral statements can be obtained from the Web site cited above or by contacting the identified DFO. Moreover, in view of the possibility that the schedule for ACRS meetings may be adjusted by the Chairman as necessary to facilitate the conduct of the meeting, persons planning to attend should check with these references if such rescheduling would result in a major inconvenience. If attending this meeting, please enter through the One White Flint North building, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD. After registering with security, please contact Mr. Theron Brown (Telephone 240–888–9835) to be escorted to the meeting room. E:\FR\FM\05NON1.SGM 05NON1

Agencies

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 214 (Wednesday, November 5, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65715-65727]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-26292]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-305; NRC-2014-0219]


Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.; Kewaunee Power Station

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) is a decommissioning nuclear 
power reactor that permanently shut down on May 7, 2013, and 
permanently defueled on May 14, 2013. In response to a request from 
Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK or the licensee), the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) is granting exemptions from certain 
emergency planning (EP) requirements. The exemptions will eliminate the 
requirements to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and 
reduce the scope of the onsite emergency planning activities at the 
Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) based on the reduced risks of accidents 
that could result in an offsite radiological

[[Page 65716]]

release when compared to operating power reactors. The exemptions will 
continue to maintain requirements for onsite radiological emergency 
planning and include provisions for capabilities to communicate and 
coordinate with offsite response authorities. The NRC staff has 
concluded that the exemptions being granted by this action will 
maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness at KPS given its 
permanently shutdown and defueled status, and that there is reasonable 
assurance that adequate offsite protective measures can and will be 
taken by State and local government agencies, if needed, in the event 
of a radiological emergency at the KPS facility.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2014-0219 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2014-0219. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-287-
3422; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact 
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC 
Library at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the 
search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-
based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's 
Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS Accession number 
for each document referenced in this document (if that document is 
available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is 
referenced.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Huffman, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-2046; email: William.Huffman@nrc.gov.

I. Background

    The KPS facility is a decommissioning power reactor located on 
approximately 900 acres in Carlton (Kewaunee County), Wisconsin, 27 
miles southeast of Green Bay, Wisconsin. The licensee, DEK, is the 
holder of KPS Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-43. The 
license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to 
all rules, regulations, and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in 
effect.
    By letter dated February 25, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML13058A065), DEK submitted a certification to the NRC indicating it 
would permanently cease power operations at KPS on May 7, 2013. On May 
7, 2013, DEK permanently shut down the KPS reactor. On May 14, 2013, 
DEK certified that it had permanently defueled the KPS reactor vessel 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML13135A209). As a permanently shutdown and 
defueled facility, and in accordance with Sec.  50.82(a)(2) of Title 10 
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), KPS is no longer 
authorized to operate the reactor or emplace nuclear fuel into the 
reactor vessel. Kewaunee Power Station is still authorized to possess 
and store irradiated nuclear fuel. Irradiated fuel is currently being 
stored onsite in a spent fuel pool (SFP) and in Independent Spent Fuel 
Storage Installation (ISFSI) dry casks.
    During normal power reactor operations, the forced flow of water 
through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes heat generated by the 
reactor. The RCS, operating at high temperatures and pressures, 
transfers this heat through the steam generator tubes converting non-
radioactive feedwater to steam, which then flows to the main turbine 
generator to produce electricity. Many of the accident scenarios 
postulated in the updated safety analysis reports (USARs) for operating 
power reactors involve failures or malfunctions of systems which could 
affect the fuel in the reactor core, which in the most severe 
postulated accidents, would involve the release of large quantities of 
fission products. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at 
KPS and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such 
accidents are no longer possible. The reactor, RCS, and supporting 
systems are no longer in operation and have no function related to the 
storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, postulated accidents 
involving failure or malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or supporting 
systems are no longer applicable.
    Since KPS is permanently shutdown and defueled, the only design 
basis accident that could potentially result in an offsite radiological 
release at KPS is the fuel handling accident. Analysis performed by DEK 
showed that 90 days after KPS permanently shutdown, the radiological 
consequence of the fuel handling accident would not exceed the limits 
established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) 
Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary. 
Based on the time that KPS has been permanently shutdown (approximately 
17 months), there is no longer any possibility of an offsite 
radiological release from a design basis-accident that could exceed the 
EPA PAGs.
    The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and 
Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for 
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear 
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have removed 
all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory 
provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that is 
permanently shutdown and defueled from a reactor that is authorized to 
operate. In order for DEK to modify the KPS emergency plan to reflect 
the reduced risk associated with the permanently shutdown and defueled 
condition of KPS, certain exemptions from the EP regulations must be 
obtained before the KPS emergency plan can be amended.

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated July 31, 2013, ``Request for Exemptions from 
Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E'' (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML13221A182), DEK requested exemptions from certain EP 
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 for KPS. More specifically, DEK 
requested exemptions from certain planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) 
regarding onsite and offsite radiological emergency plans for nuclear 
power reactors; from certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that 
require establishment of plume exposure and ingestion pathway emergency 
planning zones for nuclear power reactors; and from certain 
requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, which 
establishes the elements that make up the content of emergency plans. 
In a letter dated December 11, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13351A040), 
DEK provided responses to the NRC staff's request for additional 
information (RAI) concerning the proposed exemptions. In a letter dated 
January 10, 2014, DEK

[[Page 65717]]

provided a supplemental response to the RAI (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML14016A078), which contained information applicable to the SFP 
inventory makeup strategies for mitigating the potential loss of water 
inventory due to a beyond design-basis accident. The information 
provided by DEK included justifications for each exemption requested. 
The exemptions requested by DEK will eliminate the requirements to 
maintain offsite radiological emergency plans, reviewed by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the requirements of 44 CFR 
Part 350, and reduce the scope of onsite emergency planning activities. 
DEK stated that application of all of the standards and requirements in 
10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E is not 
needed for adequate emergency response capability based on the reduced 
risks at the permanently shutdown and defueled facility. If offsite 
protective actions where needed for a very unlikely accident that could 
challenge the safe storage of spent fuel at KPS, provisions exist for 
offsite agencies to take protective actions using a comprehensive 
emergency management plan (CEMP) under the National Preparedness System 
to protect the health and safety of the public. A CEMP in this context, 
also referred to as an emergency operations plan (EOP), is addressed in 
FEMA Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, ``Developing and Maintaining 
Emergency Operations Plans.'' Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is 
the foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local emergency 
planning in the United States. It promotes a common understanding of 
the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and decision making and 
helps planners at all levels of government in their efforts to develop 
and maintain viable, all-hazards, all-threats emergency plans. An EOP 
is flexible enough for use in all emergencies. It describes how people 
and property will be protected; details who is responsible for carrying 
out specific actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, 
supplies and other resources available; and outlines how all actions 
will be coordinated. A comprehensive emergency management plan is often 
referred to as a synonym for ``all hazards planning.''

III. Discussion

    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the 
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its 
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 
50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an 
undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the 
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances 
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances 
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in 
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of 
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule.
    As noted previously, the current EP regulations contained in 10 CFR 
50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 apply to both operating and 
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the 
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has 
permanently ceased operations and removed fuel from the reactor vessel 
is significantly lower, and the types of possible accidents are 
significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor. However, EP 
regulations are silent with regard to the fact that once a power 
reactor permanently ceases operation, the consequences of credible 
emergency accident scenarios are reduced. The reduced risks generally 
relate to a decrease in the potential for any significant offsite 
radiological release based on the preclusion of accidents applicable to 
an operating power reactor and on the reduced decay heat, and the decay 
of short-lived radionuclides as spent fuel ages. NUREG-1738, 
``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning 
Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently shutdown and defueled 
power reactors bounded by the assumptions and conditions in the report, 
the risk of offsite radiological release is significantly less than for 
an operating power reactor.
    Similar to the EP exemptions requested by DEK, prior EP exemptions 
granted to permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors did not 
relieve the licensees of all EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions 
allowed the licensees to modify their emergency plans commensurate with 
the credible site-specific risks that were consistent with a 
permanently shutdown and defueled status. Specifically, precedent for 
the approval of the exemptions from certain EP requirements for 
previous permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors were based on 
demonstrating that: (1) The radiological consequences of design-basis 
accidents would not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion 
area boundary, and; (2) in the unlikely event of a beyond design-basis 
accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat transfer from the 
fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to initiate 
appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite authorities 
to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP approach to 
protect the health and safety of the public.
    With respect to design-basis accidents at KPS, the licensee 
provided analysis demonstrating that 90 days after KPS was permanently 
shutdown, the radiological consequences of the only remaining design-
basis accident with potential for offsite radiological release (the 
fuel handling accident) will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at 
the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, because KPS has been 
permanently shutdown for approximately 17 months, there is no longer 
any design-basis accident that would warrant an offsite radiological 
emergency plan meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.
    With respect to beyond design-basis accidents at KPS, the licensee 
analyzed the two bounding beyond design-basis accidents that have a 
potential for a significant offsite release. One of these beyond 
design-basis accidents involves a complete loss of SFP water inventory, 
where cooling of the spent fuel would be primarily accomplished by 
natural circulation of air through the uncovered spent fuel assemblies. 
The licensee's analysis of this accident shows that by October 30, 
2014, air cooling of the spent fuel assemblies will be sufficient to 
keep the fuel within a safe temperature range indefinitely without fuel 
damage or offsite radiological release. The other beyond design-basis 
accident analysis performed by the licensee could not completely rule 
out the possibility of a radiological release from a SFP. This more 
limiting analysis assumes an incomplete drain down of the SFP water, or 
some other catastrophic event (such as a complete drainage of the SFP 
with rearrangement of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the addition of 
rubble to the SFP), that would effectively impede any decay heat 
removal through all possible modes of cooling. The licensee's analysis 
demonstrates that as of October 21, 2014, there would be at least 10 
hours after the loss of all cooling means considered in the analysis 
for the described beyond design-basis accident, before the spent fuel 
cladding would reach a temperature where the potential for a 
significant offsite radiological release could occur. This analysis 
conservatively does not consider the period of time from the initiating 
event

[[Page 65718]]

causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all cooling means are lost.
    The NRC staff has verified DEK's analyses and its calculations. The 
analyses provide reasonable assurance that in granting the requested 
exemption to DEK, there is no design-basis accident that will result in 
an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the site 
boundary. In the unlikely event of a beyond design-basis accident 
affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via 
all modes of heat transfer, there will be at least 10 hours available 
before an offsite release might occur and, therefore, at least 10 hours 
to initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a means of heat 
removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were projected to 
occur under this unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is considered 
sufficient time for offsite authorities to implement protective actions 
using a CEMP approach to protect the health and safety of the public.
    The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the 
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a), in 
addition to considering the basis for prior EP exemption requests as 
discussed above, to determine whether the exemptions should be granted. 
After evaluating the exemption requests, the staff determined, as 
described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR50.12(a) are met, and that 
the exemptions should be granted. Assessment of the DEK EP exemptions 
is described in SECY-14-0066, ``Request by Dominion Energy Kewaunee, 
Inc. for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements,'' 
dated June 27, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14072A257). The Commission 
approved the NRC staff's intention to grant the exemptions in the staff 
requirements memorandum (SRM) to SECY-14-0066, dated August 7, 2014 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML14219A366). Descriptions of the specific 
exemptions being granted to DEK, with the NRC staff's basis for 
granting each exemption, are provided in SECY-14-0066 and summarized in 
a table at the end of this document. The staff's detailed review and 
technical basis for the approval of the specific EP exemptions being 
granted to DEK are provided in the NRC staff's safety evaluation 
enclosed in NRC letter dated October 27, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML14261A223).

A. Authorized by Law

    The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements 
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 
Section IV, that would allow DEK to revise the KPS Emergency Plan to 
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the station. 
As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, 
upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, 
grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. The NRC staff 
has determined that granting of the licensee's proposed exemptions will 
not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 
or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, the exemptions are 
authorized by law.

B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety

    As stated previously, DEK provided analyses that show the 
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed the 
limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, 
offsite radiological emergency plans required under 10 CFR Part 50 are 
no longer needed for protection of the public beyond the exclusion area 
boundary based on the radiological consequences of design-basis 
accidents still possible at KPS.
    Although very unlikely, there are postulated beyond design-basis 
accidents that might result in significant offsite radiological 
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond design-
basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled 
reactors. The staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 concludes that the event 
sequences important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled power 
reactors are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. For EP 
assessments, this is an important difference relative to operating 
power reactors where typically a large number of different sequences 
make significant contributions to risk. Per NUREG-1738, relaxation of 
offsite EP requirements under 10 CFR Part 50 a few months after 
shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk. The report further 
concludes that the change in risk due to relaxation of offsite EP 
requirements is small because the overall risk is low, and because even 
under current EP requirements for operating power reactors, EP was 
judged to have marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness in the 
severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. All other sequences 
including cask drops (for which offsite radiological emergency plans 
are expected to be more effective) are too low in likelihood to have a 
significant impact on risk.
    Therefore, granting exemptions eliminating the requirements of 10 
CFR 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and reducing 
the scope of onsite emergency planning activities will not present an 
undue risk to the public health and safety.

C. Consistent With the Common Defense and Security

    The requested exemptions by DEK only involve EP requirements under 
10 CFR Part 50 and will allow DEK to revise the KPS Emergency Plan to 
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the 
facility. Physical security measures at KPS are not affected by the 
requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of offsite radiological 
emergency plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite emergency 
planning activities at KPS will not adversely affect DEK's ability to 
physically secure the site or protect special nuclear material. 
Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent with the common 
defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances

    Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular 
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), 
and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, is to provide reasonable 
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in 
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and 
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants, 
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite 
radiological emergency plans. The standards and requirements in these 
regulations were developed by considering the risks associated with 
operation of a power reactor at its licensed full-power level. These 
risks include the potential for a reactor accident with offsite 
radiological dose consequences.
    As discussed previously, because KPS is permanently shutdown and 
defueled, there is no longer a risk of offsite radiological release 
from a design-basis accident and the risk of a significant offsite 
radiological release from a beyond design-basis accident is greatly 
reduced when compared to an operating power reactor. The NRC staff has 
confirmed the reduced risks at KPS by comparing the generic risk 
assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to site specific conditions 
at KPS and determined that the risk values in NUREG-1738 bound the 
risks presented by KPS. Furthermore, the staff has

[[Page 65719]]

recently concluded in NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-
Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I 
Boiling Water Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML14255A365), that, consistent with earlier research studies, SFPs are 
robust structures that are likely to withstand severe earthquakes 
without leaking cooling water and potentially uncovering the spent 
fuel. The NUREG-2161 study shows the likelihood of a radiological 
release from the spent fuel after the analyzed severe earthquake at the 
reference plant to be about one time in 10 million years or lower.
    The licensee has analyzed site-specific beyond design-basis 
accidents to determine the risk of a significant offsite radiological 
release. In one such analysis, DEK determined that if all the normal 
cooling systems used to cool the SFP were lost and not restored for the 
duration of the postulated accident, then as of September 20, 2014, the 
SFP at the KPS would take 120 hours before it would begin to boil and, 
due to the loss of SFP water level from the resulting boil off, it 
would take 26 days for the water inventory to lower to a level of three 
feet from the top of the fuel. Additionally, DEK analysis shows that as 
of October 30, 2014, in the event of a complete SFP drain down due to a 
loss of water inventory, assuming natural circulation of air through 
the spent fuel racks was available, then the peak fuel clad temperature 
would remain below 1049 [deg]F (565 [deg]C), the temperature at which 
incipient cladding failure may occur. Therefore, in this postulated 
accident, fuel cladding remains intact and an offsite radiological 
release would not take place.
    The only beyond design-basis accident analysis that reached a 
condition where a significant offsite release might occur involved a 
scenario where the SFP drained in such a way that all modes of cooling 
or heat transfer are assumed to be unavailable. This results in an 
adiabatic heat-up of the spent fuel. DEK analysis of this beyond 
design-basis accident shows that as of October 21, 2014, a minimum of 
10 hours would be available between the time the fuel is uncovered (at 
which time adiabatic heat-up begins), until the fuel cladding reaches a 
temperature of 1652 [deg]F (900 [deg]C), the temperature associated 
with rapid cladding oxidation and the potential for a significant 
radiological release.
    Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR 50 have 
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses 
show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP 
coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of 
removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly 
reaches the zirconium rapid oxidation temperature. The staff concluded 
in its previously granted exemptions, as it does with the DEK requested 
EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate 
mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, or if needed, for 
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP 
approach, then offsite radiological emergency plans, required under 10 
CFR Part 50, are not necessary at permanently shutdown and defueled 
power reactor licensees.
    Additionally, DEK committed to enhanced SFP makeup strategies in 
its letter to the NRC dated August 23, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML13242A019). The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP 
include: Using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; supplying 
water through hoses to a spool piece connection to the existing SFP 
piping; or using a diesel-driven portable pump to take suction from 
Lake Michigan and provide makeup or spray to the SFP. These strategies 
will continue to be required as a license condition. DEK further 
provides that the equipment needed to perform these actions will 
continue to be located onsite, and that the external makeup strategy 
(using a diesel driven portable pump) is capable of being deployed 
within 2 hours. Considering the very low probability of beyond design-
basis accidents affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide 
defense-in-depth and time to provide makeup or spray to the SFP before 
the onset of any postulated offsite radiological release.
    For all the reasons stated above, the staff finds that the 
licensee's requested exemptions to meet the underlying purpose of all 
of the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), and requirements in 10 CFR 
50.47(c)(2) and Appendix E, acceptably satisfy the special 
circumstances in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the greatly reduced 
risk of offsite radiological consequences associated with the 
permanently shutdown and defueled state of the KPS facility.
    The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by 
this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness 
at KPS and, if needed, that there is reasonable assurance that adequate 
offsite protective measures can and will be taken by State and local 
government agencies using a CEMP approach in the event of a 
radiological emergency at the KPS facility. Since the underlying 
purposes of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even 
with the elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR Part 50 to 
maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and reduction in the 
scope of the onsite emergency planning activities at KPS, the special 
circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations

    In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined 
that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect 
on the quality of the human environment as discussed in the NRC staff's 
Finding of No Significant Impact and associated Environmental 
Assessment published October 7, 2014 (79 FR 60513).

V. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), that DEK's request for exemptions from certain EP 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 
50, Appendix E, Section IV, and as summarized in the table at the end 
of this document, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk 
to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the common 
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present. 
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants DEK exemptions from certain EP 
requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 
50, Appendix E, Section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the 
staff's safety evaluation dated October 27, 2014. The exemptions are 
effective as of October 30, 2014.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of October, 2014.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michele G. Evans,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.

[[Page 65720]]



                 IV--Table of Exemptions Granted to DEK
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              10 CFR 50.47                NRC staff basis for exemption
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR 50.47(b)........................  In the Statement of
The NRC is granting exemption from        Considerations (SOC) for the
 portions of the rule language that       final rule for emergency
 would otherwise require offsite          planning (EP) requirements for
 emergency response plans.                independent spent fuel storage
                                          installations (ISFSIs) and for
                                          monitor retrievable storage
                                          installations (MRS) (60
                                          Federal Register (FR) 32430;
                                          June 22, 1995), the Commission
                                          responded to comments
                                          concerning offsite EP for
                                          ISFSIs or an MRS and concluded
                                          that, ``the offsite
                                          consequences of potential
                                          accidents at an ISFSI or a MRS
                                          would not warrant establishing
                                          Emergency Planning Zones
                                          [EPZ].''
                                         In a nuclear power reactor's
                                          permanently defueled state,
                                          the accident risks are more
                                          similar to an ISFSI or MRS
                                          than an operating nuclear
                                          power plant. The EP program
                                          would be similar to that
                                          required for an ISFSI under
                                          Section 72.32(a) of Title 10
                                          of the Code of Federal
                                          Regulations (10 CFR) when fuel
                                          stored in the spent fuel pool
                                          (SFP) has more than 5 years of
                                          decay time and would not
                                          change substantially when all
                                          the fuel is transferred from
                                          the SFP to an onsite ISFSI.
                                          Exemptions from offsite EP
                                          requirements have previously
                                          been approved when the site-
                                          specific analyses show that at
                                          least 10 hours is available
                                          from a partial drain-down
                                          event where cooling of the
                                          spent fuel is not effective
                                          until the hottest fuel
                                          assembly reaches 900 [deg]C.
                                          The technical basis that
                                          underlied the approval of the
                                          exemption request is based
                                          partly on the analysis of a
                                          time period that spent fuel
                                          stored in the SFP is unlikely
                                          to reach the zirconium
                                          ignition temperature in less
                                          than 10 hours. This time
                                          period is based on a heat-up
                                          calculation which uses several
                                          simplifying assumptions. Some
                                          of these assumptions are
                                          conservative (adiabatic
                                          conditions), while others are
                                          non-conservative (no oxidation
                                          below 900 [deg]C). Weighing
                                          the conservatisms and non-
                                          conservatisms, the NRC staff
                                          judges that this calculation
                                          reasonably represents
                                          conditions which may occur in
                                          the event of an SFP accident.
                                          The staff concluded that if 10
                                          hours were available to
                                          initiate mitigative actions,
                                          or if needed, offsite
                                          protective actions using a
                                          comprehensive emergency
                                          management plan (CEMP), formal
                                          offsite radiological emergency
                                          plans are not necessary for
                                          these permanently defueled
                                          nuclear power reactor
                                          licensees.
                                         As supported by the licensee's
                                          SFP analysis, the NRC staff
                                          believes an exemption to the
                                          requirements for formal
                                          offsite radiological emergency
                                          plans is justified for a
                                          zirconium fire scenario
                                          considering the low likelihood
                                          of this event together with
                                          time available to take
                                          mitigative or protective
                                          actions between the initiating
                                          event and before the onset of
                                          a postulated fire.
                                         The Dominion Energy Kewaunee,
                                          Inc. (DEK) analysis has
                                          demonstrated that 90 days
                                          after shutdown, the
                                          radiological consequences of
                                          design-basis accidents will
                                          not exceed the limits of the
                                          U.S. Environmental Protection
                                          Agency's (EPA) Protective
                                          Action Guidelines (PAGs) at
                                          the exclusion area boundary.
                                          These analyses also show that
                                          after the spent fuel has
                                          decayed for 17 months, for
                                          beyond-design-basis events
                                          where the SFP is drained, air
                                          cooling will prevent the fuel
                                          from reaching the lowest
                                          temperature where incipient
                                          cladding failure may occur
                                          (565 [deg]C). In the event
                                          that air cooling is not
                                          possible, 10 hours is
                                          available to take mitigative
                                          or, if needed, offsite
                                          protective actions using a
                                          CEMP from the time the fuel is
                                          uncovered until it reaches the
                                          auto-ignition temperature of
                                          900 [deg]C.
                                         DEK has also furnished
                                          information on its SFP
                                          inventory makeup strategies
                                          for mitigating the loss of
                                          water inventory. The multiple
                                          strategies for providing
                                          makeup to the SPF include:
                                          using existing plant systems
                                          for inventory makeup;
                                          supplying water via hoses to a
                                          spool piece connection to the
                                          existing SFP piping; or using
                                          a diesel-driven portable pump
                                          to take suction from Lake
                                          Michigan and provide makeup or
                                          spray to the SFP. DEK also
                                          stated that the tools and
                                          equipment needed to perform
                                          these actions are located on
                                          site and that the external
                                          makeup strategy (using a
                                          diesel driven portable pump)
                                          was able to be deployed within
                                          2 hours. DEK believes these
                                          diverse strategies provide
                                          defense-in-depth and ample
                                          time to provide makeup or
                                          spray to the SFP prior to the
                                          onset of zirconium cladding
                                          ignition when considering very
                                          low probability of beyond
                                          design-basis events affecting
                                          the SFP.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(1).....................  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
The NRC is granting exemption from
 portions of the rule language that
 would otherwise require the need for
 Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs).

[[Page 65721]]

 
10 CFR 50.47(b)(3).....................  Decommissioning power reactors
The NRC is granting exemption from        present a low likelihood of
 portions of the rule language that       any credible accident
 would otherwise require the need for     resulting in a radiological
 an Emergency Operations Facility.        release together with the time
                                          available to take mitigative
                                          or, if needed, offsite
                                          protective actions using a
                                          CEMP between the initiating
                                          event and before the onset of
                                          a postulated fire. As such, an
                                          emergency operations facility
                                          would not be required. The
                                          ``nuclear island,'' control
                                          room, or other onsite location
                                          can provide for the
                                          communication and coordination
                                          with offsite organizations for
                                          the level of support required.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).....................  Decommissioning power reactors
The NRC is granting exemption from        present a low likelihood of
 portions of the rule language that       any credible accident
 would otherwise require reference to     resulting in a radiological
 formal offsite radiological emergency    release together with the time
 response plans.                          available to take mitigative
                                          or if needed, offsite
                                          protective actions using a
                                          CEMP between the initiating
                                          event and before the onset of
                                          a postulated fire. As such,
                                          formal offsite radiological
                                          emergency response plans are
                                          not required.
                                         The Nuclear Energy Institute
                                          (NEI) document NEI 99-01,
                                          ``Development of Emergency
                                          Action Levels for Non-Passive
                                          Reactors'' (Revision 6), was
                                          found to be an acceptable
                                          method for development of
                                          emergency action levels (EALs)
                                          and was endorsed by the U.S.
                                          Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                                          (NRC) in a letter dated March
                                          28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
                                          ML12346A463). NEI 99-01
                                          provides EALs for non-passive
                                          operating nuclear power
                                          reactors, permanently defueled
                                          reactors, and ISFSIs.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(5).....................  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
The NRC is granting exemption from
 portions of the rule language that
 would otherwise require early
 notification of the public and a means
 to provide instructions to the public
 within the plume exposure pathway
 Emergency Planning Zone.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(6).....................  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
The NRC is granting exemption from
 portions of the rule language that
 would otherwise require prompt
 communications with the public.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(7).....................  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
The NRC is granting exemption from
 portions of the rule language that
 would otherwise require information to
 be made available to the public on a
 periodic basis about how they will be
 notified and what their initial
 protective actions should be.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(9).....................  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
The NRC is granting exemption from
 portions of the rule language that
 would otherwise require the capability
 for monitoring offsite consequences.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)....................  In the unlikely event of an SFP
The NRC is granting exemption from        accident, the iodine isotopes,
 portions of the rule language that       which contribute to an off-
 would reduce the range of protective     site dose from an operating
 actions developed for emergency          reactor accident, are not
 workers and the public. Consideration    present, so potassium iodide
 of evacuation, sheltering, or the use    distribution would no longer
 of potassium iodide will no longer be    serve as an effective or
 necessary. Evacuation times will no      necessary supplemental
 longer need to developed or updated.     protective action.
 Protective actions for the ingestion    The Commission responded to
 exposure pathway EPZ will not need to    comments in its SOC for the
 be developed.                            final rule for emergency
                                          planning requirements for
                                          ISFSIs and MRS facilities (60
                                          FR 32435), and concluded that,
                                          ``the offsite consequences of
                                          potential accidents at an
                                          ISFSI or an MRS would not
                                          warrant establishing Emergency
                                          Planning Zones.''
                                          Additionally, in the SOC for
                                          the final rule for EP
                                          requirements for ISFSIs and
                                          for MRS facilities (60 FR
                                          32430), the Commission
                                          responded to comments
                                          concerning site-specific EP
                                          that includes evacuation of
                                          surrounding population for an
                                          ISFSI not at a reactor site,
                                          and concluded that, ``The
                                          Commission does not agree that
                                          as a general matter emergency
                                          plans for an ISFSI must
                                          include evacuation planning.''
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(c)(2).....................  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b)(10).
The NRC is granting exemption from
 portions of the rule language that
 would otherwise require the
 establishment of a 10 mile radius
 plume exposure pathway EPZ and a 50
 mile radius ingestion pathway EPZ.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 65722]]


 
 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV   NRC staff basis for exemption
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 1...  The EP Rule published in the
The NRC is granting exemption from        Federal Register (76 FR 72560;
 portions of the rule language that       November 23, 2011) amended
 would otherwise require onsite           certain requirements in 10 CFR
 protective actions during hostile        Part 50. Among the changes,
 action.                                  the definition of ``hostile
                                          action'' was added as an act
                                          directed toward a nuclear
                                          power plant or its personnel.
                                          This definition is based on
                                          the definition of ``hostile
                                          action'' provided in NRC
                                          Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency
                                          Preparedness and Response
                                          Actions for Security-Based
                                          Events.'' NRC Bulletin 2005-02
                                          was not applicable to nuclear
                                          power reactors that have
                                          permanently ceased operations
                                          and have certified that fuel
                                          has been removed from the
                                          reactor vessel.
                                         The NRC excluded non-power
                                          reactors from the scope of
                                          ``hostile action'' at the time
                                          of the rulemaking because, as
                                          defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a non-
                                          power reactor is not
                                          considered a nuclear power
                                          reactor and a regulatory basis
                                          had not been developed to
                                          support the inclusion of non-
                                          power reactors within the
                                          scope of ``hostile action.''
                                          Similarly, a decommissioning
                                          power reactor or an ISFSI is
                                          not a ``nuclear reactor'' as
                                          defined in 10 CFR Part 50. A
                                          decommissioning power reactor
                                          also has a low likelihood of a
                                          credible accident resulting in
                                          radiological releases
                                          requiring offsite protective
                                          measures. For all of these
                                          reasons, the staff concludes
                                          that a decommissioning power
                                          reactor is not a facility that
                                          falls within the scope of
                                          ``hostile action.''
                                         Similarly, for security, risk
                                          insights can be used to
                                          determine which targets are
                                          important to protect against
                                          sabotage. A level of security
                                          commensurate with the
                                          consequences of a sabotage
                                          event is required and is
                                          evaluated on a site-specific
                                          basis. The severity of the
                                          consequences declines as fuel
                                          ages and, thereby, removes
                                          over time the underlying
                                          concern that a sabotage attack
                                          could cause offsite
                                          radiological consequences.
                                         Although, this analysis
                                          provides a justification for
                                          exempting KPS from ``hostile
                                          action'' related requirements,
                                          some EP requirements for
                                          security-based events are
                                          maintained. The classification
                                          of security-based events,
                                          notification of offsite
                                          authorities and coordination
                                          with offsite agencies under a
                                          CEMP concept are still
                                          required.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 2...  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b)(10).
The NRC is granting exemption from
 portions of the rule language
 concerning the evacuation time
 analyses within the plume exposure
 pathway EPZ for the licensee's initial
 application
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 3...  Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from        50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
 portions of the rule language that
 would otherwise require use of NRC-
 approved evacuation time estimates
 (ETEs) and updates to State and local
 governments when developing protective
 action strategies.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 4...  Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from        50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
 portions of the rule language that
 would otherwise require licensees to
 develop evacuation time estimates
 based on the most recent census data
 and submit the ETE analysis to the NRC
 prior to providing it to State and
 local government for developing
 protective action strategies.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 5...  Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from        50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
 portions of the rule language that
 would otherwise require licensees to
 estimate the EPZ permanent resident
 population changes once a year between
 decennial censuses.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 6...  Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from        50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
 portions of the rule language that
 would otherwise require the licensee
 to submit an updated ETE analysis to
 the NRC based on changes in the
 resident population that result in
 exceeding specific evacuation time
 increase criteria.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.1.  Based on the permanently
The NRC is granting exemption from the    shutdown and defueled status
 word ``operating'' in the requirement    of the reactor, a
 to describe the normal plant             decommissioning reactor is not
 organization.                            authorized to operate under 10
                                          CFR 50.82(a). Because the
                                          licensee cannot operate the
                                          reactors, the licensee does
                                          not have a ``plant operating
                                          organization.''
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.3.  The number of staff at
The NRC is granting exemption to the      decommissioning sites is
 requirement to describe the licensee's   generally small but is
 headquarters personnel sent to the       commensurate with the need to
 site to augment the onsite emergency     safely store spent fuel at the
 response organization.                   facility in a manner that is
                                          protective of public health
                                          and safety. Decommissioning
                                          sites typically have a level
                                          of emergency response that
                                          does not require response by
                                          the licensee's headquarters
                                          personnel.

[[Page 65723]]

 
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A. 4  Although, the likelihood of
The NRC is granting exemption from        events that would result in
 portions of the rule language that       doses in excess of the EPA
 would otherwise require the licensee     PAGs to the public beyond the
 to identify a position and function      owner controlled area boundary
 within its organization which will       based on the permanently
 carry the responsibility for making      shutdown and defueled status
 offsite dose projections.                of the reactor is extremely
                                          low, the licensee still must
                                          be able to determine if a
                                          radiological release is
                                          occurring. If a release is
                                          occurring, then the licensee
                                          staff should promptly
                                          communicate that information
                                          to offsite authorities for
                                          their consideration. The
                                          offsite organizations are
                                          responsible for deciding what,
                                          if any, protective actions
                                          should be taken based on
                                          comprehensive emergency
                                          planning.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A. 5  The number of staff at
The NRC is granting exemption from the    decommissioning sites is
 requirement for the licensee to          generally small but should be
 identify individuals with special        commensurate with the need to
 qualifications for coping with           operate the facility in a
 emergencies.                             manner that is protective of
                                          public health and safety.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.7.  Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from        50, Appendix E, Section IV.1.
 portions of the rule language that
 would otherwise require a description
 of the assistance expected from State,
 local, and Federal agencies for coping
 with a hostile action.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.8.  Offsite emergency measures are
The NRC is granting exemption from the    limited to support provided by
 requirement to identify the State and    local police, fire
 local officials for ordering             departments, and ambulance and
 protective actions and evacuations.      hospital services, as
                                          appropriate. Due to the low
                                          probability of design basis
                                          accidents or other credible
                                          events to exceed the EPA PAGs,
                                          protective actions such as
                                          evacuation should not be
                                          required, but could be
                                          implemented at the discretion
                                          of offsite authorities using a
                                          CEMP.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b)(10).
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.9.  Responsibilities should be well
The NRC is granting exemption from the    defined in the emergency plan
 requirement for the licensee to          and procedures, regularly
 provide an analysis demonstrating that   tested through drills and
 on-shift personnel are not assigned      exercises audited and
 responsibilities that would prevent      inspected by the licensee and
 them from performing their assigned      the NRC. The duties of the
 emergency plan functions.                onshift personnel at a
                                          decommissioning reactor
                                          facility are not as
                                          complicated and diverse as
                                          those for an operating power
                                          reactor.
                                         The NRC staff considered the
                                          similarity between the
                                          staffing levels at a
                                          permanently shutdown and
                                          defueled reactor and staffing
                                          levels at an operating power
                                          reactor site. The minimal
                                          systems and equipment needed
                                          to maintain the spent nuclear
                                          fuel in the SFP or in a dry
                                          cask storage system in a safe
                                          condition requires minimal
                                          personnel and is governed by
                                          Technical Specifications. In
                                          the EP final rule published in
                                          the Federal Register (76 FR
                                          72560; November 23, 2011), the
                                          NRC concluded that the
                                          staffing analysis requirement
                                          was not necessary for non-
                                          power reactor licensees due to
                                          the small staffing levels
                                          required to operate the
                                          facility.
                                         The NRC staff also examined the
                                          actions required to mitigate
                                          the very low probability
                                          beyond design-basis events for
                                          the SFP. Additionally, DEK
                                          also furnished information on
                                          its SFP inventory makeup
                                          strategies for mitigating the
                                          loss of water inventory. The
                                          multiple strategies for
                                          providing makeup to the SFP
                                          include: using existing plant
                                          systems for inventory makeup;
                                          supplying water via hoses to a
                                          spool piece connection to the
                                          existing SFP piping; or using
                                          a diesel-driven portable pump
                                          to take suction from Lake
                                          Michigan and provide makeup or
                                          spray to the SFP. DEK further
                                          provided that the tools and
                                          equipment needed to perform
                                          these actions are located on
                                          site and the external makeup
                                          strategy (using a diesel
                                          driven portable pump) was
                                          demonstrated to be capable of
                                          being deployed within 2 hours,
                                          significantly less time than
                                          the 10 hours that would be
                                          available for ad hoc response.
                                          DEK believes, and the NRC
                                          staff agrees, that these
                                          diverse strategies provide
                                          defense-in-depth and ample
                                          time to provide makeup or
                                          spray to the SFP prior to the
                                          onset of zirconium cladding
                                          ignition when considering very
                                          low probability beyond design-
                                          basis events affecting the
                                          SFP.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV B.1.  NEI 99-01, ``Development of
The NRC is granting exemption from        Emergency Action levels for
 portions of the rule language that       Non-Passive Reactors''
 would otherwise require offsite          (Revision 6), was found to be
 emergency actions levels and offsite     an acceptable method for
 protective measures and associate        development of EALs and was
 offsite monitoring for the emergency     endorsed by the NRC in a
 conditions.                              letter dated March 28, 2013
In addition, the NRC is granting          (ADAMS Accession No.
 exemption from portions of the rule      ML12346A463). No offsite
 language that would otherwise require    protective actions are
 emergency action levels based on         anticipated to be necessary,
 hostile action.                          so classification above the
                                          alert level is no longer
                                          required, which is consistent
                                          with ISFSI facilities.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          Part 50, Appendix E, Section
                                          IV.1.

[[Page 65724]]

 
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV C.1.  Containment parameters do not
The NRC is granting exemption from        provide an indication of the
 portions of the rule language that       conditions at a defueled
 would otherwise require emergency        facility and emergency core
 actions levels based on operating        cooling systems are no longer
 reactor concerns, such as offsite        required. Other indications,
 radiation monitoring, pressure in        such as SFP level or
 containment, and the response of the     temperature, can be used at
 emergency core cooling system. In        sites where there is spent
 addition, the NRC is striking language   fuel in the SFPs.
 that would otherwise require offsite    In the SOC for the final rule
 emergency action levels of a site area   for EP requirements for ISFSIs
 emergency and a general emergency.       and MRS) facilities (60 FR
                                          32430), the Commission
                                          responded to comments
                                          concerning a general emergency
                                          at an ISFSI and an MRS, and
                                          concluded that, ``. . . an
                                          essential element of a General
                                          Emergency is that a release
                                          can be reasonably expected to
                                          exceed EPA Protective Action
                                          Guidelines exposure levels off
                                          site for more than the
                                          immediate site area.''
                                         The probability of a condition
                                          reaching the level above an
                                          emergency classification of
                                          alert is very low. In the
                                          event of an accident at a
                                          defueled facility that meets
                                          the conditions for relaxation
                                          of EP requirements, there will
                                          be available time for event
                                          mitigation and, if necessary,
                                          implementation of offsite
                                          protective actions using a
                                          CEMP.
                                         NEI 99-01, ``Development of
                                          Emergency Action levels for
                                          Non-Passive Reactors,''
                                          (Revision 6) was found to be
                                          an acceptable method for
                                          development of EALs and was
                                          endorsed by the NRC in a
                                          letter dated March 28, 2013
                                          (ADAMS Accession No.
                                          ML12346A463). No offsite
                                          protective actions are
                                          anticipated to be necessary,
                                          so classification above the
                                          alert level is no longer
                                          required.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV C.2.  In the EP rule published in the
The NRC is granting exemption from        Federal Register (76 FR
 portions of the rule language that       72560), non-power reactor
 would otherwise require the licensee     licensees were not required to
 to assess, classify, and declare an      assess, classify and declare
 emergency condition within 15 minutes.   an emergency condition within
                                          15 minutes. An SFP and an
                                          ISFSI are also not nuclear
                                          power reactors as defined in
                                          the NRC's regulations. A
                                          decommissioning power reactor
                                          has a low likelihood of a
                                          credible accident resulting in
                                          radiological releases
                                          requiring offsite protective
                                          measures. For these reasons,
                                          the NRC staff concludes that a
                                          decommissioning power reactor
                                          should not be required to
                                          assess, classify and declare
                                          an emergency condition within
                                          15 minutes.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.1.  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
The NRC is granting exemption from        50.47(b) and 10 CFR
 portions of the rule language that       50.47(b)(10).
 would otherwise require the licensee
 to reach agreement with local, State,
 and Federal officials and agencies for
 prompt notification of protective
 measures or evacuations and the
 associated titles of officials to be
 notified for each agency within the
 EPZs.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.2.  Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from the    50, Appendix E, Section
 requirement for the licensee to          IV.D.1.
 annually disseminate general
 information on emergency planning and
 evacuations within the plume exposure
 pathway EPZ. The need for signage or
 other measure to address transient
 populations is also being struck.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.3.  While the capability needs to
The NRC is granting exemption from        exist for the notification of
 portions of the rule language that       offsite government agencies
 would otherwise require the licensee     within a specified time
 to have the capability to make           period, previous exemptions
 notifications to State and local         have allowed for extending the
 government agencies within 15 minutes    State and local government
 of declaring an emergency.               agencies' notification time up
                                          to 60 minutes based on the
                                          site-specific justification
                                          provided.
                                         DEK's exemption request
                                          provides that the KPS will
                                          make notifications to the
                                          State of Wisconsin, to the
                                          local county (Kewaunee) and
                                          the NRC within 60 minutes of
                                          declaration of an event. In
                                          the permanently defueled
                                          condition of the reactor, the
                                          rapidly developing scenarios
                                          associated with events
                                          initiated during reactor power
                                          operation are no longer
                                          credible.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b) and 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b)(10).
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.4.  Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from the    50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3
 requirement for the licensee to obtain   regarding the alert and
 FEMA approval of its backup alert and    notification system
 notification capability.                 requirements.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       Due to the low probability of
 E.8.a.(i).                               design-basis accidents or
The NRC is granting exemption from        other credible events to
 portions of the rule language that       exceed the EPA PAGs at the
 would otherwise require the licensee     site boundary, the available
 to have an onsite technical support      time for event mitigation at a
 center and emergency operations          decommissioning reactor and,
 facility..                               if needed, to implement
                                          offsite protective actions
                                          using a CEMP, an emergency
                                          operations facility (EOF)
                                          would not be required to
                                          support offsite agency
                                          response. Onsite actions may
                                          be directed from the control
                                          room or other location,
                                          without the requirements
                                          imposed on a technical support
                                          center (TSC).

[[Page 65725]]

 
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       NUREG-0696, ``Functional
 E.8.a.(ii).                              Criteria for Emergency
The NRC is granting exemption from        Response Facilities,''
 portions of the rule language that       provides that the operational
 would otherwise require the licensee     support center (OSC) is an
 to have an onsite operational support    onsite area separate from the
 center.                                  control room and the TSC where
                                          licensee operations support
                                          personnel will assemble in an
                                          emergency. For a
                                          decommissioning power reactor,
                                          an OSC is no longer required
                                          to meet its original purpose
                                          of an assembly area for plant
                                          logistical support during an
                                          emergency. The OSC function
                                          can be incorporated into
                                          another facility.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 E.8.b. and subpart Sections IV           50.47(b)(3).
 E.8.b.(1)-E.8.b.(5).
The NRC is granting exemption from the
 requirements related to an offsite
 emergency operations facility
 location, space and size,
 communications capability, access to
 plant data and radiological
 information, and access to coping and
 office supplies.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 E.8.c. and Sections IV E.8.c.(1)-        50.47(b)(3).
 E.8.c.(3).
The NRC is granting exemption from the
 requirements to have an emergency
 operations facility with the
 capabilities to obtain and display
 plant data and radiological
 information; the capability to analyze
 technical information and provide
 briefings; and the capability to
 support events occurring at more than
 one site (if the emergency operations
 center supports more than one site).
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 E.8.d.                                   50, Appendix E, Section IV.1
The NRC is granting exemption from the    regarding hostile action.
 requirements to have an alternate
 facility that would be accessible even
 if the site is under threat of or
 experiencing hostile action, to
 function as a staging area for
 augmentation of emergency response
 staff.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 E.8.e.                                   50.47(b)(3).
The NRC is granting exemption from the
 requirement regarding the need for the
 licensee to comply with paragraph 8.b
 of this section
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 E.9.a.                                   50.47(b) and 10 CFR
The NRC is granting exemption from        50.47(b)(10).
 portions of the rule language that      Communications with State and
 would otherwise require the licensee     local governments that are not
 to have communications with State and    contiguous with or bordering
 local governments that are within the    the site boundary will no
 plume exposure pathway EPZ (which is     longer be required. However,
 no longer required by the exemption      the contiguous State and the
 granted to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)) but      local governments in which the
 are not contiguous with or bordering     nuclear facility is located
 on the licensee site boundary.           will still need to be informed
                                          of events and emergencies, so
                                          lines of communication must be
                                          maintained.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       Because of the low probability
 E.9.c.                                   of design-basis accidents or
The NRC is granting exemption from the    other credible events that
 requirements for communication and       would be expected to exceed
 testing provisions between the control   the EPA PAGs and the available
 room, the onsite technical support       time for event mitigation and,
 center, State/local emergency            if needed, implementation of
 operations facilities, and field         offsite protective actions
 assessment teams.                        using a CEMP, there is no need
                                          for the TSC, EOF, or offsite
                                          field assessment teams.
                                         Also refer to justification for
                                          10 CFR 50.47(b)(3).
                                          Communication with State and
                                          local emergency operation
                                          centers is maintained to
                                          coordinate assistance on site
                                          if required.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       The functions of the control
 E.9.d.                                   room, EOF, TSC, and OSC may be
The NRC is granting exemption from        combined into one or more
 portions of the rule language that       locations due to the smaller
 would otherwise require provisions for   facility staff and the greatly
 communications from the control room,    reduced required interaction
 onsite technical support center, and     with State and local emergency
 emergency operations facility with NRC   response facilities.
 Headquarters and appropriate Regional   Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
 Operations Center.                       50.47(b).
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.1   Decommissioning power reactor
 and Section IV F.1. v.iii.               sites typically have a level
The NRC is granting exemption from        of emergency response that
 portions of the rule language that       does not require additional
 would otherwise require the licensee     response by the licensee's
 to provide training and drills for the   headquarters personnel, Civil
 licensee's headquarters personnel,       Defense personnel, or local
 Civil Defense personnel, or local news   news media. Therefore, the NRC
 media.                                   staff considers it reasonable
                                          to exempt the licensee from
                                          training and drill
                                          requirements for these
                                          personnel.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.  Because of the low probability
The NRC is granting exemption from        of design basis accidents or
 portions of the rule language that       other credible events that
 would otherwise require testing of a     would be expected to exceed
 public alert and notification system.    the limits of EPA PAGs and the
                                          available time for event
                                          mitigation and offsite
                                          protective actions from a
                                          CEMP, the public alert and
                                          notification system will not
                                          be used and, therefore,
                                          requires no testing.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).

[[Page 65726]]

 
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       Due to the low probability of
 F.2.a. and Section IV F.2.a.(i)          design basis accidents or
 through IV F.2.a.(iii).                  other credible events that
The NRC is granting exemption from the    would be expected to exceed
 requirements for full participation      the limits of EPA PAGs, the
 exercises and the submittal of the       available time for event
 associated exercise scenarios to the     mitigation and, if necessary,
 NRC.                                     implementation of offsite
                                          protective actions using a
                                          CEMP, no formal offsite
                                          radiological emergency plans
                                          are required.
                                         The intent of submitting
                                          exercise scenarios at an
                                          operating power reactor site
                                          is to ensure that licensees
                                          utilize different scenarios in
                                          order to prevent the
                                          preconditioning of responders
                                          at power reactors. For
                                          decommissioning power reactor
                                          sites, there are limited
                                          events that could occur, and
                                          as such, the previously
                                          routine progression to general
                                          emergency in an operating
                                          power reactor site scenario is
                                          not applicable.
                                         The licensee would be exempt
                                          from 10 CFR.
                                         Part 50, Appendix E, Section
                                          IV.F.2.a.(i)-(iii) because the
                                          licensee would be exempt from
                                          the umbrella provision of 10
                                          CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
                                          Section IV.F.2.a.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 F.2.b.                                   50, Appendix E, Section
The NRC is granting exemption from        IV.F.2.a.
 portions of the rule language that      The low probability of design
 would otherwise require the licensee     basis accidents or other
 to submit scenarios for its biennial     credible events that would
 exercises of its onsite emergency        exceed the EPA PAGs, the
 plan. In addition, the NRC is granting   available time for event
 exemption from portions of the rule      mitigation and, if necessary,
 language that requires assessment of     implementation of offsite
 offsite releases, protective action      protective actions using a
 decision making, and reference to the    CEMP, render a TSC, OSC and
 Technical Support Center, Operations     EOF unnecessary. The principal
 Support Center, and the Emergency        functions required by
 Operations Facility.                     regulation can be performed at
                                          an onsite location that does
                                          not meet the requirements of
                                          the TSC, OSC or EOF.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 F.2.c. and Sections IV F.2.c.(1)         50, Appendix E, Section
 through F.2.c.(5).                       IV.F.2.a.
The NRC is granting exemption from the
 requirements regarding the need for
 the licensee to exercise offsite plans
 biennially with full participation by
 each offsite authority having a role
 under the radiological response plan.
 The NRC is also granting exemptions
 from the conditions for conducting
 these exercises (including hostile
 action exercises) if two different
 licensees have facilities on the same
 site or on adjacent, contiguous sites,
 or share most of the elements defining
 co-located licensees.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 F.2.d.                                   50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
The NRC is granting exemption from the
 requirements to obtain State
 participation in an ingestion pathway
 exercise and a hostile action
 exercise, with each State that has
 responsibilities, at least once per
 exercise cycle.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 F.2.e.                                   50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
The NRC is granting exemption from
 portions of the rule language that
 would otherwise require the licensee
 to allow participation exercise in
 licensee drills by any State and local
 Government in the plume exposure
 pathway EPZ when requested.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       The U.S. Federal Emergency
 F.2.f.                                   Management Agency is
The NRC is granting exemption from        responsible for evaluating the
 portions of the rule language that       adequacy of offsite response
 would otherwise require FEMA to          during an exercise. No action
 consult with the NRC on remedial         is expected from State or
 exercises. The NRC is granting           local government organizations
 exemption from portions of the rule      in response to an event at a
 language that discuss the extent of      decommissioning power reactor
 State and local participation in         site other than onsite
 remedial exercises.                      firefighting, law enforcement
                                          and ambulance/medical services
                                          support. A memorandum of
                                          understanding should be in
                                          place for those services.
                                          Offsite response organizations
                                          will continue to take actions
                                          on a comprehensive emergency
                                          planning basis to protect the
                                          health and safety of the
                                          public as they would at any
                                          other industrial site.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       Due to the low probability of
 F.2.i.                                   design basis accidents or
The NRC is granting exemption from        other credible events to
 portions of the rule language that       exceed the EPA PAGs, the
 would otherwise require the licensee     available time for event
 to drill and exercise scenarios that     mitigation and, if needed,
 include a wide spectrum of               implementation of offsite
 radiological release events and          protective actions using a
 hostile action.                          CEMP, the previously routine
                                          progression to general
                                          emergency in power reactor
                                          site scenarios is not
                                          applicable to a
                                          decommissioning site.
                                          Therefore, the licensee is not
                                          expected to demonstrate
                                          response to a wide spectrum of
                                          events.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          Part 50, Appendix E, Section
                                          IV.1 regarding hostile action.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV       Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 F.2.j.                                   50, Appendix E, Section
The NRC is granting exemption from the    IV.F.2.
 requirements regarding the need for
 the licensee's emergency response
 organization to demonstrate
 proficiency in key skills in the
 principal functional areas of
 emergency response. Additionally, the
 NRC is granting exemption during an
 eight calendar year exercise cycle,
 from demonstrating proficiency in the
 key skills necessary to respond to
 such scenarios as hostile actions,
 unplanned minimal radiological
 release, Sec.   50.54(hh)(2)
 implementation strategies, and
 scenarios involving rapid escalation
 to a Site Area Emergency or General
 Emergency.

[[Page 65727]]

 
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV I...  Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from the    50, Appendix E, Section
 requirements regarding the need for      IV.E.8.d.
 the licensee to develop a range of
 protective action for onsite personnel
 during hostile actions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. 2014-26292 Filed 11-4-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

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