Improving 9-1-1 Reliability; Reliability and Continuity of Communications Networks, Including Broadband Technologies, 3123-3133 [2014-00958]
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SW., Washington, DC 20554, or online
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[FR Doc. 2014–00751 Filed 1–16–14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560–50–P
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 0, 4, and 12
[PS Docket No. 13–75; PS Docket No. 11–
60; FCC 13–158]
Improving 9–1–1 Reliability; Reliability
and Continuity of Communications
Networks, Including Broadband
Technologies
Federal Communications
Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
In this document, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) adopts rules to improve
the reliability and resiliency of 911
communications networks nationwide
by requiring that 911 service providers
take ‘‘reasonable measures’’ to provide
reliable 911 service. Providers subject to
the rule can comply with the reasonable
measures requirement by either
implementing certain industry-backed
‘‘best practices’’ the Commission
adopted, or by implementing alternative
measures that are reasonably sufficient
to ensure reliable 911 service. The FCC
also requires 911 service providers to
provide public safety answering points
(PSAPs) with timely and actionable
notification of 911 outages.
DATES: Effective February 18, 2014
except for § 12.4(c) and (d)(1), which
contain information collection
requirements that have not been
approved by Office of Management and
Budget. The Federal Communications
Commission will publish a document in
the Federal Register announcing the
effective date.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric
P. Schmidt, Attorney Advisor, Public
Safety and Homeland Security Bureau,
(202) 418–1214 or eric.schmidt@fcc.gov.
For additional information concerning
the Paperwork Reduction Act
information collection requirements
contained in this document, contact
Benish Shah, (202) 418–7866, or send
an email to PRA@fcc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a
summary of the Commission’s Report
and Order in PS Docket No. 13–75 and
PS Docket No. 11–60, FCC 13–158,
released on December 12, 2013. The full
text of this document is available for
public inspection during regular
business hours in the FCC Reference
Center, Room CY–A257, 445 12th Street
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SUMMARY:
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I. Introduction
1. The Commission was spurred to
adopt these rules following the
devastating impact many
telecommunications networks
experienced as a result of the
unanticipated ‘‘derecho’’ storm in June
2012. This storm swiftly struck the
Midwest and Mid-Atlantic United
States, leaving millions of Americans
without 911 service and revealing
significant, but avoidable,
vulnerabilities in 911 network
architecture, maintenance, and
operation. After a comprehensive
inquiry into the causes of 911 outages
during the derecho, as well as 911
network reliability more generally, the
FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland
Security Bureau (PSHSB or Bureau)
determined that many of these failures
could have been mitigated or avoided
entirely through implementation of
network-reliability best practices and
other sound engineering principles.
2. The Commission requires 911
service providers to take ‘‘reasonable
measures’’ to provide reliable 911
service, based on best practices
developed by the FCC’s
Communications Security, Reliability,
and Interoperability Council (CSRIC)
advisory committee, with refinements
designed to add clarity and specific
guidance regarding how those practices
should be implemented in the context of
911 networks. Providers will
demonstrate their compliance by filing
an annual certification. The certification
elements the Commission are based on
best practices identified by CSRIC as
critical or highly important, indicating
that they significantly reduce the
potential for a catastrophic failure of
communications or—at a minimum—
improve the likelihood of emergency
call completion.
3. The Commission seeks to maximize
flexibility and account for differences in
network architectures without
sacrificing 911 service reliability.
Accordingly, service providers that
certify annually that they have
implemented certain industry-backed
‘‘best practices,’’ will be deemed to
satisfy the reasonable measures
requirement. Providers may also certify
that they have taken alternative
measures reasonably sufficient in light
of the provider’s particular facts and
circumstances to ensure reliable 911
service, so long as they briefly describe
such measures and provide supporting
documentation to the Commission.
Similarly, service providers may
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respond by demonstrating that a
particular certification element is not
applicable to their networks, but they
must include a brief explanation of why
the element does not apply.
4. Based on the information included
in the certifications, the Commission
may require remedial action to correct
vulnerabilities in a service provider’s
911 network if it determines that (a) the
service provider has not, in fact,
adhered to the best practices
incorporated in our rules or, (b) in the
case of providers employing alternative
measures, that those measures were not
reasonably sufficient to mitigate the
associated risks of failure in one or more
of these three key areas. The
Commission delegates authority to the
Bureau to review certification
information and follow up with service
providers as appropriate to address
deficiencies revealed by the certification
process.
5. The FCC also amends its outage
reporting rules under part 4 to clarify
Covered 911 Service Providers’
obligations to provide PSAPs with
timely and actionable notification of
outages affecting 911 service.
II. Background
A. 911 Network Architecture
6. The primary function of the 911
network is to route emergency calls to
the geographically appropriate PSAP
based on the caller’s location. When a
caller dials 911 on a wireline telephone,
the call goes to the local switch serving
that caller, as is typical with any other
call. The local switch then sends the
call to an aggregation point called a
selective router, which uses the caller’s
phone number and address to determine
the appropriate PSAP to which the call
should be sent. Calls to 911 from
wireless phones flow through a switch
called a mobile switching center before
reaching the selective router. For
wireless calls, the sector of the cell
tower serving the call provides the
approximate location of the caller and is
used to determine to which PSAP the
call is sent. To complete the call, a
connection is set up between the
selective router and the appropriate
PSAP, typically through a central office
serving that PSAP.
7. Once a 911 call reaches the
appropriate PSAP, the PSAP queries an
automatic location information (ALI)
database to determine the location of the
caller. For wireline calls, ALI is based
on the address associated with the
caller’s phone number. For wireless
calls, providers use various technologies
to determine the caller’s location.
Because ALI is passed to the PSAP
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along a different path than the one
carrying 911 calls, it is possible for a
PSAP to lose ALI links without losing
911 service completely.
8. The 911 network architecture
described above is evolving from a
circuit-switched network to a Next
Generation 911 (NG911) network based
on Internet protocol (IP) technology.
NG911 networks offers certain
advantages over legacy technologies,
including greater redundancy and
reliability, the ability to provide more
useful information for first responders,
wider public accessibility (including to
those with disabilities), and enhanced
capabilities for sharing data and
resources among emergency responders.
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B. FCC Approach to Communications
Reliability
9. The Commission has generally
approached communications reliability
issues by working with service
providers to develop voluntary best
practices and by measuring the
effectiveness of those best practices
through outage reporting. For example,
federal advisory committees such as
CSRIC, which includes representatives
from both industry and public safety
organizations, have developed
numerous network-reliability best
practices that communications
providers have been encouraged to
adopt on a voluntary basis. Since 1992,
the Commission has turned to CSRIC
and its predecessors, the Network
Reliability and Interoperability Council
(NRIC) and Media Security and
Reliability Council (MSRC), to make
recommendations on communications
network and system reliability and
security. Because of the collaborative
and consensus-based nature of this
process, CSRIC’s best practices generally
involve aspects of service that providers
have indicated they were already
adopting consistently.
10. The Commission’s mandatory
Network Outage Reporting System
(NORS) and voluntary Disaster
Information Reporting System (DIRS)
provide outage data that help gauge
whether best practices have been
implemented in certain circumstances
or service areas, but the Commission has
not required service providers to
implement these practices. From time to
time, however, the Bureau has publicly
reminded 911 service providers of the
importance of following industrydeveloped best practices in light of
outage trends suggesting to the Bureau
that they have not been implemented
adequately. The Bureau also works with
service providers on an informal basis to
identify and resolve communications
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reliability issues revealed through the
outage reporting process.
C. June 2012 Derecho
11. On June 29, 2012, a fast-moving
derecho storm brought a wave of
destruction across wide swaths of the
United States, beginning in the Midwest
and continuing through the
Appalachians and Mid-Atlantic states
until the early morning of June 30. The
derecho resulted in twenty-two deaths
and widespread property damage, and
left millions of residents without
electrical power for as long as two
weeks. While the destruction caused by
the derecho resembled that of other
major storms in some respects, it also
proved different in others. For example,
the landfall of a hurricane is typically
predicted days in advance, allowing
first responders and communications
providers time to prepare. In contrast,
the derecho moved rapidly across
multiple states with very little warning,
putting critical infrastructure to an
unexpected test and revealing
significant vulnerabilities in service
providers’ networks and operations.
12. The derecho’s effects were
particularly severe in northern Virginia,
where four PSAPs in the denselypopulated National Capital Region lost
service completely, and in West
Virginia, where eleven PSAPs could not
receive 911 calls for as long as twelve
hours. Fairfax County, Virginia noted
that the disruption of 911 service after
the derecho was the longest and most
severe 911 outage since Fairfax County
implemented Enhanced 911 in 1988,
leaving 1.1 million county residents
without access to 911 for seven hours
and preventing nearly 1,900 911 calls
from reaching the Fairfax County PSAP.
D. PSHSB Derecho Report
13. Immediately after
communications and 911 services were
restored, the Bureau began a
comprehensive inquiry to determine
why each outage occurred and how
such problems could be prevented in
the future. The Bureau analyzed more
than 500 confidential NORS reports
containing information on the cause,
duration, and resolution of each outage,
as well as numerous DIRS reports from
the areas hit hardest by the derecho.
Bureau staff also interviewed
representatives of eight communications
providers, twenty-eight PSAPs, three
battery manufacturers, one generator
manufacturer, and numerous state and
county entities. In addition, the Bureau
participated in several federal, state, and
local meetings and hearings on the
effects of the derecho. These
interactions clarified and expanded the
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information the Commission had
already received via NORS and DIRS.
14. In its January 2013 Derecho
Report, available at https://www.fcc.gov/
document/derecho-report-andrecommendations, the Bureau
announced the results of its inquiry and
provided specific recommendations for
Commission action to improve the
reliability and resiliency of 911
networks nationwide. The Bureau found
that many communications outages
during the derecho, including 911
outages, could have been prevented
through implementation of best
practices developed by entities such as
CSRIC and the Alliance for
Telecommunications Industry Solutions
(ATIS) Network Reliability Steering
Committee (NRSC). The Bureau found
that, above and beyond any physical
destruction by the derecho, 911
communications were disrupted in large
part because of avoidable planning and
system failures, including inadequate
physical diversity of critical 911 circuits
and a lack of functional backup power
in central offices.
E. 911 Reliability Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
15. On March 20, 2013, the
Commission adopted a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (911 Reliability
NPRM or NPRM), available at https://
www.fcc.gov/document/improving-9-11-reliability, which outlined options to
implement recommendations from the
Derecho Report. These options ranged
from reporting and certification
obligations, to mandatory reliability
requirements supported by site
inspections and compliance reviews.
The NPRM also proposed to amend the
Commission’s rules to require 911
service providers, and other
communications providers subject to
the existing rule, to notify PSAPs of
communications outages
‘‘immediately,’’ with specific
information about the nature of the
outage and area affected.
III. Discussion
A. Need for Commission Action
16. A primary responsibility of the
Commission is to make available, so far
as possible, to all people of the United
States, a wire and radio communication
service for the purpose of promoting
safety of life and property. Consistent
with that overarching obligation, the
Commission has specific statutory
responsibilities with respect to 911
service. The outage reporting process
has often been effective in improving
the reliability and resiliency of many
communications services, and the
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Commission continues to support
NORS, DIRS, and an emphasis on
voluntary best practices and outage
reporting in the context of everyday
communications. Nevertheless,
preventable 911 network failures during
the derecho put lives and property at
risk and revealed that service providers
have not consistently implemented vital
best practices voluntarily despite
repeated reminders and their past
claims to the contrary. In light of this
experience and substantial evidence in
the record of this proceeding, the
Commission concludes that additional
Commission action is both warranted
and needed with respect to critical 911
communications.
B. Entities Subject to the Rules
17. The rules adopted apply to every
‘‘Covered 911 Service Provider,’’
defined as any entity that provides 911,
E911, or NG911 capabilities such as call
routing, ALI, ANI, or the functional
equivalent of those capabilities, directly
to a PSAP, statewide default answering
point, or appropriate local emergency
authority (as that term is defined
elsewhere in the Commission’s rules), or
that operates one or more central offices
that directly serve a PSAP. For purposes
of these rules, a central office ‘‘directly
serves a PSAP’’ if it (1) hosts a selective
router or ALI/ANI database (2) provides
functionally equivalent NG911
capabilities, or (3) is the last serviceprovider facility through which a 911
trunk or administrative line passes
before connecting to a PSAP. This
definition encompasses entities that
provide capabilities to route 911 calls
and associated data such as ALI and
ANI to the appropriate PSAP, but not
entities that merely provide the
capability for customers to originate 911
calls.
18. This definition reflects the fact
that, while most current 911 networks
rely on the infrastructure of an
incumbent local exchange carrier
(ILEC), no single type of entity will
always provide 911 service in every
community. In addition, the transition
to an Internet protocol (IP) architecture
for NG911 services will allow an
expanded range of entities beyond
ILECs to route and deliver 911 calls, as
well as location and callback
information, to local PSAPs or
consolidated call centers. Consistent
with the goals of the Next Generation
911 Advancement Act of 2012, the
Commission seeks to promote NG911
adoption and account for changing
technologies that support these
functions while ensuring that legacy 911
infrastructure remains reliable as long as
it is in use. The Commission takes this
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step in recognition that overbroad rules
could inadvertently impose obligations
on entities that provide peripheral
support for NG911 but may not play a
central role in ensuring 911 reliability or
benefit as much as a typical circuitswitched ILEC from the best practices
discussed below. To minimize the risk
of unintended effects, the Commission
describes covered entities in terms of
the core 911 capabilities they provide
rather than the technology they employ
or how they are currently classified
under our rules.
19. While the FCC strongly supports
the transition to NG911, it is not
persuaded that NG911 technologies
have evolved to the point that reliability
certification rules should apply to
entities beyond those that offer core
services functionally equivalent to
current 911 and E911 capabilities. The
Commission might, however, revisit this
distinction in the future as technology
evolves, as discussed below with regard
to review and sunset of the rules. In a
similar vein, the FCC does not adopt a
definition that covers all operators of
emergency services Internet protocol
networks (ESInets). Some ESInets may
provide capabilities other than those at
issue here, and other ESInets may be
operated directly by PSAPs and 911
authorities. Under the rules, ESInet
operators will be required to certify
reliability only to the extent they qualify
as Covered 911 Service Providers under
our rules.
C. Implementation Approach
20. The FCC adopts rules requiring
Covered 911 Service Providers to: (1)
Take reasonable measures to ensure
reliable 911 service, and (2) certify
annually whether they do so by
adhering either to specified practices
based on established industry consensus
or to alternative measures demonstrated
to be reasonably sufficient to mitigate
the risk of failure. Regarding reasonable
measures, the record in this proceeding
demonstrates a number of concrete and
objective indications of whether a
service provider’s practices with respect
to 911 reliability are reasonable. For
example, best practices are developed in
a ‘‘consensus-based environment’’
reflecting the collective judgment of
industry, and other stakeholders. It
follows that compliance with best
practices is a strong indication that a
service provider is taking reasonable
measures to ensure reliable 911 service.
While there may be situations in which
it would be reasonable for a service
provider to depart from best practices,
there should be a reasonable basis for
such decisions, coupled with
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appropriate steps to compensate for any
increased risk of failure.
21. Regarding annual certification, a
Covered 911 Service Provider that
performs and certifies all the specific
certification elements outlined in the
rules regarding 911 circuit auditing,
backup power at central offices that
directly serve PSAPs, and diverse
network monitoring links, is not
required to provide additional
documentation to support its
certification that it has met the
reasonable measures requirement. These
providers will be deemed to satisfy the
obligation to take reasonable measures
to provide reliable 911 service, provided
that the certification is accurate and
complete. In the alternative, if a Covered
911 Service Provider cannot certify
affirmatively to every element in a
substantive area, but believes that its
actions are nevertheless reasonably
sufficient to mitigate the risk of 911
service failure based on the
configuration of its network and other
factors, then it may certify that it has
taken alternative measures in that
substantive area. For each element
where the Covered 911 Service Provider
certifies to taking alternative measures,
it must include with its certification a
brief explanation of those alternative
measures with respect to each PSAP,
central office, or 911 service area where
they are in use, and why those measures
are reasonable under the circumstances
to mitigate the risk of failure. Finally, a
Covered 911 Service Provider may
respond that certain elements of the
certification do not apply to all or part
of its network, but it must include with
its certification a reasonable explanation
of why those elements are not
applicable.
22. In addition, the Commission will
require Covered 911 Service Providers
to maintain for two years the records
supporting each annual certification and
to make relevant records available to the
Commission upon request. For
providers with existing electronic
recordkeeping capabilities, these
records must be maintained in an
electronic format for ease of access and
review. While certifications require only
a brief description of alternative
measures, the Commission reserves the
right to request additional information,
at the time of certification or thereafter,
to verify the accuracy of a certification
or determine whether alternative
measures are reasonable. This approach
lessens the reporting burden on service
providers while ensuring that
supporting documentation is available
when necessary. Examples of such
records include diagrams of network
routing, records of circuit audits,
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backup power deployment and
maintenance records, and
documentation of network monitoring
routes and capabilities.
23. While the FCC adopts the
certification approach, it notes that a
very high-level certification will not
provide the Commission with either the
information it needs to identify
important weaknesses in 911 networks
or a reasonable basis on which to hold
service providers accountable for
decisions affecting 911 reliability. It
therefore will require all Covered 911
Service Providers to certify annually to
certain basic measures in the three
substantive areas, and delegates to the
Bureau the responsibility to review the
certifications and take additional action
as appropriate, and the authority and
responsibility to develop the
certification form and filing system. The
reliability certifications will be subject
to penalties for false or misleading
statements both under the United States
Code and the Commission’s rules. The
certification shall also be accompanied
by a statement explaining the basis for
such certification and shall be
subscribed to as true under penalty of
perjury in substantially the form set
forth in section 1.16 of the
Commission’s rules.
24. Certification Standards. In
response to call by some commenters to
convene a new group to develop new
certification standards and procedures
unique to these rules, the Commission
notes that the process these commenters
describe is virtually indistinguishable
from the Commission’s existing CSRIC
process. These revised CSRIC best
practices are available to stakeholders
for application on a voluntary basis; the
Commission therefore sees no reason to
defer its refinement and implementation
of these best practices in a Commission
rule, in light of its experiences with
voluntary standards.
25. The FCC understands that, as
NG911 deployment advances, the
certification standards may have to
change, and the Commission may then
need to turn to multi-stakeholder bodies
like CSRIC for recommendations in
these areas. Accordingly, the
Commission adopts certification
standards that are consistent with
current best practices but also flexible
enough to account for differences in 911
and NG911 networks.
26. Certifying Official. To ensure
accuracy and accountability, each
certification must be made by a
corporate officer responsible for
network operations in all relevant
service areas. Thus, the certifying
official must have supervisory and
budgetary authority over a Covered 911
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Service Provider’s entire 911 network,
not merely certain regions or service
areas.
27. Effect of Certification. Under the
certification process, a Covered 911
Service Provider that performs all the
certification elements in a substantive
area will be deemed to comply with the
requirement to take reasonable measures
in that area. This result is subject only
to any determination the Commission or
as delegated, the Bureau, may make
afterward, based on complaints, outage
reports or other information, that the
Covered 911 Service Provider did not,
in fact, perform as claimed in its
certification. If, however, a Covered 911
Service Provider certifies that it has
taken alternative measures to mitigate
the risk of failure, or that a certification
element is not applicable to its network,
its certification is subject to a more
detailed Bureau review. In such cases,
the Covered 911 Service Provider must
provide an explanation of its alternative
measures and why they are reasonable
under the circumstances, or why the
certification element is not applicable.
The Bureau will consider a number of
factors in determining whether the
particular alternative measures are
reasonably sufficient to ensure reliable
911 service. Such factors may include
the technical characteristics of those
measures, the location and geography of
the service area, the level of service
ordered by the PSAP, and state and
local laws (such as zoning and noise
ordinances). The Bureau may rely on
information from a variety of sources,
including: (1) The certifications and
descriptions of alternative measures; (2)
supplemental responses to Commission
inquiries; (3) supporting records
retained pursuant to the record
retention requirement; (4) NORS and
DIRS data; (5) formal and informal
complaints; and/or (6) news reports or
other information available to the
Commission.
28. If the Bureau’s review indicates
that a provider’s alternative measures
are not reasonably sufficient to ensure
reliable 911 service, the Bureau should
engage with the provider and other
interested stakeholders (e.g., affected
PSAPs) to address any shortcomings. To
the extent that a collaborative process
with a provider does not yield
satisfactory results, the Bureau may
order remedial action, consistent with
the authority delegated in this Report
and Order. Any service provider
ordered to take remedial action may
seek reconsideration or review of the
Bureau’s decision in accordance with
the Commission’s rules. In extreme
cases, such as where a provider is not
acting in good faith, the Bureau may
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also refer cases to the Enforcement
Bureau for further action as appropriate.
This approach will place the least
burden on those Covered 911 Service
Providers that provide consistently
reliable 911 service, while allowing the
Commission to focus its attention and
resources where most needed.
29. Certification Phase-In. The rules,
including the underlying obligation to
take reasonable measures to provide
reliable 911 service, become effective
thirty days after publication in this
Federal Register. Although information
collection requirements pursuant to
those rules will not become effective
until approval by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB)
pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction
Act, the substantive obligation to take
such reasonable measures is not
contingent on such approval. Because
certain certification elements (e.g.,
circuit diversity audits) require time for
implementation, the first full
certification will be due two years from
the effective date of the substantive rule
requiring service providers to undertake
such reasonable measures.
30. Although service providers
indicate that they already perform many
of the elements of our annual
certification, the rules we adopt will
require a phase-in period so that all
covered entities, particularly smaller
entities with limited staff and resources,
have time to come into full compliance.
Therefore, the FCC requires that, one
year after the effective date of the rules,
all Covered 911 Service Providers file an
initial certification that they have made
substantial progress toward meeting the
standard of the full certification,
‘‘substantial progress’’ in this context
meaning at least 50-percent compliance
with each of the three substantive
certification requirements. For example,
regarding circuit diversity, Covered 911
Service Providers must certify they have
conducted at least 50 percent of the
circuit audits. The Bureau has delegated
authority to implement this initial
certification, including the form and
process through which it is submitted.
After the first full certification two years
from the effective date of the rules, all
Covered 911 Service Providers will file
a 911 reliability certification on an
annual basis.
31. Regarding costs and benefits of the
Commission’s actions, the FCC notes
that no commenter questioned the basic
premise that 911 communications
provide significant public health and
safety benefits, nor provided an
alternative method of quantifying the
public safety benefits associated with
reliable 911 service. Further, the FCC
considers it fortunate that the effects of
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the derecho were not worse given the
serious problems it revealed.
32. The 911 Reliability NPRM
estimated total costs to service providers
of $16.1 million to $44.1 million. By
relaxing or eliminating several of the
requirements proposed in the NPRM,
however, the Commission reduced the
impact on service providers far below
those estimates. The expected costs also
are within an acceptable range of the
$9.1 million floor value of benefits
estimated in this Report and Order. As
explained below, we estimate that the
total annual incremental cost to service
providers is approximately $9 million,
which includes $6.4 million for circuit
audit costs, $1.9 million for backup
power costs, and $732,000 for
monitoring costs. The FCC finds that its
statutory mandate to promote the safety
of life and property and to implement
our specific statutory 911
responsibilities makes the benefits of
reliable 911 service well worth these
costs, particularly since the approach
adopted is based on best practices
developed through broad industry
consensus.
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D. Certification Requirements
a. Circuit Diversity
33. Covered 911 Service Providers
must certify annually whether they
have, within the past year, audited the
physical diversity of critical 911 circuits
or equivalent data paths to each PSAP
they serve, tagged those circuits to
minimize the risk that they will be
reconfigured at some future date, and
eliminated all single points of failure
between the selective router, ALI/ANI
database, or equivalent NG911
component, and the central office
serving each PSAP. In lieu of
eliminating single points of failure, they
may describe why these single points of
failure cannot be eliminated and the
specific, reasonably sufficient
alternative measures they have taken to
mitigate the risks associated with the
lack of physical diversity.
34. Alternatively, Covered 911 Service
Providers may certify that they believe
this element of the certification is not
applicable to their network, although
they must explain why it is not
applicable. Under these rules, all
Covered 911 Service Providers must
conduct annual audits of the physical
diversity of their critical 911 circuits
and tag those circuits to prevent
rearrangement, but they may take a
range of corrective measures most
appropriate for their networks and
PSAP customers.
35. Covered 911 Service Providers
must also retain records of circuit audits
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for confidential review by the
Commission, upon request, for two
years.
36. ‘‘Critical 911 circuits’’ include
transmission facilities between a 911
selective router or its functional
equivalent and the final point in the
local exchange serving the PSAP where
these facilities appear in the network
(e.g., the main distribution frame) before
leaving this exchange on their way to
the PSAP. For purposes of this
requirement, a selective router is a 911
network component that selects the
appropriate destination PSAP for each
911 call based on the location of the
caller. Critical 911 circuits also include
links from ANI/ALI databases to central
offices that serve PSAPs. The definition
does not include the connections
between the calling party and the
selective router that serves this person.
Because IP-based NG911 networks may
not employ circuit-switched
technologies, the auditing obligation
extends to data transport paths for the
core 911 capabilities, regardless of
whether they are technically ‘‘circuits.’’
Likewise, the selective router function
could be hosted by a third party. The
facilities connecting the third party’s
selective router with the PSAPs to
which it is interconnected are ‘‘critical
911 circuits.’’
37. Physical diversity, sometimes
called route diversity, means that two
circuits follow different routes separated
by some physical distance so that a
single failure such as a power outage,
equipment failure, or cable cut will not
result in both circuits failing. Logical
diversity, sometimes called equipment
diversity, implies that two circuits are
provisioned to use different
transmission equipment, but could
share the same transmission medium
(for example, the same fiber or conduit).
For example, two circuits that are
modulated onto two wavelengths are
logically diverse. If they are then placed
onto two physically separate optical
fibers whose routes do not meet, they
are also physically diverse, provided
they do not share other equipment prior
to being placed on the fibers. If, instead,
they are placed onto the same optical
fiber, they are no longer physically
diverse, but they retain their logical
diversity. In the context of critical 911
circuits, the Commission focuses on
physical diversity as the optimum
standard for certification, but also
recognizes that logical diversity may be
appropriate where a PSAP has not
ordered physically diverse service or
where physical diversity is not feasible
in a particular location. Thus, there is
no blanket requirement that all critical
911 circuits be physically diverse in all
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circumstances, but we require Covered
911 Service Providers that do not
provision physically diverse 911
circuits to explain why those measures
are reasonably sufficient.
38. Auditing method. To be in
conformance with CSRIC best practices,
an auditing method must reflect the
geographic routing of circuits, as well as
the logical flow of data, which could
occur over a common physical path. In
cases where a party provides 911
services directly to a PSAP (pursuant to
contract or tariff) over leased facilities,
the auditing obligation would apply to
that party, and not to the facilities
lessor. Although it could contract with
the underlying facilities lessor, if
necessary, to audit its facilities, the
Covered 911 Service provider would
remain responsible under our rules for
ensuring compliance with the auditing
requirement.
39. Frequency of audits. The FCC
concludes that a requirement that
Covered 911 Service Providers conduct
annual audits of their 911 circuits,
coupled with a requirement for
submission of annual certifications, best
serves the public interest. Regular
auditing of critical 911 circuits can
significantly improve network
reliability, and the FCC concludes that
annual auditing of 911 circuits and
network monitoring links is necessary to
prevent a loss of diversity in these
critical circuits due to routine circuit
rearrangements between audits.
40. Corrective measures. Covered 911
Service Providers must certify annually
whether they have, within the past year,
audited the physical diversity of critical
911 circuits or equivalent data paths to
each PSAP they serve, tagged those
circuits, and eliminated single points of
failure in these circuits. In lieu of
eliminating single points of failure,
providers also may certify that they
have taken specific, alternative
measures reasonably sufficient to
mitigate the risk of insufficient physical
diversity. The Commission will also
require Covered 911 Service Providers
to explain why measures short of
physical diversity are reasonably
sufficient to ensure reliable 911 service
in individual cases.
41. Cost effectiveness. In the worst
case, where the single-stranded PSAP
audits cost as much as those for PSAPs
served by dual selective routers, we
would expect the annual incremental
cost of those audits to be about $4.5
million when based on the assumptions
in the NPRM. The Commission believes
that most of these costs associated with
these audits are already being incurred
by Covered 911 Service Providers and
will decrease over time as their auditing
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practices improve. As commenters attest
through their descriptions of existing
practices, it is more likely that only a
segment of critical 911 circuits are not
already subject to regular audits, and the
incremental cost to audit the remaining
circuits on an annual basis is the more
reasonable figure to use in an
assessment of the burden imposed by
our auditing requirement.
42. All told, commenters provided
estimates ranging from $6.4 million to
$11.2 million in annual incremental
costs, even if we accept the industry
view that critical 911 circuit audits
require more time than we estimated in
the NPRM. In light of comments from
AT&T describing the ‘‘minimal
incremental cost’’ of computerized
audits and from Frontier and
CenturyLink indicating that even their
existing auditing methods require less
than 40 hours per PSAP, the
Commission does not accept that
Verizon’s considerably-higher estimate
accurately represents the cost of our
rules to the industry as a whole.
Furthermore, the certification’s two-year
phase-in will allow all Covered 911
Service Providers to reexamine their
existing circuit auditing practices and
implement more efficient systems. As
such, the FCC believes that the lower
end of the industry range—about $6.4
million—is a reasonable estimate of the
annual incremental cost of our circuit
auditing requirement once the audits we
require are put into practice. Notably,
these estimates reflects the cost of a
‘‘highly important’’ best practice that
virtually all Covered 911 Service
Providers claim to follow already to
some degree. The incremental cost of
conducting circuit audits in
conformance with our certification will
be substantially less than the total cost,
regardless of how it is calculated.
b. Central Office Backup Power
43. Covered 911 Service Providers
must certify annually whether they have
sufficient, reliable backup power in any
central office that directly serves a PSAP
to maintain full service functionality,
including network monitoring
capabilities, for at least 24 hours at full
office load. In addition especially
critical central offices that host selective
routers must be equipped with at least
72 hours of backup power at full office
load. The specified level of backup
power may be provided through fixed
generators, portable generators,
batteries, fuel cells, or a combination of
those or other such sources so long as
it meets the applicable certification
standard.
44. If that level of backup power is not
feasible at a particular central office that
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directly serves a PSAP or hosts a
selective router, the certification will be
required to indicate this. The service
provider must briefly state why it is not
feasible and describe the specific
alternative measures it has taken to
mitigate the risk associated with backup
power configurations that fail to satisfy
the certification standard. Covered 911
Service Providers may also certify that
they believe this element of the
certification is not applicable to their
network, although they must explain
why it is not applicable. As noted above
with regard to covered entities, a central
office ‘‘directly serves a PSAP’’ if it: (1)
Hosts a selective router or ALI/ANI
database; (2) provides equivalent NG911
capabilities; or (3) is the last serviceprovider facility through which a 911
trunk or administrative line passes
before connecting to a PSAP. Service
providers must also certify whether: (1)
They test and maintain all backup
power equipment in all central offices
directly serving PSAPs in accordance
with the manufacturer’s specifications,
per CSRIC best practice; (2) adhere to
CSRIC best practices regarding fully
automatic, non-interdependent
generators that can be started manually
if necessary; and (3) retain records of
backup power deployment and
maintenance for confidential review by
the Commission, upon request, for two
years. If the specified standards related
to testing and tandem generator
configurations cannot be met, the
service provider must briefly state why
it is not feasible to meet them and
describe the specific alternative
measures it has taken to mitigate the
risk associated with the failure to satisfy
the certification standards.
45. Because different central offices
present different backup power
challenges and a single solution may not
be suitable for all, Covered 911 Service
Providers may certify and describe
reasonable alternative measures on a
case-by-case basis. For these reasons,
rather than codifying existing best
practices as prescriptive rules, the
certification requirement allows 911
service providers flexibility to maintain
adequate central-office backup power
based on best practices and reasonable
alternatives to suit site-specific
circumstances.
46. Testing standards. The rules
require Covered 911 Service Providers,
consistent with CSRIC best practice, to
certify that they test their backup power
equipment according to the relevant
manufacturers’ specifications. Further,
because failure of interdependent
generators was a significant factor in the
communications failures during the
June 2012, the Commission believes that
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tandem generators should be
electronically separated to ensure that
failure of one generator does not cause
the other to fail, and will require the
certification to confirm whether the 911
provider employs stand-alone backup
power sources. 911 providers will have
the opportunity to demonstrate that
alternative measures upon which they
rely (e.g., load shedding) are reasonably
sufficient to mitigate the risk of failure.
47. Cost effectiveness. The NPRM
estimated that the incremental cost
incurred to perform backup power
certifications, including remediation,
ranged from $11.7 million to $37.5
million depending on whether the
Commission would require fixed
generators at all central offices. The
Report and Order includes no such
requirement, meaning that there would
be no incremental costs for central
offices appropriately provisioned with
portable generators. As a result, the
Commission estimates the cost to
conform to its backup power standards
is much closer to $11.7 million than
$37.5 million. Further, the approach
adopted will also significantly reduce
the cost of compliance by covering only
central offices directly serving PSAPs or
hosting selective routers or ALI
databases, and allowing alternative
measures where the specified level of
backup power is not feasible. Limiting
these requirements to central offices that
directly serve PSAPs reduces our
estimate of cost by 72 percent, from
$11.7 million to about $3.3 million.
c. Network Monitoring
48. Covered 911 Service Providers
must certify annually whether they
have, within the past year: (1) Audited
the physical diversity of the aggregation
points that they use to gather network
monitoring data in each 911 service area
and the network monitoring links
between such aggregation points and
their NOC(s); and (2) implemented
physically diverse aggregation points for
network monitoring data in each 911
service area and physically diverse links
from such aggregation points to at least
one NOC or, in light of the required
audits, taken specific alternative
measures reasonably sufficient to
mitigate the risk of insufficient physical
diversity. They may also certify that
they believe this element of the
certification is not applicable to their
network, although they must explain
why it is not applicable.
49. Covered 911 Service Providers
also must retain records of their network
monitoring routes and capabilities for
confidential review by the Commission,
upon request, for two years.
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50. For purposes of the certification,
network monitoring links transmit data
about failed or degraded network
equipment and facilities from
monitoring points within the network to
a NOC or other location where the data
are analyzed and decisions made about
corrective action. Links from multiple
individual monitoring points may be
routed through and aggregated onto
common transport facilities at one or
more hubs in each service area for
distribution to remote NOCs, in which
case those hubs are described as
aggregation points for network
monitoring data. ‘‘Physical diversity’’
applied to aggregation points refers to
aggregation points that are not
physically co-located.
51. Corrective Measures. Recognizing
that circumstances are likely to exist in
real-world networks that prevent the
achievement of complete physical
diversity and diverse aggregation points
for network monitoring data, the
Commission believes that service
providers should retain the flexibility to
implement diversity and the migration
of telemetry to the IP network as
appropriate for their network evolution,
management, and monitoring. As such,
the certification approach provides
Covered 911 Service Providers with the
flexibility to compensate for an inability
to conform to our certification standard
by employing appropriate alternative
measures to promote reliable and
resilient network monitoring where
diverse aggregation points or monitoring
links may not be feasible.
51A. Cost effectiveness. The
Commission calculates the costs of
network monitoring to be $732,000, as
opposed to the $2,196,000 suggested in
the NPRM. In the absence of more
detailed cost estimates from
commenters, the Commission finds that
the certification approach is cost
effective because it uses standards that
are already widely in use by
communications providers and includes
flexibility to allow communications
providers to address circumstances
where the standards cannot be feasibly
implemented.
E. PSAP Outage Notification
52. Covered 911 Service Providers
must notify PSAPs of outages
potentially affecting 911 service to that
PSAP within 30 minutes of discovering
the outage and provide contact
information such as a name, telephone
number, and email for follow-up.
Whenever additional material
information becomes available, but no
later than two hours after the initial
contact, the Covered 911 Service
Provider must communicate additional
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detail to the PSAP, including the nature
of the outage, its best-known cause, the
geographic scope of the outage, and the
estimated time for repairs.
F. Legal Authority
53. In light of the Commission’s
express statutory responsibilities,
regulation of additional capabilities
related to reliable 911 service, both
today and in an NG911 environment,
would be well within Commission’s
foregoing statutory authority. A full
statement of the Commission’s legal
authority to adopt these rules is
contained in the Report and Order.
G. Confidentiality
54. The Commission recognizes that
some components of annual 911
reliability certifications are likely to
raise genuine public safety and
competitive concerns, while other
portions of the certification will not and
may be of legitimate interest to the
public. For example, there is little threat
to public safety or competition in the
mere fact of whether a Covered 911
Service Provider has filed a
certification, or whether a service
provider answers in the affirmative or
negative to each element of the
certification. Thus, a service provider’s
responses on the face of the form with
respect to whether it adheres to
certification elements or relies on
alternative measures to satisfy other
elements of the certification will not in
and of itself be considered confidential.
55. Nevertheless, confidentiality
concerns increase significantly if a
certification includes proprietary
information about a service provider’s
specific network architecture or
operations on less than an aggregated
basis. Accordingly, certain information
will be treated as presumptively
confidential and exempt from routine
public disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA): (1) Descriptions
and documentation of alternative
measures to mitigate the risks of
nonconformance with certification
standards; (2) information detailing
specific corrective actions taken; and (3)
supplemental information requested by
the Commission or Bureau with respect
to a certification. The Commission
would expect, without requiring it, that
a Covered 911 Service Provider will, at
the request of the PSAP (or state 911
authority, as relevant), enter into
discussions concerning the content of
the provider’s 911 circuit auditing
certification with respect to the PSAP.
H. Review and Sunset of Rules
56. The Commission will review the
rules adopted in this Report and Order
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3129
in five years to determine whether they
are still technologically appropriate and
both adequate and necessary to ensure
reliability and resiliency of 911
networks. Review of the rules will also
include consideration of whether they
should be revised or expanded to cover
new best practices or additional entities
that provide NG911 capabilities, or in
light of its understanding about how
NG911 networks may differ from legacy
911 service. Factors for consideration
will include outage reporting trends,
adoption of NG911 capabilities on a
nationwide basis, and whether the
certification approach has yielded the
necessary level of compliance. If, after
review, the Commission determines that
some or all of these rules are no longer
effective in promoting 911 reliability, it
will establish an appropriate sunset date
for those portions of the rules that are
no longer necessary. The Commission
declines to set a specific sunset date or
triggering event because there are still
too many uncertainties about the
timeline for widespread adoption of
NG911 and the effect of new
technologies on the need for 911
reliability rules.
I. Authority Delegated to the Public
Safety and Homeland Security Bureau
57. PSHSB has delegated authority to
implement the rules adopted in the
Report and Order, consistent with the
Administrative Procedure Act and
relevant portions of the
Communications Act. The Commission
directs the Bureau to develop such
forms and procedures as may be
required to collect and process
certifications, and to periodically
update those forms and procedures as
necessary, subject to Paperwork
Reduction Act requirements. Through
its experience with electronic outage
reports in NORS and DIRS, the Bureau
has developed expertise with outage
reports and trends that will be useful
when reviewing such certifications and
identifying issues for follow-up with
service providers. The Bureau also has
delegated authority to order appropriate
remedial actions on a case-by-case basis
where 911 reliability certifications
indicate such actions are necessary to
protect public safety and consistent
with the guidelines set forth in this
Report and Order.
IV. Procedural Matters
A. Accessible Formats
58. To request materials in accessible
formats for people with disabilities
(Braille, large print, electronic files,
audio format), send an email to fcc504@
fcc.gov or call the Consumer &
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Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202–
418–0530 (voice), 202–418–0432 (tty).
B. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis
59. The Report and Order contains
new information collection
requirements subject to the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public
Law 104–13. It will be submitted to the
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) for review under section 3507(d)
of the PRA. OMB, the general public,
and other interested parties are invited
to comment on the new information
collection requirements contained in
this proceeding.
60. We note that pursuant to the
Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of
2002, Public Law 107–198, see 44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(4), the Commission previously
sought specific comment on how the
Commission might further reduce the
information collection burden for small
business concerns with fewer than 25
employees. We have described impacts
that might affect small businesses,
which includes most businesses with
fewer than 25 employees, in the FRFA
in Appendix C of the Report and Order,
paragraphs 14–15.
C. Congressional Review Act
61. The Commission will send a copy
of the Report and Order in a report to
be sent to Congress and the Government
Accountability Office pursuant to the
Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C.
801(a)(1)(A).
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D. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
62. As required by the Regulatory
Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended
(RFA), an Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (IRFA) was included in the
NPRM in PS Docket No. 11–60 and PS
Docket No. 13–75. The Commission
sought written comment on the
proposals in this docket, including
comment on the IRFA. This Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
conforms to the RFA.
V. Ordering Clauses
63. Accordingly, it is ordered
pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o),
201(b), 214(d), 218, 251(e)(3), 301,
303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 316,
332, 403, 615a–1, and 615c of the
Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i)–(j) & (o),
201(b), 214(d), 218, 251(e)(3), 301,
303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 316,
332, 403, 615a–1, and 615c, that this
Report and Order in PS Docket No. 13–
75 and PS Docket No. 11–60 IS adopted.
64. It is further ordered that parts 0,
4, and 12 of the Commission’s rules, 47
CFR Parts 0, 4, and 12, are amended,
effective February 18, 2014 except for
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§ 12.4(c) and (d)(1), which contain
information collection requirements that
have not been approved by Office of
Management and Budget. The Federal
Communications Commission will
publish a document in the Federal
Register announcing the effective date.
65. It is further ordered that the Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis in
Appendix C hereto is adopted.
66. It is further ordered that, pursuant
to section 801(a)(1)(A) of the
Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C.
801(a)(1)(A), the Commission shall send
a copy of this Report and Order to
Congress and to the Government
Accountability Office.
67. It is further ordered that the
Commission’s Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference
Information Center, shall send a copy of
this Report and Order, including the
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration.
List of Subjects
47 CFR Part 0
Commission organization;
Confidential material; Delegation of
authority.
47 CFR Part 4
47 CFR Part 12
Certification; Telecommunications.
Federal Communications Commission.
Sheryl D. Todd,
Deputy Secretary.
Final Rules
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, the Federal Communications
Commission amends 47 CFR parts 0, 4,
and 12 as follows:
PART 0—COMMISSION
ORGANIZATION
1. The authority citation for part 0
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: Sec. 5, 48 Stat. 1068, as
amended; 47 U.S.C. 155.
2. Section 0.392 is revised by adding
paragraph (j) to read as follows:
■
Authority delegated.
*
*
*
*
*
(j) The Chief of the Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau is delegated
authority to administer the
communications reliability and
redundancy rules and policies
contained in part 12 of this chapter,
develop and revise forms and
procedures as may be required for the
administration of part 12 of this chapter,
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§ 0.457 Records not routinely available for
public inspection.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(1) * * *
(viii) Information submitted with a
911 reliability certification pursuant to
47 CFR 12.4 that consists of descriptions
and documentation of alternative
measures to mitigate the risks of
nonconformance with certification
elements, information detailing specific
corrective actions taken with respect to
certification elements, or supplemental
information requested by the
Commission with respect to such
certification.
*
*
*
*
*
PART 4—DISRUPTIONS TO
COMMUNICATIONS
4. The authority citation for part 4
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: Sec. 5, 48 Stat. 1068, as
amended; 47 U.S.C. 154, 155, 201, 251, 307,
316, 615a–1, 1302(a), and 1302(b).
Telecommunications.
§ 0.392
review certifications filed in connection
therewith, and order remedial action on
a case-by-case basis to ensure the
reliability of 911 service in accordance
with such rules and policies.
■ 3. Section 0.457 is amended by
revising paragraph (d)(1)(viii) to read as
follows:
5. Section 4.9 is amended by adding
paragraph (h) to read as follows:
■
§ 4.9 Outage reporting requirements—
threshold criteria.
*
*
*
*
*
(h) Covered 911 service providers. In
addition to any other obligations
imposed in this section, within thirty
minutes of discovering an outage that
potentially affects a 911 special facility
(as defined in § 4.5), all covered 911
service providers (as defined in
§ 12.4(a)(4) of this chapter) shall notify
as soon as possible but no later than
thirty minutes after discovering the
outage any official who has been
designated by the affected 911 special
facility as the provider’s contact
person(s) for communications outages at
that facility and convey all available
information that may be useful in
mitigating the effects of the outage, as
well as a name, telephone number, and
email address at which the service
provider can be reached for follow-up.
The covered 911 service provider shall
communicate additional material
information to the affected 911 special
facility as it becomes available, but no
later than two hours after the initial
contact. This information shall include
the nature of the outage, its best-known
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cause, the geographic scope of the
outage, the estimated time for repairs,
and any other information that may be
useful to the management of the affected
facility. All notifications shall be
transmitted by telephone and in writing
via electronic means in the absence of
another method mutually agreed upon
in advance by the 911 special facility
and the covered 911 service provider.
PART 12—RESILIENCY,
REDUNDANCY AND RELIABILITY OF
COMMUNICATIONS
6. The authority citation for part 12
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o), 5(c),
218, 219, 301, 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332, 403,
621(b)(3), and 621(d) of the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151,
154(i), 154(j), 154(o), 155(c), 218, 219, 301,
303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332, 403, 621(b)(3), and
621(d), unless otherwise noted.
7. Revise the heading of part 12 to
read as set forth above.
■ 8. Section 12.4 is added to read as
follows: § 12.4 Reliability of covered 911
service providers.
(a) Definitions. Terms in this section
shall have the following meanings:
(1) Aggregation point. A point at
which network monitoring data for a
911 service area is collected and routed
to a network operations center (NOC) or
other location for monitoring and
analyzing network status and
performance.
(2) Certification. An attestation by a
certifying official, under penalty of
perjury, that a covered 911 service
provider:
(i) Has satisfied the obligations of
paragraph (c) of this section.
(ii) Has adequate internal controls to
bring material information regarding
network architecture, operations, and
maintenance to the certifying official’s
attention.
(iii) Has made the certifying official
aware of all material information
reasonably necessary to complete the
certification.
(iv) The term ‘‘certification’’ shall
include both an annual reliability
certification under paragraph (c) of this
section and an initial reliability
certification under paragraph (d)(1) of
this section, to the extent provided
under paragraph (d)(1) of this section.
(3) Certifying official. A corporate
officer of a covered 911 service provider
with supervisory and budgetary
authority over network operations in all
relevant service areas.
(4) Covered 911 service provider.
(i) Any entity that:
(A) Provides 911, E911, or NG911
capabilities such as call routing,
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automatic location information (ALI),
automatic number identification (ANI),
or the functional equivalent of those
capabilities, directly to a public safety
answering point (PSAP), statewide
default answering point, or appropriate
local emergency authority as defined in
§§ 64.3000(b) and 20.3 of this chapter;
and/or
(B) Operates one or more central
offices that directly serve a PSAP. For
purposes of this section, a central office
directly serves a PSAP if it hosts a
selective router or ALI/ANI database,
provides equivalent NG911 capabilities,
or is the last service-provider facility
through which a 911 trunk or
administrative line passes before
connecting to a PSAP.
(ii) The term ‘‘covered 911 service
provider’’ shall not include any entity
that:
(A) Constitutes a PSAP or
governmental authority to the extent
that it provides 911 capabilities; or
(B) Offers the capability to originate
911 calls where another service provider
delivers those calls and associated
number or location information to the
appropriate PSAP.
(5) Critical 911 circuits. 911 facilities
that originate at a selective router or its
functional equivalent and terminate in
the central office that serves the PSAP(s)
to which the selective router or its
functional equivalent delivers 911 calls,
including all equipment in the serving
central office necessary for the delivery
of 911 calls to the PSAP(s). Critical 911
circuits also include ALI and ANI
facilities that originate at the ALI or ANI
database and terminate in the central
office that serves the PSAP(s) to which
the ALI or ANI databases deliver 911
caller information, including all
equipment in the serving central office
necessary for the delivery of such
information to the PSAP(s).
(6) Diversity audit. A periodic
analysis of the geographic routing of
network components to determine
whether they are physically diverse.
Diversity audits may be performed
through manual or automated means, or
through a review of paper or electronic
records, as long as they reflect whether
critical 911 circuits are physically
diverse.
(7) Monitoring links. Facilities that
collect and transmit network monitoring
data to a NOC or other location for
monitoring and analyzing network
status and performance.
(8) Physically diverse. Circuits or
equivalent data paths are Physically
Diverse if they provide more than one
physical route between end points with
no common points where a single
failure at that point would cause both
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3131
circuits to fail. Circuits that share a
common segment such as a fiber-optic
cable or circuit board are not Physically
diverse even if they are logically diverse
for purposes of transmitting data.
(9) 911 service area. The metropolitan
area or geographic region in which a
covered 911 service provider operates a
selective router or the functional
equivalent to route 911 calls to the
geographically appropriate PSAP.
(10) Selective router. A 911 network
component that selects the appropriate
destination PSAP for each 911 call
based on the location of the caller.
(11) Tagging. An inventory
management process whereby critical
911 circuits are labeled in circuit
inventory databases to make it less
likely that circuit rearrangements will
compromise diversity. A covered 911
service provider may use any system it
wishes to tag circuits so long as it tracks
whether critical 911 circuits are
physically diverse and identifies
changes that would compromise such
diversity.
(b) Provision of reliable 911 service.
All covered 911 service providers shall
take reasonable measures to provide
reliable 911 service with respect to
circuit diversity, central-office backup
power, and diverse network monitoring.
Performance of the elements of the
certification set forth in paragraphs
(c)(1)(i), (c)(2)(i), and (c)(3)(i) of this
section shall be deemed to satisfy the
requirements of this paragraph. If a
covered 911 service provider cannot
certify that it has performed a given
element, the Commission may
determine that such provider
nevertheless satisfies the requirements
of this paragraph based upon a showing
in accordance with paragraph (c) of this
section that it is taking alternative
measures with respect to that element
that are reasonably sufficient to mitigate
the risk of failure, or that one or more
certification elements are not applicable
to its network.
(c) Annual reliability certification.
One year after the initial reliability
certification described in paragraph
(d)(1) of this section and every year
thereafter, a certifying official of every
covered 911 service provider shall
submit a certification to the Commission
as follows.
(1) Circuit auditing.
(i) A covered 911 service provider
shall certify whether it has, within the
past year:
(A) Conducted diversity audits of
critical 911 circuits or equivalent data
paths to any PSAP served;
(B) Tagged such critical 911 circuits to
reduce the probability of inadvertent
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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 12 / Friday, January 17, 2014 / Rules and Regulations
loss of diversity in the period between
audits; and
(C) Eliminated all single points of
failure in critical 911 circuits or
equivalent data paths serving each
PSAP.
(ii) If a covered 911 service provider
does not conform with the elements in
paragraph (c)(1)(i)(C) of this section
with respect to the 911 service provided
to one or more PSAPs, it must certify
with respect to each such PSAP:
(A) Whether it has taken alternative
measures to mitigate the risk of critical
911 circuits that are not physically
diverse or is taking steps to remediate
any issues that it has identified with
respect to 911 service to the PSAP, in
which case it shall provide a brief
explanation of such alternative
measures or such remediation steps, the
date by which it anticipates such
remediation will be completed, and why
it believes those measures are
reasonably sufficient to mitigate such
risk; or
(B) Whether it believes that one or
more of the requirements of this
paragraph are not applicable to its
network, in which case it shall provide
a brief explanation of why it believes
any such requirement does not apply.
(2) Backup power.
(i) With respect to any central office
it operates that directly serves a PSAP,
a covered 911 service provider shall
certify whether it:
(A) Provisions backup power through
fixed generators, portable generators,
batteries, fuel cells, or a combination of
these or other such sources to maintain
full-service functionality, including
network monitoring capabilities, for at
least 24 hours at full office load or, if the
central office hosts a selective router, at
least 72 hours at full office load;
provided, however, that any such
portable generators shall be readily
available within the time it takes the
batteries to drain, notwithstanding
potential demand for such generators
elsewhere in the service provider’s
network.
(B) Tests and maintains all backup
power equipment in such central offices
in accordance with the manufacturer’s
specifications;
(C) Designs backup generators in such
central offices for fully automatic
operation and for ease of manual
operation, when required;
(D) Designs, installs, and maintains
each generator in any central office that
is served by more than one backup
generator as a stand-alone unit that does
not depend on the operation of another
generator for proper functioning.
(ii) If a covered 911 service provider
does not conform with all of the
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elements in paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this
section, it must certify with respect to
each such central office:
(A) Whether it has taken alternative
measures to mitigate the risk of a loss of
service in that office due to a loss of
power or is taking steps to remediate
any issues that it has identified with
respect to backup power in that office,
in which case it shall provide a brief
explanation of such alternative
measures or such remediation steps, the
date by which it anticipates such
remediation will be completed, and why
it believes those measures are
reasonably sufficient to mitigate such
risk; or
(B) Whether it believes that one or
more of the requirements of this
paragraph are not applicable to its
network, in which case it shall provide
a brief explanation of why it believes
any such requirement does not apply.
(3) Network monitoring.
(i) A covered 911 service provider
shall certify whether it has, within the
past year:
(A) Conducted diversity audits of the
aggregation points that it uses to gather
network monitoring data in each 911
service area;
(B) Conducted diversity audits of
monitoring links between aggregation
points and NOCs for each 911 service
area in which it operates; and
(C) Implemented physically diverse
aggregation points for network
monitoring data in each 911 service area
and physically diverse monitoring links
from such aggregation points to at least
one NOC.
(ii) If a Covered 911 service provider
does not conform with all of the
elements in paragraph (c)(3)(i)(C) of this
section, it must certify with respect to
each such 911 service area:
(A) Whether it has taken alternative
measures to mitigate the risk of network
monitoring facilities that are not
physically diverse or is taking steps to
remediate any issues that it has
identified with respect to diverse
network monitoring in that 911 service
area, in which case it shall provide a
brief explanation of such alternative
measures or such remediation steps, the
date by which it anticipates such
remediation will be completed, and why
it believes those measures are
reasonably sufficient to mitigate such
risk; or
(B) Whether it believes that one or
more of the requirements of this
paragraph are not applicable to its
network, in which case it shall provide
a brief explanation of why it believes
any such requirement does not apply.
(d) Other matters.
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Fmt 4700
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(1) Initial reliability certification. One
year after February 18, 2014, a certifying
official of every covered 911 service
provider shall certify to the Commission
that it has made substantial progress
toward meeting the standards of the
annual reliability certification described
in paragraph (c) of this section.
Substantial progress in each element of
the certification shall be defined as
compliance with standards of the full
certification in at least 50 percent of the
covered 911 service provider’s critical
911 circuits, central offices that directly
serve PSAPs, and independently
monitored 911 service areas.
(2) Confidential treatment.
(i) The fact of filing or not filing an
annual reliability certification or initial
reliability certification and the
responses on the face of such
certification forms shall not be treated
as confidential.
(ii) Information submitted with or in
addition to such certifications shall be
presumed confidential to the extent that
it consists of descriptions and
documentation of alternative measures
to mitigate the risks of nonconformance
with certification elements, information
detailing specific corrective actions
taken with respect to certification
elements, or supplemental information
requested by the Commission or Bureau
with respect to a certification.
(3) Record retention. A covered 911
service provider shall retain records
supporting the responses in a
certification for two years from the date
of such certification, and shall make
such records available to the
Commission upon request. To the extent
that a covered 911 service provider
maintains records in electronic format,
records supporting a certification
hereunder shall be maintained and
supplied in an electronic format.
(i) With respect to diversity audits of
critical 911 circuits, such records shall
include, at a minimum, audit records
separately addressing each such circuit,
any internal report(s) generated as a
result of such audits, records of actions
taken pursuant to the audit results, and
records regarding any alternative
measures taken to mitigate the risk of
critical 911 circuits that are not
physically diverse.
(ii) With respect to backup power at
central offices, such records shall
include, at a minimum, records
regarding the nature and extent of
backup power at each central office that
directly serves a PSAP, testing and
maintenance records for backup power
equipment in each such central office,
and records regarding any alternative
measures taken to mitigate the risk of
insufficient backup power.
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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 12 / Friday, January 17, 2014 / Rules and Regulations
(iii) With respect to network
monitoring, such records shall include,
at a minimum, records of diversity
audits of monitoring links, any internal
report(s) generated as a result of such
audits, records of actions taken pursuant
to the audit results, and records
regarding any alternative measures
taken to mitigate the risk of aggregation
points and/or monitoring links that are
not physically diverse.
[FR Doc. 2014–00958 Filed 1–16–14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 1 and 27
[WT Docket No. 12–357; FCC 13–88]
Service Rules for the Advanced
Wireless Services H Block—
Implementing Section 6401 of the
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job
Creation Act of 2012 Related to the
1915–1920 MHz and 1995–2000 MHz
Bands
Federal Communications
Commission.
ACTION: Final rule; announcement of
effective date.
AGENCY:
In this document, the
Commission announces that the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) has
approved, for a period of three years, the
information collection associated with
the Commission’s Report and Order
(R&O) Service Rules for the Advanced
Wireless Services H Block—
Implementing Section 6401 of the
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job
Creation Act of 2012 related to the
1915–1920 MHz and 1995–2000 MHz
Bands. This document is consistent
with the R&O, which stated that the
Commission would publish a document
in the Federal Register announcing the
effective date of those rules.
Additionally, the Commission
announces that OMB approved, for a
period of three years, the revisions to
the existing collection on FCC Form
601, which are also associated with the
Commission’s R&O, and that those
revisions are also effective with
publication of this document.
DATES: The effective date for §§ 1.946,
27.10, 27.12, and 27.17 that were
adopted on June 27, 2013, and
published in the Federal Register at 78
FR 50213, August 16, 2013, OMB
Control 3060–1184, is January 17, 2014.
The corresponding revisions to the
existing collection on FCC Form 601,
OMB Control Number 3060–0798, are
also effective January 17, 2014.
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SUMMARY:
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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Matthew Pearl, Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau,
Broadband Division, at (202) 418–BITS
or by email at Matthew.Pearl@fcc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This
document announces that, on
September 26, 2013, OMB approved, for
a period of three years, the new
information collection requirements
contained in the Commission’s R&O,
FCC 13–88, published at 78 FR 50213,
August 16, 2013. The new OMB Control
Number is 3060–1184. The Commission
publishes this document as an
announcement of the effective date of
the H Block rules: §§ 1.946(d), 27.10(d),
27.12, and 27.17. In addition, the
Commission notes that OMB previously
approved or is in the process of
approving revisions required by the
R&O to existing information collections.
To add the national security
certification required by Section 6004 of
the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job
Creation Act of 2012, 47 U.S.C 1404, to
the FCC Forms 175, 601, 603, and 608,
the Commission has obtained or is in
the process of obtaining OMB approval
for revisions to its previously-approved
information collections on those forms.
The effective date for the revisions to
the existing collection on FCC Form 175
has been published. See H Block Report
and Order (Revisions to FCC Form 175,
OMB Control 3060–0600), Effective Date
Notice, published at 78 FR 66287,
November 5, 2013. The revisions to the
existing collection on FCC Form 601
were approved by OMB on January 2,
2014 and those revisions are also
effective with this notice. See Notice of
Office of Management and Budget
Action, ICR Reference Number 201311–
3060–018, FCC Application for Radio
Service Authorization: WTB and
PSHSB, FCC Form 601, OMB Control
3060–0798, Approved without change
on Jan. 2, 2014, available at https://
www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
PRAOMBHistory?ombControlNumber
=3060-0798#. To add this certification
to the FCC Forms 603 and 608, the
Commission is currently seeking OMB
approval for revisions to its existing
information collections on those forms,
and OMB action on these revisions is
anticipated on or after January 23, 2014
(when the comment cycle for the 30-day
notice closes). See Information
Collections Being Submitted for Review
and Approval to the Office of
Management and Budget, Revisions to
FCC Application for Assignments of
Authorization and Transfers of Control
and FCC Application or Notification for
Spectrum Leasing Arrangement:
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau,
PO 00000
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3133
Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau, OMB Control Numbers 3060–
0800 and 3060–1058 (FCC Forms 603,
608), published at 78 FR 77676 on Dec.
24, 2013, available at https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-12-24/
pdf/2013-30651.pdf. The Commission
will publish an effective date notice
once these revisions to FCC Forms 603
and 608 are approved by OMB. If you
have any comments on the burden
estimates listed below, or how the
Commission can improve the
collections and reduce any burdens
caused thereby, please contact Cathy
Williams at (202) 418–2918 or via the
Internet at Cathy.Williams@fcc.gov.
Please include the new OMB Control
Number, 3060–1184, in your
correspondence. The Commission will
also accept your comments via email at
PRA@fcc.gov.
To request materials in accessible
formats for people with disabilities
(Braille, large print, electronic files,
audio format), send an email to fcc504@
fcc.gov or call the Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202)
418–0530 (voice), (202) 418–0432
(TTY).
Synopsis
As required by the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507),
the FCC is notifying the public that it
received OMB approval on September
26, 2013, which contained new and
modified information collection
requirements, in 47 CFR 1.946(d),
27.10(d), 27.12, and 27.17, which would
not be effective until approved by the
Office of Management and Budget. The
information collection was adopted in
the Report and Order in WT Docket No.
12–357, FCC 13–88, which appears at 78
FR 50213, August 16, 2013, adopts
flexible use rules for 10 megahertz of
spectrum in the 1915–1920 MHz and
1995–2000 MHz spectrum bands (H
Block) that would increase the nation’s
supply of spectrum for mobile
broadband. We adopt H Block terrestrial
service rules, modified as necessary to
account for issues unique to the H Block
bands. First, we find the spectrum is
properly allocated for commercial use as
required by the Spectrum Act. Second,
we determine the H Block can be used
without causing harmful interference to
PCS operations in the 1930–1995 MHz
band. Third, we establish 1915–1920
MHz paired with 1995–2000 MHz as the
H Block band plan. Fourth, we adopt
technical rules that authorize mobile
and fixed operations in the bands and
protect operations in adjacent and
nearby spectrum bands from harmful
interference pursuant to the
requirements of the Spectrum Act. Fifth,
E:\FR\FM\17JAR1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 12 (Friday, January 17, 2014)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 3123-3133]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-00958]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 0, 4, and 12
[PS Docket No. 13-75; PS Docket No. 11-60; FCC 13-158]
Improving 9-1-1 Reliability; Reliability and Continuity of
Communications Networks, Including Broadband Technologies
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC
or Commission) adopts rules to improve the reliability and resiliency
of 911 communications networks nationwide by requiring that 911 service
providers take ``reasonable measures'' to provide reliable 911 service.
Providers subject to the rule can comply with the reasonable measures
requirement by either implementing certain industry-backed ``best
practices'' the Commission adopted, or by implementing alternative
measures that are reasonably sufficient to ensure reliable 911 service.
The FCC also requires 911 service providers to provide public safety
answering points (PSAPs) with timely and actionable notification of 911
outages.
DATES: Effective February 18, 2014 except for Sec. 12.4(c) and (d)(1),
which contain information collection requirements that have not been
approved by Office of Management and Budget. The Federal Communications
Commission will publish a document in the Federal Register announcing
the effective date.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric P. Schmidt, Attorney Advisor,
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418-1214 or
eric.schmidt@fcc.gov. For additional information concerning the
Paperwork Reduction Act information collection requirements contained
in this document, contact Benish Shah, (202) 418-7866, or send an email
to PRA@fcc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report
and Order in PS Docket No. 13-75 and PS Docket No. 11-60, FCC 13-158,
released on December 12, 2013. The full text of this document is
available for public inspection during regular business hours in the
FCC Reference Center, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street SW., Washington, DC
20554, or online at https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-adopts-rules-improve-911-reliability.
I. Introduction
1. The Commission was spurred to adopt these rules following the
devastating impact many telecommunications networks experienced as a
result of the unanticipated ``derecho'' storm in June 2012. This storm
swiftly struck the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic United States, leaving
millions of Americans without 911 service and revealing significant,
but avoidable, vulnerabilities in 911 network architecture,
maintenance, and operation. After a comprehensive inquiry into the
causes of 911 outages during the derecho, as well as 911 network
reliability more generally, the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland
Security Bureau (PSHSB or Bureau) determined that many of these
failures could have been mitigated or avoided entirely through
implementation of network-reliability best practices and other sound
engineering principles.
2. The Commission requires 911 service providers to take
``reasonable measures'' to provide reliable 911 service, based on best
practices developed by the FCC's Communications Security, Reliability,
and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) advisory committee, with
refinements designed to add clarity and specific guidance regarding how
those practices should be implemented in the context of 911 networks.
Providers will demonstrate their compliance by filing an annual
certification. The certification elements the Commission are based on
best practices identified by CSRIC as critical or highly important,
indicating that they significantly reduce the potential for a
catastrophic failure of communications or--at a minimum--improve the
likelihood of emergency call completion.
3. The Commission seeks to maximize flexibility and account for
differences in network architectures without sacrificing 911 service
reliability. Accordingly, service providers that certify annually that
they have implemented certain industry-backed ``best practices,'' will
be deemed to satisfy the reasonable measures requirement. Providers may
also certify that they have taken alternative measures reasonably
sufficient in light of the provider's particular facts and
circumstances to ensure reliable 911 service, so long as they briefly
describe such measures and provide supporting documentation to the
Commission. Similarly, service providers may respond by demonstrating
that a particular certification element is not applicable to their
networks, but they must include a brief explanation of why the element
does not apply.
4. Based on the information included in the certifications, the
Commission may require remedial action to correct vulnerabilities in a
service provider's 911 network if it determines that (a) the service
provider has not, in fact, adhered to the best practices incorporated
in our rules or, (b) in the case of providers employing alternative
measures, that those measures were not reasonably sufficient to
mitigate the associated risks of failure in one or more of these three
key areas. The Commission delegates authority to the Bureau to review
certification information and follow up with service providers as
appropriate to address deficiencies revealed by the certification
process.
5. The FCC also amends its outage reporting rules under part 4 to
clarify Covered 911 Service Providers' obligations to provide PSAPs
with timely and actionable notification of outages affecting 911
service.
II. Background
A. 911 Network Architecture
6. The primary function of the 911 network is to route emergency
calls to the geographically appropriate PSAP based on the caller's
location. When a caller dials 911 on a wireline telephone, the call
goes to the local switch serving that caller, as is typical with any
other call. The local switch then sends the call to an aggregation
point called a selective router, which uses the caller's phone number
and address to determine the appropriate PSAP to which the call should
be sent. Calls to 911 from wireless phones flow through a switch called
a mobile switching center before reaching the selective router. For
wireless calls, the sector of the cell tower serving the call provides
the approximate location of the caller and is used to determine to
which PSAP the call is sent. To complete the call, a connection is set
up between the selective router and the appropriate PSAP, typically
through a central office serving that PSAP.
7. Once a 911 call reaches the appropriate PSAP, the PSAP queries
an automatic location information (ALI) database to determine the
location of the caller. For wireline calls, ALI is based on the address
associated with the caller's phone number. For wireless calls,
providers use various technologies to determine the caller's location.
Because ALI is passed to the PSAP
[[Page 3124]]
along a different path than the one carrying 911 calls, it is possible
for a PSAP to lose ALI links without losing 911 service completely.
8. The 911 network architecture described above is evolving from a
circuit-switched network to a Next Generation 911 (NG911) network based
on Internet protocol (IP) technology. NG911 networks offers certain
advantages over legacy technologies, including greater redundancy and
reliability, the ability to provide more useful information for first
responders, wider public accessibility (including to those with
disabilities), and enhanced capabilities for sharing data and resources
among emergency responders.
B. FCC Approach to Communications Reliability
9. The Commission has generally approached communications
reliability issues by working with service providers to develop
voluntary best practices and by measuring the effectiveness of those
best practices through outage reporting. For example, federal advisory
committees such as CSRIC, which includes representatives from both
industry and public safety organizations, have developed numerous
network-reliability best practices that communications providers have
been encouraged to adopt on a voluntary basis. Since 1992, the
Commission has turned to CSRIC and its predecessors, the Network
Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC) and Media Security and
Reliability Council (MSRC), to make recommendations on communications
network and system reliability and security. Because of the
collaborative and consensus-based nature of this process, CSRIC's best
practices generally involve aspects of service that providers have
indicated they were already adopting consistently.
10. The Commission's mandatory Network Outage Reporting System
(NORS) and voluntary Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS)
provide outage data that help gauge whether best practices have been
implemented in certain circumstances or service areas, but the
Commission has not required service providers to implement these
practices. From time to time, however, the Bureau has publicly reminded
911 service providers of the importance of following industry-developed
best practices in light of outage trends suggesting to the Bureau that
they have not been implemented adequately. The Bureau also works with
service providers on an informal basis to identify and resolve
communications reliability issues revealed through the outage reporting
process.
C. June 2012 Derecho
11. On June 29, 2012, a fast-moving derecho storm brought a wave of
destruction across wide swaths of the United States, beginning in the
Midwest and continuing through the Appalachians and Mid-Atlantic states
until the early morning of June 30. The derecho resulted in twenty-two
deaths and widespread property damage, and left millions of residents
without electrical power for as long as two weeks. While the
destruction caused by the derecho resembled that of other major storms
in some respects, it also proved different in others. For example, the
landfall of a hurricane is typically predicted days in advance,
allowing first responders and communications providers time to prepare.
In contrast, the derecho moved rapidly across multiple states with very
little warning, putting critical infrastructure to an unexpected test
and revealing significant vulnerabilities in service providers'
networks and operations.
12. The derecho's effects were particularly severe in northern
Virginia, where four PSAPs in the densely-populated National Capital
Region lost service completely, and in West Virginia, where eleven
PSAPs could not receive 911 calls for as long as twelve hours. Fairfax
County, Virginia noted that the disruption of 911 service after the
derecho was the longest and most severe 911 outage since Fairfax County
implemented Enhanced 911 in 1988, leaving 1.1 million county residents
without access to 911 for seven hours and preventing nearly 1,900 911
calls from reaching the Fairfax County PSAP.
D. PSHSB Derecho Report
13. Immediately after communications and 911 services were
restored, the Bureau began a comprehensive inquiry to determine why
each outage occurred and how such problems could be prevented in the
future. The Bureau analyzed more than 500 confidential NORS reports
containing information on the cause, duration, and resolution of each
outage, as well as numerous DIRS reports from the areas hit hardest by
the derecho. Bureau staff also interviewed representatives of eight
communications providers, twenty-eight PSAPs, three battery
manufacturers, one generator manufacturer, and numerous state and
county entities. In addition, the Bureau participated in several
federal, state, and local meetings and hearings on the effects of the
derecho. These interactions clarified and expanded the information the
Commission had already received via NORS and DIRS.
14. In its January 2013 Derecho Report, available at https://www.fcc.gov/document/derecho-report-and-recommendations, the Bureau
announced the results of its inquiry and provided specific
recommendations for Commission action to improve the reliability and
resiliency of 911 networks nationwide. The Bureau found that many
communications outages during the derecho, including 911 outages, could
have been prevented through implementation of best practices developed
by entities such as CSRIC and the Alliance for Telecommunications
Industry Solutions (ATIS) Network Reliability Steering Committee
(NRSC). The Bureau found that, above and beyond any physical
destruction by the derecho, 911 communications were disrupted in large
part because of avoidable planning and system failures, including
inadequate physical diversity of critical 911 circuits and a lack of
functional backup power in central offices.
E. 911 Reliability Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
15. On March 20, 2013, the Commission adopted a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (911 Reliability NPRM or NPRM), available at https://www.fcc.gov/document/improving-9-1-1-reliability, which outlined
options to implement recommendations from the Derecho Report. These
options ranged from reporting and certification obligations, to
mandatory reliability requirements supported by site inspections and
compliance reviews. The NPRM also proposed to amend the Commission's
rules to require 911 service providers, and other communications
providers subject to the existing rule, to notify PSAPs of
communications outages ``immediately,'' with specific information about
the nature of the outage and area affected.
III. Discussion
A. Need for Commission Action
16. A primary responsibility of the Commission is to make
available, so far as possible, to all people of the United States, a
wire and radio communication service for the purpose of promoting
safety of life and property. Consistent with that overarching
obligation, the Commission has specific statutory responsibilities with
respect to 911 service. The outage reporting process has often been
effective in improving the reliability and resiliency of many
communications services, and the
[[Page 3125]]
Commission continues to support NORS, DIRS, and an emphasis on
voluntary best practices and outage reporting in the context of
everyday communications. Nevertheless, preventable 911 network failures
during the derecho put lives and property at risk and revealed that
service providers have not consistently implemented vital best
practices voluntarily despite repeated reminders and their past claims
to the contrary. In light of this experience and substantial evidence
in the record of this proceeding, the Commission concludes that
additional Commission action is both warranted and needed with respect
to critical 911 communications.
B. Entities Subject to the Rules
17. The rules adopted apply to every ``Covered 911 Service
Provider,'' defined as any entity that provides 911, E911, or NG911
capabilities such as call routing, ALI, ANI, or the functional
equivalent of those capabilities, directly to a PSAP, statewide default
answering point, or appropriate local emergency authority (as that term
is defined elsewhere in the Commission's rules), or that operates one
or more central offices that directly serve a PSAP. For purposes of
these rules, a central office ``directly serves a PSAP'' if it (1)
hosts a selective router or ALI/ANI database (2) provides functionally
equivalent NG911 capabilities, or (3) is the last service-provider
facility through which a 911 trunk or administrative line passes before
connecting to a PSAP. This definition encompasses entities that provide
capabilities to route 911 calls and associated data such as ALI and ANI
to the appropriate PSAP, but not entities that merely provide the
capability for customers to originate 911 calls.
18. This definition reflects the fact that, while most current 911
networks rely on the infrastructure of an incumbent local exchange
carrier (ILEC), no single type of entity will always provide 911
service in every community. In addition, the transition to an Internet
protocol (IP) architecture for NG911 services will allow an expanded
range of entities beyond ILECs to route and deliver 911 calls, as well
as location and callback information, to local PSAPs or consolidated
call centers. Consistent with the goals of the Next Generation 911
Advancement Act of 2012, the Commission seeks to promote NG911 adoption
and account for changing technologies that support these functions
while ensuring that legacy 911 infrastructure remains reliable as long
as it is in use. The Commission takes this step in recognition that
overbroad rules could inadvertently impose obligations on entities that
provide peripheral support for NG911 but may not play a central role in
ensuring 911 reliability or benefit as much as a typical circuit-
switched ILEC from the best practices discussed below. To minimize the
risk of unintended effects, the Commission describes covered entities
in terms of the core 911 capabilities they provide rather than the
technology they employ or how they are currently classified under our
rules.
19. While the FCC strongly supports the transition to NG911, it is
not persuaded that NG911 technologies have evolved to the point that
reliability certification rules should apply to entities beyond those
that offer core services functionally equivalent to current 911 and
E911 capabilities. The Commission might, however, revisit this
distinction in the future as technology evolves, as discussed below
with regard to review and sunset of the rules. In a similar vein, the
FCC does not adopt a definition that covers all operators of emergency
services Internet protocol networks (ESInets). Some ESInets may provide
capabilities other than those at issue here, and other ESInets may be
operated directly by PSAPs and 911 authorities. Under the rules, ESInet
operators will be required to certify reliability only to the extent
they qualify as Covered 911 Service Providers under our rules.
C. Implementation Approach
20. The FCC adopts rules requiring Covered 911 Service Providers
to: (1) Take reasonable measures to ensure reliable 911 service, and
(2) certify annually whether they do so by adhering either to specified
practices based on established industry consensus or to alternative
measures demonstrated to be reasonably sufficient to mitigate the risk
of failure. Regarding reasonable measures, the record in this
proceeding demonstrates a number of concrete and objective indications
of whether a service provider's practices with respect to 911
reliability are reasonable. For example, best practices are developed
in a ``consensus-based environment'' reflecting the collective judgment
of industry, and other stakeholders. It follows that compliance with
best practices is a strong indication that a service provider is taking
reasonable measures to ensure reliable 911 service. While there may be
situations in which it would be reasonable for a service provider to
depart from best practices, there should be a reasonable basis for such
decisions, coupled with appropriate steps to compensate for any
increased risk of failure.
21. Regarding annual certification, a Covered 911 Service Provider
that performs and certifies all the specific certification elements
outlined in the rules regarding 911 circuit auditing, backup power at
central offices that directly serve PSAPs, and diverse network
monitoring links, is not required to provide additional documentation
to support its certification that it has met the reasonable measures
requirement. These providers will be deemed to satisfy the obligation
to take reasonable measures to provide reliable 911 service, provided
that the certification is accurate and complete. In the alternative, if
a Covered 911 Service Provider cannot certify affirmatively to every
element in a substantive area, but believes that its actions are
nevertheless reasonably sufficient to mitigate the risk of 911 service
failure based on the configuration of its network and other factors,
then it may certify that it has taken alternative measures in that
substantive area. For each element where the Covered 911 Service
Provider certifies to taking alternative measures, it must include with
its certification a brief explanation of those alternative measures
with respect to each PSAP, central office, or 911 service area where
they are in use, and why those measures are reasonable under the
circumstances to mitigate the risk of failure. Finally, a Covered 911
Service Provider may respond that certain elements of the certification
do not apply to all or part of its network, but it must include with
its certification a reasonable explanation of why those elements are
not applicable.
22. In addition, the Commission will require Covered 911 Service
Providers to maintain for two years the records supporting each annual
certification and to make relevant records available to the Commission
upon request. For providers with existing electronic recordkeeping
capabilities, these records must be maintained in an electronic format
for ease of access and review. While certifications require only a
brief description of alternative measures, the Commission reserves the
right to request additional information, at the time of certification
or thereafter, to verify the accuracy of a certification or determine
whether alternative measures are reasonable. This approach lessens the
reporting burden on service providers while ensuring that supporting
documentation is available when necessary. Examples of such records
include diagrams of network routing, records of circuit audits,
[[Page 3126]]
backup power deployment and maintenance records, and documentation of
network monitoring routes and capabilities.
23. While the FCC adopts the certification approach, it notes that
a very high-level certification will not provide the Commission with
either the information it needs to identify important weaknesses in 911
networks or a reasonable basis on which to hold service providers
accountable for decisions affecting 911 reliability. It therefore will
require all Covered 911 Service Providers to certify annually to
certain basic measures in the three substantive areas, and delegates to
the Bureau the responsibility to review the certifications and take
additional action as appropriate, and the authority and responsibility
to develop the certification form and filing system. The reliability
certifications will be subject to penalties for false or misleading
statements both under the United States Code and the Commission's
rules. The certification shall also be accompanied by a statement
explaining the basis for such certification and shall be subscribed to
as true under penalty of perjury in substantially the form set forth in
section 1.16 of the Commission's rules.
24. Certification Standards. In response to call by some commenters
to convene a new group to develop new certification standards and
procedures unique to these rules, the Commission notes that the process
these commenters describe is virtually indistinguishable from the
Commission's existing CSRIC process. These revised CSRIC best practices
are available to stakeholders for application on a voluntary basis; the
Commission therefore sees no reason to defer its refinement and
implementation of these best practices in a Commission rule, in light
of its experiences with voluntary standards.
25. The FCC understands that, as NG911 deployment advances, the
certification standards may have to change, and the Commission may then
need to turn to multi-stakeholder bodies like CSRIC for recommendations
in these areas. Accordingly, the Commission adopts certification
standards that are consistent with current best practices but also
flexible enough to account for differences in 911 and NG911 networks.
26. Certifying Official. To ensure accuracy and accountability,
each certification must be made by a corporate officer responsible for
network operations in all relevant service areas. Thus, the certifying
official must have supervisory and budgetary authority over a Covered
911 Service Provider's entire 911 network, not merely certain regions
or service areas.
27. Effect of Certification. Under the certification process, a
Covered 911 Service Provider that performs all the certification
elements in a substantive area will be deemed to comply with the
requirement to take reasonable measures in that area. This result is
subject only to any determination the Commission or as delegated, the
Bureau, may make afterward, based on complaints, outage reports or
other information, that the Covered 911 Service Provider did not, in
fact, perform as claimed in its certification. If, however, a Covered
911 Service Provider certifies that it has taken alternative measures
to mitigate the risk of failure, or that a certification element is not
applicable to its network, its certification is subject to a more
detailed Bureau review. In such cases, the Covered 911 Service Provider
must provide an explanation of its alternative measures and why they
are reasonable under the circumstances, or why the certification
element is not applicable. The Bureau will consider a number of factors
in determining whether the particular alternative measures are
reasonably sufficient to ensure reliable 911 service. Such factors may
include the technical characteristics of those measures, the location
and geography of the service area, the level of service ordered by the
PSAP, and state and local laws (such as zoning and noise ordinances).
The Bureau may rely on information from a variety of sources,
including: (1) The certifications and descriptions of alternative
measures; (2) supplemental responses to Commission inquiries; (3)
supporting records retained pursuant to the record retention
requirement; (4) NORS and DIRS data; (5) formal and informal
complaints; and/or (6) news reports or other information available to
the Commission.
28. If the Bureau's review indicates that a provider's alternative
measures are not reasonably sufficient to ensure reliable 911 service,
the Bureau should engage with the provider and other interested
stakeholders (e.g., affected PSAPs) to address any shortcomings. To the
extent that a collaborative process with a provider does not yield
satisfactory results, the Bureau may order remedial action, consistent
with the authority delegated in this Report and Order. Any service
provider ordered to take remedial action may seek reconsideration or
review of the Bureau's decision in accordance with the Commission's
rules. In extreme cases, such as where a provider is not acting in good
faith, the Bureau may also refer cases to the Enforcement Bureau for
further action as appropriate. This approach will place the least
burden on those Covered 911 Service Providers that provide consistently
reliable 911 service, while allowing the Commission to focus its
attention and resources where most needed.
29. Certification Phase-In. The rules, including the underlying
obligation to take reasonable measures to provide reliable 911 service,
become effective thirty days after publication in this Federal
Register. Although information collection requirements pursuant to
those rules will not become effective until approval by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act,
the substantive obligation to take such reasonable measures is not
contingent on such approval. Because certain certification elements
(e.g., circuit diversity audits) require time for implementation, the
first full certification will be due two years from the effective date
of the substantive rule requiring service providers to undertake such
reasonable measures.
30. Although service providers indicate that they already perform
many of the elements of our annual certification, the rules we adopt
will require a phase-in period so that all covered entities,
particularly smaller entities with limited staff and resources, have
time to come into full compliance. Therefore, the FCC requires that,
one year after the effective date of the rules, all Covered 911 Service
Providers file an initial certification that they have made substantial
progress toward meeting the standard of the full certification,
``substantial progress'' in this context meaning at least 50-percent
compliance with each of the three substantive certification
requirements. For example, regarding circuit diversity, Covered 911
Service Providers must certify they have conducted at least 50 percent
of the circuit audits. The Bureau has delegated authority to implement
this initial certification, including the form and process through
which it is submitted. After the first full certification two years
from the effective date of the rules, all Covered 911 Service Providers
will file a 911 reliability certification on an annual basis.
31. Regarding costs and benefits of the Commission's actions, the
FCC notes that no commenter questioned the basic premise that 911
communications provide significant public health and safety benefits,
nor provided an alternative method of quantifying the public safety
benefits associated with reliable 911 service. Further, the FCC
considers it fortunate that the effects of
[[Page 3127]]
the derecho were not worse given the serious problems it revealed.
32. The 911 Reliability NPRM estimated total costs to service
providers of $16.1 million to $44.1 million. By relaxing or eliminating
several of the requirements proposed in the NPRM, however, the
Commission reduced the impact on service providers far below those
estimates. The expected costs also are within an acceptable range of
the $9.1 million floor value of benefits estimated in this Report and
Order. As explained below, we estimate that the total annual
incremental cost to service providers is approximately $9 million,
which includes $6.4 million for circuit audit costs, $1.9 million for
backup power costs, and $732,000 for monitoring costs. The FCC finds
that its statutory mandate to promote the safety of life and property
and to implement our specific statutory 911 responsibilities makes the
benefits of reliable 911 service well worth these costs, particularly
since the approach adopted is based on best practices developed through
broad industry consensus.
D. Certification Requirements
a. Circuit Diversity
33. Covered 911 Service Providers must certify annually whether
they have, within the past year, audited the physical diversity of
critical 911 circuits or equivalent data paths to each PSAP they serve,
tagged those circuits to minimize the risk that they will be
reconfigured at some future date, and eliminated all single points of
failure between the selective router, ALI/ANI database, or equivalent
NG911 component, and the central office serving each PSAP. In lieu of
eliminating single points of failure, they may describe why these
single points of failure cannot be eliminated and the specific,
reasonably sufficient alternative measures they have taken to mitigate
the risks associated with the lack of physical diversity.
34. Alternatively, Covered 911 Service Providers may certify that
they believe this element of the certification is not applicable to
their network, although they must explain why it is not applicable.
Under these rules, all Covered 911 Service Providers must conduct
annual audits of the physical diversity of their critical 911 circuits
and tag those circuits to prevent rearrangement, but they may take a
range of corrective measures most appropriate for their networks and
PSAP customers.
35. Covered 911 Service Providers must also retain records of
circuit audits for confidential review by the Commission, upon request,
for two years.
36. ``Critical 911 circuits'' include transmission facilities
between a 911 selective router or its functional equivalent and the
final point in the local exchange serving the PSAP where these
facilities appear in the network (e.g., the main distribution frame)
before leaving this exchange on their way to the PSAP. For purposes of
this requirement, a selective router is a 911 network component that
selects the appropriate destination PSAP for each 911 call based on the
location of the caller. Critical 911 circuits also include links from
ANI/ALI databases to central offices that serve PSAPs. The definition
does not include the connections between the calling party and the
selective router that serves this person. Because IP-based NG911
networks may not employ circuit-switched technologies, the auditing
obligation extends to data transport paths for the core 911
capabilities, regardless of whether they are technically ``circuits.''
Likewise, the selective router function could be hosted by a third
party. The facilities connecting the third party's selective router
with the PSAPs to which it is interconnected are ``critical 911
circuits.''
37. Physical diversity, sometimes called route diversity, means
that two circuits follow different routes separated by some physical
distance so that a single failure such as a power outage, equipment
failure, or cable cut will not result in both circuits failing. Logical
diversity, sometimes called equipment diversity, implies that two
circuits are provisioned to use different transmission equipment, but
could share the same transmission medium (for example, the same fiber
or conduit). For example, two circuits that are modulated onto two
wavelengths are logically diverse. If they are then placed onto two
physically separate optical fibers whose routes do not meet, they are
also physically diverse, provided they do not share other equipment
prior to being placed on the fibers. If, instead, they are placed onto
the same optical fiber, they are no longer physically diverse, but they
retain their logical diversity. In the context of critical 911
circuits, the Commission focuses on physical diversity as the optimum
standard for certification, but also recognizes that logical diversity
may be appropriate where a PSAP has not ordered physically diverse
service or where physical diversity is not feasible in a particular
location. Thus, there is no blanket requirement that all critical 911
circuits be physically diverse in all circumstances, but we require
Covered 911 Service Providers that do not provision physically diverse
911 circuits to explain why those measures are reasonably sufficient.
38. Auditing method. To be in conformance with CSRIC best
practices, an auditing method must reflect the geographic routing of
circuits, as well as the logical flow of data, which could occur over a
common physical path. In cases where a party provides 911 services
directly to a PSAP (pursuant to contract or tariff) over leased
facilities, the auditing obligation would apply to that party, and not
to the facilities lessor. Although it could contract with the
underlying facilities lessor, if necessary, to audit its facilities,
the Covered 911 Service provider would remain responsible under our
rules for ensuring compliance with the auditing requirement.
39. Frequency of audits. The FCC concludes that a requirement that
Covered 911 Service Providers conduct annual audits of their 911
circuits, coupled with a requirement for submission of annual
certifications, best serves the public interest. Regular auditing of
critical 911 circuits can significantly improve network reliability,
and the FCC concludes that annual auditing of 911 circuits and network
monitoring links is necessary to prevent a loss of diversity in these
critical circuits due to routine circuit rearrangements between audits.
40. Corrective measures. Covered 911 Service Providers must certify
annually whether they have, within the past year, audited the physical
diversity of critical 911 circuits or equivalent data paths to each
PSAP they serve, tagged those circuits, and eliminated single points of
failure in these circuits. In lieu of eliminating single points of
failure, providers also may certify that they have taken specific,
alternative measures reasonably sufficient to mitigate the risk of
insufficient physical diversity. The Commission will also require
Covered 911 Service Providers to explain why measures short of physical
diversity are reasonably sufficient to ensure reliable 911 service in
individual cases.
41. Cost effectiveness. In the worst case, where the single-
stranded PSAP audits cost as much as those for PSAPs served by dual
selective routers, we would expect the annual incremental cost of those
audits to be about $4.5 million when based on the assumptions in the
NPRM. The Commission believes that most of these costs associated with
these audits are already being incurred by Covered 911 Service
Providers and will decrease over time as their auditing
[[Page 3128]]
practices improve. As commenters attest through their descriptions of
existing practices, it is more likely that only a segment of critical
911 circuits are not already subject to regular audits, and the
incremental cost to audit the remaining circuits on an annual basis is
the more reasonable figure to use in an assessment of the burden
imposed by our auditing requirement.
42. All told, commenters provided estimates ranging from $6.4
million to $11.2 million in annual incremental costs, even if we accept
the industry view that critical 911 circuit audits require more time
than we estimated in the NPRM. In light of comments from AT&T
describing the ``minimal incremental cost'' of computerized audits and
from Frontier and CenturyLink indicating that even their existing
auditing methods require less than 40 hours per PSAP, the Commission
does not accept that Verizon's considerably-higher estimate accurately
represents the cost of our rules to the industry as a whole.
Furthermore, the certification's two-year phase-in will allow all
Covered 911 Service Providers to reexamine their existing circuit
auditing practices and implement more efficient systems. As such, the
FCC believes that the lower end of the industry range--about $6.4
million--is a reasonable estimate of the annual incremental cost of our
circuit auditing requirement once the audits we require are put into
practice. Notably, these estimates reflects the cost of a ``highly
important'' best practice that virtually all Covered 911 Service
Providers claim to follow already to some degree. The incremental cost
of conducting circuit audits in conformance with our certification will
be substantially less than the total cost, regardless of how it is
calculated.
b. Central Office Backup Power
43. Covered 911 Service Providers must certify annually whether
they have sufficient, reliable backup power in any central office that
directly serves a PSAP to maintain full service functionality,
including network monitoring capabilities, for at least 24 hours at
full office load. In addition especially critical central offices that
host selective routers must be equipped with at least 72 hours of
backup power at full office load. The specified level of backup power
may be provided through fixed generators, portable generators,
batteries, fuel cells, or a combination of those or other such sources
so long as it meets the applicable certification standard.
44. If that level of backup power is not feasible at a particular
central office that directly serves a PSAP or hosts a selective router,
the certification will be required to indicate this. The service
provider must briefly state why it is not feasible and describe the
specific alternative measures it has taken to mitigate the risk
associated with backup power configurations that fail to satisfy the
certification standard. Covered 911 Service Providers may also certify
that they believe this element of the certification is not applicable
to their network, although they must explain why it is not applicable.
As noted above with regard to covered entities, a central office
``directly serves a PSAP'' if it: (1) Hosts a selective router or ALI/
ANI database; (2) provides equivalent NG911 capabilities; or (3) is the
last service-provider facility through which a 911 trunk or
administrative line passes before connecting to a PSAP. Service
providers must also certify whether: (1) They test and maintain all
backup power equipment in all central offices directly serving PSAPs in
accordance with the manufacturer's specifications, per CSRIC best
practice; (2) adhere to CSRIC best practices regarding fully automatic,
non-interdependent generators that can be started manually if
necessary; and (3) retain records of backup power deployment and
maintenance for confidential review by the Commission, upon request,
for two years. If the specified standards related to testing and tandem
generator configurations cannot be met, the service provider must
briefly state why it is not feasible to meet them and describe the
specific alternative measures it has taken to mitigate the risk
associated with the failure to satisfy the certification standards.
45. Because different central offices present different backup
power challenges and a single solution may not be suitable for all,
Covered 911 Service Providers may certify and describe reasonable
alternative measures on a case-by-case basis. For these reasons, rather
than codifying existing best practices as prescriptive rules, the
certification requirement allows 911 service providers flexibility to
maintain adequate central-office backup power based on best practices
and reasonable alternatives to suit site-specific circumstances.
46. Testing standards. The rules require Covered 911 Service
Providers, consistent with CSRIC best practice, to certify that they
test their backup power equipment according to the relevant
manufacturers' specifications. Further, because failure of
interdependent generators was a significant factor in the
communications failures during the June 2012, the Commission believes
that tandem generators should be electronically separated to ensure
that failure of one generator does not cause the other to fail, and
will require the certification to confirm whether the 911 provider
employs stand-alone backup power sources. 911 providers will have the
opportunity to demonstrate that alternative measures upon which they
rely (e.g., load shedding) are reasonably sufficient to mitigate the
risk of failure.
47. Cost effectiveness. The NPRM estimated that the incremental
cost incurred to perform backup power certifications, including
remediation, ranged from $11.7 million to $37.5 million depending on
whether the Commission would require fixed generators at all central
offices. The Report and Order includes no such requirement, meaning
that there would be no incremental costs for central offices
appropriately provisioned with portable generators. As a result, the
Commission estimates the cost to conform to its backup power standards
is much closer to $11.7 million than $37.5 million. Further, the
approach adopted will also significantly reduce the cost of compliance
by covering only central offices directly serving PSAPs or hosting
selective routers or ALI databases, and allowing alternative measures
where the specified level of backup power is not feasible. Limiting
these requirements to central offices that directly serve PSAPs reduces
our estimate of cost by 72 percent, from $11.7 million to about $3.3
million.
c. Network Monitoring
48. Covered 911 Service Providers must certify annually whether
they have, within the past year: (1) Audited the physical diversity of
the aggregation points that they use to gather network monitoring data
in each 911 service area and the network monitoring links between such
aggregation points and their NOC(s); and (2) implemented physically
diverse aggregation points for network monitoring data in each 911
service area and physically diverse links from such aggregation points
to at least one NOC or, in light of the required audits, taken specific
alternative measures reasonably sufficient to mitigate the risk of
insufficient physical diversity. They may also certify that they
believe this element of the certification is not applicable to their
network, although they must explain why it is not applicable.
49. Covered 911 Service Providers also must retain records of their
network monitoring routes and capabilities for confidential review by
the Commission, upon request, for two years.
[[Page 3129]]
50. For purposes of the certification, network monitoring links
transmit data about failed or degraded network equipment and facilities
from monitoring points within the network to a NOC or other location
where the data are analyzed and decisions made about corrective action.
Links from multiple individual monitoring points may be routed through
and aggregated onto common transport facilities at one or more hubs in
each service area for distribution to remote NOCs, in which case those
hubs are described as aggregation points for network monitoring data.
``Physical diversity'' applied to aggregation points refers to
aggregation points that are not physically co-located.
51. Corrective Measures. Recognizing that circumstances are likely
to exist in real-world networks that prevent the achievement of
complete physical diversity and diverse aggregation points for network
monitoring data, the Commission believes that service providers should
retain the flexibility to implement diversity and the migration of
telemetry to the IP network as appropriate for their network evolution,
management, and monitoring. As such, the certification approach
provides Covered 911 Service Providers with the flexibility to
compensate for an inability to conform to our certification standard by
employing appropriate alternative measures to promote reliable and
resilient network monitoring where diverse aggregation points or
monitoring links may not be feasible.
51A. Cost effectiveness. The Commission calculates the costs of
network monitoring to be $732,000, as opposed to the $2,196,000
suggested in the NPRM. In the absence of more detailed cost estimates
from commenters, the Commission finds that the certification approach
is cost effective because it uses standards that are already widely in
use by communications providers and includes flexibility to allow
communications providers to address circumstances where the standards
cannot be feasibly implemented.
E. PSAP Outage Notification
52. Covered 911 Service Providers must notify PSAPs of outages
potentially affecting 911 service to that PSAP within 30 minutes of
discovering the outage and provide contact information such as a name,
telephone number, and email for follow-up. Whenever additional material
information becomes available, but no later than two hours after the
initial contact, the Covered 911 Service Provider must communicate
additional detail to the PSAP, including the nature of the outage, its
best-known cause, the geographic scope of the outage, and the estimated
time for repairs.
F. Legal Authority
53. In light of the Commission's express statutory
responsibilities, regulation of additional capabilities related to
reliable 911 service, both today and in an NG911 environment, would be
well within Commission's foregoing statutory authority. A full
statement of the Commission's legal authority to adopt these rules is
contained in the Report and Order.
G. Confidentiality
54. The Commission recognizes that some components of annual 911
reliability certifications are likely to raise genuine public safety
and competitive concerns, while other portions of the certification
will not and may be of legitimate interest to the public. For example,
there is little threat to public safety or competition in the mere fact
of whether a Covered 911 Service Provider has filed a certification, or
whether a service provider answers in the affirmative or negative to
each element of the certification. Thus, a service provider's responses
on the face of the form with respect to whether it adheres to
certification elements or relies on alternative measures to satisfy
other elements of the certification will not in and of itself be
considered confidential.
55. Nevertheless, confidentiality concerns increase significantly
if a certification includes proprietary information about a service
provider's specific network architecture or operations on less than an
aggregated basis. Accordingly, certain information will be treated as
presumptively confidential and exempt from routine public disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): (1) Descriptions and
documentation of alternative measures to mitigate the risks of
nonconformance with certification standards; (2) information detailing
specific corrective actions taken; and (3) supplemental information
requested by the Commission or Bureau with respect to a certification.
The Commission would expect, without requiring it, that a Covered 911
Service Provider will, at the request of the PSAP (or state 911
authority, as relevant), enter into discussions concerning the content
of the provider's 911 circuit auditing certification with respect to
the PSAP.
H. Review and Sunset of Rules
56. The Commission will review the rules adopted in this Report and
Order in five years to determine whether they are still technologically
appropriate and both adequate and necessary to ensure reliability and
resiliency of 911 networks. Review of the rules will also include
consideration of whether they should be revised or expanded to cover
new best practices or additional entities that provide NG911
capabilities, or in light of its understanding about how NG911 networks
may differ from legacy 911 service. Factors for consideration will
include outage reporting trends, adoption of NG911 capabilities on a
nationwide basis, and whether the certification approach has yielded
the necessary level of compliance. If, after review, the Commission
determines that some or all of these rules are no longer effective in
promoting 911 reliability, it will establish an appropriate sunset date
for those portions of the rules that are no longer necessary. The
Commission declines to set a specific sunset date or triggering event
because there are still too many uncertainties about the timeline for
widespread adoption of NG911 and the effect of new technologies on the
need for 911 reliability rules.
I. Authority Delegated to the Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau
57. PSHSB has delegated authority to implement the rules adopted in
the Report and Order, consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act
and relevant portions of the Communications Act. The Commission directs
the Bureau to develop such forms and procedures as may be required to
collect and process certifications, and to periodically update those
forms and procedures as necessary, subject to Paperwork Reduction Act
requirements. Through its experience with electronic outage reports in
NORS and DIRS, the Bureau has developed expertise with outage reports
and trends that will be useful when reviewing such certifications and
identifying issues for follow-up with service providers. The Bureau
also has delegated authority to order appropriate remedial actions on a
case-by-case basis where 911 reliability certifications indicate such
actions are necessary to protect public safety and consistent with the
guidelines set forth in this Report and Order.
IV. Procedural Matters
A. Accessible Formats
58. To request materials in accessible formats for people with
disabilities (Braille, large print, electronic files, audio format),
send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer &
[[Page 3130]]
Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432
(tty).
B. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis
59. The Report and Order contains new information collection
requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA),
Public Law 104-13. It will be submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) for review under section 3507(d) of the PRA. OMB, the
general public, and other interested parties are invited to comment on
the new information collection requirements contained in this
proceeding.
60. We note that pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief
Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), the
Commission previously sought specific comment on how the Commission
might further reduce the information collection burden for small
business concerns with fewer than 25 employees. We have described
impacts that might affect small businesses, which includes most
businesses with fewer than 25 employees, in the FRFA in Appendix C of
the Report and Order, paragraphs 14-15.
C. Congressional Review Act
61. The Commission will send a copy of the Report and Order in a
report to be sent to Congress and the Government Accountability Office
pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
D. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
62. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as
amended (RFA), an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was
included in the NPRM in PS Docket No. 11-60 and PS Docket No. 13-75.
The Commission sought written comment on the proposals in this docket,
including comment on the IRFA. This Final Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis conforms to the RFA.
V. Ordering Clauses
63. Accordingly, it is ordered pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j),
4(o), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307,
309(a), 316, 332, 403, 615a-1, and 615c of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i)-(j) & (o), 201(b), 214(d), 218,
251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 316, 332, 403,
615a-1, and 615c, that this Report and Order in PS Docket No. 13-75 and
PS Docket No. 11-60 IS adopted.
64. It is further ordered that parts 0, 4, and 12 of the
Commission's rules, 47 CFR Parts 0, 4, and 12, are amended, effective
February 18, 2014 except for Sec. 12.4(c) and (d)(1), which contain
information collection requirements that have not been approved by
Office of Management and Budget. The Federal Communications Commission
will publish a document in the Federal Register announcing the
effective date.
65. It is further ordered that the Final Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis in Appendix C hereto is adopted.
66. It is further ordered that, pursuant to section 801(a)(1)(A) of
the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A), the Commission
shall send a copy of this Report and Order to Congress and to the
Government Accountability Office.
67. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a
copy of this Report and Order, including the Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration.
List of Subjects
47 CFR Part 0
Commission organization; Confidential material; Delegation of
authority.
47 CFR Part 4
Telecommunications.
47 CFR Part 12
Certification; Telecommunications.
Federal Communications Commission.
Sheryl D. Todd,
Deputy Secretary.
Final Rules
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Federal
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR parts 0, 4, and 12 as follows:
PART 0--COMMISSION ORGANIZATION
0
1. The authority citation for part 0 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Sec. 5, 48 Stat. 1068, as amended; 47 U.S.C. 155.
0
2. Section 0.392 is revised by adding paragraph (j) to read as follows:
Sec. 0.392 Authority delegated.
* * * * *
(j) The Chief of the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau is
delegated authority to administer the communications reliability and
redundancy rules and policies contained in part 12 of this chapter,
develop and revise forms and procedures as may be required for the
administration of part 12 of this chapter, review certifications filed
in connection therewith, and order remedial action on a case-by-case
basis to ensure the reliability of 911 service in accordance with such
rules and policies.
0
3. Section 0.457 is amended by revising paragraph (d)(1)(viii) to read
as follows:
Sec. 0.457 Records not routinely available for public inspection.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(1) * * *
(viii) Information submitted with a 911 reliability certification
pursuant to 47 CFR 12.4 that consists of descriptions and documentation
of alternative measures to mitigate the risks of nonconformance with
certification elements, information detailing specific corrective
actions taken with respect to certification elements, or supplemental
information requested by the Commission with respect to such
certification.
* * * * *
PART 4--DISRUPTIONS TO COMMUNICATIONS
0
4. The authority citation for part 4 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Sec. 5, 48 Stat. 1068, as amended; 47 U.S.C. 154,
155, 201, 251, 307, 316, 615a-1, 1302(a), and 1302(b).
0
5. Section 4.9 is amended by adding paragraph (h) to read as follows:
Sec. 4.9 Outage reporting requirements--threshold criteria.
* * * * *
(h) Covered 911 service providers. In addition to any other
obligations imposed in this section, within thirty minutes of
discovering an outage that potentially affects a 911 special facility
(as defined in Sec. 4.5), all covered 911 service providers (as
defined in Sec. 12.4(a)(4) of this chapter) shall notify as soon as
possible but no later than thirty minutes after discovering the outage
any official who has been designated by the affected 911 special
facility as the provider's contact person(s) for communications outages
at that facility and convey all available information that may be
useful in mitigating the effects of the outage, as well as a name,
telephone number, and email address at which the service provider can
be reached for follow-up. The covered 911 service provider shall
communicate additional material information to the affected 911 special
facility as it becomes available, but no later than two hours after the
initial contact. This information shall include the nature of the
outage, its best-known
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cause, the geographic scope of the outage, the estimated time for
repairs, and any other information that may be useful to the management
of the affected facility. All notifications shall be transmitted by
telephone and in writing via electronic means in the absence of another
method mutually agreed upon in advance by the 911 special facility and
the covered 911 service provider.
PART 12--RESILIENCY, REDUNDANCY AND RELIABILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS
0
6. The authority citation for part 12 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o), 5(c), 218, 219, 301,
303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332, 403, 621(b)(3), and 621(d) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i),
154(j), 154(o), 155(c), 218, 219, 301, 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332,
403, 621(b)(3), and 621(d), unless otherwise noted.
0
7. Revise the heading of part 12 to read as set forth above.
0
8. Section 12.4 is added to read as follows: Sec. 12.4 Reliability of
covered 911 service providers.
(a) Definitions. Terms in this section shall have the following
meanings:
(1) Aggregation point. A point at which network monitoring data for
a 911 service area is collected and routed to a network operations
center (NOC) or other location for monitoring and analyzing network
status and performance.
(2) Certification. An attestation by a certifying official, under
penalty of perjury, that a covered 911 service provider:
(i) Has satisfied the obligations of paragraph (c) of this section.
(ii) Has adequate internal controls to bring material information
regarding network architecture, operations, and maintenance to the
certifying official's attention.
(iii) Has made the certifying official aware of all material
information reasonably necessary to complete the certification.
(iv) The term ``certification'' shall include both an annual
reliability certification under paragraph (c) of this section and an
initial reliability certification under paragraph (d)(1) of this
section, to the extent provided under paragraph (d)(1) of this section.
(3) Certifying official. A corporate officer of a covered 911
service provider with supervisory and budgetary authority over network
operations in all relevant service areas.
(4) Covered 911 service provider.
(i) Any entity that:
(A) Provides 911, E911, or NG911 capabilities such as call routing,
automatic location information (ALI), automatic number identification
(ANI), or the functional equivalent of those capabilities, directly to
a public safety answering point (PSAP), statewide default answering
point, or appropriate local emergency authority as defined in
Sec. Sec. 64.3000(b) and 20.3 of this chapter; and/or
(B) Operates one or more central offices that directly serve a
PSAP. For purposes of this section, a central office directly serves a
PSAP if it hosts a selective router or ALI/ANI database, provides
equivalent NG911 capabilities, or is the last service-provider facility
through which a 911 trunk or administrative line passes before
connecting to a PSAP.
(ii) The term ``covered 911 service provider'' shall not include
any entity that:
(A) Constitutes a PSAP or governmental authority to the extent that
it provides 911 capabilities; or
(B) Offers the capability to originate 911 calls where another
service provider delivers those calls and associated number or location
information to the appropriate PSAP.
(5) Critical 911 circuits. 911 facilities that originate at a
selective router or its functional equivalent and terminate in the
central office that serves the PSAP(s) to which the selective router or
its functional equivalent delivers 911 calls, including all equipment
in the serving central office necessary for the delivery of 911 calls
to the PSAP(s). Critical 911 circuits also include ALI and ANI
facilities that originate at the ALI or ANI database and terminate in
the central office that serves the PSAP(s) to which the ALI or ANI
databases deliver 911 caller information, including all equipment in
the serving central office necessary for the delivery of such
information to the PSAP(s).
(6) Diversity audit. A periodic analysis of the geographic routing
of network components to determine whether they are physically diverse.
Diversity audits may be performed through manual or automated means, or
through a review of paper or electronic records, as long as they
reflect whether critical 911 circuits are physically diverse.
(7) Monitoring links. Facilities that collect and transmit network
monitoring data to a NOC or other location for monitoring and analyzing
network status and performance.
(8) Physically diverse. Circuits or equivalent data paths are
Physically Diverse if they provide more than one physical route between
end points with no common points where a single failure at that point
would cause both circuits to fail. Circuits that share a common segment
such as a fiber-optic cable or circuit board are not Physically diverse
even if they are logically diverse for purposes of transmitting data.
(9) 911 service area. The metropolitan area or geographic region in
which a covered 911 service provider operates a selective router or the
functional equivalent to route 911 calls to the geographically
appropriate PSAP.
(10) Selective router. A 911 network component that selects the
appropriate destination PSAP for each 911 call based on the location of
the caller.
(11) Tagging. An inventory management process whereby critical 911
circuits are labeled in circuit inventory databases to make it less
likely that circuit rearrangements will compromise diversity. A covered
911 service provider may use any system it wishes to tag circuits so
long as it tracks whether critical 911 circuits are physically diverse
and identifies changes that would compromise such diversity.
(b) Provision of reliable 911 service. All covered 911 service
providers shall take reasonable measures to provide reliable 911
service with respect to circuit diversity, central-office backup power,
and diverse network monitoring. Performance of the elements of the
certification set forth in paragraphs (c)(1)(i), (c)(2)(i), and
(c)(3)(i) of this section shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements
of this paragraph. If a covered 911 service provider cannot certify
that it has performed a given element, the Commission may determine
that such provider nevertheless satisfies the requirements of this
paragraph based upon a showing in accordance with paragraph (c) of this
section that it is taking alternative measures with respect to that
element that are reasonably sufficient to mitigate the risk of failure,
or that one or more certification elements are not applicable to its
network.
(c) Annual reliability certification. One year after the initial
reliability certification described in paragraph (d)(1) of this section
and every year thereafter, a certifying official of every covered 911
service provider shall submit a certification to the Commission as
follows.
(1) Circuit auditing.
(i) A covered 911 service provider shall certify whether it has,
within the past year:
(A) Conducted diversity audits of critical 911 circuits or
equivalent data paths to any PSAP served;
(B) Tagged such critical 911 circuits to reduce the probability of
inadvertent
[[Page 3132]]
loss of diversity in the period between audits; and
(C) Eliminated all single points of failure in critical 911
circuits or equivalent data paths serving each PSAP.
(ii) If a covered 911 service provider does not conform with the
elements in paragraph (c)(1)(i)(C) of this section with respect to the
911 service provided to one or more PSAPs, it must certify with respect
to each such PSAP:
(A) Whether it has taken alternative measures to mitigate the risk
of critical 911 circuits that are not physically diverse or is taking
steps to remediate any issues that it has identified with respect to
911 service to the PSAP, in which case it shall provide a brief
explanation of such alternative measures or such remediation steps, the
date by which it anticipates such remediation will be completed, and
why it believes those measures are reasonably sufficient to mitigate
such risk; or
(B) Whether it believes that one or more of the requirements of
this paragraph are not applicable to its network, in which case it
shall provide a brief explanation of why it believes any such
requirement does not apply.
(2) Backup power.
(i) With respect to any central office it operates that directly
serves a PSAP, a covered 911 service provider shall certify whether it:
(A) Provisions backup power through fixed generators, portable
generators, batteries, fuel cells, or a combination of these or other
such sources to maintain full-service functionality, including network
monitoring capabilities, for at least 24 hours at full office load or,
if the central office hosts a selective router, at least 72 hours at
full office load; provided, however, that any such portable generators
shall be readily available within the time it takes the batteries to
drain, notwithstanding potential demand for such generators elsewhere
in the service provider's network.
(B) Tests and maintains all backup power equipment in such central
offices in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications;
(C) Designs backup generators in such central offices for fully
automatic operation and for ease of manual operation, when required;
(D) Designs, installs, and maintains each generator in any central
office that is served by more than one backup generator as a stand-
alone unit that does not depend on the operation of another generator
for proper functioning.
(ii) If a covered 911 service provider does not conform with all of
the elements in paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section, it must certify
with respect to each such central office:
(A) Whether it has taken alternative measures to mitigate the risk
of a loss of service in that office due to a loss of power or is taking
steps to remediate any issues that it has identified with respect to
backup power in that office, in which case it shall provide a brief
explanation of such alternative measures or such remediation steps, the
date by which it anticipates such remediation will be completed, and
why it believes those measures are reasonably sufficient to mitigate
such risk; or
(B) Whether it believes that one or more of the requirements of
this paragraph are not applicable to its network, in which case it
shall provide a brief explanation of why it believes any such
requirement does not apply.
(3) Network monitoring.
(i) A covered 911 service provider shall certify whether it has,
within the past year:
(A) Conducted diversity audits of the aggregation points that it
uses to gather network monitoring data in each 911 service area;
(B) Conducted diversity audits of monitoring links between
aggregation points and NOCs for each 911 service area in which it
operates; and
(C) Implemented physically diverse aggregation points for network
monitoring data in each 911 service area and physically diverse
monitoring links from such aggregation points to at least one NOC.
(ii) If a Covered 911 service provider does not conform with all of
the elements in paragraph (c)(3)(i)(C) of this section, it must certify
with respect to each such 911 service area:
(A) Whether it has taken alternative measures to mitigate the risk
of network monitoring facilities that are not physically diverse or is
taking steps to remediate any issues that it has identified with
respect to diverse network monitoring in that 911 service area, in
which case it shall provide a brief explanation of such alternative
measures or such remediation steps, the date by which it anticipates
such remediation will be completed, and why it believes those measures
are reasonably sufficient to mitigate such risk; or
(B) Whether it believes that one or more of the requirements of
this paragraph are not applicable to its network, in which case it
shall provide a brief explanation of why it believes any such
requirement does not apply.
(d) Other matters.
(1) Initial reliability certification. One year after February 18,
2014, a certifying official of every covered 911 service provider shall
certify to the Commission that it has made substantial progress toward
meeting the standards of the annual reliability certification described
in paragraph (c) of this section. Substantial progress in each element
of the certification shall be defined as compliance with standards of
the full certification in at least 50 percent of the covered 911
service provider's critical 911 circuits, central offices that directly
serve PSAPs, and independently monitored 911 service areas.
(2) Confidential treatment.
(i) The fact of filing or not filing an annual reliability
certification or initial reliability certification and the responses on
the face of such certification forms shall not be treated as
confidential.
(ii) Information submitted with or in addition to such
certifications shall be presumed confidential to the extent that it
consists of descriptions and documentation of alternative measures to
mitigate the risks of nonconformance with certification elements,
information detailing specific corrective actions taken with respect to
certification elements, or supplemental information requested by the
Commission or Bureau with respect to a certification.
(3) Record retention. A covered 911 service provider shall retain
records supporting the responses in a certification for two years from
the date of such certification, and shall make such records available
to the Commission upon request. To the extent that a covered 911
service provider maintains records in electronic format, records
supporting a certification hereunder shall be maintained and supplied
in an electronic format.
(i) With respect to diversity audits of critical 911 circuits, such
records shall include, at a minimum, audit records separately
addressing each such circuit, any internal report(s) generated as a
result of such audits, records of actions taken pursuant to the audit
results, and records regarding any alternative measures taken to
mitigate the risk of critical 911 circuits that are not physically
diverse.
(ii) With respect to backup power at central offices, such records
shall include, at a minimum, records regarding the nature and extent of
backup power at each central office that directly serves a PSAP,
testing and maintenance records for backup power equipment in each such
central office, and records regarding any alternative measures taken to
mitigate the risk of insufficient backup power.
[[Page 3133]]
(iii) With respect to network monitoring, such records shall
include, at a minimum, records of diversity audits of monitoring links,
any internal report(s) generated as a result of such audits, records of
actions taken pursuant to the audit results, and records regarding any
alternative measures taken to mitigate the risk of aggregation points
and/or monitoring links that are not physically diverse.
[FR Doc. 2014-00958 Filed 1-16-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P