Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations, 18328-18350 [2014-06956]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 62 (Tuesday, April 1, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18328-18350]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-06956]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2014-0064]


Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility 
Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant 
Hazards Considerations

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Biweekly notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Pursuant to Section 189a. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, as amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. The Act requires the 
Commission to publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to 
be issued and grants the Commission the authority to issue and make 
immediately effective any amendment to an operating license or combined 
license, as applicable, upon a determination by the Commission that 
such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, 
notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a 
hearing from any person.
    This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or 
proposed to be issued from March 6, 2014, to March 19, 2014. The last 
biweekly notice was published on March 18, 2014.

DATES: Comments must be filed by May 1, 2014. A request for a hearing 
must be filed by June 2, 2014.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods 
(unless this document describes a different method for submitting 
comments on a specific subject):
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2014-0064. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-287-
3422; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact 
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document.
     Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Chief, Rules, 
Announcements, and Directives Branch (RADB), Office of Administration, 
Mail Stop: 3WFN-06-44M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555-0001.
    For additional direction on accessing information and submitting 
comments, see ``Accessing Information and Submitting Comments'' in the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Janet Burkhardt, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-1384, email: janet.burkhardt@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments

A. Accessing Information

    Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2014-0064 when contacting the NRC 
about the availability of information regarding this document. You may 
access publicly-available information related to this document by any 
of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2014-0064.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and 
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, 
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. 
Documents may be viewed in ADAMS by performing a search on the document 
date and docket number.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

B. Submitting Comments

    Please include Docket ID NRC-2014-0064 in the subject line of your 
comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make 
your comment submission available to the public in this docket.
    The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact 
information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in you 
comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at https://www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment submissions into 
ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove 
identifying or contact information.
    If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons 
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to 
include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be 
publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should 
state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to 
remove such information before making the comment submissions available 
to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS.

II. Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility 
Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses and Proposed No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination

    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following 
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under 
the Commission's regulations in Sec.  50.92 of Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), this means that operation of the facility 
in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated, or (2) create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or 
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis 
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown 
below.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The 
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment 
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the 
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day

[[Page 18329]]

comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day comment 
period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for 
example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the Commission 
take action prior to the expiration of either the comment period or the 
notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a notice of 
issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant Hazards 
Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after 
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will 
occur very infrequently.

A. Opportunity To Request a Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene

    Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, any 
person(s) whose interest may be affected by this action may file a 
request for a hearing and a petition to intervene with respect to 
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license or 
combined license. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Agency 
Rules of Practice and Procedure'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
person(s) should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is 
available at the NRC's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Room O1-
F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland 20852. The 
NRC's regulations are accessible electronically from the NRC Library on 
the NRC's Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is 
filed by the above date, the Commission or a presiding officer 
designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge of 
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request 
and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative Judge of 
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing 
or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone 
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the 
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the 
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's 
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the 
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the 
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must 
also identify the specific contentions which the requestor/petitioner 
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding. Each contention must consist 
of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or 
controverted. In addition, the requestor/petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases for the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the requestor/petitioner intends to rely in 
proving the contention at the hearing. The requestor/petitioner must 
also provide references to those specific sources and documents of 
which the petitioner is aware and on which the requestor/petitioner 
intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. The 
petition must include sufficient information to show that a genuine 
dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. 
Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the 
amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if 
proven, would entitle the requestor/petitioner to relief. A requestor/
petitioner who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at 
least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If 
the final determination is that the amendment request involves no 
significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment 
request involves a significant hazards consideration, then any hearing 
held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

B. Electronic Submissions (E-Filing)

    All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a 
request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or 
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a 
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by 
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c), 
must be filed in accordance with the NRC's E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139; 
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit 
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some 
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not 
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in 
accordance with the procedures described below.
    To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 
ten 10 days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should 
contact the Office of the Secretary by email at hearing.docket@nrc.gov, 
or by telephone at 301-415-1677, to request (1) a digital 
identification (ID) certificate, which allows the participant (or its 
counsel or representative) to digitally sign documents and access the 
E-Submittal server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and 
(2) advise the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a 
request or petition for hearing (even in instances in which the 
participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-
issued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the 
Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the hearing in this 
proceeding if the Secretary has not already established an electronic 
docket.
    Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is 
available on the NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing 
the E-Submittal server are detailed in the NRC's ``Guidance for 
Electronic Submission,'' which is available on the agency's public Web 
site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants 
may attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but 
should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted 
software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer 
assistance in using unlisted software.
    If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC 
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the 
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to 
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System, 
users

[[Page 18330]]

will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC's Web 
site. Further information on the Web-based submission form, including 
the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on the NRC's 
public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
    Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a 
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for 
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in 
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance 
available on the NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the 
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be 
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system 
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of 
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends 
the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The 
E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access 
to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any 
others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to 
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the 
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and 
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for 
and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition 
to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document 
via the E-Filing system.
    A person filing electronically using the NRC's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System 
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC's public 
Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email to 
MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a toll-free call at 866-672-7640. The NRC 
Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern 
Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
    Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not 
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in 
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing 
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper 
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail 
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: 
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or 
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth 
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. 
Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for 
serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered 
complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or 
by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing 
the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, 
having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a 
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer 
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from 
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
    Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the 
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at 
https://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the 
Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to 
include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers, 
home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC 
regulation or other law requires submission of such information. 
However, a request to intervene will require including information on 
local residence in order to demonstrate a proximity assertion of 
interest in the proceeding. With respect to copyrighted works, except 
for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory filings 
and would constitute a Fair Use application, participants are requested 
not to include copyrighted materials in their submission.
    Petitions for leave to intervene must be filed no later than 60 
days from the date of publication of this notice. Requests for hearing, 
petitions for leave to intervene, and motions for leave to file new or 
amended contentions that are filed after the 60-day deadline will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the presiding officer that the 
filing demonstrates good cause by satisfying the three factors in 10 
CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(iii).
    For further details with respect to these license amendment 
applications, see the application for amendment which is available for 
public inspection in ADAMS and at the NRC's PDR. For additional 
direction on accessing information related to this document, see the 
``Accessing Information and Submitting Comments'' section of this 
document.

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, McGuire 
Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina

    Date of amendment request: January 28, 2014.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment revises an 
error made during McGuire's conversion to standard technical 
specifications (TSs) in TS 3.4.12. Condition G incorrectly references 
Condition E. As currently written, TS 3.4.12 Required Actions F.2 and 
G.1 collectively require that an operable residual heat removal (RHR) 
suction relief valve be aligned within 1 hour and that a reactor 
coolant system (RCS) vent path greater than 2.75 square inches be 
established within 8 hours if one of two Power Operated Relief Valves 
(PORVs) is inoperable in accordance with Condition E. As such, the 
proposed license amendment request revises Condition G to eliminate the 
reference to Condition E on the basis that the alignment of an operable 
RHR relief valve is sufficient to compensate for the loss of one PORV.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1: Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

    Response: No.
    The proposed change has no effect on the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated since adequate low 
temperature overpressure protection [(LTOP)] of the RCS is being 
maintained.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.

Criterion 2: Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?

    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve the addition or 
modification of any plant equipment. The proposed change does not 
involve a change in the operational limits or the design 
capabilities of the LTOP system. The LTOP system remains capable of 
protecting the RCS against low temperature overpressurization.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.

[[Page 18331]]

Criterion 3: Does the proposed amendment involve a significant 
reduction in the margin of safety?

    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is related to the confidence in the ability of 
the fission product barriers to perform their design functions 
during and following an accident situation. These barriers include 
the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system, and the containment 
system. The performance of the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant 
system and the containment system will not be adversely impacted by 
the proposed change since the ability of the LTOP system to prevent 
a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier has not 
been adversely impacted by the proposed change.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in the margin of safety.
    Based on the above, Duke Energy concludes that the proposed 
amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under 
the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a 
finding of ``no significant hazards consideration'' is justified.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Lara S. Nichols, Associate General Counsel, 
Duke Energy Corporation, 526 South Church Street--EC07H, Charlotte, NC 
28202
    NRC Branch Chief: Robert J. Pascarelli.

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 
1, Pope County, Arkansas

    Date of amendment request: June 11, 2013.
    Description of amendment request: Entergy Operations, Inc., has 
requested an amendment to the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) 
Technical Specification (TS) 2.1.1.1, to add the determination of the 
maximum local fuel pin centerline temperature using NRC reviewed and 
approved COPERNIC fuel performance computer code. The ANO-1 TSs 
currently provide similar information for other fuel performance 
computer codes.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not require any physical change to any 
plant systems, structures, or components, nor does it require any 
change in systems or plant operations. The proposed change does not 
require any change in safety analysis methods or results. Operations 
and analysis will continue to be in accordance with the ANO-1 
licensing basis. The peak fuel centerline temperature is the basis 
for protecting the fuel and is consistent with safety analysis.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change adds a new fuel centerline melt temperature 
versus burnup relationship based on an NRC reviewed and approved 
fuel performance computer code. The accident analyses presented in 
the ANO-1 Safety Analysis Report indicate that the fuel centerline 
temperature is not approached or exceeded for any of the events or 
Anticipated Operational Occurrences. The existing analyses, which 
are unchanged, do not affect any accident initiators that would 
create a new accident.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not require any change in safety 
analysis methods or results. Therefore, by adding the fuel 
centerline temperature and burnup relationship as defined by the 
COPERNIC code to the TS, the margin as established with the ANO-1 TS 
and SAR [Safety Analyses Report] are unchanged.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Associate General 
Counsel--Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New 
Orleans, Louisiana 70113.
    NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 
1, Pope County, Arkansas

    Date of amendment request: December 20, 2013, as supplemented by 
March 11, 2014.
    Description of amendment request: The amendment would allow for the 
extension to the 10-year frequency of the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 
(ANO-1) Type A or Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) that is required by 
ANO-1 Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.16, ``Reactor Building Leakage 
Rate Testing Program,'' to be extended to 15 years on a permanent 
basis.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment involves changes to the ANO-1 Reactor 
Building Leakage Rate Testing Program. The proposed amendment does 
not involve a physical change to the plant or a change in the manner 
in which the plant is operated or controlled. The primary reactor 
building function is to provide an essentially leak tight barrier 
against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment 
for postulated accidents. As such, the reactor building itself and 
the testing requirements to periodically demonstrate the integrity 
of the reactor building exist to ensure the plant's ability to 
mitigate the consequences of an accident, do not involve any 
accident precursors or initiators. Therefore, the probability of 
occurrence of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly 
increased by the proposed amendment.
    The integrity of the reactor building is subject to two types of 
failure mechanisms which can be categorized as (1) activity based 
and (2) time based. Activity based failure mechanisms are defined as 
degradation due to system and/or component modifications or 
maintenance. Local leak rate test requirements and administrative 
controls such as configuration management and procedural 
requirements for system restoration ensure that the reactor building 
containment integrity is not degraded by plant modifications or 
maintenance activities. The design and construction requirements of 
the reactor building itself combined with the reactor building 
inspections performed in accordance with ASME [American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code], Section XI, 
the Maintenance Rule and regulatory commitments serve to provide a 
high degree of assurance that the containment will not degrade in a 
manner that is detectable only by a Type A test. Based on the above, 
the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in 
the consequences of an accident previously evaluate.
    The proposed amendment adopts the NRC-accepted guidelines of 
[Nuclear Energy Institute] NEI 94-01, Revision 3-A, [``Industry 
Guideline for Implementing

[[Page 18332]]

Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J''] for 
development of the ANO-1 performance-based testing program. 
Implementation of these guidelines continues to provide adequate 
assurance that during design basis accidents, the primary 
containment and its components will limit leakage rates to less the 
values assumed in the plant safety analyses. The potential 
consequences of extending the ILRT interval to 15 years have been 
evaluated by analyzing the resulting changes in risk. The increase 
in risk in terms of person-rem per year within 50 miles resulting 
from design basis accidents was estimated to be acceptably small and 
determined to be within the guidelines published in [NRC Regulatory 
Guide (RG) 1.174, ``An Approach for using Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to 
the Licensing Bases''].
    Additionally, the proposed change maintains defense-in-depth by 
preserving a reasonable balance among prevention of core damage, 
prevention of containment failure, and consequence mitigation. ANO-1 
has determined that the increase in Conditional Containment Failure 
Probability due to the proposed change would be very small. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed amendment does not 
significantly increase the consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    Based on the above discussion, it is concluded that the proposed 
change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment adopts the NRC-accepted guidelines of NEI 
94-01, Revision 3-A, for the development of the ANO-1 performance-
based leakage testing program, and establishes a 15-year interval 
for the performance of the reactor building ILRT. The reactor 
building and the testing requirements to periodically demonstrate 
the integrity of the reactor building exist to ensure the plant's 
ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident, do not involve 
any accident precursors or initiators. The proposed change does not 
involve a physical change to the plant (i.e., no new or different 
type of equipment will be installed) or a change to the manner in 
which the plant is operated or controlled.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment adopts the NRC-accepted guidelines of NEI 
94-01, Revision 3-A, for the development of the ANO-1 performance-
based leakage testing program, and establishes a 15 year interval 
for the performance of the containment ILRT. This amendment does not 
alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system 
setpoints, or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The 
specific requirements and conditions of the Reactor Building Leakage 
Rate Testing Program, as defined in the TS, ensure that the degree 
of the reactor building structural integrity and leak-tightness that 
is considered in the plant's safety analysis is maintained. The 
overall reactor building leakage rate limit specified by the TS is 
maintained, and the Type A, Type B, and Type C containment leakage 
tests will be performed at the frequencies established in accordance 
with the NRC-accepted guidelines of NEI 94-01, Revision 3-A.
    Containment inspections performed in accordance with other plant 
programs serve to provide a high degree of assurance that the 
containment will not degrade in a manner that is not detectable by 
an ILRT. A risk assessment using the current ANO-1 risk model 
concluded that extending the ILRT test interval from ten years to 15 
years results in an acceptably small change to the ANO-1 risk 
profile.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Joseph A. Aluise, Associate General 
Counsel--Nuclear, Entergy Services, Inc., 639 Loyola Avenue, New 
Orleans, Louisiana 70113.
    NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457, 
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois

Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, 
Ogle County, Illinois

    Date of amendment request: August 21, 2013.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise technical specifications (TS) Section 3.7.2, ``Main Steam 
Isolation Valves (MSIVs),'' to incorporate the MSIV actuator trains 
into the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and provide associated 
Conditions and Required Actions. The proposed amendment would also 
revise surveillance requirement (SR) 3.7.2.2 to identify that the MSIV 
actuator trains are required to be tested.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:
    EGC [Exelon Generation Company, LLC] has evaluated whether or not a 
significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed 
amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 
50.92(c), ``Issuance of amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes provide requirements for MSIVs that have 
dual actuators which receive signals from separate instrumentation 
trains. The design and functional performance requirements, 
operational characteristics, and reliability of the MSIVs and 
actuator trains are unchanged. There is no impact on the design 
safety function of the MSIVs to close (as an accident mitigator), 
nor is there any change with respect to inadvertent closure of an 
MSIV (as a potential transient initiator). Since no failure mode or 
initiating condition that could cause an accident (including any 
plant transient) is created or affected, the change cannot involve a 
significant increase in the probability of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    With regard to the consequences of an accident and the equipment 
required for mitigation of the accident, the proposed changes 
involve no design or physical changes to the MSIVs or any other 
equipment required for accident mitigation. With respect to MSIV 
actuator train Completion Times, the consequences of an accident are 
independent of equipment Completion Times as long as adequate 
equipment availability is maintained. The proposed MSIV actuator 
Completion Times take into account the redundancy of the actuator 
trains and are limited in extent consistent with other Completion 
Times specified in the Technical Specifications. Adequate equipment 
availability would therefore continue to be required by the 
Technical Specifications. On this basis, the consequences of 
applicable, analyzed accidents are not significantly affected by the 
proposed changes.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes to incorporate requirements for the MSIV 
actuator trains do not involve any design or physical changes to the 
facility, including the MSIVs and actuator trains themselves. No 
physical alteration of the plant is involved, as no new or different 
type of equipment is to be installed. The proposed changes do not 
alter any assumptions made in the safety analyses, nor do they 
involve any changes to plant procedures for ensuring that the plant 
is operated within analyzed limits. As such, no new failure modes or 
mechanisms that could

[[Page 18333]]

cause a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated are being introduced.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in [a] margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes to incorporate requirements for the MSIV 
actuator trains do not alter the manner in which safety limits or 
limiting safety system settings are determined. No changes to 
instrument/system actuation setpoints are involved. The safety 
analysis acceptance criteria are not affected by this change and the 
proposed changes will not permit plant operation in a configuration 
outside the design basis.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.
    Based on the above, EGC concludes that the proposed amendments 
do not involve a significant hazards consideration under the 
standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding 
of no significant hazards consideration is justified.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: J. Bradley Fewell, Associate General 
Counsel, Exelon Nuclear, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555.
    NRC Branch Chief: Travis L. Tate.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353, Limerick 
Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania

    Date of amendment request: December 6, 2013.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise Technical Specification (TS) setpoints and allowable values for 
certain area temperature instrumentation associated with the leak 
detection system (LDS). The purpose of the LDS is to detect and provide 
the signals necessary to isolate leakage from the reactor coolant 
pressure boundary (RCPB) before pre-determined limits are exceeded. The 
affected TS instrumentation monitor ambient temperature in the reactor 
water cleanup system (RWCS) area, the high pressure coolant injection 
(HPCI) equipment room and pipe routing area, and the reactor core 
isolation cooling (RCIC) equipment room and pipe routing area. The 
temperature setpoints, for the LDS instrumentation described above, are 
established to provide system isolations in the event of a postulated 
25 gallon per minute (gpm) steam leak.
    The proposed amendment would also change the leakage design basis 
from 25 gpm to 35 gpm for the turbine enclosure main steam line tunnel 
temperature isolation setpoint (the setpoint of this instrumentation is 
not being changed).
    The licensee's amendment request indicated that the proposed 
changes are being made in order to establish adequate margins such that 
normal variations in the maximum operating temperatures for the 
affected plant areas do not result in system isolation.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis 
against the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c). The staff's review is 
presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The LDS is a mitigating system for low energy line breaks or 
leakage. The LDS includes ambient temperature instrumentation with 
setpoints established to provide for system isolation in the event 
of a small steam leak (e.g., 25 gpm).
    The proposed changes will not alter the way any structure, 
system, or component (SSC) functions, and will not alter the manner 
in which the plant is operated. The proposed changes do not impact 
any SSC that could cause an accident. Therefore, the proposed 
amendment will not increase the probability of occurrence of an 
accident previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis 
Report (UFSAR).
    The design basis leakage values for the LDS will remain bounded 
by the design basis accident analysis analyzed in the UFSAR for a 
main steam line break (MSLB). In addition, the proposed amendment 
will not impact the ability of any SSC to mitigate an accident as 
currently evaluated in the UFSAR. Therefore, the proposed amendment 
will not increase the consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated in the UFSAR.
    Based on the above, the proposed changes will not increase the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes will not alter the plant configuration (no 
new or different type of equipment will be installed). The proposed 
changes will not change the design function of any SSC, and will not 
alter the manner in which the plant is operated. There will be no 
adverse effect on plant operation or accident mitigation equipment. 
The response of the plant and the operators following an accident 
will not be different. In addition, the proposed changes do not 
introduce any new failure modes.
    Therefore, the proposed changes will not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is related to the confidence in the ability of 
the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, RCPB, and 
containment) to limit the level of radiation dose to the public.
    The proposed changes have no impact on the fuel cladding or 
containment. With respect to the RCPB, the proposed changes to the 
TS setpoints and allowable values for the RWCS, HPCI, and RCIC 
instrumentation will be established to provide system isolations in 
the event of a postulated 25 gpm steam leak. The 25 gpm leakage 
value is the current design basis value. As such, the proposed TS 
changes have no impact on the current assumptions regarding the 
ability of the LDS to isolate leakage from the RCPB.
    The proposed amendment would also change the leakage design 
basis from 25 gpm to 35 gpm for the turbine enclosure main steam 
line tunnel temperature isolation setpoint. However, the licensee's 
application indicated that the increase in total coolant loss as a 
result of a change in the leak detection setpoint design basis from 
25 gpm to 35 gpm is insignificant compared to the bounding analysis 
for the analyzed MSLB.
    Based on the above, the proposed changes will not result in a 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    Based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 
50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine 
that the amendment request involves no significant hazards 
consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: J. Bradley Fewell, Associate General 
Counsel, Exelon Nuclear, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555.
    Acting NRC Branch Chief: John D. Hughey.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-352 and No. 50-353, 
Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Montgomery County, 
Pennsylvania

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, et al., Docket No. 50-219, Oyster Creek 
Nuclear Generating Station, Ocean County, New Jersey

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, and PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket Nos. 50-
171, 50-277, and 50-278, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 1, 2 
and 3, York and Lancaster Counties, Pennsylvania

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-289 and 50-320, Three

[[Page 18334]]

Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Dauphin County, 
Pennsylvania

    Date of amendment request: October 30, 2013.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed change would revise 
the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) requalification training 
frequency for the affected facilities.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not increase the probability or 
consequences of an accident. The proposed change does not involve 
the modification of any plant equipment or affect plant operation. 
The proposed change will have no impact on any safety-related 
Structures, Systems, or Components. The proposed change would revise 
the ERO annual requalification training frequency.
    Therefore, the proposed change to the Emergency Plan 
requalification training frequency for the affected sites does not 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of 
an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change has no impact on the design, function, or 
operation of any plant systems, structures, or components. The 
proposed change does not affect plant equipment or accident 
analyses. The proposed change only affects the administration 
aspects of the annual emergency response organization 
requalification training frequency requirements. There are no 
changes to the actual training conducted.
    Therefore, the proposed change to the Emergency Plan 
requalification training frequency for the affected sites does not 
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from 
any accident previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not adversely affect existing plant 
safety margins or the reliability of the equipment assumed to 
operate in the safety analyses. There is no change being made to 
safety analysis assumptions, safety limits, or limiting safety 
system settings that would adversely affect plant safety as a result 
of the proposed change. Margins of safety are unaffected by the 
proposed change to the frequency in the ERO requalification training 
requirements.
    Therefore, the proposed change to the Emergency Plan 
requalification training frequency for the affected sites does not 
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    Based on the above analysis, the NRC staff proposes to determine 
that the requested amendments involve no significant hazards 
consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: J. Bradley Fewell, Associate General 
Counsel, Exelon Nuclear, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555.
    NRC Branch Chief: Travis L. Tate.

PSEG Nuclear LLC, Docket No. 50-354, Hope Creek Generating Station, 
Salem County, New Jersey

    Date of amendment request: July 30, 2013.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise the technical specifications (TS) to relocate the operability 
and surveillance requirements for the reactor coolant system safety/
relief valve (SRV) position instrumentation from the Hope Creek 
Generating Station (Hope Creek) TS to the Hope Creek Technical 
Requirements Manual (TRM).
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below with the NRC staff's edits in 
square brackets:

    1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes to the TS would relocate the operability 
and surveillance requirements for the SRV position instrumentation 
from the TS to the TRM. The failure of this instrumentation is not 
assumed to be an initiator of any analyzed event in the UFSAR 
[updated final safety analysis report]. The proposed changes do not 
alter the design of the SRVs or any other system, structure, or 
component (SSC). The proposed changes conform to NRC's regulatory 
[requirements] regarding the content of plant TS, as identified in 
10 CFR 50.36, [and the regulatory guidance identified in] NUREG-
1433, and [also conform with] the NRC's Final Policy Statement 
published on July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
    Therefore, these proposed changes do not represent a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes to the TS would relocate the operability 
and surveillance requirements for the SRV position instrumentation 
from the TS to the TRM. The proposed changes do not involve a 
modification to the physical configuration of the plant or change in 
the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed changes 
will not impose any new or different requirement or introduce a new 
accident initiator, accident precursor, or malfunction mechanism.
    Additionally, there is no change in the types or increases in 
the amounts of any effluent that may be released off-site and there 
is no increase in individual or cumulative occupational exposure. 
Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes to the TS would relocate the operability 
and surveillance requirements for the SRV position instrumentation 
from the TS to the TRM. This instrumentation is not needed for 
manual operator action necessary for safety systems to accomplish 
their safety function for the design basis events. The SRV position 
instrumentation, including the acoustic monitors and the tailpipe 
temperature indicators, provides only alarm and position indication 
functions and does not provide an input to any automatic trip 
function.
    Several diverse means are available to monitor SRV position, 
including the Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring System. 
Operability and surveillance requirements will be established in a 
licensee-controlled document, the TRM, to ensure the reliability of 
SRV position monitoring capability. Changes to these requirements in 
the TRM will be subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, providing 
an appropriate level of regulatory control.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, and with the changes noted above in square brackets, it 
appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. 
Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Jeffrie J. Keenan, PSEG Nuclear, LLC--N21, 
P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038.
    NRC Branch Chief: Meena K. Khanna.

South Carolina Electric and Gas Docket Nos.: 52-027 and 52-028, Virgil 
C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Units 2 and 3, Burke County, Georgia

    Date of amendment request: December 4, 2013.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed changes would amend 
Combined License Nos. NPF-93 and NPF-94, for VCSNS Units 2 and 3, 
respectively, in regard to the Technical Specifications (TS). The 
proposed amendment updates the TS for operator usability that more 
closely aligns with

[[Page 18335]]

the form and content of other improved Standard Technical 
Specifications NUREGs. Specifically, the changes would result in closer 
alignment with the guidance of the Technical Specifications Task Force 
(TSTF) Writer's Guide for Plant-Specific Improved Technical 
Specifications, TSTF-GG-05-01, Revision 1, and with NUREG-1431, 
Standard Technical Specifications-Westinghouse Plants as updated by the 
NRC-approved generic changes.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required under 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, South 
Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) proposes to amend the VCSNS 
TS. Evaluations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92 showing that the proposed 
changes do not involve significant hazards considerations are 
provided for each change.
    However, due to the significant number of changes associated 
with the upgrade effort, SCE&G has grouped similar changes into 
categories to facilitate the significant hazards evaluations 
required by 10 CFR 50.92. Generic significant hazards evaluations 
are provided for the Administrative, More Restrictive, Relocation, 
and Detail Removed categories. Each individual Less Restrictive 
change is addressed by a specific significant hazards evaluation. 
Because of the large volume of changes, obvious editorial or 
administrative changes (e.g., formatting, page rolls, punctuation, 
etc.) have not always received an explicit discussion, but are 
considered to be addressed by the applicable generic significant 
hazards evaluation for Administrative changes.
    Each significant change to the TS is marked-up on the 
appropriate page in Enclosure 2 of SCE&G's submittal and assigned a 
reference number reflective of the significant hazards evaluation 
type. The reference number assigned to a change is used in the 
Discussion of Change (DOC) in Enclosure 1 of SCE&G's submittal which 
provides a detailed description (basis) for each change supporting 
the applicable significant hazards evaluation in Attachment 6 of 
Enclosure 1 of SCE&G's submittal.

10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES

    This generic category applies to changes that are editorial in 
nature, involve the movement of requirements within the TS without 
affecting their technical content, simply reformat a requirement or 
clarify the TS (such as deleting a footnote no longer applicable due to 
a technical change to a requirement). These changes also include non-
technical modifications of requirements to conform to TSTF-GG-05-01, 
``Writer's Guide for Plant-Specific Improved Standard Technical 
Specifications,'' or provide consistency with the Improved Standard 
Technical Specifications in NUREG-1431.
    Changes to the TS requirements categorized as Administrative are 
annotated with an ``A'' in Enclosure 1 DOC and Enclosure 2 markup of 
SCE&G's submittal.
    These changes are intended to make the TS more readily 
understandable to plant operators and other users. The application of 
the TS format and style will also assure consistency is achieved 
between TS. During this reformatting and rewording process, no 
technical changes (either actual or interpretational) were made to the 
TS unless they were identified and justified. Because of the large 
volume of changes, obvious editorial or administrative changes (e.g., 
formatting, page rolls, punctuation, etc.) do not always receive a DOC 
reference number but are considered to be addressed by this generic 
significant hazards evaluation for Administrative changes.
    SCE&G proposes to amend the VCSNS Units 2 and 3, Technical 
Specifications. SCE&G has evaluated each of the proposed TS changes 
identified as Administrative in accordance with the criteria set forth 
in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of amendment,'' and has determined that the 
proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration. 
This significant hazards consideration is applicable to each 
Administrative change identified in Enclosure 1 and Enclosure 2 of 
SCE&G's submittal.
    The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not 
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of these 
changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The criteria 
and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes involve reformatting, renumbering, and 
rewording the TS. The reformatting, renumbering, and rewording process 
involves no technical changes to the TS. As such, these changes are 
administrative in nature and do not affect initiators of analyzed 
events or assumed mitigation of accident or transient events.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or 
changes in methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed 
changes will not impose any new or different requirements, or eliminate 
any existing requirements.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes will not reduce a margin of safety because the 
changes have no effect on any safety analyses assumptions. These 
changes are administrative in nature.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR MORE RESTRICTIVE CHANGES

    This generic category include changes that impose additional 
requirements, decrease allowed outage times, increase the Frequency of 
Surveillances, impose additional Surveillances, increase the scope of 
Specifications to include additional plant equipment, broaden the 
Applicability of Specifications, or provide additional actions. These 
changes have been evaluated to not be detrimental to plant safety.
    More restrictive changes are proposed only when such changes are 
consistent with the current VCSNS, Units 2 and 3 Licensing basis; the 
applicable VCSNS safety analyses; and good engineering practice such 
that the availability and reliability of the affected equipment is not 
reduced.
    Changes to the TS requirements categorized as More Restrictive are 
annotated with an ``M'' in the Enclosure 1 DOC and Enclosure 2 markup 
of SCE&G's submittal.
    SCE&G proposes to amend the VCSNS Units 2 and 3 TS. SCE&G has 
evaluated each of the proposed TS changes identified as More 
Restrictive in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, 
``Issuance of amendment,'' and has determined that the proposed changes 
do not involve a significant hazards consideration. This significant 
hazards consideration is applicable to each More Restrictive change 
identified in Enclosure 1 and Enclosure 2 of SCE&G's submittal.
    The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not 
involve a

[[Page 18336]]

significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of these changes 
against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The criteria and 
conclusions of the evaluation are presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes provide more stringent TS requirements. 
These more stringent requirements do not result in operations that 
significantly increase the probability of initiating an analyzed 
event, and do not alter assumptions relative to mitigation of an 
accident or transient event. The more restrictive requirements 
continue to ensure process variables, structures, systems, and 
components are maintained consistent with the safety analyses and 
licensing basis.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or 
changes in methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed 
changes do impose different Technical Specification requirements. 
However, these changes are consistent with the assumptions in the 
safety analyses and licensing basis.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The imposition of more restrictive requirements either has no 
effect on or increases a margin of plant safety. As provided in the 
discussion of change, each change in this category is, by 
definition, providing additional restrictions to enhance plant 
safety. The changes maintain requirements within the safety analyses 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR RELOCATED SPECIFICATIONS

    This generic category applies to changes that relocate entire TS 
Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs). A specific DOC for each TS 
identified for relocation is provided in Enclosure 1. This evaluation 
will be applicable to each of the changes identified with an ``R'' in 
the Enclosure 1 DOC and the associated Enclosure 2 markup of SCE&G's 
submittal.
    SCE&G proposes to amend the VCSNS, Units 2 and 3 TS. Some of the 
proposed changes involve relocating certain TS LCOs to licensee 
controlled documents that are subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 
52.98.
    SCE&G has evaluated the VCSNS TS using the criteria set forth in 10 
CFR 50.36 which define the scope of the TS. LCOs identified by this 
evaluation that did not meet the retention requirements specified in 
the regulation are deleted from the TS.
    SCE&G has evaluated each of the proposed TS changes identified as 
Relocated Specifications in accordance with the criteria set forth in 
10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of Amendment,'' and has determined that the 
proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration. 
This significant hazards consideration is applicable to each Relocated 
Specification identified in Enclosure 1 and Enclosure 2 of SCE&G's 
submittal.
    The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not 
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of these 
changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The criteria 
and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes relocate LCOs for structures, systems, 
components, or variables that do not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 
50.36(c)(2)(ii) for inclusion in TS. The affected structures, 
systems, components, or variables are not assumed to be initiators 
of analyzed events and are not assumed to mitigate accident or 
transient events. The requirements and Surveillances for these 
affected structures, systems, components, or variables are proposed 
to be relocated from the TS to a licensee controlled document that 
is controlled by the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. The proposed 
changes only reduce the level of regulatory control on these 
requirements. The level of regulatory control has no impact on the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or 
change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed 
changes will not impose or eliminate any requirements, and adequate 
control of existing requirements will be maintained.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes will not reduce a margin of safety because 
they have no significant effect on any safety analyses assumptions, 
as indicated by the fact that the requirements do not meet the 10 
CFR 50.36 criteria for retention. In addition, the relocated 
requirements are moved without change, and any future changes to 
these requirements will be evaluated per 10 CFR 50.59.
    The NRC prior review and approval of changes to these relocated 
requirements, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92, will no longer be 
required. There is no margin of safety attributed to NRC prior 
review and approval. However, the proposed changes are consistent 
with 10 CFR 50.36, which allows revising the TS to relocate these 
requirements and Surveillances to a licensee controlled document.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR DETAIL REMOVED CHANGES

    This generic category applies to changes that involve removing 
details out of the TS. These details are either supported by existing 
content in the TS Bases or the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) or a 
commitment is made to add them to the TS Bases or FSAR. The removal of 
this information is considered to be less restrictive because it is no 
longer controlled by the TS change process. Typically, the information 
removed is descriptive in nature and its removal conforms to NUREG-1431 
for format and content.
    A specific DOC for each detail identified for removal is provided 
in Enclosure 1 of SCE&G's submittal. This evaluation will be applicable 
to each of the changes identified with a ``D'' in the Enclosure 1 DOC 
and the associated Enclosure 2 markup of SCE&G's submittal.
    SCE&G proposes to amend the VCSNS Units 2 and 3, Technical 
Specifications. SCE&G has evaluated each of the proposed TS changes 
identified as Detail Removed in accordance with the criteria set forth 
in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of amendment,'' and has determined that the 
proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration. 
This significant hazards consideration is applicable to each Detail 
Removed change identified in Enclosure 1 and Enclosure 2 of SCE&G's 
submittal.
    The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not 
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of these 
changes against each

[[Page 18337]]

of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The criteria and conclusions of the 
evaluation are presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes relocate certain details from the TS to 
other documents under regulatory control. The FSAR will be 
maintained in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR Part 52, 
Appendix D, Section VIII. The TS Bases are subject to the change 
control provisions in the Administrative Controls Chapter of the TS. 
Since any changes to these documents will be evaluated, no 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated will be allowed.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a 
change in the methods governing normal plant operations. The 
proposed changes will not impose or eliminate any requirements, and 
adequate control of the information will be maintained. Therefore, 
the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes will not reduce a margin of safety because 
they have no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. In 
addition, the details to be moved from the TS to other documents are 
not being changed. Since any future changes to these details will be 
evaluated under the applicable regulatory change control mechanism, 
no significant reduction in a margin of safety will be allowed. A 
significant reduction in a margin of safety is not associated with 
the elimination of the 10 CFR 50.90 requirement for the NRC review 
and approval of future changes to the relocated details. Not 
including these details in the TS is consistent with NUREG-1431, 
issued by the NRC, which allows revising the TS to relocate these 
requirements to a licensee controlled document controlled by 10 CFR 
50.59 and 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Section VIII, or other TS 
controlled or regulation controlled documents.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION FOR LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGES

    This category consists of technical changes which revise existing 
requirements such that more restoration time is provided, fewer 
compensatory measures are needed, surveillance requirements are 
deleted, or less restrictive surveillance requirements are required. 
This would also include requirements which are deleted from the TS (not 
relocated to other documents) and other technical changes that do not 
fit a generic category. These changes are evaluated individually.
    Technical changes to the TS requirements categorized as ``Less 
Restrictive'' are identified with an ``L'' and an individual number in 
the Enclosure 1 DOC and Enclosure 2 markup of SCE&G's submittal.
    SCE&G proposes to amend the VCSNS Units 2 and 3, Technical 
Specifications. SCE&G has evaluated each of the proposed technical 
changes identified as ``Less Restrictive'' individually in accordance 
with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined that the 
proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration.
    The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not 
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of these 
changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The criteria 
and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below.

L01 SCE&G proposes to amend TS 1.0, ``Definitions,'' by deleting the 
definition for Actuation Device Test. Reference to ``overlap with the 
ACTUATION DEVICE TEST'' that is cited in the definition of Actuation 
Logic Test is replaced with ``overlap with the actuated device.''

    Current Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.2.7 (``Perform ACTUATION 
DEVICE TEST'') and SR 3.3.2.8 (``Perform ACTUATION DEVICE TEST for 
squib valves'') are deleted from current TS 3.3.2 and Table 3.3.2-1, 
Function 26, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Actuation. The equivalent 
requirement (using phrasing generally consistent with NUREG-1431) is 
included in individual Specifications for the actuated devices with the 
same 24-month Frequency as the deleted SRs. The impact of this 
reformatting is such that more appropriate, albeit less restrictive, 
actions would be applied when the associated device fails to meet the 
surveillance requirement. Also, current SR 3.3.2.9 is revised to 
eliminate the use of the Actuation Device Test defined term and 
replaced it with verification of actuation on an actual or simulated 
actuation signal.
    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The change involves reformatting and revising the 
presentation of existing surveillance requirements (with no change 
in required system or device function), such that more appropriate, 
albeit less restrictive, actions would be applied when the device 
fails to meet the surveillance requirement. Revised surveillance 
requirement presentation and compliance with TS actions are not an 
initiator to any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the 
probability of an accident previously evaluated is not affected.
    The consequences of an accident as a result of the revised 
surveillance requirements and actions are no different than the 
consequences of the same accident during the existing ones. As a 
result, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not 
affected by this change.
    The proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of 
structures, systems, and components from performing their intended 
function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within 
the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect 
the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release 
assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change reformats TS requirements such that more 
appropriate, albeit less restrictive, actions would be applied when 
the device fails to meet the surveillance requirement. However, the 
proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant 
as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being introduced, and 
equipment is not being operated in a new or different manner. There 
are no setpoints, at which protective or mitigative actions are 
initiated, affected by this change. This change will not alter the 
manner in which equipment operation is initiated, nor will the 
function demands on credited equipment be changed. No change is 
being made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal 
event as described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, 
no new failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter 
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?

[[Page 18338]]

    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While 
certain actions for inoperability of actuated devices are made less 
restrictive by eliminating entry into Engineered Safety Feature 
Actuation System (ESFAS) Actuation and Instrumentation inoperability 
actions, no action is made less restrictive than currently approved 
for any associated actuated device inoperability. As such, there is 
no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

L02 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 5.6, ``Reporting Requirements,'' 
to delete TS 5.6.1, ``Occupational Radiation Exposure Report,'' and TS 
5.6.4, ``Monthly Operating Reports.'' This change results in the 
renumbering of TS 5.6 sections, but does not revise technical or 
administrative requirements. SCE&G stated that the change is consistent 
with NRC approved Industry/TSTF Standard Technical Specification Change 
Traveler, TSTF-369, ``Removal of Monthly Operating Report and 
Occupational Radiation Exposure Report,'' Revision 1.

    SCE&G has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination published on June 23, 2004 (69 FR 35067) as 
part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP) for 
TSTF-369, Revision 1. SCE&G has concluded that the proposed 
determination presented in the notice is applicable to VCSNS Units 2 
and 3 and the determination is hereby incorporated by reference to 
satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91 (a).

L03 SCE&G proposes to amend TS to eliminate the use of the defined term 
``CORE ALTERATIONS'' and incorporate changes reflected in TSTF-471-A.

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change eliminates the use of the term ``CORE 
ALTERATIONS,'' all Required Actions requiring suspension of core 
alterations, and reference to core alterations in a surveillance 
requirement. With the exception of a fuel handling accident, core 
alterations are not an initiator of any accident previously 
evaluated. Those revised Specifications which protect the initial 
conditions of a fuel handling accident also require the suspension 
of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. This Required Action 
protects the initial conditions of a fuel handling accident and, 
therefore, suspension of all other core alterations is not required. 
Suspension of core alterations, except fuel handling, does not 
provide mitigation of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, 
eliminating the TS presentation of core alterations does not affect 
the initiators of the accidents previously evaluated and suspension 
of core alterations does not affect the mitigation of the accidents 
previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Two events are postulated to occur in the plant conditions in 
which core alterations may be made: a fuel handling accident and a 
boron dilution incident. Suspending movement of irradiated fuel 
assemblies to prevent a fuel handling accident is retained as 
appropriate. As such, requiring the suspension of core alterations 
is an overly broad, redundant requirement that does not increase a 
margin of safety. Core alterations have no effect on a boron 
dilution incident. Core components are not involved in the creation 
or mitigation of a boron dilution incident and the shutdown margin 
(Mode 5) and boron concentration (Mode 6) limits are based on 
assuming the worst-case configuration of the core components. 
Therefore, core alterations have no effect on a margin of safety 
related to a boron dilution incident.
    Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.

L04 SCE&G proposes to amend TS, Section 1.3, ``Completion Times,'' 
Example 1.3-3 to eliminate the Required Action A.1 and Required Action 
B.1 second Completion Times, and to replace the discussion regarding 
second Completion Times with a new discussion. SCE&G also proposes to 
delete the second Completion Times associated with current TS 3.8.5, 
``Distribution Systems--Operating,'' Required Actions A.1, B.1, C.1, 
and D.1.
    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change eliminates certain Completion Times from the 
Technical Specifications. Completion Times are not an initiator to 
any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of 
an accident previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences 
of an accident during the revised Completion Time are no different 
than the consequences of the same accident during the existing 
Completion Times. As a result, the consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated are not affected by this change. The proposed 
change does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, 
and components (SSCs) from performing their intended function to 
mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed 
acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect the source 
term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions 
used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated. Further, the proposed change does not increase 
the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released 
offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative 
occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed change is 
consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and resultant 
consequences.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.

[[Page 18339]]

    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change to delete the second Completion Time does 
not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system 
settings or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The 
safety analysis acceptance criteria are not affected by this change. 
The proposed change will not result in plant operation in a 
configuration outside of the design basis.
    Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.

L05 SCE&G proposes to amend TS to eliminate LCO 3.0.8.

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    Technical Specification actions to restore equipment to Operable 
and to monitor plant parameters are not initiators to any analyzed 
accident sequence. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS 
continues to ensure that plant equipment is capable of performing 
mitigative functions assumed by the accident analysis. The proposed 
TS change does not involve any changes to SSCs and does not alter 
the method of operation or control of SSCs as described in the FSAR. 
The current assumptions in the safety analysis regarding accident 
initiators and mitigation of accidents are unaffected by this 
change. No additional failure modes or mechanisms are being 
introduced and the likelihood of previously analyzed failures 
remains unchanged.
    The integrity of fission product barriers, plant configuration, 
and operating procedures as described in the FSAR will not be 
affected by this change. Therefore, the consequences of previously 
analyzed accidents will not increase because of this change.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that 
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being 
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event 
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being 
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety 
analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change does not alter the requirement to 
restore compliance with TS and to monitor plant parameter status for 
appropriate manual actions. Operation in accordance with the 
proposed TS ensures that the plant response to analyzed events will 
continue to provide the margins of safety assumed by the analysis. 
Appropriate monitoring and maintenance, consistent with industry 
standards, will continue to be performed.
    As such, there is no functional change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

L06 SCE&G proposes to amend TS 3.2.5 to eliminate the increased 
frequency of verifying core power distribution parameters when the On-
line Power Distribution Monitoring System (OPDMS) alarms are 
inoperable. This change retains the normal 24-hour Frequency and 
eliminates the 12-hour Frequency when OPDMS alarms are inoperable.

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    A TS frequency for monitoring plant parameters is not an 
initiator to any accident sequence analyzed in the FSAR. Operation 
in accordance with the proposed TS continues to ensure that initial 
conditions assumed in the accident analysis are maintained.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR and does not alter the method of 
operation or control of equipment as described in the FSAR. The 
current assumptions in the safety analysis regarding accident 
initiators and mitigation of accidents are unaffected by this 
change. Plant equipment remains capable of performing mitigative 
functions assumed by the accident analysis. No additional failure 
modes or mechanisms are being introduced and the likelihood of 
previously analyzed failures remains unchanged. The integrity of 
fission product barriers, plant configuration, and operating 
procedures as described in the FSAR will not be affected by this 
change. Therefore, the consequences of previously analyzed accidents 
will not increase because of this change.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that 
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being 
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event 
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being 
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety 
analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change is acceptable because the OPDMS 
alarms do not impact a margin of safety. Operation in accordance 
with the proposed TS ensures that the plant response to analyzed 
events will continue to provide the margins of safety assumed by the 
analysis. Appropriate monitoring and maintenance, consistent with 
industry standards, will continue to be performed.
    As such, there is no functional change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

L07 SCE&G proposes to amend the TS 3.3.1, 3.3.4, and 3.4.5 by replacing 
the TS Required Actions requiring the reactor trip breakers (RTBs) to 
be opened with two Required Actions: one Required Action states 
``Initiate action to fully insert all rods,'' and the other Required 
Action states ``Place the Plant Control System in a condition incapable 
of rod withdrawal.'' For consistency, TS Applicabilities associated 
with RTB position are

[[Page 18340]]

also being revised. Applicabilities including ``RTBs closed'' are 
revised to state ``Plant Control System capable of rod withdrawal or 
one or more rods not fully inserted.'' Conversely, Applicabilities 
including ``RTBs open'' are revised to state ``With Plant Control 
System incapable of rod withdrawal and all rods fully inserted.''

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR and does not alter the method of 
operation or control of equipment as described in the FSAR. The 
current assumptions in the safety analysis regarding accident 
initiators and mitigation of accidents are unaffected by this 
change. Plant equipment remains capable of performing mitigative 
functions assumed by the accident analysis. However, the change 
involves allowing methods of compliance other than establishing or 
verifying RTB open or closed status to determine the condition of 
the capability of the Plant Control System to allow or inhibit rod 
withdrawal and the status of all rods inserted or not. The method of 
establishing this status is not an accident initiator nor involved 
with mitigation of the consequences of an accident.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does allow methods of compliance other than 
establishing or verifying RTB open or closed status; however, RTB 
open or closed status will continue to be one appropriate and viable 
method of establishing and verifying applicable plant conditions. 
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While 
certain interlocks depend on RTB open or close status, these 
interlocks and the association with RTB is not revised. When those 
interlocks are required, the position of RTBs will continue to 
dictate the appropriate protection system response. Allowing 
alternate methods of establishing or verifying the condition of the 
capability of the Plant Control System to allow or inhibit rod 
withdrawal and the status of all rods inserted or not, does not 
impact any safety analysis assumption or plant response to an 
analyzed event.
    As such, there is no functional change to the required plant 
conditions, and therefore, there is no significant reduction in a 
margin of safety.

L08 SCE&G proposes to amend the TS by deleting current TS 3.3.1, 
Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, Required Actions D.1.1, 
D.2.1, and D.2.2 applicable to inoperable Power Range Neutron Flux 
channels.

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. Overly restrictive and inappropriate Required Actions 
are being deleted since adequate compensatory measures already 
address the potential impact on radial power monitoring and the 
appropriate compensatory and mitigative actions in the event the RTS 
function is degraded for the Power Range Neutron Flux function. 
Additionally, the Surveillances for TS 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt 
Ratio (QPTR), address the requirements unique to loss of Power Range 
Neutron Flux monitoring for QPTR. Eliminating overly restrictive and 
inappropriate Required Actions does not impact an accident initiator 
or impact mitigation of the consequences of any accident. Therefore, 
this change does not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change eliminates overly restrictive and 
inappropriate Required Actions. However, the proposed change does 
not involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the 
FSAR. No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not 
being operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints, 
at which protective or mitigative actions are initiated, affected by 
this change. This change will not alter the manner in which 
equipment operation is initiated, nor will the function demands on 
credited equipment be changed. No change is being made to the 
procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event as 
described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new 
failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter 
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change will not reduce a margin of 
safety because it has no such effect on any assumption of the safety 
analyses. While certain actions for inoperability of actuated 
devices are made less restrictive by eliminating a potentially 
unnecessary power reduction, and actions that could not be 
performed, no action is made less restrictive than currently 
approved for similar channel inoperability.
    Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.

L09 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System 
(RTS) Instrumentation,'' Source Range Neutron Flux Actions in Mode 2 
for one and two inoperable channels. The change allows for placing 
inoperable channels in bypass and/or trip thereby allowing continued 
operation.

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. However, the change involves providing actions allowing 
bypassing and/or tripping one or two inoperable Source Range Neutron 
Flux channels. Required Actions are not an accident initiator nor 
credited with mitigation of the consequences of an accident. The 
actions continue to assure operation consistent with the design 
provisions and within the assumptions of the safety analysis.

[[Page 18341]]

    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change involves certain less restrictive actions; 
however, these actions are consistent with the design provisions and 
with currently approved actions for other inoperable automatic RTS 
actuation functions. The proposed change does not involve a physical 
alteration of the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment 
is being introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change will not reduce a margin of 
safety because it has no such effect on any assumption of the safety 
analyses. While the change involves less restrictive actions, these 
actions are consistent with the design provisions and with currently 
approved actions for other inoperable automatic RTS actuation 
Functions. These actions do not result in any conflict with the 
assumptions in the safety analyses and licensing basis.
    As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.

L10 SCE&G proposes to amend the TS, as follows

    : TS 3.1.8 ``PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions--MODE 2,'' is revised 
to delete the listing of current Function 16.b for TS 3.3.1, ``Reactor 
Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation'';
     Current TS 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System (RTS) 
Instrumentation,'' Table 3.3.1-1, Function 16, Reactor Trip System 
Interlocks requirements are removed;
     Current TS 3.3.1 Action M is deleted;
     Current TS 3.3.2, ``Engineered Safety Feature Actuation 
System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,'' Table 3.3.2-1, Function 18, ESFAS 
Interlocks (with the exception of Table 3.3.2-1, Function 18.b, Reactor 
Trip, P-4) requirements are removed; and
     Current TS 3.3.2 Action J is deleted.
    The design description and role in supporting operability of TS 
required RTS and ESFAS functions re retained in the FSAR Chapter 7, 
Instrumentation and Controls, as well as the TS Bases.
    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The TS RTS and ESFAS actuation functions explicitly 
retained in TS are those assumed to actuate in the safety analysis. 
The associated interlocks are necessary support functions for 
Operability of these TS required RTS and ESFAS functions. The 
removal of explicit interlock functions does not impact the design-
required actuation function. Plant equipment remains capable of 
performing preventative and mitigative functions assumed by the 
accident analysis. However, the change involves removing explicit 
requirements, including actions that lead to reestablishing 
operability of the assumed actuation functions; implicitly these 
requirements are maintained and the actions remain viable for 
reestablishing operability. Since the requirements for the safety 
function Operability remains unchanged, removing the explicit 
presentation of detail is not an accident initiator nor involved 
with mitigation of the consequences of an accident.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While the 
presentation of TS RTS and ESFAS actuation functions moves the 
associated interlocks from explicit treatment to becoming an 
implicit support system feature, the function continues to be 
required as necessary to support associated TS actuation functions. 
In doing so, certain actions for inoperability of interlocks are 
made more restrictive by now entering actions specific to the 
supported function's inoperability which have shorter Completion 
Times. However those actions are consistent with those currently 
approved for inoperability of that function.
    As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.

L11 SCE&G proposes to amend TS 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System (RTS) 
Instrumentation,'' to delete:

     Current Table 3.3.1-1, Function 5, Source Range Neutron 
Flux High Setpoint, third row for that function including Applicability 
set ``3\(e)\,4\(e)\,5\(e)\'' and associated references to Required 
Channel, Condition, and Surveillance Requirements;
     Current Table 3.3.1-1, Footnote (e); and
     Current Action R.
    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The change involves removing certain actions that apply 
during inoperability of all four source range channels to provide 
indication. However, requirements and associated Required Actions 
continue to apply to source range channels in separate TS. The 
Required Actions removed are not accident initiators nor involved 
with mitigation of the consequences of an accident. The remaining 
requirements and actions continue to assure operation within the 
assumptions of the safety analysis.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.

[[Page 18342]]

    The proposed change involves removing certain actions for 
inoperability of all four source range channels; however, this 
change does not result in any conflict with the assumptions in the 
safety analyses and licensing basis. The proposed change does not 
involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the FSAR. 
No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not being 
operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints, at 
which protective or mitigative actions are initiated, affected by 
this change. This change will not alter the manner in which 
equipment operation is initiated, nor will the function demands on 
credited equipment be changed. No change is being made to the 
procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event as 
described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new 
failure modes are being introduced.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change will not reduce a margin of 
safety because it has no such effect on any assumption of the safety 
analyses. While certain actions for inoperability of all four source 
range channels to indicate are removed, requirements and associated 
Required Actions continue to apply to source range channels in a 
separate TS. When all source range monitoring channels are 
inoperable, the remaining actions continue to assure operation 
within safety analysis assumptions. These actions are consistent 
with the actions presented in the NUREG-1431.
    As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.

L12 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.3.2, ``Engineered Safety 
Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,'' Actions related to 
functions that result in valve isolation actuations. Current TS 3.3.2 
Actions P, Q, R, S, T, and Z, are revised to ``Declare affected 
isolation valve(s) inoperable.'' Additionally, the following current 
Table 3.3.2-1 Applicability Footnotes are deleted:

     (e) Not applicable for valve isolation functions whose 
associated flow path is isolated;
     (h) Not applicable if all main steam isolation valves 
(MSIVs) are closed; and
     (i) Not applicable when the startup feedwater flow paths 
are isolated.
    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The less restrictive Required Actions are acceptable 
based on the fact that the new actions are the appropriate actions 
for the actuated equipment. Required Actions are not an accident 
initiator nor credited with mitigation of the consequences of an 
accident. The actions continue to assure operation within the 
assumptions of the safety analysis and are consistent with approved 
actions for the actuated equipment.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change involves certain less restrictive actions; 
however, the actions continue to assure operation within the 
assumptions of the safety analysis and are consistent with approved 
actions for the actuated equipment. The proposed change does not 
involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the FSAR. 
No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not being 
operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints, at 
which protective or mitigative actions are initiated, affected by 
this change. This change will not alter the manner in which 
equipment operation is initiated, nor will the function demands on 
credited equipment be changed. No change is being made to the 
procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event as 
described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new 
failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter 
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While the 
change involves less restrictive actions, the actions are consistent 
with approved actions for the actuated equipment. These actions do 
not result in any conflict with the assumptions in the safety 
analyses and licensing basis.
    As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.

L13 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.3.3, ``Post Accident 
Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation,'' as follows:

     Function 12 is revised from ``Passive Residual Heat 
Removal (PRHR) Flow and PRHR Outlet Temperature,'' to ``Passive 
Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Heat Removal.'' In addition, the Required 
Channels/Divisions column is revised from ``2 flow & 1 temperature,'' 
to ``2''.
     Function 17 is revised from ``Passive Containment Cooling 
System (PCS) Storage Tank Level and PCS Flow,'' to ``Passive 
Containment Cooling System (PCS) Heat Removal.'' In addition, the 
Required Channels/Divisions column is revised from ``2 level & 1 
flow,'' to ``2''.
    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change reduces the number of required Function 12 
and Function 17 channels from three to two. Requiring the minimum of 
two redundant channels is consistent with NUREG-1431 requirements 
for meeting Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97 PAM redundancy requirements. 
The change also relocates the details of the specific channels 
designed to satisfy the PAM requirements to the associated Bases. 
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant operations. 
PAM functions are not initiators of analyzed events and therefore 
the revised requirements do not result in operations that 
significantly increase the probability of initiating an analyzed 
event. The PAM function affected by this change is designed to 
accommodate single failure to support post-accident monitoring. The 
change reduces TS requirements on excess required channels; however, 
single failure redundancy continues to be required. Thus, the 
proposed change does not alter assumptions relative to mitigation of 
an accident or transient event. The less restrictive requirements 
continue to ensure process variables, structures, systems, and 
components are maintained consistent with the safety analyses and 
licensing basis.
    The TS Bases will be maintained in accordance with the change 
control provisions of the TS Bases Control Program described in TS 
5.5.6. Because any change to the TS Bases will be evaluated, no 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated will be allowed.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being

[[Page 18343]]

introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. In 
addition, the details being moved from the current TS to the TS 
Bases are not being changed. NRC prior review and approval of 
changes to these relocated requirements, in accordance with 10 CFR 
50.92, will no longer be required. Future change to these details 
will be evaluated under the applicable regulatory change control 
mechanism. There is no margin of safety attributed to the NRC prior 
review and approval; therefore, there is no significant reduction in 
a margin of safety.

L14 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.3.5, ``Diverse Actuation 
System (DAS) Manual Controls,'' Table 3.3.5-1, ``DAS Manual Controls,'' 
footnote b; current TS 3.6.7, ``Passive Containment Cooling System 
(PCS)--Shutdown,'' Applicability; and current TS 3.7.9, ``Fuel Storage 
Pool Makeup Water Sources,'' LCO Notes 1, 2, and 3; Applicability, 
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.9.1 Note, SR 3.7.9.2 Note, SR 3.7.9.3 
Note, and SR 3.7.9.4 Note by deleting ``calculated'' with respect to 
decay heat.

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The proposed change provides less stringent TS 
requirements for the facility by not expressly specifying the method 
of determining the decay heat value. These less stringent 
requirements do not result in operations that significantly increase 
the probability of initiating an analyzed event, and do not alter 
assumptions relative to mitigation of an accident or transient 
event. The less restrictive requirements continue to ensure process 
variables, structures, systems, and components are maintained 
consistent with the safety analyses and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. 
Eliminating the imposition of single method of determining the decay 
heat value has no effect on or a margin of plant safety. 
``Calculating'' the decay heat value remains a viable option. The 
change maintains requirements within the safety analyses and 
licensing basis.
    As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

L15 SCE&G proposes to amend TS 3.4.8, ``Minimum [Reactor Coolant 
System] RCS Flow,'' SR 3.4.8.1 from ``Verify that at least one [Reactor 
Coolant Pump] RCP is in operation at >= 10% rated speed or 
equivalent,'' to ``Verify that at least one RCP is in operation with 
total flow through the core >= 3,000 gpm.''

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The change involves revising the acceptance criteria of 
an existing surveillance requirement with no change in required 
system or device function. Surveillance acceptance criteria are not 
accident initiators nor involved with mitigation of the consequences 
of any accident. The proposed acceptance criteria ensure that the 
applicable analysis input assumptions are preserved.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change revises the acceptance criteria of an 
existing surveillance requirement. However, the proposed change does 
not involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the 
FSAR. No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not 
being operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints, 
at which protective or mitigative actions are initiated, affected by 
this change. This change will not alter the manner in which 
equipment operation is initiated, nor will the function demands on 
credited equipment be changed. No change is being made to the 
procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event as 
described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new 
failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter 
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While the 
surveillance requirement acceptance criteria is made less 
restrictive by removal of design margin that accounts for minimizing 
stress and wear, and increasing equipment life, and the expected 
operating limit on minimum RCP speed, this margin is more 
appropriately maintained in the design and in operating and 
surveillance procedures.
    Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.

L16 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.4.10, ``RCS Specific 
Activity,'' Actions by deleting Required Action B.1, which requires 
``Perform SR 3.4.10.2,'' within 4 hours.

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:


[[Page 18344]]


    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The proposed change provides less stringent TS actions 
for the facility. However, the less restrictive requirements 
continue to ensure process variables, structures, systems, and 
components are maintained consistent with the safety analyses and 
licensing basis. The performance of SR 3.4.10.2 is not related to an 
accident initiator nor credited with mitigation of the consequences 
of an accident.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. The 
change maintains requirements within the safety analyses and 
licensing basis. The result of performing the additional 
surveillance does not provide any additional margin of safety; as 
such, eliminating the Required Action for performing the additional 
surveillance does not result in a significant reduction in a margin 
of safety.

L17 SCE&G proposes to amend TS as follows:

    1. Current TS 3.5.2, ``Core Makeup Tanks (CMTs)--Operating,'' 
Condition D is revised from ``One CMT inoperable due to presence of 
noncondensible gases in one high point vent,'' to ``One CMT inlet line 
with noncondensible gas volume not within limit.''
    2. Current TS 3.5.2, Required Action D.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore CMT inlet line noncondensible gas 
volume to within limit.''
    3. Current TS 3.5.4, ``Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger 
(PRHR HX)--Operating,'' Condition C is revised from ``Presence of 
noncondensible gases in the high point vent,'' to ``PRHR HX inlet line 
noncondensible gas volume not within limit.''
    4. Current TS 3.5.4, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore PRHR HX inlet line noncondensible 
gas volume to within limit.''
    5. Current TS 3.5.5, ``Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger 
(PRHR HX)--Shutdown, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Intact,'' Condition C 
is revised from ``Presence of noncondensible gases in the high point 
vent,'' to ``PRHR HX inlet line noncondensible gas volume not within 
limit.''
    6. Current TS 3.5.5, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore PRHR HX inlet line noncondensible 
gas volume to within limit.''
    7. Current TS 3.5.6, ``In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank 
(IRWST)--Operating,'' Condition B is revised from ``One IRWST injection 
line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases in one high 
point vent,'' to ``One IRWST injection flow path with noncondensible 
gas volume in one squib valve outlet line pipe stub not within limit.''
    8. Current TS 3.5.6, Required Action B.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore noncondensible gas volume in squib 
valve outlet line pipe stub to within limit.''
    9. Current TS 3.5.6, Condition C is revised from ``One IRWST 
injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases in 
both high point vents,'' to ``One IRWST injection flow path with 
noncondensible gas volume in both squib valve outlet line pipe stubs 
not within limit.''
    10. Current TS 3.5.6, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases from one high point vent,'' to ``Restore one squib 
valve outlet line pipe stub noncondensible gas volume to within 
limit.''
    11. Current TS 3.5.7, ``In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank 
(IRWST)--Shutdown, MODE 5,'' Condition B is revised from ``Required 
IRWST injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases 
in one high point vent,'' to ``Required IRWST injection flow path with 
noncondensible gas volume in one squib valve outlet line pipe stub not 
within limit.''
    12. Current TS 3.5.7, Required Action B.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore noncondensible gas volume in squib 
valve outlet line pipe stub to within limit.
    13. Current TS 3.5.7, Condition C is revised from ``Required IRWST 
injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases in 
both high point vents,'' to ``Required IRWST injection flow path with 
noncondensible gas volume in both squib valve outlet line pipe stubs 
not within limit.''
    14. Current TS 3.5.7, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases from one high point vent,'' to ``Restore one squib 
valve outlet line pipe stub noncondensible gas volume to within 
limit.''
    15. TS 3.5.8, ``In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank 
(IRWST)--Shutdown, MODE 6,'' Condition B is revised from ``Required 
IRWST injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases 
in one high point vent,'' to ``Required IRWST injection flow path with 
noncondensible gas volume in one squib valve outlet line pipe stub not 
within limit.''
    16. Current TS 3.5.8, Required Action B.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore noncondensible gas volume in squib 
valve outlet line pipe stub to within limit.''
    17. Current TS 3.5.8, Condition C is revised from ``Required IRWST 
injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases in 
both high point vents,'' to ``Required IRWST injection flow path with 
noncondensible gas volume in both squib valve outlet line pipe stubs 
not within limit.''
    18. Current TS 3.5.8, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases from one high point vent,'' to ``Restore one squib 
valve outlet line pipe stub noncondensible gas volume to within 
limit.''
    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The proposed change provides less stringent TS 
requirements by not

[[Page 18345]]

expressly specifying the noncondensible gas volume limit; however, 
the requirement that noncondensible gas volume be within limits is 
not changed. These less stringent requirements do not result in 
operations that significantly increase the probability of initiating 
an analyzed event, and do not alter assumptions relative to 
mitigation of an accident or transient event. The less restrictive 
requirements continue to ensure process variables, structures, 
systems, and components are maintained consistent with the safety 
analyses and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. The 
amended actions and surveillances continue assure that 
noncondensible gas volumes are maintained and restored to within 
acceptable limits. The change maintains requirements within the 
safety analyses and licensing basis.
    As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

L18 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.6.8, ``Containment 
Penetrations,'' LCO 3.6.8.d.2 to allow the penetration flow path to be 
open provided it can be closed prior to steaming into the containment. 
In conjunction, current SR 3.6.8.3 as well as the corresponding 
containment Isolation function required in current TS 3.3.2, 
``Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,'' 
Table 3.3.2-1 Function 3.a for Modes 5 and 6, are removed. This removes 
requirements for Operable containment isolation signals in Modes 5 and 
6, allowing manual operator actions to affect any required isolation 
prior to steaming into the containment.

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change would remove requirements for Operable 
containment isolation signals in Modes 5 and 6, allowing manual 
operator action to effect any required isolation. The design 
provisions for instrumented closure signals are unaffected. The 
isolation status of the penetration flow path is not an initiator to 
any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of 
an accident previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences 
of an accident with the valves open and capable of being closed 
prior to steaming into the containment are no different than the 
consequences of the same accident with the current requirements. The 
valves are currently allowed to be open, provided they can be 
isolated. The accident analysis assumes cooling water inventory is 
not lost in the event of an accident. Thus, closing the valves prior 
to steaming into the containment will ensure this assumption is met. 
As a result, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated 
are not affected by this change. The proposed change does not alter 
or prevent the ability of SSCs from performing their intended 
function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within 
the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect 
the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release 
assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated. Further, the proposed change does not 
increase the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be 
released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or 
cumulative occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed 
change is consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and 
resultant consequences.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change to remove requirements for Operable 
containment isolation signals in Modes 5 and 6, and allowing manual 
operator action to isolate the purge valve penetration flow path 
prior to steaming into the containment, does not alter the manner in 
which safety limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting 
conditions for operation are determined. The safety analysis 
acceptance criteria are not affected by this change. The proposed 
change will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside 
of the design basis.
    As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

L19 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.9.6 ``pH Adjustment,'' LCO and 
current SR 3.9.6.1 trisodium phosphate (TSP) requirement from the 
volume requirement of 560 ft\3\ to a weight requirement of 26,460 lbs. 
In addition, due to this change, Condition A and Required Action A.1 is 
changed to refer to ``weight'' in lieu of ``volume.''

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change allows for a lesser volume over time 
consistent with expected compaction and agglomeration. While the 
total weight will remain constant and sufficient to assure safety 
analysis assumptions are met, the unintended requirement to maintain 
volume > 560 ft\3\, even after compaction and agglomeration is made 
less restrictive. The TSP is not an initiator to any accident 
previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of an accident 
previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences of an 
accident with the changed TSP weight limit are no different than the 
consequences of the same accident with the current TSP limit. The 
accident analysis assumes a minimum of 26,460 lbs of

[[Page 18346]]

TSP, and this value is being maintained in the TS. The assumed pH of 
7.0 will be maintained using the proposed weight of TSP. This pH 
will continue to augment the retention of elemental iodine in the 
containment water, and thus reduce the iodine available to leak to 
the environment. As a result, the consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated are not affected by this change. The proposed 
change does not alter or prevent the ability of SSCs from performing 
their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an 
initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed 
change does not affect the source term, containment isolation, or 
radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Further, the 
proposed change does not increase the types or amounts of 
radioactive effluent that may be released offsite, nor significantly 
increase individual or cumulative occupational/public radiation 
exposures. The proposed change is consistent with the safety 
analysis assumptions and resultant consequences.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change to allow for a lesser volume over time 
consistent with expected compaction and agglomeration, while 
maintaining the total weight to assure safety analysis assumptions 
are met, does not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting 
safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation are 
determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not affected 
by this change. The proposed change will not result in plant 
operation in a configuration outside of the design basis.
    As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

L20 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.7.2, ``Main Steam Isolation 
Valves (MSIVs),'' Condition D Note to allow separate Condition entry 
due to any inoperable valve covered by the LCO, not just the MSIVs.

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change allows a separate Condition entry for each 
affected flow path. The failure of the main steam line flow path 
covered by the LCO to close is not an initiator to any accident 
previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of an accident 
previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences of an 
accident are not affected since the inoperability in the flow path 
is addressed to assure affected flow paths are isolated as assumed 
in the accident analysis. As a result, the consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated are not affected by this change. The 
proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, 
systems, and components from performing their intended function to 
mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed 
acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect the source 
term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions 
used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated. Further, the proposed change does not increase 
the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released 
offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative 
occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed change is 
consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and resultant 
consequences.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change to allow a separate Condition entry for each 
affected flow path does not alter the manner in which safety limits, 
limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation 
are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not 
affected by this change. The proposed change will not result in 
plant operation in a configuration outside of the design basis.
    As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

L21 SCE&G proposes to amend TS 3.8.1, ``[Direct Current] DC Sources--
Operating,'' by deleting SR 3.8.1.3 Note 2.

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The Class 1E DC electrical power system, including associated 
battery chargers, is not an initiator to any accident sequence 
analyzed in the FSAR. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS 
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of 
performing its function as described in the FSAR, therefore the 
mitigative functions supported by the Class 1E DC electrical power 
system will continue to provide the protection assumed by the 
accident analysis.
    The proposed TS change does not involve any changes to SSCs and 
does not alter the method of operation or control of SSCs as 
described in the FSAR. The current assumptions in the safety 
analysis regarding accident initiators and mitigation of accidents 
are unaffected by this change. No additional failure modes or 
mechanisms are being introduced and the likelihood of previously 
analyzed failures remains unchanged. The integrity of fission 
product barriers, plant configuration, and operating procedures as 
described in the FSAR will not be affected by this change.
    Therefore, the consequences of previously analyzed accidents 
will not increase because of this change.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

[[Page 18347]]

    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that 
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being 
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event 
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being 
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety 
analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change is acceptable because the 
operability of the Class 1E DC electrical power system is 
unaffected, there is no detrimental impact on any equipment design 
parameter, and the plant will still be required to operate within 
assumed conditions. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS 
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of 
performing its function as described in the FSAR; therefore, the 
support of the Class 1E DC electrical power system to the plant 
response to analyzed events will continue to provide the margins of 
safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate monitoring and 
maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will continue to be 
performed.
    As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

L22 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 3.8.2, ``DC Sources--Shutdown,'' 
by adding a new Condition A to address inoperable battery chargers.

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The Class 1E DC electrical power system, including associated 
battery chargers, is not an initiator to any accident sequence 
analyzed in the FSAR. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS 
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of 
performing its function as described in the FSAR, therefore the 
mitigative functions supported by the Class 1E DC electrical power 
system will continue to provide the protection assumed by the 
accident analysis.
    The proposed change does not involve any changes to SSCs and 
does not alter the method of operation or control of SSCs as 
described in the FSAR. The current assumptions in the safety 
analysis regarding accident initiators and mitigation of accidents 
are unaffected by this change. No additional failure modes or 
mechanisms are being introduced and the likelihood of previously 
analyzed failures remains unchanged.
    The integrity of fission product barriers, plant configuration, 
and operating procedures as described in the FSAR will not be 
affected by this change. Therefore, the consequences of previously 
analyzed accidents will not increase because of this change.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that 
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being 
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event 
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being 
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety 
analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change is acceptable because the 
Operability of the Class 1E DC electrical power system is 
unaffected, there is no detrimental impact on any equipment design 
parameter, and the plant will still be required to operate within 
assumed conditions. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS 
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of 
performing its function as described in the FSAR; therefore, the 
support of the Class 1E DC electrical power system to the plant 
response to analyzed events will continue to provide the margins of 
safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate monitoring and 
maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will continue to be 
performed.
    As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

L23 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 5.5.2, ``Radioactive Effluent 
Control Program,'' to state that the provisions of SR 3.0.2 and SR 
3.0.3 are applicable to the Radioactive Effluents Control Program 
surveillance frequency.

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    A TS frequency for the determination of cumulative and projected 
dose contributions from radioactive effluents is not an initiator to 
any accident sequence analyzed in the FSAR. Operation in accordance 
with the proposed TS continues to ensure that initial conditions 
assumed in the accident analysis are maintained. The proposed change 
does not involve a modification to the physical configuration of the 
plant or change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The 
proposed change will not impose any new or different requirements or 
introduce a new accident initiator, accident precursor, or 
malfunction mechanism.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that 
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being 
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event 
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being 
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety 
analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?

[[Page 18348]]

    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change, applying the 25% extension to 
the frequency of performing the monthly cumulative dose and 
projected dose calculations, will have no effect on the plant 
response to analyzed events and with therefore not impact a margin 
of safety. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS ensures that 
the plant response to analyzed events will continue to provide the 
margins of safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate monitoring 
and maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will continue 
to be performed.
    As such, there is no functional change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

L24 SCE&G proposes to amend current TS 5.5.3, ``Inservice Testing 
Program,'' paragraph b from ``The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable 
to the above required Frequencies for performing inservice testing 
activities,'' to ``The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable to the 
above required Frequencies and other normal and accelerated Frequencies 
specified as 2 years or less in the Inservice Testing Program for 
performing inservice testing activities.''

    SCE&G has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The frequency for inservice testing is not an initiator to any 
accident sequence analyzed in the FSAR, nor is it associated with 
any mitigative actions to reduce consequences. Operation in 
accordance with the proposed TS continues to ensure that initial 
conditions accident mitigative features assumed in the accident 
analysis are maintained. The proposed change does not involve a 
modification to the physical configuration of the plant or change in 
the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed change 
will not impose any new or different requirements or introduce a new 
accident initiator, accident precursor, or malfunction mechanism.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that 
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being 
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event 
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being 
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety 
analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change, applying the 25% extension to certain 
frequencies for performing inservice testing, does not significantly 
degrade the reliability that results from performing the 
Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the 
recognition that the most probable result of any particular 
surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with 
the SRs. As such, there is no technical change to the requirements 
and therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety. Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS ensures 
that the plant response to analyzed events will continue to provide 
the margins of safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate 
monitoring and maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will 
continue to be performed.
    As such, there is no functional change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Kathryn M. Sutton, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 
LLC, 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20004-2514.
    NRC Branch Chief: Lawrence Burkhart.

Union Electric Company, Docket No. 50-483, Callaway Plant, Unit 1, 
Callaway County, Missouri

    Date of amendment request: January 23, 2014.
    Description of amendment request: The amendment would revise 
Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.12, ``Cold Overpressure Mitigation 
System (COMS),'' to reflect the mass input transient analysis that 
assumes an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) centrifugal charging 
pump (CCP) and the normal charging pump (NCP) capable of injecting into 
the reactor coolant system (RCS) when TS 3.4.12 is applicable. The 
proposed amendment would additionally revise TS Table 3.3.1-1, 
``Reactor Trip System Instrumentation,'' to remove unnecessary page 
number references.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The TS 3.4.12 Limiting Condition for Operation provides RCS 
overpressure protection by restricting coolant input capability and 
providing adequate pressure relief capability during applicable 
Modes. Analyses have demonstrated that one power-operated relief 
valve (PORV) or one residual heat removal (RHR) suction relief valve 
or an RCS vent of at least 2.0 square inches is capable of limiting 
the RCS pressure excursions below the COMS limits which are based on 
the pressure-temperature limits of 10 CFR [Part] 50, Appendix G. The 
analyzed mass transient for COMS is based on an assumption that one 
ECCS CCP and the NCP are both capable of injection to the RCS.
    The NRC has previously evaluated the allowance for an ECCS CCP 
and the NCP being capable of injecting into the RCS during the TS 
3.4.12 Modes of Applicability. In the safety evaluation dated April 
2, 1998 related to the Callaway Plant, Unit 1, Amendment No. 124, 
the NRC concluded:
    The mass input transient analysis assumes simultaneous injection 
of both a centrifugal charging pump and the `normal' charging pump 
into the water-solid RCS while the RHRS [residual heat removal 
system] and the letdown line are isolated.
    In the same safety evaluation, the NRC further concluded that 
the change to TS Bases allowing the NCP to inject to the RCS during 
COMS applicability was consistent with the TS LCO and ``therefore 
allows a centrifugal charging pump and the 'normal' charging pump to 
be operable under these modes of operation.''
    The proposed change clarifies TS 3.4.12 to allow an ECCS CCP and 
the NCP to be capable of injecting into the RCS during low RCS 
pressures and temperatures, consistent with Callaway's NRC-approved 
licensing basis, and also removes unnecessary page number references 
from TS Table 3.3.1-1. The proposed change is thus an editorial one 
that does not involve a change to the design or operation of the 
plant, including the plant's safety analysis.
    Accordingly, the proposed change does not adversely affect 
accident initiators or

[[Page 18349]]

precursors nor does it alter any design assumptions, conditions, or 
allowed configurations of the facility. In addition, the proposed 
change does not affect the manner in which the plant is operated and 
maintained. Finally, the proposed change does not adversely affect 
the ability of structures, systems and components (SSC) to perform 
their intended safety function to mitigate the consequences of an 
initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits, nor does it 
increase the types and amounts of radioactive effluent that may be 
released offsite or significantly increase individual or cumulative 
occupational/public radiation exposure.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    As noted in the response to question 1, the proposed change will 
not physically alter the plant (i.e., no new or different type of 
equipment will be installed), nor does it change the methods 
governing normal plant operation. Accordingly, the proposed change 
does not introduce new accident initiators or impact assumptions 
made in the safety analysis.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not alter the manner in which safety 
limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for 
operation are determined, nor are the safety analysis acceptance 
criteria impacted by this change. The intent of the proposed change 
is for TS 3.4.12 to continue to reflect the provisions and 
limitations of the mass transient analysis that was performed for 
ensuring cold overpressure protection of the RCPB [reactor coolant 
pressure boundary] and which is already part of the NRC-approved 
licensing basis for the facility. Consequently, there is no change 
to the margin of safety, and the proposed change will not result in 
plant operation or a configuration that is outside the design basis.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: John O'Neill, Esq., Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw 
Pittman LLP, 2300 N Street NW., Washington, DC 20037.
    NRC Branch Chief: Michael T. Markley.

III. Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses 
and Combined Licenses

    During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, 
the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has 
determined for each of these amendments that the application complies 
with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The 
Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the 
Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set 
forth in the license amendment.
    A notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to facility 
operating license or combined license, as applicable, proposed no 
significant hazards consideration determination, and opportunity for a 
hearing in connection with these actions, was published in the Federal 
Register as indicated.
    Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that 
these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in 
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), 
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an 
environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 
10 CFR 51.22(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, 
it is so indicated.
    For further details with respect to the action see (1) the 
applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's 
related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as 
indicated. All of these items can be accessed as described in the 
``Accessing Information and Submitting Comments'' section of this 
document.

DTE Electric Company, Docket No. 50-341, Fermi 2, Monroe County, 
Michigan

    Date of application for amendment: January 11, 2013, as 
supplemented by letter dated September 27, 2013.
    Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised the Fermi 2 
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to describe the methodology and 
results of the analysis performed to evaluate the protection of the 
plant's structures, systems and components from tornado-generated 
missiles. The analysis utilized a probabilistic approach implemented 
through the application of the TORMIS computer code.
    Date of issuance: March 10, 2014.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented 
within 60 days of issuance.
    Amendment No.: 197.
    Facility Operating License No. NPF-43: Amendment revised the 
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: March 19, 2013 (78 FR 
16880). The supplemental letter dated September 27, 2013, provided 
additional information that clarified the application, did not expand 
the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change 
the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination as published in the Federal Register.
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 10, 2014.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC, and Entergy Operations, Inc., 
Docket No. 50-458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish, 
Louisiana

    Date of amendment request: July 16, 2013.
    Brief description of amendment: The amendment adopts Technical 
Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Change Traveler TSTF-535, Revision 0, 
``Revise Shutdown Margin Definition to Address Advanced Fuel Designs.'' 
The Shutdown Margin (SDM), the amount of reactivity by which the 
reactor is subcritical, is calculated under the conservative conditions 
that the reactor is Xenon-free, the most reactive control rod is 
outside the reactor core, and the moderator temperature produces the 
maximum reactivity. For standard fuel designs, maximum reactivity 
occurs at a moderator temperature of 68 degrees Fahrenheit ([deg]F), 
which is reflected in the temperature specified in the Technical 
Specifications (TSs). New, advanced Boiling Water Reactor fuel designs 
can have a higher reactivity at moderator shutdown temperatures above 
68[emsp14][deg]F. Therefore, consistent with TSTF-535, Revision 0, the 
amendment modified the TSs to require the SDM to be calculated at 
whatever temperature produces the maximum reactivity (i.e., 
temperatures at or above 68[emsp14][deg]F). This TS improvement is part 
of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process and was requested 
with no modifications.
    Date of issuance: March 5, 2014.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented 
60 days from the date of issuance.
    Amendment No.: 180.
    Facility Operating License No. NPF-47: The amendment revised the 
Facility

[[Page 18350]]

Operating License and Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 20, 2013 (78 FR 
51226).
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 5, 2014.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457, 
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois

    Date of application for amendment: October 10, 2013.
    Brief description of amendment: The change revises the date for the 
performance of the Braidwood Station, Unit 2, Type A or integrated 
containment leakage rate test (ILRT) described in Technical 
Specification 5.5.16, ``Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.'' 
from ``no later than May 4, 2014,'' to ``prior to entering MODE 4 at 
the start of Cycle 18.'' Additionally, a requirement is established for 
Braidwood Station, Unit 2, to exit the MODEs of applicability for 
containment as described in Technical Specification 3.6.1, 
``Containment'' (i.e., MODEs 1-4), no later than May 4, 2014.
    Date of issuance: March 19, 2014.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented 
within 14 days.
    Amendment Nos.: 175 and 175.
    Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66: The amendment 
revised the Facility Operating Licenses and Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: December 10, 2013 (78 
FR 74183).
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 19, 2014.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, Docket No. 50-443, Seabrook Station, Unit 
1, Rockingham County, New Hampshire

    Date of amendment request: March 13, 2013, supplemented August 8, 
2013, and November 22, 2013.
    Description of amendment request: The amendment revised the 
Seabrook Technical Specifications (TSs). The amendment modifies the 
circuitry that initiates high-head safety injection by adding a new 
permissive, cold leg injection permissive (P-15). This permissive 
prevents opening of the high-head safety injection valves until reactor 
coolant system pressure decreases to the P-15 set point.
    Date of issuance: March 6, 2014.
    Effective date: As of its date of issuance and shall be implemented 
within 615 days.
    Amendment No.: 140.
    Facility Operating License No. NPF-86: The amendment revised the 
License and TSs.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: April 30, 2013 (78 FR 
25315). The supplements dated August 8, 2013, and November 22, 2013, 
provided additional information that clarified the application, did not 
expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not 
change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination as published in the Federal Register.
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 6, 2014.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, Docket No. 50-410, Nine Mile 
Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (NMP2), Oswego County, New York

    Date of application for amendment: July 5, 2013, as supplemented by 
letter dated December 6, 2013.
    Brief description of amendment: The amendment included to NMP2 
Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.7, ``Standby Liquid Control (SLC) 
System,'' to increase the isotopic enrichment of boron-10 in the sodium 
pentaborate solution utilized in the SLC System and decrease the SLC 
System tank volume. The following are the changes to the NMP2 TS 3.1.7, 
``Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System:''
     Revise the acceptance criterion in [Surveillance 
Requirement] SR 3.1.7.10 by increasing the sodium pentaborate boron-10 
enrichment requirement from >= 25 atom percent to >= 92 atom percent, 
and make a corresponding change in TS Figure 3.1.7-1, ``Sodium 
Pentaborate Solution Volume/Concentration Requirements.''
     Revise TS Figure 3.1.7-1 to account for the decrease in 
the minimum volume of the SLC system tank. At a sodium pentaborate 
concentration of 13.6% the minimum volume changes from 4,558.6 gallons 
to 1,600 gallons. At a sodium pentaborate concentration of 14.4%, the 
minimum volume changes from 4,288 gallons to 1,530 gallons.
    Date of issuance: March 14, 2014.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance to be implemented prior 
to the startup from the spring 2014 NMP2 refueling outage.
    Amendment No.: 143.
    Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-69: Amendment revised 
the License and Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: September 3, 2013 (78 
FR 54284). The supplement dated December 6, 2013, provided additional 
information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of 
the application as originally noticed, and did not change the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's initial proposed no significant 
hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal 
Register.
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 14, 2014.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, South Carolina Public Service 
Authority, Docket No. 50-395, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1, 
Fairfield County, South Carolina

    Date of application for amendment: April 3, 2013.
    Brief description of amendment: This amendment revised the control 
room emergency filtration system Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.6.
    Date of issuance: March 11, 2014.
    Effective date: This license amendment is effective as of the date 
of its issuance.
    Amendment No.: 197.
    Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-12: Amendment revised 
the License.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 6, 2013 (78 FR 
47791).
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 11, 2014.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of March 2014.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michele G. Evans,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2014-06956 Filed 3-31-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P