Waiver of Autonomous Reentry Restriction for a Reentry Vehicle, 13375-13377 [2014-05136]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 46 (Monday, March 10, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13375-13377]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-05136]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration


Waiver of Autonomous Reentry Restriction for a Reentry Vehicle

AGENCY: Office of Commercial Space Transportation; Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of waiver.

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SUMMARY: This notice concerns three petitions for waiver related to the 
launch and reentry of an Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle. In the first 
of these petitions, United Launch Alliance (ULA) requested a waiver of 
the FAA's requirement that the expected number of casualties for a 
launch not exceed 0.00003 casualties (Ec <= 30 x 
10-\6\) from debris. For the second and third petitions, 
Lockheed Martin (Lockheed) requested waivers of the FAA's regulatory 
requirements that (1) the expected number of casualties for the entire 
mission, including launch and reentry, not exceed 30 x 
10-\6\ casualties from debris; and (2) an operator only 
initiate reentry of a reentry vehicle by command. The FAA elects to 
consider all three petitions together because all three involve the 
same essential facts and risk analyses. The FAA grants all three 
petitions.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning 
this waiver, contact Charles P. Brinkman, Aerospace Engineer, AST-200, 
Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST), Federal Aviation 
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone (202) 267-7715; email: phil.brinkman@faa.gov. For legal 
questions concerning this waiver, contact Laura Montgomery, Manager, 
Space Law Branch (AGC-250), Regulations Division, Office of the Chief 
Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., 
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-3150; email: 
laura.montgomery@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Lockheed and ULA are private commercial space flight companies. 
Lockheed entered into a contract with the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) to provide the first orbital flight test 
for NASA's Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Program. Lockheed has 
contracted with ULA to provide launch services for the mission.
    The FAA is responsible for licensing, in relevant part, the launch 
of a launch vehicle and the reentry of a reentry vehicle, under 
authority granted to the Secretary of Transportation by 51 USC Subtitle 
V, chapter 509 (Chapter 509), and delegated to the FAA's Administrator 
and Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation.
    The mission at issue in this notice is Orion Exploration Flight 
Test 1, launching from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. The 
mission tests the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle in an un-crewed, 
limited-capability configuration, and serves as a stepping stone 
towards a crew-capable vehicle that would enable human exploration 
missions beyond Earth orbit. The mission is comprised of a launch, 
which is conducted by ULA, and a reentry, which is conducted by 
Lockheed. The launch vehicle is ULA's Delta IV Heavy launch vehicle, 
which consists of a Common Booster Core (CBC) as the first stage with 
two additional strap-on CBCs and a Delta IV Cryogenic Second Stage 
(DCSS). The first burn of the DCSS places the Orion and the DCSS in 
orbit, and a second DCSS burn places the Orion into a highly 
elliptical, negative-perigee trajectory, to simulate the thermal 
conditions and high reentry speeds the module would experience 
returning from missions beyond Earth orbit. After separating from the 
DCSS, the Orion module reenters over the eastern Pacific Ocean, 
splashing down 231 nautical miles west of Baja California, Mexico.
    Section 417.107(b)(1) of Title 14 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (14 CFR) prohibits the launch of a launch vehicle if the 
expected casualty (Ec) for the flight exceeds 30 x 
10-\6\ for, in relevant part, impacting inert and explosive 
debris (debris). On February 27, 2014, ULA petitioned for a waiver 
because the launch has a debris risk of 163 x 10-\6\.
    Section 435.35 establishes acceptable risk for reentry vehicles, 
and requires operators to comply with Sec. Sec.  431.35(a) and 
431.35(b)(1)(i),\1\ which in turn prohibit an Ec for debris 
in excess of 30 x 10-\6\, for both launch and reentry 
combined. On February 27, 2014, Lockheed also petitioned for a waiver 
because the mission has a combined risk of 164 x 10-\6\.
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    \1\ Although the module is a reentry vehicle and not a reusable 
launch vehicle, 14 CFR 435.33 incorporates and applies Sec.  431.43 
to all reentry vehicles.
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    Section 431.43(e) requires any reusable launch vehicle (RLV) that 
enters Earth orbit to be operated such that the vehicle operator can 
monitor and verify the status of safety critical systems before 
enabling reentry. This section also prohibits operators from designing 
a system to reenter autonomously. On February 27, 2014, Lockheed 
requested a waiver from this prohibition.

Waiver Criteria

    Chapter 509 allows the FAA to waive a license requirement if the 
waiver (1) will not jeopardize public health and safety, and safety of 
property; (2) is in the public interest; and (3) will not jeopardize 
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. 51 
U.S.C. 50905(b)(3); 14 CFR 404.5(b).

A. Sixty Day Requirement

    Section 404.3(b)(5) requires that a petition for waiver be 
submitted at least

[[Page 13376]]

sixty days before the proposed effective date of the waiver, which in 
this case would be March 8, 2014, the date by which the FAA must make 
its licensing determination. This section also provides that a petition 
may be submitted late for good cause.
    Here, ULA and Lockheed submitted their waiver petitions on February 
27, 2014, less than sixty days before the statutory deadline for the 
FAA's license determination. However, both launch operators have shared 
drafts of their petitions with the FAA, thus providing the FAA with 
sufficiently early access to the information to review the information 
in a timely fashion. Accordingly, the FAA is able to find good cause.

B. Public Health and Safety, and Safety of Property

    For the purposes of clarity, the FAA's analysis of public health 
and safety, and the safety of property, is broken down into subsections 
reflecting the various issues raised by the risk waivers and autonomous 
reentry waivers, respectively.
1. Launch and Mission Risk
    Although the FAA's regulations prohibit debris risk in excess of 30 
x 10-\6\, a waiver is warranted in this case because the 
United States Government's experience conducting other space missions 
with risk in excess of 100 x 10-\6\ demonstrates that the 
risks of this mission are consistent with the public health and safety, 
and the safety of property. ULA and Lockheed provided risk analyses for 
both launch and reentry, respectively, but it was the FAA who 
calculated the total mission risk for debris as 165 x 
10-\6\. That number may be broken down as follows:

--20 x 10-\6\ from launch, with approximately 10 x 
10-\6\ attributable to local area risk and approximately 10 
x 10-\6\ attributable to overflight (downrange) risk;
--143 x 10-\6\ from random and off-target reentry of the 
DCSS during the second DCSS burn;
--<1 x 10-\6\ for reentry of the Orion module

    The United States Government has repeatedly accepted risk for 
government launches in excess of the FAA's 30 x 10-\6\ and 
in excess of 100 x 10-\6\, without negative consequences for 
safety. For example, the current Ec requirement for 
government launches from U.S. National Test Ranges is 1 x 
10-\4\ (equal to 100 x 10-\6\), encompassing all 
risk from debris, toxics, and overpressure. See Air Force Instruction 
91-217, Space Safety and Mishap Prevention Program (2010). Moreover, 
the Space Shuttle used a debris risk criterion of 200 x 
10-\6\ for launch risk to the public. See NASA's 
Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond, Vol. 
1 Final Edition, at 2-39 (May 15, 2007). And, in 2005, the U.S. Air 
Force approved a government launch of a Titan where the risk ranged 
from 145 to 317 x 10-\6\. Dept. of the Air Force Memorandum, 
Overflight Risk Exceedance Waiver for Titan IV B-30 Mission (Apr. 4, 
2005).
    Additionally, in 2012, the FAA granted a waiver to SpaceX under 
similar circumstances. Waiver of Acceptable Risk Restriction for Launch 
and Reentry, Notice of Waiver, 77 FR 24556 (Apr. 24, 2012). SpaceX's 
2012 mission was also NASA-sponsored; involved a test of the company's 
reentry vehicle, the Dragon module; and posed an estimated total 
mission risk from debris of between 98 and 121 x 10-\6\. Id.
    ULA's launch risk of 163 x 10-\6\ is less than the risk 
approved for these government systems. Accordingly, granting a waiver 
of Sec. Sec.  417.107(b)(1) and 431.35(b)(1)(i) in this case does not 
jeopardize the public health and safety, or the safety of property.
2. Safety of Autonomous Reentry Waiver
    Because Orion's reentry system allows Lockheed to identify 
anomalies or other non-compliant conditions, a waiver allowing 
autonomous reentry in this instance would not jeopardize the public 
health and safety, or the safety of property. In 1999, in the preamble 
to the reentry-rule NPRM, the FAA expressed concern that autonomous 
reentry was not adequately safe. Commercial Space Transportation 
Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing Regulations, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 64 FR 19626, 19645 (Apr. 21, 1999). The FAA was 
specifically concerned about the possibility that anomalies or other 
non-compliant conditions occurring in then-existing technology would 
not be identified prior to an autonomous reentry initiation. Id. By 
requiring the capability for human intervention, however, the FAA did 
not intend to permanently foreclose the use of autonomous systems or 
autonomous decision-making. In fact, the agency expressly acknowledged 
that safer autonomous systems were feasible, and that greater levels of 
confidence in a particular system could cause the agency to change its 
position. Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and 
Reentry Licensing Regulations, Final Rule, 65 FR 56618, 56641 (Sept. 
19, 2000). Despite its concerns, the FAA retained the authority to 
waive the autonomous reentry restriction. Id. Lockheed's proposed 
approach to reentry addresses the concerns underlying the FAA's 
regulatory requirements. Under Lockheed's proposed plan, Lockheed would 
use two means of detecting anomalies and non-compliant conditions. 
Lockheed's Flight Control Team can monitor and control the module, and 
the Orion module monitors itself real-time.
    ULA's proven DCSS system propels the module to a targeted reentry 
location over 200 miles into the Pacific Ocean. In a nominal reentry, 
the Orion module waits for the DCSS to signal that the module is at its 
pre-determined time for separation, the DCSS thrusters are inhibited, 
and the vehicle is operating within pre-determined state vector rate 
requirements. The Orion then autonomously commands its separation from 
the DCSS and activates the module's propulsion system. Each string of 
Orion thrusters is capable of providing closed-loop attitude control in 
the pitch, yaw, and roll axes, as well as translational delta-velocity. 
Given the trajectory and landing location chosen for the mission, 
however, combined with the limited thrust performance capability of the 
module's individual thrusters and limited total onboard propellant, the 
module does not have the propulsive capability to move its impact point 
over land following DCSS separation.
    While the module is in flight, Lockheed's Flight Control Team is 
capable of receiving and monitoring real-time vehicle telemetry 
transmissions. By doing so, the team will be able to detect anomalies 
and non-compliant conditions. In the event the Flight Control Team 
detects an off-nominal condition, the team can send several pre-
approved contingency commands to the module to mitigate loss of vehicle 
and protect public safety. In the event a communications failure causes 
the Flight Control Team to lose direct insight into the raw health-and-
status telemetry data, the module has the ability to autonomously guide 
itself to its pre-determined landing site. This autonomous capability 
allows the module to safely reenter, descend, land, and safe itself 
post-splashdown--even after a communications failure with the ground.
    In addition to the systems already described, the Orion module 
itself has the ability to identify anomalies or other non-compliant 
conditions. Orion has the ability to monitor its safety-critical 
systems in real-time. It has a space-grade vehicle management computer

[[Page 13377]]

with redundant flight control modules. It has the ability to check the 
validity of its data by reviewing--using built-in channel selection 
criteria--data received from redundant sensors. The redundant sensors 
include redundant GPS receiver antennas and redundant, space-grade 
inertial measurement units.
    Also playing an instrumental role in the FAA's ability to grant a 
waiver is the fact that Orion is equipped with a number of mitigating 
features. First, Orion has a ``cold-restart'' capability and self-
checking pair processors to maintain proper vehicle commanding after 
any unexpected power cycle, radiation upset, or other off-nominal event 
that would require an automatic restart of the module's computing 
system. Also, Orion's computing system has fail-silent functionality to 
prevent off-nominal corrupted or inadvertent vehicle commanding. 
Finally, Orion has two independent and redundant propulsion strings, 
which ensure that even if one fails the propulsion system will still 
perform the planned reentry.

C. Public Interest

    The FAA looks to its enabling statute to determine how Congress has 
defined the public interest. The FAA, through AST, implements the 
agency's statutory mandate to encourage the development of commercial 
space capabilities and the continuous improvement of the safety of 
launch vehicles designed to carry passengers. 51 U.S.C. 50901(b).
    ULA and Lockheed's petitions to waive the FAA's risk and reentry 
restrictions are consistent with the public interest because the test 
flight is necessary to the development of NASA's human-missions 
capability beyond Earth orbit.

D. National Security and Foreign Policy Interests

    The FAA has not identified any national security or foreign policy 
implications associated with granting this waiver.

Summary and Conclusion

    The FAA determines that the waivers associated with this mission 
will not jeopardize public health and safety or safety of property. In 
addition, the waivers are in the public interest because they 
accomplish the goals of Chapter 509 and do not unduly increase risk to 
the public. Finally, they will not jeopardize national security and 
foreign policy interests of the United States. The FAA therefore waives 
the requirements of 14 CFR 417.107(b)(1) and 431.35(b)(1)(i) for launch 
and mission risk, respectively, and of 14 CFR 431.43(e) for a commanded 
reentry.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on February 28, 2014.
Kenneth Wong,
Licensing and Evaluation Division Manager.
[FR Doc. 2014-05136 Filed 3-7-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P