Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Personnel Surety Program, 6417-6452 [2014-02082]

Download as PDF Vol. 79 Monday, No. 22 February 3, 2014 Part IV Department of Homeland Security tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Personnel Surety Program; Notice VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:54 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 4717 Sfmt 4717 E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6418 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY [Docket No. DHS–2012–0061] Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Personnel Surety Program National Protection and Programs Directorate, DHS. ACTION: 30-Day notice and request for comments; New Information Collection Request: 1670–NEW. AGENCY: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) will submit the following Information Collection Request (ICR) to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and clearance in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–13, 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35). The Department previously published a notice about the CFATS Personnel Surety Program Information Collection Request in the Federal Register on March 22, 2013, for a 60-day public comment period.1 On May 21, 2013, the Department extended the comment period an additional 14 days.2 In this notice, NPPD is (1) responding to 28 comments submitted in response to the 60-day notice previously published about this ICR, and (2) soliciting public comments concerning this ICR for an additional 30 days. This notice also describes the nature of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program Information Collection Request, the categories of respondents, the estimated burden (in hours), and the estimated burden cost necessary to implement the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Personnel Surety Program pursuant to 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv). DATES: Comments are encouraged and will be accepted until March 5, 2014. This process is conducted in accordance with 5 CFR 1320.8. ADDRESSES: Interested persons are invited to submit written comments on the proposed information collection to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB. Comments should be addressed to OMB Desk Officer, Department of Homeland Security, National Protection and Programs tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 SUMMARY: 1 See 78 FR 17680 (March 22, 2013). The 60-day Federal Register notice for Information Collection 1670–NEW, which solicited comments for 60 days, may be found at https://federalregister.gov/a/201306184. 2 See 78 FR 29759 (May 21, 2013). The Federal Register notice that extended the comment period an additional 14 days may be viewed at https:// federalregister.gov/a/2013-12059. VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 Directorate. Comments must be identified by the docket number DHS– 2012–0061 and may be submitted by one of the following methods: • Federal eRulemaking Portal: https:// www.regulations.gov. • Email: oira_submission@ omb.eop.gov. Include the docket number in the subject line of the message. • Fax: (202) 395–5806. Instructions: All submissions received must include the words ‘‘Department of Homeland Security’’ and the docket number for this action. Comments received will be posted without alteration at https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information provided. Comments that include trade secrets, confidential commercial or financial information, Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI),3 Sensitive Security Information (SSI),4 or Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) 5 should not be submitted to the public regulatory docket. Please submit such comments separately from other comments in response to this notice. Comments containing trade secrets, confidential commercial or financial information, CVI, SSI, or PCII should be appropriately marked and submitted by mail to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB. Comments should be addressed to OMB Desk Officer, care of the DHS/NPPD/IP/ISCD CFATS Program Manager at the Department of Homeland Security, 245 Murray Lane SW., Mail Stop 0610, Arlington, VA 20528–0610. Comments must be identified by docket number DHS–2012–0061. OMB is particularly interested in comments that: 1. Evaluate whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility; 2. Evaluate the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used; 3 For more information about CVI see 6 CFR 27.400 and the CVI Procedural Manual at https:// www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_cvi_ proceduresmanual.pdf. 4 For more information about SSI see 49 CFR part 1520 and the SSI Program Web page at https:// www.tsa.gov/ssi. 5 For more information about PCII see 6 CFR part 29 and the PCII Program Web page at https:// www.dhs.gov/protected-critical-infrastructureinformation-pcii-program. PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 3. Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and 4. Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic submissions of responses. Table of Contents I. Supplementary Information • Summary of Options Available to HighRisk Chemical Facilities To Comply With RBPS 12(iv) • Scope of This Notice and Commitment To Explore Additional Options in the Future • Who is Impacted by the CFATS Personnel Surety Program? • What/Who is the Source of the Information Under Option 1 and Option 2 • CSAT User Roles and Responsibilities • Burden Resulting From the Submission of Duplicate Records About an Affected Individual • Compliance With RBPS 12(iv) and the Potential for Increased Burden to Enter the Restricted Areas or Critical Assets at a High-Risk Chemical Facility • Additional Data Privacy Considerations II. Information Collected About Affected Individuals • Option 1: Collecting Information To Conduct Direct Vetting • Option 2: Collecting Information To Use Vetting Conducted Under Other DHS Programs • Option 3: Electronic Verification of TWIC • Other Information Collected III. Request For Exception To the Requirement Under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) IV. Responses to Comments Submitted During 60-Day Comment Period V. The Department’s Methodology in Estimating the Burden • Summary of Changes From 60-Day Notice • Frequency • Affected Public • Number of Respondents Æ Number and Type of High-Risk Chemical Facilities Æ Estimated Number of Affected Individuals at Each Type of High-Risk Chemical Facility—Unescorted Visitors With Access to Restricted Areas or Critical Assets Æ Estimated Number of Affected Individuals at Each Type of High-Risk Chemical Facility—Facility Personnel With Access To Restricted Areas or Critical Assets Æ Summary of Alternatives to Estimate the Number of Respondents Æ Limitation of Respondents To Tier 1 and Tier 2 Facilities • Total Annual Burden Hours E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices • Estimated Time per Respondent • Total Burden Cost (Capital/Startup) Æ Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3— Number and Type of High-Risk Chemical Facilities That May Choose to Use Option 3 Æ Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3— TWIC Reader Costs Æ Consideration of Other Capital Costs • Recordkeeping Costs • Total Burden Cost (Operating/ Maintaining) VI. Solicitation of Comments VII. Analysis I. Supplementary Information Section 550 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, Public Law 109–295 (2006) (‘‘Section 550’’), provides the Department with the authority to identify and regulate the security of high-risk chemical facilities using a riskbased approach. On April 9, 2007, the Department issued the CFATS Interim Final Rule (IFR) implementing this statutory mandate. See 72 FR 17688 (April 9, 2007). Section 550 requires that the Department establish risk-based performance standards (RBPS) for highrisk chemical facilities and under CFATS the Department promulgated 18 RBPS. Each chemical facility that has been finally determined by the Department to be high-risk must submit a Site Security Plan (SSP), or an Alternative Security Program (ASP) if the facility so chooses, for Department approval that satisfies each applicable RBPS. RBPS 12—Personnel Surety— requires high-risk chemical facilities to: tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Perform appropriate background checks on and ensure appropriate credentials for facility personnel, and as appropriate, for unescorted visitors with access to restricted areas or critical assets, including, (i) Measures designed to verify and validate identity; (ii) Measures designed to check criminal history; (iii) Measures designed to verify and validate legal authorization to work; and (iv) Measures designed to identify people with terrorist ties[.] See 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12). As explained by the Department in the preamble to the CFATS IFR, the ability to identify affected individuals (i.e., facility personnel or unescorted visitors with access to restricted areas or critical assets at high-risk chemical facilities) who have terrorist ties is an inherently governmental function and necessarily requires the use of information held in governmentmaintained databases that are unavailable to high-risk chemical facilities. See 72 FR 17709 (April 9, 2007). Thus, under RBPS 12(iv), the Department and high-risk chemical VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 facilities must work together to satisfy the ‘‘terrorist ties’’ aspect of the Personnel Surety performance standard. As a result, the CFATS Personnel Surety Program will identify individuals with terrorist ties that have or are seeking access to the restricted areas and/or critical assets at the nation’s high-risk chemical facilities. Accordingly, in the preamble to the CFATS IFR, the Department outlined two potential approaches to help high-risk chemical facilities satisfy that particular standard, both of which would involve high-risk chemical facilities submitting certain information to the Department. See id. The first approach would involve facilities submitting certain information about affected individuals to the Department, which the Department would use to vet those individuals for terrorist ties. Specifically, identifying information about affected individuals would be compared against identifying information of known or suspected terrorists contained in the federal government’s consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist, the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), which is maintained on behalf of the federal government by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).6 In order to avoid unnecessary duplication of terrorist screening, the Department also described an additional approach under which high-risk chemical facilities would submit information about affected individuals possessing certain credentials that rely on security threat assessments conducted by the Department. See 72 FR 17709 (April 9, 2007). The Department has developed a CFATS Personnel Surety Program that will provide high-risk chemical facilities additional options to comply with RBPS 12(iv) while continuing to make available the two alternatives outlined in the preamble to the CFATS IFR. In addition to the alternatives expressly described in this document, the Department also intends to permit high-risk chemical facilities to propose other alternative measures for terrorist ties identification in their SSPs or ASPs, which the Department will consider on a case-by-case basis in evaluating highrisk chemical facilities’ SSPs or ASPs. As a result of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, regardless of the option selected by the high-risk chemical facility, the Department will identify individuals with terrorist ties that have 6 For more information about the TSDB, see DOJ/ FBI—019 Terrorist Screening Records System, 72 FR 47073 (August 22, 2007). PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 6419 or are seeking access to the restricted areas and/or critical assets at the nation’s high-risk chemical facilities. The first option is consistent with the primary approach described in the CFATS IFR preamble, as discussed above. Under Option 1—Direct Vetting, high-risk chemical facilities (or others acting on their behalf) would submit certain information about affected individuals to the Department through a Personnel Surety application in an online technology system developed under CFATS called the Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT). Access to and the use of CSAT is provided free of charge to high-risk chemical facilities (or others acting on their behalf). Under this option, information about affected individuals submitted by, or on behalf of, high-risk chemical facilities would be vetted against information contained in the federal government’s consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist. The second option is also consistent with the second approach described in the CFATS IFR preamble. Under Option 2—Use Of Vetting Conducted Under Other DHS Programs, high-risk chemical facilities (or others acting on their behalf) would also submit certain information about affected individuals to the Department through the CSAT Personnel Surety application. Option 2 would, however, allow highrisk chemical facilities and the Department to take advantage of the vetting for terrorist ties already being conducted on affected individuals enrolled in the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Program, Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME) Program, as well as the NEXUS, Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), Free and Secure Trade (FAST), and Global Entry Trusted Traveler Programs.7 All of these programs conduct terrorist ties vetting equivalent to the terrorist ties vetting that would be conducted under Option 1.8 Under Option 2, high-risk chemical 7 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has introduced SENTRI and Global Entry as Trusted Traveler Programs since the publication of CFATS in April 2007. The Department, therefore, intends to enable high-risk chemical facilities (or their designees) to submit information about affected individuals’ SENTRI and Global Entry enrollments to DHS under Option 2, even though SENTRI and Global Entry were not listed along with the other Trusted Traveler Programs in the CFATS IFR preamble. See 72 FR 17709 (April 9, 2007). 8 Each of the DHS programs referenced conducts recurrent vetting, which is equivalent to the terrorist ties vetting conducted under Option 1. Recurrent vetting compares an affected individual’s information against new and/or updated TSDB E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM Continued 03FEN3 6420 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 facilities, or their designees (e.g., third parties), could submit information to the Department about affected individuals possessing the appropriate credentials to enable the Department to electronically verify the affected individuals’ enrollments in these other programs. The Department would subsequently notify the Submitter of the high-risk chemical facility whether or not an affected individual’s enrollment in one of these other DHS programs was electronically verified. The Department would also periodically re-verify each affected individual’s continued enrollment in one of these other programs, and notify the appropriate designee of the high-risk chemical facility of significant changes in the status of an affected individual’s enrollment (e.g., if an affected individual who has been enrolled in the HME Program ceases to be enrolled, the Department would change the status of the affected individual in the CSAT Personnel Surety application and notify the Submitter).9 Electronic verification and re-verification would enable the Department and the high-risk chemical facility to ensure that an affected individual’s credential or endorsement is appropriate to rely on (i.e., an indicator that the affected individual is being recurrently vetted for terrorist ties) in compliance with RBPS 12(iv). In addition to Option 1 and Option 2, the Department has considered other potential options to help high-risk chemical facilities satisfy RBPS 12(iv). In particular, the Department has investigated the feasibility of options that would not involve the submission of information about an affected individual if the affected individual participated in one of the programs identified under Option 2. The Department believes that, for the purpose of compliance with RBPS 12(iv), simply relying on a visual inspection of a credential or endorsement is inadequate because the credential or endorsement could be expired, revoked, or fraudulent. However, the Department has concluded that information about an affected individual, enrolled in a DHS program that conducts vetting for terrorist ties equivalent to the vetting that would be conducted under Option 1, would not need to be submitted to the records as those new and/or updated records become available. Recurrent vetting is a Department best practice. 9 When the Department notifies the appropriate designee of the high-risk chemical facility of significant changes in the status of an affected individual’s enrollment, such a notification should not be construed to indicate that an individual has terrorist ties or be treated as derogatory information. VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 Department if the credential in the possession of the affected individual is electronically verified and validated. Accordingly, the Department plans to offer high-risk chemical facilities a third option. Under Option 3—Electronic Verification of TWIC, a high-risk chemical facility (or others acting on their behalf) would not submit information about affected individuals in possession of TWICs to the Department if the high-risk chemical facility (or others acting on their behalf) electronically verify and validate the affected individuals’ TWICs 10 through the use of TWIC readers (or other technology that is periodically updated using the with revoked card information).11 Any high-risk chemical facilities that choose this option would need to describe in their SSPs or ASPs the procedures they will follow if they choose to use TWIC readers for compliance with RBPS 12(iv).12 High-risk chemical facilities would have discretion as to which option(s) to use for an affected individual. For example, even though a high-risk chemical facility could comply with RBPS 12(iv) for certain affected individuals by using Option 2, the highrisk chemical facility could choose to use Option 1 for those affected individuals. Similarly, a high-risk chemical facility, at its discretion, may choose to use either Option 1 or Option 2 rather than Option 3 for affected individuals who have TWICs. High-risk chemical facilities also may choose to combine Option 1 with Option 2 and/ or Option 3, as appropriate, to ensure that adequate terrorist ties checks are performed on different types of affected individuals (e.g., employees, 10 Verification and validation of an affected individual’s TWIC requires authentication that the affected individual’s TWIC is (1) a valid credential issued by TSA, and (2) contains the Card Holder Unique Identifier and correct digital signature. 11 The Department currently offers two ways to determine if a TWIC has been revoked (or reported lost or stolen). One is the Canceled Card List (CCL), the other is the Certificate Revocation List (CRL). More information about the Canceled Card List may be found at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/ publications/pdf/twic/canceled_card_list_ccl_ faq.pdf. More information about the CRL may be in the TWIC NPRM published on March 29, 2009 at 74 FR 13364 which may be accessed at https:// www.federalregister.gov/articles/2009/03/27/E96852/transportation-worker-identificationcredential-twic-reader-requirements#p-122. 12 On March 22, 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled ‘‘TWIC Reader Requirements.’’ The procedures for using TWIC readers that are discussed in that NPRM would not apply to highrisk chemical facilities regulated under CFATS. Likewise, the ways in which high-risk chemical facilities could leverage TWICs as part of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program do not apply to maritime facilities or vessels regulated by the U.S. Coast Guard. PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 contractors, unescorted visitors). Each high-risk chemical facility will need to describe how it will comply with RBPS 12(iv) in its SSP or ASP. In addition to the options described above for satisfying RBPS 12(iv), highrisk chemical facilities are welcome to propose alternative or supplemental options not described in this PRA notice in their SSPs or ASPs. The Department will assess the adequacy of such alternative or supplemental options on a facility-by-facility basis, in the course of evaluating each facility’s SSP or ASP. Although outside the scope of this PRA notice and the underlying ICR, the Department would like to highlight that high-risk chemical facilities also have other methods to address, or minimize the impacts of, compliance with RBPS 12(iv). For example, facilities may restrict the numbers and types of persons whom they allow to access their restricted areas and critical assets, thus limiting the number of persons who will need to be checked for terrorist ties. Facilities also have wide latitude in how they define their restricted areas and critical assets in their SSPs or ASPs, thus potentially limiting the number of persons who will need to be checked for terrorist ties. High-risk chemical facilities also may choose to escort visitors to restricted areas and critical assets in lieu of performing the background checks required by RBPS 12. For example, high-risk chemical facilities could propose in their SSPs or ASPs traditional escorting solutions and/or innovative escorting alternatives such as video monitoring (which may reduce facility security costs), as appropriate, to address the unique security risks present at each facility. Summary of Options Available to HighRisk Chemical Facilities To Comply With RBPS 12(iv) The purpose of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program is to identify individuals with terrorist ties that have or are seeking access to the restricted areas and/or critical assets at the nation’s high-risk chemical facilities. As described above, under the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, for each affected individual a high-risk chemical facility would have at least three options under RBPS 12(iv): • OPTION 1—DIRECT VETTING: High-risk chemical facilities (or their designees) may submit information to the Department about an affected individual to be compared against information about known or suspected terrorists, and/or • OPTION 2 –USE OF VETTING CONDUCTED UNDER OTHER DHS PROGRAMS: High-risk chemical E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices facilities (or their designees) may submit information to the Department about an affected individual’s enrollment in another DHS program so that the Department may electronically verify and validate that the affected individual is enrolled in the other program, and/or • OPTION 3—ELECTRONIC VERIFICATION OF TWIC: High-risk chemical facilities may electronically verify and validate an affected individual’s TWIC, through the use of TWIC readers (or other technology which is periodically updated with revoked card information), rather than submitting information about the affected individual to the Department. Regardless of the option, in the event that there is a potential match, the Department has procedures in place that it will follow to resolve the match and coordinate with appropriate law enforcement entities as necessary. The Department intends to provide high-risk chemical facilities, and their designees, the ability to create an alert within the CSAT Personnel Surety application that can notify them when the Department has received information about an affected individual(s), under Option 1 or Option 2. Further, the Department will also allow high-risk chemical facilities the ability to view the status (e.g., that some information about an affected individual has been inputted into CSAT but not yet submitted to the Department under Option 1 or Option 2; that information about an affected individual has been submitted; etc.) of records about affected individuals associated with their facility within the CSAT Personnel Surety application. tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Scope of This Notice and Commitment To Explore Additional Options in the Future Between August 2012, and publication of the 60-day notice in March 2013, the Department had substantial dialogue with key CFATS stakeholders. The discussion included program design issues, the CSAT Personnel Surety application, options the Department has been considering to date, and additional options stakeholders have recommended for the Department’s consideration, both in the short and long term. The options described in this notice and, if approved, the ICR that the Department will submit to OMB would allow high-risk chemical facilities and the Department to implement the CFATS Personnel Surety Program within the Department’s existing statutory and regulatory authority, and U.S. Government watchlisting policies. VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 The Department is committed, however, to continuing to work with interested stakeholders to identify additional potential options that could further reduce the burdens related to the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, while still meeting the national security mandate to reduce the risk of an individual with terrorist ties obtaining access to the restricted areas or critical assets at a high-risk chemical facility. The Department will consider and review any alternatives suggested as part of public comments on this notice. Through both the PRA process and other ongoing dialogues, the Department will, as appropriate, also continue to work with stakeholders to identify potential additional alternatives as new technologies emerge, and as other terrorist ties vetting programs are modified or become available over time, so as to reduce the burden of this new information collection. Who is Impacted by the CFATS Personnel Surety Program? The CFATS Personnel Surety Program will provide high-risk chemical facilities the ability to submit certain biographic information about affected individuals to the Department. As explained above, affected individuals are (1) facility personnel who have access, either unescorted or otherwise, to restricted areas or critical assets, and (2) unescorted visitors who have access to restricted areas or critical assets. There are also certain groups of persons that the Department does not consider to be affected individuals, such as (1) Federal officials that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets as part of their official duties; (2) state and local law enforcement officials that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets as part of their official duties; and (3) emergency responders at the state or local level that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets during emergency situations. In some emergency or exigent situations, access to restricted areas or critical assets by other individuals who have not had appropriate background checks under RBPS 12 may be necessary. For example, emergency responders not described above may require such access as part of their official duties under appropriate circumstances. If high-risk chemical facilities anticipate that any individuals will require access to restricted areas or critical assets without visitor escorts or without the background checks listed in RBPS 12 under exceptional circumstances (e.g., foreseeable but PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 6421 unpredictable circumstances), facilities may describe such situations and the types of individuals who might require access in those situations in their SSPs or ASPs. The Department will assess the appropriateness of such situations, and any security measures to mitigate the inherent vulnerability in such situations, on a case-by-case basis as it reviews each high-risk chemical facility’s SSP or ASP. What/Who is the Source of the Information Under Option 1 And Option 2 High-risk chemical facilities are responsible for complying with RBPS 12(iv). However, companies operating multiple high-risk chemical facilities, as well as companies operating only one high-risk chemical facility, may comply with RBPS 12(iv) in a variety of ways. High-risk chemical facilities, or their parent companies, may choose to comply with RBPS 12(iv) by identifying and submitting the information about affected individuals to the Department directly. Alternatively, high-risk chemical facilities, or their parent companies, may choose to comply with RBPS 12(iv) by outsourcing the information submission process to third parties. The Department anticipates that many high-risk chemical facilities will rely on businesses that provide contract services (e.g., complex turn-arounds, freight delivery services, lawn mowing) to the high-risk chemical facilities to identify and submit the appropriate information about affected individuals they employ to the Department for vetting pursuant to RBPS 12(iv). Businesses that provide services to highrisk chemical facilities may in turn choose to manage compliance with RBPS 12(iv) themselves or to acquire the services of other third party companies to submit appropriate information about affected individuals to the Department. CSAT User Roles and Responsibilities To minimize the burden of submitting information about affected individuals, under Options 1 and 2 (as described above), high-risk chemical facilities would have wide latitude in assigning CSAT user roles to align with their business operations and/or the business operations of third parties that provide contracted services to them.13 Furthermore, the Department intends to structure the CSAT Personnel Surety application to allow designees of high13 CSAT user registration and the assignment of user roles within CSAT are covered under a different Information Collection (i.e., 1670–0007), which can be found at https://www.reginfo.gov/ public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201001-1670-007#. E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6422 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices risk chemical facilities to submit information about affected individuals directly to the Department on behalf of high-risk chemical facilities. High-risk chemical facilities and their designees will be able to structure their CSAT user roles to submit information about affected individuals to the Department in several ways: (1) A high-risk chemical facility could directly submit information about affected individuals, and designate one or more officers or employees of the facility with appropriate CSAT user roles; and/or (2) A high-risk chemical facility could ensure the submission of information about affected individuals by designating one or more persons affiliated with a third party (or with multiple third parties); and/or (3) A company owning several highrisk chemical facilities could consolidate its submission process for affected individuals. Specifically, the company could designate one or more persons to submit information about affected individuals on behalf of all of the high-risk chemical facilities on a company-wide basis. The Department may, upon request, also consider allowing CSAT users with the ability to submit information about affected individuals to the Department via a Web-service. The ability to submit information about affected individuals via a Web-service will be provided on a case by cases basis, when in the opinion of the Department, sufficient additional security and privacy safeguards have been agreed to by the CSAT user.14 tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Burden Resulting From the Submission of Duplicate Records About an Affected Individual The Department is aware that an affected individual may be associated with multiple high-risk chemical facilities, and thus information about an affected individual may be submitted to the Department multiple times by different high-risk chemical facilities and/or their designated third parties. However, the Department has learned in its dialogue with stakeholders (including third-party companies that conduct background checks for highrisk chemical facilities) that the duplicate submission of records about affected individuals is a common industry practice for companies when managing information about individuals. Specifically, when a person who has already had a background 14 A Web-service is software system designed to support interoperable machine-to-machine interaction over a network. VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 check (e.g., verification of legal authorization to work or criminal history) needs a new background check for different companies or for a new or different purpose (e.g., change in jobs or contract), third parties that routinely conduct background checks routinely will submit information about a person again to agencies responsible for maintaining relevant information (e.g., state government agencies responsible for maintaining state motor vehicle databases). Therefore, for the purpose of this notice, the Department’s estimation of burden accounts for potential multiple submissions of information about affected individuals by high-risk chemical facilities and their designated third parties. Compliance With RBPS 12(iv) and the Potential for Increased Burden To Enter the Restricted Areas or Critical Assets at a High-Risk Chemical Facility Since the Department first began seeking to implement the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, stakeholders have expressed concern that the submission of information about affected individuals under Option 1 and Option 2 to the Department would impede the ability of affected individuals to enter the restricted areas or critical assets at high-risk chemical facilities. The Department does not believe that if a facility complies with RBPS 12(iv) the high-risk chemical facility will, on a routine basis, experience an unreasonable impact in allowing affected individuals access to restricted areas or critical assets. In general, the Department expects that high-risk chemical facilities or their designees (e.g., third parties or companies employing affected individuals that provide services to high-risk chemical facilities) will already possess much, if not all, of the necessary information about affected individuals as a result of standard business practices related to employment or managing of service contracts. In the event that high-risk chemical facilities, or their designees, need to collect any additional information for the purpose of complying with RBPS 12(iv), they have significant flexibility in how to collect this information since CFATS does not prescribe how to do so. The Department also expects that high-risk chemical facilities will likely consolidate RBPS 12(iv) processing with related routine hiring and access control procedures involving background checks that are already occurring prior to access by facility personnel or unescorted visitors to restricted areas or critical assets. Consolidating RBPS PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 12(iv) processing with these other routine procedures would allow submission of personal information already collected and maintained by facilities or their designees (e.g., a third party, contracted service company, or third party acting on behalf of a contracted service company) to the Department under RBPS 12(iv) before affected individuals require access to restricted areas or critical assets. As mentioned above, third parties could submit screening information to the Department on behalf of high-risk chemical facilities as part of facilities’ routine hiring and access control procedures. Some stakeholders have expressed concerns to the Department about submission of screening information by third parties, suggesting that in such cases facilities would not be able to adequately oversee third parties’ work to ensure appropriate information submission to the Department. The Department expects, however, that highrisk chemical facilities could audit and/ or review their third party designees’ information collection and submission processes, to ensure that their designees submit appropriate information. The Department has provided below several illustrative examples about how high-risk chemical facilitates or designees are likely to consolidate RBPS 12(iv) processing with routine background check activities related to those required by RBPS 12(i)–(iii), namely, (i) measures designed to verify and validate identity; (ii) measures designed to check criminal history; and (iii) measures designed to verify and validate legal authorization to work. By consolidating RBPS 12(iv) with routine background check activities related to RBPS 12(i)-(iii), high-risk chemical facilities will likely choose to incorporate the submission of information about affected individuals to the Department under RBPS 12(iv) into the routine background check activities required by RBPS 12(i)–(iii). Although estimating the burden of RBPS 12(i)–(iii) is not within the scope of this Paperwork Reduction Act notice, when and how high-risk chemical facilities could collect information for submission to the Department has influenced the Department’s design of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. The Department believes that the illustrative examples provided below show how, if the CFATS Personnel Surety Program is implemented, a highrisk chemical facility and its associated third party companies could access the CSAT Personnel Surety application for purposes of submitting terrorist ties screening information to the Department on its behalf under RBPS 12(iv), in E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 coordination with other normal business activities not required by RBPS 12(iv). SCENARIO #1: Employees Who Are ‘‘Facility Personnel’’ This scenario could apply to a highrisk chemical facility that has a number of employees it deems in its SSP or ASP to be ‘‘facility personnel’’ with access to restricted areas and/or critical assets. In its SSP or ASP, the high-risk chemical facility could choose to comply with RBPS 12(i)–(iii) for these employees by either: • Hiring a third party background check company to perform identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks on these employees. Æ A contract or agreement between the high-risk chemical facility and the third party could establish the criteria for these background checks, and could establish which background check results qualify individuals to access the restricted areas or critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility or disqualify individuals from accessing the restricted areas or critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility. Æ The third party could submit appropriate information, under Option 1 and/or Option 2, to the Department while it conducts these identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks. Æ The high-risk chemical facility could audit or review the background checks being conducted to ensure contractual compliance. Or, • Performing identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks itself. Æ The high-risk chemical facility could establish the criteria for these background checks, and could establish which background check results qualify individuals to access the restricted areas or critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility or disqualify individuals from accessing the restricted areas or critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility. Æ The facility could submit appropriate information, under Option 1 and/or Option 2, to the Department while it conducts these identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks. Prior to an employee being granted access to restricted areas or critical assets (i.e., prior to being issued a facility-specific access credential/card, or door/gate key(s)), identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks could be completed by the third party or the high-risk VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 chemical facility in accordance with the high-risk chemical facility’s SSP or ASP. If appropriate, based upon the results of those background checks, the employee could then be determined suitable to access the high-risk chemical facility’s restricted areas and/or critical assets. The third party or the high-risk chemical facility could then report its suitability finding to the appropriate party at the high-risk chemical facility so that facility-specific access credentials/cards, or door/gate key(s) could be granted, if appropriate. Completion of submission of information about the affected individual to the Department in compliance with RBPS 12(iv) therefore would not impede the routine access control procedures of the high-risk chemical facility because the information submission would likely be accomplished in concert with the other background check activities, prior to access. SCENARIO #2: Resident Contractors Who Are ‘‘Facility Personnel’’ This scenario could apply to a highrisk chemical facility that has a number of resident contractors it deems in its SSP or ASP to be ‘‘facility personnel’’ with access to restricted areas or critical assets. In its SSP or ASP, the high-risk chemical facility could choose to comply with RBPS 12(i)–(iii) for resident contractors by: • Stipulating in a contract between the high-risk chemical facility and the company employing the resident contractors that the contractors’ employer will perform or provide for identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks to be conducted on the resident contractors. Æ A contract or agreement between the high-risk chemical facility and the company employing the resident contractors could establish the criteria for these background checks, and could establish which background check results qualify individuals to access the restricted areas or critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility or disqualify individuals from accessing the restricted areas or critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility. Æ The high-risk chemical facility could audit or review the background checks being conducted to ensure contractual compliance. • Prior to a resident contractor being granted access to the restricted areas or critical assets of the high-risk chemical facility (i.e., being issued a facilityspecific access credential/card, door/ gate key(s)), identity, criminal history, PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 6423 and legal authorization to work background checks could be completed by the company employing the resident contractor in accordance with the highrisk chemical facility’s SSP or ASP. Æ The company employing the resident contractor could conduct these identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks. Æ The company employing the resident contractor could submit appropriate information, under Option 1 and/or Option 2, to the Department while it conducts these identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks. • The company employing the resident contractor, however, might not perform the actual background checks itself. Rather, the company employing the resident contractor could hire a third party background check company to perform identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks on its employees (including the resident contractors at the high-risk chemical facility). Æ If the company employing the resident contractor hires a third party background check company for this purpose, a contract or agreement between the company employing the resident contractor and the third party background check company could establish the criteria for these background checks and could establish which background check results are acceptable for access to the restricted areas and critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility for which the resident contractor performs services. Æ The third party background check company could submit appropriate information, under Option 1 and/or Option 2, to the Department while it conducts these identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks. Prior to the resident contractor being granted access to restricted areas or critical assets of the high-risk chemical facility (i.e., being issued a facilityspecific access credential/card, or door/ gate key(s)), identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks could be completed by the company employing the resident contractor, or by a third party background check company in accordance with the high-risk chemical facility’s SSP or ASP. If appropriate, based on the results of those background checks, the resident contractor could then be determined suitable to access the high-risk chemical facility’s restricted areas and/or critical assets. The company employing the resident contractor, or a third party background E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6424 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices check company, could then report suitability findings to the high-risk chemical facility. The appropriate party at the high-risk chemical facility could then grant the resident contractor facility-specific access credentials/ cards, or door/gate key(s), if appropriate based on those suitability findings. The submission of information about the affected individual to the Department in compliance with RBPS 12(iv) therefore would not impede the routine access control procedures of the high-risk chemical facility because the submission of information would likely be accomplished in concert with the other background check activities, prior to access. tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 SCENARIO #3: Frequent ‘‘Unescorted Visitors’’ This scenario could apply to a highrisk chemical facility that has a number of frequent unescorted visitors that have or are seeking repeated access to the restricted areas or critical assets of the facility, pursuant to a contractual relationship with a company employing the frequent unescorted visitors. In its SSP or ASP, the high-risk chemical facility could choose to comply with RBPS 12(i)–(iii) for frequent unescorted visitors by: • Stipulating in a contract between the high-risk chemical facility and the company employing the frequent unescorted visitors that the frequent unescorted visitors’ employer will perform or provide for identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks to be conducted on the frequent unescorted visitors. Æ A contract or agreement between the high-risk chemical facility and the company employing the frequent unescorted visitors could establish the criteria for these background checks, and could establish which background check results qualify individuals to access the restricted areas or critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility or disqualify individuals from accessing the restricted areas or critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility. Æ The high-risk chemical facility could audit or review the background checks being conducted to ensure contractual compliance. • Prior to a frequent unescorted visitor being granted access to the restricted areas or critical assets of the facility (i.e., being issued a facilityspecific access credential/card, door/ gate key(s)), identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks could be completed by the company employing the frequent unescorted visitor in accordance with VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 the high-risk chemical facility’s SSP or ASP. Æ The company employing the frequent unescorted visitor could conduct these identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks. Æ The company employing the frequent unescorted visitor could submit appropriate information, under Option 1 and/or Option 2, to the Department while it conducts these identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks. • The company employing the frequent unescorted visitor, however, might not perform the actual background checks itself. Rather, the company employing the frequent unescorted visitor could hire a third party background check company to perform identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks on its employees (including the frequent unescorted visitors that access the restricted areas or critical assets of a high-risk chemical facility). Æ If the company employing the frequent unescorted visitor hires a third party background check company for this purpose, a contract or agreement between the company employing the frequent unescorted visitor and the third party background check company could establish the criteria for these background checks and could establish which background check results are acceptable for access to the restricted areas and critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility for which the frequent unescorted visitor performs services. Æ The third party background check company could submit appropriate information, under Option 1 and/or Option 2, to the Department while it conducts these identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks. Prior to the frequent unescorted visitor being granted access to restricted areas or critical assets of the high-risk chemical facility (i.e., being issued a facility-specific access credential/card, or door/gate key(s)), identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks could be completed by the company employing the frequent unescorted visitor, or by a third party background check company in accordance with the high-risk chemical facility’s SSP or ASP. If appropriate based on the results of those background checks, the frequent unescorted visitor could then be determined suitable to access the restricted areas or critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility. The company employing the frequent unescorted visitor, or a third party PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 background check company, could then report suitability findings to the highrisk chemical facility. The appropriate party at the high-risk chemical facility could then grant the frequent unescorted visitor facility-specific access credentials/cards, or door/gate key(s), if appropriate based on those suitability findings. The submission of information about the affected individual to the Department in compliance with RBPS 12(iv) therefore would not impede the routine access control procedures of the high-risk chemical facility because the information submission would likely be accomplished in concert with the other background check activities, prior to access. SCENARIO #4: Infrequent ‘‘Unescorted Visitors’’ Since the Department first began developing the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, some stakeholders have expressed concern that the submission of information to DHS about unescorted visitors who have only rare or infrequent access to high-risk chemical facilities would be overly burdensome and would make access by such infrequent unescorted visitors too difficult. As a general matter, however, the Department does not believe it likely that many high-risk chemical facilities will propose in their SSPs or ASPs to allow large numbers of visitors who visit the high-risk chemical facility infrequently to have unescorted access to restricted areas and critical assets, because then all four types of background checks listed in RBPS 12 would be required to be conducted for them. High-risk chemical facilities could choose to escort infrequent visitors in lieu of performing the four types of RBPS 12 background checks on them. However, even for infrequent unescorted visitors on whom the highrisk chemical facility chooses to conduct all four types of background checks, the Department does not expect data submission to the Department in compliance with RBPS 12(iv) to impede routine access procedures because the data submission is likely to be accomplished in concert with the other routine hiring and access control background checks related to RBPS 12(i)–(iii) described above. The Department believes that the data submission for RBPS 12(iv) will likely be accomplished in concert with the routine hiring and access control background checks related to RBPS 12(i)–(iii) because doing them in concert E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices is likely to generate the potential for cost savings.15 Additional Data Privacy Considerations There are various privacy requirements for high-risk chemical facilities, their designees, and the Department related to the exchange of personally identifiable information (PII) for the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. Upon receipt of PII, the Department complies with all applicable federal privacy requirements including those contained in the Privacy Act, the E-Government Act, the Homeland Security Act, and Departmental policy. The United States also follows international instruments on privacy, all of which are consistent with the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs).16 High-risk chemical facilities, or their designees, are responsible for complying with the federal, state, and national privacy laws applicable to the jurisdictions in which they do business. The Department believes that high-risk chemical facilities, or their designees, have multiple, established legal avenues that enable them to submit PII to the Department, which may include the Safe Harbor Framework,17 and meet their privacy obligations. II. Information Collected About Affected Individuals Option 1: Collecting Information To Conduct Direct Vetting If high-risk chemical facilities select Option 1 to satisfy RBPS 12(iv) for any affected individuals, the following information about these affected individuals would be submitted to the Department: • For U.S. Persons (U.S. citizens and nationals as well as U.S. lawful permanent residents): Æ Full Name Æ Date of Birth Æ Citizenship or Gender • For Non-U.S. Persons: Full Name Date of Birth Citizenship Passport information and/or alien registration number To reduce the likelihood of false positives in matching against records in the federal government’s consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist, highrisk chemical facilities would also be able to submit the following optional information about affected individuals to the Department: • Aliases • Gender (for Non-U.S. Persons) • Place of Birth • Redress Number 18 If a high-risk chemical facility chooses to submit information about an affected individual under Option 1, the following table summarizes the biographic data that would be submitted to the Department. Æ Æ Æ Æ TABLE 1—AFFECTED INDIVIDUAL REQUIRED AND OPTIONAL DATA UNDER OPTION 1 Data elements submitted to the department For a U.S. person Full Name ...... Date of Birth ... Gender ........... Required. Required. Must provide Citizenship or Gender. ........................ N/A ................ Citizenship ..... Passport Information and/ or Alien Registration Number. Aliases ........... Place of Birth Redress number. For a non-U.S. person Optional. Required. Required. Optional. Optional. Optional. Option 2: Collecting Information To Use Vetting Conducted Under Other DHS Programs In lieu of submitting information to the Department under Option 1 for 6425 terrorist ties vetting, chemical facilities would also have the option, where appropriate, to submit information to the Department to electronically verify that an affected individual is currently enrolled in one of the following DHS programs: • TWIC Program; • HME Program; • Trusted Traveler Programs, including: Æ NEXUS; Æ FAST; Æ SENTRI; and Æ Global Entry. Information collected by the Department about affected individuals under Option 2 would not be used to conduct duplicative vetting against the federal government’s consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist. To verify an affected individual’s enrollment in one of these programs under Option 2, the Department would collect the following information about the affected individual: • Full Name; • Date of Birth; and • Program-specific information or credential information, such as unique number, or issuing entity (e.g., State for Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) associated with an HME). To further reduce the potential for misidentification, high-risk chemical facilities may also submit the following optional information about affected individuals to the Department: • Aliases • Gender • Place of Birth • Citizenship If a high-risk chemical facility chooses to submit information about an affected individual under Option 2, the following table summarizes the biographic data that would be submitted to the Department. TABLE 2—AFFECTED INDIVIDUAL REQUIRED AND OPTIONAL DATA UNDER OPTION 2 Data elements submitted to the department For affected individual with a TWIC tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Full Name ...................................... 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 For affected individual enrolled in a trusted traveler programs (NEXUS, SENTRI, FAST, or global entry) Required. 15 This ICR does not estimate the potential cost savings high-risk chemical facilities or their designees could achieve as a result of submitting data in concert with the other routine hiring and access control background checks related to RBPS 12(i)–(iii) because the scope of this ICR is limited to the Departments obligation to estimate the burden of submitting information about affected individuals to identify terrorist ties under RBPS 12(iv) in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act. VerDate Mar<15>2010 For affected individual with an HME Jkt 232001 16 Examples of the international privacy instruments which the United States has endorsed are: (1) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of Personal Data (1980), and (2) Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework (2004). 17 The Safe Harbor Framework, which applies to commercial information, was developed by the U.S. Department of Commerce in consultation with the PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 European Commission in order to provide a streamlined means for U.S. organizations to comply with the European Union Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. More information on the Safe Harbor Framework can be found at https://export.gov/ safeharbor. 18 For more information about Redress Numbers, please go to https://www.dhs.gov/one-stop-travelersredress-process#1. E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6426 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices TABLE 2—AFFECTED INDIVIDUAL REQUIRED AND OPTIONAL DATA UNDER OPTION 2—Continued Data elements submitted to the department For affected individual with a TWIC Date of Birth ................................... Expiration Date .............................. Unique Identifying Number ............ Issuing State of CDL ..................... Aliases ........................................... Gender ........................................... Place of Birth ................................. Citizenship ..................................... Required. Required. TWIC Serial Number: Required ... N/A ................................................ Optional. Optional. Optional. Optional. Under the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, a high-risk chemical facility would be able to choose to follow the process described for Option 1, and would not have to implement Option 2, even if an affected individual seeking access to the high-risk chemical facility is already enrolled in the TWIC Program, HME Program, or one of the Trusted Traveler Programs. tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Option 3: Electronic Verification of TWIC Under Option 3, a high-risk chemical facility would not need to submit information about an affected individual enrolled in the TWIC Program to the Department, if the high-risk chemical facility is able to electronically verify and validate the affected individual’s TWIC through the use of a TWIC reader (or other technology that is periodically updated with revoked card information). As discussed above, under the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, high-risk chemical facilities would also be able to choose to follow the processes described for Option 1 and/or Option 2, for some or all affected individuals already enrolled in the TWIC Program, in lieu of or in addition to Option 3. Other Information Collected In addition to the information about affected individuals collected under Options 1 and 2, the Department plans to collect certain information that identifies the high-risk chemical facility, or facilities, at which each affected individual has or is seeking access to restricted areas or critical assets. The Department may also contact a high-risk chemical facility or its designees to request additional information (e.g., visa information) pertaining to affected individuals in order to clarify suspected data errors or resolve potential matches (e.g., in situations where an affected individual has a common name). Such requests will not imply, and should not be construed to indicate, that an affected VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 For affected individual with an HME CDL Number: Required ................ Required ....................................... individual’s information has been confirmed as a match to a record of an individual with terrorist ties. In the event that a confirmed match is identified as part of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, the Department may obtain references to and/or information from other government law enforcement and intelligence databases, or other relevant databases that may contain terrorism information. The Department may collect information necessary to assist in the submission and transmission of records, including electronic verification that the Department has received a particular record. The Department may also collect information about points of contact who the Department or federal law enforcement personnel may contact with follow-up questions. A request for additional information from the Department does not imply, and should not be construed to indicate, that an individual is known or suspected to be associated with terrorism. The Department may also collect information provided by individuals or high-risk chemical facilities in support of any adjudications requested under Subpart C of the CFATS regulation,19 or in support of any other redress requests.20 The Department may request information pertaining to affected individuals, previously provided to the Department by high-risk chemical facilities or their designees, in order to confirm the accuracy of that information, or to conduct data accuracy reviews and audits as part of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. 19 See 6 CFR 27.300–345. information about access, correction, and redress requests under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act can be found in Section 7.0 of the Privacy Impact Assessment for the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, dated May 4, 2011, and available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ privacy/privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf. 20 More PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 For affected individual enrolled in a trusted traveler programs (NEXUS, SENTRI, FAST, or global entry) PASS ID Number: Required. N/A. The Department will also collect administrative or programmatic information (e.g., affirmations or certifications of compliance, extension requests, brief surveys for process improvement) necessary to manage the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. Under Options 1 and 2, the Department will also collect information that will allow high-risk chemical facilities and their designees to manage their data submissions. Specifically, the Department will make available to highrisk chemical facilities and their designees blank data fields. These blank data fields may be used by a high-risk chemical facility or its designees to assign each record of an affected individual a unique designation or number that is meaningful to the highrisk chemical facility. Collecting this information will enable a high-risk chemical facility to manage the electronic records it submits into the CSAT Personnel Surety application. Entering this information into the CSAT Personnel Surety application will be voluntary, and is intended solely to enable high-risk chemical facilities and their designees to search through, sort, and manage the electronic records they submit. III. Request for Exception to the Requirement Under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) The Department is requesting from OMB an exception for the CFATS Personnel Surety Program to the PRA notice requirement in 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3), which requires federal agencies to confirm that their information collections provide certain reasonable notices under the PRA to affected individuals. If this exception is granted, the Department will be relieved of the potential obligation to require high-risk chemical facilities to collect signatures or other positive affirmations of these notices from affected individuals. Whether or not this exception is granted, Submitters must affirm that the required privacy notice regarding the collection of personal E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices information has been provided to affected individuals before personal information is submitted to the Department.21 The Department’s request for an exception to the PRA notice requirement under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) would not exempt high-risk chemical facilities from having to adhere to applicable federal, state, local, or tribal laws, or to regulations or policies pertaining to the privacy of affected individuals. IV. Responses to Comments Submitted During 60-Day Comment Period The Department solicited comments on four questions: (1) Evaluate whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility; (2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used; (3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (4) Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic submissions of responses. In response to the 60-day notice that solicited comments about the CFATS Personnel Surety Program ICR, the Department received 28 comments from 2 private citizens, 8 private sector companies 22, 14 trade associations, 1 union, 1 training council, and the Ranking Member of the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security. tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Comments Related to Whether the Proposed Collection of Information is Necessary for the Proper Performance of the Functions of the Agency, Including Whether the Information Will Have Practical Utility The Department did not receive any comments suggesting that the proposed collection of information was not 21 For more information, please see the Privacy Impact Assessment for the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, dated May 4, 2011 and available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/ privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf. 22 One private sector company submitted two distinct comments. VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency. Comments Related to the Accuracy of the Agency’s Estimate of the Burden of the Proposed Collection of Information, Including the Validity of the Methodology and Assumptions Used Comment: Several commenters suggested that the annual turnover rate of 71% for frequent unescorted visitors estimated by the Department in the 60day notice underestimated the annual turnover rate for delivery personnel.23 One commenter suggested that the Department adopt a higher annual turnover rate of 81.75% for all frequent unescorted visitors. Response: The Department agreed to adopt the higher estimated rate for frequent unescorted visitor annual turnover of 81.75%. The Department’s burden estimates reflect this revised assumption. Comment: One commenter suggested that the Department made an error in Table 18 of the 60-day notice by not differentiating between the turnover rates of employees, frequent visitors, and infrequent visitors. Response: In this notice, the Department explicitly distinguishes the turnover rates of employees, frequent visitors, and infrequent visitors when estimating the annual burden estimate. Comment: One commenter suggested that the Department did not accurately estimate the annual burden estimate in Table 19 of the 60-day notice. Specifically, the commenter suggested that Table 19 of the 60-day notice reflects a figure ‘‘0.50’’ hours for initial submission rather than ‘‘0.5425’’ hours which was the estimated time per respondent calculated in Table 18 of the 60-day notice. Response: The Department disagrees and believes that in Table 19 it was accurate to use the figure ‘‘0.50’’ hours when estimating the annual burden. The figure 0.50 hours is distinct and is only associated with initial submission and not the other types of transactions covered by the ICR such as updates, corrections, and removals. The figure 0.5425 hours represented the weighted average of all types of transactions and thus would have been inappropriate to use in Table 19 of the 60-day notice when estimating the annual burden. Comment: One commenter suggested that the Department did not account for costs imposed by information submission requests the Department may require. Specifically, when the Department ‘‘may’’ require facilities to 23 See Table 6 in the 60-day notice published on March 22, 2013 at 78 FR 17690. PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 6427 provide other pieces of information pertaining to affected individuals including visa information, the submission and transmission of records such as electronic verification that the facility provided a particular record, points of contact at a facility, and information supporting any adjudications or redress requests. Response: In the 60-day notice, Department estimated the average time per respondent to be 0.54 hours. The Department believes that the burden associated with requests from the Department for additional information about the affected individuals will be very rare and thus de minimus in nature. The Department also believes that the burden associated with information requests to support adjudication or redress requests will also be very rare and thus de minimus as well. Finally, the Department will collect submission and transmission of records, including electronic verification that the Department has received a particular record, automatically via system log files. This collection will not impose a burden on the high-risk chemical facility or designee. Therefore, for the reasons expressed above, the Department believes it has accurately estimated the estimated time per respondent. Comment: One commenter states that the Department did not account for the cost facilities will incur for a ‘‘facilityby-facility vetting of individuals accessing multiples facilities.’’ Response: As mentioned earlier in this notice, the Department is aware that an affected individual may be associated with multiple high-risk chemical facilities, and thus information about an affected individual may be submitted to the Department multiple times by different high-risk chemical facilities and/or their designated third parties. Therefore, for the purposes of this notice, the Department’s estimation of burden accounts for the notion that an affected individual’s information may be submitted by multiple times by highrisk chemical facilities and their designated third parties. Comment: Several commenters objected to the Department’s assumptions related to the potential recordkeeping burden associated with RBPS 12(iv). Namely, they objected to the idea that no potential recordkeeping should be estimated in this notice in accordance with 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(2), which directs federal agencies to not count the costs associated with the time, effort, and financial resources incurred in the normal course of their activities (e.g., in compiling and maintaining business records) if the reporting, E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6428 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 recordkeeping, or disclosure activities are usual and customary. Furthermore, commenters objected to the Department’s belief that the types of recordkeeping associated with RBPS 12(iv) are usual and customary costs that high-risk chemical facilities would incur to conduct background checks for identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work as required by RBPS 12(i)–(iii) and also by various other federal, state, or local laws or regulations. Response: As mentioned earlier in this notice, the Department expects that high-risk chemical facilities or their designees (e.g., third parties or companies employing affected individuals that provide services to high-risk chemical facilities) will already possess much, if not all, of the necessary information about affected individuals as a result of standard business practices related to employment or managing of service contracts. Furthermore, the Department also expects that high-risk chemical facilities will likely consolidate RBPS 12(iv) processing with related routine hiring and access control procedures involving background checks that are already occurring prior to access by facility personnel or unescorted visitors to restricted areas or critical assets. Consolidating RBPS 12(iv) processing with these other routine procedures would allow submission of personal information already collected and maintained by facilities or their designees (e.g., a third party, contracted service company, or third party acting on behalf of a contracted service company) to the Department under RBPS 12(iv). In this notice, the Department provides several illustrative examples to further clarify the Department’s continued belief that the types of recordkeeping associated with RBPS 12(iv) are usual and customary costs that high-risk chemical facilities (or designees) would incur to conduct background checks for identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work as required by RBPS 12(i)–(iii). Comments Related to the Quality, Utility, and Clarity of the Information to be Collected Comment: One commenter requested specifics about the mechanics of the process on how to submit information about affected individuals to the Department. Response: The Department will publish a user manual when the CFATS Personnel Surety Program is implemented. The user manual will contain the necessary details about how information about affected individuals VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 may be submitted, under Option1 or Option 2, through CSAT to the Department. Comment: One commenter requested specific information about the security or information protection requirements necessary to serve as a Submitter. Response: While an owner or operator of a chemical facility may designate someone to submit information on its behalf, the owner or operator is responsible for satisfying all the requirements of 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv). The Department provides at 6 CFR 27.200(b)(3) that any such submitter must be an officer of the corporation or other person designated by an officer of the corporation, and must be domiciled in the United States, and is responsible for attesting to the accuracy of the submitted information. When a high-risk chemical facilities relies on third party companies to submit appropriate information about affected individuals to the Department the same requirements will apply. The submitter(s) must be designated by an officer of the corporation, must be domiciled in the United States, and is responsible for attesting to the accuracy of the submitted information. determined from the CCL by using an electronic card reader to compare the TWIC’s Federal Agency Smart Credential Number (FASC–N) to those listed on the CCL. This could be accomplished by periodically downloading the current CCL from the Internet to either a TWIC reader or a Physical Access Control System (PACS).24 The status of a TWIC can also be confirmed by using a TWIC reader or PACS to check the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) for TWIC cards. The Department will also consider, in an SSP or ASP, any other specific innovative technologies that could allow high-risk chemical facilities to leverage the CCL or CRL for compliance with RBPS 12. Other Comments Submitted in Response to the Information Collection Request Comment: Several commenters suggested the Department develop substantially different processes than the processes described by the Department in the CFATS IFR published in April 2007. One commenter suggested that the Department establish a process to certify vendors so that high-risk chemical facilities could rely on the certification Comments Related to Minimizing the as proof that the vendor has Burden of the Collection of Information implemented security measures to on Those Who are to Respond, ensure that its employees do not have Including Through the Use of terrorist ties. Several commenters Appropriate Automated, Electronic, suggested establishing a voluntary Mechanical, or Other Technological process by which the Department could Collection Techniques or Other Forms of collect information directly from Information Technology, e.g., Permitting affected individuals, and subsequently Electronic Submissions of Responses issue individuals unique submission numbers. The commenters suggested Comment: One commenter requested that an affected individual could then the ability to submit information about present the unique submission number affected individuals ‘‘via some type of to the high-risk chemical facility as file (spreadsheet) upload as opposed to evidence that the Department had direct data entry into CSAT.’’ Response: When implemented, highconducted a security threat assessment risk chemical facilities (and their to determine whether or not they had designees), under Option 1 and Option any terrorist ties. Response: Neither the notice 2, will have the ability to input records published by the Department on March about affected individuals in three 22, 2013, nor this notice are rulemaking ways: (1) Manual entry, (2) bulk upload via Microsoft Excel file or an Extensible notices. These notices are published in accordance with the Paperwork Markup Language (XML) file, and (3) a Reduction Act and are not seeking to direct Web Service connection. Comment: One commenter requested expand or change CFATS. Rather, these clarification about Option 3, Paperwork Reduction Act notices are specifically, if the phrase ‘‘other seeking comments on the burden technology’’ means computer access to associated with collecting information the Internet. necessary to implement the CFATS Response: The Department’s phrase Personnel Surety Program described in ‘‘other technology which is periodically the CFATS IFR. updated using the CCL’’ was intended to Comment: One commenter suggested cover a variety of ways a high-risk that the Department’s ‘‘preconditions’’ chemical facility could, in its SSP or (i.e., the collection of information under ASP, describe how it would determine Option 2 to verify enrollment in the if a TWIC was revoked for cause, or TWIC, HME, and Trusted Traveler revoked because it was reported lost or 24 See footnote 8, supra. stolen. Revoked cards could be PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices Programs) ‘‘ipso facto do not provide reciprocal recognition of these vetting programs.’’ The commenter further suggested that the Department was not following White House recommendations to promote comparability and reciprocity across credentialing and screening programs.25 Specifically, recommendation 16 of the Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment, which recommends that the federal Government ‘‘create a more efficient Federal credentialing system by reducing credentialing redundancy, leveraging existing investments, and implementing the principle of ‘enroll once, use many’ to reuse the information of individuals applying for multiple access privileges.’’ Response: The collection of information under Option 2 to verify enrollment of an affected individual in the TWIC, HME, and the Trusted Traveler Programs does recognize and leverage the vetting activities of the TWIC, HME, and Trusted Traveler Programs. Further, the CFATS Personnel Surety Program aligns with the recommendations of the Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment. In discussions with high-risk chemical facilities over the past several years, the Department has attempted to correct the persistent misinterpretation held by commenters about the concept of ‘‘enroll once, use many’’ as meaning that an individual should only need to submit information to the Department once, and that the Department should never collect information from that individual again. Rather, the Department has defined, and continues to define, the ‘‘enroll once, use many’’ concept as the ability to reuse previously submitted program enrollment information and/or vetting results upon collection of sufficient information to confirm an individual’s prior enrollment in a Department program or prior vetting results. One example of how the Department has implemented ‘‘enroll once, use many’’ in a DHS program other than the CFATS Personnel Surety Program is when a person whose is enrolled in the TWIC Program seeks to obtain an HME. TSA collects sufficient information from the person enrolled in the TWIC Program to verify the person’s identity and verify the existence of a current and valid security threat assessment.26 If 25 Recommendation 16 of the Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment may be found on page 21 of the 2010 White House report at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ rss_viewer/STSA.pdf. 26 The online form may be found at https:// hazprints.tsa.dhs.gov/Public/STAStatus.aspx VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 verified, the existing STA is leveraged for the HME, which provides for efficiencies such as reduced enrollment cost and shorter processing time. Comment: Several commenters suggested that the collection of information under Option 2 to verify an affected individual’s enrollment in the TWIC, HME, and the Trusted Traveler Programs qualifies as a duplicative background check. Response: The information collected by the Department under Option 2 is used to verify an affected individual’s enrollment in a DHS program. The information collected under Option 2 is not used to conduct a duplicative background check. Comment: Another commenter suggested that the collection of information under Option 2 from affected individuals in possession of an HME as a proposal to ‘‘screen drivers carrying hazardous materials’’ violates 49 U.S.C. 5103a(g)(1)(B)(i) which states that ‘‘[a]n individual with respect to whom the Transportation Security Administration—(I) has performed a security threat assessment under this section; and (II) has issued a final notification of no security threat, is deemed to have met the requirements of any other background check that is required for purposes of any Federal law applicable to transportation workers if that background check is equivalent to, or less stringent than, the background check required [to receive an HME].’’ Response: Collecting information to verify an affected individual’s enrollment, so that if verified the Department may rely on the results of the security threat assessment already performed and being recurrently performed, is not prohibited by 49 U.S.C. 5103a(g)(1)(B)(i), and comports with the means of vetting verification described in the CFATS IFR. Comment: One commenter suggested that the credentials be accepted ‘‘at face value.’’ The commenter further suggested that, ‘‘[t]he fact [that affected individuals] have a valid card meets the requirement specifically detailed in RBPS 1[2] and any further collection and submission of PII not only exceeds DHS’ authority but results in duplication of effort and unnecessary cost to both the facilities and to DHS.’’ Another commenter suggested that possession of a credential was ‘‘proof’’ that the affected individual was vetted and is being revetted for terrorist ties. Another commenter took an opposing view, and supported Option 2. The commenter agreed with the Department’s intention to collect information to electronically verify and re-verify affected individuals’ PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 6429 enrollments in the TWIC, HME, and Trusted Traveler Programs. Response: While visual inspection has some security benefits, electronic verification is significantly more reliable than visual inspection for ensuring that a TWIC, HME, or Trusted Traveler Credential is not counterfeit or expired, or has not been reported lost, stolen, damaged, or revoked. Accordingly, if a high-risk chemical facility chooses to implement Option 2, the high-risk chemical facility (or its designees) must submit information to the Department about affected individuals possessing the appropriate credentials to enable the Department to electronically verify, with the relevant component of DHS (i.e., CBP or TSA) using their authoritative and original data, the affected individuals’ enrollments in these other programs. Comment: Several commenters suggested that the Department was requiring all visitors to have their information submitted to the Department 48 hours in advance of entering the site, which does not comport with the operational realities of the trucking industry. Response: The Department disagrees that this ICR does not comport with the operational realities of the trucking industry. The Department disagrees for four reasons. First, if a high-risk chemical facility chooses to allow visitors (e.g., truck operators) access to the high-risk chemical facilities, for only those visitors with unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets will the facility need to comply with RBPS 12. Second, the Department does not believe it likely that many high-risk chemical facilities will propose in their SSPs or ASPs to allow large numbers of visitors who visit the high-risk chemical facility infrequently to have unescorted access to restricted areas and critical assets, because then all four types of background checks listed in RBPS 12 would be required to be conducted for them. If the historical practice of a chemical facility has been to allow unescorted visitors access to the restricted areas or critical assets, without performing any background checks on them, the Department recognizes that the business practices of such a high-risk chemical facility will need to change as a result of RBPS 12(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv). Third, the Department generally expects that high-risk chemical facilities and designees will likely consolidate RBPS 12(iv) processing with related routine hiring and access control procedures already occurring prior to access by facility personnel or unescorted visitors to restricted areas or critical assets. As a E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 6430 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices result of discussions with industry stakeholders the Department understands that, in general, routine hiring and access control procedures are already in place for individuals, likely to be designated as affected individuals because of access to restricted areas or critical assets, working on behalf of trucking companies. Fourth, in the default schedule provided later in this notice, the Department suggests that information about a new affected individual could be provided to the Department no later than 48 hours prior to that affected individual obtaining access to the restricted areas or critical assets at a high-risk chemical facility. The Department would like to highlight that information about a particular affected individual does not need to be re-submitted to the Department 48 hours prior to each instance of access by that particular affected individual. Rather, if a high-risk chemical facility, or its designees, are able to determine that an affected individual requires repeated access to restricted areas or critical assets, the high-risk chemical facility may structure the data submission to CSAT so as to indicate that the affected individual about whom the high-risk chemical facility or designee is submitting information to the Department will have access to restricted areas or critical assets on an ongoing basis. A high-risk chemical facility, or its designees, may also structure the data submission to CSAT to indicate that the affected individual will have access to restricted areas or critical assets for a discreet period of time. Therefore, for the reasons provided above, the Department disagrees that this ICR does not comport with the operational realities of the trucking industry. Comment: Several commenters raised objections to submitting a new affected individual’s information at least 48 hours prior to their access to restricted areas or critical assets at high-risk chemical facilities. Some commenters suggested that submission of a new affected individual’s information should occur, rather, only at the time the new affected individual actually accesses restricted areas or critical assets. Alternatively, some commenters suggested that that submission of a new affected individual’s information should occur after the affected individual accessed restricted areas or critical assets. Response: The Department, in the default schedule provided later in this notice, suggests that information about new affected individuals could be provided to the Department no later VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 than 48 hours prior to the affected individual obtaining access to the restricted areas or critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility. The Department believes that 48 hours is a reasonable amount of time, which is necessary for the Department to successfully perform a background check for terrorist ties. Therefore the Department has suggested a period of time (i.e., 48 hours) as a default for when high-risk chemical facilities could submit information to the Department for new affected individuals rather than at the time, or after the time, a new affected individual obtains access to restricted areas or critical assets. Later in this notice, the Department also reiterates that it will consider alternative schedules suggested by highrisk chemical facilities in their SSPs or ASPs, for Option 1 or Option 2, based on their unique circumstances. Comment: Several commenters expressed concern about contractors and visitors arriving upon short or no notice such as when a production unit goes down or otherwise requires emergency maintenance. Response: The Department understands that contractors and visitors may arrive with only short or no notice such as when a production unit goes down or otherwise requires emergency maintenance. The Department described, in the illustrative examples provided earlier in this notice, how a high-risk chemical facility could comply with RBPS 12, ensuring that all four background checks are conducted in such situations. High-risk chemical facilities should describe in their SSP or ASP the procedures and process 27 to plan for and prepare for exceptional circumstances (e.g., unpredictable but foreseeable situations) that result in situations that require an affected individual to have short or no notice before accessing the restricted areas or critical assets at high-risk chemical facilities such as when a production unit goes down or otherwise requires emergency maintenance. Comment: Several commenters pointed out to the Department that TSA recently modified the TWIC application form 28 to expand the population of 27 One example applied from the illustrative scenarios would be that the high-risk chemical facility would have in it contract clauses that require any contractors that provides emergency repair or maintenance to have background checks completed prior to arrival at the high-risk chemical facility, to include the submission of information about the affected individuals to the Department under Option 1 or Option 2. 28 The revised TWIC application form may be viewed at (https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ PRAViewIC?ref_nbr=201210-1652-001&icID =182269). PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 individuals eligible to apply for a TWIC. The commenters uniformly suggested that the Department expand the population of individuals eligible to apply for a TWIC to include affected individuals that have or are seeking access to the restricted areas or critical assets of high-risk chemical facilities. Response: Any determination the Department or TSA makes to expand or revise the population of individuals eligible to apply and pay for TWICs is outside the scope of this notice. Comment: Some commenters supported the Department’s determination that certain groups are not affected individuals, specifically, (1) Federal officials that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets as part of their official duties; (2) state and local law enforcement officials that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets as part of their official duties; and (3) emergency responders at the state or local level that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets during emergency situations. One commenter did not support the determination and suggested that this determination only incentivized terrorists to assume the identities of law enforcement officials rather than workers. Response: The Department has opted to align how CFATS treats certain groups of persons with how those same populations are treated under the TWIC Program.29 Comment: One commenter objected to the inclusion of railroad employees as potentially affected individuals. Response: Railroad employees may be affected individuals if the high-risk chemical facility has defined railroad employees in their SSP or ASP as either (1) facility personnel who have access, either unescorted or otherwise, to restricted areas or critical assets, or (2) unescorted visitors who have access to restricted areas or critical assets. Each high risk chemical facility can choose which option or options it wishes to implement with regard to railroad employees that would be affected individuals. The Department notes that many railroad employees have TWICs and encourages high-risk chemical to consider whether Option 2 or Option 3 may provide a reasonable solution. Comment: One commenter suggested that the 60-day notice was unclear as to which set of individuals would be subject to vetting for terrorist ties. The 29 See 33 CFR 101.514 at (https://www.ecfr.gov/cgibin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=ef5225aac07 eddf7f914e57c3fda36bf&ty=HTML&h=L&r=PART& n=33y1.0.1.8.49#33:1.0.1.8.49.5.26.4) E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices commenter pointed out that the Department used the term ‘‘affected individuals’’ inconsistently. In parts of the 60-day notice, the Department described the term to mean ‘‘facility personnel or unescorted visitors with access to restricted areas or critical assets at high-risk chemical facilities.’’ In other parts of the 60-day notice the Department described the term to mean ‘‘(1) facility personnel who have access, either unescorted or otherwise, to restricted areas or critical assets, and (2) unescorted visitors who have access to restricted areas or critical assets.’’ Response: 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12) defines the scope of individuals for whom RBPS 12 (and thus RBPS 12(iv)) background checks are required. 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12) defines the scope as ‘‘facility personnel, and as appropriate, for unescorted visitors with access to restricted areas or critical assets’’ at high-risk chemical facilities. The Department has provided additional clarity in previous notices that affected individuals are (1) facility personnel who have access, either unescorted or otherwise, to restricted areas or critical assets, and (2) unescorted visitors who have access to restricted areas or critical assets. In response to public comments received on earlier notices, the Department clarified, and does so here in this notice, that individual high-risk facilities may classify particular contractors or categories of contractors either as ‘‘facility personnel’’ or as ‘‘visitors.’’ This determination should be a facility-specific determination, and should be based on facility security, operational requirements, and business practices. Comment: One commenter objected to the Department’s intention to collect information that identifies the high-risk chemical facility or facilities at which each affected individual has or is seeking access. Response: The Department requires this information so that in the event of a positive match, the Department may provide the information to appropriate federal law enforcement entities. Comment: One commenter suggested that the ICR approach was deficient because the Department, based on public comments received, is unable to amend the text of 6 CFR part 27. The commenter suggested that without the benefit of a rule published in the Code of Federal Regulations, covered facilities will not know what identifying information is to be provided on individuals, and within what timeframes thus rendering the standards for personnel surety invisible. Response: The ICR and the associated 60-day and 30-day notices do not VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 modify 6 CFR part 27. The ICR and associated notices provide descriptions of the nature of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program’s information collection, categories of respondents, estimated burden, and costs. The Department is publishing this notice in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act because, although the Department has the authority to implement the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, the Department must still comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act and its implementing regulations before collecting the necessary information from high-risk chemical facilities or designees. Comment: One commenter suggested that the three options described in the 60-day notice are an impermissible mandate. The commenter states that RBPS 12 does not require that a facility continuously vet covered individuals against the TSDB. Response: In April 2007, the CFATS IFR outlined two options, described earlier in this notice, for high-risk chemical facilities to identify individuals with terrorist ties. Both options rely on recurrent vetting, which was one of the underlying bases for including those options in the CFATS IFR. Comment: Several commenters suggested that the CFATS Personnel Surety Program outlined in the ICR exceeds the Department’s statutory authority, because the proposed CFATS Personnel Surety Program design conflicts with Section 550. Commenters suggested that the CFATS Personnel Surety Program’s design eliminates a high-risk facility’s flexibility to achieve compliance with RBPS–12. The commenters cited the following examples: (1) The ‘‘48-hour rule,’’ (2) ‘‘submission of PII on valid TWIC, DOT HAZMAT, or Trusted Traveler card holders,’’ and (3) ‘‘notification when personnel depart a regulated site[.]’’ Response: The CFATS Personnel Surety Program will not exceed the Department’s statutory authority, nor will it violate or conflict with Section 550. With respect to the specific examples cited by commenters, the Department does not believe these examples demonstrate a violation of the statutory requirement that the Department not disapprove a Site Security Plan on the basis of the presence or absence of a particular security measure. Not only does the Department disagree that 48-hour advance submission violates Section 550, the Department also disagrees with the characterization of the default schedule as a ‘‘rule.’’ As discussed earlier in this PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 6431 notice, the Department is not seeking to implement a new regulation. Rather, this notice is published in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act. The Department disagrees that a default expectation that high-risk chemical facilities or designees submit information about new affected individuals at least 48 hours in advance of access eliminates a high-risk facility’s flexibility to achieve compliance with RBPS–12. A high-risk chemical facility may suggest alternative schedules, for Option 1 or Option 2, based on their unique circumstances in their SSPs or ASPs. The Department also disagrees that the ‘‘submission of PII on valid TWIC, DOT HAZMAT, or Trusted Traveler card holders’’ violates Section 550. The CFATS Personnel Surety Program will not exceed the Department’s statutory authority, nor will it violate or conflict with Section 550 because the Department will provide and approve sufficient alternative methods for a high-risk chemical facility to satisfy the terrorism ties background check portion of RBPS 12. A high-risk chemical facility does not have to select Option 2. Rather, if a high-risk chemical facility or its designees is unable or unwilling to submit information about affected individuals to verify their enrollment, a high-risk chemical facility may select Option 1, Option 3, or propose another alternative. The Department also notes the commenter’s use of the term ‘‘valid.’’ Collection of information is necessary under Option 2 because it would be inappropriate to have confidence in the validity of a credential based solely on a visual inspection of the credential. Electronic verification of the affected individuals’ enrollments in other programs provides significantly greater confidence that the credential in the possession of the affected individual is not counterfeit or expired, or has not been reported lost, stolen, damaged, or revoked. Finally, the Department disagrees that ‘‘notification when personnel depart a regulated site’’ violates Section 550. The CFATS Personnel Surety Program does not require ‘‘notification when personnel depart a regulated site.’’ Rather the Department requires notification when an affected individual whose information has been submitted under Option 1 or Option 2 no longer has access to restricted areas or critical assets. This distinction is important— the Department has not suggested that it expects high-risk chemical facilities to update the information it sends to DHS through CSAT in real time as individuals depart the workplace, nor E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 6432 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices has it suggested that notifications are required under Option 3 or under any other options high-risk chemical facilities might propose to DHS in their SSPs or ASPs. Notifications about individuals whose information has been submitted to DHS under Option 1 and Option 2, and who will subsequently lose access to restricted areas or critical assets, could occur before or after access is lost—high-risk facilities could propose schedules for this type of notification to DHS in their SSPs or ASPs, and DHS would evaluate these proposals on a case-by-case basis, taking into account unique facility operational and security needs. The primary distinction between ‘‘notification when personnel depart a regulated site’’ and the Department’s requirement to be notified under Options 1 and 2 when an affected individual no longer has access is that the CFATS Personnel Surety Program is not tracking the real-time access of an affected individual at a high-risk chemical facility. Rather, the Department, under the CFATS Personnel Surety Program is seeking to ensure that affected individuals (whether they enter several times a day or only once over the time period in which they have the capability to enter) are checked for terrorist ties. This difference means that high-risk chemical facilities or their designees only need to notify the Department when to cease vetting once. This is in stark contrast to the multiple notifications that would be necessary if the Department required notification when ‘‘personnel depart a regulated site.’’ High-risk chemical facilities and their designees have at least two alternatives in how to notify the Department that an affected individual whose information has been submitted to DHS under Option 1 or Option 2 no longer has access. The first alternative is to submit the notification when the affected individual no longer has access. Under this alternative, a high risk chemical facility or designee would submit information about the affected individual initially and later in a separate communication notify the Department that the affected individual no longer has access. A second alternative the Department has provided is to allow the high-risk chemical facility or designee the ability to specify when the Department should stop vetting at the time of the initial submission. There are also additional alternatives available to high-risk chemical facilities. Under Option 3, the high risk chemical facilities may electronically verify and VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 validate an affected individual’s TWIC, through the use of TWIC readers (or other technology which is periodically updated with revoked card information), rather than submitting information about the affected individual to the Department. Consequently, there is no need for a high risk chemical facility to notify the Department when the affected individual no longer has access if the affected individual’s TWIC is electronically verify and validated, through the use of TWIC readers (or other technology which is periodically updated with revoked card information). As previously discussed in this notice, high-risk chemical facilities are also able to propose other options for DHS consideration as part of their SSPs or ASPs. In conclusion, the only way the Department will know that an affected individual no longer has or is seeking access, under Option 1 or Option2, is if the facility (or their designee) notifies the Department when personnel no longer have (or no longer are seeking) access to a regulated facility’s restricted areas or critical assets. The Department disagrees that this aspect of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program exceeds the Department’s statutory authority, violates, or conflict with Section 550. Comment: Several commenters suggested that the Department, in particular NPPD, has in the design of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program refused to leverage credentials from comparable programs. The commenter implied that NPPD could consider how TSA opted to implement the ‘‘Air Cargo Screening Program’’, and how ATF implemented the Employee Possessor Program. Response: Not all federal background checks conduct checks for terrorist ties that are equivalent to the background check for terrorist ties being conducted by the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. The Department has evaluated the ATF Employee Possessor Program and identified that the Employee Possessor Program conducts point-intime vetting against the TSDB, which means that ATF’s checks are conducted at only specified times, not on a recurrent basis. Recurrent vetting is a DHS best practice and compares an affected individual’s information against new and/or updated TSDB records as new and/or updated records become available. The Indirect Air Carrier (IAC) and the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) programs both conduct terrorist ties vetting equivalent to the terrorist ties vetting that would be conducted under Option 1. After the initial PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 implementation of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, if (A) the Department learns through interactions with CFATS stakeholders that a reasonable percentage of affected individuals participate in the IAC and CCSP programs, and (B) there is substantial interest from members of the regulated community in leveraging the IAC and CCSP programs, then NPPD may consider allowing high-risk chemical facilities to submit the full name, date of birth, and appropriate programspecific information or credential information necessary to enable the Department to electronically verify the affected individuals’ enrollments in IAC and CCSP programs. Comment: Several commenters suggested that the ICR claims to leverage the TWIC, HME, and the Trusted Traveler Programs, but facilities or their designees must submit more information under Option 2 than if the high-risk chemical facility or designee opted to submit the minimum information required under Option 1. The commenters conclude those who have already been screened face more burdens and greater scrutiny than those lacking any screening at all. Response: The Department has long conceded that the minimum number of data elements necessary to conduct vetting under Option 1 may, in some cases, be less than the minimum number of data elements to electronically verify an affected individual’s enrollment in the TWIC, HME or Trusted Traveler Programs. This is because of how the TWIC, HME, and Trusted Traveler databases were initially constructed, not because affected individuals undergo extra scrutiny when the Department electronically verifies their enrollment Comment: One commenter requested clarification about the process of releasing employee information. Response: The scope of this notice is limited to the information submitted by a high-risk chemical facility (or designee) to the Department, which is subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a). The Department will only release or disclose this information in accordance with the applicable Privacy Act System of Records Notice. The Submitter(s) of each high-risk chemical facility (or their designee) will be required to affirm that, in accordance with their Site Security Plans, notice required by the Privacy Act of 1974 has been given to affected individuals before their information is submitted to DHS. DHS has made available to high-risk chemical facilities a sample notice that complies with subsection (e)(3) of the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3)) in the E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices CFATS Personnel Surety Program PIA.30 This notice would: (1) Notify those individuals that their information is being submitted to DHS for vetting against the Terrorist Screening Database, and that in some cases additional information may be requested and submitted in order to resolve a potential match; (2) instruct those individuals how to access their information; (3) instruct those individuals how to correct their information; and (4) instruct those individuals on procedures available to them for redress if they believe their information has been improperly matched by the Department of Homeland Security to information contained in the Terrorist Screening Database. Individuals have the opportunity and/or right to decline to provide information, however, if an individual declines to provide information, he or she may impact a high-risk chemical facility’s compliance with CFATS. In addition, high-risk chemical facilities (or designees) may have information about an affected individual obtained for other purposes (e.g., compliance with RBPS 12(i)–(iii)) that was never submitted to the Department and thus not subject to the Privacy Act. While under CFATS no specific controls are required for information collected by high-risk chemical facilities with regard to RBPS 12(i)–(iii), the Department expects that high-risk chemical facilities will protect and safeguard the information as outlined in their SSP and in accordance with any other federal, State, or local privacy laws which do have jurisdiction relative to the collection of the information. Comment: One commenter expressed concern about the Department’s request for an exception to the PRA notice requirement in 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) when the Department is also requiring that Submitters must affirm that the required privacy notice regarding the collection of personal information has been provided to affected individuals before personal information is submitted to the Department. Specifically, the commenter suggested that ‘‘in order to make such an affirmation in good faith, the facility would almost certainly need to obtain signatures or other positive affirmations from affected individuals to protect itself against any claims of noncompliance.’’ Response: The Department believes that it is possible for a high-risk chemical facility or designee to affirm, in good faith, that the affected individual has been given adequate 30 Available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ assets/privacy/privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf. VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 notice pursuant to the Privacy Act without collecting a signature from each and every affected individual. For example, a high-risk chemical facility or its designees could consider including an appropriate statement in pay checks, posting a sign near a restricted area or critical asset, including an appropriate statement within existing standard privacy notices provided to individuals when collecting information during a routine and normal hiring process, or including an appropriate statement in a letter. Comment: One commenter requested clarification about what the Department will do with the information it collects. The commenter further suggested that reducing the security risk associated with personnel RBPS 12 could be in conflict with selecting the ‘‘best qualified personnel/contractor’’ to work in the restricted area or critical asset. Response: The Department will, under this ICR, collect the information necessary to implement the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. The CFATS Personnel Surety Program will use the information to identify affected individuals with terrorist ties. With respect to the potential conflict between reducing security risk and selecting the best qualified personnel/ contractor, the Department stated in the CFATS IFR, ‘‘that the level of screening for employees and contractors should be commensurate with the access provided. As part of this approach, the facility shall identify critical assets and restricted areas and establish which employees and contractors may need unescorted access to those areas or assets, and thus must undergo a background check . . .’’.31 A facility’s approach to personnel surety, including its defined restricted areas and critical assets, shall be detailed in the Site Security Plan that the facility submits to the Department for approval. Comment: Some commenters suggested that without a commitment from the Department to be notified when an affected individual has terrorist ties, there was little value to the default schedule which has high-risk chemical facilities submitting information about new affected individuals 48 hours prior to access to restricted areas or critical assets. Response: The CFATS Personnel Surety Program, when implemented, will identify affected individuals with terrorist ties. The Department has procedures in place that it will follow 31 See 72 FR 17688 (April 9, 2007) at https:// www.federalregister.gov/articles/2007/04/09/E76363/chemical-facility-anti-terrorism-standards#p302. PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 6433 to resolve the match and coordinate with appropriate law enforcement entities as necessary. The Department believes that 48 hours is a reasonable amount of time for the Department to successfully perform a background check for terrorist ties, and to coordinate with appropriate law enforcement entities as necessary. Comment: Several commenters suggested that by not committing to notify high-risk chemical facilities or designees when an affected individual has terrorist ties, the Department is increasing the risk of an affected individual with terrorist ties obtaining access to the restricted areas or critical assets at a high-risk chemical facility. Response: The Department’s design of the CFATS Program is intended to promote and enhance the security of high-risk chemical facilities; the Personnel Surety Program is one element of the larger CFATS Program. To prevent a significant threat to a facility or loss of life, a high-risk chemical facility will be contacted where appropriate and in accordance with federal law and policy, as well as law enforcement and intelligence requirements. Comment: One commenter suggested that the design of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program appears to indicate the Department is playing an investigative role rather than a preventative role. Response: The CFATS Personnel Surety Program is designed to identify affected individuals with terrorist ties who have or are seeking access to restricted areas or critical assets at highrisk chemical facilities. The Department does not lead the investigation of any affected individual with terrorist ties; rather the Department supports law enforcement investigation activity. The Department recognizes the significant and vested interest the high-risk chemical facility or designee may have in ensuring an affected individual with terrorist ties does not successfully carry out a terrorist attack against or involving a high-risk chemical facility. Comment: One commenter requested that the Department define what a highrisk chemical facility is. Response: Public Law 109–295 required the Department to identify and regulate the security of high-risk chemical facilities. The CFATS regulations implement this statute and describe how DHS determines which chemical facilities are high-risk chemical facilities. Defining high-risk chemical facilities is beyond the scope of this notice and is beyond the scope of the ICR for the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 6434 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices Comment: Several commenters pointed out that under Option 1, the Department will not be providing the results (i.e., that the affected individual does or does not have terrorist ties) to the high-risk chemical facility or designee, while under Option 2, the Department will be providing the results (i.e., that the Department was able to electronically verify that the affected individual is currently enrolled in either the TWIC, HME, or Trusted Traveler Programs). Some commenters suggested that not providing results under Option 1 but providing results under Option 2 was confusing. Some commenters suggested that by providing results under Option 2, high-risk chemical facilities will have greater confidence that the affected individual does not have terrorist ties (and the credential is not expired, has not been revoked, and is not fraudulent). The commenters pointed out that high-risk chemical facilities would also have greater confidence than when only relying on the visual inspection of the TWIC or other federal credential. Response: The Department has designed the CFATS Personnel Surety Program to support high-risk chemical facilities’ compliance with RBPS 12(iv) through a variety of options. The Department does agree that the flexibility high-risk chemical facilities and designees have does increase the complexity of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, however, this flexibility increases the ability of each high-risk chemical facility to be able to tailor their SSP or ASP to their unique business operations when considering how to comply with RBPS 12(iv). The Department also believes that this flexibility provides ancillary benefits. Specifically, a high-risk chemical facility may choose to rely on the electronic verification and reverifications provided by the Department under Option 2 to demonstrate compliance with RBPS 12(i)–(iii). A high-risk chemical facility may choose to rely on the Department’s electronic verification and reverification (provided via CSAT) under Option 2 not only for RBPS 12(iv) but also RBPS 12(i)–(iii) because an affected individual’s enrollment in the TWIC, HME, and Trusted Traveler Programs is dependent not only on an equivalent check for terrorist ties, but on several other factors such as a verification of identity, legal authorization to work, and a criminal history check. Therefore, a high-risk chemical facility may, in their SSP or ASP, choose to rely on the Department’s electronic verification and reverification that an affected individual VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 is currently enrolled in the TWIC, HME, and Trusted Traveler Programs as a means of complying with RBPS 12(i)– (iii). High-risk chemical facilities should carefully consider whether the specific elements of the security threat assessments performed under the TWIC, HME, or Trusted Traveler Programs meet their business and security needs before choosing to rely on them for compliance with RBPS 12(i)–(iii) in their SSP or ASP. The Department would like to highlight that, under Option 2, high-risk chemical facilities or designees will be able to, for the first time, electronically verify an affected individual’s enrollment in either the HME Program or Trusted Traveler Programs. Consequently, a high-risk chemical facility or designee may choose to rely on the Department verification of enrollment, Under Option 2, to comply with RBPS 12(iv) and RBPS 12(i)–(iii). Comment: Several commenters suggested that providing information about an affected individual to the Department prior to access would complicate the ability of a high-risk chemical facility or designee to substitute contract workers, service providers, third party carriers, and the like on short notice in the event of an accident, illness or change in work assignment/scope. Response: Earlier in this notice the Department outlined its understanding about how high-risk chemical facilities and designees could include steps for RBPS 12(iv) in their normal business operations when conducting the routine and normal background checks required for RBPS 12(i)–(iii). The steps a highrisk chemical facility normally takes to comply with RBPS 12(i)–(iii) when faced with substitute contract workers, service providers, third party carriers, and the like on short notice in the event of an accident, illness or change in work assignment/scope should be a part of a high-risk chemical facility’s SSP or ASP. These steps, or specific alternative steps to comply with RBPS 12(iv) could also be a part of, or incorporated within, those steps a high-risk chemical facility implements to comply with RBPS 12(i)– (iii) in their SSP or ASP. In addition, high-risk chemical facilities are welcome to propose alternative or supplemental options not described in this PRA notice in their SSPs or ASPs. The Department will assess the adequacy of such alternative or supplemental options on a facilityby-facility basis, in the course of evaluating each facility’s SSP or ASP. Comment: Submitters further suggested that providing information about an affected individual to the PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 Department prior to access could also complicate the admittance of specialized crews brought in to accomplish emergency repairs or provide emergency response services. Some commenters suggested that the Department’s approach to allow each high-risk chemical facility to address these issues in their SSP or ASP is not adequate because the absence of uniform guidance across all the sectors, programs and procedures will result in inconsistent processes and procedures. Response: Section 550 of Public Law 109–295 established a standards based regulatory regime to allow each highrisk chemical facility to propose in their SSP or ASP those security measures which make sense for its business operations and security risk. This will naturally result in inconsistent processes and procedures across highrisk chemical facilities. The Department believes that the intent of Section 550 is that flexibility (and thus some subsequent variation) is in fact a desired outcome of CFATS rather than a negative and unanticipated result of the CFATS regulatory program. The Department would also like to point out that P.L. 109–295 and its implementing regulations do not prohibit high-risk chemical facilities from developing consistent approaches or from adopting consistent security measures or security protocols. Comment: Several commenters pointed out an apparent inconsistency between the Department’s statement that high-risk chemical facilities are not required to create, keep, or retain records under RBPS 12(iv) and the Department’s statement that it may request information pertaining to affected individuals, previously provided to the Department by high-risk chemical facilities, or their designees, in order to confirm the accuracy of that information, or to conduct data accuracy reviews and audits as part of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. Commenters suggested that if records are not required to be kept it is unclear (1) how the Department can expect facilities to provide information on affected individuals to confirm the accuracy of previously submitted information or (2) how the Department can subject highrisk chemical facilities to data accuracy reviews and audits. Response: The Department disagrees that there is a contradiction because high-risk chemical facilities or their designees will already possess or have access to information about many affected individuals as a result of standard business practices related to employment or managing of service contracts. The Department also E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices recognizes that, unrelated to this Information Collection, high-risk chemical facilities may propose to maintain different sorts of records or information related to RBPS 12 as part of their SSPs or ASPs, and the Department expects that the records or information available could vary from one high-risk chemical facility to another. The types of information the Department could request from highrisk chemical facilities as part of data accuracy reviews or audits could thus vary from facility to facility, based on each facility’s standard business practices and SSP or ASP. Comment: Several commenters stated that they do not routinely collect information about affected individuals who are not employees (e.g., contractors and visitors). Response: The Department understands that high-risk chemical facilities may not routinely collect information about affected individuals who are not employees. Earlier in this notice the Department outlined several illustrative scenarios which describe some common business operations as part of which high-risk chemical facilities could manage the background check requirements of contractors and visitors under RBPS 12. In these illustrative scenarios there is not an expectation high-risk chemical facilities will receive and subsequently retransmit the information to the Department under Option 1 or Option 2. Though such an approach is not precluded, the Department will allow wide latitude to high-risk chemical facilities to enable third parties to submit information about affected individuals directly to the Department, to satisfy RBPS 12(iv). Comment: Several commenters requested clarity about what records would be considered government records. Response: Information about affected individuals held by the Department are government records. Thus information about affected individuals obtained from the Department (via CSAT) by high-risk chemical facilities or their designees are government records. There is often confusion about copies of information which is best clarified through illustrations. • ILLUSTRATION #1: A high-risk chemical facility or designee holds information about affected individuals which it obtained to perform the four background checks required under RBPS 12. This information does not qualify as government records. • ILLUSTRATION #2: A high-risk chemical facility or designee holds information about affected individuals VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 which it obtained to perform the four background checks required under RBPS 12. The high-risk chemical facility or designee submits portions of the information necessary under Option 1 and Option 2 to the Department via CSAT. The information in the possession of the high-risk chemical facility or designee does not qualify as government records. • ILLUSTRATION #3: A high-risk chemical facility or designee holds information about affected individuals which it obtained to perform the four background checks required under RBPS 12. The high-risk chemical facility or designee submits portions of the information necessary under Option 1 and Option 2 to the Department via CSAT. The high-risk chemical facility or designee logs into CSAT and downloads, prints, or copies one or more records about affected individuals. Only the records downloaded, printed, or copied from CSAT are government records. • ILLUSTRATION #4: A high-risk chemical facility or designee holds information about affected individuals which it obtained to perform the four background checks required under RBPS 12. The high-risk chemical facility or designee submits portions of the information necessary under Option 1 and Option 2 to the Department via CSAT. The high-risk chemical facility or designee logs into CSAT and downloads only whether or not an affected individual, under Option 2, has or has not been electronically verified as enrolled in the TWIC, HME, or Trusted Traveler Programs. The record of an affected individual’s enrollment status provided by the Department is a government record. Comment: Commenters requested additional information about what information and records, related to the CFATS Personnel Surety Program was and was not considered Chemicalterrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI). Response: The Department does not generally expect information and records related to the CFATS Personnel Surety Program to contain CVI. In the May 2011 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), the Department previously indicated that it would issue a ‘‘verification of receipt’’ and that the ‘‘verification of receipt qualifies as Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information.[.]’’ 32 However, as 32 See section 5.3 of the Privacy Impact Assessment for the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, dated May 4, 2011, and available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/ PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 6435 discussed earlier in this notice, instead the Department now intends to provide high-risk chemical facilities, and their designees, the ability to create an alert within the CSAT Personnel Surety application that can notify them when the Department has received information about an affected individual(s). Such an alert would not be CVI. Comment: One commenter was troubled by the information pertaining to RBPS–12 contained in Appendix C of the May 2009 Risk-Based Performance Standards Guidance (https:// www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_ cfats_riskbased_performance_ standards.pdf), because the commenter believes that certain types of measures, procedures, policies, and plans mentioned in Appendix C are not appropriate for determining if chemical facility personnel are terrorist threats. Response: The Department expects high-risk chemical facilities to implement appropriate security measures to conduct identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks. These security measures can vary from facility to facility commensurate with facilityspecific risks, security issues, and business practices. The guidance referenced by the commenter (see pages 180 to 186 of the Risk-Based Performance Standards Guidance) and other guidance addressing identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background checks, however, is not guidance addressing compliance with 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv), and as such is not the subject of this notice, nor is it the subject of the underlying ICR or of the 60-day notice preceding this notice. Comment: One commenter requested that the Department clarify what appeal or waiver options an affected individual has if his/her employer takes an adverse employment action against him/her based on RBPS–12 background checks or based on information received or obtained under the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. The commenter also requested that the Department prevent high-risk chemical facilities from using personal information collected from affected individuals as part of RBPS–12 for purposes other than conducting the background checks required by RBPS– 12. privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf. The Department also discussed ‘‘verification of receipt’’ in previous public notices related to an earlier (now withdrawn) ICR for the Personnel Surety Program—see for example NPPD’s June 14, 2011 PRA Response to Comments Document, 76 FR 34720, 34721. E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6436 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices Response: High-risk chemical facilities’ employment actions are not regulated by CFATS. The ICR the Department will submit to OMB, the 60-day notice, and the 30day notice address the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, not the identity, legal authorization to work, and criminal history background checks required by 6 CFR 230(a)(12)(i)–(iii). Discussion of information collected as part of those other three background checks, or employment decisions based on them, is beyond the scope of this notice. However, the Department expects that the high-risk chemical facilities and their designees will safeguard information collected and maintained under RBPS–12 as outlined in their SSP and in accordance with any other applicable federal, State, or local privacy laws which apply to the collection of the information. Comment: One commenter requested information about the controls to prevent an individual or the facility from using the personal information for purposes other than RBPS 12(iv). Response: The Department expects that high-risk chemical facilities and their designees will safeguard information collected and maintained under RBPS–12 as outlined in their SSP. While under CFATS, no additional specific controls are required by the Department for information collected by high-risk chemical facilities, the Department does expect that high-risk chemical facilities will protect and safeguard the information as outlined in their SSP or ASP in accordance with any other federal, State, or local privacy laws which apply to the collection of the information. The information collected by a highrisk chemical facility pursuant to RBPS 12(iv) may be submitted to DHS under Option 1 and Option 2. Information collected or retained by the facility that has not been submitted to DHS and facility-generated copies of information that have been submitted to DHS are not considered government records and therefore are not covered under the Privacy Act of 1974. However, any information about affected individuals that is obtained from the CSAT Personnel Surety application is a government record and subject to the Privacy Act of 1974. Those government records must be protected as stated in the DHS CSAT Personnel Surety application Rules of Behavior, which every CSAT user will be required to affirm prior to receiving access to the application. V. The Department’s Methodology in Estimating the Burden Summary of Changes From 60-Day Notice When compared to the 60-day notice, the Department made only a few changes which impacted the burden estimates in this notice. Table 3 below briefly summarizes them. TABLE 3—SUMMARY OF CHANGES ICR Burden Variables Description of changes Frequency ................................................................................................. Affected Public .......................................................................................... Number of Respondents .......................................................................... No Changes. No Changes. Revised the turnover rate of frequent visitors from 71% to 81.75%. As a result, the number of respondents increased from 192,000 affected individuals to 195,000 affected individuals. Updated from 0.54 hours to 0.58 hours as a result of the revised turnover rate increase. Updated from 104,100 hours to 113,600 hours as a result of the revised turnover rate increase. No Changes. No Changes. Updated from $4,771,00 to $4,844,000 as a result of the revised turnover rate increase. Estimated Time Per Respondent ............................................................. Total Burden Hours .................................................................................. Total Burden Cost (Capital/Startup) ......................................................... Total Recordkeeping ................................................................................ Total Burden Cost .................................................................................... Frequency The Department will expect, unless otherwise noted in an authorized or approved SSP or ASP, that high-risk chemical facilities submit information, under Option 1 and/or Option 2, about affected individuals in accordance with the schedule outlined below in Table 4. High-risk chemical facilities may suggest alternative schedules for Option 1 or Option 2 based on their unique circumstances in their SSPs or ASPs. The default schedule below would not apply to Option 3. Schedules for implementing Option 3, or alternative security measures other than Option 1 or Option 2, could vary from high-risk chemical facility to high-risk chemical facility, as described in individual facilities’ SSPs or ASPs, subject to approval by the Department. The Department will expect a highrisk chemical facility to begin submitting information about affected individuals under Option 1 and/or Option 2 under the schedule below after: (1) The high-risk chemical facility has been directed to comply with RBPS 12(iv); and (2) the high-risk chemical facility has been notified that the Department has implemented the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. TABLE 4—COMPLIANCE SCHEDULE FOR OPTION 1 AND OPTION 2 UNDER THE CFATS PERSONNEL SURETY PROGRAM tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Tier 1 Initial Submission Of Affected Individuals’ Information. VerDate Mar<15>2010 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 60 days after the day when both conditions are true: (1) DHS directs the facility to comply with RBPS 12(iv), AND 60 days after the day when both conditions are true: (1) DHS directs the facility to comply with RBPS 12(iv), AND 90 days after the day when both conditions are true: (1) DHS directs the facility to comply with RBPS 12(iv), AND 90 days after the day when both conditions are true: (1) DHS directs the facility to comply with RBPS 12(iv), AND 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6437 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices TABLE 4—COMPLIANCE SCHEDULE FOR OPTION 1 AND OPTION 2 UNDER THE CFATS PERSONNEL SURETY PROGRAM— Continued Tier 1 Submission Of A New Affected Individual’s Information. Submission Of Updates And Corrections To An Affected Individual’s Information Submission Of Notification That An Affected Individual No Longer Has Access Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 (2) DHS provides notification that it has implemented the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. 48 hours prior to access to restricted areas or critical assets. Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need for an update or correction. Within 90 days of access being removed. (2) DHS provides notification that it has implemented the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. 48 hours prior to access to restricted areas or critical assets. Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need for an update or correction. Within 90 days of access being removed. (2) DHS provides notification that it has implemented the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. 48 hours prior to access to restricted areas or critical assets. Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need for an update or correction. Within 90 days of access being removed. (2) DHS provides notification that it has implemented the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. 48 hours prior to access to restricted areas or critical assets. Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need for an update or correction. Within 90 days of access being removed. Therefore, after evaluating the choices available to the Department under Question 16 on the Paperwork Reduction Act Submission form (Standard Form–83(i)),33 the Department believes that the description of ‘‘Other: In accordance with the compliance schedule or the facility SSP or ASP’’ is the most appropriate choice. • the number of unescorted visitors at each type of high-risk chemical facility, and • the number of facility personnel and resident contractors at each type of high-risk chemical facility. Affected Public The number of respondents under this collection is the number of affected individuals that high-risk chemical facilities or their designees submit information about in compliance with RBPS 12(iv). As described more fully below, for the purpose of this notice the number of respondents is estimated by multiplying: • The estimated number and types of high-risk chemical facilities, and • the estimated number of affected individuals at each type of high-risk chemical facility. For the purpose of this notice, the Department estimates the number of affected individuals at each type of high-risk chemical facility as the sum of: In the 60-day notice, the Department followed the methodology used in the 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment 34 which recognized that each chemical facility is unique. In the 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment the Department determined that it was impractical to estimate costs for each high-risk chemical facility. Therefore, the Department created four categories of facilities for each tier; three categories of facilities where loss of containment of the chemicals of interest is the primary concern and one category of facilities where theft and diversion of chemicals is the primary concern. Specifically, • Group A includes open facilities with 100 or more employees where loss of containment is the primary concern. These facilities are assumed to have five security entrances for the purpose of the cost analysis. • Group B includes open facilities with 99 or fewer employees where loss of containment is the primary concern. In addition, facilities that store anhydrous ammonia for commercial refrigeration in outdoor vessels are also considered ‘‘open’’ for the purpose of this analysis because it is the outdoor storage that requires protection. These facilities are assumed to have two security entrances for the purpose of the cost analysis. 33 A blank copy of Standard Form 83(i) may be found at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ files/omb/inforeg/83i-fill.pdf. 34 See CFATS Regulatory Assessment Section 5.1 (April 1, 2007), https://www.regulations.gov/ #!documentDetail;D=DHS-2006-0073-0116. Most high-risk chemical facilities regulated under CFATS are private businesses, or parts of private businesses. Most people that access the restricted areas and critical assets of high-risk chemical facilities do so for business purposes. Therefore, after evaluating the choices available to the Department on Standard Form 83(i), the Department selected the description of ‘‘Business or other for-profit’’ as the most appropriate selection for this proposed Information Collection. tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Number of Respondents VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 Number and Type of High-Risk Chemical Facilities PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 • Group C facilities are enclosed facilities where loss of containment is the primary concern (i.e., warehouses, enclosed manufacturing sites) that manufacture, process, use, store and/or distribute chemicals. The Department did not segment enclosed facilities by size because the same degree of variation between a large open facility (i.e., a 2,000-acre petrochemical complex) and a small open 3–5-acre facility does not exist. These facilities are assumed to have one security entrance for the purpose of the cost analysis. • Theft/Diversion facilities are typically merchant wholesalers (often called chemical distributors), chemical manufacturers, or other manufacturers that manufacture, process, use, store or distribute chemicals that could be the target of theft and diversion. The theft of chemicals could include theft of portable containers by employees, visitors or adversaries. The diversion of chemicals involves what often looks like a legitimate transaction where an adversary, impersonating a legitimate customer, purchases chemicals that could later be turned into weapons. These facilities are assumed to have one security entrance for the purposes of cost analysis. In the 60-day notice, the Department updated the number and type of highrisk chemical facilities estimated in the 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment. The updated analysis, hereafter referred to as the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis, determined the highrisk chemical facility count for each of the 16 model facility categories identified in the 2007 Regulatory Assessment by analyzing high-risk chemical facilities designated with a final tier under CFATS as of August 2012. A comparison of the number of high-risk chemical facilities, estimated E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6438 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices by the 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment, to the number of high-risk chemical facilities identified within the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis is presented in Table 5. TABLE 5—NUMBER OF FACILITIES IN EACH MODEL FACILITY CATEGORY 2007 CFATS regulatory assessment Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 2012 CFATS personnel surety program analysis (raw data) Group A ............................................................................................................................................. Group B ............................................................................................................................................. Group C ............................................................................................................................................. Theft .................................................................................................................................................. Group A ............................................................................................................................................. Group B ............................................................................................................................................. Group C ............................................................................................................................................. Theft .................................................................................................................................................. Group A ............................................................................................................................................. Group B ............................................................................................................................................. Group C ............................................................................................................................................. Theft .................................................................................................................................................. Group A ............................................................................................................................................. Group B ............................................................................................................................................. Group C ............................................................................................................................................. Theft .................................................................................................................................................. 81 89 24 6 166 64 80 189 315 438 329 718 242 690 599 970 4 6 10 93 8 16 15 400 22 33 66 935 72 190 13 1,683 Total ...................................................................................................................................................... 5,000 3,566 In the 60-day notice, the Department normalized the number of facilities in each model facility category of the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis to 4,000 facilities by multiplying the number of high-risk chemical facilities in each category by a factor of 1.22.35 The 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis revised (i.e., normalized) high-risk chemical facility count is compared to the 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment high-risk chemical facility count, by model facility category, in Table 6. TABLE 6—NUMBER OF HIGH-RISK CHEMICAL FACILITIES IN EACH MODEL FACILITY CATEGORY [Normalized to 4,000 facilities] 2007 CFATS regulatory assessment Group A ............................................................................................................................................. Group B ............................................................................................................................................. Group C ............................................................................................................................................. Theft .................................................................................................................................................. Group A ............................................................................................................................................. Group B ............................................................................................................................................. Group C ............................................................................................................................................. Theft .................................................................................................................................................. Group A ............................................................................................................................................. Group B ............................................................................................................................................. Group C ............................................................................................................................................. Theft .................................................................................................................................................. Group A ............................................................................................................................................. Group B ............................................................................................................................................. Group C ............................................................................................................................................. Theft .................................................................................................................................................. 81 89 24 6 166 64 80 189 315 438 329 718 242 690 599 970 4 7 11 104 9 18 17 449 25 37 74 1,049 81 213 15 1,888 Total ...................................................................................................................................................... tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 2012 CFATS personnel surety program analysis (normalized) 5,000 4,000 As in the 60-day notice, this notice the Department continues to use the number and type of high-risk chemical facilities in each facility category estimated through the normalized 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis because the distribution of facility type (i.e., facility count) is based upon actual historical data. 35 The factor of 1.22 was used because (4,000 facilities/3566 facilities) = 1.22. VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6439 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices Estimated Number of Affected Individuals at Each Type of High-Risk Chemical Facility—Unescorted Visitors With Access to Restricted Areas or Critical Assets For the purpose of estimating the potential burden this information collection could impose, the Department determined that it was appropriate to continue to use the conservative assumptions from the American Chemistry Council (ACC) about frequent and infrequent visitors and treat them all as unescorted visitors.36 Specifically, the ACC provided the Department with an estimate on the number and turnover of frequent and infrequent visitors at highrisk chemical facilities. ACC’s analysis suggests that 1,200 total visitors per year should be expected at large open manufacturing facilities that align with Group A (Tier 1 through 4) model facility categories; 300 visitors each at small open manufacturing facilities (Group B model facility categories, Tier 1 through 4) and enclosed manufacturing facilities (Group C model facility categories, Tier 1 through 4); and 50 visitors expected at theft/diversion model facilities (Tier 1 through 4). ACC estimated an annual turnover rate of 71 percent for frequent visitors (e.g., delivery personnel) and an annual turnover rate of 20 percent for infrequent visitors that only visit the facility once or twice a year (e.g., corporate auditors). In response to the 60-day notice, the Department received a comment from American Trucking Associations (ATA) that suggested the annual turnover rate for frequent visitors (e.g., delivery personnel) suggested by ACC is too low. ATA suggested that the Department use a turnover rate of 81.75% instead of 71%. As a result, the Department increased its estimate of the frequent visitor annual turnover rate to 81.75%. The Department also continues to maintain the assumption in the 60-day notice that frequent and infrequent visitors were expected to compose equal volume of traffic at high-risk chemical facilities. ACC’s analysis assumed that all visitors count towards the number of affected individuals. However, high-risk chemical facilities will only be responsible for submitting information for unescorted visitors with access to restricted areas or critical assets. The Department does not expect high-risk chemical facilities to allow large numbers of visitors to have unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets. As a general matter, the Department does not believe it to be likely that many high-risk chemical facilities will propose in their SSPs under CFATS to allow large numbers of visitors to have unescorted access to the restricted areas and critical assets of high-risk chemical facilities because then these visitors would be subject to all four types of background checks listed in RBPS 12. However, for the purpose of estimating the potential burden this information collection could impose, the Department continues to use ACC’s conservative assumptions about frequent and infrequent visitors and treat them all as unescorted visitors. Table 7 provides the Department’s estimated number of unescorted visitors that have or are seeking access to restricted areas or critical assets. TABLE 7—ESTIMATE OF UNESCORTED VISITORS THAT HAVE OR ARE SEEKING ACCESS TO RESTRICTED AREAS OR CRITICAL ASSETS A 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 C* D** E=C+D A+B+E Infrequent visitors Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier B Frequent visitors Infrequent visitor annual turnover (20%) Frequent visitor annul turnover (81.75%) Unescorted visitor annual turnover Unescorted visitor estimate Group A ......................................... Group B ......................................... Group C ......................................... Theft .............................................. Group A ......................................... Group B ......................................... Group C ......................................... Theft .............................................. Group A ......................................... Group B ......................................... Group C ......................................... Theft .............................................. Group A ......................................... Group B ......................................... Group C ......................................... Theft .............................................. 600 150 150 25 600 150 150 25 600 150 150 25 600 150 150 25 600 150 150 25 600 150 150 25 600 150 150 25 600 150 150 25 120 30 30 5 120 30 30 5 120 30 30 5 120 30 30 5 491 123 123 20 491 123 123 20 491 123 123 20 491 123 123 20 611 153 153 25 611 153 153 25 611 153 153 25 611 153 153 25 1811 453 453 75 1811 453 453 75 1811 453 453 75 1811 453 453 75 * C = A × 0.20, ** D = B × 0.8175. tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Estimated Number of Affected Individuals at Each Type of High-Risk Chemical Facility—Facility Personnel With Access to Restricted Areas or Critical Assets The 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment also provided an estimate of full time employees and resident contractors for the 16 model facility categories, as shown in Table 8.37 36 This cost estimate has been posted to Docket DHS–2012–0061, which may be accessed through the Federal eRulemaking Portal at https:// www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS2012-0061-0008. 37 See CFATS Regulatory Assessment Section 6.3.7, Table 15 (April 1, 2007), https:// www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS2006-0073-0116. VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6440 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices TABLE 8—2007 CFATS REGULATORY ASSESSMENT ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND RESIDENT CONTRACTORS A C* D** A+C+D Number of full time employees per facility Resident contractors per facility (as percent of full time employees) Resident contractors per facility 20% Annual turnover (full time employees and resident contractors per facility) Number of full time employees and resident contractors per facility (including 20% annual turnover) Group A ..................................................................... Group B ..................................................................... Group C ..................................................................... Theft .......................................................................... Group A ..................................................................... Group B ..................................................................... Group C ..................................................................... Theft .......................................................................... Group A ..................................................................... Group B ..................................................................... Group C ..................................................................... Theft .......................................................................... Group A ..................................................................... Group B ..................................................................... Group C ..................................................................... Theft .......................................................................... 391 35 152 35 279 34 317 35 487 47 310 35 283 139 201 35 30 20 10 10 30 20 10 10 30 20 10 10 30 20 10 10 117 7 15 4 84 7 32 4 146 9 31 4 85 28 20 4 102 8 33 8 73 8 70 8 127 11 68 8 74 33 44 8 610 50 200 47 436 49 419 47 760 67 409 47 442 200 265 47 Total .............................................................................. Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier B n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 *C = A × B, **D = (A + C) × 0.20. In the June 2011 ICR, the Department updated the estimate of employees and resident contractors in the 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment in response to a survey submitted by the American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers 38 during the 30 day comment period associated with the previous CFATS Personnel Surety Program ICR.39 Specifically, the Department increased the estimated number of full time employees/contractors in Group A facilities by 5, as shown in Table 9. TABLE 9—REVISED 2007 CFATS REGULATORY ASSESSMENT ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND RESIDENT CONTRACTORS Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 B C* D** A+C+D Number of full time employees per facility tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 A Resident contractors per facility (as percent of full time employees) Resident contractors per facility 20% Annual turnover (full time employees and resident contractors per facility) Number of full time employees and resident contractors per facility (including 20% annual turnover) 1,955 35 152 35 1,395 34 317 35 2,435 47 310 35 30 20 10 10 30 20 10 10 30 20 10 10 Group A ..................................................................... Group B ..................................................................... Group C ..................................................................... Theft .......................................................................... Group A ..................................................................... Group B ..................................................................... Group C ..................................................................... Theft .......................................................................... Group A ..................................................................... Group B ..................................................................... Group C ..................................................................... Theft .......................................................................... 38 The American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers is the name of the former National Petrochemical & Refiners Association, whose comment may be found at https:// VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS2009-0026-0029. 39 See Response To Comments Received During 30 Day Comment Period: New Information PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 587 7 15 4 419 7 32 4 731 9 31 4 508 8 33 8 363 8 70 8 633 11 68 8 3,050 50 201 46 2,176 49 418 46 3,799 68 409 46 Collection Request 1670—NEW, 76 FR 34720 (June 14, 2011). E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6441 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices TABLE 9—REVISED 2007 CFATS REGULATORY ASSESSMENT ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND RESIDENT CONTRACTORS—Continued A C* D** A+C+D Number of full time employees per facility Resident contractors per facility (as percent of full time employees) Resident contractors per facility 20% Annual turnover (full time employees and resident contractors per facility) Number of full time employees and resident contractors per facility (including 20% annual turnover) Group A ..................................................................... Group B ..................................................................... Group C ..................................................................... Theft .......................................................................... 1,415 139 201 35 30 20 10 10 425 28 20 4 368 33 44 8 2,207 200 265 46 Total .............................................................................. Tier Tier Tier Tier B n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 4 4 4 4 *C = A × B, **D = (A + C) × 0.20. In addition to submitting comments on the Department’s June 2011 estimated burden about unescorted visitors, ACC also suggested that 80 percent of employees/resident contractors have access to restricted areas and/or critical assets at Group A, B and C facilities and only 15 percent of employees/resident contractors have access to theft/diversion facilities. To provide an additional estimate of the number of respondents the Department applied this ACC assumption to the revised 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis. The resulting estimate, referred to as the ‘‘Adjusted June 2011 ICR Estimate of the Number of Full Time Employees and Resident Contractors’’ is shown in Table 10. TABLE 10—ADJUSTED JUNE 2011 ICR ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND RESIDENT CONTRACTORS A tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 C* D** A+C+D E (A+C+D) × E Number of full time employees per facility Resident contractors per facility (as percent of full time employees) Resident contractors per facility 20% annual turnover (full time employees and resident contractors per facility) Number of full time employees and resident contractors per facility (including 20% annual turnover) ACC’s estimate of full time employees and contractors with access to restricted areas or critical assets (percent) Number of full time employees and resident contractors per facility with access to restricted areas or critical assets (including 20% annual turnover) 1 Group A ............. 1 Group B ............. 1 Group C ............. 1 Theft .................. 2 Group A ............. 2 Group B ............. Group C ................ 2 Theft .................. 3 Group A ............. 3 Group B ............. 3 Group C ............. 3 Theft .................. 4 Group A ............. 4 Group B ............. 4 Group C ............. 4 Theft .................. 1,955 35 152 35 1,395 34 317 35 2,435 47 310 35 1,415 139 201 35 30 20 10 10 30 20 10 10 30 20 10 10 30 20 10 10 587 7 15 4 419 7 32 4 731 9 31 4 425 28 20 4 508 8 33 8 363 8 70 8 633 11 68 8 368 33 44 8 3,050 50 201 46 2,176 49 418 46 3,799 68 409 46 2,207 200 265 46 80 80 80 15 80 80 80 15 80 80 80 15 80 80 80 15 2,440 40 161 7 1,741 39 335 7 3,039 54 327 7 1,766 160 212 7 Total ...................... Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier B n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a *C = A × B, **D = (A + C) × 0.020. For the purpose of this notice, the Department also evaluated whether or VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 not the 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment should continue to be the PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 basis for the estimate of full time employees and resident contractors. To E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6442 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices provide an additional estimate of the number of respondents, the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis analyzed actual information submitted by high-risk chemical facilities in response to Top-Screen 40 Question Q:1.45–400.41 Based upon the submitted information, the Department was able to estimate full time employees and resident contractors by each model facility category, as shown in Table 11. TABLE 11—2012 CFATS PERSONNEL SURETY PROGRAM ANALYSIS’ ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND RESIDENT CONTRACTORS A B Response to top screen question Q:1.45–400 Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 Group A ................... Group B ................... Group C .................. Theft ........................ Group A ................... Group B ................... Group C .................. Theft ........................ Group A ................... Group B ................... Group C .................. Theft ........................ Group A ................... Group B ................... Group C .................. Theft ........................ 599 36 300 653 222 30 489 416 594 33 188 233 737 17 175 195 Total ............................ Resident contractors per facility 20% annual turnover (full time employees and resident contractors per facility) Number of full time employees and resident contractors per facility (including 20% annual turnover) 120 7 60 131 44 6 98 83 119 7 38 47 147 3 35 39 719 43 360 783 267 36 587 499 713 39 225 279 884 20 211 234 n/a Resident contractors per facility (as percent of full time employees) A+B n/a n/a N/A—Top Screen Question Q1:1.45–400 incorporates estimate of resident contractors * In question Top Screen Question Q:1.45–400, facilities provide both full time employees and resident contractors. Table 12 compares the estimates of full time employees and resident contractors in the: (1) 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment; (2) ICR submitted in June of 2011; (3) adjusted June 2011 ICR Estimate of the Number of Full Time Employees and Resident Contractors; and (4) 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis. TABLE 12—AVERAGE NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS PER FACILITY BY MODEL FACILITY CATEGORY tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 2007 CFATS regulatory assessment Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 Group A ................................................................................................. Group B ................................................................................................. Group C ................................................................................................. Theft ...................................................................................................... Group A ................................................................................................. Group B ................................................................................................. Group C ................................................................................................. Theft ...................................................................................................... Group A ................................................................................................. Group B ................................................................................................. Group C ................................................................................................. Theft ...................................................................................................... Group A ................................................................................................. Group B ................................................................................................. 40 Top-Screen is defined at 6 CFR 27.105. refers to the specific question reference number in the online Top-Screen 41 Q:1.45–400 VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 Frm 00026 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 3,050 50 201 46 2,176 49 418 46 3,799 68 409 46 2,207 200 2,440 40 161 7 1,741 39 335 7 3,039 54 327 7 1,766 160 610 50 200 47 436 49 419 47 760 67 409 47 442 200 application which is not available to the general public. However, the exact text of the question is available on page 20 of the CSAT Top-Screen Survey Application User Guide v1.99 in the row PO 00000 Estimate used in June 2011 ICR June 2011 ICR (adjusted with ACC’s assumption on facility personnel with access to restricted areas or critical assets) 2012 CFATS personnel surety program analysis 719 43 360 783 267 36 587 499 713 39 225 279 884 20 entitled, ‘‘Number of Full Time Employees.’’ See https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_ csattopscreenusersmanual.pdf. E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6443 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices TABLE 12—AVERAGE NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS PER FACILITY BY MODEL FACILITY CATEGORY—Continued Estimate used in June 2011 ICR 265 46 2007 CFATS regulatory assessment Tier 4 Group C ................................................................................................. Tier 4 Theft ...................................................................................................... When evaluating the reasonable alternatives (see next section) to estimate the total number of respondents, the Department did not consider alternatives that used an assumption about the full time employees and resident contractors estimates from the 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment or the estimate in the June 2011 ICR. Rather, when evaluating the reasonable alternatives to estimate the total number of respondents (see the next section of this document for this evaluation), the Department opted to use the best available industry estimates, as well as actual historical data collected directly from high-risk chemical facilities, to estimate the full time employees and resident contractors. Namely: (1) the adjusted June 2011 ICR estimate of full time employees and resident contractors, and June 2011 ICR (adjusted with ACC’s assumption on facility personnel with access to restricted areas or critical assets) 212 7 265 47 (2) the estimate of full time employees and resident contractors in the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis. Summary of Alternatives To Estimate the Number of Respondents As mentioned above, for the purpose of this notice, the number of respondents is estimated by multiplying: • The number and type of high-risk chemical facilities, and • the number of affected individuals at each type of high-risk chemical facility. For the purpose of this notice, the Department estimates the number of affected individuals at each type of high-risk chemical facility as the sum of: • The number of unescorted visitors at each type of high-risk chemical facility, and 2012 CFATS personnel surety program analysis 211 234 • the number of facility personnel and resident contractors at each type of high-risk chemical facility. In light of the data submitted by commenters and the Department’s own analysis, three alternatives for the total number of respondents were considered by the Department. First, the total number of respondents is based on: a. The number and type of high-risk chemical facilities assumed in the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis; b. the ACC’s estimates about unescorted visitors; and c. the adjusted June 2011 ICR estimate of the number of full time employees and resident contractors. This alternative results in an estimate of an initial 995,944 respondents with an annual turnover of 313,819 respondents. See Table 13. TABLE 13—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS—ALTERNATIVE 1 (A + B) × C B A B C Number of full time employees and resident contractors CFATS personnel surety program ICR withdrawn in July of 2012 (including 20% annual turnover) (Table 8) tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 A Estimate of full time employees and contractors with access to restricted areas or critical assets (Percent) Full time employees and resident contractors CFATS personnel surety program ICR withdrawn in July of 2012 with estimates of percentage of employees/ resident contractors with restricted area and/ or critical asset (Table 9) ACC unescorted visitor estimate (including 81.75% turnover for frequent visitors, 20% turnover for infrequent visitors) Table 6) Number of facilities (Table 5) 3,050 50 80 80 2,440 40 1,811 453 4 7 Tier 1 Group A ........... Tier 1 Group B ........... VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 D E (D + E) × C Number of initial respondents (includes 20% annual turnover) CFATS personnel surety program ICR withdrawn in July of 2011 20% annual turnover (Table 9) ACC unescorted visitors annual turnover (Table 6) Annual respondent turnover 19,071 3,318 508 8 611 153 5,020 1,084 E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6444 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices TABLE 13—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS—ALTERNATIVE 1—Continued D E (D + E) × C Number of initial respondents (includes 20% annual turnover) CFATS personnel surety program ICR withdrawn in July of 2011 20% annual turnover (Table 9) ACC unescorted visitors annual turnover (Table 6) Annual respondent turnover 11 104 9 18 17 449 25 37 74 1,049 81 213 15 1,888 6,878 8,592 31,870 8,826 13,248 36,957 119,671 18,759 57,744 86,387 288,842 130,592 9,695 155,496 33 8 363 8 70 8 633 11 68 8 368 33 44 8 153 25 611 153 153 25 611 153 153 25 611 153 153 25 2,087 3,457 8,733 2,886 3,741 14,868 30,689 6,067 16,348 34,754 79,018 39,638 2,870 62,558 4,000 995,944 n/a n/a 313,819 A A B C Number of full time employees and resident contractors CFATS personnel surety program ICR withdrawn in July of 2012 (including 20% annual turnover) (Table 8) Estimate of full time employees and contractors with access to restricted areas or critical assets (Percent) Full time employees and resident contractors CFATS personnel surety program ICR withdrawn in July of 2012 with estimates of percentage of employees/ resident contractors with restricted area and/ or critical asset (Table 9) ACC unescorted visitor estimate (including 81.75% turnover for frequent visitors, 20% turnover for infrequent visitors) Table 6) Number of facilities (Table 5) Group C ........... Theft ................. Group A ........... Group B ........... Group C ........... Theft ................. Group A ........... Group B ........... Group C ........... Theft ................. Group A ........... Group B ........... Group C ........... Theft ................. 201 46 2,176 49 418 46 3,799 68 409 46 2,207 200 265 46 80 15 80 80 80 15 80 80 80 15 80 80 80 15 161 7 1,741 39 335 7 3,039 54 327 7 1,766 160 212 7 453 75 1,811 453 453 75 1,811 453 453 75 1,811 453 453 75 Total .................... Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier B n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Second, the total number of respondents is based on: a. The number and type of high-risk chemical facilities assumed in the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis; b. the ACC’s estimates about unescorted visitors; VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 (A + B) × C c. the number of full time employees and resident contractors estimated by the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis; and d. ACC’s estimate of the percentage of resident employees and contractors with PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 access to restricted areas or critical assets. This alternative results in an estimate of an initial 919,646 respondents with an annual turnover of 416,879 respondents. See Table 14. E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6445 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices TABLE 14—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS—ALTERNATIVE 2 (A × B) = C A 2012 CFATS personnel surety program analysis average number of full time employees and contractors (including 20% turnover) (Table 10) Estimate of full time employees and contractors with access to restricted areas or critical assets (percent) Group A ........... Group B ........... Group C ........... Theft ................. Group A ........... Group B ........... Group C ........... Theft ................. Group A ........... Group B ........... Group C ........... Theft ................. Group A ........... Group B ........... Group C ........... Theft ................. 719 43 360 783 267 36 587 499 713 39 225 279 884 20 211 234 Total .................... Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier B n/a 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 (C + D) × E E Average number of full time employees and contractors (including 20% turnover) ACC unescorted visitor estimate (including 81.75% turnover for frequent visitors, 20% turnover for infrequent visitors) (Table 6) Number of facilities (Table 5) 80 80 80 15 80 80 80 15 80 80 80 15 80 80 80 15 575 34 288 118 213 29 469 75 571 31 180 42 707 16 168 35 1811 453 453 75 1,811 453 453 75 1,811 453 453 75 1,811 453 453 75 n/a Third the total number of respondents is based on: a. The number and type of high-risk chemical facilities assumed in the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis; b. the ACC’s estimates about unescorted visitors; D n/a n/a (F + G) × E F G Number of initial respondents (includes 20% annual turnover) 2012 CFATS personnel surety program analysis 20% annual turnover (Table 10) ACC unescorted visitors annual turnover (Table 6) Annual respondent turnover 4 7 11 104 9 18 17 449 25 37 74 1,049 81 213 15 1,888 10,702 3,278 8,304 20,127 18,161 8,645 15,514 67,405 58,760 17,917 46,854 123,087 203,357 99,897 9,057 208,578 120 7 60 131 44 6 98 83 119 7 38 47 147 3 35 39 611 153 153 25 611 153 153 25 611 153 153 25 611 153 153 25 3,277 1,075 2,384 16,273 5,877 2,848 4,214 48,700 17,999 5,892 14,079 75,533 61,209 33,243 2,737 121,538 4,000 919,646 n/a n/a 416,879 c. the number of full time employees and resident contractors estimated by the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis; and d. does not include ACC’s estimate of the percentage of resident employees and contractors with access to restricted areas or critical assets. This alternative results in an estimate of an initial 1,830,356 respondents with an annual turnover of 416,879 respondents. See Table 15. TABLE 15—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS—ALTERNATIVE 3 (A × B) = C tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 A 2012 CFATS personnel surety proram analysis average number of full time employees and contractors (including 20% turnover) (Table 10) Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier 1 1 1 1 2 B Estimate of full time employees and contractors with access to restricted areas or critical assets (percent) 719 43 360 783 267 100 100 100 100 100 Group A ........... Group B ........... Group C ........... Theft ................. Group A ........... VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 D E (C + D) × E Average number of full time employees and contractors (including 20% turnover) ACC unescorted visitor estimate (including 81.75% turnover for frequent visitors, 20% turnover for infrequent visitors) (Table 6) Number of facilities (Table 5) 719 43 360 783 267 1,811 453 453 75 1,811 4 7 11 104 9 Frm 00029 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 (F + G) × E F G Number of initial respondents 2012 CFATS personnel surety program analysis 20% annual turnover (Table 10) ACC unescorted visitors annual turnover (Table 6) Annual respondent turnover 11,347 3,336 9,111 89,587 18,640 120 7 60 131 44 611 153 153 25 611 3,277 1,075 2,384 16,273 5,877 E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6446 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices TABLE 15—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS—ALTERNATIVE 3—Continued (A × B) = C D E (C + D) × E Average number of full time employees and contractors (including 20% turnover) ACC unescorted visitor estimate (including 81.75% turnover for frequent visitors, 20% turnover for infrequent visitors) (Table 6) Number of facilities (Table 5) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 36 587 499 713 39 225 279 884 20 211 234 453 453 75 1,811 453 453 75 1,811 453 453 75 n/a n/a n/a A 2012 CFATS personnel surety proram analysis average number of full time employees and contractors (including 20% turnover) (Table 10) Estimate of full time employees and contractors with access to restricted areas or critical assets (percent) Group B ........... Group C ........... Theft ................. Group A ........... Group B ........... Group C ........... Theft ................. Group A ........... Group B ........... Group C ........... Theft ................. 36 587 499 713 39 225 279 884 20 211 234 Total .................... Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier B n/a 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 (F + G) × E F G Number of initial respondents 2012 CFATS personnel surety program analysis 20% annual turnover (Table 10) ACC unescorted visitors annual turnover (Table 6) Annual respondent turnover 18 17 449 25 37 74 1,049 81 213 15 1,888 8,775 17,489 257,567 62,281 18,208 50,191 372,244 217,641 100,755 9,671 583,514 6 98 83 119 7 38 47 147 3 35 39 153 153 25 611 153 153 25 611 153 153 25 2,848 4,214 48,700 17,999 5,892 14,079 75,533 61,209 33,243 2,737 121,538 4,000 1,830,356 n/a n/a 416,879 These three alternatives are summarized in Table 16. TABLE 16—COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS FOR ALTERNATIVES 1, 2 AND 3 Initial Year Alternative 1 ..................................................................................................... Alternative 2 ..................................................................................................... Alternative 3 ..................................................................................................... tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 For the purpose of this notice the Department selected alternative 3. Alternative 3 reasonably reflects the type and number of facilities regulated by CFATS, is based upon the actual number of full time employees and contractors as reported by high-risk chemical facilities, and explicitly estimates unescorted visitors as a separate population from facility employees and resident contractors. VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:54 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 995,944 919,646 1,830,356 Limitation of Respondents to Tier 1 and Tier 2 Facilities The Department is proposing to limit this information collection, and to limit initial CFATS Personnel Surety Program implementation, to only Tier 1 and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities. A limited implementation would enable the Department to implement the CFATS Personnel Surety Program for those facilities presenting the highest risk, while not imposing the burden on all PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 Year 2 313,819 416,879 416,879 Year 3 313,819 416,879 416,879 Number of respondents (annual average) 541,194 584,468 888,038 CFATS regulated facilities. Assuming this information collection request is approved, a subsequent ICR would be published and submitted to OMB for approval to incorporate any lessons learned and potential improvements to the CFATS Personnel Surety Program prior to collecting information from Tier 3 and Tier 4 high-risk chemical facilities. Table 17 provides the estimate of the number of respondents using alternative 3 for Tier 1 and 2 high-risk chemical facilities. E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6447 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices TABLE 17—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF TIER 1 & 2 RESPONDENTS (A × B) = C D E (C + D) × E Average number of full time employees and contractors (Including 20% turnover) ACC unescorted visitor estimate (including 81.75% turnover for frequent visitors, 20% turnover for infrequent visitors) (Table 6) Number of facilities (Table 5) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 719 43 360 783 267 36 587 499 1,811 453 453 75 1,811 453 453 75 n/a n/a n/a A 2012 CFATS personnel surety program analysis average number of full time employees and contractors (including 20% turnover) (Table 10) Estimate of full time employees and contractors with access to restricted areas or critical assets (Percent) Group A ........... Group B ........... Group C ........... Theft ................. Group A ........... Group B ........... Group C ........... Theft ................. 719 43 360 783 267 36 587 499 Total .................... Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier B n/a 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 Therefore, the annual average number of respondents is equal to 195,049, as shown in Table 18. The Department’s (F = G) × E F G Number of initial respondents 2012 CFATS personnel surety program analysis 20% annual turnover (Table 10) ACC unescorted visitors annual turnover (Table 6) Annual respondent turnover 4 7 11 104 9 18 17 449 11,347 3,336 9,111 89,587 18,640 8,775 17,489 257,567 120 7 60 131 44 6 98 83 611 153 153 25 611 153 153 25 3,277 1,075 2,384 16,273 5,877 2,848 4,214 48,700 n/a 415,852 n/a n/a 84,648 rounded estimate is 195,000 respondents. TABLE 18—ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS FOR TIER 1 & 2 FACILITIES A 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 C (A + B + C)/3 Total respondents year 1 Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier B Total respondents year 2 Total respondents year 3 Number of respondents (annual average) Group A ................................................................................................. Group B ................................................................................................. Group C ................................................................................................. Theft ...................................................................................................... Group A ................................................................................................. Group B ................................................................................................. Group C ................................................................................................. Theft ...................................................................................................... 11,347 3,336 9,111 89,587 18,640 8,775 17,489 257,567 3,277 1,075 2,384 16,273 5,877 2,848 4,214 48,700 3,277 1,075 2,384 16,273 5,877 2,848 4,214 48,700 5,967 1,829 4,627 40,711 10,132 4,823 8,639 118,322 Total .......................................................................................................... 415,852 84,648 84,648 195,049 Total Annual Burden Hours tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 The total annual burden hours were estimated in a three step process. The VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 first step was to derive from previous tables in this notice the estimated number of initial submissions for Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities: (1) Full time PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 employees and contractors, (2) frequent visitors, and (3) infrequent visitors. The derived estimates are shown in Table 18. E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6448 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices TABLE 19—STEP 1 OF ESTIMATING THE TOTAL ANNUAL BURDEN HOURS [Estimate of initial submissions for Tier 1 & 2 facilities in Year 1] A C D E = (A × D) F = (B × D) G = (C × D) Response to top screen question Q:1.45–400 (Table 11) Initial submissions— frequent visitors (Table 7) Initial submissions— infrequent visitors (Table 7) 2012 CFATS personnel surety program analysis (normalized) (Table 6) Initial submissions— full time employees and contractors (Year 1) Initial submissions— frequent visitors (Year 1) Initial submissions— infrequent visitors (Year 1) Group A ........................... Group B ........................... Group C ........................... Theft ................................ Group A ........................... Group B ........................... Group C ........................... Theft ................................ 599 36 300 653 222 30 489 416 600 150 150 25 600 150 150 25 600 150 150 25 600 150 150 25 4 7 11 104 9 18 17 449 2,686 241 3,362 68,098 1,994 543 8,228 186,433 2,692 1,010 1,683 2,608 5,384 2,692 2,524 11,217 2,692 1,010 1,683 2,608 5,384 2,692 2,524 11,217 Total .................................... Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier B n/a n/a n/a n/a 271,585 29,809 29,809 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 The second step of estimating the total annual burden hours was to estimate the average annual number of submission by the type of submission. The average annual number of submissions, by the type of submission for Tier 1 and Tier 2 Facilities over three years is shown in Table 20. TABLE 20—STEP 2 OF ESTIMATING THE TOTAL ANNUAL BURDEN HOURS [Average annual estimate of total number of submissions, by type of submission, for Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities in each year] A tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 The third, and final step of estimating the total annual burden hours, was to sum the average annual burden hours for each type of submission. The average annual burden hour for each type of submission was estimated by multiplying the average annual number of: (1) Initial respondents VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 A×B=C (A + B) * 0.05 C Initial submissions Year 1 Full Time Employees and Contractors ......................... Frequent Visitors ........................................................... Infrequent Visitors ......................................................... Year 1 Submissions ............................................................. Year 2 Full Time Employees and Contractors ......................... Frequent Visitors ........................................................... Infrequent Visitors ......................................................... Year 2 Submissions ............................................................. Year 3 Full Time Employees and Contractors ......................... Frequent Visitors ........................................................... Infrequent Visitors ......................................................... Year 3 Submissions ............................................................. Total Submissions Over 3 Years ......................................... Number of Average Annual Submissions ............................ B Annual turnover percentage Additional submissions due to industry turnover Update/ corrections Removal due to turnover 271,585 29,809 29,809 ........................ 20 81.75 20 415,853 54,317 24,369 5,962 ........................ 16,295 2,709 1,789 20,793 54,317 24,369 5,962 84,648 0 0 0 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 84,648 54,317 24,369 5,962 ........................ 2,716 1,218 298 4,232 54,317 24,369 5,962 84,648 0 0 0 ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ 84,648 585,149 195,050 54,317 24,369 5,962 ........................ ........................ ........................ 2,716 1,218 298 4,232 29,257 9,752 54,317 24,369 5,962 84,648 253,944 84,648 multiplied by the estimated time per initial respondent (0.50 hours or 30 minutes); (2) respondents for which a high-risk chemical facility will need to update/correct information multiplied by the number of hours necessary to type and submit each update/correction (i.e., 0.17 hours or 10 minutes); and (3) PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 respondents that are expected to no longer have access to a high-risk chemical facility’s restricted area(s) multiplied by the number of hours necessary to notify the Department (i.e., 0.17 hours or 10 minutes). Both calculations described above are displayed below in Table 21. E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6449 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices TABLE 21—STEP 3 OF ESTIMATING THE ANNUAL BURDEN ESTIMATE A (A × B) = C Average annual respondents Initial Submissions ....................................................................................................................... Updates/Corrections .................................................................................................................... Removal—Turnover ..................................................................................................................... B Duration (hours) Burden hours Estimated Time per Respondent tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 For the purpose of estimating the time per respondent, the Department considered making an assumption about the percentage of affected individuals under the three options outlined in the summary section of this notice (e.g., information about one-third of affected individuals would be submitted for direct vetting against the federal government’s consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist, information about one-third of affected individuals would be submitted to verify enrollment in other DHS programs, and information about onethird of affected individuals would not be submitted because they possess TWICs that high-risk chemical facilities would electronically verify through the use of TWIC readers). However, the Department concluded that such an assumption was unwarranted because: (1) The assumption would be without any factual basis; (2) the burden to submit information about an affected individual for direct vetting is approximately the same as the burden to submit information in order to verify enrollment (i.e., similar number of required data elements); and (3) the most conservative burden estimate would assume that information is submitted for all affected individuals (i.e., no facilities will choose to electronically verify the TWIC in the possession of an affected individual). 42 Facilities that are partially regulated under both MTSA and CFATS have the opportunity to identify themselves in the CSAT Top-Screen. The text of the VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 To avoid making unjustified assumptions, and to avoid underestimating the time per respondent, the Department decided to estimate the average burden per respondent by assuming each and every respondent’s information will be manually submitted, rather than uploaded via a bulk file or web-service, to the Department for vetting for terrorist ties. Accordingly, the Department’s ‘‘estimated time per respondent’’ is estimated by dividing the average annual burden hours (113,573 hours) by the number of respondents (195,049). Therefore, for the purpose of this notice, the estimated time per respondent is 0.5822 hours. The Department’s rounded estimate is 0.58 hours. 0.50 0.17 0.17 97,525 1,658 14,390 ........................ Therefore, the average annual burden is estimated to be 113,573 hours. The Department’s rounded estimate is 113,600 hours. 195,049 9,752 84,648 ........................ 113,573 readers at the high-risk chemical facilities. Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3— Number and Type of High-Risk Chemical Facilities That May Choose To Use Option 3 The Department expects no capital/ startup cost for high-risk chemical facilities that choose to implement Option 1 or Option 2. Although there are no costs associated with high-risk chemical facilities providing information to the Department under Option 3, the Department has nonetheless estimated the potential capital costs incurred by high-risk chemical facilities that choose to implement Option 3 under the CFATS Personnel Surety Program to ensure an appropriate accounting of the costs potentially incurred by this Information Collection. The capital cost of Option 3 can be estimated by multiplying (1) the number of high-risk chemical facilities that are likely to implement Option 3 by (2) the cost to acquire, install, and maintain TWIC High-risk chemical facilities and their designees have wide latitude in how they may implement Option 3, if they choose to do so. High-risk chemical facilities could propose, in their SSPs or ASPs, to share the costs of TWIC readers and any associated infrastructure at central locations, or high-risk chemical facilities could propose to purchase and install TWIC readers for their own use. The Department will assess the adequacy of such proposals on a facility-by-facility basis, in the course of evaluating each facility’s SSP or ASP. For the purpose of this notice, the Department estimates that the number of high-risk chemical facilities that are likely to implement Option 3 is the number of high-risk chemical facilities likely to have affected individuals who possess TWICs accessing their restricted areas or critical assets. Through the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis, the Department determined that there are currently 32 high-risk chemical facilities that have claimed a partial Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) exemption 42 and have received a final tier determination under CFATS. The Department then normalized the facility count by multiplying the number of facilities that claimed a partial exemption in each category by a factor of 1.22 (as it did in estimating the total number of facilities in Table 6 above), as shown in Table 22. question is available on page 22 of the CSAT TopScreen Survey Application User Guide v1.99. See https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_ csattopscreenusersmanual.pdf. Total Burden Cost (Capital/Startup) PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6450 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices TABLE 22—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF HIGH-RISK CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT MAY CHOOSE TO USE TWIC READERS A 2012 CFATS personnel surety program analysis 2012 CFATS personnel surety program analysis (normalized) Group A ......................................................................................................................................................... Group B ......................................................................................................................................................... Group C ......................................................................................................................................................... Theft .............................................................................................................................................................. Group A ......................................................................................................................................................... Group B ......................................................................................................................................................... Group C ......................................................................................................................................................... Theft .............................................................................................................................................................. Group A ......................................................................................................................................................... Group B ......................................................................................................................................................... Group C ......................................................................................................................................................... Theft .............................................................................................................................................................. Group A ......................................................................................................................................................... Group B ......................................................................................................................................................... Group C ......................................................................................................................................................... Theft .............................................................................................................................................................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 0 2 13 1 2 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 0 2 15 1 2 0 8 Total .................................................................................................................................................................. Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier A × 1.22 32 35 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3— TWIC Reader Costs For the purpose of this notice, the Department has based the potential per high-risk chemical facility capital costs related to Option 3 on the TWIC Reader Requirements notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).43 In the TWIC Reader Requirements NPRM, the Department estimated the initial phasein costs annual recurring costs, and annual recurring costs that considers equipment replacement for container terminals, large passenger vessels/ terminals, petroleum facilities, breakbulk terminals and small passenger vessels/towboats. For the purpose of this notice, the Department has based the capital costs related to Option 3 on the costs incurred by the petroleum facilities (i.e., bulk liquid facilities) in the TWIC Reader Requirements NPRM. Specifically, the Department estimated the capital costs in this notice to be the average of the initial phase-in cost plus three years of the annual reoccurring cost without equipment replacement. NPPD opted to use the annual reoccurring cost without equipment replacement to align with the TWIC Reader Requirements NPRM assumption that equipment replacement cost occurs every five years. This notice estimates average annual costs for a three year period. Thus, for the purposes of this notice the estimated the capital costs per facility is $99,953.33, [(($256,267 + ($14,531 × 3))/3]. The Department then calculated the capital costs for the 35 high-risk chemical facilities, as shown in Table 23. TABLE 23—CAPITAL COST BURDEN ESTIMATE FOR HIGH-RISK CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT MAY CHOOSE TO USE TWIC READERS Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 B (A × B) Number of facilities tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 A Average TWIC reader implementation cost per facility Capital cost of TWIC reader implementation Group A ............................................................................................................. Group B ............................................................................................................. Group C ............................................................................................................. Theft .................................................................................................................. Group A ............................................................................................................. Group B ............................................................................................................. Group C ............................................................................................................. Theft .................................................................................................................. Group A ............................................................................................................. Group B ............................................................................................................. Group C ............................................................................................................. Theft .................................................................................................................. 43 See 78 FR 17781 (March 22, 2013). The TWIC Reader Requirements NPRM Table 4 may be found at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/03/ VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 0 2 15 22/2013-06182/transportation-workeridentification-credential-twic-readerrequirements#t-6. Future cost estimates for TWIC PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 $99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 $0 0 0 0 0 0 99,953 299,860 299,860 0 199,907 1,499,300 readers may change as a result of updates to price data and public comment received on the TWIC Reader Requirements NPRM. E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6451 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices TABLE 23—CAPITAL COST BURDEN ESTIMATE FOR HIGH-RISK CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT MAY CHOOSE TO USE TWIC READERS—Continued A 4 4 4 4 (A × B) Number of facilities Tier Tier Tier Tier B Average TWIC reader implementation cost per facility Capital cost of TWIC reader implementation Group A ............................................................................................................. Group B ............................................................................................................. Group C ............................................................................................................. Theft .................................................................................................................. 1 2 0 8 99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 199,907 0 799,627 Total ...................................................................................................................... 35 n/a 3,498,367 The capital cost for the 35 high-risk chemical facilities totals $3,498,367.67; however, the Department intends to limit this information collection to only Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities. Therefore, for the purpose of this notice, the Department estimates the capital cost for the implementation of TWIC readers is $399,813, as shown in Table 24. The Department’s rounded estimate is $399,800. TABLE 24—CAPITAL COST BURDEN ESTIMATE FOR TIER 1 & 2 HIGH-RISK CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT MAY CHOOSE TO USE TWIC READERS A 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 (A × B) Number of facilities Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier Tier B Average TWIC reader implementation cost per facility Capital cost of TWIC reader implementation Group A ............................................................................................................................. Group B ............................................................................................................................. Group C ............................................................................................................................. Theft .................................................................................................................................. Group A ............................................................................................................................. Group B ............................................................................................................................. Group C ............................................................................................................................. Theft .................................................................................................................................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 $99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 99,953 $0 0 0 0 0 0 99,953 299,860 Total ...................................................................................................................................... 4 n/a 399,813 tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 Consideration of Other Capital Costs The burden estimates outlined in this notice are limited in scope to those activities listed in 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(1). Specifically, 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(1) and 5 CFR 1320.8 require the Department to estimate the total time, effort, or financial resources expended by persons to generate, maintain, retain, disclose or provide information to or for a federal agency. Therefore, many costs (e.g., physical modification of the facility layout) a facility may choose to incur to develop or implement its SSP or ASP should not be accounted for when estimating the capital costs associated with this information collection. The Department did consider estimating certain facility capital costs such as: (1) Capital costs for computer, telecommunications equipment, software, and storage to manage the data collection, submissions, and tracking; (2) capital and ongoing costs for VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 designing, deploying and operating information technology (IT) systems necessary to maintain the data collection, submissions, and tracking; (3) cost of training facility personnel to maintain the data collection, submissions, and tracking; and (4) site security officer time to manage the data collection, submissions, and tracking. However, the Department has concluded that these costs should be excluded in accordance with 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(2), which directs federal agencies to not count the costs associated with the time, effort, and financial resources incurred in the normal course of their activities (e.g., in compiling and maintaining business records) if the reporting, recordkeeping, or disclosure activities are usual and customary. The Department believes that the time, effort, and financial resources are usual and customary costs because these are costs that high-risk chemical PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 facilities would incur to conduct background checks for identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work under 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(i)–(iii), and also under various other federal, state, or local laws or regulations. Recordkeeping Costs High-risk chemical facilities are not required to create, keep, or retain facility records under 6 CFR 27.255 to comply with RBPS 12(iv). If a high-risk chemical facility elects, for its own business purposes, to create, keep, or retain facility records that identify and manage the submission of information about affected individuals, those records are not government records. The recordkeeping costs, if any, to create, keep, or retain facility records pertaining to background checks as part of a high-risk chemical facility’s SSP or ASP, are properly estimated in the recordkeeping estimates associated with E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3 6452 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices the SSP Instrument under Information Collection 1670–0007.44 The Department considered estimating the potential recordkeeping burden associated with RBPS 12(iv), but subsequently concluded that no potential recordkeeping should be estimated in this notice in accordance with 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(2), which directs federal agencies to not count the costs associated with the time, effort, and financial resources incurred in the normal course of their activities (e.g., in compiling and maintaining business records) if the reporting, recordkeeping, or disclosure activities are usual and customary. The Department believes that the types of recordkeeping associated with RBPS 12(iv) are usual and customary costs that high-risk chemical facilities would incur to conduct background checks for identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work as required by RBPS (12)(i)–(iii) and also by various other federal, state, or local laws or regulations. Total Burden Cost (Operating/ Maintaining) The annual burden cost is equal to the sum of the: (1) Annual burden hours multiplied by the hourly wage rate for appropriate facility personnel; (2) the capital costs ($399,800); and (3) recordkeeping costs ($0). Comments associated with the previous ICR suggested an appropriate wage rate between $20 and $40 per hour; the Department picked the midpoint of $30 to estimate the hourly direct wage rate, which corresponds to a fully loaded wage rate of $42. Therefore, the annual burden not including capital costs and recordkeeping costs is $4,770,051 as shown in Table 25. The rounded estimate is $4,770,000. TABLE 25—ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL BURDEN COST FOR TIER 1 & TIER 2 FACILITIES A B (A × B) Burden (hours) Waste rate Cost Initial Submission ......................................................................................................................... Updates/Corrections .................................................................................................................... Removal-Turnover ....................................................................................................................... 97,525 1,658 14,390 $42 42 42 $4,096,032 69,633 604,386 Total Burden Cost (operating/maintaining) .......................................................................... 113,573 42 4,770,051 Therefore, the total annual burden cost is $4,844,008, after the inclusion of the $399,813 capital cost burden. The Department’s rounded estimate is $4,844,000. VI. Solicitation of Comments tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3 OMB is particularly interested in comments which: (1) Evaluate whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility; (2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used; (3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (4) Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic submissions of responses. VII. Analysis Agency: Department of Homeland Security, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Office of Infrastructure Protection, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division. Title: Chemical Facility AntiTerrorism Standards (CFATS) Personnel Surety Program. OMB Number: 1670—NEW. Frequency: Other: In accordance with the compliance schedule or the facility Site Security Plan or Alternative Security Plan. Affected Public: Business or other forprofit. Number of Respondents: 195,000 affected individuals. Estimated Time per Respondent: 0.58 hours. Total Burden Hours: 113,600 annual burden hours. Total Burden Cost (capital/startup): $399,800. Total Recordkeeping Burden: $0. Total Burden Cost (operating/ maintaining): $4,844,000. Dated: January 17, 2014. Scott Libby, Deputy Chief Information Officer, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security. [FR Doc. 2014–02082 Filed 1–31–14; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 9110–9P–P 44 Information Collection 1670–0007 may be viewed at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201001-1670-007#. VerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 9990 E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 22 (Monday, February 3, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6417-6452]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-02082]



[[Page 6417]]

Vol. 79

Monday,

No. 22

February 3, 2014

Part IV





Department of Homeland Security





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Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Personnel Surety Program; 
Notice

Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / 
Notices

[[Page 6418]]


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

[Docket No. DHS-2012-0061]


Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Personnel Surety 
Program

AGENCY: National Protection and Programs Directorate, DHS.

ACTION: 30-Day notice and request for comments; New Information 
Collection Request: 1670-NEW.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Protection 
and Programs Directorate (NPPD), Office of Infrastructure Protection 
(IP), Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) will submit 
the following Information Collection Request (ICR) to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) for review and clearance in accordance with 
the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-13, 44 U.S.C. 
Chapter 35). The Department previously published a notice about the 
CFATS Personnel Surety Program Information Collection Request in the 
Federal Register on March 22, 2013, for a 60-day public comment 
period.\1\ On May 21, 2013, the Department extended the comment period 
an additional 14 days.\2\ In this notice, NPPD is (1) responding to 28 
comments submitted in response to the 60-day notice previously 
published about this ICR, and (2) soliciting public comments concerning 
this ICR for an additional 30 days. This notice also describes the 
nature of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program Information Collection 
Request, the categories of respondents, the estimated burden (in 
hours), and the estimated burden cost necessary to implement the 
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Personnel Surety 
Program pursuant to 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv).
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    \1\ See 78 FR 17680 (March 22, 2013). The 60-day Federal 
Register notice for Information Collection 1670-NEW, which solicited 
comments for 60 days, may be found at https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-06184.
    \2\ See 78 FR 29759 (May 21, 2013). The Federal Register notice 
that extended the comment period an additional 14 days may be viewed 
at https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-12059.

DATES: Comments are encouraged and will be accepted until March 5, 
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2014. This process is conducted in accordance with 5 CFR 1320.8.

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are invited to submit written comments on 
the proposed information collection to the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, OMB. Comments should be addressed to OMB Desk 
Officer, Department of Homeland Security, National Protection and 
Programs Directorate. Comments must be identified by the docket number 
DHS-2012-0061 and may be submitted by one of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
     Email: oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Include the docket 
number in the subject line of the message.
     Fax: (202) 395-5806.
    Instructions: All submissions received must include the words 
``Department of Homeland Security'' and the docket number for this 
action. Comments received will be posted without alteration at https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information provided.
    Comments that include trade secrets, confidential commercial or 
financial information, Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information 
(CVI),\3\ Sensitive Security Information (SSI),\4\ or Protected 
Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) \5\ should not be submitted 
to the public regulatory docket. Please submit such comments separately 
from other comments in response to this notice. Comments containing 
trade secrets, confidential commercial or financial information, CVI, 
SSI, or PCII should be appropriately marked and submitted by mail to 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB. Comments should 
be addressed to OMB Desk Officer, care of the DHS/NPPD/IP/ISCD CFATS 
Program Manager at the Department of Homeland Security, 245 Murray Lane 
SW., Mail Stop 0610, Arlington, VA 20528-0610. Comments must be 
identified by docket number DHS-2012-0061.
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    \3\ For more information about CVI see 6 CFR 27.400 and the CVI 
Procedural Manual at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_cvi_proceduresmanual.pdf.
    \4\ For more information about SSI see 49 CFR part 1520 and the 
SSI Program Web page at https://www.tsa.gov/ssi.
    \5\ For more information about PCII see 6 CFR part 29 and the 
PCII Program Web page at https://www.dhs.gov/protected-critical-infrastructure-information-pcii-program.
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    OMB is particularly interested in comments that:
    1. Evaluate whether the proposed collection of information is 
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, 
including whether the information will have practical utility;
    2. Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of 
the proposed collection of information, including the validity of the 
methodology and assumptions used;
    3. Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to 
be collected; and
    4. Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those 
who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, 
electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or 
other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic 
submissions of responses.

Table of Contents

I. Supplementary Information
     Summary of Options Available to High-Risk Chemical 
Facilities To Comply With RBPS 12(iv)
     Scope of This Notice and Commitment To Explore 
Additional Options in the Future
     Who is Impacted by the CFATS Personnel Surety Program?
     What/Who is the Source of the Information Under Option 
1 and Option 2
     CSAT User Roles and Responsibilities
     Burden Resulting From the Submission of Duplicate 
Records About an Affected Individual
     Compliance With RBPS 12(iv) and the Potential for 
Increased Burden to Enter the Restricted Areas or Critical Assets at 
a High-Risk Chemical Facility
     Additional Data Privacy Considerations
II. Information Collected About Affected Individuals
     Option 1: Collecting Information To Conduct Direct 
Vetting
     Option 2: Collecting Information To Use Vetting 
Conducted Under Other DHS Programs
     Option 3: Electronic Verification of TWIC
     Other Information Collected
III. Request For Exception To the Requirement Under 5 CFR 
1320.8(b)(3)
IV. Responses to Comments Submitted During 60-Day Comment Period
V. The Department's Methodology in Estimating the Burden
     Summary of Changes From 60-Day Notice
     Frequency
     Affected Public
     Number of Respondents

    [cir] Number and Type of High-Risk Chemical Facilities

    [cir] Estimated Number of Affected Individuals at Each Type of 
High-Risk Chemical Facility--Unescorted Visitors With Access to 
Restricted Areas or Critical Assets
    [cir] Estimated Number of Affected Individuals at Each Type of 
High-Risk Chemical Facility--Facility Personnel With Access To 
Restricted Areas or Critical Assets
    [cir] Summary of Alternatives to Estimate the Number of 
Respondents

    [cir] Limitation of Respondents To Tier 1 and Tier 2 Facilities
     Total Annual Burden Hours

[[Page 6419]]

     Estimated Time per Respondent
     Total Burden Cost (Capital/Startup)

    [cir] Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3--Number and Type of 
High-Risk Chemical Facilities That May Choose to Use Option 3

    [cir] Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3--TWIC Reader Costs

    [cir] Consideration of Other Capital Costs
     Recordkeeping Costs
     Total Burden Cost (Operating/Maintaining)
VI. Solicitation of Comments
VII. Analysis

I. Supplementary Information

    Section 550 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations 
Act of 2007, Public Law 109-295 (2006) (``Section 550''), provides the 
Department with the authority to identify and regulate the security of 
high-risk chemical facilities using a risk-based approach. On April 9, 
2007, the Department issued the CFATS Interim Final Rule (IFR) 
implementing this statutory mandate. See 72 FR 17688 (April 9, 2007).
    Section 550 requires that the Department establish risk-based 
performance standards (RBPS) for high-risk chemical facilities and 
under CFATS the Department promulgated 18 RBPS. Each chemical facility 
that has been finally determined by the Department to be high-risk must 
submit a Site Security Plan (SSP), or an Alternative Security Program 
(ASP) if the facility so chooses, for Department approval that 
satisfies each applicable RBPS. RBPS 12--Personnel Surety--requires 
high-risk chemical facilities to:

    Perform appropriate background checks on and ensure appropriate 
credentials for facility personnel, and as appropriate, for 
unescorted visitors with access to restricted areas or critical 
assets, including, (i) Measures designed to verify and validate 
identity; (ii) Measures designed to check criminal history; (iii) 
Measures designed to verify and validate legal authorization to 
work; and (iv) Measures designed to identify people with terrorist 
ties[.]

See 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12).
    As explained by the Department in the preamble to the CFATS IFR, 
the ability to identify affected individuals (i.e., facility personnel 
or unescorted visitors with access to restricted areas or critical 
assets at high-risk chemical facilities) who have terrorist ties is an 
inherently governmental function and necessarily requires the use of 
information held in government-maintained databases that are 
unavailable to high-risk chemical facilities. See 72 FR 17709 (April 9, 
2007). Thus, under RBPS 12(iv), the Department and high-risk chemical 
facilities must work together to satisfy the ``terrorist ties'' aspect 
of the Personnel Surety performance standard. As a result, the CFATS 
Personnel Surety Program will identify individuals with terrorist ties 
that have or are seeking access to the restricted areas and/or critical 
assets at the nation's high-risk chemical facilities. Accordingly, in 
the preamble to the CFATS IFR, the Department outlined two potential 
approaches to help high-risk chemical facilities satisfy that 
particular standard, both of which would involve high-risk chemical 
facilities submitting certain information to the Department. See id.
    The first approach would involve facilities submitting certain 
information about affected individuals to the Department, which the 
Department would use to vet those individuals for terrorist ties. 
Specifically, identifying information about affected individuals would 
be compared against identifying information of known or suspected 
terrorists contained in the federal government's consolidated and 
integrated terrorist watchlist, the Terrorist Screening Database 
(TSDB), which is maintained on behalf of the federal government by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 
the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ For more information about the TSDB, see DOJ/FBI--019 
Terrorist Screening Records System, 72 FR 47073 (August 22, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to avoid unnecessary duplication of terrorist screening, 
the Department also described an additional approach under which high-
risk chemical facilities would submit information about affected 
individuals possessing certain credentials that rely on security threat 
assessments conducted by the Department. See 72 FR 17709 (April 9, 
2007).
    The Department has developed a CFATS Personnel Surety Program that 
will provide high-risk chemical facilities additional options to comply 
with RBPS 12(iv) while continuing to make available the two 
alternatives outlined in the preamble to the CFATS IFR. In addition to 
the alternatives expressly described in this document, the Department 
also intends to permit high-risk chemical facilities to propose other 
alternative measures for terrorist ties identification in their SSPs or 
ASPs, which the Department will consider on a case-by-case basis in 
evaluating high-risk chemical facilities' SSPs or ASPs.
    As a result of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, regardless of 
the option selected by the high-risk chemical facility, the Department 
will identify individuals with terrorist ties that have or are seeking 
access to the restricted areas and/or critical assets at the nation's 
high-risk chemical facilities.
    The first option is consistent with the primary approach described 
in the CFATS IFR preamble, as discussed above. Under Option 1--Direct 
Vetting, high-risk chemical facilities (or others acting on their 
behalf) would submit certain information about affected individuals to 
the Department through a Personnel Surety application in an online 
technology system developed under CFATS called the Chemical Security 
Assessment Tool (CSAT). Access to and the use of CSAT is provided free 
of charge to high-risk chemical facilities (or others acting on their 
behalf).
    Under this option, information about affected individuals submitted 
by, or on behalf of, high-risk chemical facilities would be vetted 
against information contained in the federal government's consolidated 
and integrated terrorist watchlist.
    The second option is also consistent with the second approach 
described in the CFATS IFR preamble. Under Option 2--Use Of Vetting 
Conducted Under Other DHS Programs, high-risk chemical facilities (or 
others acting on their behalf) would also submit certain information 
about affected individuals to the Department through the CSAT Personnel 
Surety application.
    Option 2 would, however, allow high-risk chemical facilities and 
the Department to take advantage of the vetting for terrorist ties 
already being conducted on affected individuals enrolled in the 
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Program, 
Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME) Program, as well as the NEXUS, 
Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), Free 
and Secure Trade (FAST), and Global Entry Trusted Traveler Programs.\7\ 
All of these programs conduct terrorist ties vetting equivalent to the 
terrorist ties vetting that would be conducted under Option 1.\8\ Under 
Option 2, high-risk chemical

[[Page 6420]]

facilities, or their designees (e.g., third parties), could submit 
information to the Department about affected individuals possessing the 
appropriate credentials to enable the Department to electronically 
verify the affected individuals' enrollments in these other programs. 
The Department would subsequently notify the Submitter of the high-risk 
chemical facility whether or not an affected individual's enrollment in 
one of these other DHS programs was electronically verified. The 
Department would also periodically re-verify each affected individual's 
continued enrollment in one of these other programs, and notify the 
appropriate designee of the high-risk chemical facility of significant 
changes in the status of an affected individual's enrollment (e.g., if 
an affected individual who has been enrolled in the HME Program ceases 
to be enrolled, the Department would change the status of the affected 
individual in the CSAT Personnel Surety application and notify the 
Submitter).\9\ Electronic verification and re-verification would enable 
the Department and the high-risk chemical facility to ensure that an 
affected individual's credential or endorsement is appropriate to rely 
on (i.e., an indicator that the affected individual is being 
recurrently vetted for terrorist ties) in compliance with RBPS 12(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has introduced 
SENTRI and Global Entry as Trusted Traveler Programs since the 
publication of CFATS in April 2007. The Department, therefore, 
intends to enable high-risk chemical facilities (or their designees) 
to submit information about affected individuals' SENTRI and Global 
Entry enrollments to DHS under Option 2, even though SENTRI and 
Global Entry were not listed along with the other Trusted Traveler 
Programs in the CFATS IFR preamble. See 72 FR 17709 (April 9, 2007).
    \8\ Each of the DHS programs referenced conducts recurrent 
vetting, which is equivalent to the terrorist ties vetting conducted 
under Option 1. Recurrent vetting compares an affected individual's 
information against new and/or updated TSDB records as those new 
and/or updated records become available. Recurrent vetting is a 
Department best practice.
    \9\ When the Department notifies the appropriate designee of the 
high-risk chemical facility of significant changes in the status of 
an affected individual's enrollment, such a notification should not 
be construed to indicate that an individual has terrorist ties or be 
treated as derogatory information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to Option 1 and Option 2, the Department has considered 
other potential options to help high-risk chemical facilities satisfy 
RBPS 12(iv). In particular, the Department has investigated the 
feasibility of options that would not involve the submission of 
information about an affected individual if the affected individual 
participated in one of the programs identified under Option 2. The 
Department believes that, for the purpose of compliance with RBPS 
12(iv), simply relying on a visual inspection of a credential or 
endorsement is inadequate because the credential or endorsement could 
be expired, revoked, or fraudulent. However, the Department has 
concluded that information about an affected individual, enrolled in a 
DHS program that conducts vetting for terrorist ties equivalent to the 
vetting that would be conducted under Option 1, would not need to be 
submitted to the Department if the credential in the possession of the 
affected individual is electronically verified and validated.
    Accordingly, the Department plans to offer high-risk chemical 
facilities a third option. Under Option 3--Electronic Verification of 
TWIC, a high-risk chemical facility (or others acting on their behalf) 
would not submit information about affected individuals in possession 
of TWICs to the Department if the high-risk chemical facility (or 
others acting on their behalf) electronically verify and validate the 
affected individuals' TWICs \10\ through the use of TWIC readers (or 
other technology that is periodically updated using the with revoked 
card information).\11\ Any high-risk chemical facilities that choose 
this option would need to describe in their SSPs or ASPs the procedures 
they will follow if they choose to use TWIC readers for compliance with 
RBPS 12(iv).\12\
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    \10\ Verification and validation of an affected individual's 
TWIC requires authentication that the affected individual's TWIC is 
(1) a valid credential issued by TSA, and (2) contains the Card 
Holder Unique Identifier and correct digital signature.
    \11\ The Department currently offers two ways to determine if a 
TWIC has been revoked (or reported lost or stolen). One is the 
Canceled Card List (CCL), the other is the Certificate Revocation 
List (CRL). More information about the Canceled Card List may be 
found at https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/pdf/twic/canceled_card_list_ccl_faq.pdf. More information about the 
CRL may be in the TWIC NPRM published on March 29, 2009 at 74 FR 
13364 which may be accessed at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2009/03/27/E9-6852/transportation-worker-identification-credential-twic-reader-requirements#p-122.
    \12\ On March 22, 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard published a notice 
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled ``TWIC Reader Requirements.'' 
The procedures for using TWIC readers that are discussed in that 
NPRM would not apply to high-risk chemical facilities regulated 
under CFATS. Likewise, the ways in which high-risk chemical 
facilities could leverage TWICs as part of the CFATS Personnel 
Surety Program do not apply to maritime facilities or vessels 
regulated by the U.S. Coast Guard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    High-risk chemical facilities would have discretion as to which 
option(s) to use for an affected individual. For example, even though a 
high-risk chemical facility could comply with RBPS 12(iv) for certain 
affected individuals by using Option 2, the high-risk chemical facility 
could choose to use Option 1 for those affected individuals. Similarly, 
a high-risk chemical facility, at its discretion, may choose to use 
either Option 1 or Option 2 rather than Option 3 for affected 
individuals who have TWICs. High-risk chemical facilities also may 
choose to combine Option 1 with Option 2 and/or Option 3, as 
appropriate, to ensure that adequate terrorist ties checks are 
performed on different types of affected individuals (e.g., employees, 
contractors, unescorted visitors). Each high-risk chemical facility 
will need to describe how it will comply with RBPS 12(iv) in its SSP or 
ASP.
    In addition to the options described above for satisfying RBPS 
12(iv), high-risk chemical facilities are welcome to propose 
alternative or supplemental options not described in this PRA notice in 
their SSPs or ASPs. The Department will assess the adequacy of such 
alternative or supplemental options on a facility-by-facility basis, in 
the course of evaluating each facility's SSP or ASP.
    Although outside the scope of this PRA notice and the underlying 
ICR, the Department would like to highlight that high-risk chemical 
facilities also have other methods to address, or minimize the impacts 
of, compliance with RBPS 12(iv). For example, facilities may restrict 
the numbers and types of persons whom they allow to access their 
restricted areas and critical assets, thus limiting the number of 
persons who will need to be checked for terrorist ties. Facilities also 
have wide latitude in how they define their restricted areas and 
critical assets in their SSPs or ASPs, thus potentially limiting the 
number of persons who will need to be checked for terrorist ties. High-
risk chemical facilities also may choose to escort visitors to 
restricted areas and critical assets in lieu of performing the 
background checks required by RBPS 12. For example, high-risk chemical 
facilities could propose in their SSPs or ASPs traditional escorting 
solutions and/or innovative escorting alternatives such as video 
monitoring (which may reduce facility security costs), as appropriate, 
to address the unique security risks present at each facility.

Summary of Options Available to High-Risk Chemical Facilities To Comply 
With RBPS 12(iv)

    The purpose of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program is to identify 
individuals with terrorist ties that have or are seeking access to the 
restricted areas and/or critical assets at the nation's high-risk 
chemical facilities. As described above, under the CFATS Personnel 
Surety Program, for each affected individual a high-risk chemical 
facility would have at least three options under RBPS 12(iv):
     OPTION 1--DIRECT VETTING: High-risk chemical facilities 
(or their designees) may submit information to the Department about an 
affected individual to be compared against information about known or 
suspected terrorists, and/or
     OPTION 2 -USE OF VETTING CONDUCTED UNDER OTHER DHS 
PROGRAMS: High-risk chemical

[[Page 6421]]

facilities (or their designees) may submit information to the 
Department about an affected individual's enrollment in another DHS 
program so that the Department may electronically verify and validate 
that the affected individual is enrolled in the other program, and/or
     OPTION 3--ELECTRONIC VERIFICATION OF TWIC: High-risk 
chemical facilities may electronically verify and validate an affected 
individual's TWIC, through the use of TWIC readers (or other technology 
which is periodically updated with revoked card information), rather 
than submitting information about the affected individual to the 
Department.
    Regardless of the option, in the event that there is a potential 
match, the Department has procedures in place that it will follow to 
resolve the match and coordinate with appropriate law enforcement 
entities as necessary.
    The Department intends to provide high-risk chemical facilities, 
and their designees, the ability to create an alert within the CSAT 
Personnel Surety application that can notify them when the Department 
has received information about an affected individual(s), under Option 
1 or Option 2. Further, the Department will also allow high-risk 
chemical facilities the ability to view the status (e.g., that some 
information about an affected individual has been inputted into CSAT 
but not yet submitted to the Department under Option 1 or Option 2; 
that information about an affected individual has been submitted; etc.) 
of records about affected individuals associated with their facility 
within the CSAT Personnel Surety application.

Scope of This Notice and Commitment To Explore Additional Options in 
the Future

    Between August 2012, and publication of the 60-day notice in March 
2013, the Department had substantial dialogue with key CFATS 
stakeholders. The discussion included program design issues, the CSAT 
Personnel Surety application, options the Department has been 
considering to date, and additional options stakeholders have 
recommended for the Department's consideration, both in the short and 
long term.
    The options described in this notice and, if approved, the ICR that 
the Department will submit to OMB would allow high-risk chemical 
facilities and the Department to implement the CFATS Personnel Surety 
Program within the Department's existing statutory and regulatory 
authority, and U.S. Government watchlisting policies.
    The Department is committed, however, to continuing to work with 
interested stakeholders to identify additional potential options that 
could further reduce the burdens related to the CFATS Personnel Surety 
Program, while still meeting the national security mandate to reduce 
the risk of an individual with terrorist ties obtaining access to the 
restricted areas or critical assets at a high-risk chemical facility. 
The Department will consider and review any alternatives suggested as 
part of public comments on this notice. Through both the PRA process 
and other ongoing dialogues, the Department will, as appropriate, also 
continue to work with stakeholders to identify potential additional 
alternatives as new technologies emerge, and as other terrorist ties 
vetting programs are modified or become available over time, so as to 
reduce the burden of this new information collection.

Who is Impacted by the CFATS Personnel Surety Program?

    The CFATS Personnel Surety Program will provide high-risk chemical 
facilities the ability to submit certain biographic information about 
affected individuals to the Department. As explained above, affected 
individuals are (1) facility personnel who have access, either 
unescorted or otherwise, to restricted areas or critical assets, and 
(2) unescorted visitors who have access to restricted areas or critical 
assets.
    There are also certain groups of persons that the Department does 
not consider to be affected individuals, such as (1) Federal officials 
that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or critical assets as 
part of their official duties; (2) state and local law enforcement 
officials that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or critical 
assets as part of their official duties; and (3) emergency responders 
at the state or local level that gain unescorted access to restricted 
areas or critical assets during emergency situations.
    In some emergency or exigent situations, access to restricted areas 
or critical assets by other individuals who have not had appropriate 
background checks under RBPS 12 may be necessary. For example, 
emergency responders not described above may require such access as 
part of their official duties under appropriate circumstances. If high-
risk chemical facilities anticipate that any individuals will require 
access to restricted areas or critical assets without visitor escorts 
or without the background checks listed in RBPS 12 under exceptional 
circumstances (e.g., foreseeable but unpredictable circumstances), 
facilities may describe such situations and the types of individuals 
who might require access in those situations in their SSPs or ASPs. The 
Department will assess the appropriateness of such situations, and any 
security measures to mitigate the inherent vulnerability in such 
situations, on a case-by-case basis as it reviews each high-risk 
chemical facility's SSP or ASP.

What/Who is the Source of the Information Under Option 1 And Option 2

    High-risk chemical facilities are responsible for complying with 
RBPS 12(iv). However, companies operating multiple high-risk chemical 
facilities, as well as companies operating only one high-risk chemical 
facility, may comply with RBPS 12(iv) in a variety of ways. High-risk 
chemical facilities, or their parent companies, may choose to comply 
with RBPS 12(iv) by identifying and submitting the information about 
affected individuals to the Department directly. Alternatively, high-
risk chemical facilities, or their parent companies, may choose to 
comply with RBPS 12(iv) by outsourcing the information submission 
process to third parties.
    The Department anticipates that many high-risk chemical facilities 
will rely on businesses that provide contract services (e.g., complex 
turn-arounds, freight delivery services, lawn mowing) to the high-risk 
chemical facilities to identify and submit the appropriate information 
about affected individuals they employ to the Department for vetting 
pursuant to RBPS 12(iv). Businesses that provide services to high-risk 
chemical facilities may in turn choose to manage compliance with RBPS 
12(iv) themselves or to acquire the services of other third party 
companies to submit appropriate information about affected individuals 
to the Department.

CSAT User Roles and Responsibilities

    To minimize the burden of submitting information about affected 
individuals, under Options 1 and 2 (as described above), high-risk 
chemical facilities would have wide latitude in assigning CSAT user 
roles to align with their business operations and/or the business 
operations of third parties that provide contracted services to 
them.\13\ Furthermore, the Department intends to structure the CSAT 
Personnel Surety application to allow designees of high-

[[Page 6422]]

risk chemical facilities to submit information about affected 
individuals directly to the Department on behalf of high-risk chemical 
facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ CSAT user registration and the assignment of user roles 
within CSAT are covered under a different Information Collection 
(i.e., 1670-0007), which can be found at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201001-1670-007#.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    High-risk chemical facilities and their designees will be able to 
structure their CSAT user roles to submit information about affected 
individuals to the Department in several ways:
    (1) A high-risk chemical facility could directly submit information 
about affected individuals, and designate one or more officers or 
employees of the facility with appropriate CSAT user roles; and/or
    (2) A high-risk chemical facility could ensure the submission of 
information about affected individuals by designating one or more 
persons affiliated with a third party (or with multiple third parties); 
and/or
    (3) A company owning several high-risk chemical facilities could 
consolidate its submission process for affected individuals. 
Specifically, the company could designate one or more persons to submit 
information about affected individuals on behalf of all of the high-
risk chemical facilities on a company-wide basis.
    The Department may, upon request, also consider allowing CSAT users 
with the ability to submit information about affected individuals to 
the Department via a Web-service. The ability to submit information 
about affected individuals via a Web-service will be provided on a case 
by cases basis, when in the opinion of the Department, sufficient 
additional security and privacy safeguards have been agreed to by the 
CSAT user.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ A Web-service is software system designed to support 
interoperable machine-to-machine interaction over a network.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Burden Resulting From the Submission of Duplicate Records About an 
Affected Individual

    The Department is aware that an affected individual may be 
associated with multiple high-risk chemical facilities, and thus 
information about an affected individual may be submitted to the 
Department multiple times by different high-risk chemical facilities 
and/or their designated third parties. However, the Department has 
learned in its dialogue with stakeholders (including third-party 
companies that conduct background checks for high-risk chemical 
facilities) that the duplicate submission of records about affected 
individuals is a common industry practice for companies when managing 
information about individuals. Specifically, when a person who has 
already had a background check (e.g., verification of legal 
authorization to work or criminal history) needs a new background check 
for different companies or for a new or different purpose (e.g., change 
in jobs or contract), third parties that routinely conduct background 
checks routinely will submit information about a person again to 
agencies responsible for maintaining relevant information (e.g., state 
government agencies responsible for maintaining state motor vehicle 
databases). Therefore, for the purpose of this notice, the Department's 
estimation of burden accounts for potential multiple submissions of 
information about affected individuals by high-risk chemical facilities 
and their designated third parties.

Compliance With RBPS 12(iv) and the Potential for Increased Burden To 
Enter the Restricted Areas or Critical Assets at a High-Risk Chemical 
Facility

    Since the Department first began seeking to implement the CFATS 
Personnel Surety Program, stakeholders have expressed concern that the 
submission of information about affected individuals under Option 1 and 
Option 2 to the Department would impede the ability of affected 
individuals to enter the restricted areas or critical assets at high-
risk chemical facilities. The Department does not believe that if a 
facility complies with RBPS 12(iv) the high-risk chemical facility 
will, on a routine basis, experience an unreasonable impact in allowing 
affected individuals access to restricted areas or critical assets.
    In general, the Department expects that high-risk chemical 
facilities or their designees (e.g., third parties or companies 
employing affected individuals that provide services to high-risk 
chemical facilities) will already possess much, if not all, of the 
necessary information about affected individuals as a result of 
standard business practices related to employment or managing of 
service contracts. In the event that high-risk chemical facilities, or 
their designees, need to collect any additional information for the 
purpose of complying with RBPS 12(iv), they have significant 
flexibility in how to collect this information since CFATS does not 
prescribe how to do so.
    The Department also expects that high-risk chemical facilities will 
likely consolidate RBPS 12(iv) processing with related routine hiring 
and access control procedures involving background checks that are 
already occurring prior to access by facility personnel or unescorted 
visitors to restricted areas or critical assets. Consolidating RBPS 
12(iv) processing with these other routine procedures would allow 
submission of personal information already collected and maintained by 
facilities or their designees (e.g., a third party, contracted service 
company, or third party acting on behalf of a contracted service 
company) to the Department under RBPS 12(iv) before affected 
individuals require access to restricted areas or critical assets.
    As mentioned above, third parties could submit screening 
information to the Department on behalf of high-risk chemical 
facilities as part of facilities' routine hiring and access control 
procedures. Some stakeholders have expressed concerns to the Department 
about submission of screening information by third parties, suggesting 
that in such cases facilities would not be able to adequately oversee 
third parties' work to ensure appropriate information submission to the 
Department. The Department expects, however, that high-risk chemical 
facilities could audit and/or review their third party designees' 
information collection and submission processes, to ensure that their 
designees submit appropriate information.
    The Department has provided below several illustrative examples 
about how high-risk chemical facilitates or designees are likely to 
consolidate RBPS 12(iv) processing with routine background check 
activities related to those required by RBPS 12(i)-(iii), namely, (i) 
measures designed to verify and validate identity; (ii) measures 
designed to check criminal history; and (iii) measures designed to 
verify and validate legal authorization to work. By consolidating RBPS 
12(iv) with routine background check activities related to RBPS 12(i)-
(iii), high-risk chemical facilities will likely choose to incorporate 
the submission of information about affected individuals to the 
Department under RBPS 12(iv) into the routine background check 
activities required by RBPS 12(i)-(iii).
    Although estimating the burden of RBPS 12(i)-(iii) is not within 
the scope of this Paperwork Reduction Act notice, when and how high-
risk chemical facilities could collect information for submission to 
the Department has influenced the Department's design of the CFATS 
Personnel Surety Program. The Department believes that the illustrative 
examples provided below show how, if the CFATS Personnel Surety Program 
is implemented, a high-risk chemical facility and its associated third 
party companies could access the CSAT Personnel Surety application for 
purposes of submitting terrorist ties screening information to the 
Department on its behalf under RBPS 12(iv), in

[[Page 6423]]

coordination with other normal business activities not required by RBPS 
12(iv).

SCENARIO 1: Employees Who Are ``Facility Personnel''

    This scenario could apply to a high-risk chemical facility that has 
a number of employees it deems in its SSP or ASP to be ``facility 
personnel'' with access to restricted areas and/or critical assets.
    In its SSP or ASP, the high-risk chemical facility could choose to 
comply with RBPS 12(i)-(iii) for these employees by either:
     Hiring a third party background check company to perform 
identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background 
checks on these employees.
    [cir] A contract or agreement between the high-risk chemical 
facility and the third party could establish the criteria for these 
background checks, and could establish which background check results 
qualify individuals to access the restricted areas or critical assets 
at the high-risk chemical facility or disqualify individuals from 
accessing the restricted areas or critical assets at the high-risk 
chemical facility.
    [cir] The third party could submit appropriate information, under 
Option 1 and/or Option 2, to the Department while it conducts these 
identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background 
checks.
    [cir] The high-risk chemical facility could audit or review the 
background checks being conducted to ensure contractual compliance.

Or,
     Performing identity, criminal history, and legal 
authorization to work background checks itself.
    [cir] The high-risk chemical facility could establish the criteria 
for these background checks, and could establish which background check 
results qualify individuals to access the restricted areas or critical 
assets at the high-risk chemical facility or disqualify individuals 
from accessing the restricted areas or critical assets at the high-risk 
chemical facility.
    [cir] The facility could submit appropriate information, under 
Option 1 and/or Option 2, to the Department while it conducts these 
identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background 
checks.
    Prior to an employee being granted access to restricted areas or 
critical assets (i.e., prior to being issued a facility-specific access 
credential/card, or door/gate key(s)), identity, criminal history, and 
legal authorization to work background checks could be completed by the 
third party or the high-risk chemical facility in accordance with the 
high-risk chemical facility's SSP or ASP. If appropriate, based upon 
the results of those background checks, the employee could then be 
determined suitable to access the high-risk chemical facility's 
restricted areas and/or critical assets.
    The third party or the high-risk chemical facility could then 
report its suitability finding to the appropriate party at the high-
risk chemical facility so that facility-specific access credentials/
cards, or door/gate key(s) could be granted, if appropriate. Completion 
of submission of information about the affected individual to the 
Department in compliance with RBPS 12(iv) therefore would not impede 
the routine access control procedures of the high-risk chemical 
facility because the information submission would likely be 
accomplished in concert with the other background check activities, 
prior to access.

SCENARIO 2: Resident Contractors Who Are ``Facility 
Personnel''

    This scenario could apply to a high-risk chemical facility that has 
a number of resident contractors it deems in its SSP or ASP to be 
``facility personnel'' with access to restricted areas or critical 
assets.
    In its SSP or ASP, the high-risk chemical facility could choose to 
comply with RBPS 12(i)-(iii) for resident contractors by:
     Stipulating in a contract between the high-risk chemical 
facility and the company employing the resident contractors that the 
contractors' employer will perform or provide for identity, criminal 
history, and legal authorization to work background checks to be 
conducted on the resident contractors.
    [cir] A contract or agreement between the high-risk chemical 
facility and the company employing the resident contractors could 
establish the criteria for these background checks, and could establish 
which background check results qualify individuals to access the 
restricted areas or critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility 
or disqualify individuals from accessing the restricted areas or 
critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility.
    [cir] The high-risk chemical facility could audit or review the 
background checks being conducted to ensure contractual compliance.
     Prior to a resident contractor being granted access to the 
restricted areas or critical assets of the high-risk chemical facility 
(i.e., being issued a facility-specific access credential/card, door/
gate key(s)), identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to 
work background checks could be completed by the company employing the 
resident contractor in accordance with the high-risk chemical 
facility's SSP or ASP.
    [cir] The company employing the resident contractor could conduct 
these identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work 
background checks.
    [cir] The company employing the resident contractor could submit 
appropriate information, under Option 1 and/or Option 2, to the 
Department while it conducts these identity, criminal history, and 
legal authorization to work background checks.
     The company employing the resident contractor, however, 
might not perform the actual background checks itself. Rather, the 
company employing the resident contractor could hire a third party 
background check company to perform identity, criminal history, and 
legal authorization to work background checks on its employees 
(including the resident contractors at the high-risk chemical 
facility).
    [cir] If the company employing the resident contractor hires a 
third party background check company for this purpose, a contract or 
agreement between the company employing the resident contractor and the 
third party background check company could establish the criteria for 
these background checks and could establish which background check 
results are acceptable for access to the restricted areas and critical 
assets at the high-risk chemical facility for which the resident 
contractor performs services.
    [cir] The third party background check company could submit 
appropriate information, under Option 1 and/or Option 2, to the 
Department while it conducts these identity, criminal history, and 
legal authorization to work background checks.
    Prior to the resident contractor being granted access to restricted 
areas or critical assets of the high-risk chemical facility (i.e., 
being issued a facility-specific access credential/card, or door/gate 
key(s)), identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work 
background checks could be completed by the company employing the 
resident contractor, or by a third party background check company in 
accordance with the high-risk chemical facility's SSP or ASP. If 
appropriate, based on the results of those background checks, the 
resident contractor could then be determined suitable to access the 
high-risk chemical facility's restricted areas and/or critical assets.
    The company employing the resident contractor, or a third party 
background

[[Page 6424]]

check company, could then report suitability findings to the high-risk 
chemical facility. The appropriate party at the high-risk chemical 
facility could then grant the resident contractor facility-specific 
access credentials/cards, or door/gate key(s), if appropriate based on 
those suitability findings. The submission of information about the 
affected individual to the Department in compliance with RBPS 12(iv) 
therefore would not impede the routine access control procedures of the 
high-risk chemical facility because the submission of information would 
likely be accomplished in concert with the other background check 
activities, prior to access.

SCENARIO 3: Frequent ``Unescorted Visitors''

    This scenario could apply to a high-risk chemical facility that has 
a number of frequent unescorted visitors that have or are seeking 
repeated access to the restricted areas or critical assets of the 
facility, pursuant to a contractual relationship with a company 
employing the frequent unescorted visitors.
    In its SSP or ASP, the high-risk chemical facility could choose to 
comply with RBPS 12(i)-(iii) for frequent unescorted visitors by:
     Stipulating in a contract between the high-risk chemical 
facility and the company employing the frequent unescorted visitors 
that the frequent unescorted visitors' employer will perform or provide 
for identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work 
background checks to be conducted on the frequent unescorted visitors.
    [cir] A contract or agreement between the high-risk chemical 
facility and the company employing the frequent unescorted visitors 
could establish the criteria for these background checks, and could 
establish which background check results qualify individuals to access 
the restricted areas or critical assets at the high-risk chemical 
facility or disqualify individuals from accessing the restricted areas 
or critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility.
    [cir] The high-risk chemical facility could audit or review the 
background checks being conducted to ensure contractual compliance.
     Prior to a frequent unescorted visitor being granted 
access to the restricted areas or critical assets of the facility 
(i.e., being issued a facility-specific access credential/card, door/
gate key(s)), identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to 
work background checks could be completed by the company employing the 
frequent unescorted visitor in accordance with the high-risk chemical 
facility's SSP or ASP.
    [cir] The company employing the frequent unescorted visitor could 
conduct these identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to 
work background checks.
    [cir] The company employing the frequent unescorted visitor could 
submit appropriate information, under Option 1 and/or Option 2, to the 
Department while it conducts these identity, criminal history, and 
legal authorization to work background checks.
     The company employing the frequent unescorted visitor, 
however, might not perform the actual background checks itself. Rather, 
the company employing the frequent unescorted visitor could hire a 
third party background check company to perform identity, criminal 
history, and legal authorization to work background checks on its 
employees (including the frequent unescorted visitors that access the 
restricted areas or critical assets of a high-risk chemical facility).
    [cir] If the company employing the frequent unescorted visitor 
hires a third party background check company for this purpose, a 
contract or agreement between the company employing the frequent 
unescorted visitor and the third party background check company could 
establish the criteria for these background checks and could establish 
which background check results are acceptable for access to the 
restricted areas and critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility 
for which the frequent unescorted visitor performs services.
    [cir] The third party background check company could submit 
appropriate information, under Option 1 and/or Option 2, to the 
Department while it conducts these identity, criminal history, and 
legal authorization to work background checks.
    Prior to the frequent unescorted visitor being granted access to 
restricted areas or critical assets of the high-risk chemical facility 
(i.e., being issued a facility-specific access credential/card, or 
door/gate key(s)), identity, criminal history, and legal authorization 
to work background checks could be completed by the company employing 
the frequent unescorted visitor, or by a third party background check 
company in accordance with the high-risk chemical facility's SSP or 
ASP. If appropriate based on the results of those background checks, 
the frequent unescorted visitor could then be determined suitable to 
access the restricted areas or critical assets at the high-risk 
chemical facility.
    The company employing the frequent unescorted visitor, or a third 
party background check company, could then report suitability findings 
to the high-risk chemical facility. The appropriate party at the high-
risk chemical facility could then grant the frequent unescorted visitor 
facility-specific access credentials/cards, or door/gate key(s), if 
appropriate based on those suitability findings. The submission of 
information about the affected individual to the Department in 
compliance with RBPS 12(iv) therefore would not impede the routine 
access control procedures of the high-risk chemical facility because 
the information submission would likely be accomplished in concert with 
the other background check activities, prior to access.

SCENARIO 4: Infrequent ``Unescorted Visitors''

    Since the Department first began developing the CFATS Personnel 
Surety Program, some stakeholders have expressed concern that the 
submission of information to DHS about unescorted visitors who have 
only rare or infrequent access to high-risk chemical facilities would 
be overly burdensome and would make access by such infrequent 
unescorted visitors too difficult. As a general matter, however, the 
Department does not believe it likely that many high-risk chemical 
facilities will propose in their SSPs or ASPs to allow large numbers of 
visitors who visit the high-risk chemical facility infrequently to have 
unescorted access to restricted areas and critical assets, because then 
all four types of background checks listed in RBPS 12 would be required 
to be conducted for them. High-risk chemical facilities could choose to 
escort infrequent visitors in lieu of performing the four types of RBPS 
12 background checks on them.
    However, even for infrequent unescorted visitors on whom the high-
risk chemical facility chooses to conduct all four types of background 
checks, the Department does not expect data submission to the 
Department in compliance with RBPS 12(iv) to impede routine access 
procedures because the data submission is likely to be accomplished in 
concert with the other routine hiring and access control background 
checks related to RBPS 12(i)-(iii) described above. The Department 
believes that the data submission for RBPS 12(iv) will likely be 
accomplished in concert with the routine hiring and access control 
background checks related to RBPS 12(i)-(iii) because doing them in 
concert

[[Page 6425]]

is likely to generate the potential for cost savings.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ This ICR does not estimate the potential cost savings high-
risk chemical facilities or their designees could achieve as a 
result of submitting data in concert with the other routine hiring 
and access control background checks related to RBPS 12(i)-(iii) 
because the scope of this ICR is limited to the Departments 
obligation to estimate the burden of submitting information about 
affected individuals to identify terrorist ties under RBPS 12(iv) in 
accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Additional Data Privacy Considerations

    There are various privacy requirements for high-risk chemical 
facilities, their designees, and the Department related to the exchange 
of personally identifiable information (PII) for the CFATS Personnel 
Surety Program. Upon receipt of PII, the Department complies with all 
applicable federal privacy requirements including those contained in 
the Privacy Act, the E-Government Act, the Homeland Security Act, and 
Departmental policy. The United States also follows international 
instruments on privacy, all of which are consistent with the Fair 
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs).\16\ High-risk chemical 
facilities, or their designees, are responsible for complying with the 
federal, state, and national privacy laws applicable to the 
jurisdictions in which they do business. The Department believes that 
high-risk chemical facilities, or their designees, have multiple, 
established legal avenues that enable them to submit PII to the 
Department, which may include the Safe Harbor Framework,\17\ and meet 
their privacy obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ Examples of the international privacy instruments which the 
United States has endorsed are: (1) Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on the Protection of 
Privacy and Trans-border Flows of Personal Data (1980), and (2) Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework (2004).
    \17\ The Safe Harbor Framework, which applies to commercial 
information, was developed by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 
consultation with the European Commission in order to provide a 
streamlined means for U.S. organizations to comply with the European 
Union Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. More information on the 
Safe Harbor Framework can be found at https://export.gov/safeharbor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Information Collected About Affected Individuals

Option 1: Collecting Information To Conduct Direct Vetting

    If high-risk chemical facilities select Option 1 to satisfy RBPS 
12(iv) for any affected individuals, the following information about 
these affected individuals would be submitted to the Department:
     For U.S. Persons (U.S. citizens and nationals as well as 
U.S. lawful permanent residents):
[cir] Full Name
[cir] Date of Birth
[cir] Citizenship or Gender
     For Non-U.S. Persons:
[cir] Full Name
[cir] Date of Birth
[cir] Citizenship
[cir] Passport information and/or alien registration number
    To reduce the likelihood of false positives in matching against 
records in the federal government's consolidated and integrated 
terrorist watchlist, high-risk chemical facilities would also be able 
to submit the following optional information about affected individuals 
to the Department:
 Aliases
 Gender (for Non-U.S. Persons)
 Place of Birth
 Redress Number \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ For more information about Redress Numbers, please go to 
https://www.dhs.gov/one-stop-travelers-redress-process#1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If a high-risk chemical facility chooses to submit information 
about an affected individual under Option 1, the following table 
summarizes the biographic data that would be submitted to the 
Department.

 Table 1--Affected Individual Required and Optional Data Under Option 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Data elements submitted to the                          For a non-U.S.
           department              For a U.S. person         person
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full Name.......................  Required...........
Date of Birth...................  Required...........
Gender..........................  Must provide         Optional.
                                   Citizenship or
                                   Gender.
Citizenship.....................  ...................  Required.
Passport Information and/or       N/A................  Required.
 Alien Registration Number.
Aliases.........................  Optional...........
Place of Birth..................  Optional...........
Redress number..................  Optional...........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Option 2: Collecting Information To Use Vetting Conducted Under Other 
DHS Programs

    In lieu of submitting information to the Department under Option 1 
for terrorist ties vetting, chemical facilities would also have the 
option, where appropriate, to submit information to the Department to 
electronically verify that an affected individual is currently enrolled 
in one of the following DHS programs:
     TWIC Program;
     HME Program;
     Trusted Traveler Programs, including:
    [cir] NEXUS;
    [cir] FAST;
    [cir] SENTRI; and
    [cir] Global Entry.
    Information collected by the Department about affected individuals 
under Option 2 would not be used to conduct duplicative vetting against 
the federal government's consolidated and integrated terrorist 
watchlist.
    To verify an affected individual's enrollment in one of these 
programs under Option 2, the Department would collect the following 
information about the affected individual:
     Full Name;
     Date of Birth; and
     Program-specific information or credential information, 
such as unique number, or issuing entity (e.g., State for Commercial 
Driver's License (CDL) associated with an HME).
    To further reduce the potential for misidentification, high-risk 
chemical facilities may also submit the following optional information 
about affected individuals to the Department:
 Aliases
 Gender
 Place of Birth
 Citizenship
    If a high-risk chemical facility chooses to submit information 
about an affected individual under Option 2, the following table 
summarizes the biographic data that would be submitted to the 
Department.

                     Table 2--Affected Individual Required and Optional Data Under Option 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                         For affected individual
                                                                                          enrolled in a trusted
    Data elements submitted to the     For affected individual  For affected individual     traveler programs
              department                     with a TWIC              with an HME         (NEXUS, SENTRI, FAST,
                                                                                             or global entry)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full Name............................  Required...............

[[Page 6426]]

 
Date of Birth........................  Required...............
Expiration Date......................  Required...............
Unique Identifying Number............  TWIC Serial Number:      CDL Number: Required...  PASS ID Number:
                                        Required.                                         Required.
Issuing State of CDL.................  N/A....................  Required...............  N/A.
Aliases..............................  Optional...............
Gender...............................  Optional...............
Place of Birth.......................  Optional...............
Citizenship..........................  Optional...............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, a high-risk chemical 
facility would be able to choose to follow the process described for 
Option 1, and would not have to implement Option 2, even if an affected 
individual seeking access to the high-risk chemical facility is already 
enrolled in the TWIC Program, HME Program, or one of the Trusted 
Traveler Programs.

Option 3: Electronic Verification of TWIC

    Under Option 3, a high-risk chemical facility would not need to 
submit information about an affected individual enrolled in the TWIC 
Program to the Department, if the high-risk chemical facility is able 
to electronically verify and validate the affected individual's TWIC 
through the use of a TWIC reader (or other technology that is 
periodically updated with revoked card information).
    As discussed above, under the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, high-
risk chemical facilities would also be able to choose to follow the 
processes described for Option 1 and/or Option 2, for some or all 
affected individuals already enrolled in the TWIC Program, in lieu of 
or in addition to Option 3.

Other Information Collected

    In addition to the information about affected individuals collected 
under Options 1 and 2, the Department plans to collect certain 
information that identifies the high-risk chemical facility, or 
facilities, at which each affected individual has or is seeking access 
to restricted areas or critical assets.
    The Department may also contact a high-risk chemical facility or 
its designees to request additional information (e.g., visa 
information) pertaining to affected individuals in order to clarify 
suspected data errors or resolve potential matches (e.g., in situations 
where an affected individual has a common name). Such requests will not 
imply, and should not be construed to indicate, that an affected 
individual's information has been confirmed as a match to a record of 
an individual with terrorist ties.
    In the event that a confirmed match is identified as part of the 
CFATS Personnel Surety Program, the Department may obtain references to 
and/or information from other government law enforcement and 
intelligence databases, or other relevant databases that may contain 
terrorism information.
    The Department may collect information necessary to assist in the 
submission and transmission of records, including electronic 
verification that the Department has received a particular record.
    The Department may also collect information about points of contact 
who the Department or federal law enforcement personnel may contact 
with follow-up questions. A request for additional information from the 
Department does not imply, and should not be construed to indicate, 
that an individual is known or suspected to be associated with 
terrorism.
    The Department may also collect information provided by individuals 
or high-risk chemical facilities in support of any adjudications 
requested under Subpart C of the CFATS regulation,\19\ or in support of 
any other redress requests.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See 6 CFR 27.300-345.
    \20\ More information about access, correction, and redress 
requests under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act 
can be found in Section 7.0 of the Privacy Impact Assessment for the 
CFATS Personnel Surety Program, dated May 4, 2011, and available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department may request information pertaining to affected 
individuals, previously provided to the Department by high-risk 
chemical facilities or their designees, in order to confirm the 
accuracy of that information, or to conduct data accuracy reviews and 
audits as part of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program.
    The Department will also collect administrative or programmatic 
information (e.g., affirmations or certifications of compliance, 
extension requests, brief surveys for process improvement) necessary to 
manage the CFATS Personnel Surety Program.
    Under Options 1 and 2, the Department will also collect information 
that will allow high-risk chemical facilities and their designees to 
manage their data submissions. Specifically, the Department will make 
available to high-risk chemical facilities and their designees blank 
data fields. These blank data fields may be used by a high-risk 
chemical facility or its designees to assign each record of an affected 
individual a unique designation or number that is meaningful to the 
high-risk chemical facility. Collecting this information will enable a 
high-risk chemical facility to manage the electronic records it submits 
into the CSAT Personnel Surety application. Entering this information 
into the CSAT Personnel Surety application will be voluntary, and is 
intended solely to enable high-risk chemical facilities and their 
designees to search through, sort, and manage the electronic records 
they submit.

III. Request for Exception to the Requirement Under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3)

    The Department is requesting from OMB an exception for the CFATS 
Personnel Surety Program to the PRA notice requirement in 5 CFR 
1320.8(b)(3), which requires federal agencies to confirm that their 
information collections provide certain reasonable notices under the 
PRA to affected individuals. If this exception is granted, the 
Department will be relieved of the potential obligation to require 
high-risk chemical facilities to collect signatures or other positive 
affirmations of these notices from affected individuals. Whether or not 
this exception is granted, Submitters must affirm that the required 
privacy notice regarding the collection of personal

[[Page 6427]]

information has been provided to affected individuals before personal 
information is submitted to the Department.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ For more information, please see the Privacy Impact 
Assessment for the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, dated May 4, 2011 
and available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department's request for an exception to the PRA notice 
requirement under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) would not exempt high-risk 
chemical facilities from having to adhere to applicable federal, state, 
local, or tribal laws, or to regulations or policies pertaining to the 
privacy of affected individuals.

IV. Responses to Comments Submitted During 60-Day Comment Period

    The Department solicited comments on four questions:
    (1) Evaluate whether the proposed collection of information is 
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, 
including whether the information will have practical utility;
    (2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of 
the proposed collection of information, including the validity of the 
methodology and assumptions used;
    (3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to 
be collected; and
    (4) Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those 
who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, 
electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or 
other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic 
submissions of responses.
    In response to the 60-day notice that solicited comments about the 
CFATS Personnel Surety Program ICR, the Department received 28 comments 
from 2 private citizens, 8 private sector companies \22\, 14 trade 
associations, 1 union, 1 training council, and the Ranking Member of 
the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ One private sector company submitted two distinct comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comments Related to Whether the Proposed Collection of Information is 
Necessary for the Proper Performance of the Functions of the Agency, 
Including Whether the Information Will Have Practical Utility

    The Department did not receive any comments suggesting that the 
proposed collection of information was not necessary for the proper 
performance of the functions of the agency.

Comments Related to the Accuracy of the Agency's Estimate of the Burden 
of the Proposed Collection of Information, Including the Validity of 
the Methodology and Assumptions Used

    Comment: Several commenters suggested that the annual turnover rate 
of 71% for frequent unescorted visitors estimated by the Department in 
the 60-day notice underestimated the annual turnover rate for delivery 
personnel.\23\ One commenter suggested that the Department adopt a 
higher annual turnover rate of 81.75% for all frequent unescorted 
visitors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ See Table 6 in the 60-day notice published on March 22, 
2013 at 78 FR 17690.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Response: The Department agreed to adopt the higher estimated rate 
for frequent unescorted visitor annual turnover of 81.75%. The 
Department's burden estimates reflect this revised assumption.
    Comment: One commenter suggested that the Department made an error 
in Table 18 of the 60-day notice by not differentiating between the 
turnover rates of employees, frequent visitors, and infrequent 
visitors.
    Response: In this notice, the Department explicitly distinguishes 
the turnover rates of employees, frequent visitors, and infrequent 
visitors when estimating the annual burden estimate.
    Comment: One commenter suggested that the Department did not 
accurately estimate the annual burden estimate in Table 19 of the 60-
day notice. Specifically, the commenter suggested that Table 19 of the 
60-day notice reflects a figure ``0.50'' hours for initial submission 
rather than ``0.5425'' hours which was the estimated time per 
respondent calculated in Table 18 of the 60-day notice.
    Response: The Department disagrees and believes that in Table 19 it 
was accurate to use the figure ``0.50'' hours when estimating the 
annual burden. The figure 0.50 hours is distinct and is only associated 
with initial submission and not the other types of transactions covered 
by the ICR such as updates, corrections, and removals. The figure 
0.5425 hours represented the weighted average of all types of 
transactions and thus would have been inappropriate to use in Table 19 
of the 60-day notice when estimating the annual burden.
    Comment: One commenter suggested that the Department did not 
account for costs imposed by information submission requests the 
Department may require. Specifically, when the Department ``may'' 
require facilities to provide other pieces of information pertaining to 
affected individuals including visa information, the submission and 
transmission of records such as electronic verification that the 
facility provided a particular record, points of contact at a facility, 
and information supporting any adjudications or redress requests.
    Response: In the 60-day notice, Department estimated the average 
time per respondent to be 0.54 hours. The Department believes that the 
burden associated with requests from the Department for additional 
information about the affected individuals will be very rare and thus 
de minimus in nature. The Department also believes that the burden 
associated with information requests to support adjudication or redress 
requests will also be very rare and thus de minimus as well. Finally, 
the Department will collect submission and transmission of records, 
including electronic verification that the Department has received a 
particular record, automatically via system log files. This collection 
will not impose a burden on the high-risk chemical facility or 
designee. Therefore, for the reasons expressed above, the Department 
believes it has accurately estimated the estimated time per respondent.
    Comment: One commenter states that the Department did not account 
for the cost facilities will incur for a ``facility-by-facility vetting 
of individuals accessing multiples facilities.''
    Response: As mentioned earlier in this notice, the Department is 
aware that an affected individual may be associated with multiple high-
risk chemical facilities, and thus information about an affected 
individual may be submitted to the Department multiple times by 
different high-risk chemical facilities and/or their designated third 
parties. Therefore, for the purposes of this notice, the Department's 
estimation of burden accounts for the notion that an affected 
individual's information may be submitted by multiple times by high-
risk chemical facilities and their designated third parties.
    Comment: Several commenters objected to the Department's 
assumptions related to the potential recordkeeping burden associated 
with RBPS 12(iv). Namely, they objected to the idea that no potential 
recordkeeping should be estimated in this notice in accordance with 5 
CFR 1320.3(b)(2), which directs federal agencies to not count the costs 
associated with the time, effort, and financial resources incurred in 
the normal course of their activities (e.g., in compiling and 
maintaining business records) if the reporting,

[[Page 6428]]

recordkeeping, or disclosure activities are usual and customary. 
Furthermore, commenters objected to the Department's belief that the 
types of recordkeeping associated with RBPS 12(iv) are usual and 
customary costs that high-risk chemical facilities would incur to 
conduct background checks for identity, criminal history, and legal 
authorization to work as required by RBPS 12(i)-(iii) and also by 
various other federal, state, or local laws or regulations.
    Response: As mentioned earlier in this notice, the Department 
expects that high-risk chemical facilities or their designees (e.g., 
third parties or companies employing affected individuals that provide 
services to high-risk chemical facilities) will already possess much, 
if not all, of the necessary information about affected individuals as 
a result of standard business practices related to employment or 
managing of service contracts. Furthermore, the Department also expects 
that high-risk chemical facilities will likely consolidate RBPS 12(iv) 
processing with related routine hiring and access control procedures 
involving background checks that are already occurring prior to access 
by facility personnel or unescorted visitors to restricted areas or 
critical assets. Consolidating RBPS 12(iv) processing with these other 
routine procedures would allow submission of personal information 
already collected and maintained by facilities or their designees 
(e.g., a third party, contracted service company, or third party acting 
on behalf of a contracted service company) to the Department under RBPS 
12(iv). In this notice, the Department provides several illustrative 
examples to further clarify the Department's continued belief that the 
types of recordkeeping associated with RBPS 12(iv) are usual and 
customary costs that high-risk chemical facilities (or designees) would 
incur to conduct background checks for identity, criminal history, and 
legal authorization to work as required by RBPS 12(i)-(iii).

Comments Related to the Quality, Utility, and Clarity of the 
Information to be Collected

    Comment: One commenter requested specifics about the mechanics of 
the process on how to submit information about affected individuals to 
the Department.
    Response: The Department will publish a user manual when the CFATS 
Personnel Surety Program is implemented. The user manual will contain 
the necessary details about how information about affected individuals 
may be submitted, under Option1 or Option 2, through CSAT to the 
Department.
    Comment: One commenter requested specific information about the 
security or information protection requirements necessary to serve as a 
Submitter.
    Response: While an owner or operator of a chemical facility may 
designate someone to submit information on its behalf, the owner or 
operator is responsible for satisfying all the requirements of 6 CFR 
27.230(a)(12)(iv). The Department provides at 6 CFR 27.200(b)(3) that 
any such submitter must be an officer of the corporation or other 
person designated by an officer of the corporation, and must be 
domiciled in the United States, and is responsible for attesting to the 
accuracy of the submitted information.
    When a high-risk chemical facilities relies on third party 
companies to submit appropriate information about affected individuals 
to the Department the same requirements will apply. The submitter(s) 
must be designated by an officer of the corporation, must be domiciled 
in the United States, and is responsible for attesting to the accuracy 
of the submitted information.

Comments Related to Minimizing the Burden of the Collection of 
Information on Those Who are to Respond, Including Through the Use of 
Appropriate Automated, Electronic, Mechanical, or Other Technological 
Collection Techniques or Other Forms of Information Technology, e.g., 
Permitting Electronic Submissions of Responses

    Comment: One commenter requested the ability to submit information 
about affected individuals ``via some type of file (spreadsheet) upload 
as opposed to direct data entry into CSAT.''
    Response: When implemented, high-risk chemical facilities (and 
their designees), under Option 1 and Option 2, will have the ability to 
input records about affected individuals in three ways: (1) Manual 
entry, (2) bulk upload via Microsoft Excel file or an Extensible Markup 
Language (XML) file, and (3) a direct Web Service connection.
    Comment: One commenter requested clarification about Option 3, 
specifically, if the phrase ``other technology'' means computer access 
to the Internet.
    Response: The Department's phrase ``other technology which is 
periodically updated using the CCL'' was intended to cover a variety of 
ways a high-risk chemical facility could, in its SSP or ASP, describe 
how it would determine if a TWIC was revoked for cause, or revoked 
because it was reported lost or stolen. Revoked cards could be 
determined from the CCL by using an electronic card reader to compare 
the TWIC's Federal Agency Smart Credential Number (FASC-N) to those 
listed on the CCL. This could be accomplished by periodically 
downloading the current CCL from the Internet to either a TWIC reader 
or a Physical Access Control System (PACS).\24\ The status of a TWIC 
can also be confirmed by using a TWIC reader or PACS to check the 
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) for TWIC cards. The Department will 
also consider, in an SSP or ASP, any other specific innovative 
technologies that could allow high-risk chemical facilities to leverage 
the CCL or CRL for compliance with RBPS 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ See footnote 8, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Other Comments Submitted in Response to the Information Collection 
Request

    Comment: Several commenters suggested the Department develop 
substantially different processes than the processes described by the 
Department in the CFATS IFR published in April 2007. One commenter 
suggested that the Department establish a process to certify vendors so 
that high-risk chemical facilities could rely on the certification as 
proof that the vendor has implemented security measures to ensure that 
its employees do not have terrorist ties. Several commenters suggested 
establishing a voluntary process by which the Department could collect 
information directly from affected individuals, and subsequently issue 
individuals unique submission numbers. The commenters suggested that an 
affected individual could then present the unique submission number to 
the high-risk chemical facility as evidence that the Department had 
conducted a security threat assessment to determine whether or not they 
had any terrorist ties.
    Response: Neither the notice published by the Department on March 
22, 2013, nor this notice are rulemaking notices. These notices are 
published in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act and are not 
seeking to expand or change CFATS. Rather, these Paperwork Reduction 
Act notices are seeking comments on the burden associated with 
collecting information necessary to implement the CFATS Personnel 
Surety Program described in the CFATS IFR.
    Comment: One commenter suggested that the Department's 
``preconditions'' (i.e., the collection of information under Option 2 
to verify enrollment in the TWIC, HME, and Trusted Traveler

[[Page 6429]]

Programs) ``ipso facto do not provide reciprocal recognition of these 
vetting programs.'' The commenter further suggested that the Department 
was not following White House recommendations to promote comparability 
and reciprocity across credentialing and screening programs.\25\ 
Specifically, recommendation 16 of the Surface Transportation Security 
Priority Assessment, which recommends that the federal Government 
``create a more efficient Federal credentialing system by reducing 
credentialing redundancy, leveraging existing investments, and 
implementing the principle of `enroll once, use many' to reuse the 
information of individuals applying for multiple access privileges.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Recommendation 16 of the Surface Transportation Security 
Priority Assessment may be found on page 21 of the 2010 White House 
report at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/STSA.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Response: The collection of information under Option 2 to verify 
enrollment of an affected individual in the TWIC, HME, and the Trusted 
Traveler Programs does recognize and leverage the vetting activities of 
the TWIC, HME, and Trusted Traveler Programs. Further, the CFATS 
Personnel Surety Program aligns with the recommendations of the Surface 
Transportation Security Priority Assessment.
    In discussions with high-risk chemical facilities over the past 
several years, the Department has attempted to correct the persistent 
misinterpretation held by commenters about the concept of ``enroll 
once, use many'' as meaning that an individual should only need to 
submit information to the Department once, and that the Department 
should never collect information from that individual again. Rather, 
the Department has defined, and continues to define, the ``enroll once, 
use many'' concept as the ability to reuse previously submitted program 
enrollment information and/or vetting results upon collection of 
sufficient information to confirm an individual's prior enrollment in a 
Department program or prior vetting results.
    One example of how the Department has implemented ``enroll once, 
use many'' in a DHS program other than the CFATS Personnel Surety 
Program is when a person whose is enrolled in the TWIC Program seeks to 
obtain an HME. TSA collects sufficient information from the person 
enrolled in the TWIC Program to verify the person's identity and verify 
the existence of a current and valid security threat assessment.\26\ If 
verified, the existing STA is leveraged for the HME, which provides for 
efficiencies such as reduced enrollment cost and shorter processing 
time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ The online form may be found at https://hazprints.tsa.dhs.gov/Public/STAStatus.aspx
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comment: Several commenters suggested that the collection of 
information under Option 2 to verify an affected individual's 
enrollment in the TWIC, HME, and the Trusted Traveler Programs 
qualifies as a duplicative background check.
    Response: The information collected by the Department under Option 
2 is used to verify an affected individual's enrollment in a DHS 
program. The information collected under Option 2 is not used to 
conduct a duplicative background check.
    Comment: Another commenter suggested that the collection of 
information under Option 2 from affected individuals in possession of 
an HME as a proposal to ``screen drivers carrying hazardous materials'' 
violates 49 U.S.C. 5103a(g)(1)(B)(i) which states that ``[a]n 
individual with respect to whom the Transportation Security 
Administration--(I) has performed a security threat assessment under 
this section; and (II) has issued a final notification of no security 
threat, is deemed to have met the requirements of any other background 
check that is required for purposes of any Federal law applicable to 
transportation workers if that background check is equivalent to, or 
less stringent than, the background check required [to receive an 
HME].''
    Response: Collecting information to verify an affected individual's 
enrollment, so that if verified the Department may rely on the results 
of the security threat assessment already performed and being 
recurrently performed, is not prohibited by 49 U.S.C. 
5103a(g)(1)(B)(i), and comports with the means of vetting verification 
described in the CFATS IFR.
    Comment: One commenter suggested that the credentials be accepted 
``at face value.'' The commenter further suggested that, ``[t]he fact 
[that affected individuals] have a valid card meets the requirement 
specifically detailed in RBPS 1[2] and any further collection and 
submission of PII not only exceeds DHS' authority but results in 
duplication of effort and unnecessary cost to both the facilities and 
to DHS.'' Another commenter suggested that possession of a credential 
was ``proof'' that the affected individual was vetted and is being 
revetted for terrorist ties. Another commenter took an opposing view, 
and supported Option 2. The commenter agreed with the Department's 
intention to collect information to electronically verify and re-verify 
affected individuals' enrollments in the TWIC, HME, and Trusted 
Traveler Programs.
    Response: While visual inspection has some security benefits, 
electronic verification is significantly more reliable than visual 
inspection for ensuring that a TWIC, HME, or Trusted Traveler 
Credential is not counterfeit or expired, or has not been reported 
lost, stolen, damaged, or revoked. Accordingly, if a high-risk chemical 
facility chooses to implement Option 2, the high-risk chemical facility 
(or its designees) must submit information to the Department about 
affected individuals possessing the appropriate credentials to enable 
the Department to electronically verify, with the relevant component of 
DHS (i.e., CBP or TSA) using their authoritative and original data, the 
affected individuals' enrollments in these other programs.
    Comment: Several commenters suggested that the Department was 
requiring all visitors to have their information submitted to the 
Department 48 hours in advance of entering the site, which does not 
comport with the operational realities of the trucking industry.
    Response: The Department disagrees that this ICR does not comport 
with the operational realities of the trucking industry. The Department 
disagrees for four reasons. First, if a high-risk chemical facility 
chooses to allow visitors (e.g., truck operators) access to the high-
risk chemical facilities, for only those visitors with unescorted 
access to restricted areas or critical assets will the facility need to 
comply with RBPS 12. Second, the Department does not believe it likely 
that many high-risk chemical facilities will propose in their SSPs or 
ASPs to allow large numbers of visitors who visit the high-risk 
chemical facility infrequently to have unescorted access to restricted 
areas and critical assets, because then all four types of background 
checks listed in RBPS 12 would be required to be conducted for them. If 
the historical practice of a chemical facility has been to allow 
unescorted visitors access to the restricted areas or critical assets, 
without performing any background checks on them, the Department 
recognizes that the business practices of such a high-risk chemical 
facility will need to change as a result of RBPS 12(i), (ii), (iii), 
and (iv). Third, the Department generally expects that high-risk 
chemical facilities and designees will likely consolidate RBPS 12(iv) 
processing with related routine hiring and access control procedures 
already occurring prior to access by facility personnel or unescorted 
visitors to restricted areas or critical assets. As a

[[Page 6430]]

result of discussions with industry stakeholders the Department 
understands that, in general, routine hiring and access control 
procedures are already in place for individuals, likely to be 
designated as affected individuals because of access to restricted 
areas or critical assets, working on behalf of trucking companies. 
Fourth, in the default schedule provided later in this notice, the 
Department suggests that information about a new affected individual 
could be provided to the Department no later than 48 hours prior to 
that affected individual obtaining access to the restricted areas or 
critical assets at a high-risk chemical facility. The Department would 
like to highlight that information about a particular affected 
individual does not need to be re-submitted to the Department 48 hours 
prior to each instance of access by that particular affected 
individual. Rather, if a high-risk chemical facility, or its designees, 
are able to determine that an affected individual requires repeated 
access to restricted areas or critical assets, the high-risk chemical 
facility may structure the data submission to CSAT so as to indicate 
that the affected individual about whom the high-risk chemical facility 
or designee is submitting information to the Department will have 
access to restricted areas or critical assets on an ongoing basis. A 
high-risk chemical facility, or its designees, may also structure the 
data submission to CSAT to indicate that the affected individual will 
have access to restricted areas or critical assets for a discreet 
period of time.
    Therefore, for the reasons provided above, the Department disagrees 
that this ICR does not comport with the operational realities of the 
trucking industry.
    Comment: Several commenters raised objections to submitting a new 
affected individual's information at least 48 hours prior to their 
access to restricted areas or critical assets at high-risk chemical 
facilities. Some commenters suggested that submission of a new affected 
individual's information should occur, rather, only at the time the new 
affected individual actually accesses restricted areas or critical 
assets. Alternatively, some commenters suggested that that submission 
of a new affected individual's information should occur after the 
affected individual accessed restricted areas or critical assets.
    Response: The Department, in the default schedule provided later in 
this notice, suggests that information about new affected individuals 
could be provided to the Department no later than 48 hours prior to the 
affected individual obtaining access to the restricted areas or 
critical assets at the high-risk chemical facility. The Department 
believes that 48 hours is a reasonable amount of time, which is 
necessary for the Department to successfully perform a background check 
for terrorist ties. Therefore the Department has suggested a period of 
time (i.e., 48 hours) as a default for when high-risk chemical 
facilities could submit information to the Department for new affected 
individuals rather than at the time, or after the time, a new affected 
individual obtains access to restricted areas or critical assets. Later 
in this notice, the Department also reiterates that it will consider 
alternative schedules suggested by high-risk chemical facilities in 
their SSPs or ASPs, for Option 1 or Option 2, based on their unique 
circumstances.
    Comment: Several commenters expressed concern about contractors and 
visitors arriving upon short or no notice such as when a production 
unit goes down or otherwise requires emergency maintenance.
    Response: The Department understands that contractors and visitors 
may arrive with only short or no notice such as when a production unit 
goes down or otherwise requires emergency maintenance. The Department 
described, in the illustrative examples provided earlier in this 
notice, how a high-risk chemical facility could comply with RBPS 12, 
ensuring that all four background checks are conducted in such 
situations. High-risk chemical facilities should describe in their SSP 
or ASP the procedures and process \27\ to plan for and prepare for 
exceptional circumstances (e.g., unpredictable but foreseeable 
situations) that result in situations that require an affected 
individual to have short or no notice before accessing the restricted 
areas or critical assets at high-risk chemical facilities such as when 
a production unit goes down or otherwise requires emergency 
maintenance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ One example applied from the illustrative scenarios would 
be that the high-risk chemical facility would have in it contract 
clauses that require any contractors that provides emergency repair 
or maintenance to have background checks completed prior to arrival 
at the high-risk chemical facility, to include the submission of 
information about the affected individuals to the Department under 
Option 1 or Option 2.
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    Comment: Several commenters pointed out to the Department that TSA 
recently modified the TWIC application form \28\ to expand the 
population of individuals eligible to apply for a TWIC. The commenters 
uniformly suggested that the Department expand the population of 
individuals eligible to apply for a TWIC to include affected 
individuals that have or are seeking access to the restricted areas or 
critical assets of high-risk chemical facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ The revised TWIC application form may be viewed at (https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewIC?ref_nbr=201210-1652-001&icID=182269).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Response: Any determination the Department or TSA makes to expand 
or revise the population of individuals eligible to apply and pay for 
TWICs is outside the scope of this notice.
    Comment: Some commenters supported the Department's determination 
that certain groups are not affected individuals, specifically, (1) 
Federal officials that gain unescorted access to restricted areas or 
critical assets as part of their official duties; (2) state and local 
law enforcement officials that gain unescorted access to restricted 
areas or critical assets as part of their official duties; and (3) 
emergency responders at the state or local level that gain unescorted 
access to restricted areas or critical assets during emergency 
situations. One commenter did not support the determination and 
suggested that this determination only incentivized terrorists to 
assume the identities of law enforcement officials rather than workers.
    Response: The Department has opted to align how CFATS treats 
certain groups of persons with how those same populations are treated 
under the TWIC Program.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ See 33 CFR 101.514 at (https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=ef5225aac07eddf7f914e57c3fda36bf&ty=HTML&h=L&r=PART&n=33y1.0.1.8.49#33:1.0.1.8.49.5.26.4)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comment: One commenter objected to the inclusion of railroad 
employees as potentially affected individuals.
    Response: Railroad employees may be affected individuals if the 
high-risk chemical facility has defined railroad employees in their SSP 
or ASP as either (1) facility personnel who have access, either 
unescorted or otherwise, to restricted areas or critical assets, or (2) 
unescorted visitors who have access to restricted areas or critical 
assets.
    Each high risk chemical facility can choose which option or options 
it wishes to implement with regard to railroad employees that would be 
affected individuals. The Department notes that many railroad employees 
have TWICs and encourages high-risk chemical to consider whether Option 
2 or Option 3 may provide a reasonable solution.
    Comment: One commenter suggested that the 60-day notice was unclear 
as to which set of individuals would be subject to vetting for 
terrorist ties. The

[[Page 6431]]

commenter pointed out that the Department used the term ``affected 
individuals'' inconsistently. In parts of the 60-day notice, the 
Department described the term to mean ``facility personnel or 
unescorted visitors with access to restricted areas or critical assets 
at high-risk chemical facilities.'' In other parts of the 60-day notice 
the Department described the term to mean ``(1) facility personnel who 
have access, either unescorted or otherwise, to restricted areas or 
critical assets, and (2) unescorted visitors who have access to 
restricted areas or critical assets.''
    Response: 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12) defines the scope of individuals for 
whom RBPS 12 (and thus RBPS 12(iv)) background checks are required. 6 
CFR 27.230(a)(12) defines the scope as ``facility personnel, and as 
appropriate, for unescorted visitors with access to restricted areas or 
critical assets'' at high-risk chemical facilities. The Department has 
provided additional clarity in previous notices that affected 
individuals are (1) facility personnel who have access, either 
unescorted or otherwise, to restricted areas or critical assets, and 
(2) unescorted visitors who have access to restricted areas or critical 
assets.
    In response to public comments received on earlier notices, the 
Department clarified, and does so here in this notice, that individual 
high-risk facilities may classify particular contractors or categories 
of contractors either as ``facility personnel'' or as ``visitors.'' 
This determination should be a facility-specific determination, and 
should be based on facility security, operational requirements, and 
business practices.
    Comment: One commenter objected to the Department's intention to 
collect information that identifies the high-risk chemical facility or 
facilities at which each affected individual has or is seeking access.
    Response: The Department requires this information so that in the 
event of a positive match, the Department may provide the information 
to appropriate federal law enforcement entities.
    Comment: One commenter suggested that the ICR approach was 
deficient because the Department, based on public comments received, is 
unable to amend the text of 6 CFR part 27. The commenter suggested that 
without the benefit of a rule published in the Code of Federal 
Regulations, covered facilities will not know what identifying 
information is to be provided on individuals, and within what 
timeframes thus rendering the standards for personnel surety invisible.
    Response: The ICR and the associated 60-day and 30-day notices do 
not modify 6 CFR part 27. The ICR and associated notices provide 
descriptions of the nature of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program's 
information collection, categories of respondents, estimated burden, 
and costs. The Department is publishing this notice in accordance with 
the Paperwork Reduction Act because, although the Department has the 
authority to implement the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, the 
Department must still comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act and its 
implementing regulations before collecting the necessary information 
from high-risk chemical facilities or designees.
    Comment: One commenter suggested that the three options described 
in the 60-day notice are an impermissible mandate. The commenter states 
that RBPS 12 does not require that a facility continuously vet covered 
individuals against the TSDB.
    Response: In April 2007, the CFATS IFR outlined two options, 
described earlier in this notice, for high-risk chemical facilities to 
identify individuals with terrorist ties. Both options rely on 
recurrent vetting, which was one of the underlying bases for including 
those options in the CFATS IFR.
    Comment: Several commenters suggested that the CFATS Personnel 
Surety Program outlined in the ICR exceeds the Department's statutory 
authority, because the proposed CFATS Personnel Surety Program design 
conflicts with Section 550. Commenters suggested that the CFATS 
Personnel Surety Program's design eliminates a high-risk facility's 
flexibility to achieve compliance with RBPS-12. The commenters cited 
the following examples: (1) The ``48-hour rule,'' (2) ``submission of 
PII on valid TWIC, DOT HAZMAT, or Trusted Traveler card holders,'' and 
(3) ``notification when personnel depart a regulated site[.]''
    Response: The CFATS Personnel Surety Program will not exceed the 
Department's statutory authority, nor will it violate or conflict with 
Section 550. With respect to the specific examples cited by commenters, 
the Department does not believe these examples demonstrate a violation 
of the statutory requirement that the Department not disapprove a Site 
Security Plan on the basis of the presence or absence of a particular 
security measure.
    Not only does the Department disagree that 48-hour advance 
submission violates Section 550, the Department also disagrees with the 
characterization of the default schedule as a ``rule.'' As discussed 
earlier in this notice, the Department is not seeking to implement a 
new regulation. Rather, this notice is published in accordance with the 
Paperwork Reduction Act.
    The Department disagrees that a default expectation that high-risk 
chemical facilities or designees submit information about new affected 
individuals at least 48 hours in advance of access eliminates a high-
risk facility's flexibility to achieve compliance with RBPS-12. A high-
risk chemical facility may suggest alternative schedules, for Option 1 
or Option 2, based on their unique circumstances in their SSPs or ASPs.
    The Department also disagrees that the ``submission of PII on valid 
TWIC, DOT HAZMAT, or Trusted Traveler card holders'' violates Section 
550. The CFATS Personnel Surety Program will not exceed the 
Department's statutory authority, nor will it violate or conflict with 
Section 550 because the Department will provide and approve sufficient 
alternative methods for a high-risk chemical facility to satisfy the 
terrorism ties background check portion of RBPS 12. A high-risk 
chemical facility does not have to select Option 2. Rather, if a high-
risk chemical facility or its designees is unable or unwilling to 
submit information about affected individuals to verify their 
enrollment, a high-risk chemical facility may select Option 1, Option 
3, or propose another alternative.
    The Department also notes the commenter's use of the term 
``valid.'' Collection of information is necessary under Option 2 
because it would be inappropriate to have confidence in the validity of 
a credential based solely on a visual inspection of the credential. 
Electronic verification of the affected individuals' enrollments in 
other programs provides significantly greater confidence that the 
credential in the possession of the affected individual is not 
counterfeit or expired, or has not been reported lost, stolen, damaged, 
or revoked.
    Finally, the Department disagrees that ``notification when 
personnel depart a regulated site'' violates Section 550. The CFATS 
Personnel Surety Program does not require ``notification when personnel 
depart a regulated site.'' Rather the Department requires notification 
when an affected individual whose information has been submitted under 
Option 1 or Option 2 no longer has access to restricted areas or 
critical assets. This distinction is important--the Department has not 
suggested that it expects high-risk chemical facilities to update the 
information it sends to DHS through CSAT in real time as individuals 
depart the workplace, nor

[[Page 6432]]

has it suggested that notifications are required under Option 3 or 
under any other options high-risk chemical facilities might propose to 
DHS in their SSPs or ASPs. Notifications about individuals whose 
information has been submitted to DHS under Option 1 and Option 2, and 
who will subsequently lose access to restricted areas or critical 
assets, could occur before or after access is lost--high-risk 
facilities could propose schedules for this type of notification to DHS 
in their SSPs or ASPs, and DHS would evaluate these proposals on a 
case-by-case basis, taking into account unique facility operational and 
security needs.
    The primary distinction between ``notification when personnel 
depart a regulated site'' and the Department's requirement to be 
notified under Options 1 and 2 when an affected individual no longer 
has access is that the CFATS Personnel Surety Program is not tracking 
the real-time access of an affected individual at a high-risk chemical 
facility. Rather, the Department, under the CFATS Personnel Surety 
Program is seeking to ensure that affected individuals (whether they 
enter several times a day or only once over the time period in which 
they have the capability to enter) are checked for terrorist ties. This 
difference means that high-risk chemical facilities or their designees 
only need to notify the Department when to cease vetting once. This is 
in stark contrast to the multiple notifications that would be necessary 
if the Department required notification when ``personnel depart a 
regulated site.''
    High-risk chemical facilities and their designees have at least two 
alternatives in how to notify the Department that an affected 
individual whose information has been submitted to DHS under Option 1 
or Option 2 no longer has access. The first alternative is to submit 
the notification when the affected individual no longer has access. 
Under this alternative, a high risk chemical facility or designee would 
submit information about the affected individual initially and later in 
a separate communication notify the Department that the affected 
individual no longer has access. A second alternative the Department 
has provided is to allow the high-risk chemical facility or designee 
the ability to specify when the Department should stop vetting at the 
time of the initial submission.
    There are also additional alternatives available to high-risk 
chemical facilities. Under Option 3, the high risk chemical facilities 
may electronically verify and validate an affected individual's TWIC, 
through the use of TWIC readers (or other technology which is 
periodically updated with revoked card information), rather than 
submitting information about the affected individual to the Department. 
Consequently, there is no need for a high risk chemical facility to 
notify the Department when the affected individual no longer has access 
if the affected individual's TWIC is electronically verify and 
validated, through the use of TWIC readers (or other technology which 
is periodically updated with revoked card information). As previously 
discussed in this notice, high-risk chemical facilities are also able 
to propose other options for DHS consideration as part of their SSPs or 
ASPs.
    In conclusion, the only way the Department will know that an 
affected individual no longer has or is seeking access, under Option 1 
or Option2, is if the facility (or their designee) notifies the 
Department when personnel no longer have (or no longer are seeking) 
access to a regulated facility's restricted areas or critical assets. 
The Department disagrees that this aspect of the CFATS Personnel Surety 
Program exceeds the Department's statutory authority, violates, or 
conflict with Section 550.
    Comment: Several commenters suggested that the Department, in 
particular NPPD, has in the design of the CFATS Personnel Surety 
Program refused to leverage credentials from comparable programs. The 
commenter implied that NPPD could consider how TSA opted to implement 
the ``Air Cargo Screening Program'', and how ATF implemented the 
Employee Possessor Program.
    Response: Not all federal background checks conduct checks for 
terrorist ties that are equivalent to the background check for 
terrorist ties being conducted by the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. 
The Department has evaluated the ATF Employee Possessor Program and 
identified that the Employee Possessor Program conducts point-in-time 
vetting against the TSDB, which means that ATF's checks are conducted 
at only specified times, not on a recurrent basis. Recurrent vetting is 
a DHS best practice and compares an affected individual's information 
against new and/or updated TSDB records as new and/or updated records 
become available.
    The Indirect Air Carrier (IAC) and the Certified Cargo Screening 
Program (CCSP) programs both conduct terrorist ties vetting equivalent 
to the terrorist ties vetting that would be conducted under Option 1. 
After the initial implementation of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, 
if (A) the Department learns through interactions with CFATS 
stakeholders that a reasonable percentage of affected individuals 
participate in the IAC and CCSP programs, and (B) there is substantial 
interest from members of the regulated community in leveraging the IAC 
and CCSP programs, then NPPD may consider allowing high-risk chemical 
facilities to submit the full name, date of birth, and appropriate 
program-specific information or credential information necessary to 
enable the Department to electronically verify the affected 
individuals' enrollments in IAC and CCSP programs.
    Comment: Several commenters suggested that the ICR claims to 
leverage the TWIC, HME, and the Trusted Traveler Programs, but 
facilities or their designees must submit more information under Option 
2 than if the high-risk chemical facility or designee opted to submit 
the minimum information required under Option 1. The commenters 
conclude those who have already been screened face more burdens and 
greater scrutiny than those lacking any screening at all.
    Response: The Department has long conceded that the minimum number 
of data elements necessary to conduct vetting under Option 1 may, in 
some cases, be less than the minimum number of data elements to 
electronically verify an affected individual's enrollment in the TWIC, 
HME or Trusted Traveler Programs. This is because of how the TWIC, HME, 
and Trusted Traveler databases were initially constructed, not because 
affected individuals undergo extra scrutiny when the Department 
electronically verifies their enrollment
    Comment: One commenter requested clarification about the process of 
releasing employee information.
    Response: The scope of this notice is limited to the information 
submitted by a high-risk chemical facility (or designee) to the 
Department, which is subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 
552a). The Department will only release or disclose this information in 
accordance with the applicable Privacy Act System of Records Notice. 
The Submitter(s) of each high-risk chemical facility (or their 
designee) will be required to affirm that, in accordance with their 
Site Security Plans, notice required by the Privacy Act of 1974 has 
been given to affected individuals before their information is 
submitted to DHS. DHS has made available to high-risk chemical 
facilities a sample notice that complies with subsection (e)(3) of the 
Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3)) in the

[[Page 6433]]

CFATS Personnel Surety Program PIA.\30\ This notice would: (1) Notify 
those individuals that their information is being submitted to DHS for 
vetting against the Terrorist Screening Database, and that in some 
cases additional information may be requested and submitted in order to 
resolve a potential match; (2) instruct those individuals how to access 
their information; (3) instruct those individuals how to correct their 
information; and (4) instruct those individuals on procedures available 
to them for redress if they believe their information has been 
improperly matched by the Department of Homeland Security to 
information contained in the Terrorist Screening Database. Individuals 
have the opportunity and/or right to decline to provide information, 
however, if an individual declines to provide information, he or she 
may impact a high-risk chemical facility's compliance with CFATS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, high-risk chemical facilities (or designees) may have 
information about an affected individual obtained for other purposes 
(e.g., compliance with RBPS 12(i)-(iii)) that was never submitted to 
the Department and thus not subject to the Privacy Act. While under 
CFATS no specific controls are required for information collected by 
high-risk chemical facilities with regard to RBPS 12(i)-(iii), the 
Department expects that high-risk chemical facilities will protect and 
safeguard the information as outlined in their SSP and in accordance 
with any other federal, State, or local privacy laws which do have 
jurisdiction relative to the collection of the information.
    Comment: One commenter expressed concern about the Department's 
request for an exception to the PRA notice requirement in 5 CFR 
1320.8(b)(3) when the Department is also requiring that Submitters must 
affirm that the required privacy notice regarding the collection of 
personal information has been provided to affected individuals before 
personal information is submitted to the Department. Specifically, the 
commenter suggested that ``in order to make such an affirmation in good 
faith, the facility would almost certainly need to obtain signatures or 
other positive affirmations from affected individuals to protect itself 
against any claims of non-compliance.''
    Response: The Department believes that it is possible for a high-
risk chemical facility or designee to affirm, in good faith, that the 
affected individual has been given adequate notice pursuant to the 
Privacy Act without collecting a signature from each and every affected 
individual. For example, a high-risk chemical facility or its designees 
could consider including an appropriate statement in pay checks, 
posting a sign near a restricted area or critical asset, including an 
appropriate statement within existing standard privacy notices provided 
to individuals when collecting information during a routine and normal 
hiring process, or including an appropriate statement in a letter.
    Comment: One commenter requested clarification about what the 
Department will do with the information it collects. The commenter 
further suggested that reducing the security risk associated with 
personnel RBPS 12 could be in conflict with selecting the ``best 
qualified personnel/contractor'' to work in the restricted area or 
critical asset.
    Response: The Department will, under this ICR, collect the 
information necessary to implement the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. 
The CFATS Personnel Surety Program will use the information to identify 
affected individuals with terrorist ties.
    With respect to the potential conflict between reducing security 
risk and selecting the best qualified personnel/contractor, the 
Department stated in the CFATS IFR, ``that the level of screening for 
employees and contractors should be commensurate with the access 
provided. As part of this approach, the facility shall identify 
critical assets and restricted areas and establish which employees and 
contractors may need unescorted access to those areas or assets, and 
thus must undergo a background check . . .''.\31\ A facility's approach 
to personnel surety, including its defined restricted areas and 
critical assets, shall be detailed in the Site Security Plan that the 
facility submits to the Department for approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ See 72 FR 17688 (April 9, 2007) at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2007/04/09/E7-6363/chemical-facility-anti-terrorism-standards#p-302.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comment: Some commenters suggested that without a commitment from 
the Department to be notified when an affected individual has terrorist 
ties, there was little value to the default schedule which has high-
risk chemical facilities submitting information about new affected 
individuals 48 hours prior to access to restricted areas or critical 
assets.
    Response: The CFATS Personnel Surety Program, when implemented, 
will identify affected individuals with terrorist ties. The Department 
has procedures in place that it will follow to resolve the match and 
coordinate with appropriate law enforcement entities as necessary. The 
Department believes that 48 hours is a reasonable amount of time for 
the Department to successfully perform a background check for terrorist 
ties, and to coordinate with appropriate law enforcement entities as 
necessary.
    Comment: Several commenters suggested that by not committing to 
notify high-risk chemical facilities or designees when an affected 
individual has terrorist ties, the Department is increasing the risk of 
an affected individual with terrorist ties obtaining access to the 
restricted areas or critical assets at a high-risk chemical facility.
    Response: The Department's design of the CFATS Program is intended 
to promote and enhance the security of high-risk chemical facilities; 
the Personnel Surety Program is one element of the larger CFATS 
Program. To prevent a significant threat to a facility or loss of life, 
a high-risk chemical facility will be contacted where appropriate and 
in accordance with federal law and policy, as well as law enforcement 
and intelligence requirements.
    Comment: One commenter suggested that the design of the CFATS 
Personnel Surety Program appears to indicate the Department is playing 
an investigative role rather than a preventative role.
    Response: The CFATS Personnel Surety Program is designed to 
identify affected individuals with terrorist ties who have or are 
seeking access to restricted areas or critical assets at high-risk 
chemical facilities. The Department does not lead the investigation of 
any affected individual with terrorist ties; rather the Department 
supports law enforcement investigation activity. The Department 
recognizes the significant and vested interest the high-risk chemical 
facility or designee may have in ensuring an affected individual with 
terrorist ties does not successfully carry out a terrorist attack 
against or involving a high-risk chemical facility.
    Comment: One commenter requested that the Department define what a 
high-risk chemical facility is.
    Response: Public Law 109-295 required the Department to identify 
and regulate the security of high-risk chemical facilities. The CFATS 
regulations implement this statute and describe how DHS determines 
which chemical facilities are high-risk chemical facilities. Defining 
high-risk chemical facilities is beyond the scope of this notice and is 
beyond the scope of the ICR for the CFATS Personnel Surety Program.

[[Page 6434]]

    Comment: Several commenters pointed out that under Option 1, the 
Department will not be providing the results (i.e., that the affected 
individual does or does not have terrorist ties) to the high-risk 
chemical facility or designee, while under Option 2, the Department 
will be providing the results (i.e., that the Department was able to 
electronically verify that the affected individual is currently 
enrolled in either the TWIC, HME, or Trusted Traveler Programs). Some 
commenters suggested that not providing results under Option 1 but 
providing results under Option 2 was confusing. Some commenters 
suggested that by providing results under Option 2, high-risk chemical 
facilities will have greater confidence that the affected individual 
does not have terrorist ties (and the credential is not expired, has 
not been revoked, and is not fraudulent). The commenters pointed out 
that high-risk chemical facilities would also have greater confidence 
than when only relying on the visual inspection of the TWIC or other 
federal credential.
    Response: The Department has designed the CFATS Personnel Surety 
Program to support high-risk chemical facilities' compliance with RBPS 
12(iv) through a variety of options. The Department does agree that the 
flexibility high-risk chemical facilities and designees have does 
increase the complexity of the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, however, 
this flexibility increases the ability of each high-risk chemical 
facility to be able to tailor their SSP or ASP to their unique business 
operations when considering how to comply with RBPS 12(iv).
    The Department also believes that this flexibility provides 
ancillary benefits. Specifically, a high-risk chemical facility may 
choose to rely on the electronic verification and re-verifications 
provided by the Department under Option 2 to demonstrate compliance 
with RBPS 12(i)-(iii). A high-risk chemical facility may choose to rely 
on the Department's electronic verification and re-verification 
(provided via CSAT) under Option 2 not only for RBPS 12(iv) but also 
RBPS 12(i)-(iii) because an affected individual's enrollment in the 
TWIC, HME, and Trusted Traveler Programs is dependent not only on an 
equivalent check for terrorist ties, but on several other factors such 
as a verification of identity, legal authorization to work, and a 
criminal history check.
    Therefore, a high-risk chemical facility may, in their SSP or ASP, 
choose to rely on the Department's electronic verification and re-
verification that an affected individual is currently enrolled in the 
TWIC, HME, and Trusted Traveler Programs as a means of complying with 
RBPS 12(i)-(iii). High-risk chemical facilities should carefully 
consider whether the specific elements of the security threat 
assessments performed under the TWIC, HME, or Trusted Traveler Programs 
meet their business and security needs before choosing to rely on them 
for compliance with RBPS 12(i)-(iii) in their SSP or ASP.
    The Department would like to highlight that, under Option 2, high-
risk chemical facilities or designees will be able to, for the first 
time, electronically verify an affected individual's enrollment in 
either the HME Program or Trusted Traveler Programs. Consequently, a 
high-risk chemical facility or designee may choose to rely on the 
Department verification of enrollment, Under Option 2, to comply with 
RBPS 12(iv) and RBPS 12(i)-(iii).
    Comment: Several commenters suggested that providing information 
about an affected individual to the Department prior to access would 
complicate the ability of a high-risk chemical facility or designee to 
substitute contract workers, service providers, third party carriers, 
and the like on short notice in the event of an accident, illness or 
change in work assignment/scope.
    Response: Earlier in this notice the Department outlined its 
understanding about how high-risk chemical facilities and designees 
could include steps for RBPS 12(iv) in their normal business operations 
when conducting the routine and normal background checks required for 
RBPS 12(i)-(iii). The steps a high-risk chemical facility normally 
takes to comply with RBPS 12(i)-(iii) when faced with substitute 
contract workers, service providers, third party carriers, and the like 
on short notice in the event of an accident, illness or change in work 
assignment/scope should be a part of a high-risk chemical facility's 
SSP or ASP. These steps, or specific alternative steps to comply with 
RBPS 12(iv) could also be a part of, or incorporated within, those 
steps a high-risk chemical facility implements to comply with RBPS 
12(i)-(iii) in their SSP or ASP.
    In addition, high-risk chemical facilities are welcome to propose 
alternative or supplemental options not described in this PRA notice in 
their SSPs or ASPs. The Department will assess the adequacy of such 
alternative or supplemental options on a facility-by-facility basis, in 
the course of evaluating each facility's SSP or ASP.
    Comment: Submitters further suggested that providing information 
about an affected individual to the Department prior to access could 
also complicate the admittance of specialized crews brought in to 
accomplish emergency repairs or provide emergency response services. 
Some commenters suggested that the Department's approach to allow each 
high-risk chemical facility to address these issues in their SSP or ASP 
is not adequate because the absence of uniform guidance across all the 
sectors, programs and procedures will result in inconsistent processes 
and procedures.
    Response: Section 550 of Public Law 109-295 established a standards 
based regulatory regime to allow each high-risk chemical facility to 
propose in their SSP or ASP those security measures which make sense 
for its business operations and security risk. This will naturally 
result in inconsistent processes and procedures across high-risk 
chemical facilities. The Department believes that the intent of Section 
550 is that flexibility (and thus some subsequent variation) is in fact 
a desired outcome of CFATS rather than a negative and unanticipated 
result of the CFATS regulatory program.
    The Department would also like to point out that P.L. 109-295 and 
its implementing regulations do not prohibit high-risk chemical 
facilities from developing consistent approaches or from adopting 
consistent security measures or security protocols.
    Comment: Several commenters pointed out an apparent inconsistency 
between the Department's statement that high-risk chemical facilities 
are not required to create, keep, or retain records under RBPS 12(iv) 
and the Department's statement that it may request information 
pertaining to affected individuals, previously provided to the 
Department by high-risk chemical facilities, or their designees, in 
order to confirm the accuracy of that information, or to conduct data 
accuracy reviews and audits as part of the CFATS Personnel Surety 
Program. Commenters suggested that if records are not required to be 
kept it is unclear (1) how the Department can expect facilities to 
provide information on affected individuals to confirm the accuracy of 
previously submitted information or (2) how the Department can subject 
high-risk chemical facilities to data accuracy reviews and audits.
    Response: The Department disagrees that there is a contradiction 
because high-risk chemical facilities or their designees will already 
possess or have access to information about many affected individuals 
as a result of standard business practices related to employment or 
managing of service contracts. The Department also

[[Page 6435]]

recognizes that, unrelated to this Information Collection, high-risk 
chemical facilities may propose to maintain different sorts of records 
or information related to RBPS 12 as part of their SSPs or ASPs, and 
the Department expects that the records or information available could 
vary from one high-risk chemical facility to another. The types of 
information the Department could request from high-risk chemical 
facilities as part of data accuracy reviews or audits could thus vary 
from facility to facility, based on each facility's standard business 
practices and SSP or ASP.
    Comment: Several commenters stated that they do not routinely 
collect information about affected individuals who are not employees 
(e.g., contractors and visitors).
    Response: The Department understands that high-risk chemical 
facilities may not routinely collect information about affected 
individuals who are not employees. Earlier in this notice the 
Department outlined several illustrative scenarios which describe some 
common business operations as part of which high-risk chemical 
facilities could manage the background check requirements of 
contractors and visitors under RBPS 12. In these illustrative scenarios 
there is not an expectation high-risk chemical facilities will receive 
and subsequently re-transmit the information to the Department under 
Option 1 or Option 2. Though such an approach is not precluded, the 
Department will allow wide latitude to high-risk chemical facilities to 
enable third parties to submit information about affected individuals 
directly to the Department, to satisfy RBPS 12(iv).
    Comment: Several commenters requested clarity about what records 
would be considered government records.
    Response: Information about affected individuals held by the 
Department are government records. Thus information about affected 
individuals obtained from the Department (via CSAT) by high-risk 
chemical facilities or their designees are government records. There is 
often confusion about copies of information which is best clarified 
through illustrations.
     ILLUSTRATION 1: A high-risk chemical facility or 
designee holds information about affected individuals which it obtained 
to perform the four background checks required under RBPS 12. This 
information does not qualify as government records.
     ILLUSTRATION 2: A high-risk chemical facility or 
designee holds information about affected individuals which it obtained 
to perform the four background checks required under RBPS 12. The high-
risk chemical facility or designee submits portions of the information 
necessary under Option 1 and Option 2 to the Department via CSAT. The 
information in the possession of the high-risk chemical facility or 
designee does not qualify as government records.
     ILLUSTRATION 3: A high-risk chemical facility or 
designee holds information about affected individuals which it obtained 
to perform the four background checks required under RBPS 12. The high-
risk chemical facility or designee submits portions of the information 
necessary under Option 1 and Option 2 to the Department via CSAT. The 
high-risk chemical facility or designee logs into CSAT and downloads, 
prints, or copies one or more records about affected individuals. Only 
the records downloaded, printed, or copied from CSAT are government 
records.
     ILLUSTRATION 4: A high-risk chemical facility or 
designee holds information about affected individuals which it obtained 
to perform the four background checks required under RBPS 12. The high-
risk chemical facility or designee submits portions of the information 
necessary under Option 1 and Option 2 to the Department via CSAT. The 
high-risk chemical facility or designee logs into CSAT and downloads 
only whether or not an affected individual, under Option 2, has or has 
not been electronically verified as enrolled in the TWIC, HME, or 
Trusted Traveler Programs. The record of an affected individual's 
enrollment status provided by the Department is a government record.
    Comment: Commenters requested additional information about what 
information and records, related to the CFATS Personnel Surety Program 
was and was not considered Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information 
(CVI).
    Response: The Department does not generally expect information and 
records related to the CFATS Personnel Surety Program to contain CVI.
    In the May 2011 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Privacy Impact 
Assessment (PIA), the Department previously indicated that it would 
issue a ``verification of receipt'' and that the ``verification of 
receipt qualifies as Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information.[.]'' 
\32\ However, as discussed earlier in this notice, instead the 
Department now intends to provide high-risk chemical facilities, and 
their designees, the ability to create an alert within the CSAT 
Personnel Surety application that can notify them when the Department 
has received information about an affected individual(s). Such an alert 
would not be CVI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ See section 5.3 of the Privacy Impact Assessment for the 
CFATS Personnel Surety Program, dated May 4, 2011, and available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf. The Department also discussed ``verification of receipt'' in 
previous public notices related to an earlier (now withdrawn) ICR 
for the Personnel Surety Program--see for example NPPD's June 14, 
2011 PRA Response to Comments Document, 76 FR 34720, 34721.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comment: One commenter was troubled by the information pertaining 
to RBPS-12 contained in Appendix C of the May 2009 Risk-Based 
Performance Standards Guidance (https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_cfats_riskbased_performance_standards.pdf), because the 
commenter believes that certain types of measures, procedures, 
policies, and plans mentioned in Appendix C are not appropriate for 
determining if chemical facility personnel are terrorist threats.
    Response: The Department expects high-risk chemical facilities to 
implement appropriate security measures to conduct identity, criminal 
history, and legal authorization to work background checks. These 
security measures can vary from facility to facility commensurate with 
facility-specific risks, security issues, and business practices. The 
guidance referenced by the commenter (see pages 180 to 186 of the Risk-
Based Performance Standards Guidance) and other guidance addressing 
identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work background 
checks, however, is not guidance addressing compliance with 6 CFR 
27.230(a)(12)(iv), and as such is not the subject of this notice, nor 
is it the subject of the underlying ICR or of the 60-day notice 
preceding this notice.
    Comment: One commenter requested that the Department clarify what 
appeal or waiver options an affected individual has if his/her employer 
takes an adverse employment action against him/her based on RBPS-12 
background checks or based on information received or obtained under 
the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. The commenter also requested that 
the Department prevent high-risk chemical facilities from using 
personal information collected from affected individuals as part of 
RBPS-12 for purposes other than conducting the background checks 
required by RBPS-12.

[[Page 6436]]

    Response: High-risk chemical facilities' employment actions are not 
regulated by CFATS.
    The ICR the Department will submit to OMB, the 60-day notice, and 
the 30-day notice address the CFATS Personnel Surety Program, not the 
identity, legal authorization to work, and criminal history background 
checks required by 6 CFR 230(a)(12)(i)-(iii). Discussion of information 
collected as part of those other three background checks, or employment 
decisions based on them, is beyond the scope of this notice. However, 
the Department expects that the high-risk chemical facilities and their 
designees will safeguard information collected and maintained under 
RBPS-12 as outlined in their SSP and in accordance with any other 
applicable federal, State, or local privacy laws which apply to the 
collection of the information.
    Comment: One commenter requested information about the controls to 
prevent an individual or the facility from using the personal 
information for purposes other than RBPS 12(iv).
    Response: The Department expects that high-risk chemical facilities 
and their designees will safeguard information collected and maintained 
under RBPS-12 as outlined in their SSP. While under CFATS, no 
additional specific controls are required by the Department for 
information collected by high-risk chemical facilities, the Department 
does expect that high-risk chemical facilities will protect and 
safeguard the information as outlined in their SSP or ASP in accordance 
with any other federal, State, or local privacy laws which apply to the 
collection of the information.
    The information collected by a high-risk chemical facility pursuant 
to RBPS 12(iv) may be submitted to DHS under Option 1 and Option 2. 
Information collected or retained by the facility that has not been 
submitted to DHS and facility-generated copies of information that have 
been submitted to DHS are not considered government records and 
therefore are not covered under the Privacy Act of 1974. However, any 
information about affected individuals that is obtained from the CSAT 
Personnel Surety application is a government record and subject to the 
Privacy Act of 1974. Those government records must be protected as 
stated in the DHS CSAT Personnel Surety application Rules of Behavior, 
which every CSAT user will be required to affirm prior to receiving 
access to the application.

V. The Department's Methodology in Estimating the Burden

Summary of Changes From 60-Day Notice

    When compared to the 60-day notice, the Department made only a few 
changes which impacted the burden estimates in this notice. Table 3 
below briefly summarizes them.

                       Table 3--Summary of Changes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
          ICR Burden Variables                Description of changes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Frequency..............................  No Changes.
Affected Public........................  No Changes.
Number of Respondents..................  Revised the turnover rate of
                                          frequent visitors from 71% to
                                          81.75%. As a result, the
                                          number of respondents
                                          increased from 192,000
                                          affected individuals to
                                          195,000 affected individuals.
Estimated Time Per Respondent..........  Updated from 0.54 hours to 0.58
                                          hours as a result of the
                                          revised turnover rate
                                          increase.
Total Burden Hours.....................  Updated from 104,100 hours to
                                          113,600 hours as a result of
                                          the revised turnover rate
                                          increase.
Total Burden Cost (Capital/Startup)....  No Changes.
Total Recordkeeping....................  No Changes.
Total Burden Cost......................  Updated from $4,771,00 to
                                          $4,844,000 as a result of the
                                          revised turnover rate
                                          increase.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Frequency

    The Department will expect, unless otherwise noted in an authorized 
or approved SSP or ASP, that high-risk chemical facilities submit 
information, under Option 1 and/or Option 2, about affected individuals 
in accordance with the schedule outlined below in Table 4. High-risk 
chemical facilities may suggest alternative schedules for Option 1 or 
Option 2 based on their unique circumstances in their SSPs or ASPs. The 
default schedule below would not apply to Option 3. Schedules for 
implementing Option 3, or alternative security measures other than 
Option 1 or Option 2, could vary from high-risk chemical facility to 
high-risk chemical facility, as described in individual facilities' 
SSPs or ASPs, subject to approval by the Department.
    The Department will expect a high-risk chemical facility to begin 
submitting information about affected individuals under Option 1 and/or 
Option 2 under the schedule below after: (1) The high-risk chemical 
facility has been directed to comply with RBPS 12(iv); and (2) the 
high-risk chemical facility has been notified that the Department has 
implemented the CFATS Personnel Surety Program.

         Table 4--Compliance Schedule for Option 1 and Option 2 Under the CFATS Personnel Surety Program
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               Tier 1                 Tier 2                 Tier 3                Tier 4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial Submission Of  60 days after the day  60 days after the day  90 days after the day  90 days after the
 Affected               when both conditions   when both conditions   when both conditions   day when both
 Individuals'           are true:              are true:              are true:              conditions are
 Information.                                                                                true:
                       (1) DHS directs the    (1) DHS directs the    (1) DHS directs the    (1) DHS directs the
                        facility to comply     facility to comply     facility to comply     facility to comply
                        with RBPS 12(iv),      with RBPS 12(iv),      with RBPS 12(iv),      with RBPS 12(iv),
                        AND                    AND                    AND                    AND

[[Page 6437]]

 
                       (2) DHS provides       (2) DHS provides       (2) DHS provides       (2) DHS provides
                        notification that it   notification that it   notification that it   notification that
                        has implemented the    has implemented the    has implemented the    it has implemented
                        CFATS Personnel        CFATS Personnel        CFATS Personnel        the CFATS Personnel
                        Surety Program.        Surety Program.        Surety Program.        Surety Program.
Submission Of A New    48 hours prior to      48 hours prior to      48 hours prior to      48 hours prior to
 Affected               access to restricted   access to restricted   access to restricted   access to
 Individual's           areas or critical      areas or critical      areas or critical      restricted areas or
 Information.           assets.                assets.                assets.                critical assets.
Submission Of Updates  Within 90 days of      Within 90 days of      Within 90 days of      Within 90 days of
 And Corrections To     becoming aware of      becoming aware of      becoming aware of      becoming aware of
 An Affected            the need for an        the need for an        the need for an        the need for an
 Individual's           update or              update or              update or              update or
 Information            correction.            correction.            correction.            correction.
Submission Of          Within 90 days of      Within 90 days of      Within 90 days of      Within 90 days of
 Notification That An   access being           access being           access being           access being
 Affected Individual    removed.               removed.               removed.               removed.
 No Longer Has Access
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Therefore, after evaluating the choices available to the Department 
under Question 16 on the Paperwork Reduction Act Submission form 
(Standard Form-83(i)),\33\ the Department believes that the description 
of ``Other: In accordance with the compliance schedule or the facility 
SSP or ASP'' is the most appropriate choice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ A blank copy of Standard Form 83(i) may be found at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/83i-fill.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Affected Public

    Most high-risk chemical facilities regulated under CFATS are 
private businesses, or parts of private businesses. Most people that 
access the restricted areas and critical assets of high-risk chemical 
facilities do so for business purposes. Therefore, after evaluating the 
choices available to the Department on Standard Form 83(i), the 
Department selected the description of ``Business or other for-profit'' 
as the most appropriate selection for this proposed Information 
Collection.

Number of Respondents

    The number of respondents under this collection is the number of 
affected individuals that high-risk chemical facilities or their 
designees submit information about in compliance with RBPS 12(iv). As 
described more fully below, for the purpose of this notice the number 
of respondents is estimated by multiplying:
     The estimated number and types of high-risk chemical 
facilities, and
     the estimated number of affected individuals at each type 
of high-risk chemical facility.
    For the purpose of this notice, the Department estimates the number 
of affected individuals at each type of high-risk chemical facility as 
the sum of:
     the number of unescorted visitors at each type of high-
risk chemical facility, and
     the number of facility personnel and resident contractors 
at each type of high-risk chemical facility.
Number and Type of High-Risk Chemical Facilities
    In the 60-day notice, the Department followed the methodology used 
in the 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment \34\ which recognized that each 
chemical facility is unique. In the 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment 
the Department determined that it was impractical to estimate costs for 
each high-risk chemical facility. Therefore, the Department created 
four categories of facilities for each tier; three categories of 
facilities where loss of containment of the chemicals of interest is 
the primary concern and one category of facilities where theft and 
diversion of chemicals is the primary concern. Specifically,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ See CFATS Regulatory Assessment Section 5.1 (April 1, 
2007), https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS-2006-0073-
0116.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Group A includes open facilities with 100 or more 
employees where loss of containment is the primary concern. These 
facilities are assumed to have five security entrances for the purpose 
of the cost analysis.
     Group B includes open facilities with 99 or fewer 
employees where loss of containment is the primary concern. In 
addition, facilities that store anhydrous ammonia for commercial 
refrigeration in outdoor vessels are also considered ``open'' for the 
purpose of this analysis because it is the outdoor storage that 
requires protection. These facilities are assumed to have two security 
entrances for the purpose of the cost analysis.
     Group C facilities are enclosed facilities where loss of 
containment is the primary concern (i.e., warehouses, enclosed 
manufacturing sites) that manufacture, process, use, store and/or 
distribute chemicals. The Department did not segment enclosed 
facilities by size because the same degree of variation between a large 
open facility (i.e., a 2,000-acre petrochemical complex) and a small 
open 3-5-acre facility does not exist. These facilities are assumed to 
have one security entrance for the purpose of the cost analysis.
     Theft/Diversion facilities are typically merchant 
wholesalers (often called chemical distributors), chemical 
manufacturers, or other manufacturers that manufacture, process, use, 
store or distribute chemicals that could be the target of theft and 
diversion. The theft of chemicals could include theft of portable 
containers by employees, visitors or adversaries. The diversion of 
chemicals involves what often looks like a legitimate transaction where 
an adversary, impersonating a legitimate customer, purchases chemicals 
that could later be turned into weapons. These facilities are assumed 
to have one security entrance for the purposes of cost analysis.
    In the 60-day notice, the Department updated the number and type of 
high-risk chemical facilities estimated in the 2007 CFATS Regulatory 
Assessment. The updated analysis, hereafter referred to as the 2012 
CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis, determined the high-risk 
chemical facility count for each of the 16 model facility categories 
identified in the 2007 Regulatory Assessment by analyzing high-risk 
chemical facilities designated with a final tier under CFATS as of 
August 2012. A comparison of the number of high-risk chemical 
facilities, estimated

[[Page 6438]]

by the 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment, to the number of high-risk 
chemical facilities identified within the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety 
Program Analysis is presented in Table 5.

      Table 5--Number of Facilities in Each Model Facility Category
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           2012 CFATS
                                        2007 CFATS      personnel surety
                                        regulatory      program analysis
                                        assessment         (raw data)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A....................                 81                  4
Tier 1 Group B....................                 89                  6
Tier 1 Group C....................                 24                 10
Tier 1 Theft......................                  6                 93
Tier 2 Group A....................                166                  8
Tier 2 Group B....................                 64                 16
Tier 2 Group C....................                 80                 15
Tier 2 Theft......................                189                400
Tier 3 Group A....................                315                 22
Tier 3 Group B....................                438                 33
Tier 3 Group C....................                329                 66
Tier 3 Theft......................                718                935
Tier 4 Group A....................                242                 72
Tier 4 Group B....................                690                190
Tier 4 Group C....................                599                 13
Tier 4 Theft......................                970              1,683
                                   -------------------------------------
    Total.........................              5,000              3,566
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 

    In the 60-day notice, the Department normalized the number of 
facilities in each model facility category of the 2012 CFATS Personnel 
Surety Program Analysis to 4,000 facilities by multiplying the number 
of high-risk chemical facilities in each category by a factor of 
1.22.\35\ The 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis revised 
(i.e., normalized) high-risk chemical facility count is compared to the 
2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment high-risk chemical facility count, by 
model facility category, in Table 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ The factor of 1.22 was used because (4,000 facilities/3566 
facilities) = 1.22.

 Table 6--Number of High-Risk Chemical Facilities in Each Model Facility
                                Category
                    [Normalized to 4,000 facilities]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           2012 CFATS
                                        2007 CFATS      personnel surety
                                        regulatory      program analysis
                                        assessment        (normalized)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A....................                 81                  4
Tier 1 Group B....................                 89                  7
Tier 1 Group C....................                 24                 11
Tier 1 Theft......................                  6                104
Tier 2 Group A....................                166                  9
Tier 2 Group B....................                 64                 18
Tier 2 Group C....................                 80                 17
Tier 2 Theft......................                189                449
Tier 3 Group A....................                315                 25
Tier 3 Group B....................                438                 37
Tier 3 Group C....................                329                 74
Tier 3 Theft......................                718              1,049
Tier 4 Group A....................                242                 81
Tier 4 Group B....................                690                213
Tier 4 Group C....................                599                 15
Tier 4 Theft......................                970              1,888
                                   -------------------------------------
    Total.........................              5,000              4,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As in the 60-day notice, this notice the Department continues to 
use the number and type of high-risk chemical facilities in each 
facility category estimated through the normalized 2012 CFATS Personnel 
Surety Program Analysis because the distribution of facility type 
(i.e., facility count) is based upon actual historical data.

[[Page 6439]]

Estimated Number of Affected Individuals at Each Type of High-Risk 
Chemical Facility--Unescorted Visitors With Access to Restricted Areas 
or Critical Assets
    For the purpose of estimating the potential burden this information 
collection could impose, the Department determined that it was 
appropriate to continue to use the conservative assumptions from the 
American Chemistry Council (ACC) about frequent and infrequent visitors 
and treat them all as unescorted visitors.\36\ Specifically, the ACC 
provided the Department with an estimate on the number and turnover of 
frequent and infrequent visitors at high-risk chemical facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ This cost estimate has been posted to Docket DHS-2012-0061, 
which may be accessed through the Federal eRulemaking Portal at 
https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS-2012-0061-0008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ACC's analysis suggests that 1,200 total visitors per year should 
be expected at large open manufacturing facilities that align with 
Group A (Tier 1 through 4) model facility categories; 300 visitors each 
at small open manufacturing facilities (Group B model facility 
categories, Tier 1 through 4) and enclosed manufacturing facilities 
(Group C model facility categories, Tier 1 through 4); and 50 visitors 
expected at theft/diversion model facilities (Tier 1 through 4). ACC 
estimated an annual turnover rate of 71 percent for frequent visitors 
(e.g., delivery personnel) and an annual turnover rate of 20 percent 
for infrequent visitors that only visit the facility once or twice a 
year (e.g., corporate auditors). In response to the 60-day notice, the 
Department received a comment from American Trucking Associations (ATA) 
that suggested the annual turnover rate for frequent visitors (e.g., 
delivery personnel) suggested by ACC is too low. ATA suggested that the 
Department use a turnover rate of 81.75% instead of 71%. As a result, 
the Department increased its estimate of the frequent visitor annual 
turnover rate to 81.75%.
    The Department also continues to maintain the assumption in the 60-
day notice that frequent and infrequent visitors were expected to 
compose equal volume of traffic at high-risk chemical facilities.
    ACC's analysis assumed that all visitors count towards the number 
of affected individuals. However, high-risk chemical facilities will 
only be responsible for submitting information for unescorted visitors 
with access to restricted areas or critical assets. The Department does 
not expect high-risk chemical facilities to allow large numbers of 
visitors to have unescorted access to restricted areas or critical 
assets. As a general matter, the Department does not believe it to be 
likely that many high-risk chemical facilities will propose in their 
SSPs under CFATS to allow large numbers of visitors to have unescorted 
access to the restricted areas and critical assets of high-risk 
chemical facilities because then these visitors would be subject to all 
four types of background checks listed in RBPS 12. However, for the 
purpose of estimating the potential burden this information collection 
could impose, the Department continues to use ACC's conservative 
assumptions about frequent and infrequent visitors and treat them all 
as unescorted visitors.
    Table 7 provides the Department's estimated number of unescorted 
visitors that have or are seeking access to restricted areas or 
critical assets.

                     Table 7--Estimate of Unescorted Visitors That Have or are Seeking Access to Restricted Areas or Critical Assets
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 A               B              C*              D**          E = C + D       A + B + E
                                                              Infrequent        Frequent      Infrequent        Frequent      Unescorted      Unescorted
                                                                visitors        visitors  visitor annual   visitor annul  visitor annual         visitor
                                                                                                turnover        turnover        turnover        estimate
                                                                                                   (20%)        (81.75%)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A..........................................             600             600             120             491             611            1811
Tier 1 Group B..........................................             150             150              30             123             153             453
Tier 1 Group C..........................................             150             150              30             123             153             453
Tier 1 Theft............................................              25              25               5              20              25              75
Tier 2 Group A..........................................             600             600             120             491             611            1811
Tier 2 Group B..........................................             150             150              30             123             153             453
Tier 2 Group C..........................................             150             150              30             123             153             453
Tier 2 Theft............................................              25              25               5              20              25              75
Tier 3 Group A..........................................             600             600             120             491             611            1811
Tier 3 Group B..........................................             150             150              30             123             153             453
Tier 3 Group C..........................................             150             150              30             123             153             453
Tier 3 Theft............................................              25              25               5              20              25              75
Tier 4 Group A..........................................             600             600             120             491             611            1811
Tier 4 Group B..........................................             150             150              30             123             153             453
Tier 4 Group C..........................................             150             150              30             123             153             453
Tier 4 Theft............................................              25              25               5              20              25              75
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* C = A x 0.20, ** D = B x 0.8175.

Estimated Number of Affected Individuals at Each Type of High-Risk 
Chemical Facility--Facility Personnel With Access to Restricted Areas 
or Critical Assets
    The 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment also provided an estimate of 
full time employees and resident contractors for the 16 model facility 
categories, as shown in Table 8.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ See CFATS Regulatory Assessment Section 6.3.7, Table 15 
(April 1, 2007), https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS-
2006-0073-0116.

[[Page 6440]]



  Table 8--2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment Estimate of Number of Full Time Employees and Resident Contractors
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         A               B              C*              D**          A + C + D
                                       Number of        Resident        Resident      20% Annual       Number of
                                       full time     contractors     contractors        turnover       full time
                                   employees per    per facility    per facility      (full time   employees and
                                        facility  (as percent of                   employees and        resident
                                                       full time                        resident     contractors
                                                      employees)                     contractors    per facility
                                                                                   per facility)  (including 20%
                                                                                                          annual
                                                                                                       turnover)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A..................             391              30             117             102             610
Tier 1 Group B..................              35              20               7               8              50
Tier 1 Group C..................             152              10              15              33             200
Tier 1 Theft....................              35              10               4               8              47
Tier 2 Group A..................             279              30              84              73             436
Tier 2 Group B..................              34              20               7               8              49
Tier 2 Group C..................             317              10              32              70             419
Tier 2 Theft....................              35              10               4               8              47
Tier 3 Group A..................             487              30             146             127             760
Tier 3 Group B..................              47              20               9              11              67
Tier 3 Group C..................             310              10              31              68             409
Tier 3 Theft....................              35              10               4               8              47
Tier 4 Group A..................             283              30              85              74             442
Tier 4 Group B..................             139              20              28              33             200
Tier 4 Group C..................             201              10              20              44             265
Tier 4 Theft....................              35              10               4               8              47
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................             n/a             n/a             n/a             n/a             n/a
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*C = A x B, **D = (A + C) x 0.20.

    In the June 2011 ICR, the Department updated the estimate of 
employees and resident contractors in the 2007 CFATS Regulatory 
Assessment in response to a survey submitted by the American Fuel and 
Petrochemical Manufacturers \38\ during the 30 day comment period 
associated with the previous CFATS Personnel Surety Program ICR.\39\ 
Specifically, the Department increased the estimated number of full 
time employees/contractors in Group A facilities by 5, as shown in 
Table 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ The American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers is the 
name of the former National Petrochemical & Refiners Association, 
whose comment may be found at https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS-2009-0026-0029.
    \39\ See Response To Comments Received During 30 Day Comment 
Period: New Information Collection Request 1670--NEW, 76 FR 34720 
(June 14, 2011).

    Table 9--Revised 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment Estimate of Number of Full Time Employees and Resident
                                                   Contractors
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         A               B              C*              D**          A + C + D
                                       Number of        Resident        Resident      20% Annual       Number of
                                       full time     contractors     contractors        turnover       full time
                                   employees per    per facility    per facility      (full time   employees and
                                        facility  (as percent of                   employees and        resident
                                                       full time                        resident     contractors
                                                      employees)                     contractors    per facility
                                                                                             per      (including
                                                                                       facility)      20% annual
                                                                                                       turnover)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A..................           1,955              30             587             508           3,050
Tier 1 Group B..................              35              20               7               8              50
Tier 1 Group C..................             152              10              15              33             201
Tier 1 Theft....................              35              10               4               8              46
Tier 2 Group A..................           1,395              30             419             363           2,176
Tier 2 Group B..................              34              20               7               8              49
Tier 2 Group C..................             317              10              32              70             418
Tier 2 Theft....................              35              10               4               8              46
Tier 3 Group A..................           2,435              30             731             633           3,799
Tier 3 Group B..................              47              20               9              11              68
Tier 3 Group C..................             310              10              31              68             409
Tier 3 Theft....................              35              10               4               8              46

[[Page 6441]]

 
Tier 4 Group A..................           1,415              30             425             368           2,207
Tier 4 Group B..................             139              20              28              33             200
Tier 4 Group C..................             201              10              20              44             265
Tier 4 Theft....................              35              10               4               8              46
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................             n/a             n/a             n/a             n/a             n/a
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*C = A x B, **D = (A + C) x 0.20.

    In addition to submitting comments on the Department's June 2011 
estimated burden about unescorted visitors, ACC also suggested that 80 
percent of employees/resident contractors have access to restricted 
areas and/or critical assets at Group A, B and C facilities and only 15 
percent of employees/resident contractors have access to theft/
diversion facilities. To provide an additional estimate of the number 
of respondents the Department applied this ACC assumption to the 
revised 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis. The resulting 
estimate, referred to as the ``Adjusted June 2011 ICR Estimate of the 
Number of Full Time Employees and Resident Contractors'' is shown in 
Table 10.

                         Table 10--Adjusted June 2011 ICR Estimate of the Number of Full Time Employees and Resident Contractors
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 A               B              C*              D**          A + C + D           E          (A+C+D) x E
                                               Number of        Resident        Resident      20% annual       Number of           ACC's       Number of
                                               full time     contractors     contractors        turnover       full time     estimate of       full time
                                           employees per    per facility    per facility      (full time       employees       full time       employees
                                                facility  (as percent of                       employees             and       employees    and resident
                                                               full time                    and resident        resident             and     contractors
                                                              employees)                     contractors     contractors     contractors    per facility
                                                                                                     per    per facility     with access     with access
                                                                                               facility)      (including   to restricted   to restricted
                                                                                                              20% annual        areas or        areas or
                                                                                                               turnover)        critical        critical
                                                                                                                                  assets          assets
                                                                                                                               (percent)      (including
                                                                                                                                              20% annual
                                                                                                                                               turnover)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A..........................           1,955              30             587             508           3,050              80           2,440
Tier 1 Group B..........................              35              20               7               8              50              80              40
Tier 1 Group C..........................             152              10              15              33             201              80             161
Tier 1 Theft............................              35              10               4               8              46              15               7
Tier 2 Group A..........................           1,395              30             419             363           2,176              80           1,741
Tier 2 Group B..........................              34              20               7               8              49              80              39
Tier Group C............................             317              10              32              70             418              80             335
Tier 2 Theft............................              35              10               4               8              46              15               7
Tier 3 Group A..........................           2,435              30             731             633           3,799              80           3,039
Tier 3 Group B..........................              47              20               9              11              68              80              54
Tier 3 Group C..........................             310              10              31              68             409              80             327
Tier 3 Theft............................              35              10               4               8              46              15               7
Tier 4 Group A..........................           1,415              30             425             368           2,207              80           1,766
Tier 4 Group B..........................             139              20              28              33             200              80             160
Tier 4 Group C..........................             201              10              20              44             265              80             212
Tier 4 Theft............................              35              10               4               8              46              15               7
                                         ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...............................             n/a             n/a             n/a             n/a             n/a             n/a             n/a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*C = A x B, **D = (A + C) x 0.020.

    For the purpose of this notice, the Department also evaluated 
whether or not the 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment should continue to 
be the basis for the estimate of full time employees and resident 
contractors. To

[[Page 6442]]

provide an additional estimate of the number of respondents, the 2012 
CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis analyzed actual information 
submitted by high-risk chemical facilities in response to Top-Screen 
\40\ Question Q:1.45-400.\41\ Based upon the submitted information, the 
Department was able to estimate full time employees and resident 
contractors by each model facility category, as shown in Table 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ Top-Screen is defined at 6 CFR 27.105.
    \41\ Q:1.45-400 refers to the specific question reference number 
in the online Top-Screen application which is not available to the 
general public. However, the exact text of the question is available 
on page 20 of the CSAT Top-Screen Survey Application User Guide 
v1.99 in the row entitled, ``Number of Full Time Employees.'' See 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_csattopscreenusersmanual.pdf.

             Table 11--2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis' Estimate of the Number of Full Time Employees and Resident Contractors
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 A                                                                          B                A + B
                                          ..............  ...........................  ...........................         20% annual     Number of full
                                             Response to  Resident contractors.......  ...........................           turnover     time employees
                                              top screen  per facility...............  Resident contractors.......         (full time       and resident
                                                question  (as percent of.............  per facility...............      employees and    contractors per
                                              Q:1.45-400  full time employees).......                                        resident           facility
                                                                                                                      contractors per     (including 20%
                                                                                                                            facility)   annual turnover)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A..........................             599                                                                          120                719
Tier 1 Group B..........................              36                                                                            7                 43
Tier 1 Group C..........................             300                                                                           60                360
Tier 1 Theft............................             653                                                                          131                783
Tier 2 Group A..........................             222                                                                           44                267
Tier 2 Group B..........................              30                                                                            6                 36
Tier 2 Group C..........................             489                                                                           98                587
Tier 2 Theft............................             416      N/A--Top Screen Question Q1:1.45-400 incorporates                    83                499
Tier 3 Group A..........................             594              estimate of resident contractors                            119                713
Tier 3 Group B..........................              33                                                                            7                 39
Tier 3 Group C..........................             188                                                                           38                225
Tier 3 Theft............................             233                                                                           47                279
Tier 4 Group A..........................             737                                                                          147                884
Tier 4 Group B..........................              17                                                                            3                 20
Tier 4 Group C..........................             175                                                                           35                211
Tier 4 Theft............................             195                                                                           39                234
                                         ----------------                                                          -------------------------------------
    Total...............................             n/a                                                                          n/a                n/a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* In question Top Screen Question Q:1.45-400, facilities provide both full time employees and resident contractors.

    Table 12 compares the estimates of full time employees and resident 
contractors in the: (1) 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment; (2) ICR 
submitted in June of 2011; (3) adjusted June 2011 ICR Estimate of the 
Number of Full Time Employees and Resident Contractors; and (4) 2012 
CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis.

     Table 12--Average Number of Full Time Employees and Contractors per Facility by Model Facility Category
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                   June 2011 ICR
                                                                                  (adjusted with
                                                                                       ACC's
                                                                                   assumption on
                                                    2007 CFATS     Estimate used     facility       2012 CFATS
                                                    regulatory     in June 2011   personnel with     personnel
                                                    assessment          ICR          access to    surety program
                                                                                    restricted       analysis
                                                                                     areas or
                                                                                     critical
                                                                                      assets)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A..................................             610           3,050           2,440             719
Tier 1 Group B..................................              50              50              40              43
Tier 1 Group C..................................             200             201             161             360
Tier 1 Theft....................................              47              46               7             783
Tier 2 Group A..................................             436           2,176           1,741             267
Tier 2 Group B..................................              49              49              39              36
Tier 2 Group C..................................             419             418             335             587
Tier 2 Theft....................................              47              46               7             499
Tier 3 Group A..................................             760           3,799           3,039             713
Tier 3 Group B..................................              67              68              54              39
Tier 3 Group C..................................             409             409             327             225
Tier 3 Theft....................................              47              46               7             279
Tier 4 Group A..................................             442           2,207           1,766             884
Tier 4 Group B..................................             200             200             160              20

[[Page 6443]]

 
Tier 4 Group C..................................             265             265             212             211
Tier 4 Theft....................................              47              46               7             234
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When evaluating the reasonable alternatives (see next section) to 
estimate the total number of respondents, the Department did not 
consider alternatives that used an assumption about the full time 
employees and resident contractors estimates from the 2007 CFATS 
Regulatory Assessment or the estimate in the June 2011 ICR.
    Rather, when evaluating the reasonable alternatives to estimate the 
total number of respondents (see the next section of this document for 
this evaluation), the Department opted to use the best available 
industry estimates, as well as actual historical data collected 
directly from high-risk chemical facilities, to estimate the full time 
employees and resident contractors. Namely:
    (1) the adjusted June 2011 ICR estimate of full time employees and 
resident contractors, and
    (2) the estimate of full time employees and resident contractors in 
the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis.
Summary of Alternatives To Estimate the Number of Respondents
    As mentioned above, for the purpose of this notice, the number of 
respondents is estimated by multiplying:
     The number and type of high-risk chemical facilities, and
     the number of affected individuals at each type of high-
risk chemical facility.
    For the purpose of this notice, the Department estimates the number 
of affected individuals at each type of high-risk chemical facility as 
the sum of:
     The number of unescorted visitors at each type of high-
risk chemical facility, and
     the number of facility personnel and resident contractors 
at each type of high-risk chemical facility.
    In light of the data submitted by commenters and the Department's 
own analysis, three alternatives for the total number of respondents 
were considered by the Department.
    First, the total number of respondents is based on:
    a. The number and type of high-risk chemical facilities assumed in 
the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis;
    b. the ACC's estimates about unescorted visitors; and
    c. the adjusted June 2011 ICR estimate of the number of full time 
employees and resident contractors.
    This alternative results in an estimate of an initial 995,944 
respondents with an annual turnover of 313,819 respondents. See Table 
13.

                                               Table 13--Estimate of Number of Respondents--Alternative 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                           (A + B) x                           (D + E) x
                                                   A           B           A           B           C           C           D           E           C
                                               Number of    Estimate   Full time         ACC   Number of   Number of       CFATS         ACC   (Table 6)
                                               full time     of full   employees   unescort-  facilities     initial   personnel  unescorted      Annual
                                               employees        time         and  ed visitor   (Table 5)  respondent      surety    visitors  respondent
                                                     and   employees    resident    estimate                       s     program      annual    turnover
                                                resident         and  contractor  (including               (includes         ICR    turnover
                                              contractor  contractor     s CFATS      81.75%                     20%   withdrawn
                                                 s CFATS      s with   personnel    turnover                  annual  in July of
                                               personnel   access to      surety         for               turnover)    2011 20%
                                                  surety  restricted     program    frequent                              annual
                                                 program    areas or         ICR   visitors,                            turnover
                                                     ICR    critical   withdrawn         20%                           (Table 9)
                                               withdrawn      assets  in July of    turnover
                                              in July of   (Percent)   2012 with         for
                                                    2012               estimates  infrequent
                                              (including                      of   visitors)
                                              20% annual              percentage    Table 6)
                                               turnover)                      of
                                               (Table 8)              employees/
                                                                        resident
                                                                      contractor
                                                                          s with
                                                                      restricted
                                                                       area and/
                                                                              or
                                                                        critical
                                                                           asset
                                                                       (Table 9)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A..............................       3,050          80       2,440       1,811           4      19,071         508         611       5,020
Tier 1 Group B..............................          50          80          40         453           7       3,318           8         153       1,084

[[Page 6444]]

 
Tier 1 Group C..............................         201          80         161         453          11       6,878          33         153       2,087
Tier 1 Theft................................          46          15           7          75         104       8,592           8          25       3,457
Tier 2 Group A..............................       2,176          80       1,741       1,811           9      31,870         363         611       8,733
Tier 2 Group B..............................          49          80          39         453          18       8,826           8         153       2,886
Tier 2 Group C..............................         418          80         335         453          17      13,248          70         153       3,741
Tier 2 Theft................................          46          15           7          75         449      36,957           8          25      14,868
Tier 3 Group A..............................       3,799          80       3,039       1,811          25     119,671         633         611      30,689
Tier 3 Group B..............................          68          80          54         453          37      18,759          11         153       6,067
Tier 3 Group C..............................         409          80         327         453          74      57,744          68         153      16,348
Tier 3 Theft................................          46          15           7          75       1,049      86,387           8          25      34,754
Tier 4 Group A..............................       2,207          80       1,766       1,811          81     288,842         368         611      79,018
Tier 4 Group B..............................         200          80         160         453         213     130,592          33         153      39,638
Tier 4 Group C..............................         265          80         212         453          15       9,695          44         153       2,870
Tier 4 Theft................................          46          15           7          75       1,888     155,496           8          25      62,558
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...................................         n/a         n/a         n/a         n/a       4,000     995,944         n/a         n/a     313,819
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the total number of respondents is based on:
    a. The number and type of high-risk chemical facilities assumed in 
the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis;
    b. the ACC's estimates about unescorted visitors;
    c. the number of full time employees and resident contractors 
estimated by the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis; and
    d. ACC's estimate of the percentage of resident employees and 
contractors with access to restricted areas or critical assets.
    This alternative results in an estimate of an initial 919,646 
respondents with an annual turnover of 416,879 respondents. See Table 
14.

[[Page 6445]]



                                               Table 14--Estimate of Number of Respondents--Alternative 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       (A x B) =                           (C + D) x                           (F + G) x
                                                   A           B           C           D           E           E           F           G           E
                                              2012 CFATS    Estimate     Average         ACC   Number of   Number of  2012 CFATS         ACC      Annual
                                               personnel     of full   number of  unescorted  facilities     initial   personnel  unescorted  respondent
                                                  surety        time   full time     visitor   (Table 5)  respondent      surety    visitors    turnover
                                                 program   employees   employees    estimate                       s     program      annual
                                                analysis         and         and  (including               (includes    analysis    turnover
                                                 average  contractor  contractor      81.75%                     20%  20% annual   (Table 6)
                                               number of      s with           s    turnover                  annual    turnover
                                               full time   access to  (including         for               turnover)  (Table 10)
                                               employees  restricted         20%    frequent
                                                     and    areas or   turnover)   visitors,
                                              contractor    critical                     20%
                                                       s      assets                turnover
                                              (including   (percent)                     for
                                                     20%                          infrequent
                                               turnover)                           visitors)
                                              (Table 10)                           (Table 6)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A..............................         719          80         575        1811           4      10,702         120         611       3,277
Tier 1 Group B..............................          43          80          34         453           7       3,278           7         153       1,075
Tier 1 Group C..............................         360          80         288         453          11       8,304          60         153       2,384
Tier 1 Theft................................         783          15         118          75         104      20,127         131          25      16,273
Tier 2 Group A..............................         267          80         213       1,811           9      18,161          44         611       5,877
Tier 2 Group B..............................          36          80          29         453          18       8,645           6         153       2,848
Tier 2 Group C..............................         587          80         469         453          17      15,514          98         153       4,214
Tier 2 Theft................................         499          15          75          75         449      67,405          83          25      48,700
Tier 3 Group A..............................         713          80         571       1,811          25      58,760         119         611      17,999
Tier 3 Group B..............................          39          80          31         453          37      17,917           7         153       5,892
Tier 3 Group C..............................         225          80         180         453          74      46,854          38         153      14,079
Tier 3 Theft................................         279          15          42          75       1,049     123,087          47          25      75,533
Tier 4 Group A..............................         884          80         707       1,811          81     203,357         147         611      61,209
Tier 4 Group B..............................          20          80          16         453         213      99,897           3         153      33,243
Tier 4 Group C..............................         211          80         168         453          15       9,057          35         153       2,737
Tier 4 Theft................................         234          15          35          75       1,888     208,578          39          25     121,538
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...................................         n/a         n/a         n/a         n/a       4,000     919,646         n/a         n/a     416,879
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third the total number of respondents is based on:
    a. The number and type of high-risk chemical facilities assumed in 
the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis;
    b. the ACC's estimates about unescorted visitors;
    c. the number of full time employees and resident contractors 
estimated by the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program Analysis; and
    d. does not include ACC's estimate of the percentage of resident 
employees and contractors with access to restricted areas or critical 
assets.
    This alternative results in an estimate of an initial 1,830,356 
respondents with an annual turnover of 416,879 respondents. See Table 
15.

                                               Table 15--Estimate of Number of Respondents--Alternative 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       (A x B) =                           (C + D) x                           (F + G) x
                                                   A           B           C           D           E           E           F           G           E
                                              2012 CFATS    Estimate     Average         ACC   Number of   Number of  2012 CFATS         ACC      Annual
                                               personnel     of full   number of  unescorted  facilities     initial   personnel  unescorted  respondent
                                                  surety        time   full time     visitor   (Table 5)  respondent      surety    visitors    turnover
                                                  proram   employees   employees    estimate                       s     program      annual
                                                analysis         and         and  (including                            analysis    turnover
                                                 average  contractor  contractor      81.75%                          20% annual   (Table 6)
                                               number of      s with           s    turnover                            turnover
                                               full time   access to  (including         for                          (Table 10)
                                               employees  restricted         20%    frequent
                                                     and    areas or   turnover)   visitors,
                                              contractor    critical                     20%
                                                       s      assets                turnover
                                              (including   (percent)                     for
                                                     20%                          infrequent
                                               turnover)                           visitors)
                                              (Table 10)                           (Table 6)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A..............................         719         100         719       1,811           4      11,347         120         611       3,277
Tier 1 Group B..............................          43         100          43         453           7       3,336           7         153       1,075
Tier 1 Group C..............................         360         100         360         453          11       9,111          60         153       2,384
Tier 1 Theft................................         783         100         783          75         104      89,587         131          25      16,273
Tier 2 Group A..............................         267         100         267       1,811           9      18,640          44         611       5,877

[[Page 6446]]

 
Tier 2 Group B..............................          36         100          36         453          18       8,775           6         153       2,848
Tier 2 Group C..............................         587         100         587         453          17      17,489          98         153       4,214
Tier 2 Theft................................         499         100         499          75         449     257,567          83          25      48,700
Tier 3 Group A..............................         713         100         713       1,811          25      62,281         119         611      17,999
Tier 3 Group B..............................          39         100          39         453          37      18,208           7         153       5,892
Tier 3 Group C..............................         225         100         225         453          74      50,191          38         153      14,079
Tier 3 Theft................................         279         100         279          75       1,049     372,244          47          25      75,533
Tier 4 Group A..............................         884         100         884       1,811          81     217,641         147         611      61,209
Tier 4 Group B..............................          20         100          20         453         213     100,755           3         153      33,243
Tier 4 Group C..............................         211         100         211         453          15       9,671          35         153       2,737
Tier 4 Theft................................         234         100         234          75       1,888     583,514          39          25     121,538
                                             -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...................................         n/a         n/a         n/a         n/a       4,000   1,830,356         n/a         n/a     416,879
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These three alternatives are summarized in Table 16.

                    Table 16--Comparison of Number of Respondents for Alternatives 1, 2 and 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                     Number of
                                                                                                    respondents
                                                   Initial Year       Year 2          Year 3          (annual
                                                                                                     average)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternative 1...................................         995,944         313,819         313,819         541,194
Alternative 2...................................         919,646         416,879         416,879         584,468
Alternative 3...................................       1,830,356         416,879         416,879         888,038
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the purpose of this notice the Department selected alternative 
3. Alternative 3 reasonably reflects the type and number of facilities 
regulated by CFATS, is based upon the actual number of full time 
employees and contractors as reported by high-risk chemical facilities, 
and explicitly estimates unescorted visitors as a separate population 
from facility employees and resident contractors.
Limitation of Respondents to Tier 1 and Tier 2 Facilities
    The Department is proposing to limit this information collection, 
and to limit initial CFATS Personnel Surety Program implementation, to 
only Tier 1 and Tier 2 high-risk chemical facilities. A limited 
implementation would enable the Department to implement the CFATS 
Personnel Surety Program for those facilities presenting the highest 
risk, while not imposing the burden on all CFATS regulated facilities. 
Assuming this information collection request is approved, a subsequent 
ICR would be published and submitted to OMB for approval to incorporate 
any lessons learned and potential improvements to the CFATS Personnel 
Surety Program prior to collecting information from Tier 3 and Tier 4 
high-risk chemical facilities. Table 17 provides the estimate of the 
number of respondents using alternative 3 for Tier 1 and 2 high-risk 
chemical facilities.

[[Page 6447]]



                                                 Table 17--Estimate of Number of Tier 1 & 2 Respondents
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       (A x B) =                           (C + D) x                           (F = G) x
                                                   A           B           C           D           E           E           F           G           E
                                              2012 CFATS    Estimate     Average         ACC   Number of   Number of  2012 CFATS         ACC      Annual
                                               personnel     of full   number of  unescorted  facilities     initial   personnel  unescorted  respondent
                                                  surety        time   full time     visitor   (Table 5)  respondent      surety    visitors    turnover
                                                 program   employees   employees    estimate                       s     program      annual
                                                analysis         and         and  (including                            analysis    turnover
                                                 average  contractor  contractor      81.75%                          20% annual   (Table 6)
                                               number of      s with           s    turnover                            turnover
                                               full time   access to  (Including         for                          (Table 10)
                                               employees  restricted         20%    frequent
                                                     and    areas or   turnover)   visitors,
                                              contractor    critical                     20%
                                                       s      assets                turnover
                                              (including   (Percent)                     for
                                                     20%                          infrequent
                                               turnover)                           visitors)
                                              (Table 10)                           (Table 6)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A..............................         719         100         719       1,811           4      11,347         120         611       3,277
Tier 1 Group B..............................          43         100          43         453           7       3,336           7         153       1,075
Tier 1 Group C..............................         360         100         360         453          11       9,111          60         153       2,384
Tier 1 Theft................................         783         100         783          75         104      89,587         131          25      16,273
Tier 2 Group A..............................         267         100         267       1,811           9      18,640          44         611       5,877
Tier 2 Group B..............................          36         100          36         453          18       8,775           6         153       2,848
Tier 2 Group C..............................         587         100         587         453          17      17,489          98         153       4,214
Tier 2 Theft................................         499         100         499          75         449     257,567          83          25      48,700
                                             -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...................................         n/a         n/a         n/a         n/a         n/a     415,852         n/a         n/a      84,648
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Therefore, the annual average number of respondents is equal to 
195,049, as shown in Table 18. The Department's rounded estimate is 
195,000 respondents.

                  Table 18--Estimate of Annual Number of Respondents for Tier 1 & 2 Facilities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         A               B               C         (A + B + C)/3
                                                           Total           Total           Total       Number of
                                                     respondents     respondents     respondents     respondents
                                                          year 1          year 2          year 3         (annual
                                                                                                        average)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A..................................          11,347           3,277           3,277           5,967
Tier 1 Group B..................................           3,336           1,075           1,075           1,829
Tier 1 Group C..................................           9,111           2,384           2,384           4,627
Tier 1 Theft....................................          89,587          16,273          16,273          40,711
Tier 2 Group A..................................          18,640           5,877           5,877          10,132
Tier 2 Group B..................................           8,775           2,848           2,848           4,823
Tier 2 Group C..................................          17,489           4,214           4,214           8,639
Tier 2 Theft....................................         257,567          48,700          48,700         118,322
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................         415,852          84,648          84,648         195,049
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total Annual Burden Hours

    The total annual burden hours were estimated in a three step 
process. The first step was to derive from previous tables in this 
notice the estimated number of initial submissions for Tier 1 and Tier 
2 facilities: (1) Full time employees and contractors, (2) frequent 
visitors, and (3) infrequent visitors. The derived estimates are shown 
in Table 18.

[[Page 6448]]



                                              Table 19--Step 1 of Estimating the Total Annual Burden Hours
                                          [Estimate of initial submissions for Tier 1 & 2 facilities in Year 1]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              A             B             C             D        E = (A x D)   F = (B x D)   G = (C x D)
                                                         Response to       Initial       Initial    2012 CFATS       Initial       Initial       Initial
                                                          top screen  submissions-  submissions-     personnel  submissions-  submissions-  submissions-
                                                            question             -             -        surety             -             -             -
                                                          Q:1.45-400      frequent    infrequent       program     full time      frequent    infrequent
                                                          (Table 11)      visitors      visitors      analysis     employees      visitors      visitors
                                                                         (Table 7)     (Table 7)  (normalized)           and      (Year 1)      (Year 1)
                                                                                                     (Table 6)   contractors
                                                                                                                    (Year 1)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A........................................           599           600           600             4         2,686         2,692         2,692
Tier 1 Group B........................................            36           150           150             7           241         1,010         1,010
Tier 1 Group C........................................           300           150           150            11         3,362         1,683         1,683
Tier 1 Theft..........................................           653            25            25           104        68,098         2,608         2,608
Tier 2 Group A........................................           222           600           600             9         1,994         5,384         5,384
Tier 2 Group B........................................            30           150           150            18           543         2,692         2,692
Tier 2 Group C........................................           489           150           150            17         8,228         2,524         2,524
Tier 2 Theft..........................................           416            25            25           449       186,433        11,217        11,217
                                                       -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.............................................           n/a           n/a           n/a           n/a       271,585        29,809        29,809
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The second step of estimating the total annual burden hours was to 
estimate the average annual number of submission by the type of 
submission. The average annual number of submissions, by the type of 
submission for Tier 1 and Tier 2 Facilities over three years is shown 
in Table 20.

                          Table 20--Step 2 of Estimating the Total Annual Burden Hours
[Average annual estimate of total number of submissions, by type of submission, for Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities
                                                  in each year]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         A               B           A x B = C    (A + B) * 0.05         C
                                         Initial          Annual      Additional         Update/  Removal due to
                                     submissions        turnover     submissions     corrections        turnover
                                                      percentage          due to
                                                                        industry
                                                                        turnover
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year 1
    Full Time Employees and              271,585              20          54,317          16,295          54,317
     Contractors................
    Frequent Visitors...........          29,809           81.75          24,369           2,709          24,369
    Infrequent Visitors.........          29,809              20           5,962           1,789           5,962
Year 1 Submissions..............  ..............         415,853  ..............          20,793          84,648
Year 2
    Full Time Employees and                    0  ..............          54,317           2,716          54,317
     Contractors................
    Frequent Visitors...........               0  ..............          24,369           1,218          24,369
    Infrequent Visitors.........               0  ..............           5,962             298           5,962
Year 2 Submissions..............  ..............          84,648  ..............           4,232          84,648
Year 3
    Full Time Employees and                    0  ..............          54,317           2,716          54,317
     Contractors................
    Frequent Visitors...........               0  ..............          24,369           1,218          24,369
    Infrequent Visitors.........               0  ..............           5,962             298           5,962
Year 3 Submissions..............  ..............          84,648  ..............           4,232          84,648
Total Submissions Over 3 Years..  ..............         585,149  ..............          29,257         253,944
Number of Average Annual          ..............         195,050  ..............           9,752          84,648
 Submissions....................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The third, and final step of estimating the total annual burden 
hours, was to sum the average annual burden hours for each type of 
submission.
    The average annual burden hour for each type of submission was 
estimated by multiplying the average annual number of: (1) Initial 
respondents multiplied by the estimated time per initial respondent 
(0.50 hours or 30 minutes); (2) respondents for which a high-risk 
chemical facility will need to update/correct information multiplied by 
the number of hours necessary to type and submit each update/correction 
(i.e., 0.17 hours or 10 minutes); and (3) respondents that are expected 
to no longer have access to a high-risk chemical facility's restricted 
area(s) multiplied by the number of hours necessary to notify the 
Department (i.e., 0.17 hours or 10 minutes).
    Both calculations described above are displayed below in Table 21.

[[Page 6449]]



                            Table 21--Step 3 of Estimating the Annual Burden Estimate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                         A               B          (A x B) = C
                                                                  Average annual        Duration    Burden hours
                                                                     respondents         (hours)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial Submissions.............................................         195,049            0.50          97,525
Updates/Corrections.............................................           9,752            0.17           1,658
Removal--Turnover...............................................          84,648            0.17          14,390
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                                                  ..............  ..............         113,573
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 

    Therefore, the average annual burden is estimated to be 113,573 
hours. The Department's rounded estimate is 113,600 hours.

Estimated Time per Respondent

    For the purpose of estimating the time per respondent, the 
Department considered making an assumption about the percentage of 
affected individuals under the three options outlined in the summary 
section of this notice (e.g., information about one-third of affected 
individuals would be submitted for direct vetting against the federal 
government's consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist, 
information about one-third of affected individuals would be submitted 
to verify enrollment in other DHS programs, and information about one-
third of affected individuals would not be submitted because they 
possess TWICs that high-risk chemical facilities would electronically 
verify through the use of TWIC readers). However, the Department 
concluded that such an assumption was unwarranted because: (1) The 
assumption would be without any factual basis; (2) the burden to submit 
information about an affected individual for direct vetting is 
approximately the same as the burden to submit information in order to 
verify enrollment (i.e., similar number of required data elements); and 
(3) the most conservative burden estimate would assume that information 
is submitted for all affected individuals (i.e., no facilities will 
choose to electronically verify the TWIC in the possession of an 
affected individual).
    To avoid making unjustified assumptions, and to avoid 
underestimating the time per respondent, the Department decided to 
estimate the average burden per respondent by assuming each and every 
respondent's information will be manually submitted, rather than 
uploaded via a bulk file or web-service, to the Department for vetting 
for terrorist ties.
    Accordingly, the Department's ``estimated time per respondent'' is 
estimated by dividing the average annual burden hours (113,573 hours) 
by the number of respondents (195,049). Therefore, for the purpose of 
this notice, the estimated time per respondent is 0.5822 hours. The 
Department's rounded estimate is 0.58 hours.

Total Burden Cost (Capital/Startup)

    The Department expects no capital/startup cost for high-risk 
chemical facilities that choose to implement Option 1 or Option 2.
    Although there are no costs associated with high-risk chemical 
facilities providing information to the Department under Option 3, the 
Department has nonetheless estimated the potential capital costs 
incurred by high-risk chemical facilities that choose to implement 
Option 3 under the CFATS Personnel Surety Program to ensure an 
appropriate accounting of the costs potentially incurred by this 
Information Collection. The capital cost of Option 3 can be estimated 
by multiplying (1) the number of high-risk chemical facilities that are 
likely to implement Option 3 by (2) the cost to acquire, install, and 
maintain TWIC readers at the high-risk chemical facilities.
Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3--Number and Type of High-Risk 
Chemical Facilities That May Choose To Use Option 3
    High-risk chemical facilities and their designees have wide 
latitude in how they may implement Option 3, if they choose to do so. 
High-risk chemical facilities could propose, in their SSPs or ASPs, to 
share the costs of TWIC readers and any associated infrastructure at 
central locations, or high-risk chemical facilities could propose to 
purchase and install TWIC readers for their own use. The Department 
will assess the adequacy of such proposals on a facility-by-facility 
basis, in the course of evaluating each facility's SSP or ASP.
    For the purpose of this notice, the Department estimates that the 
number of high-risk chemical facilities that are likely to implement 
Option 3 is the number of high-risk chemical facilities likely to have 
affected individuals who possess TWICs accessing their restricted areas 
or critical assets. Through the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program 
Analysis, the Department determined that there are currently 32 high-
risk chemical facilities that have claimed a partial Maritime 
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) exemption \42\ and have received a 
final tier determination under CFATS. The Department then normalized 
the facility count by multiplying the number of facilities that claimed 
a partial exemption in each category by a factor of 1.22 (as it did in 
estimating the total number of facilities in Table 6 above), as shown 
in Table 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Facilities that are partially regulated under both MTSA and 
CFATS have the opportunity to identify themselves in the CSAT Top-
Screen. The text of the question is available on page 22 of the CSAT 
Top-Screen Survey Application User Guide v1.99. See https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_csattopscreenusersmanual.pdf.

[[Page 6450]]



 Table 22--Estimate of Number of High-Risk Chemical Facilities That May
                       Choose To Use TWIC Readers
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                A            A x 1.22
                                              2012 CFATS      2012 CFATS
                                               personnel       personnel
                                          surety program  surety program
                                                analysis        analysis
                                                            (normalized)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A..........................               0               0
Tier 1 Group B..........................               0               0
Tier 1 Group C..........................               0               0
Tier 1 Theft............................               0               0
Tier 2 Group A..........................               0               0
Tier 2 Group B..........................               0               0
Tier 2 Group C..........................               1               1
Tier 2 Theft............................               3               3
Tier 3 Group A..........................               3               3
Tier 3 Group B..........................               0               0
Tier 3 Group C..........................               2               2
Tier 3 Theft............................              13              15
Tier 4 Group A..........................               1               1
Tier 4 Group B..........................               2               2
Tier 4 Group C..........................               0               0
Tier 4 Theft............................               7               8
                                         -------------------------------
    Total...............................              32              35
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3--TWIC Reader Costs
    For the purpose of this notice, the Department has based the 
potential per high-risk chemical facility capital costs related to 
Option 3 on the TWIC Reader Requirements notice of proposed rulemaking 
(NPRM).\43\ In the TWIC Reader Requirements NPRM, the Department 
estimated the initial phase-in costs annual recurring costs, and annual 
recurring costs that considers equipment replacement for container 
terminals, large passenger vessels/terminals, petroleum facilities, 
break-bulk terminals and small passenger vessels/towboats. For the 
purpose of this notice, the Department has based the capital costs 
related to Option 3 on the costs incurred by the petroleum facilities 
(i.e., bulk liquid facilities) in the TWIC Reader Requirements NPRM. 
Specifically, the Department estimated the capital costs in this notice 
to be the average of the initial phase-in cost plus three years of the 
annual reoccurring cost without equipment replacement. NPPD opted to 
use the annual reoccurring cost without equipment replacement to align 
with the TWIC Reader Requirements NPRM assumption that equipment 
replacement cost occurs every five years. This notice estimates average 
annual costs for a three year period. Thus, for the purposes of this 
notice the estimated the capital costs per facility is $99,953.33, 
[(($256,267 + ($14,531 x 3))/3].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ See 78 FR 17781 (March 22, 2013). The TWIC Reader 
Requirements NPRM Table 4 may be found at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/03/22/2013-06182/transportation-worker-identification-credential-twic-reader-requirements#t-6. Future cost estimates for TWIC readers may change 
as a result of updates to price data and public comment received on 
the TWIC Reader Requirements NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department then calculated the capital costs for the 35 high-
risk chemical facilities, as shown in Table 23.

  Table 23--Capital Cost Burden Estimate for High-Risk Chemical Facilities That May Choose To Use TWIC Readers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                A               B                (A x B)
                                                              Number of    Average TWIC     Capital cost of TWIC
                                                             facilities          reader    reader implementation
                                                                         implementation
                                                                               cost per
                                                                               facility
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A.........................................               0         $99,953                       $0
Tier 1 Group B.........................................               0          99,953                        0
Tier 1 Group C.........................................               0          99,953                        0
Tier 1 Theft...........................................               0          99,953                        0
Tier 2 Group A.........................................               0          99,953                        0
Tier 2 Group B.........................................               0          99,953                        0
Tier 2 Group C.........................................               1          99,953                   99,953
Tier 2 Theft...........................................               3          99,953                  299,860
Tier 3 Group A.........................................               3          99,953                  299,860
Tier 3 Group B.........................................               0          99,953                        0
Tier 3 Group C.........................................               2          99,953                  199,907
Tier 3 Theft...........................................              15          99,953                1,499,300

[[Page 6451]]

 
Tier 4 Group A.........................................               1          99,953                   99,953
Tier 4 Group B.........................................               2          99,953                  199,907
Tier 4 Group C.........................................               0          99,953                        0
Tier 4 Theft...........................................               8          99,953                  799,627
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------
    Total..............................................              35             n/a                3,498,367
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The capital cost for the 35 high-risk chemical facilities totals 
$3,498,367.67; however, the Department intends to limit this 
information collection to only Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities. Therefore, 
for the purpose of this notice, the Department estimates the capital 
cost for the implementation of TWIC readers is $399,813, as shown in 
Table 24. The Department's rounded estimate is $399,800.

 Table 24--Capital Cost Burden Estimate for Tier 1 & 2 High-Risk Chemical Facilities That May Choose To Use TWIC
                                                     Readers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                         A               B            (A x B)
                                                                       Number of    Average TWIC    Capital cost
                                                                      facilities          reader  of TWIC reader
                                                                                  implementation  implementation
                                                                                        cost per
                                                                                        facility
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tier 1 Group A..................................................               0         $99,953              $0
Tier 1 Group B..................................................               0          99,953               0
Tier 1 Group C..................................................               0          99,953               0
Tier 1 Theft....................................................               0          99,953               0
Tier 2 Group A..................................................               0          99,953               0
Tier 2 Group B..................................................               0          99,953               0
Tier 2 Group C..................................................               1          99,953          99,953
Tier 2 Theft....................................................               3          99,953         299,860
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................               4             n/a         399,813
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Consideration of Other Capital Costs
    The burden estimates outlined in this notice are limited in scope 
to those activities listed in 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(1). Specifically, 5 CFR 
1320.3(b)(1) and 5 CFR 1320.8 require the Department to estimate the 
total time, effort, or financial resources expended by persons to 
generate, maintain, retain, disclose or provide information to or for a 
federal agency. Therefore, many costs (e.g., physical modification of 
the facility layout) a facility may choose to incur to develop or 
implement its SSP or ASP should not be accounted for when estimating 
the capital costs associated with this information collection.
    The Department did consider estimating certain facility capital 
costs such as: (1) Capital costs for computer, telecommunications 
equipment, software, and storage to manage the data collection, 
submissions, and tracking; (2) capital and ongoing costs for designing, 
deploying and operating information technology (IT) systems necessary 
to maintain the data collection, submissions, and tracking; (3) cost of 
training facility personnel to maintain the data collection, 
submissions, and tracking; and (4) site security officer time to manage 
the data collection, submissions, and tracking. However, the Department 
has concluded that these costs should be excluded in accordance with 5 
CFR 1320.3(b)(2), which directs federal agencies to not count the costs 
associated with the time, effort, and financial resources incurred in 
the normal course of their activities (e.g., in compiling and 
maintaining business records) if the reporting, recordkeeping, or 
disclosure activities are usual and customary.
    The Department believes that the time, effort, and financial 
resources are usual and customary costs because these are costs that 
high-risk chemical facilities would incur to conduct background checks 
for identity, criminal history, and legal authorization to work under 6 
CFR 27.230(a)(12)(i)-(iii), and also under various other federal, 
state, or local laws or regulations.

Recordkeeping Costs

    High-risk chemical facilities are not required to create, keep, or 
retain facility records under 6 CFR 27.255 to comply with RBPS 12(iv). 
If a high-risk chemical facility elects, for its own business purposes, 
to create, keep, or retain facility records that identify and manage 
the submission of information about affected individuals, those records 
are not government records.
    The recordkeeping costs, if any, to create, keep, or retain 
facility records pertaining to background checks as part of a high-risk 
chemical facility's SSP or ASP, are properly estimated in the 
recordkeeping estimates associated with

[[Page 6452]]

the SSP Instrument under Information Collection 1670-0007.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Information Collection 1670-0007 may be viewed at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201001-1670-007#.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department considered estimating the potential recordkeeping 
burden associated with RBPS 12(iv), but subsequently concluded that no 
potential recordkeeping should be estimated in this notice in 
accordance with 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(2), which directs federal agencies to 
not count the costs associated with the time, effort, and financial 
resources incurred in the normal course of their activities (e.g., in 
compiling and maintaining business records) if the reporting, 
recordkeeping, or disclosure activities are usual and customary. The 
Department believes that the types of recordkeeping associated with 
RBPS 12(iv) are usual and customary costs that high-risk chemical 
facilities would incur to conduct background checks for identity, 
criminal history, and legal authorization to work as required by RBPS 
(12)(i)-(iii) and also by various other federal, state, or local laws 
or regulations.

Total Burden Cost (Operating/Maintaining)

    The annual burden cost is equal to the sum of the: (1) Annual 
burden hours multiplied by the hourly wage rate for appropriate 
facility personnel; (2) the capital costs ($399,800); and (3) 
recordkeeping costs ($0).
    Comments associated with the previous ICR suggested an appropriate 
wage rate between $20 and $40 per hour; the Department picked the 
midpoint of $30 to estimate the hourly direct wage rate, which 
corresponds to a fully loaded wage rate of $42.
    Therefore, the annual burden not including capital costs and 
recordkeeping costs is $4,770,051 as shown in Table 25. The rounded 
estimate is $4,770,000.

                     Table 25--Estimate of Annual Burden Cost for Tier 1 & Tier 2 Facilities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                         A               B            (A x B)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                          Burden      Waste rate            Cost
                                                                         (hours)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial Submission..............................................          97,525             $42      $4,096,032
Updates/Corrections.............................................           1,658              42          69,633
Removal-Turnover................................................          14,390              42         604,386
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total Burden Cost (operating/maintaining)...................         113,573              42       4,770,051
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Therefore, the total annual burden cost is $4,844,008, after the 
inclusion of the $399,813 capital cost burden. The Department's rounded 
estimate is $4,844,000.

VI. Solicitation of Comments

    OMB is particularly interested in comments which:
    (1) Evaluate whether the proposed collection of information is 
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, 
including whether the information will have practical utility;
    (2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of 
the proposed collection of information, including the validity of the 
methodology and assumptions used;
    (3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to 
be collected; and
    (4) Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those 
who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, 
electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or 
other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic 
submissions of responses.

VII. Analysis

    Agency: Department of Homeland Security, National Protection and 
Programs Directorate, Office of Infrastructure Protection, 
Infrastructure Security Compliance Division.
    Title: Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Personnel 
Surety Program.
    OMB Number: 1670--NEW.
    Frequency: Other: In accordance with the compliance schedule or the 
facility Site Security Plan or Alternative Security Plan.
    Affected Public: Business or other for-profit.
    Number of Respondents: 195,000 affected individuals.
    Estimated Time per Respondent: 0.58 hours.
    Total Burden Hours: 113,600 annual burden hours.
    Total Burden Cost (capital/startup): $399,800.
    Total Recordkeeping Burden: $0.
    Total Burden Cost (operating/maintaining): $4,844,000.

    Dated: January 17, 2014.
Scott Libby,
Deputy Chief Information Officer, National Protection and Programs 
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2014-02082 Filed 1-31-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-9P-P
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