Conceptual Example of a Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework Policy Statement, 70354-70356 [2013-28065]
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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 227 / Monday, November 25, 2013 / Notices
strategic SNM are required to report
inventories every 6 months. Licensees
possessing SNM of moderate strategic
significance must report every 9
months. Licensees possessing SNM of
low strategic significance must report
annually, except two licensees must
report their dynamic inventories every 2
months and a static inventory on an
annual basis.
6. Who will be required or asked to
report: Fuel facility licensees possessing
special nuclear material, i.e., enriched
uranium, plutonium or U–233.
7. An estimate of the number of
annual responses: 35.
8. The estimated number of annual
respondents: 7.
9. An estimate of the total number of
hours needed annually to complete the
requirement or request: 140 hours (4
hours per response × 35 responses).
10. Abstract: NRC Form 327 is
submitted by fuel facility licensees to
account for special nuclear material.
The data is used by NRC to assess
licensee material control and accounting
programs and to confirm the absence of
(or detect the occurrence of) SNM theft
or diversion. NUREG/BR–0096 provides
specific guidance and instructions for
completing the form in accordance with
the requirements appropriate for a
particular licensee.
The public may examine and have
copied for fee publicly available
documents, including the final
supporting statement, at the NRC’s
Public Document Room, Room O–1F21,
One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. The
OMB clearance requests are available at
the NRC’s Web site: https://www.nrc.gov/
public-involve/doc-comment/omb/. The
document will be available on the
NRC’s home page site for 60 days after
the signature date of this notice.
Comments and questions should be
directed to the OMB reviewer listed
below by December 26, 2013. Comments
received after this date will be
considered if it is practical to do so, but
assurance of consideration cannot be
given to comments received after this
date.
Chad Whiteman, Desk Officer, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs
(3150–0139), NEOB–10202, Office of
Management and Budget,
Washington, DC 20503.
Comments can also be emailed to
Chad_S_Whiteman@omb.eop.gov or
submitted by telephone at 202–395–
4718.
The NRC Clearance Officer is
Tremaine Donnell, telephone: 301–415–
6258.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day
of November, 2013.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:53 Nov 22, 2013
Jkt 232001
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Tremaine Donnell,
NRC Clearance Officer, Office of Information
Services.
[FR Doc. 2013–28181 Filed 11–22–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[NRC–2013–0254]
Conceptual Example of a Proposed
Risk Management Regulatory
Framework Policy Statement
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Conceptual example of a
proposed policy statement; request for
comment.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing a
document entitled: ‘‘White Paper on a
Conceptual Example of a Proposed Risk
Management Regulatory Framework
Policy Statement’’ (ADAMS Accession
No. ML13273A517) and requesting
public comment. The conceptual
statement would set forth a possible
Commission policy regarding the use of
a structured decision-making model that
results in risk-informed and
performance-based defense-in-depth
protections to: Ensure appropriate
personnel, barriers, and controls to
prevent, contain, and mitigate possible
inadvertent exposure to radioactive
material according to the hazard
present, the relevant scenarios, and the
associated uncertainties; and ensure that
the risks resulting from the failure of
some or all of the established barriers
and controls, including human errors,
are maintained acceptably low. The
white paper is an illustration of the
staff’s work in progress and is expected
to be modified as both internal and
external review is solicited and
considered.
DATES: Please submit comments by
January 10, 2014. Comments received
after this date will be considered if it is
practical to do so, but the NRC staff is
able to ensure consideration only for
comments received on or before this
date.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
by any of the following methods (unless
this document describes a different
method for submitting comments on a
specific subject):
• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2013–0254. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol
Gallagher; telephone: 301–287–3422;
SUMMARY:
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email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For
technical questions, contact the
individual(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document.
• Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey,
Chief, Rules, Announcements, and
Directives Branch (RADB), Office of
Administration, Mail Stop: 3WFN–06–
44M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001.
For additional direction on accessing
information and submitting comments,
see ‘‘Accessing Information and
Submitting Comments’’ in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of
this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mary Drouin, Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–251–
7574; email: Mary.Drouin@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Accessing Information and
Submitting Comments
A. Accessing Information
Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2013–
0254 when contacting the NRC about
the availability of information regarding
this document. You may access
publicly-available information related to
this document by any of the following
methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2013–0254.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may access publicly
available documents online in the NRC
Library at https://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To begin the search,
select ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and
then select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC’s Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The
ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced in this document
(if that document is available in
ADAMS) is provided the first time that
a document is referenced.
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
purchase copies of public documents at
the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
B. Submitting Comments
Please include Docket ID NRC–2013–
0254 in the subject line of your
comment submission, in order to ensure
that the NRC is able to make your
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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 227 / Monday, November 25, 2013 / Notices
sroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
comment submission available to the
public in this docket.
The NRC cautions you not to include
identifying or contact information that
you do not want to be publicly
disclosed in you comment submission.
The NRC will post all comment
submissions at https://
www.regulations.gov as well as enter the
comment submissions into ADAMS.
The NRC does not routinely edit
comment submissions to remove
identifying or contact information.
If you are requesting or aggregating
comments from other persons for
submission to the NRC, then you should
inform those persons not to include
identifying or contact information that
they do not want to be publicly
disclosed in their comment submission.
Your request should state that the NRC
does not routinely edit comment
submissions to remove such information
before making the comment
submissions available to the public or
entering the comment submissions into
ADAMS.
II. Discussion
As part of the NRC strategic plan’s
goal of ‘‘openness,’’ a white paper on a
Conceptual Example of a Proposed Risk
Management Regulatory Framework
(RMRF) Policy Statement
(ML13273A517) is being issued to both
inform public stakeholders of the work
and to start soliciting stakeholder
feedback with regard to an NRC working
group’s early draft. An NRC inter-office
working group has been chartered to
develop a conceptual draft of a RMRF
Policy Statement for Commission
consideration. The document is a work
in progress and has been developed to
illustrate a potential organization,
structure, and content of a conceptual
policy statement. It is expected that as
the Conceptual Example of a Proposed
RMRF Policy Statement is modified that
additional notices, requesting public
comment will be published in the
Federal Register. In early 2011, at the
request of Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko,
Commissioner George Apostolakis lead
a Risk Management Task Force (RMTF)
to evaluate how the agency should be
regulating 10 to 15 years in the future.
More specifically, the RMTF was
chartered ‘‘to develop a strategic vision
and options for adopting a more
comprehensive and holistic riskinformed, performance-based regulatory
approach for reactors, materials, waste,
fuel cycle, and transportation that
would continue to ensure the safe and
secure use of nuclear material.’’ The
NUREG–2150, ‘‘A Proposed Risk
Management Regulatory Framework,’’
was published in April 2012
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:53 Nov 22, 2013
Jkt 232001
(ML12109A277). This report describes
the findings and recommendations of
this evaluation. The report provides
findings and recommendations which
are compiled into two groups. The first
group addresses agency-wide, more
strategic issues, recommending that
‘‘The NRC should formally adopt the
proposed Risk Management Regulatory
Framework through a Commission
Policy Statement.’’ The second group
addresses what changes would be
needed in specific program areas (e.g.,
power reactors and materials) in the
next several years to ensure that the
framework is implemented.
The agency-wide findings of the
RMTF are:
• Finding: Whether used explicitly, as
for power reactors, or implicitly, as for
materials programs, the concept of
defense-in-depth has served the NRC
and the regulated industries well and
continues to be valuable today.
However, it is not used consistently,
and there is no guidance on how much
defense-in-depth is sufficient.
• Finding: Risk assessments provide
valuable and realistic insights into
potential exposure scenarios. In
combination with other technical
analyses, risk assessments can inform
decisions about appropriate defense-indepth measures.
Considering these findings, the RMTF
proposes that ‘‘The NRC should
formally adopt the proposed Risk
Management Regulatory Framework
through a Commission Policy
Statement.’’
The RMTF notes that the proposed
framework includes several important
benefits:
• Updated knowledge from
contemporary studies, such as risk
assessments, would be incorporated into
the regulations and guidance, thereby
improving their realism and technical
basis.
• Implementation of a systematic
approach would foster a consistent
regulatory decision-making process
throughout the agency and improve
resource allocation.
• Consistency in language and
communication would be improved
across the agency and externally.
• Support of issue resolution would
be achieved in a systematic, consistent,
and efficient manner.
The RMTF also notes that
implementation of the proposed
framework would also pose challenges:
• A change would be required within
the agency and externally to increase
understanding of the value and use of
risk concepts and risk management
language.
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70355
• The proposed risk-informed and
performance-based concept of defensein-depth may require the development
of additional decision metrics and
numerical guidelines.
• The approach would likely require
developing new or revised riskassessment consensus codes and
standards.
• A long-term commitment from the
Commission and senior agency
management would be required for
implementation.
To assist in the review and comment
process, the NRC is requesting the
public address the specific questions
listed below.
Overall Questions:
(1) Is there a need for such a policy
statement? If so, why? If not, why not?
(2) Do you see any benefits in such a
policy statement? If so, what are they?
If not, why not?
(3) How could the proposed RMRF
policy statement be made more useful to
licensees and/or certificate holders,
applicants and other stakeholders?
(4) Is the policy statement sufficiently
flexible to address the specific program
area activities (e.g., reactor versus
transportation) with regard, for example,
to the type of risk analyses, to the
defense-in-depth principles?
(5) What implementation challenges
do you foresee?
(6) A policy statement generally states
the Commission’s expectation regarding
a particular subject. How to meet the
Commission’s expectation is not
included in the policy statement. If
approved by the Commission, the staff
plans to develop associated
implementation guidance. What should
be the scope and extent of this guidance
to be helpful? For example,
a. For program area of interest, what
would be the appropriate decision
criteria for determining adequate
defense-in-depth?
b. What specific issues or actions
should the guidance address in order to
implement the policy statement for a
particular program area (of interest)?
(7) Does the proposed policy
statement appropriately integrate
security considerations into the RMRF?
If not, why not?’’
Sections I and II
(8) Are these two sections
(Background and Development of Risk
Management Regulatory Framework
Policy Statement) informative? Do they
provide useful information in helping to
clarify the need, purpose, goals, etc. of
the policy statement in Section III?
What information is not necessary and
what type of information should be
added, if any?
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70356
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 227 / Monday, November 25, 2013 / Notices
Section III
(9) Is the purpose and goal of the
proposed conceptual policy statement
clear? If not, where is clarification
needed?
(10) Is the proposed conceptual RMRF
policy statement useful in clarifying the
Commission’s intent to use a riskinformed and performance-based
defense-in-depth approach in
performing its regulatory function? If
not, what needs to be clarified?
Section II
(11) Should the current PRA policy
statement (60 FR 42622, August 16,
1995) be replaced or subsumed/
incorporated into this policy statement?
(12) What would be the benefit? What
would be the detriment?
Section III.B
(13) If subsumed, is the proposed
manner of incorporating the PRA
statement reasonable? If not, why not?
(14) Should the policy statement
establish a Commission expectation that
for all program areas, licensees and/or
certificate holders are expected to have
a risk analysis that is commensurate
with the activity and technology?
Section III.A
(15) Do the proposed key elements in
the RMRF process represent a complete
and reasonable set?
a. If not, what modifications should
be made?
b. Are other elements needed to cover
the full spectrum of regulated activities?
c. Are the elements sufficient to
develop a consistent decisionmaking
approach across all regulated activities?
sroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Section III.C
(16) Should defense-in-depth be a key
aspect of a RMRF? If not, why not?
(17) Will such proposed draft policy
statement be useful in determining the
extent of defense-in-depth needed in
each program area?
(18) Is the approach proposed for
characterizing defense-in-depth clear? If
not, where is clarification needed? Is the
strategy reasonable? If not, why not?
(19) Is the definition provided for
defense-in-depth clear? If not, why not?
(20) Are the key attributes identified
reasonable and complete? If not, why
not?
(21) Are the basic levels of prevention
and mitigation reasonable? If not, why
not?
(22) Are the definitions of prevention
and mitigation clear and reasonable? If
not, why not?
a. Are they sufficiently flexible to
support all program areas? If not, where
not?
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:53 Nov 22, 2013
Jkt 232001
b. Should and can these levels be
further detailed (i.e., more specific) and
still be sufficiently flexible to support
all program areas?
(23) Is it reasonable to expect the
levels of defense to be independent such
that failure of one level does not lead to
failure of subsequent levels? If not, why
not?
a. Should the NRC accept different
levels of rigor, or different levels of
confidence, in demonstrating that there
is independence between levels? Could
the level of rigor vary depending upon
the nature of the activity and the risks
associate with loss of independence?
b. Are there any other considerations
that should be taken into account in
determining the acceptable level of rigor
or confidence in demonstrating
independence between layers?
(24) Is it reasonable to expect the
following with regards to defense-indepth:
a. Ensure appropriate barriers,
controls, and personnel are available to
prevent and mitigate exposure to
radioactive material according to the
hazard present, the credible scenarios,
and the associated uncertainties; and
b. Ensure that the risks resulting from
the failure of some or all of the
established barriers and controls,
including human errors, are maintained
acceptably low consistent with the
applicable acceptance guidelines.
c. Overall, ensure that each regulated
activity has appropriate defense-indepth measures for prevention and
mitigation of adverse events and
accidents.
d. If the expectations of a, b, or c are
not reasonable, why not?
(25) Are the proposed defense-indepth principles and decision criteria
complete? Are they useful in deciding
the extent of defense-in-depth needed in
a program area? If not, how should they
be improved?
Section III.D
(26) Are the proposed program area
specific policy considerations clear and
complete? If not, what modifications
should be made? Are others needed to
cover the full spectrum of regulated
activities?
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day
of November, 2013.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Richard P. Correia,
Director, Division of Risk Analysis, Office of
Nuclear Regulatory Research.
[FR Doc. 2013–28065 Filed 11–22–13; 8:45 am]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[NRC–2013–0215]
Compliance With Order EA–13–109,
Order Modifying Licenses With Regard
to Reliable Hardened Containment
Vents Capable of Operation Under
Severe Accident Conditions
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Interim Staff Guidance;
Issuance.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing Japan
Lessons-Learned Project Directorate
Interim Staff Guidance (JLD–ISG), JLD–
ISG–2013–02, ‘‘Compliance with Order
EA–13–109, Order Modifying Licenses
with Regard to Reliable Hardened
Containment Vents Capable of
Operation under Severe Accident
Conditions.’’ Agencywide Documents
and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML13130A067). This ISG
provides guidance and clarifies the
requirements in the order to assist the
licensees that have Boiling Water
Reactors with Mark I and Mark II
Containments in the design and
implementation of a containment
venting system that is capable of a
operation under severe accident
conditions. This ISG also endorses, with
clarifications, the industry guidance
contained in Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI) 13–02, ‘‘Industry Guidance for
Compliance with Order EA–13–109,’’
Revision 0 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML13316A853).
SUMMARY:
Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2013–0215 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may access publicly-available
information related to this action by the
following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2013–0215. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol
Gallagher; telephone: 301–287–3422;
email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For
technical questions, contact the
individual(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may access publicly
available documents online in the NRC
Library at https://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To begin the search,
select ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and
then select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS,
ADDRESSES:
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 227 (Monday, November 25, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70354-70356]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-28065]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2013-0254]
Conceptual Example of a Proposed Risk Management Regulatory
Framework Policy Statement
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Conceptual example of a proposed policy statement; request for
comment.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing a
document entitled: ``White Paper on a Conceptual Example of a Proposed
Risk Management Regulatory Framework Policy Statement'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML13273A517) and requesting public comment. The
conceptual statement would set forth a possible Commission policy
regarding the use of a structured decision-making model that results in
risk-informed and performance-based defense-in-depth protections to:
Ensure appropriate personnel, barriers, and controls to prevent,
contain, and mitigate possible inadvertent exposure to radioactive
material according to the hazard present, the relevant scenarios, and
the associated uncertainties; and ensure that the risks resulting from
the failure of some or all of the established barriers and controls,
including human errors, are maintained acceptably low. The white paper
is an illustration of the staff's work in progress and is expected to
be modified as both internal and external review is solicited and
considered.
DATES: Please submit comments by January 10, 2014. Comments received
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the
NRC staff is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on
or before this date.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods
(unless this document describes a different method for submitting
comments on a specific subject):
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2013-0254. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-287-
3422; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact
the individual(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section
of this document.
Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Chief, Rules,
Announcements, and Directives Branch (RADB), Office of Administration,
Mail Stop: 3WFN-06-44M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001.
For additional direction on accessing information and submitting
comments, see ``Accessing Information and Submitting Comments'' in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mary Drouin, Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001; telephone: 301-251-7574; email: Mary.Drouin@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments
A. Accessing Information
Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2013-0254 when contacting the NRC
about the availability of information regarding this document. You may
access publicly-available information related to this document by any
of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2013-0254.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC
Library at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the
search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-
based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's
Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number
for each document referenced in this document (if that document is
available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is
referenced.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
B. Submitting Comments
Please include Docket ID NRC-2013-0254 in the subject line of your
comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make
your
[[Page 70355]]
comment submission available to the public in this docket.
The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact
information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in you
comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at https://www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment submissions into
ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove
identifying or contact information.
If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to
include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be
publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should
state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to
remove such information before making the comment submissions available
to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS.
II. Discussion
As part of the NRC strategic plan's goal of ``openness,'' a white
paper on a Conceptual Example of a Proposed Risk Management Regulatory
Framework (RMRF) Policy Statement (ML13273A517) is being issued to both
inform public stakeholders of the work and to start soliciting
stakeholder feedback with regard to an NRC working group's early draft.
An NRC inter-office working group has been chartered to develop a
conceptual draft of a RMRF Policy Statement for Commission
consideration. The document is a work in progress and has been
developed to illustrate a potential organization, structure, and
content of a conceptual policy statement. It is expected that as the
Conceptual Example of a Proposed RMRF Policy Statement is modified that
additional notices, requesting public comment will be published in the
Federal Register. In early 2011, at the request of Chairman Gregory B.
Jaczko, Commissioner George Apostolakis lead a Risk Management Task
Force (RMTF) to evaluate how the agency should be regulating 10 to 15
years in the future. More specifically, the RMTF was chartered ``to
develop a strategic vision and options for adopting a more
comprehensive and holistic risk-informed, performance-based regulatory
approach for reactors, materials, waste, fuel cycle, and transportation
that would continue to ensure the safe and secure use of nuclear
material.'' The NUREG-2150, ``A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory
Framework,'' was published in April 2012 (ML12109A277). This report
describes the findings and recommendations of this evaluation. The
report provides findings and recommendations which are compiled into
two groups. The first group addresses agency-wide, more strategic
issues, recommending that ``The NRC should formally adopt the proposed
Risk Management Regulatory Framework through a Commission Policy
Statement.'' The second group addresses what changes would be needed in
specific program areas (e.g., power reactors and materials) in the next
several years to ensure that the framework is implemented.
The agency-wide findings of the RMTF are:
Finding: Whether used explicitly, as for power reactors,
or implicitly, as for materials programs, the concept of defense-in-
depth has served the NRC and the regulated industries well and
continues to be valuable today. However, it is not used consistently,
and there is no guidance on how much defense-in-depth is sufficient.
Finding: Risk assessments provide valuable and realistic
insights into potential exposure scenarios. In combination with other
technical analyses, risk assessments can inform decisions about
appropriate defense-in-depth measures.
Considering these findings, the RMTF proposes that ``The NRC should
formally adopt the proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework
through a Commission Policy Statement.''
The RMTF notes that the proposed framework includes several
important benefits:
Updated knowledge from contemporary studies, such as risk
assessments, would be incorporated into the regulations and guidance,
thereby improving their realism and technical basis.
Implementation of a systematic approach would foster a
consistent regulatory decision-making process throughout the agency and
improve resource allocation.
Consistency in language and communication would be
improved across the agency and externally.
Support of issue resolution would be achieved in a
systematic, consistent, and efficient manner.
The RMTF also notes that implementation of the proposed framework
would also pose challenges:
A change would be required within the agency and
externally to increase understanding of the value and use of risk
concepts and risk management language.
The proposed risk-informed and performance-based concept
of defense-in-depth may require the development of additional decision
metrics and numerical guidelines.
The approach would likely require developing new or
revised risk-assessment consensus codes and standards.
A long-term commitment from the Commission and senior
agency management would be required for implementation.
To assist in the review and comment process, the NRC is requesting
the public address the specific questions listed below.
Overall Questions:
(1) Is there a need for such a policy statement? If so, why? If
not, why not?
(2) Do you see any benefits in such a policy statement? If so, what
are they? If not, why not?
(3) How could the proposed RMRF policy statement be made more
useful to licensees and/or certificate holders, applicants and other
stakeholders?
(4) Is the policy statement sufficiently flexible to address the
specific program area activities (e.g., reactor versus transportation)
with regard, for example, to the type of risk analyses, to the defense-
in-depth principles?
(5) What implementation challenges do you foresee?
(6) A policy statement generally states the Commission's
expectation regarding a particular subject. How to meet the
Commission's expectation is not included in the policy statement. If
approved by the Commission, the staff plans to develop associated
implementation guidance. What should be the scope and extent of this
guidance to be helpful? For example,
a. For program area of interest, what would be the appropriate
decision criteria for determining adequate defense-in-depth?
b. What specific issues or actions should the guidance address in
order to implement the policy statement for a particular program area
(of interest)?
(7) Does the proposed policy statement appropriately integrate
security considerations into the RMRF? If not, why not?''
Sections I and II
(8) Are these two sections (Background and Development of Risk
Management Regulatory Framework Policy Statement) informative? Do they
provide useful information in helping to clarify the need, purpose,
goals, etc. of the policy statement in Section III? What information is
not necessary and what type of information should be added, if any?
[[Page 70356]]
Section III
(9) Is the purpose and goal of the proposed conceptual policy
statement clear? If not, where is clarification needed?
(10) Is the proposed conceptual RMRF policy statement useful in
clarifying the Commission's intent to use a risk-informed and
performance-based defense-in-depth approach in performing its
regulatory function? If not, what needs to be clarified?
Section II
(11) Should the current PRA policy statement (60 FR 42622, August
16, 1995) be replaced or subsumed/incorporated into this policy
statement?
(12) What would be the benefit? What would be the detriment?
Section III.B
(13) If subsumed, is the proposed manner of incorporating the PRA
statement reasonable? If not, why not?
(14) Should the policy statement establish a Commission expectation
that for all program areas, licensees and/or certificate holders are
expected to have a risk analysis that is commensurate with the activity
and technology?
Section III.A
(15) Do the proposed key elements in the RMRF process represent a
complete and reasonable set?
a. If not, what modifications should be made?
b. Are other elements needed to cover the full spectrum of
regulated activities?
c. Are the elements sufficient to develop a consistent
decisionmaking approach across all regulated activities?
Section III.C
(16) Should defense-in-depth be a key aspect of a RMRF? If not, why
not?
(17) Will such proposed draft policy statement be useful in
determining the extent of defense-in-depth needed in each program area?
(18) Is the approach proposed for characterizing defense-in-depth
clear? If not, where is clarification needed? Is the strategy
reasonable? If not, why not?
(19) Is the definition provided for defense-in-depth clear? If not,
why not?
(20) Are the key attributes identified reasonable and complete? If
not, why not?
(21) Are the basic levels of prevention and mitigation reasonable?
If not, why not?
(22) Are the definitions of prevention and mitigation clear and
reasonable? If not, why not?
a. Are they sufficiently flexible to support all program areas? If
not, where not?
b. Should and can these levels be further detailed (i.e., more
specific) and still be sufficiently flexible to support all program
areas?
(23) Is it reasonable to expect the levels of defense to be
independent such that failure of one level does not lead to failure of
subsequent levels? If not, why not?
a. Should the NRC accept different levels of rigor, or different
levels of confidence, in demonstrating that there is independence
between levels? Could the level of rigor vary depending upon the nature
of the activity and the risks associate with loss of independence?
b. Are there any other considerations that should be taken into
account in determining the acceptable level of rigor or confidence in
demonstrating independence between layers?
(24) Is it reasonable to expect the following with regards to
defense-in-depth:
a. Ensure appropriate barriers, controls, and personnel are
available to prevent and mitigate exposure to radioactive material
according to the hazard present, the credible scenarios, and the
associated uncertainties; and
b. Ensure that the risks resulting from the failure of some or all
of the established barriers and controls, including human errors, are
maintained acceptably low consistent with the applicable acceptance
guidelines.
c. Overall, ensure that each regulated activity has appropriate
defense-in-depth measures for prevention and mitigation of adverse
events and accidents.
d. If the expectations of a, b, or c are not reasonable, why not?
(25) Are the proposed defense-in-depth principles and decision
criteria complete? Are they useful in deciding the extent of defense-
in-depth needed in a program area? If not, how should they be improved?
Section III.D
(26) Are the proposed program area specific policy considerations
clear and complete? If not, what modifications should be made? Are
others needed to cover the full spectrum of regulated activities?
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of November, 2013.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Richard P. Correia,
Director, Division of Risk Analysis, Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Research.
[FR Doc. 2013-28065 Filed 11-22-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
