Outer Continental Shelf Units-Fire and Explosion Analyses, 25139-25141 [2014-10010]
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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 85 / Friday, May 2, 2014 / Notices
required to be closed pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552b(c)(1)(A).
The second agenda item, the
discussion of potential NSTAC study
topics, will address areas of critical
cybersecurity vulnerabilities and
priorities for Government. Government
officials will share data with NSTAC
members on initiatives, assessments,
and future security requirements. The
data to be shared includes specific
vulnerabilities within cyberspace that
affect the Nation’s communications and
information technology infrastructures
and proposed mitigation strategies.
Disclosure of this information to the
public would provide criminals with an
incentive to focus on these
vulnerabilities to increase attacks on our
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Therefore, this portion of the meeting is
likely to significantly frustrate
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actions and is required to be closed
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(B).
Dated: April 25, 2014.
Helen Jackson,
Designated Federal Officer for the NSTAC.
[FR Doc. 2014–10024 Filed 5–1–14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Coast Guard
[USCG–2013–0316]
Outer Continental Shelf Units—Fire
and Explosion Analyses
Coast Guard, DHS.
Notice of recommended interim
voluntary guidelines.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
As part of its continuing
response to the explosion, fire and
sinking of the mobile offshore drilling
unit (MODU) DEEPWATER HORIZON
in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010,
the Coast Guard is providing
recommended interim voluntary
guidelines concerning fire and
explosion analyses for MODUs and
manned fixed and floating offshore
facilities engaged in activities on the
U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).
DATES: The recommended voluntary
guidelines in this notice are effective
May 2, 2014.
Documents mentioned as being
available in the docket are part of docket
USCG–2013–0316 and are available for
inspection or copying at the Docket
Management Facility (M–30), U.S.
Department of Transportation, West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
SUMMARY:
VerDate Mar<15>2010
00:23 May 02, 2014
Jkt 232001
Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. You may also
find this docket on the Internet by going
to https://www.regulations.gov, inserting
USCG–2013–0316 in the ‘‘Keyword’’
box, and then clicking ‘‘Search.’’
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If
you have questions on this notice, call
or email LCDR John H. Miller, U.S.
Coast Guard, Office of Design and
Engineering Standards, Lifesaving and
Fire Safety Division (CG–ENG–4),
telephone (202) 372–1372, email
John.H.Miller@uscg.mil.
Background
The ‘‘Report of Investigation into the
Circumstances Surrounding the
Explosion, Fire, Sinking and Loss of
Eleven Crew Members Aboard the
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU)
DEEPWATER HORIZON in the Gulf of
Mexico, April 20–22, 2010,’’ (hereinafter
referred to as ‘‘Report’’), and related
Commandant’s Final Action Memo,
dated September 9, 2011, contain a
number of recommendations for OCS
safety improvements that are presently
being evaluated for further regulatory
action. (These documents may be found
in the docket for this action, as
indicated under ADDRESSES).
Recommendations 1D, 1E, 2B, 2C, 2E,
and 3A in the Report urged the Coast
Guard to evaluate the need for fire and
explosion risk analyses to ensure an
adequate level of protection is provided
for accommodation spaces, escape
paths, embarkation stations, and
structures housing vital safety
equipment from drill floor and
production area events. The Report
highlighted the following considerations
as areas not specifically addressed by
current regulations:
• Minimum values are needed for
explosion design loads for use in
calculating the required blast resistance
of structures;
• Explosion risk analysis of the
design and layout of each facility should
be performed to identify high risk
situations;
• H–60 rated fire boundaries between
the drilling area and adjacent
accommodation spaces and spaces
housing vital safety equipment may be
necessary dependent on the
arrangement of the facility;
• Uniform guidelines for performing
engineering evaluations to ensure
adequate protection of bulkheads and
decks separating hazardous areas from
adjacent structures and escape routes for
likely drill floor fire scenarios are
necessary;
• Performance-based fire risk analysis
should be used to supplement the
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
25139
prescriptive requirements in the MODU
Code; such analysis should use defined
heat flux loads to calculate necessary
levels of protection for structures,
equipment, and vital systems that could
be affected by fires on the drill floor;
• Maximum allowable radiant heat
exposure limits for personnel at the
muster stations and lifesaving appliance
launching stations in anticipated
evacuation scenarios should be
implemented.
To implement these
recommendations, a future Coast Guard
rulemaking will address fire and
explosion risk analyses for MODUs and
manned fixed and floating offshore
facilities engaged in OCS activities.
Comments will be invited in connection
with that rulemaking.
Currently, there is no requirement in
the current OCS regulations, in Title 33
of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR), that requires a fire and explosion
analysis that would implement the
recommendations from the Report.
Furthermore, while Section 9 of the
2009 IMO MODU Code contains some
recommendations on the parameters of
fire and explosion risk analysis, we
believe that these recommendations are
not sufficiently specific to adequately
and consistently address these
recommendations from the Report on
their own.
We believe that the recommendations
from the 2009 IMO MODU Code are
insufficiently specific for several
reasons. Section 9.3.1 of the 2009
MODU Code provides, ‘‘In general,
accommodation spaces, service spaces
and control stations should not be
located adjacent to hazardous areas.
However, where this is not practicable,
an engineering evaluation should be
performed to ensure that the level of fire
protection and blast resistance of the
bulkheads and decks separating these
spaces from the hazardous areas are
adequate for the likely hazard.’’ This
requirement is not specific enough to
consistently ensure the protection of
safety-critical spaces and elements
aboard MODUs and manned fixed and
floating offshore facilities engaged in
OCS activities, and needs to be
supported by guidance to better define
what the ‘‘engineering evaluation’’
should include and what performance
criteria should be met to ensure
‘‘adequate protection’’ is provided.
Safety-critical spaces and elements
refers to any accommodation or work
area, equipment, system, device, or
material, the failure, destruction, or
release of which could directly or
indirectly endanger the survivability of
the facility and the personnel onboard.
These safety-critical spaces and
E:\FR\FM\02MYN1.SGM
02MYN1
25140
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 85 / Friday, May 2, 2014 / Notices
elements can include, but not be limited
to, control stations, accommodation
areas, vital safety equipment, escape
routes and survival craft launching
areas, and other equipment with
escalation potential (e.g., fuel storage).
Survivability refers to the event
threshold determined by the company
for the purposes of fire and explosion.
This normally includes the specification
of a sufficient period of time to maintain
the habitability of safety-critical spaces
and escape routes, temporary refuge,
and muster areas to allow for emergency
response and boarding of survival craft
and subsequent evacuation of the
facility.
Additionally, Section 9.4.5 of the
2009 MODU Code also requires that,
‘‘Consideration should be given by the
Administration to the siting of
superstructures and deckhouses such
that in the event of fire at the drill floor
at least one escape route to the
embarkation position and survival craft
is protected against radiation effects of
that fire as far as practicable.’’ This
requirement is not specific enough to
consistently ensure the protection of
escape routes aboard MODUs and
manned fixed and floating offshore
facilities engaged in OCS activities, and
needs to be supported by guidance to
better define what level of ‘‘radiation
effects’’ to personnel and safety
equipment is acceptable.
The Coast Guard believes the fire and
explosion analysis guidelines set forth
below are needed to uniformly
implement the recommendations in
paragraphs 9.3.1 and 9.4.5 of 2009
MODU Code, and address
recommendations 1D, 1E, 2B, 2C, 2E,
and 3A of the Report. It is the Coast
Guard’s belief that following these
recommendations would yield
significant safety improvements. These
guidelines were developed based on
industry standards, technical expert
advice, and fire protection engineering
references. These guidelines are
intended for use in the design phase of
new facility construction; however, they
may be useful in assessing and
increasing the safety of existing
facilities.
Interim Voluntary Guidance
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
(a) Introduction
As an interim measure pending a
Coast Guard future rulemaking, owners/
operators of MODUs and manned fixed
and floating offshore facilities operating
on the U.S. OCS are urged to consider
voluntary compliance with the
guidelines laid out below, to the extent
appropriate and practicable.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
00:23 May 02, 2014
Jkt 232001
The intent of the recommendations
set forth below is to provide a consistent
approach for adequate protection of
personnel and safety-critical spaces and
elements located on MODUS and
manned fixed and floating offshore
facilities against potential fire and
explosion events following a
catastrophic failure such as loss of well
control. This approach should consider
all facility operating modes including
startup, maintenance periods, crew
turnover, etc.
(b) Recommendations
(1) Engineering Evaluation
The engineering evaluation of fire and
blast loads in the design of offshore
facilities should follow an established
and widely accepted approach,
normally based on the fire and
explosion risk of hydrocarbon fuel
sources. An engineering evaluation
should identify hazards and the
potential damage of major accident
events. This evaluation should consist
of a methodology that may include the
following: hazard identification,
consequence evaluation, adequacy of
control and mitigation measures, and
final risk assessment. The evaluation
should be completed by a Registered
Professional Fire Protection Engineer
with experience in fire and explosion
analysis, or by a recognized class society
(under 46 CFR part 8) with similar
equivalent experience.
This evaluation should include
establishment of accepted performance
criteria to demonstrate that appropriate
mitigating measures have been
implemented to ensure survivability of
the facility and personnel.
The Coast Guard recommends the use
of American Petroleum Institute (API)
Recommended Practice (RP) 2FB for
conducting an engineering evaluation.
We note that there are other standards
available that can be used for the
engineering evaluation. We chose API
RP 2FB because it contains thorough
coverage of the elements which are
important to an engineering evaluation
and because the Coast Guard actively
participates in the API committee
process. We do note that there are
alternative approaches that have been
widely accepted by the oil and gas
industry meeting the intent of this
recommendation.
(2) Explosion Protection
Maximum allowable values for
explosion design loads should be
determined based on accepted industry
standards and used to calculate the
required blast resistance of structures
for each particular arrangement.
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Frm 00048
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Explosion design load means a nominal,
peak overpressure that has been defined
in industry standards based on a limited
data set for a number of platform
concept types (nominal values are
determined from acquired experience or
physical conditions). In cases where
vulnerabilities are noted, facility
arrangements should be modified or
additional protective measures
provided.
We recommend use of the unmodified
nominal explosion overpressures by
facility type and load modifiers listed in
API RP 2FB, Tables C.6.3.1–1 and
C.6.3.2–1, where appropriate. As
described in the guide, load modifiers
should be used to account for the higher
or lower pressures that may be
associated with specific facility
arrangements or operations.
We do note that there are alternative
explosion design loads that have been
widely accepted by the oil and gas
industry meeting the intent of this
recommendation.
(3) Fire Protection
The radiant heat flux produced by
particular hazards should be prescribed
and calculations completed to assess the
effects on safety critical spaces and
elements. Radiant heat flux means the
rate of heat transfer per unit area
perpendicular to the direction of heat
flow; normally expressed in kilowatts
per meters squared (kW/m2) or British
Thermal Units per second foot squared
(Btu/(s*ft2)). Radiant heat flux is a
measure of the potential for injury,
damage or fire spread (e.g., most
common combustibles ignite when
exposed to a radiant heat flux of 0.9–1.8
Btu/(s*ft2) or 10–20 kW/m2).
The radiant heat flux from typical
drill floor fire sources should be
approximated from the following:
(i) As specified in API RP 2FB, jet
fires may give rise to radiant heat flux
levels on the order of 300 KW/m2 in
open conditions and up to 400 KW/m2
in confined areas. Jet fire refers to a
high-pressure release of any flammable
fluid or gases in a solution that forms a
jet which is ignited, and in which the
flame burns back against the flow
towards the release point;
(ii) As specified in API RP 2FB, pool
fires may give rise to lower radiant heat
flux levels on the order of 100–160 KW/
m2. Pool fire refers to a body of fuel that
is confined by physical boundaries (e.g.,
obstructions on the floor will limit a
fuel release to a smaller area than the
potential unconfined spill area).
Where the safety-critical spaces and
elements are exposed to a radiant heat
flux up to 100 KW/m2, a passive
structural fire protection equivalent
E:\FR\FM\02MYN1.SGM
02MYN1
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 85 / Friday, May 2, 2014 / Notices
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
rating of A–60 should generally be
considered sufficient for the surface
facing the source of the radiant heat
flux. For radiant heat flux levels 100
KW/m2 and above, H–60 rated
protection should be considered as a
minimum. In either case, the protection
should continue on the adjacent sides of
such structures for a minimum distance
of 10 feet (3 meters) from the surface
facing the source of the radiant heat flux
(SOLAS II–2/9.2.4.2.5). This
overlapping of protection on adjacent
areas is necessary to prevent the radiant
heat from ‘‘wrapping around’’ to expose
an inadequately protected area.
The Coast Guard recommends use of
the following references for calculating
the radiant heat flux at a target from a
fire source (i.e., pool or jet fire).
(i) The SFPE Handbook of Fire
Protection Engineering, Fourth Edition
(Section 3, Chapter 10);
(iii) API Recommended Practice 2FB.
We do note that there are alternative
baseline radiant heat flux levels and
calculations that have been recognized
by the oil and gas industry meeting the
intent of this recommendation.
(4) Heat Exposure
The maximum radiant heat exposure
to personnel should be evaluated at the
assembly/muster stations and survival
craft launching stations as well as along
the normal escape routes from the
accommodation and service areas to
those areas.
The maximum allowable radiant heat
flux exposure for personnel at the
muster stations and survival craft
launching stations should be low
enough to prevent injury when exposed
for the period of time needed to embark
and launch the survival craft (normally
around 2.5 KW/m2 for approximately
thirty minutes on bare skin).
The Coast Guard recommends use of
the following references for calculating
the radiant heat flux exposure to a target
and the limits on personnel exposure:
(i) The SFPE Handbook of Fire
Protection Engineering, Fourth Edition
(Section 2, Chapter 6; Section 3, Chapter
10);
(ii) Fire Protection Handbook,
Twentieth Edition (Section 6, Chapter
2);
(iii) API Recommended Practice 2FB.
We do note that there are alternative
methods for calculating radiant heat
flux exposure to personnel and
exposure limits which meet the intent of
this recommendation.
(5) Mitigation
Where the explosion design load,
radiant heat flux and radiant heat
exposure values calculated for the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
00:23 May 02, 2014
Jkt 232001
facility exceed the recommended
performance standard of the equipment
in place, mitigation measures, such as
venting, increased structural strength of
blast-walls, bulkheads and decks,
passive fire protection, re-arrangement
and shifting of structures, or other
viable and analyzed mitigation
measures should be incorporated.
Authority; Disclaimer
This document is issued under the
authority of 5 U.S.C. 552(a), 43 U.S.C.
1331, et seq., and 33 CFR 1.05–1. The
guidance contained in this notice is not
a substitute for applicable legal
requirements or current Coast Guard
and Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement regulations, nor is it itself
a regulation. It is not intended to nor
does it impose legally binding
requirements on any party. It represents
the Coast Guard’s current thinking on
this topic and may assist industry,
mariners, the general public, and the
Coast Guard, as well as other Federal
and State regulators, in instituting
lessons learned from the Report.
Dated: April 28, 2014.
J.G. Lantz,
Director of Commercial Regulations and
Standards, U.S. Coast Guard.
[FR Doc. 2014–10010 Filed 5–1–14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110–04–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services
[CIS No. 2542–14; DHS Docket No. USCIS–
2014–0001]
RIN 1615–ZB25
Extension of the Re-registration Period
for Haiti Temporary Protected Status
U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, Department of
Homeland Security.
ACTION: Notice; Extension of reregistration period.
AGENCY:
On March 3, 2014, the
Secretary of Homeland Security
(Secretary) extended the designation of
Haiti for Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) for a period of 18 months by
notice in the Federal Register. The
Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) established a 60-day reregistration period from March 3, 2014
through May 2, 2014. DHS is extending
the re-registration period through July
22, 2014 through this Notice, to
maximize re-registration opportunities
for those eligible to re-register.
SUMMARY:
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
25141
DHS extended Haiti TPS on
March 3, 2014. The re-registration
period that was to expire on May 2,
2014, will be extended with a new reregistration filing deadline of July 22,
2014.
DATES:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
• For further information on TPS,
including guidance on the application
process and additional information on
eligibility, please visit the USCIS TPS
Web page at https://www.uscis.gov/tps.
You can find specific information about
the extension of the TPS designation for
Haiti and the extension of the reregistration period by selecting ‘‘TPS
Designated Country: Haiti’’ from the
menu on the left of the TPS Web page.
On the Haiti TPS Web page, there is a
link to the Federal Register notice at 79
FR 11808 (March 3, 2014) that provides
detailed information and procedures to
re-register for Haiti TPS.
• You can also contact the TPS
Operations Program Manager at the
Family and Status Branch, Service
Center Operations Directorate, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services,
Department of Homeland Security, Mail
Stop 2060, Washington, DC 20529–
2060; or by phone at (202) 272–1533
(this is not a toll-free number). Note:
The phone number provided here is
solely for questions regarding this TPS
notice. It is not for individual case
status updates.
• Applicants seeking information
about the status of their individual cases
can check Case Status Online, available
at the USCIS Web site at https://
www.uscis.gov, or call the USCIS
National Customer Service Center at
800–375–5283 (TTY for the hearing
impaired is at 800–767–1833). Service is
available in English and Spanish only.
• Further information will also be
available at local USCIS offices upon
publication of this Notice.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
When did the Secretary extend the TPS
designation for Haiti?
On March 3, 2014, the Secretary
extended the TPS designation for Haiti
for a period of 18 months by notice in
the Federal Register. See 79 FR 11808.
The extension is effective from July 23,
2014 through January 22, 2016.
Why is the Secretary extending the reregistration period for Haitian TPS
beneficiaries?
DHS is extending the re-registration
period through July 22, 2014 in order to
maximize re-registration opportunities
for those eligible to do so. As of April
20, 2014, USCIS had received a low
proportion of the expected number of
E:\FR\FM\02MYN1.SGM
02MYN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 85 (Friday, May 2, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 25139-25141]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-10010]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Coast Guard
[USCG-2013-0316]
Outer Continental Shelf Units--Fire and Explosion Analyses
AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.
ACTION: Notice of recommended interim voluntary guidelines.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: As part of its continuing response to the explosion, fire and
sinking of the mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) DEEPWATER HORIZON
in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, the Coast Guard is providing
recommended interim voluntary guidelines concerning fire and explosion
analyses for MODUs and manned fixed and floating offshore facilities
engaged in activities on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).
DATES: The recommended voluntary guidelines in this notice are
effective May 2, 2014.
Documents mentioned as being available in the docket are part of
docket USCG-2013-0316 and are available for inspection or copying at
the Docket Management Facility (M-30), U.S. Department of
Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. You may also find this
docket on the Internet by going to https://www.regulations.gov,
inserting USCG-2013-0316 in the ``Keyword'' box, and then clicking
``Search.''
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions on this notice,
call or email LCDR John H. Miller, U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Design
and Engineering Standards, Lifesaving and Fire Safety Division (CG-ENG-
4), telephone (202) 372-1372, email John.H.Miller@uscg.mil.
Background
The ``Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding
the Explosion, Fire, Sinking and Loss of Eleven Crew Members Aboard the
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) DEEPWATER HORIZON in the Gulf of
Mexico, April 20-22, 2010,'' (hereinafter referred to as ``Report''),
and related Commandant's Final Action Memo, dated September 9, 2011,
contain a number of recommendations for OCS safety improvements that
are presently being evaluated for further regulatory action. (These
documents may be found in the docket for this action, as indicated
under ADDRESSES).
Recommendations 1D, 1E, 2B, 2C, 2E, and 3A in the Report urged the
Coast Guard to evaluate the need for fire and explosion risk analyses
to ensure an adequate level of protection is provided for accommodation
spaces, escape paths, embarkation stations, and structures housing
vital safety equipment from drill floor and production area events. The
Report highlighted the following considerations as areas not
specifically addressed by current regulations:
Minimum values are needed for explosion design loads for
use in calculating the required blast resistance of structures;
Explosion risk analysis of the design and layout of each
facility should be performed to identify high risk situations;
H-60 rated fire boundaries between the drilling area and
adjacent accommodation spaces and spaces housing vital safety equipment
may be necessary dependent on the arrangement of the facility;
Uniform guidelines for performing engineering evaluations
to ensure adequate protection of bulkheads and decks separating
hazardous areas from adjacent structures and escape routes for likely
drill floor fire scenarios are necessary;
Performance-based fire risk analysis should be used to
supplement the prescriptive requirements in the MODU Code; such
analysis should use defined heat flux loads to calculate necessary
levels of protection for structures, equipment, and vital systems that
could be affected by fires on the drill floor;
Maximum allowable radiant heat exposure limits for
personnel at the muster stations and lifesaving appliance launching
stations in anticipated evacuation scenarios should be implemented.
To implement these recommendations, a future Coast Guard rulemaking
will address fire and explosion risk analyses for MODUs and manned
fixed and floating offshore facilities engaged in OCS activities.
Comments will be invited in connection with that rulemaking.
Currently, there is no requirement in the current OCS regulations,
in Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), that requires a
fire and explosion analysis that would implement the recommendations
from the Report. Furthermore, while Section 9 of the 2009 IMO MODU Code
contains some recommendations on the parameters of fire and explosion
risk analysis, we believe that these recommendations are not
sufficiently specific to adequately and consistently address these
recommendations from the Report on their own.
We believe that the recommendations from the 2009 IMO MODU Code are
insufficiently specific for several reasons. Section 9.3.1 of the 2009
MODU Code provides, ``In general, accommodation spaces, service spaces
and control stations should not be located adjacent to hazardous areas.
However, where this is not practicable, an engineering evaluation
should be performed to ensure that the level of fire protection and
blast resistance of the bulkheads and decks separating these spaces
from the hazardous areas are adequate for the likely hazard.'' This
requirement is not specific enough to consistently ensure the
protection of safety-critical spaces and elements aboard MODUs and
manned fixed and floating offshore facilities engaged in OCS
activities, and needs to be supported by guidance to better define what
the ``engineering evaluation'' should include and what performance
criteria should be met to ensure ``adequate protection'' is provided.
Safety-critical spaces and elements refers to any accommodation or work
area, equipment, system, device, or material, the failure, destruction,
or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the
survivability of the facility and the personnel onboard. These safety-
critical spaces and
[[Page 25140]]
elements can include, but not be limited to, control stations,
accommodation areas, vital safety equipment, escape routes and survival
craft launching areas, and other equipment with escalation potential
(e.g., fuel storage). Survivability refers to the event threshold
determined by the company for the purposes of fire and explosion. This
normally includes the specification of a sufficient period of time to
maintain the habitability of safety-critical spaces and escape routes,
temporary refuge, and muster areas to allow for emergency response and
boarding of survival craft and subsequent evacuation of the facility.
Additionally, Section 9.4.5 of the 2009 MODU Code also requires
that, ``Consideration should be given by the Administration to the
siting of superstructures and deckhouses such that in the event of fire
at the drill floor at least one escape route to the embarkation
position and survival craft is protected against radiation effects of
that fire as far as practicable.'' This requirement is not specific
enough to consistently ensure the protection of escape routes aboard
MODUs and manned fixed and floating offshore facilities engaged in OCS
activities, and needs to be supported by guidance to better define what
level of ``radiation effects'' to personnel and safety equipment is
acceptable.
The Coast Guard believes the fire and explosion analysis guidelines
set forth below are needed to uniformly implement the recommendations
in paragraphs 9.3.1 and 9.4.5 of 2009 MODU Code, and address
recommendations 1D, 1E, 2B, 2C, 2E, and 3A of the Report. It is the
Coast Guard's belief that following these recommendations would yield
significant safety improvements. These guidelines were developed based
on industry standards, technical expert advice, and fire protection
engineering references. These guidelines are intended for use in the
design phase of new facility construction; however, they may be useful
in assessing and increasing the safety of existing facilities.
Interim Voluntary Guidance
(a) Introduction
As an interim measure pending a Coast Guard future rulemaking,
owners/operators of MODUs and manned fixed and floating offshore
facilities operating on the U.S. OCS are urged to consider voluntary
compliance with the guidelines laid out below, to the extent
appropriate and practicable.
The intent of the recommendations set forth below is to provide a
consistent approach for adequate protection of personnel and safety-
critical spaces and elements located on MODUS and manned fixed and
floating offshore facilities against potential fire and explosion
events following a catastrophic failure such as loss of well control.
This approach should consider all facility operating modes including
startup, maintenance periods, crew turnover, etc.
(b) Recommendations
(1) Engineering Evaluation
The engineering evaluation of fire and blast loads in the design of
offshore facilities should follow an established and widely accepted
approach, normally based on the fire and explosion risk of hydrocarbon
fuel sources. An engineering evaluation should identify hazards and the
potential damage of major accident events. This evaluation should
consist of a methodology that may include the following: hazard
identification, consequence evaluation, adequacy of control and
mitigation measures, and final risk assessment. The evaluation should
be completed by a Registered Professional Fire Protection Engineer with
experience in fire and explosion analysis, or by a recognized class
society (under 46 CFR part 8) with similar equivalent experience.
This evaluation should include establishment of accepted
performance criteria to demonstrate that appropriate mitigating
measures have been implemented to ensure survivability of the facility
and personnel.
The Coast Guard recommends the use of American Petroleum Institute
(API) Recommended Practice (RP) 2FB for conducting an engineering
evaluation.
We note that there are other standards available that can be used
for the engineering evaluation. We chose API RP 2FB because it contains
thorough coverage of the elements which are important to an engineering
evaluation and because the Coast Guard actively participates in the API
committee process. We do note that there are alternative approaches
that have been widely accepted by the oil and gas industry meeting the
intent of this recommendation.
(2) Explosion Protection
Maximum allowable values for explosion design loads should be
determined based on accepted industry standards and used to calculate
the required blast resistance of structures for each particular
arrangement. Explosion design load means a nominal, peak overpressure
that has been defined in industry standards based on a limited data set
for a number of platform concept types (nominal values are determined
from acquired experience or physical conditions). In cases where
vulnerabilities are noted, facility arrangements should be modified or
additional protective measures provided.
We recommend use of the unmodified nominal explosion overpressures
by facility type and load modifiers listed in API RP 2FB, Tables
C.6.3.1-1 and C.6.3.2-1, where appropriate. As described in the guide,
load modifiers should be used to account for the higher or lower
pressures that may be associated with specific facility arrangements or
operations.
We do note that there are alternative explosion design loads that
have been widely accepted by the oil and gas industry meeting the
intent of this recommendation.
(3) Fire Protection
The radiant heat flux produced by particular hazards should be
prescribed and calculations completed to assess the effects on safety
critical spaces and elements. Radiant heat flux means the rate of heat
transfer per unit area perpendicular to the direction of heat flow;
normally expressed in kilowatts per meters squared (kW/m\2\) or British
Thermal Units per second foot squared (Btu/(s*ft\2\)). Radiant heat
flux is a measure of the potential for injury, damage or fire spread
(e.g., most common combustibles ignite when exposed to a radiant heat
flux of 0.9-1.8 Btu/(s*ft\2\) or 10-20 kW/m\2\).
The radiant heat flux from typical drill floor fire sources should
be approximated from the following:
(i) As specified in API RP 2FB, jet fires may give rise to radiant
heat flux levels on the order of 300 KW/m\2\ in open conditions and up
to 400 KW/m\2\ in confined areas. Jet fire refers to a high-pressure
release of any flammable fluid or gases in a solution that forms a jet
which is ignited, and in which the flame burns back against the flow
towards the release point;
(ii) As specified in API RP 2FB, pool fires may give rise to lower
radiant heat flux levels on the order of 100-160 KW/m\2\. Pool fire
refers to a body of fuel that is confined by physical boundaries (e.g.,
obstructions on the floor will limit a fuel release to a smaller area
than the potential unconfined spill area).
Where the safety-critical spaces and elements are exposed to a
radiant heat flux up to 100 KW/m\2\, a passive structural fire
protection equivalent
[[Page 25141]]
rating of A-60 should generally be considered sufficient for the
surface facing the source of the radiant heat flux. For radiant heat
flux levels 100 KW/m\2\ and above, H-60 rated protection should be
considered as a minimum. In either case, the protection should continue
on the adjacent sides of such structures for a minimum distance of 10
feet (3 meters) from the surface facing the source of the radiant heat
flux (SOLAS II-2/9.2.4.2.5). This overlapping of protection on adjacent
areas is necessary to prevent the radiant heat from ``wrapping around''
to expose an inadequately protected area.
The Coast Guard recommends use of the following references for
calculating the radiant heat flux at a target from a fire source (i.e.,
pool or jet fire).
(i) The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, Fourth
Edition (Section 3, Chapter 10);
(iii) API Recommended Practice 2FB.
We do note that there are alternative baseline radiant heat flux
levels and calculations that have been recognized by the oil and gas
industry meeting the intent of this recommendation.
(4) Heat Exposure
The maximum radiant heat exposure to personnel should be evaluated
at the assembly/muster stations and survival craft launching stations
as well as along the normal escape routes from the accommodation and
service areas to those areas.
The maximum allowable radiant heat flux exposure for personnel at
the muster stations and survival craft launching stations should be low
enough to prevent injury when exposed for the period of time needed to
embark and launch the survival craft (normally around 2.5 KW/m\2\ for
approximately thirty minutes on bare skin).
The Coast Guard recommends use of the following references for
calculating the radiant heat flux exposure to a target and the limits
on personnel exposure:
(i) The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, Fourth
Edition (Section 2, Chapter 6; Section 3, Chapter 10);
(ii) Fire Protection Handbook, Twentieth Edition (Section 6,
Chapter 2);
(iii) API Recommended Practice 2FB.
We do note that there are alternative methods for calculating
radiant heat flux exposure to personnel and exposure limits which meet
the intent of this recommendation.
(5) Mitigation
Where the explosion design load, radiant heat flux and radiant heat
exposure values calculated for the facility exceed the recommended
performance standard of the equipment in place, mitigation measures,
such as venting, increased structural strength of blast-walls,
bulkheads and decks, passive fire protection, re-arrangement and
shifting of structures, or other viable and analyzed mitigation
measures should be incorporated.
Authority; Disclaimer
This document is issued under the authority of 5 U.S.C. 552(a), 43
U.S.C. 1331, et seq., and 33 CFR 1.05-1. The guidance contained in this
notice is not a substitute for applicable legal requirements or current
Coast Guard and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
regulations, nor is it itself a regulation. It is not intended to nor
does it impose legally binding requirements on any party. It represents
the Coast Guard's current thinking on this topic and may assist
industry, mariners, the general public, and the Coast Guard, as well as
other Federal and State regulators, in instituting lessons learned from
the Report.
Dated: April 28, 2014.
J.G. Lantz,
Director of Commercial Regulations and Standards, U.S. Coast Guard.
[FR Doc. 2014-10010 Filed 5-1-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-04-P