Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company, 12420-12423 [2014-04893]

Download as PDF 12420 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 43 / Wednesday, March 5, 2014 / Proposed Rules Airworthiness Directive 2013–0267, dated November 6, 2013, for related information. You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket on the Internet at https:// www.regulations.gov/ #!documentDetail;D=FAA-2013&-0828-0001. (2) For Airbus service information identified in this AD, contact Airbus SAS— Airworthiness Office—EAL, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 93 45 80; email airworthiness.A330A340@airbus.com; Internet https:// www.airbus.com. For Messier-Dowty service information identified in this AD, contact Messier-Dowty: Messier Services Americas, Customer Support Center, 45360 Severn Way, Sterling, VA 20166–8910; telephone 703–450–8233; fax 703–404–1621; Internet https://techpubs.services/messier-dowty.com. You may view this service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 19, 2014. Jeffrey E. Duven, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2014–04892 Filed 3–4–14; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods: • Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments. • Fax: 202–493–2251. • Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. • Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. ADDRESSES: Examining the AD Docket You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2014–0127; Directorate Identifier 2013–NM–237–AD] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; phone: (425) 917–6509; fax: (425) 917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: AGENCY: Comments Invited We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. This proposed AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This proposed AD would require revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are proposing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure. DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by April 21, 2014. We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA– 2014–0127; Directorate Identifier 2013– NM–237–AD’’ at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments. We will post all comments we receive, without change, to https:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS SUMMARY: VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:16 Mar 04, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 Discussion We have received reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. Deficiencies in the valve actuator design have resulted in latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure. FAA’s Determination We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design. Proposed AD Requirements This proposed AD would require revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. The airworthiness limitations would allow an operator to perform the operational check as either a maintenance action or a flightcrew action. The flightcrew or maintenance crew would monitor the engine spar valve lights for a few seconds immediately after moving the engine fuel condition levers. Flightcrews can perform this operational check while starting the engine or while shutting down the engine. Maintenance crews can do this operational check as a separate action that does not require actual starting of the engine. This proposed AD would require revisions to certain operator maintenance documents to include these new inspections. Compliance with these inspections is required by section 91.403(c) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)). For airplanes that have been previously modified, altered, or repaired in the areas addressed by these inspections, an operator might not be able to accomplish the inspections described in the revisions. In this situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), the operator must request approval of an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (i) of this proposed AD. The request should include a description of changes to the proposed inspections that will ensure the continued operational safety of the airplane. Interim Action We consider this proposed AD interim action. The manufacturer is E:\FR\FM\05MRP1.SGM 05MRP1 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 43 / Wednesday, March 5, 2014 / Proposed Rules currently developing a modification that will address the unsafe condition identified in this proposed AD. Once this modification is developed, approved, and available, we might consider additional rulemaking. 12421 Costs of Compliance We estimate that this proposed AD affects 450 airplanes of U.S. registry. We estimate the following costs to comply with this proposed AD: ESTIMATED COSTS Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product Cost on U.S. operators Incorporating Airworthiness Limitation ............ 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ................. $0 $85 $38,250 Authority for This Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority. We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. (2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. The Proposed Amendment Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows: PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES Regulatory Findings We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation: (1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: ■ Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. Amend § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD): ■ The Boeing Company: Docket No. FAA– 2014–0127; Directorate Identifier 2013– NM–237–AD. (a) Comments Due Date We must receive comments by April 21, 2014. (b) Affected ADs None. (c) Applicability This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 767–200, –300, –300F, and –400ER series airplanes, certificated in any category. (d) Subject Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 2823, Fuel Selector/Shut-off Valve. (e) Unsafe Condition This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure. (f) Compliance Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. (g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection Program Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add airworthiness limitation numbers 28–AWL–ENG, 28–AWL– MOV, and 28–AWL–APU, by incorporating the information specified in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD into the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. The initial compliance time for accomplishing the actions specified in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD is within 7 days after accomplishing the maintenance or inspection program revision required by this paragraph. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD: ENGINE SHUT-OFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION OPERATIONAL CHECK AWL Number 28–AWL– ENG. VerDate Mar<15>2010 Task Interval ALI .... DAILY ...... 16:16 Mar 04, 2014 Applicability Description 767–200, –300, and –300F airplanes. Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Engine Shut-Off Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication Operational Check. Concern: The MOV actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed MOV actuator that is not reported. A latently failed MOV actuator could prevent fuel shut off to an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable. Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\05MRP1.SGM 05MRP1 12422 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 43 / Wednesday, March 5, 2014 / Proposed Rules FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD: ENGINE SHUT-OFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS AWL Number Task Interval Applicability Description Perform one of the following operational checks of the Fuel Spar Valve position indication (unless checked by the flight crew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector): A. Operational Check during engine shutdown 1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing Airplane Maintenance Manual (AMM) 28–22–11). 2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). B. Operational check during engine start 1. Do an operational check the left engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the RUN (or RICH) position, verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the RUN (or RICH) position, verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). C. Operational check without engine operation 1. Make sure all fuel pump switches on the Overhead Panel are in the OFF position. 2. If the APU is running, open and collar the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP (C00372) circuit breaker on the Main Power Distribution Panel. 3. Make sure LEFT and RIGHT ENG FIRE switches on the Aft Aisle Stand are in the NORMAL (IN) position. 4. Make sure L and R ENG STAR Selector Switches on the Overhead Panel are in the OFF position. 5. For airplanes with PW4000 series engines without SCU, make sure the EEC MAINT ‘‘L ENG POWER’’ and ‘‘R ENG POWER’’ switches on the right side P61 maintenance panel is in the ‘‘NORM’’ position. 6. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the RUN position and wait 10 seconds. NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand to stay illuminated. b. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the CUTOFF position. c. Verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 7. Operational check the right engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the RUN position and wait 10 seconds. NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand to stay illuminated. b. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the CUTOFF position. c. Verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 8. If the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP circuit breaker was collared in step C.2., remove collar and close. VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:16 Mar 04, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\05MRP1.SGM 05MRP1 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 43 / Wednesday, March 5, 2014 / Proposed Rules 12423 FIGURE 2 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD: ENGINE SHUT-OFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) MOV ACTUATOR INSPECTION AWL Number Task Interval Applicability 28–AWL–MOV ALI .... 10 DAYS .. 767–400ER series airplanes. Description Engine Shut-Off Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) MOV Actuator Inspection Concern: The MOV actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed MOV actuator that is not reported. A latently failed MOV actuator would prevent fuel shutoff to an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable. Perform an inspection of the Fuel Spar Valve MOV Actuator position (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–00). NOTE: The Fuel Spar Valve MOV Actuator is located behind latch panel 551 DB (left engine) and latch panel 651 DB (right engine). 1. Make sure the Engine Control Switch is in the CUTOFF position. 2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar. a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. b. Repair or replace any MOV actuator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 3. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar. a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. b. Repair or replace any MOV actuator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). FIGURE 3 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD: APU FUEL VALVE POSITION INDICATION OPERATIONAL CHECK Task Interval Applicability Description 28-AWL-APU .. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS AWL Number ALI .... 10 DAYS .. ALL ........................ APU Fuel Valve Position Indication Operational Check Concern: The MOV actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed MOV actuator that is not reported. A latently failed MOV actuator could prevent fuel shut off to the APU. In the event of certain APU fires, the potential exists for an APU fire to be uncontrollable. Perform the operational check of the APU Fuel Valve position indication (unless checked by the flight crew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector) A. Do an operational check of the APU Fuel Valve position indication. 1. If the APU is running, unload and shut down the APU using standard practices. 2. Make sure the APU FIRE switch on the Aft Aisle Stand is in the NORMAL (IN) position. 3. Make sure there is at least 1,000 lbs (500 kgs) of fuel in the Left Main Tank. 4. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel to the ON position and wait 10 seconds. 5. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel to the OFF position. 6. Verify the APU FAULT light on the Overhead Panel illuminates and then goes off. 7. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight requiring APU availability, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–25–02). NOTE: Dispatch may be permitted per MMEL 28–25–02 if APU is not required for flight. (h) No Alternative Actions and Intervals After accomplishment of the maintenance or inspection program revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD. (i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) (1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:16 Mar 04, 2014 Jkt 232001 appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACOAMOCvRequests@faa.gov. (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/ certificate holding district office. Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 18, 2014. Ross Landes, Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2014–04893 Filed 3–4–14; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P (j) Related Information For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; phone: (425) 917–6509; fax: (425) 917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov. PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 9990 E:\FR\FM\05MRP1.SGM 05MRP1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 43 (Wednesday, March 5, 2014)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 12420-12423]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-04893]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2014-0127; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-237-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all
The Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. This proposed AD was prompted
by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during
fuel filter replacement. This proposed AD would require revising the
maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness
limitations. We are proposing this AD to detect and correct latent
failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in
the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain
engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by April 21, 2014.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 202-493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street
address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES
section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after
receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: (425) 917-
6509; fax: (425) 917-6590; email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed
under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2014-0127;
Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-237-AD'' at the beginning of your
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposed AD because of those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we
receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

We have received reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves
discovered during fuel filter replacement. Deficiencies in the valve
actuator design have resulted in latent failures of the fuel shutoff
valve to the engine. This condition, if not detected and corrected,
could result in latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the
engine, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the
engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire
that could lead to wing failure.

FAA's Determination

We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant
information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is
likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design.

Proposed AD Requirements

This proposed AD would require revising the maintenance or
inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. The
airworthiness limitations would allow an operator to perform the
operational check as either a maintenance action or a flightcrew
action. The flightcrew or maintenance crew would monitor the engine
spar valve lights for a few seconds immediately after moving the engine
fuel condition levers. Flightcrews can perform this operational check
while starting the engine or while shutting down the engine.
Maintenance crews can do this operational check as a separate action
that does not require actual starting of the engine.
This proposed AD would require revisions to certain operator
maintenance documents to include these new inspections. Compliance with
these inspections is required by section 91.403(c) of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)). For airplanes that have been
previously modified, altered, or repaired in the areas addressed by
these inspections, an operator might not be able to accomplish the
inspections described in the revisions. In this situation, to comply
with 14 CFR 91.403(c), the operator must request approval of an
alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (i) of this proposed AD. The request should
include a description of changes to the proposed inspections that will
ensure the continued operational safety of the airplane.

Interim Action

We consider this proposed AD interim action. The manufacturer is

[[Page 12421]]

currently developing a modification that will address the unsafe
condition identified in this proposed AD. Once this modification is
developed, approved, and available, we might consider additional
rulemaking.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this proposed AD affects 450 airplanes of U.S.
registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this proposed AD:

Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incorporating Airworthiness 1 work-hour x $85 per $0 $85 $38,250
Limitation. hour = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

0
2. Amend Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):

The Boeing Company: Docket No. FAA-2014-0127; Directorate Identifier
2013-NM-237-AD.

(a) Comments Due Date

We must receive comments by April 21, 2014.

(b) Affected ADs

None.

This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, -
300F, and -400ER series airplanes, certificated in any category.

(d) Subject

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 2823, Fuel Selector/
Shut-off Valve.

(e) Unsafe Condition

This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff
valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff
valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off
fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an
uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.

(f) Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.

(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection Program

Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the
maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add
airworthiness limitation numbers 28-AWL-ENG, 28-AWL-MOV, and 28-AWL-
APU, by incorporating the information specified in Figure 1, Figure
2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD into the Airworthiness
Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
The initial compliance time for accomplishing the actions specified
in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD is
within 7 days after accomplishing the maintenance or inspection
program revision required by this paragraph.

Figure 1 to Paragraph (g) of This AD: Engine Shut-Off Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication Operational
Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWL Number Task Interval Applicability Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-ENG........... ALI.......... DAILY............ 767-200, -300, and - Engine Shut-Off Valve (Fuel Spar
300F airplanes. Valve) Position Indication
Operational Check.
Concern: The MOV actuator design
can result in airplanes operating
with a failed MOV actuator that
is not reported. A latently
failed MOV actuator could prevent
fuel shut off to an engine. In
the event of certain engine
fires, the potential exists for
an engine fire to be
uncontrollable.

[[Page 12422]]

Perform one of the following
operational checks of the Fuel
Spar Valve position indication
(unless checked by the flight
crew in a manner approved by the
principal operations inspector):
A. Operational Check during engine
shutdown
1. Do an operational check of the
left engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on
the quadrant control stand is
moved to the CUTOFF position,
verify the left SPAR VALVE
disagreement light on the
quadrant control stand
illuminates and then goes off.
b. If the test fails (light fails
to illuminate), before further
flight, repair faults as required
(refer to Boeing Airplane
Maintenance Manual (AMM) 28-22-
11).
2. Do an operational check of the
right engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on
the quadrant control stand is
moved to the CUTOFF position,
verify the right SPAR VALVE
disagreement light on the
quadrant control stand
illuminates and then goes off.
b. If the test fails (light fails
to illuminate), before further
flight, repair faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-22-11).
B. Operational check during engine
start
1. Do an operational check the
left engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on
the quadrant control stand is
moved to the RUN (or RICH)
position, verify the left SPAR
VALVE disagreement light on the
quadrant control stand
illuminates and then goes off.
b. If the test fails (light fails
to illuminate), before further
flight, repair faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-22-11).
2. Do an operational check of the
right engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on
the quadrant control stand is
moved to the RUN (or RICH)
position, verify the right SPAR
VALVE disagreement light on the
quadrant control stand
illuminates and then goes off.
b. If the test fails (light fails
to illuminate), before further
flight, repair faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-22-11).
C. Operational check without
engine operation
1. Make sure all fuel pump
switches on the Overhead Panel
are in the OFF position.
2. If the APU is running, open and
collar the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP
(C00372) circuit breaker on the
Main Power Distribution Panel.
3. Make sure LEFT and RIGHT ENG
FIRE switches on the Aft Aisle
Stand are in the NORMAL (IN)
position.
4. Make sure L and R ENG STAR
Selector Switches on the Overhead
Panel are in the OFF position.
5. For airplanes with PW4000
series engines without SCU, make
sure the EEC MAINT ``L ENG
POWER'' and ``R ENG POWER''
switches on the right side P61
maintenance panel is in the
``NORM'' position.
6. Do an operational check of the
left engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on
the quadrant control stand to the
RUN position and wait 10 seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under this test
condition for the ENG VALVE
disagreement light on the
quadrant control stand to stay
illuminated.
b. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on
the quadrant control stand to the
CUTOFF position.
c. Verify the left SPAR VALVE
disagreement light on the
quadrant control stand
illuminates and then goes off.
d. If the test fails (light fails
to illuminate), before further
flight, repair faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-22-11).
7. Operational check the right
engine fuel spar valve actuator.
a. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on
the quadrant control stand to the
RUN position and wait 10 seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under this test
condition for the ENG VALVE
disagreement light on the
quadrant control stand to stay
illuminated.
b. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on
the quadrant control stand to the
CUTOFF position.
c. Verify the right SPAR VALVE
disagreement light on the
quadrant control stand
illuminates and then goes off.
d. If the test fails (light fails
to illuminate), before further
flight, repair faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-22-11).
8. If the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP
circuit breaker was collared in
step C.2., remove collar and
close.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12423]]

Figure 2 to Paragraph (g) of This AD: Engine Shut-Off Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) MOV Actuator Inspection
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWL Number Task Interval Applicability Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-MOV....... ALI...... 10 DAYS...... 767-400ER Engine Shut-Off Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) MOV
series Actuator Inspection
airplanes.
Concern: The MOV actuator design can result in
airplanes operating with a failed MOV actuator
that is not reported. A latently failed MOV
actuator would prevent fuel shutoff to an engine.
In the event of certain engine fires, the
potential exists for an engine fire to be
uncontrollable.
Perform an inspection of the Fuel Spar Valve MOV
Actuator position (refer to Boeing AMM 28-22-00).
NOTE: The Fuel Spar Valve MOV Actuator is located
behind latch panel 551 DB (left engine) and latch
panel 651 DB (right engine).
1. Make sure the Engine Control Switch is in the
CUTOFF position.
2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the left rear spar.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine
fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED
position.
b. Repair or replace any MOV actuator that is not
in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 28-22-
11).
3. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the right rear spar.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine
fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED
position.
b. Repair or replace any MOV actuator that is not
in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 28-22-
11).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Figure 3 to Paragraph (g) of This AD: APU Fuel Valve Position Indication Operational Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWL Number Task Interval Applicability Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28[dash]AWL[dash] ALI...... 10 DAYS...... ALL............ APU Fuel Valve Position Indication Operational
APU. Check
Concern: The MOV actuator design can result in
airplanes operating with a failed MOV actuator
that is not reported. A latently failed MOV
actuator could prevent fuel shut off to the APU.
In the event of certain APU fires, the potential
exists for an APU fire to be uncontrollable.
Perform the operational check of the APU Fuel
Valve position indication (unless checked by the
flight crew in a manner approved by the principal
operations inspector)
A. Do an operational check of the APU Fuel Valve
position indication.
1. If the APU is running, unload and shut down the
APU using standard practices.
2. Make sure the APU FIRE switch on the Aft Aisle
Stand is in the NORMAL (IN) position.
3. Make sure there is at least 1,000 lbs (500 kgs)
of fuel in the Left Main Tank.
4. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel
to the ON position and wait 10 seconds.
5. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel
to the OFF position.
6. Verify the APU FAULT light on the Overhead
Panel illuminates and then goes off.
7. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate),
before further flight requiring APU availability,
repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
25-02).
NOTE: Dispatch may be permitted per MMEL 28-25-02
if APU is not required for flight.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(h) No Alternative Actions and Intervals

After accomplishment of the maintenance or inspection program
revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the
actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO)
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCvRequests@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.

(j) Related Information

For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols,
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA
98057-3356; phone: (425) 917-6509; fax: (425) 917-6590; email:
rebel.nichols@faa.gov.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 18, 2014.
Ross Landes,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2014-04893 Filed 3-4-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.