United States et al. v. US Airways Group, Inc. and AMR Corporation; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 71377-71407 [2013-28224]

Agencies

• Antitrust Division
• Department of Justice

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 229 (Wednesday, November 27, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 71377-71407]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-28224]



[[Page 71377]]

Vol. 78

Wednesday,

No. 229

November 27, 2013

Part III





Department of Justice





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Antitrust Division





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 United States et al. v. US Airways Group, Inc. and AMR Corporation; 
Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement; Notice

Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 229 / Wednesday, November 27, 2013 / 
Notices

[[Page 71378]]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


United States et al. v. US Airways Group, Inc. and AMR 
Corporation; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement

    Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and 
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment, 
Stipulation and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia in United 
States, et al. v. US Airways Group, Inc., et al., Civil No. 1:13-cv-
01236 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 
On August 13, 2013, the United States and six plaintiff states and the 
District of Columbia filed a Complaint alleging that the proposed 
merger of US Airways Group, Inc. (``US Airways'') and AMR Corporation 
(``American'') would substantially lessen competition for scheduled 
airline passenger service in the United States and therefore violate 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act 15 U.S.C. 18. The proposed Final Judgment, 
filed November 12, 2013, requires US Airways and American to divest (1) 
104 air carrier slots at Washington Reagan National Airport along with 
gates and related facilities, (2) 34 slots at New York LaGuardia 
Airport along with gates and related facilities, and (3) two gates and 
related facilities at each of five key airports: Boston Logan, Chicago 
O'Hare, Dallas Love Field, Los Angeles International and Miami 
International.
    Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment and Competitive 
Impact Statement are available for inspection at the Department of 
Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Documents Group, 450 Fifth 
Street NW., Suite 1010, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-514-2481), 
on the Department of Justice's Web site at https://www.justice.gov/atr, 
and at the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia. Copies of these materials may be obtained 
from the Antitrust Division upon request and payment of the copying fee 
set by Department of Justice regulations.
    Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this 
notice. Such comments, including the name of the submitter, and 
responses thereto, will be posted on the U.S. Department of Justice, 
Antitrust Division's internet Web site, filed by the United States on 
the public Court docket and, under certain circumstances, published in 
the Federal Register. Comments should be directed to William Stallings, 
Chief, Transportation, Energy & Agriculture Section, Antitrust 
Division, Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW., Suite 8000, 
Washington, DC 20530, (telephone: 202-514-9323). Comments should not be 
directed to the Court.

Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil Enforcement.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
450 Fifth Street Northwest, Suite 8000
Washington, DC 20530
STATE OF ARIZONA
1275 West Washington
Phoenix, AZ 85007
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
441 Fourth Street Northwest, Suite 600 South
Washington, DC 20001
STATE OF FLORIDA
PL-01, The Capitol
Tallahassee, FL 32399
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
14th Floor, Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120
STATE OF TENNESSEE
500 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville, TN 37202
STATE OF TEXAS
300 W. 15th Street, 7th Floor
Austin, TX 78701

and

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
900 East Main Street
Richmond, VA 23219

Plaintiffs,
v.

US AIRWAYS GROUP, INC.
111 W. Rio Salado Parkway
Tempe, AZ 85281
and
AMR CORPORATION
4333 Amon Carter Boulevard
Fort Worth, TX 76155

Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-cv-01236 (CKK)
Judge: Colleen Kollar-Kotelly
Filed: 08/13/2013

Complaint

    The United States of America, acting under the direction of the 
Attorney General of the United States, and the States of Arizona, 
Florida, Tennessee, Texas, the Commonwealths of Pennsylvania and 
Virginia, and the District of Columbia (``Plaintiff States''), acting 
by and through their respective Attorneys General, bring this civil 
action under federal antitrust law to enjoin the planned merger of two 
of the nation's five major airlines, US Airways Group, Inc. (``US 
Airways'') and AMR Corporation (``American''), and to obtain equitable 
and other relief as appropriate.

I. Introduction

    1. Millions of passengers depend on the airline industry to travel 
quickly, efficiently, and safely between various cities in the United 
States and throughout the world. Since 1978, the nation has relied on 
competition among airlines to promote affordability, innovation, and 
service and quality improvements. In recent years, however, the major 
airlines have, in tandem, raised fares, imposed new and higher fees, 
and reduced service. Competition has diminished and consumers have paid 
a heavy price. This merger--by creating the world's largest airline--
would, in the words of US Airways' management, ``finish[ ] industry 
evolution.'' It would reduce the number of major domestic airlines from 
five to four, and the number of ``legacy'' airlines--today, Delta, 
United, American, and US Airways--from four to three. In so doing, it 
threatens substantial harm to consumers. Because of the size of the 
airline industry, if this merger were approved, even a small increase 
in the price of airline tickets, checked bags, or flight change fees 
would cause hundreds of millions of dollars of harm to American 
consumers annually.
    2. American and US Airways compete directly on thousands of heavily 
traveled nonstop and connecting routes. Millions of passengers benefit 
each year from head-to-head competition that this merger would 
eliminate. With less competition, airlines can cut service and raise 
prices with less fear of competitive responses from rivals.
    3. This merger will leave three very similar legacy airlines--
Delta, United, and the new American--that past experience shows 
increasingly prefer tacit coordination over full-throated competition. 
By further reducing the number of legacy airlines and aligning the 
economic incentives of those that remain, the merger of US Airways and 
American would make it easier for the remaining airlines to cooperate, 
rather than compete, on price and service. That enhanced cooperation is 
unlikely to be significantly disrupted by Southwest and JetBlue, which, 
while offering important competition on the routes they fly, have less 
extensive domestic and international route networks than the legacy 
airlines.
    4. US Airways' own executives--who would run the new American--have 
long been ``proponents of consolidation.'' US Airways believes that the 
industry--before 2005--had ``too many'' competitors, causing an 
``irrational business model.'' Since 2005, there has been a wave of 
consolidation in the industry. US Airways has cheered these successive 
mergers, with its CEO stating in 2011 that ``fewer airlines'' is a 
``good thing.'' US Airways' President

[[Page 71379]]

explained this thinking that same year: ``Three successful fare 
increases--[we are] able to pass along to customers because of 
consolidation.'' (emphasis added). Similarly, he boasted at a 2012 
industry conference: ``Consolidation has also . . . allowed the 
industry to do things like ancillary revenues [e.g., checked bag and 
ticket change fees]. . . . That is a structural permanent change to the 
industry and one that's impossible to overstate the benefit from it.'' 
In essence, industry consolidation has left fewer, more-similar 
airlines, making it easier for the remaining airlines to raise prices, 
impose new or higher baggage and other ancillary fees, and reduce 
capacity and service. This merger positions US Airways' management to 
continue the trend--at the expense of consumers.
    5. US Airways intends to do just that. If this merger were 
approved, US Airways would no longer need to offer low-fare options for 
certain travelers. For example, US Airways employs ``Advantage Fares,'' 
an aggressive discounting strategy aimed at undercutting the other 
legacy airlines' nonstop fares with cheaper connecting service. US 
Airways' hubs are in cities that generate less lucrative nonstop 
traffic than the other legacy airlines' hubs. To compensate, US Airways 
uses its Advantage Fares to attract additional passengers on flights 
connecting through its hubs.
    6. The other legacy airlines take a different approach. If, for 
example, United offers nonstop service on a route, and Delta and 
American offer connecting service on that same route, Delta and 
American typically charge the same price for their connecting service 
as United charges for its nonstop service. As American executives 
observed, the legacy airlines ``generally respect the pricing of the 
non-stop carrier [on a given route],'' even though it means offering 
connecting service at the same price as nonstop service. But American, 
Delta, and United frequently do charge lower prices for their 
connecting service on routes where US Airways offers nonstop service. 
They do so to respond to US Airways' use of Advantage Fares on other 
routes.
    7. If the merger were approved, US Airways' economic rationale for 
offering Advantage Fares would likely go away. The merged airline's 
cost of sticking with US Airways' one-stop, low-price strategy would 
increase. Delta and United would likely undercut the merged firm on a 
larger number of nonstop routes. At the same time, the revenues 
generated from Advantage Fares would shrink as American's current 
nonstop routes would cease to be targets for Advantage Fares. The 
bottom line is that the merged airline would likely abandon Advantage 
Fares, eliminating significant competition and causing consumers to pay 
hundreds of millions of dollars more.
    8. Consumers will likely also be harmed by the planned merger 
because American had a standalone plan to emerge from bankruptcy poised 
to grow. American planned to expand domestically and internationally, 
adding service on nearly 115 new routes. To support its plan, American 
recently made the largest aircraft order in industry history.
    9. American's standalone plan would have bucked current industry 
trends toward capacity reductions and less competition. US Airways 
called American's growth plan ``industry destabilizing'' and worried 
that American's plan would cause other carriers to react ``with their 
own enhanced growth plans. . . .'' The result would be to increase 
competitive pressures throughout the industry. After the merger, US 
Airways' current executives--who would manage the merged firm--would be 
able to abandon American's efforts to expand and instead continue the 
industry's march toward higher prices and less service. As its CEO 
candidly stated earlier this year, US Airways views this merger as 
``the last major piece needed to fully rationalize the industry.''
    10. Passengers to and from the Washington, DC area are likely to be 
particularly hurt. To serve Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport 
(``Reagan National''), a carrier must have ``slots,'' which are 
government-issued rights to take off and land. US Airways currently 
holds 55% of the slots at Reagan National and the merger would increase 
the percentage of slots held by the combined firm to 69%. The combined 
airline would have a monopoly on 63% of the nonstop routes served out 
of the airport. Competition at Reagan National cannot flourish where 
one airline increasingly controls an essential ingredient to 
competition. Without slots, other airlines cannot enter or expand the 
number of flights that they offer on other routes. As a result, 
Washington, DC area passengers would likely see higher prices and fewer 
choices if the merger were approved.
    11. Notwithstanding their prior unequivocal statements about the 
effects of consolidation, the defendants will likely claim that the 
elimination of American as a standalone competitor will benefit 
consumers. They will argue that Advantage Fares will continue, existing 
capacity levels and growth plans will be maintained, and unspecified or 
unverified ``synergies'' will materialize, creating the possibility of 
lower fares. The American public has seen this before. Commenting on a 
commitment to maintain service levels made by two other airlines 
seeking approval for a merger in 2010, the CEO of US Airways said: 
``I'm hopeful they're just saying what they need . . . to get this 
[transaction] approved.'' By making claims about benefits that are at 
odds with their prior statements on the likely effects of this merger, 
that is precisely what the merging parties' executives are doing here--
saying what they believe needs to be said to pass antitrust scrutiny.
    12. There is no reason to accept the likely anticompetitive 
consequences of this merger. Both airlines are confident they can and 
will compete effectively as standalone companies. A revitalized 
American is fully capable of emerging from bankruptcy proceedings on 
its own with a competitive cost structure, profitable existing 
business, and plans for growth. US Airways today is competing 
vigorously and earning record profits. Executives of both airlines have 
repeatedly stated that they do not need this merger to succeed.
    13. The merger between US Airways and American would likely 
substantially lessen competition, and tend to create a monopoly, in 
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. Therefore, 
this merger should be permanently enjoined.

II. Jurisdiction, Interstate Commerce, and Venue

    14. The United States brings this action, and this Court has 
subject-matter jurisdiction over this action, under Section 15 of the 
Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 25, to prevent and restrain US 
Airways and American Airlines from violating Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18.
    15. The Plaintiff States bring this action under Section 16 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 26, to prevent and restrain US Airways and 
American Airlines from violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. 18. The Plaintiff States, by and through their 
respective Attorneys General, bring this action as parens patriae on 
behalf of the citizens, general welfare, and economy of each of their 
states.
    16. The defendants are engaged in, and their activities 
substantially affect, interstate commerce, and commerce in each of the 
Plaintiff States. US Airways and American Airlines each annually 
transport millions of passengers across state lines throughout this 
country, generating billions of dollars in revenue while doing so.

[[Page 71380]]

    17. Venue is proper under Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
Sec.  22. This Court also has personal jurisdiction over each 
defendant. Both defendants are found and transact business in this 
judicial district.

III. The Defendants and the Transaction

    18. Defendant US Airways Group, Inc., is a Delaware corporation 
headquartered in Tempe, Arizona. Last year, it flew over fifty million 
passengers to approximately 200 locations worldwide, taking in more 
than $13 billion in revenue. US Airways operates hubs in Phoenix, 
Charlotte, Philadelphia, and Washington, DC
    19. US Airways is performing exceptionally well. In 2012, it 
enjoyed record profits. It is operating at high load factors--the 
percentage of seats sold on its flights--and has a national and 
international route network, alliances with international airlines, a 
strong brand name, modern equipment, and a competitive cost structure. 
In mid-2012, US Airways' CEO, touting the airline's ``record second 
quarter results,'' told Dow Jones that the company ``has a great 
business model that works and we certainly don't need to merge with 
another airline.''
    20. Defendant AMR Corporation is a Delaware corporation 
headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas. AMR Corporation is the parent 
company of American Airlines. Last year, American flew over eighty 
million passengers to approximately 250 locations worldwide, taking in 
more than $24 billion in revenue. American operates hubs in New York, 
Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, and Miami. The American Airlines brand is 
``one of the most recognized . . . in the world.''
    21. In November 2011, American filed for bankruptcy reorganization 
and is currently under the supervision of the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of New York. American adopted and implemented a 
standalone business plan designed ``to restore American to industry 
leadership, profitability and growth.'' While in bankruptcy, American 
management ``pursued and successfully implemented'' key provisions of 
this plan, including revenue and network enhancements, as well as 
``restructuring efforts [that] have encompassed labor cost savings, 
managerial efficiencies, fleet reconfiguration, and other economies . . 
. .'' That work has paid off. American reported that its revenue growth 
has ``outpaced'' the industry since entering bankruptcy and in its most 
recent quarterly results reported a company record-high $5.6 billion in 
revenues, with $357 million in profits. Under experienced and 
sophisticated senior management, American's restructuring process has 
positioned it to produce ``industry leading profitability.'' As 
recently as January 8, 2013, American's management presented plans to 
emerge from bankruptcy that would increase the destinations American 
serves in the United States and the frequency of its flights, and 
position American to compete independently as a profitable airline with 
aggressive plans for growth.
    22. US Airways sees American the same way. Its CEO observed in 
December 2011 that ``A[merican] is not going away, they will be 
stronger post-bankruptcy because they will have less debt and reduced 
labor costs.'' A US Airways' executive vice president similarly wrote 
in July 2012 that ``[t]here is no question about AMR's ability to 
survive on a standalone basis.''
    23. US Airways and American agreed to merge on February 13, 2013. 
US Airways shareholders would own 28 percent of the combined airline, 
while American shareholders, creditors, labor unions, and employees 
would own 72 percent. The merged airline would operate under the 
American brand name, but the new American would be run by US Airways 
management.

IV. The Relevant Markets

A. Scheduled Air Passenger Service Between Cities

    24. Domestic scheduled air passenger service enables consumers to 
travel quickly and efficiently between various cities in the United 
States. Air travel offers passengers significant time savings and 
convenience over other forms of travel. For example, a flight from 
Washington, DC to Detroit takes just over an hour of flight time. 
Driving between the two cities takes at least eight hours. A train 
between the two cities takes more than fifteen hours.
    25. Due to time savings and convenience afforded by scheduled air 
passenger service, few passengers would substitute other modes of 
transportation (car, bus, or train) for scheduled air passenger service 
in response to a small but significant industry-wide fare increase. 
Another way to say this, as described in the Fed. Trade Comm'n & U.S. 
Dep't of Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), and endorsed by 
courts in this Circuit, is that a hypothetical monopolist of all 
domestic scheduled air passenger service likely would increase its 
prices by at least a small but significant and non-transitory amount. 
Scheduled air passenger service, therefore, constitutes a line of 
commerce and a relevant product market within the meaning of Section 7 
of the Clayton Act.
    26. A ``city pair'' is comprised of a flight's departure and 
arrival cities. For example, a flight departing from Washington and 
arriving in Chicago makes up the Washington-Chicago city pair. 
Passengers seek to depart from airports close to where they live and 
work, and arrive at airports close to their intended destinations. Most 
airline travel is related to business, family events, and vacations. 
Thus, most passengers book flights with their origins and destinations 
predetermined. Few passengers who wish to fly from one city to another 
would likely switch to flights between other cities in response to a 
small but significant and non-transitory fare increase.
    27. Airlines customarily set fares on a city pair basis. For each 
city pair, the degree and nature of the competition from other airlines 
generally plays a large role in an airline's pricing decision.
    28. Therefore, a hypothetical monopolist of scheduled air passenger 
service between specific cities likely would increase its prices by at 
least a small but significant and non-transitory amount. Accordingly, 
each city pair is a relevant geographic market and section of the 
country under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
    29. Consumer preferences also play a role in airline pricing and 
are relevant for the purpose of analyzing the likely effects of the 
proposed merger. Some passengers prefer nonstop service because it 
saves travel time; some passengers prefer buying tickets at the last 
minute; others prefer service at a particular airport within a 
metropolitan area. For example, most business customers traveling to 
and from downtown Washington prefer service at Reagan National over 
other airports in the Washington, DC metropolitan area. Through a 
variety of fare restrictions and rules, airlines can profitably raise 
prices for some of these passengers without raising prices for others. 
Thus, the competitive effects of the proposed merger may vary among 
passengers depending on their preferences for particular types of 
service or particular airports.

B. Takeoff and Landing Slots at Reagan National Airport

    30. Reagan National is one of only four airports in the country 
requiring slots for takeoffs and landings. Slots are expensive (often 
valued at over $2 million per slot), difficult to obtain, and only 
rarely change hands between airlines. There are no alternatives to

[[Page 71381]]

slots for airlines seeking to enter or expand their service at Reagan 
National.
    31. Reagan National is across the Potomac River from Washington, 
DC, and, due to its proximity to the city and direct service via the 
Metro, airlines actively seek to serve passengers flying into and out 
of Reagan National. Airlines do not view service at other airports as 
adequate substitutes for service offered at Reagan National for certain 
passengers, and thus they are unlikely to switch away from buying or 
leasing slots at Reagan National in response to a small but significant 
increase in the price of slots. Airlines pay significant sums for slots 
at Reagan National, despite having the option of serving passengers 
through the region's other airports. A hypothetical monopolist of slots 
at Reagan National likely would increase its prices by at least a small 
but significant and non-transitory amount. Thus, slots at Reagan 
National Airport constitute a line of commerce, section of the country, 
and relevant market within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

V. The Merger Is Likely to Result in Anticompetitive Effects

A. Industry Background

    32. Today, four network or ``legacy'' airlines remain in the United 
States: American, US Airways, United, and Delta. These four have 
extensive national and international networks, connections to hundreds 
of destinations, established brand names, and strong frequent flyer 
reward programs. In addition, there are non-network airlines, including 
Southwest Airlines and a handful of smaller firms, which typically do 
not offer ``hub-and-spoke'' service.
    33. Airlines compete in many ways. One is the price of a ticket. 
Airlines also compete based on: nonstop versus connecting flights; 
number of destinations served; convenient flight schedules; passenger 
comfort and seating policies; choices for classes of service; carry-on 
baggage policies; the degree of personal service at ticket counters and 
boarding areas; onboard meal and drink service; in-flight 
entertainment; and the quality and generosity of frequent flyer 
programs.
    34. Since 2005, the U.S. airline industry has undergone significant 
consolidation. The consolidation ``wave'' started with the 2005 merger 
between US Airways and America West, creating today's US Airways. In 
2008, Delta and Northwest Airlines merged; in 2010, United and 
Continental merged; and in 2011, Southwest Airlines and AirTran merged. 
The chart below, in which one of US Airways' executive vice presidents 
referred to industry consolidation as the ``New Holy Grail,'' 
demonstrates that since 2005 the number of major airlines has dropped 
from nine to five.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN27NO13.002

    35. Increasing consolidation among large airlines has hurt 
passengers. The major airlines have copied each other in raising fares, 
imposing new fees on travelers, reducing or eliminating service on a 
number of city pairs, and downgrading amenities. An August 2012 
presentation from US Airways observes that consolidation has resulted 
in ``Fewer and Larger Competitors.'' The structural change to ``fewer 
and larger competitors'' has allowed ``[t]he industry'' to ``reap the 
benefits.'' Those benefits to the industry are touted by US Airways in 
the same presentation as including ``capacity reductions'' and new 
``ancillary revenues'' like bag fees.

B. Many Relevant Markets Are Highly Concentrated and the Planned Merger 
Would Significantly Increase That Concentration

    36. In 2005, there were nine major airlines. If this merger were 
approved, there would be only four. The three remaining legacy airlines 
and Southwest would account for over 80% of the domestic scheduled 
passenger service market, with the new American becoming the biggest 
airline in the world.
    37. Market concentration is one useful indicator of the level of 
competitive vigor in a market, and the likely competitive effects of a 
merger. The more concentrated a market, and the more a transaction 
would increase concentration in a market, the more likely it is that a 
transaction would result in a meaningful reduction in competition. 
Concentration in relevant markets is typically measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (``HHI''). Markets in which the HHI exceeds 
2,500 points are considered highly concentrated. Post-merger increases 
in

[[Page 71382]]

HHI of more than 200 points are considered to be significant increases 
in concentration.
    38. In more than 1,000 of the city pair markets in which American 
and US Airways currently compete head-to-head, the post-merger HHI 
would exceed 2,500 points and the merger would increase the HHI by more 
than 200 points. For example, on the Charlotte-Dallas city pair, the 
post-merger HHI will increase by 4,648 to 9,319 (out of 10,000). In 
these markets, US Airways and American annually serve more than 14 
million passengers and collect more than $6 billion in fares. The 
substantial increases in concentration in these highly concentrated 
markets demonstrate that in these relevant markets, the merger is 
presumed, as a matter of law, to be anticompetitive. The relevant 
markets described in this paragraph are listed in Appendix A.
    39. Other city pairs across the country would likely be affected by 
the loss of competition stemming from this planned merger. In some of 
these markets, US Airways and American compete head-to-head, often 
offering consumers discounted fares. If approved, this merger will 
likely end much of that discounting, significantly harming consumers in 
the process. Moreover, the loss of competition in these markets would 
increase the likelihood that the remaining airlines can coordinate to 
raise price, reduce output, and diminish the quality of their services. 
In these relevant markets, the merger is likely also to substantially 
lessen competition.
    40. In the market for slots at Reagan National, the merger would 
result in a highly concentrated market, with a post-merger HHI of 
4,959. The merger would also significantly increase concentration by 
1,493 points. As a result, the merger should be presumed, as a matter 
of law, to be anticompetitive.

C. This Merger Would Increase the Likelihood of Coordinated Behavior 
Among the Remaining Network Airlines Causing Higher Fares, Higher Fees, 
and More Limited Service

    41. The structure of the airline industry is already conducive to 
coordinated behavior: Few large players dominate the industry; each 
transaction is small; and most pricing is readily transparent.
    42. For example, the legacy airlines closely watch the pricing 
moves of their competitors. When one airline ``leads'' a price 
increase, other airlines frequently respond by following with price 
increases of their own. The initiating carrier will lead the price 
increase and then see if the other carriers will match the increase. If 
they do not, the initiating carrier will generally withdraw the 
increase shortly thereafter.
    43. The legacy airlines also use what they call ``cross-market 
initiatives,'' or ``CMIs,'' to deter aggressive discounting and prevent 
fare wars. A CMI occurs where two or more airlines compete against each 
other on multiple routes. If an airline offers discounted fares in one 
market, an affected competitor often responds with discounts in another 
market--a CMI--where the discounting airline prefers a higher fare. 
CMIs often cause an airline to withdraw fare discounts. For example, in 
the fall of 2009, US Airways lowered fares and relaxed restrictions on 
flights out of Detroit (a Delta stronghold) to Philadelphia. Delta 
responded by offering lower fares and relaxed restrictions from Boston 
to Washington (a US Airways stronghold). US Airways' team lead for 
pricing observed Delta's move and concluded ``[w]e have more to lose in 
BOSWAS . . . I think we need to bail on the [Detroit-Philadelphia] 
changes.''
    44. There is also past express coordinated behavior in the 
industry. For example, all airlines have complete, accurate, and real-
time access to every detail of every airline's published fare structure 
on every route through the airline-owned Airline Tariff Publishing 
Company (``ATPCO''). US Airways' management has called ATPCO ``a 
dedicated price-telegraph network for the industry.'' The airlines use 
ATPCO to monitor and analyze each other's fares and fare changes and 
implement strategies designed to coordinate pricing. Airlines have 
previously used ATPCO to engage in coordinated behavior. In 1992, the 
United States filed a lawsuit to stop several airlines, including both 
defendants, from using their ATPCO filings as a signaling device to 
facilitate agreements on fares. That lawsuit resulted in a consent 
decree, now expired.
    45. US Airways also has communicated directly with a competitor 
when it was upset by that competitor's efforts to compete more 
aggressively. In 2010, one of US Airways' larger rivals extended a 
``triple miles'' promotion that set off a market share battle among 
legacy carriers. The rival airline was also expanding into new markets 
and was rumored to be returning planes to its fleet that had been 
mothballed during the recession. US Airways' CEO complained about these 
aggressive maneuvers, stating to his senior executives that such 
actions were ``hurting [the rival airline's] profitability--and 
unfortunately everyone else's.'' US Airways' senior management debated 
over email about how best to get the rival airline's attention and 
bring it back in line with the rest of the industry. In that email 
thread, US Airways' CEO urged the other executives to ``portray[ ] 
these guys as idiots to Wall Street and anyone else who'll listen.'' 
Ultimately, to make sure the message was received, US Airways' CEO 
forwarded the email chain--and its candid discussion about how 
aggressive competition would be bad for the industry--directly to the 
CEO of the rival airline. (The rival's CEO immediately responded that 
it was an inappropriate communication that he was referring to his 
general counsel.)
    46. Coordination becomes easier as the number of major airlines 
dwindles and their business models converge. If not stopped, the merger 
would likely substantially enhance the ability of the industry to 
coordinate on fares, ancillary fees, and service reductions by 
creating, in the words of US Airways executives, a ``Level Big 3''of 
network carriers, each with similar sizes, costs, and structures.
    47. Southwest, the only major, non-network airline, and other 
smaller carriers have networks and business models that differ 
significantly from the legacy airlines. Traditionally, Southwest and 
other smaller carriers have been less likely to participate in 
coordinated pricing or service reductions. For example, Southwest does 
not charge customers for a first checked bag or ticket change fees. Yet 
that has not deterred the legacy carriers from continuing, and even 
increasing, those fees. In November 2011, a senior US Airways executive 
explained to her boss the reason: ``Our employees know full well that 
the real competition for us is [American], [Delta], and [United]. Yes 
we compete with Southwest and JetBlue, but the product is different and 
the customer base is also different.''
1. The Merger Would Likely Result in the Elimination of US Airways' 
Advantage Fares
    48. On routes where one legacy airline offers nonstop service, the 
other legacies ``generally respect the pricing of the non-stop 
carrier,'' as American has put it. Thus, if American offers nonstop 
service from Washington to Dallas at $800 round-trip, United and Delta 
will, ``[d]espite having a service disadvantage,'' price their 
connecting fares at the level of American's nonstop fares. The legacy 
carriers do this because if one airline, say Delta, were to undercut 
fares in markets where American offers nonstop service, American would 
likely do the same in

[[Page 71383]]

Delta's nonstop markets. To Delta, the cost of being undercut in its 
nonstop markets exceeds the benefit it would receive from winning 
additional passengers in American nonstop markets.
    49. US Airways, alone among the legacy carriers, has a different 
cost-benefit analysis for pricing connecting routes. Although it too is 
a national network carrier, US Airways has hubs in cities that generate 
less revenue from passengers flying nonstop than the other legacy 
airlines' hubs. Because US Airways' hubs generate less revenue from 
passengers flying nonstop, US Airways must gain more revenue from 
connecting passengers. It gets that revenue by offering connecting 
service that is up to 40% cheaper than other airlines' nonstop service. 
US Airways calls this program ``Advantage Fares.''
    50. Millions of consumers have benefitted. Advantage Fares offer 
consumers, especially those who purchase tickets at the last minute, 
meaningfully lower fares. The screenshot below from ITA Software, 
Airfare Matrix (``ITA''), taken on August 12, 2013, for travel 
departing on August 13 and returning August 14 from Miami to 
Cincinnati, shows the benefits of US Airways' Advantage Fare program to 
passengers\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ ``Multiple Airlines'' refers to an itinerary where a 
passenger uses different airlines for their departing and returning 
flights.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN27NO13.003

American is the only airline on this route to offer nonstop service, 
charging $740. Delta and United do not meaningfully compete. Both 
charge more for their connecting service than American charges for 
nonstop service. Thus, on this particular route, a passenger who chose 
Delta or United would pay more for an inferior product. In contrast, US 
Airways' fares today are significantly lower than American's fares, and 
offer consumers a real choice. Those consumers who are more price 
conscious receive the benefit of a substantially lower-fare option. In 
this case, a customer who purchased a US Airways one-stop ticket would 
save $269 compared to American's nonstop service.
    51. The benefits from Advantage Fares extend to hundreds of other 
routes, including those where more than one carrier offers nonstop 
service. The screenshot below from ITA, taken on August 12, 2013, for 
travel departing on August 13 and returning August 14 from New York to 
Houston, demonstrates just how dramatic the savings can be:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN27NO13.004

    US Airways' connecting fare is $870 cheaper than the other legacy 
carriers' nonstop flights, and beats JetBlue and AirTran's fares by 
more than $300. Although Southwest does not participate in the standard 
online travel sites, a cross-check against the Southwest Web site 
demonstrates that US Airways also beats Southwest's $887 nonstop fare 
by more than $300.
    52. Other airlines have chosen to respond to Advantage Fares with 
their

[[Page 71384]]

own low connecting fares in markets where US Airways has nonstop 
service. That is, the other legacy airlines undercut US Airways' 
nonstop fares the same way that US Airways undercuts their nonstop 
fares. The screenshot below from ITA, taken on August 12, 2013, for 
travel on August 13 and returning August 14 from Charlotte to Syracuse, 
shows how the other legacy carriers respond to Advantage Fares to the 
benefit of consumers:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN27NO13.005

    Here, US Airways is the only airline to offer nonstop service, 
charging $685. Delta and United undercut that price by charging $375 
and $395, respectively, for connecting service. Once again, consumers 
benefit by having the option of far less expensive connecting service. 
A customer who buys a Delta one-stop flight saves $310 over US Airways' 
nonstop service.
    53. There are over 100 routes where other carriers offer nonstop 
service on which US Airways does not offer Advantage Fares. Consumers 
in these markets are not given the option of a low-cost connecting 
alternative and are forced to pay significantly more for service. For 
example, US Airways does not currently offer Advantage Fares on flights 
from Cincinnati to Pittsburgh. Without the option of a low connecting 
fare, consumers see significantly higher prices, as illustrated by a 
screenshot from ITA, taken on August 12, 2013, for travel on August 13 
and returning August 14:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN27NO13.006

    54. Advantage Fares have proven highly disruptive to the industry's 
overall coordinated pricing dynamic. An American executive expressed 
her frustration in September 2011 with US Airways' Advantage Fares, 
noting that US Airways was ``still way undercutting us [on flights from 
Boston and New York to Dallas] and getting significant share.'' One 
response American considered was to lower its fares on the same route. 
Another option was ``to take up this battle w/them again,'' in an 
attempt to force US Airways to limit or abandon its strategy.
    55. US Airways' President acknowledged in September 2010 that its 
Advantage Fare strategy ``would be different if we had a different 
route network. . . .'' Currently, US Airways' network structure 
precludes Delta and United from preventing US Airways' aggressive 
``one-stop pricing.'' Because US Airways' hubs have relatively less 
nonstop traffic, the other legacy airlines cannot respond sufficiently 
to make Advantage Fares unprofitable. But by increasing the size and 
scope of US Airways' network, the merger makes it likely that US 
Airways will have to discontinue its Advantage Fares.
    56. American's executives agree. American believes that Advantage 
Fares will be eliminated because of the merger. Internal analysis at 
American in October 2012 concluded that ``[t]he [Advantage Fares] 
program would have to be eliminated in a merger with American, as 
American's large non-stop markets would now be susceptible to 
reactionary pricing from Delta and United.'' Another American executive 
observed that same month: ``The industry will force alignment to a 
single approach--one that aligns with the large legacy carriers as it 
is revenue maximizing.''

[[Page 71385]]

    57. US Airways believes that it currently gains ``most of its 
advantage fare value from AA,'' meaning that Advantage Fares provide 
substantial value for US Airways on routes where American is the legacy 
airline offering nonstop service. Post-merger, continuing Advantage 
Fares would mean that US Airways was taking that value away from itself 
by undercutting its own nonstop prices. Plainly, this would make no 
sense. Thus, for US Airways post-merger, the benefits of Advantage 
Fares would go down, and its costs would go up.
    58. By ending Advantage Fares, the merger would eliminate lower 
fares for millions of consumers. Last year, more than 2.5 million 
round-trip passengers--including more than 250,000 passengers from the 
greater Washington, DC area; another 250,000 passengers in the Dallas-
Fort Worth area; half a million passengers in the greater New York City 
area; and 175,000 passengers from Detroit--bought an Advantage Fare 
ticket. Hundreds of thousands of other passengers flying nonstop on US 
Airways, particularly from their hubs in Phoenix, Charlotte, and 
Philadelphia, benefited from responsive fares offered by the legacy 
airlines.
2. The Merger Would Likely Lead to Increased Industry-Wide ``Capacity 
Discipline,'' Resulting in Higher Fares and Less Service
    59. Legacy airlines have taken advantage of increasing 
consolidation to exercise ``capacity discipline.'' ``Capacity 
discipline'' has meant restraining growth or reducing established 
service. The planned merger would be a further step in that industry-
wide effort. In theory, reducing unused capacity can be an efficient 
decision that allows a firm to reduce its costs, ultimately leading to 
lower consumer prices. In the airline industry, however, recent 
experience has shown that capacity discipline has resulted in fewer 
flights and higher fares.
    60. Each significant legacy airline merger in recent years has been 
followed by substantial reductions in service and capacity. These 
capacity reductions have not consisted simply of cancellation of empty 
planes or empty seats; rather, when airlines have cut capacity after a 
merger, the number of passengers they carry on the affected routes has 
also decreased.
    61. US Airways has recognized that it benefitted from this industry 
consolidation and the resulting capacity discipline. US Airways has 
long taken the position that the capacity cuts achieved through 
capacity discipline ``enabled'' fare increases and that ``pricing 
power'' results from ``reduced industry capacity.'' US Airways' CEO 
explained to investors in 2006 that there is an ``inextricable link'' 
between removing seats and raising fares.
    62. In 2005, America West--managed then by many of the same 
executives who currently manage US Airways--merged with US Airways. 
America West had hubs in Phoenix and Las Vegas while the former US 
Airways had hubs in Pittsburgh, Charlotte, and Philadelphia. Following 
the merger, the combined firm reduced capacity, including significant 
cuts in Pittsburgh and Las Vegas. In 2010, the Chief Financial Officer 
for US Airways explained:

    We believe in the hub system. I just think there's too many 
hubs. If you look across the country, you can probably pick a few 
that are smaller hubs and maybe duplicative to other hubs that 
airlines have that they could probably get out of. In our example, 
we merged with US Airways [and] . . . what we have done over time, 
which is unfortunate for the cities, but we couldn't hold a hub in 
Pittsburgh and we couldn't hold a hub in Las Vegas. So over time we 
have consolidated and condensed our operation back, which is really 
important, condensed it back to our major hubs.

A post-merger US Airways analysis confirmed that it succeeded in 
obtaining a ``3% to 4% capacity reduction.''
    63. In 2006, on the heels of the America West/US Airways merger, 
the combined firm submitted an ultimately unsuccessful hostile bid for 
Delta Air Lines. US Airways' management had concluded that a merged US 
Airways/Delta could reduce the combined carrier's capacity by 10 
percent, which would lead to higher revenues for the combined firm and 
for the industry. In 2007, following the rejection of the hostile bid, 
US Airways' CEO explained to investors how the deal would have 
increased industry profits:

    It's part of what we tried to impress upon people as we were 
going through our run at Delta, was that * * * it was good for US 
Airways [and] good for the entire industry. We're going to take out 
4% of the industry capacity as we did that. Everyone's 2008 numbers 
would look a (expletive) of a lot better had that transaction 
happened * * *

    64. In 2008, Delta merged with Northwest Airlines. Despite promises 
to the contrary, the combined airline reduced capacity, including 
significant cuts at its former hubs in Cincinnati and Memphis. US 
Airways' CEO was ``quite happy'' to see the merger and advocated for 
further consolidation. He explained that an industry structure of 
``five different hub and spoke airlines with who knows how many hubs 
across the United States . . . results in all of us fighting for the 
same connecting passengers over numerous hubs.'' Left unsaid was that 
fewer airlines meant less competition and higher fares.
    65. In May 2010, United Airlines and Continental Airlines announced 
their planned merger. The announcement caused speculation about the 
future of each airline's hubs, including Continental's Cleveland hub. 
In Congressional testimony, an industry analyst stated that he did not 
believe the merger would cause reductions in Cleveland. On June 18, 
2010, upon seeing the testimony, US Airways' CEO wrote an email to 
other US Airways executives stating, ``[s]urely these guys [United/
Continental] aren't really planning to keep Cleveland open. I'm hopeful 
they're just saying what they need to (including to [the analyst]) to 
get this approved.'' United and Continental closed their deal on 
October 1, 2010. The combined firm has reduced capacity at nearly all 
of its major hubs (including Cleveland) and at many other airports 
where the two airlines previously competed. Similarly, Southwest/
AirTran has reduced service in a number of its focus cities and on many 
of AirTran's former routes following its 2011 merger.
    66. The defendants are fully aware of these earlier mergers' 
effects. A 2012 American Airlines analysis concluded that ``following a 
merger, carriers tend to remove capacity or grow more slowly than the 
rest of the industry.'' US Airways' management concluded that although 
industry consolidation has been a success, as its CEO stated publicly 
in 2010, the industry had yet to hit its ``sweet spot,'' and additional 
consolidation was needed because the industry remained ``overly 
fragmented.''
    67. A merger with American would allow US Airways to hit the 
``sweet spot.'' For consumers, however, it would be anything but sweet. 
US Airways believes that merging with American ``finishes industry 
evolution'' by accomplishing US Airways' goal of ``reduc[ing] capacity 
more efficiently.'' When first considering a combination with American, 
US Airways projected that the merged firm could reduce capacity by as 
much as 10 percent. Similarly, American expects that the merger will 
lead to capacity reductions that would negatively impact 
``communities,'' ``people,'' ``customers,'' and ``suppliers.'' Higher 
fares would be right around the corner.

[[Page 71386]]

3. The Planned Merger Would Likely Block American's Standalone 
Expansion Plans, Thwarting Likely Capacity Increases
    68. American does not need this merger to thrive, let alone 
survive. Before the announcement of this merger, a key component of 
American's standalone plan for exiting bankruptcy revolved around 
substantial expansion, including increases in both domestic and 
international flights. Thus, in 2011, American placed the largest order 
for new aircraft in the industry's history.
    69. US Airways executives feared that American's standalone growth 
plan would disrupt the industry's capacity discipline ``momentum.'' In 
a 2012 internal presentation, US Airways executives recognized that 
while ``[i]ndustry mergers and capacity discipline expand margins,'' 
American's standalone ``growth plan has potential to disrupt the new 
dynamic'' and would ``Reverse Industry Capacity Trends.'' Moreover, US 
Airways believed that if American implemented its growth plans, other 
airlines would ``react to AMRs plans with their own enhanced growth 
plans destabilizing industry.'' US Airways believed that American's 
standalone capacity growth would ``negatively impact'' industry 
revenues and threaten industry pricing.
    70. US Airways thought that a merger with American was a ``lower 
risk alternative'' than letting American's standalone plan come to 
fruition because US Airways management could maintain capacity 
discipline. American's executives have observed that ``the combined 
network would likely need to be rationalized,'' especially given the 
merged carrier's numerous hubs, and that it is ``unlikely that [a 
combined US Airways/American] would pursue growth. * * *''
4. The Merger Would Likely Result in Higher Fees
    71. Since 2008, the airline industry has increasingly charged 
consumers fees for services that were previously included in the price 
of a ticket. These so-called ancillary fees, including those for 
checked bags and flight changes, have become very profitable. In 2012 
alone, airlines generated over $6 billion in fees for checked bags and 
flight changes. Even a small increase in these fees would cost 
consumers millions.
    72. Increased consolidation has likely aided the implementation of 
these fees. The levels of the ancillary fees charged by the legacy 
carriers have been largely set in lockstep. One airline acts as the 
``price leader,'' with others following soon after. Using this process, 
as a US Airways strategic plan observed, the airlines can raise their 
fees without suffering ``market share impacts.'' For example, American 
announced that it would charge for a first checked bag on May 21, 2008. 
On June 12, 2008, both United and US Airways followed American's lead. 
Similarly, over a period of just two weeks this spring, all four legacy 
airlines increased their ticket change fee for domestic travel from 
$150 to $200.
    73. The legacy airlines recognize that the success of any 
individual attempt to impose a new fee or fee increase depends on 
whether the other legacies follow suit. When, in July 2009, American 
matched the other legacy carriers by raising its checked bag fee to 
$20, but did not join the others in offering a $5 web discount, US 
Airways was faced with the decision of whether to ``match'' American by 
either eliminating its own web discount, or raising its price to $25, 
with a $5 discount. US Airways' CEO gave his view:

    I can't believe I'm saying this, but I think we should stand 
still on this for now. I recognize that increases the chances of 
everyone standing still . . . the [dollars] aren't compelling enough 
for us to stick our necks out first. I do think D[elta] or U[nited] 
won't let them have an advantage, so it'll get matched--I'm just not 
sure we should go first. If a couple weeks go by and no one's moved, 
we can always jump in.

    74. Similarly, when US Airways was considering whether to raise its 
second checked bag fee to $100 to match Delta's fee, a US Airways 
executive observed: ``Wow--$100 is a lot for second bag. I would think 
there's big passenger gag reflex associated with that, but if we can 
get it, we should charge it. Do you think we should wait for [United] 
or [American] to move first, though?''
    75. Conversely, in 2008, when US Airways began charging passengers 
for soft drinks, the other legacy airlines did not follow its lead, and 
US Airways backed off. US Airways' CEO explained: ``With US Airways 
being the only network carrier to charge for drinks, we are at a 
disadvantage.'' Had US Airways not rescinded this fee, it would have 
lost passengers to the other legacy airlines.
    76. At times, the airlines consider new fees or fee increases, but 
hold off implementing them while they wait to see if other airlines 
will move first. For example, on April 18, United announced that it was 
increasing its ticket change fee from $150 to $200. American decided 
that ``waiting for [Delta] and then moving to match if [Delta] comes 
along'' would be its best strategy. Over the next two weeks, US 
Airways, Delta, and American each fell in line, leading a US Airways 
executive to observe on May 1: ``A[merican] increased their change fees 
this morning. The network carriers now have the same $200 domestic . . 
. change fees.''
    77. Post-merger, the new American would likely lead new fee 
increases. A December 2012 discussion between US Airways executives 
included the observation that after the merger, ``even as the world's 
largest airline we'd want to consider raising some of the baggage fees 
a few dollars in some of the leisure markets.''
    78. New checked bag fees on flights from the United States to 
Europe are a likely target. Both US Airways and American have 
considered imposing a first checked bag fee on flights to Europe but 
have refrained from doing so. US Airways seriously considered leading 
such a price move but was concerned that other airlines would not 
match: ``We would hope that [other airlines] would follow us right away 
. . . but there is no guarantee. . . .'' Ultimately, US Airways 
concluded it was ``too small'' to lead additional checked bag fees for 
flights to Europe. Post-merger, that would no longer be true. The 
merged firm would be the world's largest airline, giving it sufficient 
size to lead industry fee and price increases across the board.
    79. Some fee increases are likely to result from US Airways raising 
American's existing fees. Today, ``US Airways generally charges higher 
bag fees than AA'' for travel from the United States to international 
destinations. Post-merger, US Airways would likely raise American's 
ancillary fees to US Airways' higher fee levels as part of a ``fee 
harmonization'' process. US Airways' own documents estimate that ``fee 
harmonization'' would generate an additional $280 million in revenue 
annually--directly harming consumers by the same amount. A US Airways 
presentation from earlier this year analyzing the merger identifies 
American's lower bag fees as a ``value lever'' that US Airways ``will 
likely manage differently with tangible financial upside.'' The 
analysis concludes that ``[i]ncreasing AA baggage fees to match US 
creates significant revenue impact.'' US Airways also plans to 
institute its fees ($40 on average) for the redemption of frequent 
flyer tickets on American's existing frequent fliers, who currently are 
not charged for mileage redemption.
    80. The merger would also likely reduce the quality and variety of 
ancillary services offered by the legacy

[[Page 71387]]

airlines--a side effect of consolidation anticipated and embraced by US 
Airways' CEO. In a 2011 email exchange lamenting the need for US 
Airways to deploy wireless internet on all of its airplanes, a senior 
US Airways executive groused:

    [N]ext it will be more legroom. Then industry standard labor 
contracts. Then better wines. Then the ability to book on Facebook. 
Penultimately, television commercials. Then, finally, we will pay 
the NYSE an exorbitant fee to change our ticker symbol [from LCC].

US Airways' CEO responded: ``Easy now. Consolidation will help stop 
much of the stupid stuff but inflight internet is not one of them.''
    81. If the planned merger is enjoined, both American and US Airways 
will have to compete against two larger legacy rivals, and against each 
other. The four legacy airlines will not look exactly the same. As the 
smallest of the legacy airlines, American and US Airways will have 
greater incentives to grow and compete aggressively through lower 
ancillary fees, new services, and lower fares.

D. The Merger Would Eliminate Head-to-Head Competition in Hundreds of 
Relevant Markets and Entrench US Airways' Dominance at Reagan National 
Airport

    82. American and US Airways engage in head-to-head competition with 
nonstop service on 17 domestic routes representing about $2 billion in 
annual industry-wide revenues. American and US Airways also compete 
directly on more than a thousand routes where one or both offer 
connecting service, representing billions of dollars in annual 
revenues. The merger's elimination of this head-to-head competition 
would create strong incentives for the merged airline to reduce 
capacity and raise fares where they previously competed.
    83. The combined firm would control 69% of the slots at Reagan 
National Airport, almost six times more than its closest competitor. 
This would eliminate head-to-head competition at the airport between 
American and US Airways. It would also effectively foreclose entry or 
expansion by other airlines that might increase competition at Reagan 
National.
    84. The need for slots is a substantial barrier to entry at Reagan 
National. The FAA has occasionally provided a limited number of slots 
for new service. In almost all cases, however, a carrier wishing to 
begin or expand service at Reagan National must buy or lease slots from 
an airline that already owns them.
    85. This merger would thwart any prospect for future entry or 
expansion at Reagan National. US Airways, which already has 55% of the 
airport's slots, does not sell or lease them because any slot that goes 
to another airline will almost certainly be used to compete with US 
Airways. The merger would only increase US Airways' incentives to hoard 
its slots. Today, US Airways provides nonstop service to 71 airports 
from Reagan National, and it faces no nonstop competitors on 55 of 
those routes. After this merger, the number of US Airways routes with 
no nonstop competition would increase to 59, leaving, at best, only 21 
routes at the entire airport with more than one nonstop competitor. 
Unsurprisingly, Reagan National is US Airways' second most-profitable 
airport.
    86. Potential entrants would likely not be able to turn to other 
airlines to obtain slots. When allocating their slots, airlines 
prioritize their most profitable routes, typically those where they 
have a frequent, significant pattern of service. If a carrier has a 
small portfolio of slots, it is likely to allocate almost all of its 
slots to its most profitable routes. If it has additional slots beyond 
what is needed to serve those routes, a carrier will then work its way 
down to other routes or sell or lease those slots to other airlines. 
Over the last several years, US Airways has purchased nearly all of the 
slots that might otherwise be available to interested buyers. Thus, 
before this planned merger, American was the only airline at Reagan 
National with the practical ability to sell or lease additional slots.
    87. In March 2010, American and JetBlue entered into an arrangement 
in which JetBlue traded slots at New York's JFK International Airport 
to American in exchange for American trading slots at Reagan National 
to JetBlue. And until American reached agreement with US Airways to 
merge, it had been negotiating to sell those slots and ten other Reagan 
National slots to JetBlue.
    88. JetBlue's entry on four routes, particularly Reagan National to 
Boston, has generated stiff price competition. Fares on the route have 
dropped dramatically. US Airways estimated that after JetBlue's entry, 
the last-minute fare for travel between Reagan National and Boston 
dropped by over $700. The combined firm will have the right to 
terminate the JetBlue leases and thereby eliminate, or at least 
diminish, JetBlue as a competitor on some or all of these routes.
    89. The merger would also eliminate the potential for future head-
to-head competition between US Airways and American on flights at 
Reagan National. In 2011, US Airways planned to start service from 
Reagan National to Miami and St. Louis, which would directly compete 
with American's existing service. US Airways argued to the Department 
of Transportation that this new competition would ``substantial[ly] 
benefit[]'' consumers, and so asked DOT to approve the purchase of 
slots from Delta that would make the service possible. DOT ultimately 
approved that purchase. When it developed its plan to merge with 
American, however, US Airways abandoned its plans to enter those 
markets and deprived consumers of the ``substantial benefits'' it had 
promised.
    90. By acquiring American's slot portfolio, US Airways would 
eliminate existing and future head-to-head competition, and effectively 
block other airlines' competitive entry or expansion.

VI. Absence of Countervailing Factors

    91. New entry, or expansion by existing competitors, is unlikely to 
prevent or remedy the merger's likely anticompetitive effects. New 
entrants into a particular market face significant barriers to success, 
including difficulty in obtaining access to slots and gate facilities; 
the effects of corporate discount programs offered by dominant 
incumbents; loyalty to existing frequent flyer programs; an unknown 
brand; and the risk of aggressive responses to new entry by the 
dominant incumbent carrier. In addition, entry is highly unlikely on 
routes where the origin or destination airport is another airline's 
hub, because the new entrant would face substantial challenges 
attracting sufficient local passengers to support service.
    92. United and Delta are unlikely to expand in the event of 
anticompetitive price increases or capacity reductions by the merged 
airline. Indeed, those carriers are likely to benefit from and 
participate in such conduct by coordinating with the merged firm.
    93. The remaining airlines in the United States, including 
Southwest and JetBlue, have networks and business models that are 
significantly different from the legacy airlines. In particular, most 
do not have hub-and-spoke networks. In many relevant markets, these 
airlines do not offer any service at all, and in other markets, many 
passengers view them as a less preferred alternative to the legacy 
carriers. Therefore, competition from Southwest, JetBlue, or other 
airlines would not be sufficient to prevent the anticompetitive 
consequences of the merger.
    94. There are not sufficient acquisition-specific and cognizable

[[Page 71388]]

efficiencies that would be passed through to U.S. consumers to rebut 
the presumption that competition and consumers would likely be harmed 
by this merger.

VII. Violation Alleged

    95. The effect of the proposed merger, if approved, likely will be 
to lessen competition substantially, or tend to create a monopoly, in 
interstate trade and commerce in the relevant markets, in violation of 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18.
    96. Unless enjoined, the proposed merger likely would have the 
following effects in the relevant markets, among others:
    (a) Actual and potential competition between US Airways and 
American Airlines would be eliminated;
    (b) competition in general among network airlines would be lessened 
substantially;
    (c) ticket prices and ancillary fees would be higher than they 
otherwise would;
    (d) industry capacity would be lower than it otherwise would;
    (e) service would be lessened; and
    (f) the availability of slots at Reagan National would be 
significantly impaired.

VIII. Request for Relief

    97. Plaintiffs request:
    (a) that US Airways' proposed merger with American Airlines be 
adjudged to violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18;
    (b) that Defendants be permanently enjoined from and restrained 
from carrying out the planned merger of US Airways and American or any 
other transaction that would combine the two companies;
    (c) that Plaintiffs be awarded their costs of this action, 
including attorneys' fees to Plaintiff States; and
    (d) that Plaintiffs be awarded such other relief as the Court may 
deem just and proper.

    Dated this 13th day of August 2013.

    Respectfully submitted,
    For Plaintiff United States:

------------/s/------------
William J. Baer (D.C. Bar  324723),
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust

------------/s/------------
Renata B. Hesse (D.C. Bar 466107),
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

------------/s/------------
Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil Enforcement

------------/s/------------
Mark W. Ryan (D.C. Bar  359098),
Director of Litigation

------------/s/------------
William H. Stallings (D.C. Bar 444924),
Chief Transportation, Energy & Agriculture Section

------------/s/------------
Kathleen S. O'Neill,
Assistant Chief Transportation, Energy & Agriculture Section

------------/s/------------
Ryan J. Danks*,
Attorney, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 450 Fifth 
Street NW., Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202) 305-
0128, Facsimile: (202) 307-2784, E-mail: Ryan.Danks@usdoj.gov.

Michael D. Billiel (D.C. Bar  394377)
Katherine A. Celeste
J. Richard Doidge
Tracy L. Fisher
David Z. Gringer
Amanda D. Klovers
Caroline E. Laise
John M. Lynch (D.C. Bar  418313)
William M. Martin
Jospeh Chandra Mazumdar
Robert D. Young (D.C. Bar  248260)

Attorneys for the United States
*Attorney of Record

FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF ARIZONA

Thomas C. Horne
Attorney General

Eric J. Bistrow
Chief Deputy

Thomas Chenal
Chief, Public Advocacy & Civil Rights Division

Dena Benjamin
Chief, Consumer Protection and Advocacy Section

------------/s/------------
Nancy M. Bonnell
Antitrust Unit Chief, Arizona Bar No. 016382, 1275 West Washington, 
Phoenix, Arizona 85007, Phone: 602-542-7728, Fax: 602-542-9088, 
Nancy.bonnell@azag.gov.

For Plaintiff District of Columbia

Irvin B. Nathan
Attorney General for the District of Columbia

Ellen A. Efros
Deputy Attorney General, Public Interest Division

------------/s/------------
Bennett Rushkoff (DC Bar No. 386925)
Chief, Public Advocacy Section

------------/s/------------
Nicholas A. Bush (DC Bar No. 1011001)
Assistant Attorney General, 441 4th Street NW., Suite 600 South, 
Washington, DC 20001, Ph: 202-442-9841, Fax: 202-715-7720, 
nicholas.bush@dc.gov.

Attorneys for the District of Columbia

For Plaintiff State of Florida

Pamela Jo Bondi
Attorney General of the State of Florida

Patricia A. Conners
Associate Deputy Attorney General, Antitrust Division

Lizabeth A. Brady
Chief, Multistate Antitrust Enforcement, Antitrust Division

Christopher A. Hunt
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division

------------/s/------------
Lizabeth A. Brady
Chief, Multistate Antitrust Enforcement, Florida Bar No. 0457991, 
PL-01, The Capitol, Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050, Ph: 850-414-2918, 
Fax: 850-488-9134, Liz.Brady@Myfloridalegal.com.

For Plaintiff Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Kathleen G. Kane
Attorney General

Adrian R. King, Jr.
First Deputy Attorney General

James A. Donahue, III
Executive Deputy Attorney General, Public Protection Division

Tracy W. Wertz
Acting Chief Deputy Attorney General, Antitrust Section

------------/s/------------
James A. Donahue, III
Executive Deputy Attorney Attorney General, PA Bar No. 42624, Public 
Protection Division, 14th Floor, Strawberry Square, Harrisburg, PA 
17120, Ph: 717-787-4530, Fax: 717-787-1190, 
jdonahue@attorneygeneral.gov.

For Plaintiff State of Tennesee

Robert E. Cooper, Jr.
Attorney General and Reporter

------------/s/------------
Victor J. Domen, Jr.
Senior Antitrust Counsel, Tennessee Bar No. 015803, 500 Charlotte 
Avenue, Nashville, TN 37202, Ph: 615-253-3327, Fax: 615-532-6951, 
Vic.Domen@ag.tn.gov.

For Plaintiff State of Texas

Greg Abbott
Attorney General

Daniel Hodge
First Assistant Attorney General

John B. Scott
Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation

John T. Prud'homme
Chief, Consumer Protection Division

Kim Van Winkle
Chief, Antitrust Section, Consumer Protection Division

------------/s/------------
Mark Levy
Assistant Attorney General, Texas Bar No. 24014555, 300 W. 15th 
Street, 7th Floor, Austin, Texas 78701, Ph: 512-936-1847, Fax: 512-
320-0975, Mark.Levy@texasattorneygeneral.gov.

For Plaintiff Commonwealth of Virginia

Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II
Attorney General

Patricia L. West
Chief Deputy Attorney General

Wesley G. Russell, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General, Civil Litigation Division

David B. Irvin
Senior Assistant Attorney General and Chief, Consumer Protection 
Section

------------/s/------------
Sarah Oxenham Allen
Assistant Attorney General, Consumer Protection Section, Virginia 
Bar No. 33217,

[[Page 71389]]

Office of the Attorney General, 900 East Main Street, Richmond, VA 
23219, Ph: 804-786-6557, Fax: 804-786-0122, SOAllen@oag.state.va.us.

Appendix A--City Pairs Where the Merger Is Presumptively Illegal

     HHIs in this appendix are calculated based on publicly 
available airline ticket revenue data from Department of 
Transportation's Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) database, 
available at: https://www.transtats.bts.gov/DatabaseInfo.asp?DB_ID=125&Link=0
     Routes are listed only once but include flights at all 
airports within the metropolitan area and in both directions. For 
example, the entry

------------------------------------------------------------------------
         City pair route           Post- merger  HHI      [Delta] HHI
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charlotte, NC (CLT)--Dallas, TX                9319                4648
 (DFW)..........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

includes flights from Charlotte, North Carolina, to airports in and 
around Dallas, Texas, including both Dallas-Fort Worth International 
Airport (DFW) and Love Field (DAL), and it includes flights from both 
airports to Charlotte.
BILLING CODE P
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BILLING CODE C

[[Page 71396]]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

Plaintiffs,
v.

US AIRWAYS GROUP, INC.
and
AMR CORPORATION

Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-cv-01236 (CKK)
Judge: Colleen Kollar-Kotelly
Filed: 11/12/2013

Competitive Impact Statement

    Pursuant to Section 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties 
Act (``APPA'' or ``Tunney Act''), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), Plaintiffs 
United States of America (``United States'') files this Competitive 
Impact Statement relating to the proposed Final Judgment submitted on 
November 12, 2013, for entry in this civil antitrust matter.

I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding

    On August 13, 2013, the United States and the States of Arizona, 
Florida, Tennessee, Texas, the Commonwealths of Pennsylvania and 
Virginia, and the District of Columbia (``Plaintiff States'') filed a 
civil antitrust Complaint seeking to enjoin the proposed merger of 
Defendants US Airways Group, Inc. (``US Airways'') and AMR Corporation 
(``American'').\2\ The Complaint alleges that the likely effect of this 
merger would be to lessen competition substantially for the sale of 
scheduled air passenger service in city pair markets throughout the 
United States, and in the market for takeoff and landing authorizations 
(``slots'') at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (``Reagan 
National'') in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act as amended, 15 
U.S.C. 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Michigan joined the group of Plaintiff States on September 
5, 2013; Texas withdrew from the lawsuit on October 1, 2013 after 
reaching a settlement with the Defendants. References to Plaintiff 
States include Michigan and exclude Texas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On November 12, 2013, the United States filed a proposed Final 
Judgment designed to remedy the harm to competition that was likely to 
result from the proposed merger. The proposed Final Judgment, which is 
explained more fully below, requires the divestiture of slots, gates, 
and ground facilities at key airports around the country to permit the 
entry or expansion of airlines that can provide meaningful competition 
in numerous markets, eliminate the significant increase in 
concentration of slots at Reagan National that otherwise would have 
occurred, and enhance the ability of low-cost carriers to compete with 
legacy carriers on a system-wide basis.
    As set forth in the proposed Final Judgment, the Defendants are 
required to divest or transfer to purchasers approved by the United 
States, in consultation with the Plaintiff States:
     104 air carrier slots \3\ at Reagan National and rights 
and interests in any associated gates or other ground facilities, up to 
the extent such gates and ground facilities were used by Defendants to 
support the use of the divested slots;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Slots at Reagan National are designated as either ``air 
carrier,'' which may be operated with any size aircraft, or 
``commuter,'' which must be operated using aircraft with 76 seats or 
less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     34 slots at New York LaGuardia International Airport 
(``LaGuardia'') and rights and interests in any associated gates or 
other ground facilities, up to the extent such gates and ground 
facilities were used by Defendants to support the use of the divested 
slots; and
     rights and interests to two airport gates and associated 
ground facilities at each of the following airports: Chicago O'Hare 
International Airport (``ORD''), Los Angeles International Airport 
(``LAX''), Boston Logan International Airport (``BOS''), Miami 
International Airport (``MIA''), and Dallas Love Field (``DAL'').
    The Reagan National and LaGuardia slots will be sold in bundles, 
under procedures approved by the United States, in consultation with 
the Plaintiff States.
    Trial in this matter is scheduled to begin on November 25, 2013. 
Plaintiffs and Defendants have filed an Asset Preservation Order and 
Stipulation providing that: (1) Defendants are bound by the terms of 
the proposed Final Judgment, (2) the litigation will be stayed pending 
completion of the procedures called for by the APPA, and (3) the 
proposed Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA. 
Entry of the proposed Final Judgment would terminate this action, 
except that the Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or 
enforce the provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish 
violations thereof.

II. Description of the Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violation

A. The Defendants and the Proposed Transaction

    US Airways is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Tempe, 
Arizona. Last year, it flew over fifty million passengers to 
approximately 200 locations worldwide, taking in more than $13 billion 
in revenue. US Airways operates hubs in Phoenix, Charlotte, 
Philadelphia, and Washington, DC.
    American is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Fort Worth, 
Texas. AMR Corporation is the parent company of American Airlines. Last 
year, American flew over eighty million passengers to approximately 250 
locations worldwide, taking in more than $24 billion in revenue. 
American operates hubs in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, and 
Miami. In November 2011, American filed for bankruptcy reorganization 
and is currently under the supervision of the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of New York.
    US Airways and American agreed to merge on February 13, 2013. US 
Airways shareholders would own 28 percent of the combined airline, 
while American shareholders, creditors, labor unions, and employees 
would own 72 percent. The merged airline would operate under the 
American brand name, but the new American would be run by US Airways 
management.

B. The Competitive Effects of the Transaction

1. Relevant Markets
    Domestic scheduled air passenger service is a relevant product 
market within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Because air 
travel offers passengers significant time savings and convenience over 
other forms of travel, few passengers would substitute other modes of 
transportation (car, bus, or train) for scheduled air passenger service 
in response to a small but significant industry-wide fare increase.
    City pairs are relevant geographic markets within the meaning of 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Passengers seek to depart from airports 
close to where they live and work, and arrive at airports close to 
their intended destinations. Most airline travel is related to 
business, family events, and vacations. Thus, most passengers book 
flights with their origins and destinations predetermined. Few 
passengers who wish to fly from one city to another would switch to 
flights between other cities in response to a small but significant and 
non-transitory fare increase.
    Passengers traveling within city pairs have different preferences 
for factors such as nonstop service, the flexibility to purchase 
tickets or change plans at the last minute and, in cities served by 
more than one airport, the ability to fly in to or out of the airport 
most convenient to their home or intended destination. Through a 
variety of fare restrictions and rules, airlines can profitably raise 
prices for some of these passengers without raising prices for others. 
Thus, the competitive effects of

[[Page 71397]]

the proposed merger may vary among passengers depending on their 
preferences for particular types of service or particular airports.
    Slots at Reagan National Airport also constitute a relevant market 
within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Reagan National is 
across the Potomac River from Washington, DC, and, due to its proximity 
to the city and direct service via the Metro, airlines actively seek to 
serve passengers flying into and out of Reagan National. To serve 
Reagan National, a carrier must have ``slots,'' which are government-
issued rights to take off and land. Reagan National is one of only four 
airports in the country requiring federally-issued slots. Slots at 
Reagan National are highly valued, difficult to obtain, and only rarely 
change hands between airlines. There are no alternatives to slots for 
airlines seeking to enter or expand their service at Reagan National.
2. Competitive Effects
    As alleged in the Complaint, this merger would combine two of the 
four major ``legacy'' carriers, leaving ``New American,'' Delta, and 
United as the remaining major national network carriers.\4\ Those three 
carriers would have extensive national and international networks, 
connections to hundreds of destinations, established brand names, and 
strong frequent flyer reward programs. In contrast to the legacy 
carriers, other carriers (hereinafter referred to as ``low-cost 
carriers'' or ``LCCs''), such as Southwest Airlines (``Southwest''), 
JetBlue Airways (``JetBlue''), Virgin America, Frontier Airlines, and 
Spirit Airlines, have less extensive networks and tend to focus more 
heavily on lower fares and other value propositions. Southwest carries 
the most domestic passengers of any airline, however, its route network 
is limited compared to the four current legacy carriers, especially to 
significant business-oriented markets. Although the LCCs serve fewer 
destinations than the legacy airlines, they generally offer important 
competition on the routes that they do serve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Two carriers--Hawaiian Airlines and Alaska Air--are 
technically ``legacy'' carriers, as they have operated interstate 
service since prior to deregulation and rely on hub-and-spoke 
networks, but each operates in a narrow geographic region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This merger would leave three very similar legacy airlines--Delta, 
United, and the New American. By further reducing the number of legacy 
airlines and aligning the economic incentives of those that remain, the 
merger would make it easier for the remaining legacy airlines to 
cooperate, rather than compete, on price and service. Absent the 
merger, US Airways and American, as independent competitors, would have 
unique incentives to disrupt coordination that already occurs to some 
degree among the legacy carriers. US Airways' network structure 
provides the incentive to offer its ``Advantage Fares'' program, an 
aggressive discounting strategy aimed at undercutting the other 
airlines' nonstop fares with cheaper connecting service. American, 
having completed a successful reorganization in bankruptcy, would have 
the incentive, and indeed, it has announced the intention to undertake 
significant growth at the expense of its competitors. The merger would 
diminish these important competitive constraints.
    The merger would also entrench the merged airline as the dominant 
carrier at Washington Reagan National Airport, where it would control 
69 percent of the take-off and landing slots. The merger would 
eliminate head-to-head competition between American and US Airways on 
the routes they both serve from the airport and would effectively 
foreclose entry or expansion by other airlines that might increase 
competition at Reagan National.
    Finally, the merger would eliminate head-to-head competition 
between US Airways and American on numerous non-stop and connecting 
routes.
3. Entry and Expansion
    New entry, or expansion by existing competitors, would be unlikely 
to prevent or remedy the merger's likely anticompetitive effects absent 
the proposed divestitures. Operational barriers limit entry and 
expansion at a number of important airports. Four of the busiest 
airports in the United States--including Reagan National and 
LaGuardia--are subject to slot limitations governed by the FAA. The 
lack of availability of slots is a substantial barrier to entry at 
those airports, especially for low-cost carriers. Slots at these 
airports are concentrated in the hands of large legacy airlines that 
have little incentive to sell or lease slots to those carriers most 
likely to compete aggressively against them. As a result, slots are 
expensive, difficult to obtain, and change hands only rarely.
    Access to gates can also be a substantial barrier to entry or 
expansion at some airports. At several large airports, a significant 
portion of the available gates are leased to established airlines under 
long-term exclusive-use leases. In such cases, a carrier seeking to 
enter or expand would have to sublease gates from incumbent airlines.
    In addition to operational constraints, new entrants and those 
seeking to expand must overcome the effects of corporate discount 
programs offered by dominant incumbents; loyalty to existing frequent 
flyer programs; a less well-known brand; and the risk of aggressive 
responses to new entry by the dominant incumbent carrier. However, 
especially in large cities, low-cost carriers have demonstrated some 
ability to overcome those disadvantages with the help of lower costs, 
when they are able to obtain access to the necessary airport 
facilities.

III. Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment

    The Complaint alleges several ways that the elimination of US 
Airways and American as independent competitors will result in harm to 
consumers. As things stand today, each carrier places important 
competitive constraints on the other large network carriers. US Airways 
undercuts the nonstop fares of legacy carriers through its Advantage 
Fares program. American had planned to fly more planes. The Complaint 
alleges that the merger will diminish New American's incentives to 
maintain these strategies and increase its incentives to coordinate 
with the other legacy carriers rather than compete. The Complaint also 
alleges harm resulting from increased slot concentration at DCA.
    The proposed remedy seeks to address both the harm resulting from 
increased slot concentration at DCA and the broader harms alleged in 
the Complaint by requiring the divestiture of an unprecedented quantity 
of valuable facilities at seven of the most important airports in the 
United States. The access to key airports made possible by the 
divestitures will create network opportunities for the purchasing 
carriers that would otherwise have been out of reach for the 
foreseeable future. Those opportunities will provide increased 
incentives for those carriers to invest in new capacity and expand into 
additional markets.
    The proposed remedy will not create a new independent competitor, 
nor does it purport to replicate American's capacity expansion plans or 
create Advantage Fares where they might otherwise be eliminated. 
Instead, it promises to impede the industry's evolution toward a 
tighter oligopoly by requiring the divestiture of critical facilities 
to carriers that will likely use them to fly more people to more places 
at more competitive fares. In this way, the proposed remedy will 
deliver benefits to consumers that could not be obtained by enjoining 
the merger.
    The divestiture of 104 air carrier slots at Reagan National and 34 
slots at

[[Page 71398]]

LaGuardia will not only address the localized competitive concerns at 
those airports, but will deliver substantial additional benefits. 
American and US Airways currently compete head-to-head on two routes 
from Reagan National (Raleigh-Durham and Nashville) and one route from 
LaGuardia (Charlotte). In addition, JetBlue and Southwest offer service 
on a limited number of routes at these airports through use of slots 
leased from American on terms that could be renegotiated or cancelled 
by the New American.\5\ Through the remedy, Southwest and JetBlue will 
have the opportunity to obtain permanent access to the slots they are 
currently leasing from American, and those LCCs and others will have 
the opportunity to acquire more slots at DCA and at LGA as well. This 
will allow them to provide greatly expanded service on numerous routes, 
including new nonstop and connecting service to points throughout the 
country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ JetBlue and American currently engage in an exchange in 
which JetBlue trades 24 slots at New York's JFK International 
Airport to American in exchange for American trading 16 slots at 
Reagan National to JetBlue. Southwest currently leases ten slots 
from American at LaGuardia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, gate divestitures at O'Hare (ORD), Los Angeles (LAX), 
Boston (BOS), Dallas Love Field (DAL), and Miami (MIA) would expand the 
presence of potentially disruptive competitors at these strategically 
important airports located throughout the country.\6\ ORD and LAX, two 
of American's major hubs, are among the most highly congested airports 
in the country, and competitors have historically had difficulties 
obtaining access to gates and other facilities at those airports to be 
able to enter or expand service. The divestitures will give competing 
carriers an expanded foothold at these important airports in the center 
of the country and the west coast, respectively. Likewise, there is 
limited ability to enter or expand at BOS; the divestitures will 
provide relief there. Although access issues at Miami are not as acute 
as at the other airports, the proposed Final Judgment also ensures that 
a carrier seeking to enter or expand at Miami will have access to two 
of the gates and associated ground facilities currently leased by US 
Airways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ We estimate that each gate can support between eight and ten 
round trips per day and thus, two gates at each of these key 
airports will provide for commercially viable and competitive 
patterns of service for the recipients of the divested gates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed Final Judgment also includes divestitures at Dallas 
Love Field, an airport near American's largest hub at Dallas-Fort Worth 
International Airport (``DFW''). Gates at DFW are readily available, 
but Love Field, which is much closer to downtown Dallas, is highly 
gate-constrained. Although today operations at Love Field are severely 
restricted under current law,\7\ those restrictions are due to expire 
in October 2014, at which point Love Field will have a distinct 
advantage versus DFW, particularly in serving business customers. The 
divestitures will position a low-cost carrier to provide vigorous 
competition to the New American's nonstop and connecting service out of 
DFW.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Under legislation known as the Wright Amendment, airlines 
operating out of Love Field may not operate nonstop service on 
aircraft with more than 56 seats to any points beyond Texas, New 
Mexico, Oklahoma, Kansas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri 
or Alabama.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Past antitrust enforcement demonstrates that providing LCCs with 
access to constrained airports results in dramatic consumer benefits. 
In 2010, in response to the United States' concerns regarding 
competitive effects of the proposed United/Continental merger, United 
and Continental transferred 36 slots, three gates and other facilities 
at Newark to Southwest. Southwest used those assets to establish 
service on six nonstop routes from Newark, resulting in substantially 
lower fares to consumers. For example, average fares for travel between 
Newark and St. Louis dropped 27% and fares for travel between Newark 
and Houston dropped 15%. In addition, Southwest established connecting 
service to approximately 60 additional cities throughout the United 
States.
    The proposed remedy will require the divestiture of almost four 
times as many slots as were divested at the time of the United/
Continental merger, plus gates and additional facilities at key 
airports throughout the country. In total, the divestitures will 
significantly strengthen the purchasing carriers, provide the incentive 
and ability for those carriers to invest in new capacity, and position 
them to provide more meaningful competition system-wide.

A. The Divestiture of Slots at Reagan National

    Section IV.F of the Proposed Final Judgment requires that the New 
American permanently divest 104 air carrier slots at Reagan National, 
two of which shall be slots currently held by US Airways and the 
remainder from American, including 16 slots American currently leases 
to JetBlue in exchange for slots at John F. Kennedy International 
Airport. New American will offer to make the slot exchange with JetBlue 
permanent. The remaining 88 slots (plus any of the 16 traded slots that 
JetBlue declines) will be divided into bundles, taking into account 
specific slot times to ensure commercially viable and competitive 
patterns of service for the recipients of the divested slots. New 
American will divest these slot bundles to at least two different 
carriers approved by the United States in its sole discretion, in 
consultation with the Plaintiff States.
    In addition, New American will either sublease or transfer to the 
purchaser of any Reagan National slots, gates and other ground 
facilities (e.g., ticket counters, hold-rooms, leased jet bridges, and 
operations space), up to the extent such gates and facilities were used 
by Defendants to support the use of the divested slots, on the same 
terms and conditions pursuant to which the New American currently 
leases those facilities.
    Following the divestiture of the Reagan National slots, if 
requested by the purchasers, Defendants shall lease back the slots for 
no consideration for a period not to exceed 180 calendar days, or as 
may be extended at the request of the purchaser, with the approval of 
the United States, in consultation with the Plaintiff States. The value 
of this rent-free lease back will naturally be reflected in the 
purchase price of the slots. A transfer of this magnitude will 
naturally entail a transition period for both the acquirers and the 
Defendants. The lease-back provisions are designed to allow purchasers 
sufficient time to institute new service while incentivizing them to 
establish that service reasonably quickly.

B. The Divestiture of Slots and Facilities at LaGuardia

    Section IV.G of the Proposed Final Judgment requires that New 
American permanently divest 34 air carrier slots at LGA. New American 
will offer to divest to Southwest on commercially reasonable terms the 
10 slots Southwest currently leases from American. The United States 
will identify the remaining 24 slots to be divested taking into account 
specific slot times to ensure commercially viable and competitive 
patterns of service for the recipients of the divested slots. The 24 
slots (in addition to any of the 10 leased slots that Southwest 
declines) will be divided into bundles and divested to carriers 
approved by the United States in its sole discretion, in consultation 
with the Plaintiff States.
    In addition, New American will either sublease or transfer to the 
purchaser of any LaGuardia slots gates and other ground facilities 
(e.g., ticket counters, hold-rooms, leased jet bridges, and

[[Page 71399]]

operations space), up to the extent such gates and facilities were used 
by Defendants to support the use of the divested slots, on the same 
terms and conditions pursuant to which the New American currently 
leases those facilities. With respect to gates, New American will make 
reasonable best efforts to facilitate any gate moves necessary to 
ensure that the purchasing carrier can operate contiguous gates.
    Following the divestiture of the LaGuardia slots, if requested by 
the purchasers, Defendants shall lease back the slots for no 
consideration for a period not to exceed 180 calendar days, or as may 
be extended at the request of the purchaser, with the approval of the 
United States, in consultation with the Plaintiff States. The value of 
this rent-free lease back will naturally be reflected in the purchase 
price of the slots. A transfer of this magnitude will naturally entail 
a transition period for both the acquirers and the Defendants. The 
lease-back provisions are designed to allow purchasers sufficient time 
to institute new service while incentivizing them to establish that 
service reasonably quickly.

C. The Divestiture of Gates at Other Key Airports

    Section IV.H of the Proposed Final Judgment requires that New 
American will transfer, consistent with the practices of the relevant 
airport authority, to another carrier or carriers approved by DOJ in 
its sole discretion, in consultation with the Plaintiff States, all 
rights and interests in two gates, to be identified and approved by DOJ 
in its sole discretion, in consultation with the Plaintiff States, and 
provide reasonable access to ground facilities (e.g., ticket counters, 
baggage handling facilities, office space, loading bridges) at each of: 
ORD, LAX, BOS, MIA, DAL on commercial terms and conditions identical to 
those pursuant to which the gates and facilities are leased to New 
American. New American will make reasonable best efforts to facilitate 
any gate moves necessary to ensure that the transferee can operate 
contiguous gates.

D. Divestiture Trustee

    In the event the Defendants do not accomplish the divestitures as 
prescribed by the proposed Final Judgment, Section V of the proposed 
Final Judgment provides that the Court will appoint a Divestiture 
Trustee selected by the United States, in consultation with the 
Plaintiff States, to complete the divestitures. If a Divestiture 
Trustee is appointed, the proposed Final Judgment provides that the 
Defendants will pay all costs and expenses of the Divestiture Trustee. 
After his or her appointment becomes effective, the Divestiture Trustee 
will file monthly reports with the Court and the United States setting 
forth his or her efforts to accomplish the divestiture.

E. Monitoring Trustee

    Section VII of the proposed Final Judgment permits the United 
States, in consultation with the Plaintiff States, to appoint a 
Monitoring Trustee, subject to approval by the Court. If a Monitoring 
Trustee is appointed, the proposed Final Judgment provides that the 
Defendants will pay all costs and expenses of the Monitoring Trustee. 
After his or her appointment becomes effective, the Monitoring Trustee 
will file reports with the Court and the United States every ninety 
days or more frequently as needed setting forth the Defendants' efforts 
to comply with the terms of the Final Judgment.

F. Prohibition on Reacquisition

    Section XII of the proposed Final Judgment prohibits the merged 
company from reacquiring an ownership interest in the divested slots or 
gates during the term of the Final Judgment. The proposed Final 
Judgment will not prevent New American from engaging in short-term 
trades or exchanges involving the divested slots at Reagan National or 
LGA for scheduling purposes.

G. Future Transactions

    The proposed Final Judgment requires Defendants to provide advance 
notification of any future slot acquisition at Reagan National by the 
merged company, regardless of whether the transaction meets the 
reporting thresholds set forth in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1976, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18a (the ``HSR Act''). 
The proposed Final Judgment further provides for waiting periods and 
opportunities for the United States to obtain additional information 
analogous to the provisions of the HSR Act.

H. Stipulation and Order Provisions

    Defendants have entered into the Stipulation and Order attached as 
an exhibit to the Explanation of Consent Decree Procedures, which was 
filed simultaneously with the Court, to ensure that, pending the 
divestitures, the Divestiture Assets are maintained. The Stipulation 
and Order ensures that the Divestiture Assets are preserved and 
maintained in a condition that allows the divestitures to be effective.

IV. Remedies Available to Potential Private Litigants

    Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any 
person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the 
antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times 
the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither 
impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action. 
Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
16(a), the proposed Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any 
subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against Defendants.

V. Procedures Available for Modification of the Proposed Final Judgment

    The United States and Defendants have stipulated that the proposed 
Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance with the 
provisions of the APPA, provided that the United States has not 
withdrawn its consent. The APPA conditions entry upon the Court's 
determination that the proposed Final Judgment is in the public 
interest.
    The APPA provides a period of at least sixty (60) days preceding 
the effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any 
person may submit to the United States written comments regarding the 
proposed Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so 
within sixty (60) days of the date of publication of this Competitive 
Impact Statement in the Federal Register, or the last date of 
publication in a newspaper of the summary of this Competitive Impact 
Statement, whichever is later. All comments received during this period 
will be considered by the United States Department of Justice, which 
remains free to withdraw its consent to the proposed Final Judgment at 
any time prior to the Court's entry of judgment. The comments and the 
response of the United States will be filed with the Court. In 
addition, comments will be posted on the U.S. Department of Justice, 
Antitrust Division's internet Web site and, under certain 
circumstances, published in the Federal Register.
    Written comments should be submitted to: William H. Stallings, 
Chief, Transportation, Energy & Agriculture Section Antitrust Division, 
United States Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW., Suite 8000, 
Washington, DC 20530.
    The proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court retains

[[Page 71400]]

jurisdiction over this action, and the parties may apply to the Court 
for any order necessary or appropriate for the modification, 
interpretation, or enforcement of the Final Judgment.

VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment

    The United States considered, as an alternative to the proposed 
Final Judgment, a full trial on the merits against the Defendants. The 
United States could have continued the litigation and sought 
preliminary and permanent injunctions against the proposed merger. 
However, the proposed Final Judgment avoids the time, expense, and 
uncertainty of a full trial on the merits. Moreover, the United States 
is satisfied that the divestiture of assets described in the proposed 
Final Judgment is an appropriate remedy. The proposed relief will 
facilitate entry and expansion by low-cost carriers at key slot-
constrained and gate-constrained airports, thereby enhancing the 
ability of the purchasing carrier(s) to provide meaningful competition 
to New American and other legacy carriers.

VII. Standard of Review Under the APPA for the Proposed Final Judgment

    The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed 
consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be 
subject to a sixty-day comment period, after which the court shall 
determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment ``is in the 
public interest.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In making that determination, 
the court, in accordance with the statute as amended in 2004, is 
required to consider:

    (A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including 
termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and 
modification, duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of 
alternative remedies actually considered, whether its terms are 
ambiguous, and any other competitive considerations bearing upon the 
adequacy of such judgment that the court deems necessary to a 
determination of whether the consent judgment is in the public 
interest; and
    (B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the 
relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and 
individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth 
in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if 
any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial.

15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In considering these statutory factors, 
the court's inquiry is necessarily a limited one as the government is 
entitled to ``broad discretion to settle with the defendant within the 
reaches of the public interest.'' United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 
F.3d 1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see generally United States v. SBC 
Commc'ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (assessing public 
interest standard under the Tunney Act); United States v. InBev N.V./
S.A., 2009-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ] 76,736, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, 
No. 08-1965 (JR), at *3, (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that the 
court's review of a consent judgment is limited and only inquires 
``into whether the government's determination that the proposed 
remedies will cure the antitrust violations alleged in the complaint 
was reasonable, and whether the mechanism to enforce the final judgment 
are clear and manageable.'').\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ The 2004 amendments substituted ``shall'' for ``may'' in 
directing relevant factors for a court to consider and amended the 
list of factors to focus on competitive considerations and to 
address potentially ambiguous judgment terms. Compare 15 U.S.C. 
16(e) (2004), with 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1) (2006); see also SBC Commc'ns, 
489 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (concluding that the 2004 amendments 
``effected minimal changes'' to Tunney Act review).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit has held, under the APPA a court considers, among other things, 
the relationship between the remedy secured and the specific 
allegations set forth in the government's complaint, whether the decree 
is sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, 
and whether the decree may positively harm third parties. See 
Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1458-62. With respect to the adequacy of the 
relief secured by the decree, a court may not ``engage in an 
unrestricted evaluation of what relief would best serve the public.'' 
United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing 
United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981)); see 
also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460-62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 152 
F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001); InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, 
at *3. Courts have held that:

[t]he balancing of competing social and political interests affected 
by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first 
instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The court's 
role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the 
government has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to 
the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a 
particular decree is the one that will best serve society, but 
whether the settlement is ``within the reaches of the public 
interest.'' More elaborate requirements might undermine the 
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.

Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).\9\ In 
determining whether a proposed settlement is in the public interest, a 
district court ``must accord deference to the government's predictions 
about the efficacy of its remedies, and may not require that the 
remedies perfectly match the alleged violations.'' SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. 
Supp. 2d at 17; see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (noting the need 
for courts to be ``deferential to the government's predictions as to 
the effect of the proposed remedies''); United States v. Archer-
Daniels-Midland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that 
the court should grant due respect to the United States' prediction as 
to the effect of proposed remedies, its perception of the market 
structure, and its views of the nature of the case).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Cf. BNS, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the court's 
``ultimate authority under the [APPA] is limited to approving or 
disapproving the consent decree''); United States v. Gillette Co., 
406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way, the 
court is constrained to ``look at the overall picture not 
hypercritically, nor with a microscope, but with an artist's 
reducing glass''). See generally Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 
(discussing whether ``the remedies [obtained in the decree are] so 
inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall outside of the 
`reaches of the public interest''').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Courts have greater flexibility in approving proposed consent 
decrees than in crafting their own decrees following a finding of 
liability in a litigated matter. ``[A] proposed decree must be approved 
even if it falls short of the remedy the court would impose on its own, 
as long as it falls within the range of acceptability or is `within the 
reaches of public interest.''' United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
552 F. Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975)), aff'd 
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also 
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 622 (W.D. Ky. 
1985) (approving the consent decree even though the court would have 
imposed a greater remedy). To meet this standard, the United States 
``need only provide a factual basis for concluding that the settlements 
are reasonably adequate remedies for the alleged harms.'' SBC Commc'ns, 
489 F. Supp. 2d at 17.
    Moreover, the court's role under the APPA is limited to reviewing 
the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has 
alleged in its Complaint, and does not authorize the court to 
``construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree 
against that case.'' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459; see also InBev, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (``the `public interest' is not to be 
measured by comparing the violations alleged in the complaint against 
those the court

[[Page 71401]]

believes could have, or even should have, been alleged''). Because the 
``court's authority to review the decree depends entirely on the 
government's exercising its prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case 
in the first place,'' it follows that ``the court is only authorized to 
review the decree itself,'' and not to ``effectively redraft the 
complaint'' to inquire into other matters that the United States did 
not pursue. Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459-60. As this Court confirmed in 
SBC Communications, courts ``cannot look beyond the complaint in making 
the public interest determination unless the complaint is drafted so 
narrowly as to make a mockery of judicial power.'' SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. 
Supp. 2d at 15.
    In its 2004 amendments, Congress made clear its intent to preserve 
the practical benefits of utilizing consent decrees in antitrust 
enforcement, adding the unambiguous instruction that ``[n]othing in 
this section shall be construed to require the court to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to 
intervene.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2). The language wrote into the statute 
what Congress intended when it enacted the Tunney Act in 1974, as 
Senator Tunney explained: ``[t]he court is nowhere compelled to go to 
trial or to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect 
of vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement through 
the consent decree process.'' 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement 
of Senator Tunney). Rather, the procedure for the public interest 
determination is left to the discretion of the court, with the 
recognition that the court's ``scope of review remains sharply 
proscribed by precedent and the nature of Tunney Act proceedings.'' SBC 
Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ See United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17 
(D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the ``Tunney Act expressly allows the 
court to make its public interest determination on the basis of the 
competitive impact statement and response to comments alone''); 
United States v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ] 
61,508, at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (``Absent a showing of corrupt 
failure of the government to discharge its duty, the Court, in 
making its public interest finding, should . . . carefully consider 
the explanations of the government in the competitive impact 
statement and its responses to comments in order to determine 
whether those explanations are reasonable under the 
circumstances.''); S. Rep. No. 93-298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 
(1973) (``Where the public interest can be meaningfully evaluated 
simply on the basis of briefs and oral arguments, that is the 
approach that should be utilized.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. Determinative Documents

    There are no determinative materials or documents within the 
meaning of the APPA that were considered by the United States in 
formulating the proposed Final Judgment.

    Dated: November 12, 2013

    Respectfully submitted,

/s/
Michael D. Billiel (DC BAR  394377)
Attorney, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 450 Fifth 
Street, NW., Suite 4100, Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202) 307-
6666, Facsimile: (202) 307-2784, Email: Michael.Billiel@usdoj.gov.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

Plaintiffs,
v.

US AIRWAYS GROUP, INC.
and
AMR CORPORATION

Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-cv-01236 (CKK)
Judge: Colleen Kollar-Kotelly
Filed: 11/12/2013

Proposed Final Judgment

    Whereas, Plaintiffs United States of America (``United States'') 
and the States of Arizona, Florida, Tennessee and Michigan, the 
Commonwealths of Pennsylvania and Virginia, and the District of 
Columbia (``Plaintiff States'') filed their Complaint against 
Defendants US Airways Group, Inc. (``US Airways'') and AMR Corporation 
(``American'') on August 13, 2013, as amended on September 5, 2013;
    And whereas, the United States and the Plaintiff States and 
Defendants, by their respective attorneys, have consented to the entry 
of this Final Judgment without trial or adjudication of any issue of 
fact or law, and without this Final Judgment constituting any evidence 
against or admission by any party regarding any issue of fact or law;
    And whereas, Defendants agree to be bound by the provisions of the 
Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court;
    And whereas, the essence of this Final Judgment is the prompt and 
certain divestiture of certain rights or assets by the Defendants to 
assure that competition is not substantially lessened;
    And whereas, the Final Judgment requires Defendants to make certain 
divestitures for the purposes of remedying the loss of competition 
alleged in the Complaint;
    And whereas, Defendants have represented to the United States and 
the Plaintiff States that the divestitures required below can and will 
be made, and that the Defendants will later raise no claim of hardship 
or difficulty as grounds for asking the Court to modify any of the 
provisions below;
    Now therefore, before any testimony is taken, without trial or 
adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and upon consent of the 
parties, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed:

I. Jursidiction

    This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and each of 
the parties to this action. The Complaint states a claim upon which 
relief can be granted against Defendants US Airways and American under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act as amended (15 U.S.C. 18).

II. Definitions

    As used in the Final Judgment:
    A. ``Acquirer'' or ``Acquirers'' means the entity or entities, 
approved by the United States in its sole discretion in consultation 
with the Plaintiff States, to which Defendants may divest all or 
specified parts of the Divestiture Assets.
    B. ``American'' means Defendant AMR Corporation, its parents, 
successors and assigns, divisions, subsidiaries, affiliates, 
partnerships and joint ventures; and all directors, officers, 
employees, agents, and representatives of the foregoing. As used in 
this definition, the terms ``parent,'' ``subsidiary,'' ``affiliate,'' 
and ``joint venture'' refer to any person or entity in which American 
holds, directly or indirectly, a majority (greater than 50 percent) or 
total ownership or control or which holds, directly or indirectly a 
majority (greater than 50 percent) or total ownership or control in 
American.
    C. ``Associated Ground Facilities'' means the facilities owned or 
operated by Defendants and reasonably necessary for Acquirer(s) to 
operate the Divested Assets at the relevant airport, including, but not 
limited to, ticket counters, hold-rooms, leased jet bridges, and 
operations space.
    D. ``DCA Gates and Facilities'' means all rights and interests held 
by Defendants in the gates at Washington Reagan National Airport 
(``DCA'') described in Exhibit A and in the Associated Ground 
Facilities, up to the extent such gates and Associated Ground 
Facilities were used by Defendants to support the use of the DCA Slots.
    E. ``DCA Slots'' means all rights and interests held by Defendants 
in the 104 slots at DCA listed in Exhibit A, consisting of two air 
carrier slots held by US Airways at DCA and 102 air carrier slots held 
by American at DCA, including the JetBlue Slots.
    F. ``Divestiture Assets'' means (1) the DCA Slots, (2) the DCA 
Gates and Facilities, (3) the LGA Slots, (4) the LGA Gates and 
Facilities, and (5) the Key Airport Gates and Facilities.

[[Page 71402]]

    G. ``JetBlue Slots'' means all rights and interests held by 
Defendants in the 16 slots at DCA currently leased by American to 
JetBlue Airways, Inc., listed in Exhibit A.
    H. ``Key Airport'' means each of the following airports: (1) Boston 
Logan International Airport; (2) Chicago O'Hare International Airport; 
(3) Dallas Love Field; (4) Los Angeles International Airport; and (5) 
Miami International Airport.
    I. ``Key Airport Gates and Facilities'' means all rights and 
interests held by Defendants in two gates at each Key Airport as 
described in Exhibit C. The term ``Key Airport Gates and Facilities'' 
includes Associated Ground Facilities, up to the extent such facilities 
were used by Defendants to support the gates described in Exhibit C.
    J. ``LGA Gates and Facilities'' means all rights and interests held 
by Defendants in the gates at New York LaGuardia Airport (``LGA'') 
described in Exhibit B and Associated Ground Facilities up to the 
extent of such gates and Associated Ground Facilities were used by 
Defendants to support the use of the LGA Slots.
    K. ``LGA Slots'' means the 34 slots at New York LaGuardia Airport 
(``LGA'') listed in Exhibit B, consisting of the Southwest Slots and 24 
additional slots held by American or US Airways.
    L. ``Slot Bundles'' means groupings of DCA Slots and LGA Slots, as 
determined by the United States in its sole discretion in consultation 
with the Plaintiff States.
    M. ``Southwest Slots'' means the 10 slots at LGA currently leased 
by American to Southwest Airlines, Inc. listed in Exhibit B.
    N. ``Transaction'' means the transaction referred to in the 
Agreement and Plan of Merger among AMR Corporation, AMR Merger Sub, 
Inc., and US Airways Group, Inc., dated as of February 13, 2013.
    O. ``US Airways'' means Defendant US Airways Group, Inc., its 
parents, successors and assigns, divisions, subsidiaries, affiliates, 
partnerships and joint ventures; and all directors, officers, 
employees, agents, and representatives of the foregoing. For purposes 
of this definition, the terms ``parent,'' ``subsidiary,'' 
``affiliate,'' and ``joint venture'' refer to any person or entity in 
which US Airways holds, directly or indirectly, a majority (greater 
than 50 percent) or total ownership or control or which holds, directly 
or indirectly, a majority (greater than 50 percent) or total ownership 
or control in US Airways.

III. Applicability

    A. This Final Judgment applies to Defendants and all other persons 
in active concert or participation with any of them who receive actual 
notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise.
    B. If, prior to complying with Section IV and V of this Final 
Judgment, a Defendant directly or indirectly sells or otherwise 
disposes of any of the Divestiture Assets, it shall require the 
purchaser of the Divestiture Assets to be bound by the provisions of 
this Final Judgment. Defendants need not obtain such an agreement from 
the Acquirer(s) of the assets divested pursuant to this Final Judgment.

IV. Divestitures

    A. Subject to any necessary approval of the Federal Aviation 
Administration, Defendants are ordered and directed to divest the DCA 
Slots and LGA Slots to Acquirers in a manner consistent with this Final 
Judgment within ninety (90) calendar days after the later of (1) 
completion of the Transaction or (2) the United States providing 
Defendants a list of the Acquirers and Slot Bundles.
    B. Subject to any necessary approval of the relevant airport 
operator, Defendants are ordered and directed to transfer the DCA Gates 
and Facilities as necessary to Acquirers of the DCA Slots within ninety 
(90) days after completion of the divestiture of the DCA Slots.
    C. Subject to any necessary approval of the relevant airport 
operator, Defendants are ordered and directed to transfer the LGA Gates 
and Facilities as necessary to Acquirer(s) of the LGA Slots within 
ninety (90) days after completion of the divestiture of the LGA Slots.
    D. Subject to any necessary approval of the relevant airport 
operator, Defendants are ordered and directed to divest the Key Airport 
Gates and Facilities to Acquirer(s) in a manner consistent with this 
Final Judgment within 180 calendar days after the later of (1) 
completion of the Transaction or (2) the United States providing 
Defendants a list of the Acquirers.
    E. All proceeds from the transfer of the DCA Slots and the LGA 
Slots are for the account of Defendants. Defendants agree to use their 
best efforts to divest the Divestiture Assets as expeditiously as 
possible. The United States in its sole discretion, may agree to one or 
more extensions of each of the time periods specified in Sections 
IV.A.--IV.D., not to exceed sixty (60) calendar days in total for each 
such time period, and shall extend any time period by the number of 
days during which there is pending any objection under Section VI of 
this Final Judgment. The United States shall notify the Court of any 
extensions of the time periods.
    F. The Court orders the divestiture of the DCA Slots and DCA Gates 
and Facilities to proceed as follows:
    1. Defendants shall offer to divest the 16 JetBlue Slots to JetBlue 
Airways, Inc., by making permanent the current agreement between 
JetBlue and American to exchange the JetBlue Slots for slots at John F. 
Kennedy International Airport;
    2. Defendants shall divest in Slot Bundles to at least two 
Acquirers the other 88 DCA slots listed in Exhibit A, together with any 
of the JetBlue Slots not sold to JetBlue pursuant to paragraph IV.F.1. 
above;
    3. Defendants shall either (a) sublease to Acquirers of the DCA 
Slots, the DCA Gates and Facilities on the same terms and conditions 
pursuant to which the Defendants currently lease the DCA Gates and 
Facilities or, (b) with the consent of the United States, pursuant to 
an agreement with the airport operator, relinquish the DCA Gates and 
Facilities to the airport operator to enable the Acquirer to lease them 
from the airport operator on terms and conditions determined by the 
airport operator, and shall make best efforts to obtain any consent or 
approval from the relevant airport operator for the divestitures 
required by this paragraph;
    4. Following the divestiture of the DCA Slots, if requested by an 
Acquirer, Defendants shall lease the DCA Slots from the Acquirer for no 
consideration for a period not to exceed 180 calendar days. Defendants 
shall continue to operate the DCA Slots during this lease-back period 
at a level sufficient to prevent the DCA Slots from reverting to the 
Federal Aviation Administration pursuant to 14 CFR 93.227. The lease-
back period may be extended at the sole discretion of the Acquirer(s), 
with the approval of the United States, in consultation with the 
Plaintiff States.
    G. The Court orders the divestiture of the LGA Slots and LGA Gates 
and Facilities to proceed as follows:
    1. Defendants shall offer to divest the ten Southwest Slots to 
Southwest Airlines, Inc.;
    2. Defendants shall divest in Slot Bundles to Acquirer(s) the other 
24 LGA slots listed in Exhibit B, together with any of the Southwest 
Slots not sold to Southwest pursuant to Paragraph IV.G.1. above;
    3. Defendants shall either (a) sublease to the Acquirer(s) of the 
LGA Slots, the LGA Gates and Facilities on the same terms and 
conditions pursuant to which the Defendants currently lease the LGA

[[Page 71403]]

Gates and Facilities or, (b) with the consent of the United States, 
pursuant to an agreement with the airport operator, relinquish the LGA 
Gates and Facilities to the airport operator to enable the Acquirer to 
lease them from the airport operator on terms and conditions determined 
by the airport operator, and shall make best efforts to obtain any 
consent or approval from the relevant airport operator for the 
divestitures required by this paragraph;
    4. Defendants shall make reasonable best efforts to facilitate any 
re-locations necessary to ensure that the Acquirer(s) can operate from 
contiguous gates at LGA to the extent such relocation does not unduly 
disrupt Defendants' operations.
    5. Following the divestiture of the LGA Slots, if requested by the 
Acquirer(s), Defendants shall lease the LGA Slots from the Acquirer for 
no consideration for a period not to exceed 180 calendar days. 
Defendants shall continue to operate the LGA Slots during this lease-
back period at a level sufficient to prevent the LGA Slots from 
reverting to the Federal Aviation Administration pursuant to 71 FR 
77,854 (Dec. 27, 2006), as extended by 78 FR 28, 279 (Oct. 24, 2013). 
The lease-back period may be extended at the sole discretion of the 
Acquirer(s), with the approval of the United States, in consultation 
with the Plaintiff States.
    H. The Court orders the divestiture of the Key Airport Gates and 
Facilities, to proceed as follows:
    1. Defendants shall either (a) lease to the Acquirers the Key 
Airport Gates and Facilities on the same terms and conditions pursuant 
to which the Defendants currently lease the Key Airport Gates and 
Facilities, or (b) with the consent of the United States, pursuant to 
an agreement with the airport operator, relinquish the Key Airport 
Gates and Facilities to the airport operator to enable the Acquirer to 
lease them from the airport operator on terms and conditions determined 
by the airport operator;
    2. Defendants shall make best efforts to obtain any consent or 
approval from the relevant airport operator for the transfer(s) 
required by this Section;
    3. With respect to the Divestiture Assets at Boston Logan 
International Airport, Defendants shall make reasonable best efforts to 
facilitate any re-locations necessary to ensure that the Acquirer(s) 
can operate from contiguous gates at the Key Airport, to the extent 
such relocation does not unduly disrupt Defendants' operations.
    I. In accomplishing the divestiture ordered by this Final Judgment, 
Defendants promptly shall make known, by usual and customary means, the 
availability of the Divestiture Assets to Acquirer(s). Defendants shall 
inform any such person contacted regarding a possible purchase of the 
Divestiture Assets that they are being divested pursuant to this Final 
Judgment and provide that person with a copy of this Final Judgment. 
Defendants shall offer to furnish to all prospective Acquirers, subject 
to customary confidentiality assurances, all information and documents 
relating to the Divestiture Assets customarily provided in a due 
diligence process except such information or documents subject to the 
attorney-client privileges or work-product doctrine. Defendants shall 
make available such information to the United States at the same time 
that such information is made available to any other person.
    J. As part of their obligations under paragraph IV.I. above, 
Defendants shall permit prospective Acquirers of the Divestiture Assets 
to have reasonable access to: (i) Personnel; (ii) the physical 
facilities of the Divestiture Assets to make reasonable inspections; 
(iii) all environmental, zoning, and other permit documents and 
information; and (iv) all financial, operational, or other documents 
and information customarily provided as part of a due diligence 
process.
    K. Defendants shall warrant to the Acquirer(s) that each asset will 
be operational on the date of transfer.
    L. Defendants shall not take any action that will impede in any way 
the permitting, operation, or divestiture of the Divestiture Assets.
    M. Defendants shall warrant to the Acquirer(s) that there are no 
material defects in any environmental, zoning or other permits obtained 
or controlled by Defendants pertaining to the operation of the 
Divestiture Assets, and that following the sale of the Divestiture 
Assets, Defendants will not undertake, directly or indirectly, any 
challenges to the environmental, zoning, or other permits relating to 
the operation of the Divestiture Assets.
    N. Unless the United States otherwise consents in writing, the 
divestiture pursuant to Section IV or V shall include the entire 
Divestiture Assets, and shall be accomplished in such a way as to 
satisfy the United States, in its sole discretion, in consultation with 
the Plaintiff States, that the Divestiture Assets can and will be used 
by the Acquirer(s) as part of a viable, ongoing business, engaged in 
providing scheduled air passenger service in the United States. 
Divestiture of the Divestiture Assets may be made to Acquirers, 
provided that in each instance it is demonstrated to the sole 
satisfaction of the United States, in consultation with the Plaintiff 
States, that the Divestiture Assets will remain viable and the 
divestiture of such assets will remedy the competitive harm alleged in 
the Complaint. The divestiture, whether pursuant to Section IV or 
Section V of this Final Judgment, shall be:
    1. made to an Acquirer(s) that, in the United States' sole 
judgment, in consultation with the Plaintiff States, has the intent and 
capability (including the necessary managerial, operational, technical 
and financial capability) to compete effectively in the business of 
providing scheduled airline passenger service; and
    2. accomplished so as to satisfy the United States in its sole 
discretion, in consultation with the Plaintiff States, that none of the 
terms of any agreement between an Acquirer(s) and Defendants gives 
Defendants the ability unreasonably to raise the Acquirer's costs, to 
lower the Acquirer's efficiency, or otherwise to interfere in the 
ability of the Acquirer(s) to effectively compete.

V. Appointment of Trustee To Effect Divestiture

    A. If Defendants have not divested the Divestiture Assets within 
the time periods specified in Sections IV.A.--IV.D., Defendants shall 
notify the United States and the Plaintiff States of that fact in 
writing. Upon application of the United States, the Court shall appoint 
a Divestiture Trustee selected by the United States, in consultation 
with the Plaintiff States, and approved by the Court to divest the 
Divestiture Assets in a manner consistent with this Final Judgment.
    B. After the appointment of a Divestiture Trustee becomes 
effective, only the Divestiture Trustee shall have the right to sell 
the Divestiture Assets, including any arrangements related to 
Associated Ground Facilities. The Divestiture Trustee shall have the 
power and authority to accomplish the divestiture to an Acquirer(s) 
acceptable to the United States in its sole discretion, in consultation 
with the Plaintiff States, at such price and on such terms as are then 
obtainable upon reasonable effort by the Divestiture Trustee, subject 
to the provisions of Section IV, V, and VI of this Final Judgment, and 
shall have such other powers as this Court deems appropriate.
    C. Subject to Section V.E. of this Final Judgment, the Divestiture 
Trustee may hire at the reasonable cost and expense of Defendants any 
investment bankers, attorneys, or other agents, who shall be solely 
accountable to the Divestiture

[[Page 71404]]

Trustee, reasonably necessary in the Divestiture Trustee's judgment to 
assist in the divestiture.
    D. Defendants shall not object to a sale by the Divestiture Trustee 
on any ground other than the Divestiture Trustee's malfeasance. Any 
such objections by Defendants must be conveyed in writing to the United 
States, the Plaintiff States and the Divestiture Trustee within ten 
(10) calendar days after the Divestiture Trustee has provided the 
notice required under Section VI.A.
    E. The Divestiture Trustee shall serve at the cost and expense of 
Defendants, pursuant to a written agreement with Defendants on such 
terms and conditions as the United States approves, in consultation 
with the Plaintiff States, and shall account for all monies derived 
from the sale of the assets sold by the Divestiture Trustee and all 
costs and expenses so incurred. After approval by the Court of the 
Divestiture Trustee's accounting, including fees for its services and 
those of any professionals and agents retained by the Divestiture 
Trustee, all remaining money shall be paid to Defendants and the trust 
shall then be terminated. The compensation of the Divestiture Trustee 
and any professionals and agents retained by the Divestiture Trustee 
shall be reasonable in light of the value of the Divestiture Assets and 
based on a fee arrangement providing the Divestiture Trustee with an 
incentive based on the price and terms of the divestiture and the speed 
with which it is accomplished, but timeliness is paramount.
    F. Defendants shall use their best efforts to assist the 
Divestiture Trustee in accomplishing the required divestiture. The 
Divestiture Trustee and any consultants, accountants, attorneys, and 
other persons retained by the Divestiture Trustee shall have full and 
complete access to the personnel, books, records, and facilities of the 
business to be divested, and Defendants shall develop financial and 
other information relevant to such business as the Divestiture Trustee 
may reasonably request, subject to reasonable protection for trade 
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial 
information. Defendants shall take no action to interfere with or to 
impede the Divestiture Trustee's accomplishment of the divestiture.
    G. After its appointment, the Divestiture Trustee shall file 
monthly reports with the United States, the Plaintiff States, and the 
Court setting forth the Divestiture Trustee's efforts to accomplish the 
divestiture ordered under this Final Judgment. To the extent such 
reports contain information that the Divestiture Trustee or Defendants 
deem confidential, such reports shall not be filed in the public docket 
of the Court. Such reports shall include the name, address, and 
telephone number of each person who, during the preceding month, made 
an offer to acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring, entered into 
negotiations to acquire, or was contacted or made an inquiry about 
acquiring any interest in the Divestiture Assets, and shall describe in 
detail each contact with any such person. The Divestiture Trustee shall 
maintain full records of all efforts made to divest the Divestiture 
Assets.
    H. If the Divestiture Trustee has not accomplished the divestiture 
ordered under this Final Judgment within six (6) months after its 
appointment, the Divestiture Trustee shall promptly file with the Court 
a report setting forth (1) the Divestiture Trustee's efforts to 
accomplish the required divestiture, (2) the reasons, in the 
Divestiture Trustee's judgment, why the required divestiture has not 
been accomplished, and (3) the Divestiture Trustee's recommendations. 
To the extent such reports contain information that the Divestiture 
Trustee deems confidential, such reports shall not be filed in the 
public docket of the Court. The Divestiture Trustee shall at the same 
time furnish such report to the Defendants and to the United States, 
which shall have the right to make additional recommendations 
consistent with the purpose of the trust. The Court thereafter shall 
enter such orders as it shall deem appropriate to carry out the purpose 
of the Final Judgment, which may, if necessary, include extending the 
trust and the term of the Divestiture Trustee's appointment by a period 
requested by the United States.

VI. Notice of Proposed Divestitures

    A. Within two (2) business days following execution of a definitive 
divestiture agreement, Defendants or the Divestiture Trustee, whichever 
is then responsible for effecting the divestitures required herein, 
shall notify the United States and the Plaintiff States, of any 
proposed divestitures required by Section IV or V of this Final 
Judgment. If the trustee is responsible, it shall similarly notify 
Defendants. The notice shall set forth the details of the proposed 
divestitures and list the name, address, and telephone number of each 
person not previously identified who offered or expressed an interest 
in or desire to acquire any ownership interest in the Divestiture 
Assets, together with full details of the same.
    B. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of receipt by the United 
States of such notice, the United States, in its sole discretion, in 
consultation with the Plaintiff States, may request from Defendants, 
the proposed Acquirer(s), any other third party, or the Divestiture 
Trustee, if applicable, additional information concerning the proposed 
divestitures, the proposed Acquirer(s), and any other potential 
Acquirer(s). Defendants and the Divestiture Trustee shall furnish any 
additional information requested to the United States within fifteen 
(15) calendar days of receipt of the request, unless the parties 
otherwise agree.
    C. Within thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of the notice, or 
within twenty (20) calendar days after the United States has been 
provided the additional information requested from Defendants, the 
proposed Acquirer(s), any third party, and the trustee, whichever is 
later, the United States, in consultation with the Plaintiff States, 
shall provide written notice to Defendants and/or the Divestiture 
Trustee, stating whether it objects to the proposed divestitures. If 
the United States provides written notice that it does not object, the 
divestitures may be consummated, subject only to the Defendants' 
limited right to object to the sale under Section V.D. of this Final 
Judgment. Absent written notice that the United States does not object 
to the proposed Acquirer(s) or upon objection by the United States, a 
divestiture proposed under Section IV or Section V shall not be 
consummated. Upon objection by Defendants under Section V.D., a 
divestiture proposed under Section V shall not be consummated unless 
approved by the Court.

VII. Monitoring Trustee

    A. Upon the filing of this Final Judgment, the United States may, 
in its sole discretion, in consultation with the Plaintiff States, 
appoint a Monitoring Trustee, subject to approval by the Court.
    B. The Monitoring Trustee shall have the power and authority to 
monitor Defendants' compliance with the terms of this Final Judgment, 
and shall have such powers as this Court deems appropriate. The 
Monitoring Trustee shall be required to investigate and report on the 
Defendants' compliance with this Final Judgment and the Defendants' 
progress toward effectuating the purposes of this Final Judgment.
    C. Subject to Section VII.E of this Final Judgment, the Monitoring 
Trustee may hire at the cost and expense of Defendants, any 
consultants, accountants, attorneys, or other persons, who shall be 
solely accountable to the

[[Page 71405]]

Monitoring Trustee, reasonably necessary in the Monitoring Trustee's 
judgment.
    D. Defendants shall not object to actions taken by the Monitoring 
Trustee in fulfillment of the Monitoring Trustee's responsibilities 
under this Final Judgment or any other Order of this Court on any 
ground other than the Monitoring Trustee's malfeasance. Any such 
objections by Defendants must be conveyed in writing to the United 
States, the Plaintiff States, and the Monitoring Trustee within ten 
(10) calendar days after the action taken by the Monitoring Trustee 
giving rise to the Defendants' objection.
    E. The Monitoring Trustee shall serve at the cost and expense of 
Defendants, pursuant to a written agreement with Defendants on such 
terms and conditions as the United States, in consultation with the 
Plaintiff States, approves. The compensation of the Monitoring Trustee 
and any consultants, accountants, attorneys, and other persons retained 
by the Monitoring Trustee shall be on reasonable and customary terms 
commensurate with the individuals' experience and responsibilities. The 
Monitoring Trustee shall, within three (3) business days of hiring any 
consultants, accountants, attorneys, or other persons, provide written 
notice of such hiring and the rate of compensation to Defendants.
    F. The Monitoring Trustee shall have no responsibility or 
obligation for the operation of Defendants' businesses.
    G. Defendants shall use their best efforts to assist the Monitoring 
Trustee in monitoring Defendants' compliance with their individual 
obligations under this Final Judgment. The Monitoring Trustee and any 
consultants, accountants, attorneys, and other persons retained by the 
Monitoring Trustee shall have full and complete access to the 
personnel, books, records, and facilities relating to compliance with 
this Final Judgment, subject to reasonable protection for trade secret 
or confidential research, development, or commercial information or any 
applicable privileges. Defendants shall take no action to interfere 
with or to impede the Monitoring Trustee's accomplishment of its other 
responsibilities. The Monitoring Trustee shall, within three (3) 
business days of hiring any consultants, accountants, attorneys, or 
other persons, provide written notice of such hiring and the rate of 
compensation to Defendants.
    H. After its appointment, the Monitoring Trustee shall file reports 
every ninety (90) days, or more frequently as needed, with the United 
States, the Plaintiff States, the Defendants and the Court setting 
forth the Defendants' efforts to comply with their individual 
obligations under this Final Judgment. To the extent such reports 
contain information that the trustee deems confidential, such reports 
shall not be filed in the public docket of the Court.
    I. The Monitoring Trustee shall serve until the completion of the 
divestitures required by Sections IV and V of this Final Judgment, 
including any lease back period pursuant to Section IV.F.5. or IV.G.5.

VIII. Financing

    Defendants shall not finance all or any part of any purchase made 
pursuant to Section IV or V of this Final Judgment. For purposes of 
this Section VIII, subleasing shall not be regarded as financing.

IX. Asset Preservation

    Until the divestiture required by this Final Judgment has been 
accomplished, Defendants shall take all steps necessary to comply with 
the Asset Preservation Stipulation and Order entered by this Court. 
Defendants shall take no action that would jeopardize the divestiture 
ordered by this Court.

X. Affidavits

    A. Within twenty (20) calendar days of entry of the Court entering 
the Asset Preservation Order and Stipulation in this matter, and every 
thirty (30) calendar days thereafter until the divestiture has been 
completed under Section IV or V, Defendants shall deliver to the United 
States and the Plaintiff States an affidavit as to the fact and manner 
of its compliance with Section IV or V of this Final Judgment. Each 
such affidavit shall include the name, address, and telephone number of 
each person who, during the first twenty (20) calendar days or, 
thereafter, the preceding thirty (30) calendar days, made an offer to 
acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring, entered into negotiations 
to acquire, or was contacted or made an inquiry about acquiring, any 
interest in the Divestiture Assets, and shall describe in detail each 
contact with any such person during that period. Each such affidavit 
shall also include a description of the efforts defendants have taken 
to solicit buyers for the Divestiture Assets, and to provide required 
information to prospective Acquirers, including the limitations, if 
any, on such information. Assuming the information set forth in the 
affidavit is true and complete, any objection by the United States to 
information provided by Defendants, including limitation on 
information, shall be made within fourteen (14) calendar days of 
receipt of such affidavit.
    B. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the Court entering the Asset 
Preservation Order and Stipulation in this matter, Defendants shall 
deliver to the United States an affidavit that describes in reasonable 
detail all actions defendants have taken and all steps Defendants have 
implemented on an ongoing basis to comply with Section IX of this Final 
Judgment. Defendants shall deliver to the United States an affidavit 
describing any changes to the efforts and actions outlined in 
Defendants' earlier affidavits filed pursuant to this section within 
fifteen (15) calendar days after the change is implemented.
    C. Defendants shall keep all records of all efforts made to 
preserve and divest the Divestiture Assets until one year after such 
divestiture has been completed.

XI. Compliance Inspection

    A. For the purposes of determining or securing compliance with this 
Final Judgment, or of any related orders such as any Asset Preservation 
Order, or of determining whether the Final Judgment should be modified 
or vacated, and subject to any legally recognized privilege, from time 
to time authorized representatives of the United States Department of 
Justice, including consultants and other persons retained by the United 
States, shall, upon written request of an authorized representative of 
the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, and 
on reasonable notice to Defendants, be permitted:
    (1) Access during Defendants' office hours to inspect and copy, or 
at the option of the United States, to require Defendants to provide 
hard copy or electronic copies of, all books, ledgers, accounts, 
records, data, and documents in the possession, custody, or control of 
Defendants, relating to any matters contained in this Final Judgment; 
and
    (2) to interview, either informally or on the record, Defendants' 
officers, employees, or agents, who may have their individual counsel 
present, regarding such matters. The interviews shall be subject to the 
reasonable convenience of the interviewee and without restraint or 
interference by Defendants.
    B. Upon the written request of an authorized representative of the 
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, 
Defendants shall submit written reports or response to written 
interrogatories, under oath if requested, relating to any of the 
matters

[[Page 71406]]

contained in this Final Judgment as may be requested.
    C. No information or documents obtained by the means provided in 
this section shall be divulged by the United States to any person other 
than an authorized representative of the executive branch of the United 
States, except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United 
States is a party (including grand jury proceedings), or for the 
purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or as 
otherwise required by law.
    D. If at the time information or documents are furnished by 
Defendants to the United States, Defendants represent and identify in 
writing the material in any such information or documents to which a 
claim of protection may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(7) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and Defendants mark each pertinent page of 
such material, ``Subject to claim of protection under Rule 26(c)(7) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'' then the United States shall 
give Defendants ten (10) calendar days notice prior to divulging such 
material in any legal proceeding (other than a grand jury proceeding).

XII. No Reacquisition

    Defendants shall not reacquire any interest in any part of the 
Divestiture Assets divested under this Final Judgment during the term 
of this Final Judgment. Nothing in this Final Judgment shall prevent 
Defendants from engaging in trades, exchanges, or swaps involving 
Divestiture Assets with an Acquirer, provided such arrangements do not 
increase Defendants' percentage of slots operated or held or gates 
operated or held at the airport in question, except that, consistent 
with industry practice, Defendants may temporarily operate slots for 
periods of no more than two consecutive months at the request of the 
Acquirer. Nothing in this Section XII shall prevent Defendants from 
acquiring additional slots, gates or facilities, other than the 
Divestiture Assets, at DCA, LGA or the Key Airports subject to the 
notification requirement in Section XIII.A. Nothing in this Section 
shall prevent Defendants from cooperating in gate or facility re-
locations in the ordinary course of the airport operator's business, 
including re-locating to the Divestiture Assets, provided the Acquirer 
of those gates is offered alternative gates and Associated Ground 
Facilities from the airport operator.

XIII. Notification of Future Transactions

    A. Unless such transaction is otherwise subject to the reporting 
and waiting period requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1976, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18a (the ``HSR Act''), 
Defendants shall not acquire any interest in any slot at DCA that was 
in use at the completion of the Transaction without providing notice to 
the United States at least thirty (30) calendar days prior to the 
acquisition, provided however that this reporting requirement shall not 
apply to transactions that do not result in an increase in Defendants' 
percentage of slots operated or held at DCA. Defendants shall maintain 
a record of any non-reportable transactions and shall provide such 
record to the United States promptly upon request.
    B. Any notification provided pursuant to Section XIII.A. above 
shall be provided in the same format as required by the HSR Act, and 
shall include the names of the principal representatives of the parties 
to the transaction who negotiated the agreement and any management or 
strategic plans discussing the proposed transaction. If within the 30-
day period after notification the United States makes a written request 
for additional information regarding the transaction, Defendants shall 
not consummate the proposed transaction or agreement until thirty (30) 
calendar days after submitting all such additional information. Early 
termination of the waiting periods in this paragraph may be requested 
and, where appropriate, granted in a similar manner as applicable under 
the requirements and provisions of the HSR Act and rules promulgated 
thereunder.
    C. All references to the HSR Act in this Final Judgment refer to 
the HSR Act as it exists at the time of the transaction or agreement 
and incorporate any subsequent amendments to the HSR Act.

XIV. Bankruptcy

    For purposes of Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
as amended, and codified as 11 U.S.C. 101 et seq. (the ``Bankruptcy 
Code'') or any analogous provision under any law of any foreign or 
domestic, federal, state, provincial, local, municipal or other 
governmental jurisdiction relating to bankruptcy, insolvency or 
reorganization (``Foreign Bankruptcy Law''), (a) no sublease or other 
agreement related to the Divesture Assets will be deemed to be an 
executory contract, and (b) if for any reason a sublease or other 
agreement related to the Divesture Assets is deemed to be an executory 
contract, the Defendants shall take all necessary steps to ensure that 
the Acquirer(s) shall be protected in the continued enjoyment of its 
right under any such agreement including, acceptance of such agreement 
or any underlying lease or other agreement in proceedings under the 
Bankruptcy Code or any analogous provision of Foreign Bankruptcy Law.

XV. Retention of Jurisdiction

    This Court retains jurisdiction to enable any party to this Final 
Judgment to apply to this Court at any time for further orders and 
directions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe 
this Final Judgment, to modify any of its provisions, to ensure and 
enforce compliance, and to punish violations of its provisions.

XVI. Expiration of Final Judgment

    Unless this Court grants an extension, this Final Judgment shall 
expire ten (10) years from the date of its entry.

XVII. Public Interest Determination

    Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest. The parties 
have complied with the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and 
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16, including making copies available to the 
public of this Final Judgment, the Competitive Impact Statement, and 
any comments thereon and the United States' responses to comments. 
Based upon the record before the Court, which includes the Competitive 
Impact Statement and any comments and response to comments filed with 
the Court, entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.

Date:------------------------------------------------------------------

    Court approval subject to procedures of the Antitrust Procedures 
and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec.  16
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Honorable Colleen Kollar-Kotelly,
United States District Judge

[[Page 71407]]



----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    EXHIBIT A
                                                    DCA SLOTS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JetBlue Slots (currently held by American)
1284...........................................         1040         1018         1012         1025         1200
1034...........................................         1334         1013         1058         1172         1221
1014...........................................         1217         1097         1174
Additional American Air Carrier Slots
1090...........................................         1144         1570         1321         1425         1445
1521...........................................         1585         1092         1159         1274         1296
1493...........................................         1496         1044         1051         1667         1233
1322...........................................         1341         1616         1138         1139         1271
1430...........................................         1464         1547         1272         1351         1481
1506...........................................         1525         1611         1381         1420         1480
1641...........................................         1662         1104         1342         1543         1666
1208...........................................         1286         1299         1345         1388         1422
1620...........................................         1117         1121         1167         1312         1460
1473...........................................         1624         1625         1628         1364         1411
1561...........................................         1646         1074         1100         1202         1380
1405...........................................         1499         1276         1292         1353         1396
1634...........................................         1441         1475         1492         1503         1559
1587...........................................         1623         1008         1606         1575         1642
1122...........................................         1216
US Airways Air Carrier Slots
1070...........................................         1066
DCA Gates
Up to five (5) gates from among Gates 24, 26, 28, 30 and 32, if necessary.......................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    EXHIBIT B
                                                    LGA SLOTS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Southwest Slots (currently held by American)
3351...........................................         2101         3335         3422         3665         3314
2215...........................................         3045         2120         3312
American LGA Slots
3189...........................................         3068         2139         2147         3236         2222
2096...........................................         2075         3784         2033         3841         2008
3594...........................................         3671         3380         3258         3282         3080
2032...........................................         2230         3013         2166         2111         3826
LGA Gates
Up to two contiguous gates on Concourse C currently leased by American at LGA...................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Exhibit C--Key Airport Gates

Boston Logan International Airport

    Two gates that Defendants currently lease or two gates that 
Defendants would be entitled to occupy following any relocation of 
gates and facilities at the direction of Massport.

Chicago O'Hare International Airport

    Gates L1 and L2. Defendants, at their own expense, will reconfigure 
Gate L2A, L2B, and L2C, as follows: Gate L2A will be restored to a 
mainline gate by (a) removing the gate at L2B, (b) moving the gate 
podium that currently serves Gate L2C south, creating one additional 
bay for gate L2A, and restriping the tarmac. Defendants will retain 
their interest in Gate L2C.

Dallas Love Field

    Gates currently leased by American at Dallas Love Field, or which 
American will be entitled to occupy following completion of 
construction of the Love Field Modernization Program.

Los Angeles International Airport

    Gates 31A and 31B in Terminal 3.

Miami International Airport

    Two gates currently leased by US Airways in Terminal J.

[FR Doc. 2013-28224 Filed 11-26-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P