Reliability Standard for Geomagnetic Disturbance Operations, 35911-35920 [2014-14849]
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Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
Vol. 79, No. 122
Wednesday, June 25, 2014
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Nuclear Regulatory
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ACTION: Direct Final Rule; Withdrawal.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is withdrawing a
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Transnuclear, Inc. Standardized
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DATES: Effective June 25, 2014, the NRC
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SUMMARY:
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On April
15, 2014 (79 FR 21121), the NRC
published in the Federal Register a
direct final rule amending its
regulations in part 72 of Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations to include
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Transnuclear, Inc. Standardized
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In the April 15, 2014, proposed rule,
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Docket ID NRC–2013–0271. The NRC
determined that at least one of the
comments is significant and adverse.
The comment, submitted by two
attorneys on behalf of 20 environmental
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concern that the direct final rule
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the transportation of high burnup fuel.’’
Although this amendment does not
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considers this comment to be a
significant adverse comment as defined
in Section I, Procedural Background, of
the direct final rule because the
comment raises an issue serious enough
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clarify or complete the record.
Therefore, the NRC is withdrawing the
direct final rule.
As stated in the April 15, 2014,
proposed rule, the NRC will address the
comments in a subsequent final rule.
The NRC will not initiate a second
comment period on this action.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day
of June, 2014.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Mark A. Satorius,
Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. 2014–14867 Filed 6–24–14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
18 CFR Part 40
[Docket No. RM14–1–000 Order No. 797]
Reliability Standard for Geomagnetic
Disturbance Operations
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
Pursuant to section 215 of the
Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (Commission)
approves Reliability Standard EOP–
010–1 (Geomagnetic Disturbance
Operations). The North American
Electric Reliability Corporation, the
Commission-certified Electric
Reliability Organization, submitted the
Reliability Standard for Commission
SUMMARY:
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approval in response to a Commission
directive in Order No. 779. Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 is designed to
mitigate the effects of geomagnetic
disturbances on the Bulk-Power System
by requiring responsible entities to
implement Operating Plans and
Operating Procedures or Processes.
DATES: This rule is effective August 25,
2014.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Michael Gandolfo (Technical
Information), Office of Electric
Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, Telephone:
(202) 502–6817,
Michael.Gandolfo@ferc.gov.
Matthew Vlissides (Legal Information),
Office of the General Counsel, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street NE., Washington, DC
20426, Telephone: (202) 502–8408,
Matthew.Vlissides@ferc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
147 FERC ¶ 61,209
Before Commissioners: Cheryl A.
LaFleur, Acting Chairman; Philip D.
Moeller, John R. Norris, and Tony
Clark.
Final Rule
(Issued June 19, 2014)
1. Pursuant to section 215 of the
Federal Power Act (FPA),1 the
Commission approves Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 (Geomagnetic
Disturbance Operations). The North
American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC), the Commissioncertified Electric Reliability
Organization (ERO), submitted the
Reliability Standard for Commission
approval in response to a Commission
directive in Order No. 779.2 The
Reliability Standard is designed to
mitigate the effects of geomagnetic
disturbances (GMD) on the Bulk-Power
System by requiring responsible entities
to implement Operating Plans and
Operating Procedures or Processes. The
Commission also approves the
associated violation risk factors and
violation severity levels,
implementation plan, and effective
dates proposed by NERC.
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I. Background
A. Section 215 and Mandatory
Reliability Standards
2. Section 215 of the FPA requires the
Commission to certify an ERO to
1 16
U.S.C. 824o.
2 Reliability Standards for Geomagnetic
Disturbances, Order No. 779, 78 FR 30,747 (May 23,
2013), 143 FERC ¶ 61,147, reh’g denied, 144 FERC
¶ 61,113 (2013).
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develop mandatory and enforceable
Reliability Standards, subject to
Commission review and approval.3
Once approved, the Reliability
Standards may be enforced in the
United States by the ERO, subject to
Commission oversight, or by the
Commission independently.4
B. Order No. 779
3. In Order No. 779, the Commission
directed NERC, pursuant to FPA section
215(d)(5), to develop and submit for
approval proposed Reliability Standards
that address the impact of GMDs on the
reliable operation of the Bulk-Power
System. The Commission based its
directive on the potentially severe,
wide-spread impact on the reliable
operation of the Bulk-Power System that
can be caused by GMD events and the
absence of existing Reliability Standards
to address GMD events.5
4. The Commission directed NERC to
implement the directive in two stages.
In the first stage, the Commission
directed NERC to submit, within six
months of the effective date of Order
No. 779, one or more Reliability
Standards (First Stage GMD Reliability
Standards) that require owners and
operators of the Bulk-Power System to
develop and implement operational
procedures to mitigate the effects of
GMDs consistent with the reliable
operation of the Bulk-Power System.6
5. In the second stage, the
Commission directed NERC to submit,
within 18 months of the effective date
of Order No. 779, one or more
Reliability Standards (Second Stage
GMD Reliability Standards) that require
owners and operators of the Bulk-Power
System to conduct initial and on-going
assessments of the potential impact of
benchmark GMD events on Bulk-Power
System equipment and the Bulk-Power
System as a whole. Order No. 779
directed that the Second Stage GMD
Reliability Standards must identify
benchmark GMD events that specify
what severity GMD events a responsible
entity must assess for potential impacts
on the Bulk-Power System.7 Order No.
779 explained that, if the assessments
identify potential impacts from
benchmark GMD events, the Reliability
Standards should require owners and
operators to develop and implement a
plan to protect against instability,
uncontrolled separation, or cascading
failures of the Bulk-Power System,
caused by damage to critical or
3 16
U.S.C. 824o.
4 Id. 824o(e).
5 Order No. 779, 143 FERC ¶ 61,147 at P 3.
6 Id. P 2.
7 Id.
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vulnerable Bulk-Power System
equipment, or otherwise, as a result of
a benchmark GMD event. The
Commission directed that the
development of this plan could not be
limited to considering operational
procedures or enhanced training alone,
but should, subject to the potential
impacts of the benchmark GMD events
identified in the assessments, contain
strategies for protecting against the
potential impact of GMDs based on
factors such as the age, condition,
technical specifications, system
configuration, or location of specific
equipment.8 Order No. 779 observed
that these strategies could, for example,
include automatically blocking
geomagnetically-induced currents (GIC)
from entering the Bulk-Power System,
instituting specification requirements
for new equipment, inventory
management, isolating certain
equipment that is not cost effective to
retrofit, or a combination thereof.
C. NERC Petition
6. On November 13, 2013, NERC
petitioned the Commission to approve
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1 and its
associated violation risk factors and
violation severity levels,
implementation plan, and effective
dates. In the petition, NERC states that
the Reliability Standard is just,
reasonable, not unduly discriminatory
or preferential, and in the public
interest. NERC maintains that the
Reliability Standard satisfies the
Commission’s directive in Order No.
779 corresponding to the development
and submission of the First Stage GMD
Reliability Standards.
7. NERC states that, consistent with
Order No. 779 and the NERC Functional
Model, Reliability Standard EOP–010–1
applies to reliability coordinators and
transmission operators with a
‘‘Transmission Operator Area that
includes a power transformer with a
high side wye-grounded winding with
terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.’’ 9
NERC explains that the Reliability
Standard has three requirements: (1)
Requirement R1 addresses coordination
by reliability coordinators within their
areas; (2) Requirement R2 addresses the
dissemination of space weather
information by reliability coordinators
to ensure that entities within a
reliability coordinator area have the
appropriate information necessary to
8 Id.
9 NERC Petition at 8 (‘‘A power transformer with
a ‘high side wye-grounded winding’ refers to a
power transformer with windings on the high
voltage side that are connected in a wye
configuration and have a grounded neutral
connection.’’).
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take action and that the same
information is available to all entities;
and (3) Requirement R3 requires
transmission operators to develop GMD
Operating Procedures or Processes.
8. NERC states that Requirement R1
requires each reliability coordinator to
develop, maintain, and implement a
GMD Operating Plan that coordinates
the GMD Operating Procedures or
Operating Processes within its
reliability coordinator area.10 NERC
explains that each reliability
coordinator is required to ensure that
GMD Operating Procedures and
Operating Processes in its reliability
coordinator area are not in conflict, but
a reliability coordinator will not review
the technical aspects of the GMD
Operating Procedures and Operating
Processes.11 Instead, according to NERC,
each transmission operator will be
responsible for the technical aspects of
its Operating Procedures and Operating
Processes. NERC further states that
Requirement R1 requires each reliability
coordinator to describe the activities
that must be undertaken in order to
mitigate the effects of a GMD event.
NERC explains that, pursuant to
Reliability Standard IRO–001–1.1, each
reliability coordinator has decisionmaking authority to act and to direct
actions to be taken by transmission
operators, balancing authorities,
generator operators, transmission
service providers, load-serving entities,
and purchasing-selling entities within
its reliability coordinator area to
preserve the reliability of the bulk
electric system.
9. NERC states that Requirement R2
requires each reliability coordinator to
disseminate space weather information
to ensure coordination and consistent
awareness in its reliability coordinator
area. NERC maintains that entrusting
this responsibility to reliability
coordinators is appropriate given the
reliability coordinator’s wide-area view.
NERC also explains that Requirement
R2 replaces existing Requirement R3 of
10 Operating Plan, Operating Procedure, and
Operating Process are existing terms defined in the
Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability
Standards. See Glossary of Terms Used in NERC
Reliability Standards (effective November 21, 2013)
at 49–50.
11 NERC explains that ‘‘if Company A submitted
an Operating Procedure proposing to take Line X
out of service under specified GMD conditions, and
Company B submitted an Operating Procedure that
relies on Line X remaining in service in the event
of a GMD—it is the responsibility of the Reliability
Coordinator to identify this conflict.’’ NERC Petition
at 11–12 (emphasis in original). Beyond identifying
a conflict and requiring its resolution by Company
A and Company B, NERC states that the review is
‘‘not intended to be a review by the Reliability
Coordinator of the technical aspects of the GMD
Operating Procedures or Processes.’’ Id. at 11.
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Reliability Standard IRO–005–3.1a,
which currently addresses
dissemination of information regarding
GMD forecasts.12
10. NERC states that Requirement R3
requires each transmission operator to
develop GMD Operating Procedures or
Operating Processes to address GMD
events. NERC explains that Requirement
R3 is not prescriptive and allows each
transmission operator to tailor its
Operating Procedures or Operating
Processes based on the transmission
operator’s assessment of entity-specific
factors, such as geography, geology, and
system topology. According to NERC,
Requirement R3 requires each
transmission operator to specify: (1)
Steps or tasks that must be conducted to
receive space weather information; (2)
what actions must be taken under what
conditions, and such conditions must be
predetermined; and (3) when and under
what conditions the Operating
Procedure or Operating Process is
exited. NERC maintains that Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 does not prescribe
specific actions that must be taken by
responsible entities because ‘‘a ‘one-size
fits all’ approach to crafting GMD
Reliability Standards would fail to
recognize the important role of
locational differences.’’ 13
11. NERC proposes that Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 become effective
the ‘‘first day of the first calendar
quarter that is six months after the date
that this standard is approved by an
applicable governmental authority.’’ 14
However, NERC states that Requirement
R2 of Reliability Standard EOP–010–1,
pertaining to reliability coordinator
dissemination of space weather
information, is meant to replace existing
Requirement R3 of Reliability Standard
IRO–005–3.1a, which includes similar
language. Therefore, to avoid
duplicative requirements being enforced
at the same time, NERC proposes that,
if Reliability Standard EOP–010–1
becomes effective prior to the retirement
of Reliability Standard IRO–005–3.1a,
then Requirement R2 of Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 will not become
effective until the first day following
retirement of Reliability Standard IRO–
005–3.1a.
D. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
12. On January 16, 2014, the
Commission issued a Notice of
12 According to NERC, Reliability Standard IRO–
005–3.1a will be retired once the Commission
approves proposed Reliability Standard IRO–005–4,
which is currently pending before the Commission.
NERC Petition at 13.
13 NERC Petition at 14.
14 NERC Petition, Exhibit B (Implementation
Plan) at 2.
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35913
Proposed Rulemaking that proposed to
approve Reliability Standard EOP–010–
1 as just, reasonable, not unduly
discriminatory or preferential, and in
the public interest based on the
Commission’s review of NERC’s petition
and supporting exhibits.15 The NOPR
stated that the Reliability Standard
satisfies the directive in Order No. 779
that NERC submit one or more
Reliability Standards that require
owners and operators of the Bulk-Power
System to develop and implement
operational procedures to mitigate the
effects of GMDs consistent with the
reliable operation of the Bulk-Power
System. The NOPR also stated that the
Reliability Standard is consistent with
the guidance in Order No. 779 that
NERC develop Reliability Standards
that, rather than require specific
operational procedures, require
responsible entities to develop and
implement entity-specific operational
procedures because owners and
operators of the Bulk-Power System are
most familiar with their own equipment
and system configurations.16 The NOPR
further stated that the Reliability
Standard requires coordination of
operational procedures and processes,
overseen by a functional entity with a
wide-area perspective (i.e., reliability
coordinators), which is consistent with
the guidance in Order No. 779.17
13. In response to the NOPR, the
Commission received 20 sets of
comments. We address below the issues
raised in the comments. The Appendix
to this Final Rule lists the entities that
filed comments in response to the
NOPR.
II. Discussion
14. Pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(2),
we approve Reliability Standard EOP–
010–1 as just, reasonable, not unduly
discriminatory or preferential, and in
the public interest. As the Commission
stated in Order No. 779, ‘‘operational
procedures, while not a complete
solution, constitute an important first
step to addressing the GMD reliability
gap because they can be implemented
relatively quickly . . . [and]
[o]perational procedures may help
alleviate abnormal system conditions
due to transformer absorption of
reactive power during GMD events,
helping to stabilize system voltage
swings, and may potentially isolate
some equipment from being damaged or
15 Reliability Standard for Geomagnetic
Disturbance Operations, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 79 FR 3547 (Jan. 22, 2014), 146 FERC
¶ 61,015 (2014) (NOPR).
16 Id. P 38.
17 Id.
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misoperated.’’ 18 We determine that
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1
addresses the directive in Order No. 779
that NERC submit one or more
Reliability Standards that require
owners and operators of the Bulk-Power
System to develop and implement
operational procedures to mitigate the
effects of GMDs consistent with the
reliable operation of the Bulk-Power
System.19 We also determine that the
Reliability Standard is consistent with
the guidance in Order No. 779 that
NERC develop Reliability Standards
that, rather than require specific
operational procedures, require
responsible entities to develop and
implement entity-specific operational
procedures because owners and
operators of the Bulk-Power System are
most familiar with their own equipment
and system configurations.20 Further,
we determine that the Reliability
Standard requires coordination of
operational procedures and processes,
overseen by a functional entity with a
wide-area perspective (i.e., reliability
coordinators), which is also consistent
with the guidance in Order No. 779.21
15. Several commenters support
approval of Reliability Standard EOP–
010–1 without modification.22 We
address below the following issues
raised by other commenters: (A) the
applicability section of Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1; (B) effectiveness
of GMD operational procedures; (C)
implementation plan; and (D) other
issues. We also address below the
violation risk factors and violation
severity levels associated with
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1.
A. Applicability Section of Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1
NERC Petition
16. NERC submitted a white paper as
part of its petition explaining the
technical justification for applying
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1 only to
transmission operators that operate a
power transformer with a high side wyegrounded winding with terminal voltage
greater than 200 kV in their
transmission operator areas.23 In
another white paper, NERC explains its
18 Order
No. 779, 143 FERC ¶ 61,147 at P 36.
Standard EOP–010–1 only addresses
the First Stage GMD Reliability Standards directed
in Order No. 779. The Reliability Standard does not
address the Second Stage GMD Reliability
Standards, which NERC indicates are under
development. NERC Petition at 3.
20 Order No. 779, 143 FERC ¶ 61,147 at P 38.
21 Id.
22 See comments submitted by NERC, IRC, EEI,
Chamber of Commerce, Dominion, AEP, ITC, and
ASO.
23 NERC Petition, Exhibit D (White Paper
Supporting Network Applicability) at 1.
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19 Reliability
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proposal regarding the applicability of
the Reliability Standard to reliability
coordinators and transmission operators
only.24 The White Paper Supporting
Functional Entity Applicability explains
that the reliability coordinator has
‘‘responsibility and authority for reliable
operation within the Reliability
Coordinator Area (RCA) . . . and
includes a wide-area view with
situational awareness of neighboring
RCAs.’’ 25 NERC states that including
reliability coordinators as applicable
entities ‘‘provides the necessary
coordination for planning and real-time
actions.’’ 26 With respect to transmission
operators, NERC explains that ‘‘[l]ike
the [reliability coordinator], the
[transmission operator] has
responsibility and authority for the
reliable operation of the transmission
system within a specified area.’’ 27 In
addition, NERC justifies omitting
balancing authorities and generator
operators from the scope of the
Reliability Standard. NERC explains
that balancing authorities ‘‘can be
expected to address GMD impacts
through use of generation . . . [but] the
[balancing authority] would not initiate
actions unilaterally during a GMD event
and would instead respond to the
direction of the [transmission operator]
and [reliability coordinator].’’ 28 As for
generator operators, NERC states that
some generator operators ‘‘would not
have the technical basis for taking steps
[to mitigate GMDs] on [their] own and
would instead take steps based on the
[reliability coordinator’s] or
[transmission operator’s] Operating
Plans, Processes, or Procedures.’’ 29
NERC also notes that generator owners
and generator operators will be
considered for inclusion in the Second
Stage GMD Reliability Standards,
‘‘which will require applicable entities
to conduct vulnerability assessment and
develop appropriate mitigation
strategies . . . [and that] [s]uch
mitigation strategies could include the
development of Operating Procedures
for applicable [generator owners] and
[generator operators].’’ 30
NOPR
17. The NOPR stated that the
applicability designations in Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 are appropriate,
based on the justifications set forth in
the white papers in Exhibits D and E of
NERC’s petition.
Comments
18. Foundation, SmartSense, AFS,
and Baker maintain that Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 should be
applicable to more entities than
transmission operators having a power
transformer with a high side wyegrounded winding with terminal voltage
greater than 200 kV in the transmission
operator area.
19. Foundation states that during the
March 1989 solar storm discussed in
Order No. 779, electric utilities reported
effects on static VAR compensators and
other reactive power equipment
operating between 100 kV and 200 kV.
Foundation notes that such equipment
is ‘‘designed to provide reactive power
and to stabilize transmission networks
during GMD.’’ 31 Foundation states that
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1 ‘‘would
exempt Transmission Operators with
equipment operating between 100 kV
and 200 kV.’’ 32 Foundation requests
that the Commission remand Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 to include
‘‘owners and operators of all stabilizing
and reactive power equipment operating
between 100 kV and 200 kV.’’ 33
20. Foundation and SmartSense assert
that the 200 kV threshold for
transmission operators is inconsistent
with the Commission-approved
definition of bulk electric system, which
generally includes assets operating at
voltages of 100 kV and higher.
SmartSense asserts that there is
evidence that elements of the BulkPower System operating between 100
kV and 200kV would be substantially
affected by a GMD event. In support,
SmartSense cites to an Oak Ridge
National Laboratory GMD Study and an
article from the Idaho National
Laboratory, which SmartSense states
tested sub-200 kV transformers.34
SmartSense further claims that NERC
improperly relied on a cost-benefit
analysis to exclude networks operating
at 200 kV and below.
21. Foundation, AFS, EMP Coalition,
Kappenman, and Baker maintain that
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1 should
31 Foundation
33 Id.
at 13.
34 SmartSense
24 NERC
Petition, Exhibit E (White Paper
Supporting Functional Entity Applicability).
25 Id. at 2.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 3–4.
29 Id. at 4.
30 Id.
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Comments at 10.
32 Id.
Comments at 10–11 (citing Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, Electromagnetic Pulse:
Effects on the U.S. Power Grid: Meta-R–319 at page
4–14 (January 2010), available at https://
www.ornl.gov/sci/ees/etsd/pes/pubs/ferc_Meta-R319.pdf; Idaho National Laboratory, INL Broadens
Understanding of Solar Storms (December 16,
2013), available at https://inlportal.inl.gov/portal/
server.pt/community/newsroom/257/feature_story_
details/1269?featurestory=DA_615269).
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be applicable to generator operators
and/or balancing authorities.
22. Foundation states that balancing
authorities have real-time
responsibilities that would be essential
during a GMD event. Foundation asserts
that excluding balancing authorities
from the applicability section of
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1 is
‘‘operationally unworkable’’ because it
‘‘assumes that the real time
responsibilities of Balancing Authorities
under fast-moving GMD conditions
could be assumed by Reliability
Coordinators.’’ 35 Foundation states that
the NOAA Space Weather Prediction
Center would only provide 15–60
minutes warning of a severe solar storm.
Foundation asserts that, given the 15–60
minute limitation, there would be
insufficient time for reliability
coordinators to communicate with
balancing authorities, transmission
operators, and generator operators
following a solar storm warning because
the NERC Reliability Standards require
three-part communications when
engaging in oral, two-party
communications.
23. Foundation and Kappenman also
maintain that Reliability Standard EOP–
010–1 does not address generator step
up (GSU) transformers, which they
assert are vulnerable to GMDs.
Foundation contends that generator
operators have been installing GIC
monitors for their GSU transformers and
have taken actions to downrate their
GSU transformers during solar storms.
Foundation also notes that the NERC
GMD Task Force developed an
Operating Procedure Template for
generator operators.
Commission Determination
24. We determine that the
applicability section of Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 is technically
justified and consistent with Order No.
779, both in terms of using a 200 kV
threshold for determining applicable
transmission operators and not
including balancing authorities and
generator operators as applicable
entities.
25. We reject the argument that the
applicability threshold in Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 is inconsistent
with the definition of bulk electric
system because it excludes transmission
operators with only 200 kV transformers
and below. Instead, we determine that
the applicability section of Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 complies with the
directive in Order No. 779 that the First
Stage GMD Reliability Standards should
mitigate the effects of GMDs consistent
35 Foundation
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with the reliable operation of the BulkPower System.36 The NERC petition and
White Paper Supporting Network
Applicability provide an adequate
technical basis to conclude that
transformers operating at 200 kV and
below are likely to have a limited
impact on the Bulk-Power System
during a GMD event. We are not
persuaded by the Foundation
comments, discussed above, which do
not refute this conclusion, or the
materials cited by SmartSense.
SmartSense cites a table in the Oak
Ridge Laboratory GMD Study
identifying at-risk transformers
operating at 345 kV, which fall within
the applicability criteria.37 Moreover,
the Oak Ridge Laboratory GMD Study
found that significantly higher GIC
flows occur at higher operating
voltages.38
26. The applicability criteria for
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1
determine which transmission operators
must comply with the Reliability
Standard (i.e., those with a power
transformer with a high side wyegrounded winding with terminal voltage
greater than 200 kV in the transmission
operator area). While this criterion
excludes transmission operators
operating transformers 200 kV and
below, the 200 kV threshold does not
mean that applicable transmission
operators will ignore reactive power
supplies operating at 200 kV or below
on their systems when developing the
required GMD Operating Procedures or
Operating Processes. Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1, Requirement R3
supports this conclusion because it
directs each applicable transmission
operator to ‘‘develop, maintain, and
36 Order No. 779, 143 FERC ¶ 61,147 at P 29; see
also 16 U.S.C. 824o(a)(3) (‘‘The term ‘reliability
standard’ means a requirement . . . to provide for
the reliable operation of the bulk-power system.’’);
Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk-Power
System, Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶
31,242, at PP 97–98, order on reh’g, Order No. 693–
A, 120 FERC ¶ 61,053 (2007) (explaining that each
Reliability Standard will identify the set of users,
owners and operators that must comply with that
standard and ‘‘NERC has indicated that in the
future it may add to a Reliability Standard
limitations on applicability based on electric
facility characteristics such as generator nameplate
ratings’’).
37 SmartSense Comments at 10 n.31 (citing Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, Electromagnetic Pulse:
Effects on the U.S. Power Grid: Meta-R–319 at page
4–14).
38 Id. at page 1–15 (‘‘The operating voltage of the
transmission network is an important factor in
determining the level of GIC flow that will occur
on each part of the U.S. power grid. At the higher
operating voltages, there are pronounced trends
that: the average length of each line increases and
the average circuit resistance decreases. These
trends result in larger GIC flows in the higher
voltage portions of the network, given the same geoelectric field conditions.’’).
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implement a GMD Operating Procedure
or Operating Process to mitigate the
effects of GMD events on the reliable
operation of its respective system.’’
Accordingly, because Requirement R3
addresses an applicable transmission
operator’s entire system, the
requirement is not limited to
transformers operating above 200 kV for
the purposes of developing GMD
Operating Procedures or Operating
Processes by applicable transmission
operators.39
27. The Idaho National Laboratory
article cited by SmartSense stated that a
simulated solar event affected ‘‘a pair of
138kV core form, 2 winding substation
transformers, which had been in-service
at [Idaho National Laboratory] since the
1950s,’’ through increased losses and
generation of harmonics that resulted in
loss of excitation.40 The Idaho National
Laboratory article does not contradict
NERC’s technical analysis, however.
NERC does not contend that GMD
events will have no effect on networks
operating at 200 kV and below. Rather,
the standard drafting team found that
geomagnetically-induced currents
generated on networks operated at 200
kV and below would be significantly
less than those operated at higher
voltages, a finding that is consistent
with the Oak Ridge Laboratory GMD
Study. Specifically, NERC’s modeling of
a portion of the Eastern Interconnection
showed only a small change in system
impact from a GMD event when 115 kV
and 161 kV circuits were excluded from
the model.41 The materials cited in the
comments do not rebut NERC’s
technical analysis. In sum, we
determine that there is adequate
technical justification for the 200 kV
threshold for transmission operators.42
28. We also determine that NERC
provided adequate justification not to
include balancing authorities and
generator operators in the applicability
section of Reliability Standard EOP–
39 See NERC Petition at 14 (‘‘An Operating
Procedure or Operating Process is maintained when
it is kept relevant by taking into consideration
system configuration, conditions or operating
experiences, as needed to accomplish its purpose.
Requirement R3 . . . allows entities to tailor their
Operational Procedures or Processes based on the
responsible entity’s assessment of entity-specific
factors, such as geography, geology, and system
topology.’’).
40 Idaho National Laboratory, INL Broadens
Understanding of Solar Storms (December 16,
2013), available at https://inlportal.inl.gov/portal/
server.pt/community/newsroom/257/feature_story_
details/1269?featurestory=DA_615269).
41 NERC Petition, Exhibit D (White Paper
Supporting Network Applicability) at 8 (Table A2).
42 As we conclude that NERC provided adequate
technical justification for the 200 kV applicability
threshold, there is no reason to address
SmartSense’s assertion that NERC improperly based
the 200 kV threshold on a cost-benefit analysis.
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010–1. We disagree with Foundation’s
assertion that balancing authorities
should be included in the applicability
section because reliability coordinators
are incapable of communicating quickly
with transmission operators, generator
operators, and balancing authorities due
to the three-part communications
requirement in Reliability Standard
COM–002–2. We are not persuaded that
GMD events pose unique
communication problems for reliability
coordinators because a reliability
coordinator may only have 15–60
minutes warning of a severe solar storm.
Reliability coordinators are responsible
for real-time system reliability and often
must respond quickly or even
immediately to Bulk-Power System
events with little or no warning.43
Reliability Standard COM–002–2,
Requirement R1 recognizes this
responsibility by stating that ‘‘[e]ach
Transmission Operator, Balancing
Authority, and Generator Operator shall
have communications (voice and data
links) with appropriate Reliability
Coordinators, Balancing Authorities,
and Transmission Operators . . . [and]
[s]uch communications shall be staffed
and available for addressing a real-time
emergency condition.’’
29. With respect to generator
operators, there is no dispute that GSU
transformers are susceptible to
geomagnetically-induced currents.
While generator operators are not listed
as applicable entities in Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1, NERC explains
that generator operators will have to act
during a GMD event when directed by
a reliability coordinator, in accordance
with its reliability coordiantor’s GMD
Operating Plan, or by a transmission
operator, in accordance with its
transmission operator’s GMD Operating
Procedures or Operating Processes.44
We are not persuaded that generator
operators should be required to act
independently under Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1. While generator
operators might be, as Foundation
asserts, increasingly installing GIC
monitoring equipment, there is no
evidence in the record regarding the
proportion of generator operators with
GIC monitoring capabilities.
Accordingly, we agree with NERC that
at least some generator operators would
not have the technical basis to address
a GMD event and would instead need to
rely on reliability coordinators and
43 NERC, Reliability Functional Model Technical
Document, Version 5, at 7 (Approved May 2010),
available at https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/
Functional%20Model%20Archive%201/FM_
Technical_Document_V5_2009Dec1.pdf.
44 NERC Petition, Exhibit E (White Paper
Supporting Functional Entity Applicability) at 2–4.
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transmission operators for direction.45
We also note that the Geomagnetic
Disturbance Operating Procedure
Template for generator operators
developed by the NERC GMD Task
Force, which the Foundation’s
comments reference, conditions some of
its suggested actions on the generator
operator having adequate monitoring
systems.46 In sum, we are not persuaded
by Foundation’s comments and, rather,
determine that there is adequate
justification in the record for not
including balancing authorities and
generator operators in the applicability
section of Reliability Standard EOP–
010–1.47
B. Effectiveness of GMD Operational
Procedures
NERC Petition
30. NERC states, quoting Order No.
779, that ‘‘[o]perational procedures may
help alleviate abnormal system
conditions due to transformer
absorption of reactive power during
GMD events, helping to stabilize system
voltage swings, and may potentially
isolate some equipment from being
damaged or misoperated.’’ 48 NERC
explains that Reliability Standard EOP–
010–1 ‘‘is an important first step in
addressing the issue of GMDs and can
be implemented relatively quickly.
While responsible entities will develop
and implement Operational Procedures
or Operational Processes, NERC will
continue to support those efforts
through the GMD Task Force, for
example, by identifying and sharing
Operating Plans, Processes, and
Procedures found to be the most
effective.’’ 49
NOPR
31. The NOPR stated that Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 satisfies the
directive in Order No. 779 that NERC
submit one or more Reliability
Standards that require owners and
45 Id.
at 4.
Geomagnetic Disturbance Operating
Procedure Template Generator Operator, at 1,
available at https://www.nerc.com/docs/pc/gmdtf/
Template_GOP.pdf (‘‘Some actions listed below
should only be undertaken if supported by an
adequate GIC impact study and/or if adequate
monitoring systems are available. Otherwise they
can make matters worse.’’).
47 While not basing our determination on NERC’s
representation or pre-judging what NERC ultimately
submits in the Second Stage GMD Reliability
Standards, we note NERC’s statement that the
standard drafting team for the Second Stage GMD
Reliability Standards is considering including
generator owners and generator operators in the
applicability section of that proposed Reliability
Standard. NERC Petition, Exhibit E at 4.
48 NERC Petition at 3 (quoting Order No. 779, 143
FERC ¶ 61,147 at P 36).
49 Id. at 3–4.
46 NERC,
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operators of the Bulk-Power System to
develop and implement operational
procedures to mitigate the effects of
GMDs consistent with the reliable
operation of the Bulk-Power System.
The NOPR also stated that operational
procedures, while not a complete
solution, constitute an important first
step to addressing the GMD reliability
gap.
Comments
32. SmartSense and Orquin state that
GMD operational procedures depend on
the limited ability to predict GMD
events. SmartSense states that space
weather information is the ‘‘default
trigger’’ for implementing operating
procedures under Reliability Standard
EOP–010–1 but that space weather
forecasts have a high error rate.
SmartSense contends that relying on
space weather forecasts alone will result
in false alarms or missed GMD event
forecasts. SmartSense maintains that
real-time or near real-time monitoring
data should be used in conjunction with
space weather forecasts to trigger GMD
operational procedures.
33. Baker states that operational
procedures will be ineffective because:
(1) Grid operators will be reluctant to
take action during a GMD event (e.g.,
shed load); (2) the warning period for
solar storms does not allow enough time
for grid operators to take action; (3) grid
operators will not have enough
situational awareness to know how to
take action during a GMD event; (4)
there is no capacity to address GMD
events on a national scale; (5)
operational procedures have been
shown to be inadequate in other
contexts; (6) equipment failure may
undermine the grid operators’ ability to
respond; (7) GMD events will disrupt
communication networks used by grid
operators; (8) the potential effects of a
GMD event on the Bulk-Power System
are too complex to anticipate; and (9)
Regional Transmission Organizations
and Independent System Operators do
not have the authority to shut down the
grid in neighboring Regions. Foundation
states that grid operators will have to act
blindly during a GMD event because
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1 does
not require GIC monitoring or
mandatory sharing of GIC monitoring
data. Foundation also states that
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1 is
ineffective because it does not require
‘‘quantified contingency planning.’’
Orquin maintains that operational
procedures are of limited value and
recommends using monitoring
equipment and blocking devices at least
as a back-up measure.
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Commission Determination
34. As the Commission stated in
Order No. 779, operational procedures
are not a complete solution to the risks
posed by a GMD event to the BulkPower System. Order No. 779 directed
NERC to develop Reliability Standards
that require operational procedures
because such Reliability Standards
could be developed and implemented
relatively quickly. While we recognize
the concerns in the comments of Baker
and others regarding the efficacy of
operational procedures, Order No. 779
weighed those concerns in ultimately
directing NERC to develop operational
procedures in the First Stage GMD
Reliability Standards and more
comprehensive protections in the
Second Stage GMD Reliability
Standards.50 We affirm the
determination in Order No. 779 that
operational procedures constitute ‘‘an
important first step to addressing the
GMD reliability gap because they can be
implemented relatively quickly . . .
[and] may help alleviate abnormal
system conditions due to transformer
absorption of reactive power during
GMD events, helping to stabilize system
voltage swings, and may potentially
isolate some equipment from being
damaged or misoperated.’’ 51
35. With respect to the concerns
raised by SmartSense regarding
overreliance on space weather forecasts
to trigger GMD operational procedures,
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1 does
not mandate the use of space weather to
trigger the GMD operational procedures.
While Requirement R2 requires
reliability coordinators to disseminate
current and forecasted space weather
conditions to the appropriate functional
entities, Requirement R3 requires
transmission operators to develop
Operating Procedures or Operating
Processes that, at a minimum, include
‘‘System Operator actions to be initiated
based on predetermined conditions.’’
Those ‘‘predetermined conditions’’
might include space weather
information or other data, including GIC
monitoring data, if available.
Requirement R3 ultimately leaves it to
the transmission operator to define the
predetermined conditions in its
Operating Procedure or Operating
Process. Accordingly, we disagree that
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1
requires that initiation of GMD
operating procedures be based upon
space weather only.
50 In Order No. 779, the Commission noted that
some entities have already implemented
operational procedures that address GMD events.
Order No. 779, 143 FERC ¶ 61,147 at P 37.
51 Order No. 779, 143 FERC ¶ 61,147 at P 36.
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36. We are not persuaded that the
First Stage GMD Reliability Standards
should require all responsible entities to
monitor GICs or mandate sharing GIC
monitoring data with reliability
coordinators, as Foundation contends.
As explained above, we directed NERC
to develop only operational procedures
in the First Stage GMD Reliability
Standards, and to develop more
comprehensive protections in the
Second Stage GMD Reliability
Standards. The issue of monitoring
requirements properly belongs in the
Second Stage GMD Reliability
Standards.52
37. In terms of real-time sharing of
GIC information with reliability
coordinators, we note that Reliability
Standard COM–002–2, Requirement
R1.1 states that ‘‘[e]ach Balancing
Authority and Transmission Operator
shall notify its Reliability Coordinator,
and all other potentially affected
Balancing Authorities and Transmission
Operators through predetermined
communication paths of any condition
that could threaten the reliability of its
area or when firm load shedding is
anticipated.’’ Accordingly, if a
transmission operator monitors GIC
levels that could threaten the reliability
of its area of the Bulk-Power System, the
transmission operator would have to
communicate that information to its
reliability coordinator.53 With respect to
Foundation’s comment that Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 should include
‘‘quantified contingency planning,’’
Foundation does not explain the
meaning of this term. In any case, we
note that Reliability Standard EOP–010–
1, Requirement R3 requires applicable
transmission operators to ‘‘develop,
maintain, and implement a GMD
Operating Procedure or Operating
Process to mitigate the effects of GMD
events on the reliable operation of its
respective system.’’
C. Implementation Plan and Effective
Dates
NERC Petition
38. The NERC petition proposes that
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1 become
effective the ‘‘first day of the first
calendar quarter that is six months after
the date that this standard is approved
by an applicable governmental
52 We will also consider then the need for the
Second Stage GMD Reliability Standard’s planning
requirements to integrate appropriately with the
First Stage GMD Reliability Standard’s operating
requirements.
53 We do not address here the issue of access to
GMD monitoring data for other purposes, such as
reassessing the benchmark GMD event, since this
issue too belongs properly in the Second Stage
GMD Reliability Standards.
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authority.’’ 54 However, NERC states that
Requirement R2 of Reliability Standard
EOP–010–1, pertaining to reliability
coordinator dissemination of space
weather information, is meant to replace
existing Requirement R3 of Reliability
Standard IRO–005–3.1a, which includes
similar language. Therefore, to avoid
duplicative requirements being enforced
at the same time, NERC proposes that,
if Reliability Standard EOP–010–1
becomes effective prior to the retirement
of Reliability Standard IRO–005–3.1a,
then Requirement R2 of Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 will not become
effective until the first day following
retirement of Reliability Standard IRO–
005–3.1a.55 According to NERC’s
petition, Requirements R1 and R3 of
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1 are not
affected by the possible retirement of
IRO–05–3.1a and, thus, will be effective
the first day of the first calendar quarter
that is six months after the date that the
Reliability Standard is approved by an
applicable governmental authority.56
NOPR
39. The NOPR proposed to approve
NERC’s implementation plan and
effective dates for Reliability Standard
EOP–010–1.
54 NERC Petition, Exhibit B (Implementation
Plan) at 2.
55 We agree with NERC that Reliability Standard
IRO–005–3.1a, Requirement R3, which requires that
‘‘[e]ach Reliability Coordinator shall ensure its
Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities
are aware of Geo-Magnetic Disturbance (GMD)
forecast information and assist as needed in the
development of any required response plans,’’ and
Requirement R2 of Reliability Standard EOP–010–
1, which requires that ‘‘[e]ach Reliability
Coordinator shall disseminate forecasted and
current space weather information to functional
entities identified as recipients in the Reliability
Coordinator’s GMD Operating Plan,’’ are largely
duplicative in that both requirements require the
dissemination of GMD forecast information, at a
minimum, to applicable transmission operators.
56 NERC Petition, Exhibit B (Implementation
Plan) at 2. On April 16, 2013, NERC submitted a
petition requesting approval of three revised IRO
Reliability Standards and the retirement or revision
of six currently-effective Reliability Standards,
including IRO–005–3.1a (Docket No. RM13–15–
000). On November 21, 2013, the Commission
issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that, inter
alia, proposes to remand the proposed IRO
Reliability Standards and related retirements and
revisions. See Monitoring System Conditions—
Transmission Operations Reliability Standard,
Transmission Operation Reliability Standards,
Interconnection Reliability Operations and
Coordination Reliability Standards, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 78 FR 73,112 (Dec. 5, 2013),
145 FERC ¶ 61,158 (2013). On January 14, 2014, the
Commission granted NERC’s motion to defer action,
until January 31, 2015, on the rulemaking in Docket
No. RM13–15–000. Monitoring System Conditions—
Transmission Operations Reliability Standard,
Transmission Operation Reliability Standards,
Interconnection Reliability Operations and
Coordination Reliability Standards, 146 FERC ¶
61,023 (2014).
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Comments
40. APS states that a six-month
implementation period is not a
sufficient amount of time to create a
new Operating Process or Operating
Procedure. APS explains that it will
develop an Operation Process or
Operating Procedure after its reliability
coordinator develops an Operating Plan
that identifies the activities designed to
mitigate the effects of GMD events on
the Bulk-Power System. APS states that
its Operating Process or Operating
Procedure will then be reviewed by the
reliability coordinator, and that it is
unrealistic to expect all this to be done
in six months. APS proposes allowing
the reliability coordinator six months to
develop its Operating Plan and then
allowing transmission operators a
further six months to develop their
Operating Processes or Operating
Procedures.
Commission Determination
41. We determine that a six-month
implementation period, as proposed by
NERC, allows enough time for reliability
coordinators and transmission operators
to implement the requirements of
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1. Only
APS indicates that a six-month period
does not afford applicable entities
enough time to implement the
Reliability Standard. No other
commenter expresses similar concerns.
Further, we see no reason why, as APS
contends, a transmission operator must
wait until its reliability coordinator has
completed its Operating Plan before the
transmission operator begins work on its
Operating Process or Operating
Procedure. Reliability coordinators and
transmission operators should be able to
work largely in parallel and coordinate
their efforts to implement the
requirements of the Reliability
Standard. Accordingly, we approve the
implementation plan and effective dates
proposed by NERC.
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D. Other Issues
42. Commenters express concern that
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1 does
not address electromagnetic pulses
(EMPs).57 However, Order No. 779
explicitly stated that EMPs were not
within the scope of that rulemaking,
which led to NERC’s petition here.58
Likewise, Reliability Standard EOP–
010–1 is responsive to the Commission
directive, and comments critiquing the
Reliability Standard for not addressing
57 See comments submitted by Orquin, EMP,
Stolov, and Baker.
58 Order No. 779, 143 FERC ¶ 61,147 at P 14 n.20.
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EMPs are outside the scope of the
immediate proceeding.
43. Other commenters criticize the
NERC Board of Trustees’ approval of
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1
because ‘‘no substantive discussion
occurred at the November 7 meeting [at
which the NERC Board of Trustees
approved the Reliability Standard] and,
as a result, the public was deprived of
its right for due process under Section
215 of the Federal Power Act.’’ 59 We
find no basis to conclude that the NERC
Board of Trustees either violated the
NERC Rules of Procedure or otherwise
acted improperly in approving
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1.
Foundation does not identify any rule or
other provision that, it claims, the NERC
Board of Trustees violated in allegedly
failing to conduct a ‘‘substantive
discussion’’ at the November 7 meeting.
Moreover, in considering whether to
approve Reliability Standard EOP–010–
1, the Commission established this
rulemaking docket to provide the public
with an opportunity to comment; thus
the public has been afforded adequate
due process under FPA section 215.
This is in addition to opportunities to
participate in NERC’s standard
development process, by submitting
comments or otherwise.
44. In response to a comment that
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1 could
interfere with the development of statelevel efforts to address GMD events,60
we note that FPA section 215(j)(3)
provides in relevant part that section
215 does not ‘‘preempt any authority of
any State to take action to ensure the
safety, adequacy, and reliability of
electric service within that State, as long
as such action is not inconsistent with
any reliability standard.’’ We also
observe that Reliability Standard EOP–
010–1 does not preclude users, owners
and operators of the Bulk-Power System
from taking additional steps that are
designed to mitigate the effects of GMD
events, provided those additional steps
are not inconsistent with the
Commission-approved Reliability
Standards.
E. Violation Risk Factors and Violation
Severity Levels
45. Each requirement of proposed
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1
includes one violation risk factor and
has an associated set of at least one
violation severity level. The ranges of
ERO penalties for violations will be
based on the sanctions table and
supporting penalty determination
59 Foundation Comments at 45; see also CSP
Comments at 1.
60 Maine Representative Boland Comments at 3.
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process described in the Commissionapproved NERC Sanction Guidelines,
according to the NERC petition. The
NOPR proposed to approve the
proposed violation risk factors and
violation severity levels for the
requirements proposed in Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 as consistent with
the Commission’s established
guidelines.61 The Commission did not
receive any comments regarding this
aspect of the NOPR. Accordingly, the
Commission approves the violation risk
factors and violation severity levels for
the requirements in Reliability Standard
EOP–010–1.
III. Information Collection Statement
46. The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) regulations require
approval of certain information
collection requirements imposed by
agency rules. Upon approval of a
collection(s) of information, OMB will
assign an OMB control number and an
expiration date. Respondents subject to
the filing requirements of an agency rule
will not be penalized for failing to
respond to these collections of
information unless the collections of
information display a valid OMB
control number. The Paperwork
Reduction Act (PRA) requires each
federal agency to seek and obtain OMB
approval before undertaking a collection
of information directed to ten or more
persons, or contained in a rule of
general applicability.
47. The Commission is submitting
these reporting requirements to OMB for
its review and approval under section
3507(d) of the PRA. The Commission
solicited comments on the need for and
the purpose of the information
contained in Reliability Standard EOP–
010–1 and the corresponding burden to
implement the Reliability Standard. The
Commission received comments on
specific requirements in the Reliability
Standard, which we address in this
Final Rule. However, the Commission
did not receive any comments on our
reporting burden estimates or on the
need for and the purpose of the
information collection requirements.
48. The Commission based its
paperwork burden estimates on the
NERC compliance registry as of
November 27, 2013. According to the
registry, there are 16 reliability
coordinators and 183 transmission
operators.
49. The Commission estimates an
increased burden for each requirement,
as explained in the chart below, for a
total estimated burden of $238,800. The
61 See North American Electric Reliability Corp.,
135 FERC ¶ 61,166 (2011).
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Commission based the burden estimates
on staff experience, knowledge, and
expertise:
BURDEN ESTIMATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RELIABILITY STANDARD EOP–010–1
Number of
respondents
Type of
respondents
Number of
responses per
respondent
Average
burden hours
per response
Total annual
burden hours
(1)
Reliability Standard No.
(2)
(3)
(1)×(2)×(3)
EOP–010–1 (R1) ................
Reliability Coordinator ........
16
1
20
320
EOP–010–1 (R3) ................
Transmission Operator .......
183
1
20
3660
Total .............................
.............................................
........................
........................
........................
3980
50. The above chart does not include
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1,
Requirement R2 because, as NERC
states, that requirement replaces IRO–
005–3.1a, Requirement R3 and has no
change in overall burden. In addition,
while our burden estimate with respect
to Reliability Standard EOP–010–1,
Requirement R3 assumes that all 183
transmission operators are subject to
that requirement, we note that not all
183 transmission operators are likely to
be subject to Requirement R3 because
that requirement only applies to
transmission operators with a
Transmission Operator Area that
includes a power transformer with a
high side, wye-grounded winding with
terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.
Title: FERC–725S, Mandatory
Reliability Standards: Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1.
Action: Proposed Collection of
Information.
OMB Control No: 1902–0270.
Respondents: Business or other for
profit, and not for profit institutions.
Frequency of Responses: One-time
and ongoing.
Necessity of the Information:
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1
implements the Congressional mandate
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to
develop mandatory and enforceable
Reliability Standards to better ensure
the reliability of the nation’s BulkPower System. Specifically, the
Reliability Standard ensures that
responsible entities have Operating
Plans and Operating Procedures or
ehiers on DSK2VPTVN1PROD with RULES
Total annual
cost 62
62 The estimated hourly loaded cost (salary plus
benefits) for an engineer is assumed to be $60/hour,
based on salaries as reported by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) (https://bls.gov/oes/current/
naics2_22.htm). Loaded costs are BLS rates divided
by 0.703 and rounded to the nearest dollar (https://
www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm). While the
BLS figures have been updated since the issuance
of the NOPR, the new BLS figures are not
significantly different. For consistency, the
Commission continues with the same loaded cost
figure used in the NOPR.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
14:16 Jun 24, 2014
Jkt 232001
Processes in place to mitigate the effects
of geomagnetic disturbances on the
Bulk-Power System.
Internal review: The Commission has
reviewed Reliability Standard EOP–
010–1 and has determined that the
Reliability Standard is necessary to
ensure the reliability and integrity of the
Nation’s Bulk-Power System.
51. Interested persons may obtain
information on the reporting
requirements by contacting: Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426
[Attention: Ellen Brown, Office of the
Executive Director, email:
DataClearance@ferc.gov, Phone: (202)
502–8663, fax: (202) 273–0873].
Comments on the requirements of this
rule may also be sent to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget,
Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk
Officer for the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission]. For security
reasons, comments should be sent by
email to OMB at oira_submission@
omb.eop.gov. Comments submitted to
OMB should include Docket Number
RM14–1–000.
IV. Environmental Analysis
52. The Commission is required to
prepare an Environmental Assessment
or an Environmental Impact Statement
for any action that may have a
significant adverse effect on the human
environment.63 The Commission has
categorically excluded certain actions
from this requirement as not having a
significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion
are rules that are clarifying, corrective,
or procedural or that do not
substantially change the effect of the
regulations being amended.64 The
actions here fall within this categorical
63 Regulations Implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act, Order No. 486, 52 FR
47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs.,
Regulations Preambles 1986–1990 ¶ 30,783 (1987).
64 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
PO 00000
Frm 00009
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
$19,200
($60/hr)
219,600
($60/hr)
238,800
exclusion in the Commission’s
regulations.
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act
53. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980 (RFA) 65 generally requires a
description and analysis of proposed
rules that will have significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
54. The NOPR compared the NERC
compliance registry with data submitted
to the Energy Information
Administration on Form EIA–861,
which indicated that perhaps as many
as 34 small entities were registered as
transmission operators and no small
entities were registered as reliability
coordinators. However, the Commission
estimated in the NOPR that there will be
no material change in burden for the 34
transmission operators that qualified as
small entities because they will likely
not be subject to Reliability Standard
EOP–010–1. Reliability Standard EOP–
010–1 applies to transmission operators
with a Transmission Operator Area that
includes a power transformer with a
high side, wye-grounded winding with
terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.
The NOPR stated that transmission
operators with Transmission Operator
Areas that include a power transformer
with a high side, wye-grounded winding
with terminal voltage greater than 200
kV are generally large entities serving
substantial geographical areas with
significant energy output. The
Commission did not receive any
comments regarding this aspect of the
NOPR.
55. Since the issuance of the NOPR,
the Small Business Administration
changed the small business size
standard applicable to reliability
coordinators and transmission
operators. The Commission currently
does not have an estimate of the number
of small reliability coordinators and
transmission operators using the new
65 5
E:\FR\FM\25JNR1.SGM
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size standard. However, the
Commission still estimates that the
specific applicability of Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 means that
generally only large entities will have to
meet the new requirements.
56. Based on the above, the
Commission certifies that Reliability
Standard EOP–010–1 will not have a
significant impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Accordingly,
no initial regulatory flexibility analysis
is required.
VI. Document Availability
57. In addition to publishing the full
text of this document in the Federal
Register, the Commission provides all
interested persons an opportunity to
view and/or print the contents of this
document via the Internet through the
Commission’s Home Page (https://
www.ferc.gov) and in the Commission’s
Public Reference Room during normal
business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE.,
Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426.
58. From the Commission’s Home
Page on the Internet, this information is
available on eLibrary. The full text of
this document is available on eLibrary
in PDF and Microsoft Word format for
viewing, printing, and/or downloading.
To access this document in eLibrary,
type the docket number excluding the
last three digits of this document in the
docket number field.
59. User assistance is available for
eLibrary and the Commission’s Web site
during normal business hours from the
Commission’s Online Support at (202)
502–6652 (toll free at 1–866–208–3676)
or email at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov,
or the Public Reference Room at (202)
502–8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. Email
the Public Reference Room at
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
VII. Effective Date and Congressional
Notification
60. These regulations are effective
August 25, 2014. The Commission has
determined, with the concurrence of the
Administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs of
OMB, that this rule is not a ‘‘major rule’’
as defined in section 351 of the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996.
By the Commission.
Issued: June 19, 2014.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
Appendix
Commenters
Abbreviation
Commenter
AEP ...........................................................................................................
AFS ...........................................................................................................
APS ...........................................................................................................
ASO ..........................................................................................................
Baker ........................................................................................................
Maine Representative Boland ..................................................................
CSP ..........................................................................................................
Dominion ...................................................................................................
EEI ............................................................................................................
EMP Coalition ...........................................................................................
Emprimus ..................................................................................................
Chamber of Commerce ............................................................................
Foundation ................................................................................................
IRC ............................................................................................................
ITC ............................................................................................................
Kappenman ..............................................................................................
NERC ........................................................................................................
Orquin .......................................................................................................
SmartSenseCom ......................................................................................
Stolov ........................................................................................................
concerning the conduct of antidumping
and countervailing duty investigations
and reviews. The amendments are
designed to increase efficiency in
processing and reviewing documents
filed with the Commission and reduce
Commission expenditures.
[FR Doc. 2014–14849 Filed 6–24–14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION
19 CFR Parts 201 and 207
Conduct of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Investigations and
Reviews
International Trade
Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
ehiers on DSK2VPTVN1PROD with RULES
AGENCY:
The United States
International Trade Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) amends its Rules of
Practice and Procedure concerning rules
of general application, and provisions
SUMMARY:
14:16 Jun 24, 2014
This regulation is effective July
25, 2014. This regulation is applicable
to all proceedings pending before the
Commission as of July 25, 2014.
DATES:
[Docket No. MISC–013]
VerDate Mar<15>2010
American Electric Power Service Corporation.
Advanced Fusion Systems.
Arizona Public Service Company.
Atomic Safety Organization.
George H. Baker.
Hon. Andrea M. Boland, Maine State Representative.
Center for Security Policy.
Dominion Resources Services, Inc.
Edison Electric Institute.
EMP Coalition.
Emprimus LLC.
Institute for 21st Century Energy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
Foundation for Resilient Societies.
ISO/RTO Council.
International Transmission Company.
John G. Kappenman.
North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
Alberto Ramirez Orquin.
SmartSenseCom, Inc.
Jerome J. Stolov.
Jkt 232001
Lisa
R. Barton, Secretary, telephone (202)
205–2000, or David Goldfine, AttorneyAdvisor, Office of the General Counsel,
telephone (202) 708–5452, United States
International Trade Commission.
Hearing-impaired individuals are
advised that information on this matter
can be obtained by contacting the
Commission’s TDD terminal at (202)
205–1810. General information
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
concerning the Commission may also be
obtained by accessing its Internet server
at https://www.usitc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Section 335 of the Tariff Act of 1930
(19 U.S.C. 1335) authorizes the
Commission to adopt such reasonable
procedures, rules, and regulations as it
deems necessary to carry out its
functions and duties. This rulemaking
seeks to improve provisions of the
Commission’s existing Rules of Practice
and Procedure. The Commission is
amending Part 201 of its rules, which
are rules of general application. The
Commission also is amending Part 207
of its rules covering proceedings such as
investigations and reviews conducted
under title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930
(‘‘title VII proceedings’’). The
Commission published a notice of
E:\FR\FM\25JNR1.SGM
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 122 (Wednesday, June 25, 2014)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 35911-35920]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-14849]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
18 CFR Part 40
[Docket No. RM14-1-000 Order No. 797]
Reliability Standard for Geomagnetic Disturbance Operations
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) approves Reliability Standard
EOP-010-1 (Geomagnetic Disturbance Operations). The North American
Electric Reliability Corporation, the Commission-certified Electric
Reliability Organization, submitted the Reliability Standard for
Commission
[[Page 35912]]
approval in response to a Commission directive in Order No. 779.
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 is designed to mitigate the effects of
geomagnetic disturbances on the Bulk-Power System by requiring
responsible entities to implement Operating Plans and Operating
Procedures or Processes.
DATES: This rule is effective August 25, 2014.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Michael Gandolfo (Technical Information), Office of Electric
Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street
NE., Washington, DC 20426, Telephone: (202) 502-6817,
Michael.Gandolfo@ferc.gov.
Matthew Vlissides (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington,
DC 20426, Telephone: (202) 502-8408, Matthew.Vlissides@ferc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
147 FERC ] 61,209
Before Commissioners: Cheryl A. LaFleur, Acting Chairman; Philip D.
Moeller, John R. Norris, and Tony Clark.
Final Rule
(Issued June 19, 2014)
1. Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA),\1\ the
Commission approves Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 (Geomagnetic
Disturbance Operations). The North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC), the Commission-certified Electric Reliability
Organization (ERO), submitted the Reliability Standard for Commission
approval in response to a Commission directive in Order No. 779.\2\ The
Reliability Standard is designed to mitigate the effects of geomagnetic
disturbances (GMD) on the Bulk-Power System by requiring responsible
entities to implement Operating Plans and Operating Procedures or
Processes. The Commission also approves the associated violation risk
factors and violation severity levels, implementation plan, and
effective dates proposed by NERC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o.
\2\ Reliability Standards for Geomagnetic Disturbances, Order
No. 779, 78 FR 30,747 (May 23, 2013), 143 FERC ] 61,147, reh'g
denied, 144 FERC ] 61,113 (2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Background
A. Section 215 and Mandatory Reliability Standards
2. Section 215 of the FPA requires the Commission to certify an ERO
to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, subject to
Commission review and approval.\3\ Once approved, the Reliability
Standards may be enforced in the United States by the ERO, subject to
Commission oversight, or by the Commission independently.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ 16 U.S.C. 824o.
\4\ Id. 824o(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Order No. 779
3. In Order No. 779, the Commission directed NERC, pursuant to FPA
section 215(d)(5), to develop and submit for approval proposed
Reliability Standards that address the impact of GMDs on the reliable
operation of the Bulk-Power System. The Commission based its directive
on the potentially severe, wide-spread impact on the reliable operation
of the Bulk-Power System that can be caused by GMD events and the
absence of existing Reliability Standards to address GMD events.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at P 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. The Commission directed NERC to implement the directive in two
stages. In the first stage, the Commission directed NERC to submit,
within six months of the effective date of Order No. 779, one or more
Reliability Standards (First Stage GMD Reliability Standards) that
require owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System to develop and
implement operational procedures to mitigate the effects of GMDs
consistent with the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Id. P 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. In the second stage, the Commission directed NERC to submit,
within 18 months of the effective date of Order No. 779, one or more
Reliability Standards (Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards) that
require owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System to conduct
initial and on-going assessments of the potential impact of benchmark
GMD events on Bulk-Power System equipment and the Bulk-Power System as
a whole. Order No. 779 directed that the Second Stage GMD Reliability
Standards must identify benchmark GMD events that specify what severity
GMD events a responsible entity must assess for potential impacts on
the Bulk-Power System.\7\ Order No. 779 explained that, if the
assessments identify potential impacts from benchmark GMD events, the
Reliability Standards should require owners and operators to develop
and implement a plan to protect against instability, uncontrolled
separation, or cascading failures of the Bulk-Power System, caused by
damage to critical or vulnerable Bulk-Power System equipment, or
otherwise, as a result of a benchmark GMD event. The Commission
directed that the development of this plan could not be limited to
considering operational procedures or enhanced training alone, but
should, subject to the potential impacts of the benchmark GMD events
identified in the assessments, contain strategies for protecting
against the potential impact of GMDs based on factors such as the age,
condition, technical specifications, system configuration, or location
of specific equipment.\8\ Order No. 779 observed that these strategies
could, for example, include automatically blocking geomagnetically-
induced currents (GIC) from entering the Bulk-Power System, instituting
specification requirements for new equipment, inventory management,
isolating certain equipment that is not cost effective to retrofit, or
a combination thereof.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Id.
\8\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. NERC Petition
6. On November 13, 2013, NERC petitioned the Commission to approve
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 and its associated violation risk
factors and violation severity levels, implementation plan, and
effective dates. In the petition, NERC states that the Reliability
Standard is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or
preferential, and in the public interest. NERC maintains that the
Reliability Standard satisfies the Commission's directive in Order No.
779 corresponding to the development and submission of the First Stage
GMD Reliability Standards.
7. NERC states that, consistent with Order No. 779 and the NERC
Functional Model, Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 applies to reliability
coordinators and transmission operators with a ``Transmission Operator
Area that includes a power transformer with a high side wye-grounded
winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.'' \9\ NERC explains
that the Reliability Standard has three requirements: (1) Requirement
R1 addresses coordination by reliability coordinators within their
areas; (2) Requirement R2 addresses the dissemination of space weather
information by reliability coordinators to ensure that entities within
a reliability coordinator area have the appropriate information
necessary to
[[Page 35913]]
take action and that the same information is available to all entities;
and (3) Requirement R3 requires transmission operators to develop GMD
Operating Procedures or Processes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ NERC Petition at 8 (``A power transformer with a `high side
wye-grounded winding' refers to a power transformer with windings on
the high voltage side that are connected in a wye configuration and
have a grounded neutral connection.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. NERC states that Requirement R1 requires each reliability
coordinator to develop, maintain, and implement a GMD Operating Plan
that coordinates the GMD Operating Procedures or Operating Processes
within its reliability coordinator area.\10\ NERC explains that each
reliability coordinator is required to ensure that GMD Operating
Procedures and Operating Processes in its reliability coordinator area
are not in conflict, but a reliability coordinator will not review the
technical aspects of the GMD Operating Procedures and Operating
Processes.\11\ Instead, according to NERC, each transmission operator
will be responsible for the technical aspects of its Operating
Procedures and Operating Processes. NERC further states that
Requirement R1 requires each reliability coordinator to describe the
activities that must be undertaken in order to mitigate the effects of
a GMD event. NERC explains that, pursuant to Reliability Standard IRO-
001-1.1, each reliability coordinator has decision-making authority to
act and to direct actions to be taken by transmission operators,
balancing authorities, generator operators, transmission service
providers, load-serving entities, and purchasing-selling entities
within its reliability coordinator area to preserve the reliability of
the bulk electric system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Operating Plan, Operating Procedure, and Operating Process
are existing terms defined in the Glossary of Terms Used in NERC
Reliability Standards. See Glossary of Terms Used in NERC
Reliability Standards (effective November 21, 2013) at 49-50.
\11\ NERC explains that ``if Company A submitted an Operating
Procedure proposing to take Line X out of service under specified
GMD conditions, and Company B submitted an Operating Procedure that
relies on Line X remaining in service in the event of a GMD--it is
the responsibility of the Reliability Coordinator to identify this
conflict.'' NERC Petition at 11-12 (emphasis in original). Beyond
identifying a conflict and requiring its resolution by Company A and
Company B, NERC states that the review is ``not intended to be a
review by the Reliability Coordinator of the technical aspects of
the GMD Operating Procedures or Processes.'' Id. at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. NERC states that Requirement R2 requires each reliability
coordinator to disseminate space weather information to ensure
coordination and consistent awareness in its reliability coordinator
area. NERC maintains that entrusting this responsibility to reliability
coordinators is appropriate given the reliability coordinator's wide-
area view. NERC also explains that Requirement R2 replaces existing
Requirement R3 of Reliability Standard IRO-005-3.1a, which currently
addresses dissemination of information regarding GMD forecasts.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ According to NERC, Reliability Standard IRO-005-3.1a will
be retired once the Commission approves proposed Reliability
Standard IRO-005-4, which is currently pending before the
Commission. NERC Petition at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. NERC states that Requirement R3 requires each transmission
operator to develop GMD Operating Procedures or Operating Processes to
address GMD events. NERC explains that Requirement R3 is not
prescriptive and allows each transmission operator to tailor its
Operating Procedures or Operating Processes based on the transmission
operator's assessment of entity-specific factors, such as geography,
geology, and system topology. According to NERC, Requirement R3
requires each transmission operator to specify: (1) Steps or tasks that
must be conducted to receive space weather information; (2) what
actions must be taken under what conditions, and such conditions must
be predetermined; and (3) when and under what conditions the Operating
Procedure or Operating Process is exited. NERC maintains that
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 does not prescribe specific actions that
must be taken by responsible entities because ``a `one-size fits all'
approach to crafting GMD Reliability Standards would fail to recognize
the important role of locational differences.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ NERC Petition at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. NERC proposes that Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 become
effective the ``first day of the first calendar quarter that is six
months after the date that this standard is approved by an applicable
governmental authority.'' \14\ However, NERC states that Requirement R2
of Reliability Standard EOP-010-1, pertaining to reliability
coordinator dissemination of space weather information, is meant to
replace existing Requirement R3 of Reliability Standard IRO-005-3.1a,
which includes similar language. Therefore, to avoid duplicative
requirements being enforced at the same time, NERC proposes that, if
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 becomes effective prior to the
retirement of Reliability Standard IRO-005-3.1a, then Requirement R2 of
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 will not become effective until the
first day following retirement of Reliability Standard IRO-005-3.1a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ NERC Petition, Exhibit B (Implementation Plan) at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
12. On January 16, 2014, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that proposed to approve Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 as
just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the
public interest based on the Commission's review of NERC's petition and
supporting exhibits.\15\ The NOPR stated that the Reliability Standard
satisfies the directive in Order No. 779 that NERC submit one or more
Reliability Standards that require owners and operators of the Bulk-
Power System to develop and implement operational procedures to
mitigate the effects of GMDs consistent with the reliable operation of
the Bulk-Power System. The NOPR also stated that the Reliability
Standard is consistent with the guidance in Order No. 779 that NERC
develop Reliability Standards that, rather than require specific
operational procedures, require responsible entities to develop and
implement entity-specific operational procedures because owners and
operators of the Bulk-Power System are most familiar with their own
equipment and system configurations.\16\ The NOPR further stated that
the Reliability Standard requires coordination of operational
procedures and processes, overseen by a functional entity with a wide-
area perspective (i.e., reliability coordinators), which is consistent
with the guidance in Order No. 779.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Reliability Standard for Geomagnetic Disturbance
Operations, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 79 FR 3547 (Jan. 22,
2014), 146 FERC ] 61,015 (2014) (NOPR).
\16\ Id. P 38.
\17\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. In response to the NOPR, the Commission received 20 sets of
comments. We address below the issues raised in the comments. The
Appendix to this Final Rule lists the entities that filed comments in
response to the NOPR.
II. Discussion
14. Pursuant to FPA section 215(d)(2), we approve Reliability
Standard EOP-010-1 as just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or
preferential, and in the public interest. As the Commission stated in
Order No. 779, ``operational procedures, while not a complete solution,
constitute an important first step to addressing the GMD reliability
gap because they can be implemented relatively quickly . . . [and]
[o]perational procedures may help alleviate abnormal system conditions
due to transformer absorption of reactive power during GMD events,
helping to stabilize system voltage swings, and may potentially isolate
some equipment from being damaged or
[[Page 35914]]
misoperated.'' \18\ We determine that Reliability Standard EOP-010-1
addresses the directive in Order No. 779 that NERC submit one or more
Reliability Standards that require owners and operators of the Bulk-
Power System to develop and implement operational procedures to
mitigate the effects of GMDs consistent with the reliable operation of
the Bulk-Power System.\19\ We also determine that the Reliability
Standard is consistent with the guidance in Order No. 779 that NERC
develop Reliability Standards that, rather than require specific
operational procedures, require responsible entities to develop and
implement entity-specific operational procedures because owners and
operators of the Bulk-Power System are most familiar with their own
equipment and system configurations.\20\ Further, we determine that the
Reliability Standard requires coordination of operational procedures
and processes, overseen by a functional entity with a wide-area
perspective (i.e., reliability coordinators), which is also consistent
with the guidance in Order No. 779.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at P 36.
\19\ Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 only addresses the First
Stage GMD Reliability Standards directed in Order No. 779. The
Reliability Standard does not address the Second Stage GMD
Reliability Standards, which NERC indicates are under development.
NERC Petition at 3.
\20\ Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at P 38.
\21\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Several commenters support approval of Reliability Standard
EOP-010-1 without modification.\22\ We address below the following
issues raised by other commenters: (A) the applicability section of
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1; (B) effectiveness of GMD operational
procedures; (C) implementation plan; and (D) other issues. We also
address below the violation risk factors and violation severity levels
associated with Reliability Standard EOP-010-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See comments submitted by NERC, IRC, EEI, Chamber of
Commerce, Dominion, AEP, ITC, and ASO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Applicability Section of Reliability Standard EOP-010-1
NERC Petition
16. NERC submitted a white paper as part of its petition explaining
the technical justification for applying Reliability Standard EOP-010-1
only to transmission operators that operate a power transformer with a
high side wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200
kV in their transmission operator areas.\23\ In another white paper,
NERC explains its proposal regarding the applicability of the
Reliability Standard to reliability coordinators and transmission
operators only.\24\ The White Paper Supporting Functional Entity
Applicability explains that the reliability coordinator has
``responsibility and authority for reliable operation within the
Reliability Coordinator Area (RCA) . . . and includes a wide-area view
with situational awareness of neighboring RCAs.'' \25\ NERC states that
including reliability coordinators as applicable entities ``provides
the necessary coordination for planning and real-time actions.'' \26\
With respect to transmission operators, NERC explains that ``[l]ike the
[reliability coordinator], the [transmission operator] has
responsibility and authority for the reliable operation of the
transmission system within a specified area.'' \27\ In addition, NERC
justifies omitting balancing authorities and generator operators from
the scope of the Reliability Standard. NERC explains that balancing
authorities ``can be expected to address GMD impacts through use of
generation . . . [but] the [balancing authority] would not initiate
actions unilaterally during a GMD event and would instead respond to
the direction of the [transmission operator] and [reliability
coordinator].'' \28\ As for generator operators, NERC states that some
generator operators ``would not have the technical basis for taking
steps [to mitigate GMDs] on [their] own and would instead take steps
based on the [reliability coordinator's] or [transmission operator's]
Operating Plans, Processes, or Procedures.'' \29\ NERC also notes that
generator owners and generator operators will be considered for
inclusion in the Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards, ``which will
require applicable entities to conduct vulnerability assessment and
develop appropriate mitigation strategies . . . [and that] [s]uch
mitigation strategies could include the development of Operating
Procedures for applicable [generator owners] and [generator
operators].'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ NERC Petition, Exhibit D (White Paper Supporting Network
Applicability) at 1.
\24\ NERC Petition, Exhibit E (White Paper Supporting Functional
Entity Applicability).
\25\ Id. at 2.
\26\ Id.
\27\ Id.
\28\ Id. at 3-4.
\29\ Id. at 4.
\30\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOPR
17. The NOPR stated that the applicability designations in
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 are appropriate, based on the
justifications set forth in the white papers in Exhibits D and E of
NERC's petition.
Comments
18. Foundation, SmartSense, AFS, and Baker maintain that
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 should be applicable to more entities
than transmission operators having a power transformer with a high side
wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV in the
transmission operator area.
19. Foundation states that during the March 1989 solar storm
discussed in Order No. 779, electric utilities reported effects on
static VAR compensators and other reactive power equipment operating
between 100 kV and 200 kV. Foundation notes that such equipment is
``designed to provide reactive power and to stabilize transmission
networks during GMD.'' \31\ Foundation states that Reliability Standard
EOP-010-1 ``would exempt Transmission Operators with equipment
operating between 100 kV and 200 kV.'' \32\ Foundation requests that
the Commission remand Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 to include
``owners and operators of all stabilizing and reactive power equipment
operating between 100 kV and 200 kV.'' \33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Foundation Comments at 10.
\32\ Id.
\33\ Id. at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Foundation and SmartSense assert that the 200 kV threshold for
transmission operators is inconsistent with the Commission-approved
definition of bulk electric system, which generally includes assets
operating at voltages of 100 kV and higher. SmartSense asserts that
there is evidence that elements of the Bulk-Power System operating
between 100 kV and 200kV would be substantially affected by a GMD
event. In support, SmartSense cites to an Oak Ridge National Laboratory
GMD Study and an article from the Idaho National Laboratory, which
SmartSense states tested sub-200 kV transformers.\34\ SmartSense
further claims that NERC improperly relied on a cost-benefit analysis
to exclude networks operating at 200 kV and below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ SmartSense Comments at 10-11 (citing Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, Electromagnetic Pulse: Effects on the U.S. Power Grid:
Meta-R-319 at page 4-14 (January 2010), available at https://www.ornl.gov/sci/ees/etsd/pes/pubs/ferc_Meta-R-319.pdf; Idaho
National Laboratory, INL Broadens Understanding of Solar Storms
(December 16, 2013), available at https://inlportal.inl.gov/portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/257/feature_story_details/1269?featurestory=DA_615269).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. Foundation, AFS, EMP Coalition, Kappenman, and Baker maintain
that Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 should
[[Page 35915]]
be applicable to generator operators and/or balancing authorities.
22. Foundation states that balancing authorities have real-time
responsibilities that would be essential during a GMD event. Foundation
asserts that excluding balancing authorities from the applicability
section of Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 is ``operationally
unworkable'' because it ``assumes that the real time responsibilities
of Balancing Authorities under fast-moving GMD conditions could be
assumed by Reliability Coordinators.'' \35\ Foundation states that the
NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center would only provide 15-60 minutes
warning of a severe solar storm. Foundation asserts that, given the 15-
60 minute limitation, there would be insufficient time for reliability
coordinators to communicate with balancing authorities, transmission
operators, and generator operators following a solar storm warning
because the NERC Reliability Standards require three-part
communications when engaging in oral, two-party communications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Foundation Comments at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
23. Foundation and Kappenman also maintain that Reliability
Standard EOP-010-1 does not address generator step up (GSU)
transformers, which they assert are vulnerable to GMDs. Foundation
contends that generator operators have been installing GIC monitors for
their GSU transformers and have taken actions to downrate their GSU
transformers during solar storms. Foundation also notes that the NERC
GMD Task Force developed an Operating Procedure Template for generator
operators.
Commission Determination
24. We determine that the applicability section of Reliability
Standard EOP-010-1 is technically justified and consistent with Order
No. 779, both in terms of using a 200 kV threshold for determining
applicable transmission operators and not including balancing
authorities and generator operators as applicable entities.
25. We reject the argument that the applicability threshold in
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 is inconsistent with the definition of
bulk electric system because it excludes transmission operators with
only 200 kV transformers and below. Instead, we determine that the
applicability section of Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 complies with
the directive in Order No. 779 that the First Stage GMD Reliability
Standards should mitigate the effects of GMDs consistent with the
reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System.\36\ The NERC petition and
White Paper Supporting Network Applicability provide an adequate
technical basis to conclude that transformers operating at 200 kV and
below are likely to have a limited impact on the Bulk-Power System
during a GMD event. We are not persuaded by the Foundation comments,
discussed above, which do not refute this conclusion, or the materials
cited by SmartSense. SmartSense cites a table in the Oak Ridge
Laboratory GMD Study identifying at-risk transformers operating at 345
kV, which fall within the applicability criteria.\37\ Moreover, the Oak
Ridge Laboratory GMD Study found that significantly higher GIC flows
occur at higher operating voltages.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at P 29; see also 16
U.S.C. 824o(a)(3) (``The term `reliability standard' means a
requirement . . . to provide for the reliable operation of the bulk-
power system.''); Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk-Power
System, Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,242, at PP 97-98,
order on reh'g, Order No. 693-A, 120 FERC ] 61,053 (2007)
(explaining that each Reliability Standard will identify the set of
users, owners and operators that must comply with that standard and
``NERC has indicated that in the future it may add to a Reliability
Standard limitations on applicability based on electric facility
characteristics such as generator nameplate ratings'').
\37\ SmartSense Comments at 10 n.31 (citing Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, Electromagnetic Pulse: Effects on the U.S. Power Grid:
Meta-R-319 at page 4-14).
\38\ Id. at page 1-15 (``The operating voltage of the
transmission network is an important factor in determining the level
of GIC flow that will occur on each part of the U.S. power grid. At
the higher operating voltages, there are pronounced trends that: the
average length of each line increases and the average circuit
resistance decreases. These trends result in larger GIC flows in the
higher voltage portions of the network, given the same geo-electric
field conditions.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26. The applicability criteria for Reliability Standard EOP-010-1
determine which transmission operators must comply with the Reliability
Standard (i.e., those with a power transformer with a high side wye-
grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV in the
transmission operator area). While this criterion excludes transmission
operators operating transformers 200 kV and below, the 200 kV threshold
does not mean that applicable transmission operators will ignore
reactive power supplies operating at 200 kV or below on their systems
when developing the required GMD Operating Procedures or Operating
Processes. Reliability Standard EOP-010-1, Requirement R3 supports this
conclusion because it directs each applicable transmission operator to
``develop, maintain, and implement a GMD Operating Procedure or
Operating Process to mitigate the effects of GMD events on the reliable
operation of its respective system.'' Accordingly, because Requirement
R3 addresses an applicable transmission operator's entire system, the
requirement is not limited to transformers operating above 200 kV for
the purposes of developing GMD Operating Procedures or Operating
Processes by applicable transmission operators.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ See NERC Petition at 14 (``An Operating Procedure or
Operating Process is maintained when it is kept relevant by taking
into consideration system configuration, conditions or operating
experiences, as needed to accomplish its purpose. Requirement R3 . .
. allows entities to tailor their Operational Procedures or
Processes based on the responsible entity's assessment of entity-
specific factors, such as geography, geology, and system
topology.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
27. The Idaho National Laboratory article cited by SmartSense
stated that a simulated solar event affected ``a pair of 138kV core
form, 2 winding substation transformers, which had been in-service at
[Idaho National Laboratory] since the 1950s,'' through increased losses
and generation of harmonics that resulted in loss of excitation.\40\
The Idaho National Laboratory article does not contradict NERC's
technical analysis, however. NERC does not contend that GMD events will
have no effect on networks operating at 200 kV and below. Rather, the
standard drafting team found that geomagnetically-induced currents
generated on networks operated at 200 kV and below would be
significantly less than those operated at higher voltages, a finding
that is consistent with the Oak Ridge Laboratory GMD Study.
Specifically, NERC's modeling of a portion of the Eastern
Interconnection showed only a small change in system impact from a GMD
event when 115 kV and 161 kV circuits were excluded from the model.\41\
The materials cited in the comments do not rebut NERC's technical
analysis. In sum, we determine that there is adequate technical
justification for the 200 kV threshold for transmission operators.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Idaho National Laboratory, INL Broadens Understanding of
Solar Storms (December 16, 2013), available at https://inlportal.inl.gov/portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/257/feature_story_details/1269?featurestory=DA_615269).
\41\ NERC Petition, Exhibit D (White Paper Supporting Network
Applicability) at 8 (Table A2).
\42\ As we conclude that NERC provided adequate technical
justification for the 200 kV applicability threshold, there is no
reason to address SmartSense's assertion that NERC improperly based
the 200 kV threshold on a cost-benefit analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
28. We also determine that NERC provided adequate justification not
to include balancing authorities and generator operators in the
applicability section of Reliability Standard EOP-
[[Page 35916]]
010-1. We disagree with Foundation's assertion that balancing
authorities should be included in the applicability section because
reliability coordinators are incapable of communicating quickly with
transmission operators, generator operators, and balancing authorities
due to the three-part communications requirement in Reliability
Standard COM-002-2. We are not persuaded that GMD events pose unique
communication problems for reliability coordinators because a
reliability coordinator may only have 15-60 minutes warning of a severe
solar storm. Reliability coordinators are responsible for real-time
system reliability and often must respond quickly or even immediately
to Bulk-Power System events with little or no warning.\43\ Reliability
Standard COM-002-2, Requirement R1 recognizes this responsibility by
stating that ``[e]ach Transmission Operator, Balancing Authority, and
Generator Operator shall have communications (voice and data links)
with appropriate Reliability Coordinators, Balancing Authorities, and
Transmission Operators . . . [and] [s]uch communications shall be
staffed and available for addressing a real-time emergency condition.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ NERC, Reliability Functional Model Technical Document,
Version 5, at 7 (Approved May 2010), available at https://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Functional%20Model%20Archive%201/FM_Technical_Document_V5_2009Dec1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
29. With respect to generator operators, there is no dispute that
GSU transformers are susceptible to geomagnetically-induced currents.
While generator operators are not listed as applicable entities in
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1, NERC explains that generator operators
will have to act during a GMD event when directed by a reliability
coordinator, in accordance with its reliability coordiantor's GMD
Operating Plan, or by a transmission operator, in accordance with its
transmission operator's GMD Operating Procedures or Operating
Processes.\44\ We are not persuaded that generator operators should be
required to act independently under Reliability Standard EOP-010-1.
While generator operators might be, as Foundation asserts, increasingly
installing GIC monitoring equipment, there is no evidence in the record
regarding the proportion of generator operators with GIC monitoring
capabilities. Accordingly, we agree with NERC that at least some
generator operators would not have the technical basis to address a GMD
event and would instead need to rely on reliability coordinators and
transmission operators for direction.\45\ We also note that the
Geomagnetic Disturbance Operating Procedure Template for generator
operators developed by the NERC GMD Task Force, which the Foundation's
comments reference, conditions some of its suggested actions on the
generator operator having adequate monitoring systems.\46\ In sum, we
are not persuaded by Foundation's comments and, rather, determine that
there is adequate justification in the record for not including
balancing authorities and generator operators in the applicability
section of Reliability Standard EOP-010-1.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ NERC Petition, Exhibit E (White Paper Supporting Functional
Entity Applicability) at 2-4.
\45\ Id. at 4.
\46\ NERC, Geomagnetic Disturbance Operating Procedure Template
Generator Operator, at 1, available at https://www.nerc.com/docs/pc/gmdtf/Template_GOP.pdf (``Some actions listed below should only be
undertaken if supported by an adequate GIC impact study and/or if
adequate monitoring systems are available. Otherwise they can make
matters worse.'').
\47\ While not basing our determination on NERC's representation
or pre-judging what NERC ultimately submits in the Second Stage GMD
Reliability Standards, we note NERC's statement that the standard
drafting team for the Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards is
considering including generator owners and generator operators in
the applicability section of that proposed Reliability Standard.
NERC Petition, Exhibit E at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Effectiveness of GMD Operational Procedures
NERC Petition
30. NERC states, quoting Order No. 779, that ``[o]perational
procedures may help alleviate abnormal system conditions due to
transformer absorption of reactive power during GMD events, helping to
stabilize system voltage swings, and may potentially isolate some
equipment from being damaged or misoperated.'' \48\ NERC explains that
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 ``is an important first step in
addressing the issue of GMDs and can be implemented relatively quickly.
While responsible entities will develop and implement Operational
Procedures or Operational Processes, NERC will continue to support
those efforts through the GMD Task Force, for example, by identifying
and sharing Operating Plans, Processes, and Procedures found to be the
most effective.'' \49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ NERC Petition at 3 (quoting Order No. 779, 143 FERC ]
61,147 at P 36).
\49\ Id. at 3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOPR
31. The NOPR stated that Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 satisfies
the directive in Order No. 779 that NERC submit one or more Reliability
Standards that require owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System to
develop and implement operational procedures to mitigate the effects of
GMDs consistent with the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System.
The NOPR also stated that operational procedures, while not a complete
solution, constitute an important first step to addressing the GMD
reliability gap.
Comments
32. SmartSense and Orquin state that GMD operational procedures
depend on the limited ability to predict GMD events. SmartSense states
that space weather information is the ``default trigger'' for
implementing operating procedures under Reliability Standard EOP-010-1
but that space weather forecasts have a high error rate. SmartSense
contends that relying on space weather forecasts alone will result in
false alarms or missed GMD event forecasts. SmartSense maintains that
real-time or near real-time monitoring data should be used in
conjunction with space weather forecasts to trigger GMD operational
procedures.
33. Baker states that operational procedures will be ineffective
because: (1) Grid operators will be reluctant to take action during a
GMD event (e.g., shed load); (2) the warning period for solar storms
does not allow enough time for grid operators to take action; (3) grid
operators will not have enough situational awareness to know how to
take action during a GMD event; (4) there is no capacity to address GMD
events on a national scale; (5) operational procedures have been shown
to be inadequate in other contexts; (6) equipment failure may undermine
the grid operators' ability to respond; (7) GMD events will disrupt
communication networks used by grid operators; (8) the potential
effects of a GMD event on the Bulk-Power System are too complex to
anticipate; and (9) Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent
System Operators do not have the authority to shut down the grid in
neighboring Regions. Foundation states that grid operators will have to
act blindly during a GMD event because Reliability Standard EOP-010-1
does not require GIC monitoring or mandatory sharing of GIC monitoring
data. Foundation also states that Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 is
ineffective because it does not require ``quantified contingency
planning.'' Orquin maintains that operational procedures are of limited
value and recommends using monitoring equipment and blocking devices at
least as a back-up measure.
[[Page 35917]]
Commission Determination
34. As the Commission stated in Order No. 779, operational
procedures are not a complete solution to the risks posed by a GMD
event to the Bulk-Power System. Order No. 779 directed NERC to develop
Reliability Standards that require operational procedures because such
Reliability Standards could be developed and implemented relatively
quickly. While we recognize the concerns in the comments of Baker and
others regarding the efficacy of operational procedures, Order No. 779
weighed those concerns in ultimately directing NERC to develop
operational procedures in the First Stage GMD Reliability Standards and
more comprehensive protections in the Second Stage GMD Reliability
Standards.\50\ We affirm the determination in Order No. 779 that
operational procedures constitute ``an important first step to
addressing the GMD reliability gap because they can be implemented
relatively quickly . . . [and] may help alleviate abnormal system
conditions due to transformer absorption of reactive power during GMD
events, helping to stabilize system voltage swings, and may potentially
isolate some equipment from being damaged or misoperated.'' \51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ In Order No. 779, the Commission noted that some entities
have already implemented operational procedures that address GMD
events. Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at P 37.
\51\ Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at P 36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
35. With respect to the concerns raised by SmartSense regarding
overreliance on space weather forecasts to trigger GMD operational
procedures, Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 does not mandate the use of
space weather to trigger the GMD operational procedures. While
Requirement R2 requires reliability coordinators to disseminate current
and forecasted space weather conditions to the appropriate functional
entities, Requirement R3 requires transmission operators to develop
Operating Procedures or Operating Processes that, at a minimum, include
``System Operator actions to be initiated based on predetermined
conditions.'' Those ``predetermined conditions'' might include space
weather information or other data, including GIC monitoring data, if
available. Requirement R3 ultimately leaves it to the transmission
operator to define the predetermined conditions in its Operating
Procedure or Operating Process. Accordingly, we disagree that
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 requires that initiation of GMD
operating procedures be based upon space weather only.
36. We are not persuaded that the First Stage GMD Reliability
Standards should require all responsible entities to monitor GICs or
mandate sharing GIC monitoring data with reliability coordinators, as
Foundation contends. As explained above, we directed NERC to develop
only operational procedures in the First Stage GMD Reliability
Standards, and to develop more comprehensive protections in the Second
Stage GMD Reliability Standards. The issue of monitoring requirements
properly belongs in the Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ We will also consider then the need for the Second Stage
GMD Reliability Standard's planning requirements to integrate
appropriately with the First Stage GMD Reliability Standard's
operating requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
37. In terms of real-time sharing of GIC information with
reliability coordinators, we note that Reliability Standard COM-002-2,
Requirement R1.1 states that ``[e]ach Balancing Authority and
Transmission Operator shall notify its Reliability Coordinator, and all
other potentially affected Balancing Authorities and Transmission
Operators through predetermined communication paths of any condition
that could threaten the reliability of its area or when firm load
shedding is anticipated.'' Accordingly, if a transmission operator
monitors GIC levels that could threaten the reliability of its area of
the Bulk-Power System, the transmission operator would have to
communicate that information to its reliability coordinator.\53\ With
respect to Foundation's comment that Reliability Standard EOP-010-1
should include ``quantified contingency planning,'' Foundation does not
explain the meaning of this term. In any case, we note that Reliability
Standard EOP-010-1, Requirement R3 requires applicable transmission
operators to ``develop, maintain, and implement a GMD Operating
Procedure or Operating Process to mitigate the effects of GMD events on
the reliable operation of its respective system.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ We do not address here the issue of access to GMD
monitoring data for other purposes, such as reassessing the
benchmark GMD event, since this issue too belongs properly in the
Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Implementation Plan and Effective Dates
NERC Petition
38. The NERC petition proposes that Reliability Standard EOP-010-1
become effective the ``first day of the first calendar quarter that is
six months after the date that this standard is approved by an
applicable governmental authority.'' \54\ However, NERC states that
Requirement R2 of Reliability Standard EOP-010-1, pertaining to
reliability coordinator dissemination of space weather information, is
meant to replace existing Requirement R3 of Reliability Standard IRO-
005-3.1a, which includes similar language. Therefore, to avoid
duplicative requirements being enforced at the same time, NERC proposes
that, if Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 becomes effective prior to the
retirement of Reliability Standard IRO-005-3.1a, then Requirement R2 of
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 will not become effective until the
first day following retirement of Reliability Standard IRO-005-
3.1a.\55\ According to NERC's petition, Requirements R1 and R3 of
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 are not affected by the possible
retirement of IRO-05-3.1a and, thus, will be effective the first day of
the first calendar quarter that is six months after the date that the
Reliability Standard is approved by an applicable governmental
authority.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ NERC Petition, Exhibit B (Implementation Plan) at 2.
\55\ We agree with NERC that Reliability Standard IRO-005-3.1a,
Requirement R3, which requires that ``[e]ach Reliability Coordinator
shall ensure its Transmission Operators and Balancing Authorities
are aware of Geo-Magnetic Disturbance (GMD) forecast information and
assist as needed in the development of any required response
plans,'' and Requirement R2 of Reliability Standard EOP-010-1, which
requires that ``[e]ach Reliability Coordinator shall disseminate
forecasted and current space weather information to functional
entities identified as recipients in the Reliability Coordinator's
GMD Operating Plan,'' are largely duplicative in that both
requirements require the dissemination of GMD forecast information,
at a minimum, to applicable transmission operators.
\56\ NERC Petition, Exhibit B (Implementation Plan) at 2. On
April 16, 2013, NERC submitted a petition requesting approval of
three revised IRO Reliability Standards and the retirement or
revision of six currently-effective Reliability Standards, including
IRO-005-3.1a (Docket No. RM13-15-000). On November 21, 2013, the
Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that, inter alia,
proposes to remand the proposed IRO Reliability Standards and
related retirements and revisions. See Monitoring System
Conditions--Transmission Operations Reliability Standard,
Transmission Operation Reliability Standards, Interconnection
Reliability Operations and Coordination Reliability Standards,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 78 FR 73,112 (Dec. 5, 2013), 145 FERC
] 61,158 (2013). On January 14, 2014, the Commission granted NERC's
motion to defer action, until January 31, 2015, on the rulemaking in
Docket No. RM13-15-000. Monitoring System Conditions--Transmission
Operations Reliability Standard, Transmission Operation Reliability
Standards, Interconnection Reliability Operations and Coordination
Reliability Standards, 146 FERC ] 61,023 (2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOPR
39. The NOPR proposed to approve NERC's implementation plan and
effective dates for Reliability Standard EOP-010-1.
[[Page 35918]]
Comments
40. APS states that a six-month implementation period is not a
sufficient amount of time to create a new Operating Process or
Operating Procedure. APS explains that it will develop an Operation
Process or Operating Procedure after its reliability coordinator
develops an Operating Plan that identifies the activities designed to
mitigate the effects of GMD events on the Bulk-Power System. APS states
that its Operating Process or Operating Procedure will then be reviewed
by the reliability coordinator, and that it is unrealistic to expect
all this to be done in six months. APS proposes allowing the
reliability coordinator six months to develop its Operating Plan and
then allowing transmission operators a further six months to develop
their Operating Processes or Operating Procedures.
Commission Determination
41. We determine that a six-month implementation period, as
proposed by NERC, allows enough time for reliability coordinators and
transmission operators to implement the requirements of Reliability
Standard EOP-010-1. Only APS indicates that a six-month period does not
afford applicable entities enough time to implement the Reliability
Standard. No other commenter expresses similar concerns. Further, we
see no reason why, as APS contends, a transmission operator must wait
until its reliability coordinator has completed its Operating Plan
before the transmission operator begins work on its Operating Process
or Operating Procedure. Reliability coordinators and transmission
operators should be able to work largely in parallel and coordinate
their efforts to implement the requirements of the Reliability
Standard. Accordingly, we approve the implementation plan and effective
dates proposed by NERC.
D. Other Issues
42. Commenters express concern that Reliability Standard EOP-010-1
does not address electromagnetic pulses (EMPs).\57\ However, Order No.
779 explicitly stated that EMPs were not within the scope of that
rulemaking, which led to NERC's petition here.\58\ Likewise,
Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 is responsive to the Commission
directive, and comments critiquing the Reliability Standard for not
addressing EMPs are outside the scope of the immediate proceeding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ See comments submitted by Orquin, EMP, Stolov, and Baker.
\58\ Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at P 14 n.20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
43. Other commenters criticize the NERC Board of Trustees' approval
of Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 because ``no substantive discussion
occurred at the November 7 meeting [at which the NERC Board of Trustees
approved the Reliability Standard] and, as a result, the public was
deprived of its right for due process under Section 215 of the Federal
Power Act.'' \59\ We find no basis to conclude that the NERC Board of
Trustees either violated the NERC Rules of Procedure or otherwise acted
improperly in approving Reliability Standard EOP-010-1. Foundation does
not identify any rule or other provision that, it claims, the NERC
Board of Trustees violated in allegedly failing to conduct a
``substantive discussion'' at the November 7 meeting. Moreover, in
considering whether to approve Reliability Standard EOP-010-1, the
Commission established this rulemaking docket to provide the public
with an opportunity to comment; thus the public has been afforded
adequate due process under FPA section 215. This is in addition to
opportunities to participate in NERC's standard development process, by
submitting comments or otherwise.
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\59\ Foundation Comments at 45; see also CSP Comments at 1.
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44. In response to a comment that Reliability Standard EOP-010-1
could interfere with the development of state-level efforts to address
GMD events,\60\ we note that FPA section 215(j)(3) provides in relevant
part that section 215 does not ``preempt any authority of any State to
take action to ensure the safety, adequacy, and reliability of electric
service within that State, as long as such action is not inconsistent
with any reliability standard.'' We also observe that Reliability
Standard EOP-010-1 does not preclude users, owners and operators of the
Bulk-Power System from taking additional steps that are designed to
mitigate the effects of GMD events, provided those additional steps are
not inconsistent with the Commission-approved Reliability Standards.
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\60\ Maine Representative Boland Comments at 3.
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E. Violation Risk Factors and Violation Severity Levels
45. Each requirement of proposed Reliability Standard EOP-010-1
includes one violation risk factor and has an associated set of at
least one violation severity level. The ranges of ERO penalties for
violations will be based on the sanctions table and supporting penalty
determination process described in the Commission-approved NERC
Sanction Guidelines, according to the NERC petition. The NOPR proposed
to approve the proposed violation risk factors and violation severity
levels for the requirements proposed in Reliability Standard EOP-010-1
as consistent with the Commission's established guidelines.\61\ The
Commission did not receive any comments regarding this aspect of the
NOPR. Accordingly, the Commission approves the violation risk factors
and violation severity levels for the requirements in Reliability
Standard EOP-010-1.
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\61\ See North American Electric Reliability Corp., 135 FERC ]
61,166 (2011).
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III. Information Collection Statement
46. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations require
approval of certain information collection requirements imposed by
agency rules. Upon approval of a collection(s) of information, OMB will
assign an OMB control number and an expiration date. Respondents
subject to the filing requirements of an agency rule will not be
penalized for failing to respond to these collections of information
unless the collections of information display a valid OMB control
number. The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) requires each federal agency
to seek and obtain OMB approval before undertaking a collection of
information directed to ten or more persons, or contained in a rule of
general applicability.
47. The Commission is submitting these reporting requirements to
OMB for its review and approval under section 3507(d) of the PRA. The
Commission solicited comments on the need for and the purpose of the
information contained in Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 and the
corresponding burden to implement the Reliability Standard. The
Commission received comments on specific requirements in the
Reliability Standard, which we address in this Final Rule. However, the
Commission did not receive any comments on our reporting burden
estimates or on the need for and the purpose of the information
collection requirements.
48. The Commission based its paperwork burden estimates on the NERC
compliance registry as of November 27, 2013. According to the registry,
there are 16 reliability coordinators and 183 transmission operators.
49. The Commission estimates an increased burden for each
requirement, as explained in the chart below, for a total estimated
burden of $238,800. The
[[Page 35919]]
Commission based the burden estimates on staff experience, knowledge,
and expertise:
Burden Estimate for Implementation of Reliability Standard EOP-010-1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Average burden
Reliability Standard No. Type of respondents Number of responses per hours per Total annual Total annual
respondents respondent response burden hours cost \62\
(1) (2) (3) (1)x(2)x(3) ..............
�������������������������������������������-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EOP-010-1 (R1)............................ Reliability Coordinator..... 16 1 20 320 $19,200
($60/hr)
EOP-010-1 (R3)............................ Transmission Operator....... 183 1 20 3660 219,600
($60/hr)
Total................................. ............................ .............. .............. .............. 3980 238,800
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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\62\ The estimated hourly loaded cost (salary plus benefits) for
an engineer is assumed to be $60/hour, based on salaries as reported
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (https://bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_22.htm). Loaded costs are BLS rates divided by 0.703 and
rounded to the nearest dollar (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm). While the BLS figures have been updated since the
issuance of the NOPR, the new BLS figures are not significantly
different. For consistency, the Commission continues with the same
loaded cost figure used in the NOPR.
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50. The above chart does not include Reliability Standard EOP-010-
1, Requirement R2 because, as NERC states, that requirement replaces
IRO-005-3.1a, Requirement R3 and has no change in overall burden. In
addition, while our burden estimate with respect to Reliability
Standard EOP-010-1, Requirement R3 assumes that all 183 transmission
operators are subject to that requirement, we note that not all 183
transmission operators are likely to be subject to Requirement R3
because that requirement only applies to transmission operators with a
Transmission Operator Area that includes a power transformer with a
high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200
kV.
Title: FERC-725S, Mandatory Reliability Standards: Reliability
Standard EOP-010-1.
Action: Proposed Collection of Information.
OMB Control No: 1902-0270.
Respondents: Business or other for profit, and not for profit
institutions.
Frequency of Responses: One-time and ongoing.
Necessity of the Information: Reliability Standard EOP-010-1
implements the Congressional mandate of the Energy Policy Act of 2005
to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards to better
ensure the reliability of the nation's Bulk-Power System. Specifically,
the Reliability Standard ensures that responsible entities have
Operating Plans and Operating Procedures or Processes in place to
mitigate the effects of geomagnetic disturbances on the Bulk-Power
System.
Internal review: The Commission has reviewed Reliability Standard
EOP-010-1 and has determined that the Reliability Standard is necessary
to ensure the reliability and integrity of the Nation's Bulk-Power
System.
51. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting
requirements by contacting: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen Brown, Office
of the Executive Director, email: DataClearance@ferc.gov, Phone: (202)
502-8663, fax: (202) 273-0873]. Comments on the requirements of this
rule may also be sent to the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503
[Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission].
For security reasons, comments should be sent by email to OMB at oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Comments submitted to OMB should include Docket
Number RM14-1-000.
IV. Environmental Analysis
52. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\63\ The
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying,
corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the
effect of the regulations being amended.\64\ The actions here fall
within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's regulations.
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\63\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy
Act, Order No. 486, 52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. &
Regs., Regulations Preambles 1986-1990 ] 30,783 (1987).
\64\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
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V. Regulatory Flexibility Act
53. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \65\ generally
requires a description and analysis of proposed rules that will have
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
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54. The NOPR compared the NERC compliance registry with data
submitted to the Energy Information Administration on Form EIA-861,
which indicated that perhaps as many as 34 small entities were
registered as transmission operators and no small entities were
registered as reliability coordinators. However, the Commission
estimated in the NOPR that there will be no material change in burden
for the 34 transmission operators that qualified as small entities
because they will likely not be subject to Reliability Standard EOP-
010-1. Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 applies to transmission operators
with a Transmission Operator Area that includes a power transformer
with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater
than 200 kV. The NOPR stated that transmission operators with
Transmission Operator Areas that include a power transformer with a
high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200
kV are generally large entities serving substantial geographical areas
with significant energy output. The Commission did not receive any
comments regarding this aspect of the NOPR.
55. Since the issuance of the NOPR, the Small Business
Administration changed the small business size standard applicable to
reliability coordinators and transmission operators. The Commission
currently does not have an estimate of the number of small reliability
coordinators and transmission operators using the new
[[Page 35920]]
size standard. However, the Commission still estimates that the
specific applicability of Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 means that
generally only large entities will have to meet the new requirements.
56. Based on the above, the Commission certifies that Reliability
Standard EOP-010-1 will not have a significant impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Accordingly, no initial regulatory
flexibility analysis is required.
VI. Document Availability
57. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
Internet through the Commission's Home Page (https://www.ferc.gov) and
in the Commission's Public Reference Room during normal business hours
(8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE., Room 2A,
Washington, DC 20426.
58. From the Commission's Home Page on the Internet, this
information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is
available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing,
printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type
the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in
the docket number field.
59. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's
Web site during normal business hours from the Commission's Online
Support at (202) 502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. Email the Public Reference Room at
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
VII. Effective Date and Congressional Notification
60. These regulations are effective August 25, 2014. The Commission
has determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB, that this rule is not a
``major rule'' as defined in section 351 of the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996.
By the Commission.
Issued: June 19, 2014.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
Appendix
Commenters
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abbreviation Commenter
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AEP.................................... American Electric Power Service
Corporation.
AFS.................................... Advanced Fusion Systems.
APS.................................... Arizona Public Service Company.
ASO.................................... Atomic Safety Organization.
Baker.................................. George H. Baker.
Maine Representative Boland............ Hon. Andrea M. Boland, Maine
State Representative.
CSP.................................... Center for Security Policy.
Dominion............................... Dominion Resources Services,
Inc.
EEI.................................... Edison Electric Institute.
EMP Coalition.......................... EMP Coalition.
Emprimus............................... Emprimus LLC.
Chamber of Commerce.................... Institute for 21st Century
Energy, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce.
Foundation............................. Foundation for Resilient
Societies.
IRC.................................... ISO/RTO Council.
ITC.................................... International Transmission
Company.
Kappenman.............................. John G. Kappenman.
NERC................................... North American Electric
Reliability Corporation.
Orquin................................. Alberto Ramirez Orquin.
SmartSenseCom.......................... SmartSenseCom, Inc.
Stolov................................. Jerome J. Stolov.
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[FR Doc. 2014-14849 Filed 6-24-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
