Conceptual Example of a Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework Policy Statement, 70354-70356 [2013-28065]

Download as PDF sroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 70354 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 227 / Monday, November 25, 2013 / Notices strategic SNM are required to report inventories every 6 months. Licensees possessing SNM of moderate strategic significance must report every 9 months. Licensees possessing SNM of low strategic significance must report annually, except two licensees must report their dynamic inventories every 2 months and a static inventory on an annual basis. 6. Who will be required or asked to report: Fuel facility licensees possessing special nuclear material, i.e., enriched uranium, plutonium or U–233. 7. An estimate of the number of annual responses: 35. 8. The estimated number of annual respondents: 7. 9. An estimate of the total number of hours needed annually to complete the requirement or request: 140 hours (4 hours per response × 35 responses). 10. Abstract: NRC Form 327 is submitted by fuel facility licensees to account for special nuclear material. The data is used by NRC to assess licensee material control and accounting programs and to confirm the absence of (or detect the occurrence of) SNM theft or diversion. NUREG/BR–0096 provides specific guidance and instructions for completing the form in accordance with the requirements appropriate for a particular licensee. The public may examine and have copied for fee publicly available documents, including the final supporting statement, at the NRC’s Public Document Room, Room O–1F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. The OMB clearance requests are available at the NRC’s Web site: http://www.nrc.gov/ public-involve/doc-comment/omb/. The document will be available on the NRC’s home page site for 60 days after the signature date of this notice. Comments and questions should be directed to the OMB reviewer listed below by December 26, 2013. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given to comments received after this date. Chad Whiteman, Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (3150–0139), NEOB–10202, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. Comments can also be emailed to Chad_S_Whiteman@omb.eop.gov or submitted by telephone at 202–395– 4718. The NRC Clearance Officer is Tremaine Donnell, telephone: 301–415– 6258. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of November, 2013. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:53 Nov 22, 2013 Jkt 232001 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Tremaine Donnell, NRC Clearance Officer, Office of Information Services. [FR Doc. 2013–28181 Filed 11–22–13; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC–2013–0254] Conceptual Example of a Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework Policy Statement Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Conceptual example of a proposed policy statement; request for comment. AGENCY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing a document entitled: ‘‘White Paper on a Conceptual Example of a Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework Policy Statement’’ (ADAMS Accession No. ML13273A517) and requesting public comment. The conceptual statement would set forth a possible Commission policy regarding the use of a structured decision-making model that results in risk-informed and performance-based defense-in-depth protections to: Ensure appropriate personnel, barriers, and controls to prevent, contain, and mitigate possible inadvertent exposure to radioactive material according to the hazard present, the relevant scenarios, and the associated uncertainties; and ensure that the risks resulting from the failure of some or all of the established barriers and controls, including human errors, are maintained acceptably low. The white paper is an illustration of the staff’s work in progress and is expected to be modified as both internal and external review is solicited and considered. DATES: Please submit comments by January 10, 2014. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the NRC staff is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or before this date. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods (unless this document describes a different method for submitting comments on a specific subject): • Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC–2013–0254. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301–287–3422; SUMMARY: PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact the individual(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. • Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Chief, Rules, Announcements, and Directives Branch (RADB), Office of Administration, Mail Stop: 3WFN–06– 44M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 0001. For additional direction on accessing information and submitting comments, see ‘‘Accessing Information and Submitting Comments’’ in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mary Drouin, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–251– 7574; email: Mary.Drouin@nrc.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments A. Accessing Information Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2013– 0254 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may access publicly-available information related to this document by any of the following methods: • Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC–2013–0254. • NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC Library at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number for each document referenced in this document (if that document is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is referenced. • NRC’s PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. B. Submitting Comments Please include Docket ID NRC–2013– 0254 in the subject line of your comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make your E:\FR\FM\25NON1.SGM 25NON1 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 227 / Monday, November 25, 2013 / Notices sroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES comment submission available to the public in this docket. The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in you comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at http:// www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment submissions into ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove identifying or contact information. If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove such information before making the comment submissions available to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS. II. Discussion As part of the NRC strategic plan’s goal of ‘‘openness,’’ a white paper on a Conceptual Example of a Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework (RMRF) Policy Statement (ML13273A517) is being issued to both inform public stakeholders of the work and to start soliciting stakeholder feedback with regard to an NRC working group’s early draft. An NRC inter-office working group has been chartered to develop a conceptual draft of a RMRF Policy Statement for Commission consideration. The document is a work in progress and has been developed to illustrate a potential organization, structure, and content of a conceptual policy statement. It is expected that as the Conceptual Example of a Proposed RMRF Policy Statement is modified that additional notices, requesting public comment will be published in the Federal Register. In early 2011, at the request of Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko, Commissioner George Apostolakis lead a Risk Management Task Force (RMTF) to evaluate how the agency should be regulating 10 to 15 years in the future. More specifically, the RMTF was chartered ‘‘to develop a strategic vision and options for adopting a more comprehensive and holistic riskinformed, performance-based regulatory approach for reactors, materials, waste, fuel cycle, and transportation that would continue to ensure the safe and secure use of nuclear material.’’ The NUREG–2150, ‘‘A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework,’’ was published in April 2012 VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:53 Nov 22, 2013 Jkt 232001 (ML12109A277). This report describes the findings and recommendations of this evaluation. The report provides findings and recommendations which are compiled into two groups. The first group addresses agency-wide, more strategic issues, recommending that ‘‘The NRC should formally adopt the proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework through a Commission Policy Statement.’’ The second group addresses what changes would be needed in specific program areas (e.g., power reactors and materials) in the next several years to ensure that the framework is implemented. The agency-wide findings of the RMTF are: • Finding: Whether used explicitly, as for power reactors, or implicitly, as for materials programs, the concept of defense-in-depth has served the NRC and the regulated industries well and continues to be valuable today. However, it is not used consistently, and there is no guidance on how much defense-in-depth is sufficient. • Finding: Risk assessments provide valuable and realistic insights into potential exposure scenarios. In combination with other technical analyses, risk assessments can inform decisions about appropriate defense-indepth measures. Considering these findings, the RMTF proposes that ‘‘The NRC should formally adopt the proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework through a Commission Policy Statement.’’ The RMTF notes that the proposed framework includes several important benefits: • Updated knowledge from contemporary studies, such as risk assessments, would be incorporated into the regulations and guidance, thereby improving their realism and technical basis. • Implementation of a systematic approach would foster a consistent regulatory decision-making process throughout the agency and improve resource allocation. • Consistency in language and communication would be improved across the agency and externally. • Support of issue resolution would be achieved in a systematic, consistent, and efficient manner. The RMTF also notes that implementation of the proposed framework would also pose challenges: • A change would be required within the agency and externally to increase understanding of the value and use of risk concepts and risk management language. PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 70355 • The proposed risk-informed and performance-based concept of defensein-depth may require the development of additional decision metrics and numerical guidelines. • The approach would likely require developing new or revised riskassessment consensus codes and standards. • A long-term commitment from the Commission and senior agency management would be required for implementation. To assist in the review and comment process, the NRC is requesting the public address the specific questions listed below. Overall Questions: (1) Is there a need for such a policy statement? If so, why? If not, why not? (2) Do you see any benefits in such a policy statement? If so, what are they? If not, why not? (3) How could the proposed RMRF policy statement be made more useful to licensees and/or certificate holders, applicants and other stakeholders? (4) Is the policy statement sufficiently flexible to address the specific program area activities (e.g., reactor versus transportation) with regard, for example, to the type of risk analyses, to the defense-in-depth principles? (5) What implementation challenges do you foresee? (6) A policy statement generally states the Commission’s expectation regarding a particular subject. How to meet the Commission’s expectation is not included in the policy statement. If approved by the Commission, the staff plans to develop associated implementation guidance. What should be the scope and extent of this guidance to be helpful? For example, a. For program area of interest, what would be the appropriate decision criteria for determining adequate defense-in-depth? b. What specific issues or actions should the guidance address in order to implement the policy statement for a particular program area (of interest)? (7) Does the proposed policy statement appropriately integrate security considerations into the RMRF? If not, why not?’’ Sections I and II (8) Are these two sections (Background and Development of Risk Management Regulatory Framework Policy Statement) informative? Do they provide useful information in helping to clarify the need, purpose, goals, etc. of the policy statement in Section III? What information is not necessary and what type of information should be added, if any? E:\FR\FM\25NON1.SGM 25NON1 70356 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 227 / Monday, November 25, 2013 / Notices Section III (9) Is the purpose and goal of the proposed conceptual policy statement clear? If not, where is clarification needed? (10) Is the proposed conceptual RMRF policy statement useful in clarifying the Commission’s intent to use a riskinformed and performance-based defense-in-depth approach in performing its regulatory function? If not, what needs to be clarified? Section II (11) Should the current PRA policy statement (60 FR 42622, August 16, 1995) be replaced or subsumed/ incorporated into this policy statement? (12) What would be the benefit? What would be the detriment? Section III.B (13) If subsumed, is the proposed manner of incorporating the PRA statement reasonable? If not, why not? (14) Should the policy statement establish a Commission expectation that for all program areas, licensees and/or certificate holders are expected to have a risk analysis that is commensurate with the activity and technology? Section III.A (15) Do the proposed key elements in the RMRF process represent a complete and reasonable set? a. If not, what modifications should be made? b. Are other elements needed to cover the full spectrum of regulated activities? c. Are the elements sufficient to develop a consistent decisionmaking approach across all regulated activities? sroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES Section III.C (16) Should defense-in-depth be a key aspect of a RMRF? If not, why not? (17) Will such proposed draft policy statement be useful in determining the extent of defense-in-depth needed in each program area? (18) Is the approach proposed for characterizing defense-in-depth clear? If not, where is clarification needed? Is the strategy reasonable? If not, why not? (19) Is the definition provided for defense-in-depth clear? If not, why not? (20) Are the key attributes identified reasonable and complete? If not, why not? (21) Are the basic levels of prevention and mitigation reasonable? If not, why not? (22) Are the definitions of prevention and mitigation clear and reasonable? If not, why not? a. Are they sufficiently flexible to support all program areas? If not, where not? VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:53 Nov 22, 2013 Jkt 232001 b. Should and can these levels be further detailed (i.e., more specific) and still be sufficiently flexible to support all program areas? (23) Is it reasonable to expect the levels of defense to be independent such that failure of one level does not lead to failure of subsequent levels? If not, why not? a. Should the NRC accept different levels of rigor, or different levels of confidence, in demonstrating that there is independence between levels? Could the level of rigor vary depending upon the nature of the activity and the risks associate with loss of independence? b. Are there any other considerations that should be taken into account in determining the acceptable level of rigor or confidence in demonstrating independence between layers? (24) Is it reasonable to expect the following with regards to defense-indepth: a. Ensure appropriate barriers, controls, and personnel are available to prevent and mitigate exposure to radioactive material according to the hazard present, the credible scenarios, and the associated uncertainties; and b. Ensure that the risks resulting from the failure of some or all of the established barriers and controls, including human errors, are maintained acceptably low consistent with the applicable acceptance guidelines. c. Overall, ensure that each regulated activity has appropriate defense-indepth measures for prevention and mitigation of adverse events and accidents. d. If the expectations of a, b, or c are not reasonable, why not? (25) Are the proposed defense-indepth principles and decision criteria complete? Are they useful in deciding the extent of defense-in-depth needed in a program area? If not, how should they be improved? Section III.D (26) Are the proposed program area specific policy considerations clear and complete? If not, what modifications should be made? Are others needed to cover the full spectrum of regulated activities? Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of November, 2013. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Richard P. Correia, Director, Division of Risk Analysis, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. [FR Doc. 2013–28065 Filed 11–22–13; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC–2013–0215] Compliance With Order EA–13–109, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Interim Staff Guidance; Issuance. AGENCY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing Japan Lessons-Learned Project Directorate Interim Staff Guidance (JLD–ISG), JLD– ISG–2013–02, ‘‘Compliance with Order EA–13–109, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation under Severe Accident Conditions.’’ Agencywide Documents and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML13130A067). This ISG provides guidance and clarifies the requirements in the order to assist the licensees that have Boiling Water Reactors with Mark I and Mark II Containments in the design and implementation of a containment venting system that is capable of a operation under severe accident conditions. This ISG also endorses, with clarifications, the industry guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 13–02, ‘‘Industry Guidance for Compliance with Order EA–13–109,’’ Revision 0 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13316A853). SUMMARY: Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2013–0215 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may access publicly-available information related to this action by the following methods: • Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC–2013–0215. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301–287–3422; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact the individual(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. • NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC Library at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, ADDRESSES: E:\FR\FM\25NON1.SGM 25NON1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 227 (Monday, November 25, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70354-70356]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-28065]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2013-0254]


Conceptual Example of a Proposed Risk Management Regulatory 
Framework Policy Statement

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Conceptual example of a proposed policy statement; request for 
comment.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing a 
document entitled: ``White Paper on a Conceptual Example of a Proposed 
Risk Management Regulatory Framework Policy Statement'' (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML13273A517) and requesting public comment. The 
conceptual statement would set forth a possible Commission policy 
regarding the use of a structured decision-making model that results in 
risk-informed and performance-based defense-in-depth protections to: 
Ensure appropriate personnel, barriers, and controls to prevent, 
contain, and mitigate possible inadvertent exposure to radioactive 
material according to the hazard present, the relevant scenarios, and 
the associated uncertainties; and ensure that the risks resulting from 
the failure of some or all of the established barriers and controls, 
including human errors, are maintained acceptably low. The white paper 
is an illustration of the staff's work in progress and is expected to 
be modified as both internal and external review is solicited and 
considered.

DATES: Please submit comments by January 10, 2014. Comments received 
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the 
NRC staff is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on 
or before this date.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods 
(unless this document describes a different method for submitting 
comments on a specific subject):
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2013-0254. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-287-
3422; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact 
the individual(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section 
of this document.
     Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Chief, Rules, 
Announcements, and Directives Branch (RADB), Office of Administration, 
Mail Stop: 3WFN-06-44M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555-0001.
    For additional direction on accessing information and submitting 
comments, see ``Accessing Information and Submitting Comments'' in the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mary Drouin, Office of Nuclear 
Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001; telephone: 301-251-7574; email: Mary.Drouin@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments

A. Accessing Information

    Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2013-0254 when contacting the NRC 
about the availability of information regarding this document. You may 
access publicly-available information related to this document by any 
of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2013-0254.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC 
Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the 
search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-
based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's 
Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number 
for each document referenced in this document (if that document is 
available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is 
referenced.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

B. Submitting Comments

    Please include Docket ID NRC-2013-0254 in the subject line of your 
comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make 
your

[[Page 70355]]

comment submission available to the public in this docket.
    The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact 
information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in you 
comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at http://www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment submissions into 
ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove 
identifying or contact information.
    If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons 
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to 
include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be 
publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should 
state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to 
remove such information before making the comment submissions available 
to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS.

II. Discussion

    As part of the NRC strategic plan's goal of ``openness,'' a white 
paper on a Conceptual Example of a Proposed Risk Management Regulatory 
Framework (RMRF) Policy Statement (ML13273A517) is being issued to both 
inform public stakeholders of the work and to start soliciting 
stakeholder feedback with regard to an NRC working group's early draft. 
An NRC inter-office working group has been chartered to develop a 
conceptual draft of a RMRF Policy Statement for Commission 
consideration. The document is a work in progress and has been 
developed to illustrate a potential organization, structure, and 
content of a conceptual policy statement. It is expected that as the 
Conceptual Example of a Proposed RMRF Policy Statement is modified that 
additional notices, requesting public comment will be published in the 
Federal Register. In early 2011, at the request of Chairman Gregory B. 
Jaczko, Commissioner George Apostolakis lead a Risk Management Task 
Force (RMTF) to evaluate how the agency should be regulating 10 to 15 
years in the future. More specifically, the RMTF was chartered ``to 
develop a strategic vision and options for adopting a more 
comprehensive and holistic risk-informed, performance-based regulatory 
approach for reactors, materials, waste, fuel cycle, and transportation 
that would continue to ensure the safe and secure use of nuclear 
material.'' The NUREG-2150, ``A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory 
Framework,'' was published in April 2012 (ML12109A277). This report 
describes the findings and recommendations of this evaluation. The 
report provides findings and recommendations which are compiled into 
two groups. The first group addresses agency-wide, more strategic 
issues, recommending that ``The NRC should formally adopt the proposed 
Risk Management Regulatory Framework through a Commission Policy 
Statement.'' The second group addresses what changes would be needed in 
specific program areas (e.g., power reactors and materials) in the next 
several years to ensure that the framework is implemented.
    The agency-wide findings of the RMTF are:
     Finding: Whether used explicitly, as for power reactors, 
or implicitly, as for materials programs, the concept of defense-in-
depth has served the NRC and the regulated industries well and 
continues to be valuable today. However, it is not used consistently, 
and there is no guidance on how much defense-in-depth is sufficient.
     Finding: Risk assessments provide valuable and realistic 
insights into potential exposure scenarios. In combination with other 
technical analyses, risk assessments can inform decisions about 
appropriate defense-in-depth measures.
    Considering these findings, the RMTF proposes that ``The NRC should 
formally adopt the proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework 
through a Commission Policy Statement.''
    The RMTF notes that the proposed framework includes several 
important benefits:
     Updated knowledge from contemporary studies, such as risk 
assessments, would be incorporated into the regulations and guidance, 
thereby improving their realism and technical basis.
     Implementation of a systematic approach would foster a 
consistent regulatory decision-making process throughout the agency and 
improve resource allocation.
     Consistency in language and communication would be 
improved across the agency and externally.
     Support of issue resolution would be achieved in a 
systematic, consistent, and efficient manner.
    The RMTF also notes that implementation of the proposed framework 
would also pose challenges:
     A change would be required within the agency and 
externally to increase understanding of the value and use of risk 
concepts and risk management language.
     The proposed risk-informed and performance-based concept 
of defense-in-depth may require the development of additional decision 
metrics and numerical guidelines.
     The approach would likely require developing new or 
revised risk-assessment consensus codes and standards.
     A long-term commitment from the Commission and senior 
agency management would be required for implementation.
    To assist in the review and comment process, the NRC is requesting 
the public address the specific questions listed below.
    Overall Questions:
    (1) Is there a need for such a policy statement? If so, why? If 
not, why not?
    (2) Do you see any benefits in such a policy statement? If so, what 
are they? If not, why not?
    (3) How could the proposed RMRF policy statement be made more 
useful to licensees and/or certificate holders, applicants and other 
stakeholders?
    (4) Is the policy statement sufficiently flexible to address the 
specific program area activities (e.g., reactor versus transportation) 
with regard, for example, to the type of risk analyses, to the defense-
in-depth principles?
    (5) What implementation challenges do you foresee?
    (6) A policy statement generally states the Commission's 
expectation regarding a particular subject. How to meet the 
Commission's expectation is not included in the policy statement. If 
approved by the Commission, the staff plans to develop associated 
implementation guidance. What should be the scope and extent of this 
guidance to be helpful? For example,
    a. For program area of interest, what would be the appropriate 
decision criteria for determining adequate defense-in-depth?
    b. What specific issues or actions should the guidance address in 
order to implement the policy statement for a particular program area 
(of interest)?
    (7) Does the proposed policy statement appropriately integrate 
security considerations into the RMRF? If not, why not?''

Sections I and II

    (8) Are these two sections (Background and Development of Risk 
Management Regulatory Framework Policy Statement) informative? Do they 
provide useful information in helping to clarify the need, purpose, 
goals, etc. of the policy statement in Section III? What information is 
not necessary and what type of information should be added, if any?

[[Page 70356]]

Section III

    (9) Is the purpose and goal of the proposed conceptual policy 
statement clear? If not, where is clarification needed?
    (10) Is the proposed conceptual RMRF policy statement useful in 
clarifying the Commission's intent to use a risk-informed and 
performance-based defense-in-depth approach in performing its 
regulatory function? If not, what needs to be clarified?

Section II

    (11) Should the current PRA policy statement (60 FR 42622, August 
16, 1995) be replaced or subsumed/incorporated into this policy 
statement?
    (12) What would be the benefit? What would be the detriment?

Section III.B

    (13) If subsumed, is the proposed manner of incorporating the PRA 
statement reasonable? If not, why not?
    (14) Should the policy statement establish a Commission expectation 
that for all program areas, licensees and/or certificate holders are 
expected to have a risk analysis that is commensurate with the activity 
and technology?

Section III.A

    (15) Do the proposed key elements in the RMRF process represent a 
complete and reasonable set?
    a. If not, what modifications should be made?
    b. Are other elements needed to cover the full spectrum of 
regulated activities?
    c. Are the elements sufficient to develop a consistent 
decisionmaking approach across all regulated activities?

Section III.C

    (16) Should defense-in-depth be a key aspect of a RMRF? If not, why 
not?
    (17) Will such proposed draft policy statement be useful in 
determining the extent of defense-in-depth needed in each program area?
    (18) Is the approach proposed for characterizing defense-in-depth 
clear? If not, where is clarification needed? Is the strategy 
reasonable? If not, why not?
    (19) Is the definition provided for defense-in-depth clear? If not, 
why not?
    (20) Are the key attributes identified reasonable and complete? If 
not, why not?
    (21) Are the basic levels of prevention and mitigation reasonable? 
If not, why not?
    (22) Are the definitions of prevention and mitigation clear and 
reasonable? If not, why not?
    a. Are they sufficiently flexible to support all program areas? If 
not, where not?
    b. Should and can these levels be further detailed (i.e., more 
specific) and still be sufficiently flexible to support all program 
areas?
    (23) Is it reasonable to expect the levels of defense to be 
independent such that failure of one level does not lead to failure of 
subsequent levels? If not, why not?
    a. Should the NRC accept different levels of rigor, or different 
levels of confidence, in demonstrating that there is independence 
between levels? Could the level of rigor vary depending upon the nature 
of the activity and the risks associate with loss of independence?
    b. Are there any other considerations that should be taken into 
account in determining the acceptable level of rigor or confidence in 
demonstrating independence between layers?
    (24) Is it reasonable to expect the following with regards to 
defense-in-depth:
    a. Ensure appropriate barriers, controls, and personnel are 
available to prevent and mitigate exposure to radioactive material 
according to the hazard present, the credible scenarios, and the 
associated uncertainties; and
    b. Ensure that the risks resulting from the failure of some or all 
of the established barriers and controls, including human errors, are 
maintained acceptably low consistent with the applicable acceptance 
guidelines.
    c. Overall, ensure that each regulated activity has appropriate 
defense-in-depth measures for prevention and mitigation of adverse 
events and accidents.
    d. If the expectations of a, b, or c are not reasonable, why not?
    (25) Are the proposed defense-in-depth principles and decision 
criteria complete? Are they useful in deciding the extent of defense-
in-depth needed in a program area? If not, how should they be improved?

Section III.D

    (26) Are the proposed program area specific policy considerations 
clear and complete? If not, what modifications should be made? Are 
others needed to cover the full spectrum of regulated activities?

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of November, 2013.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Richard P. Correia,
Director, Division of Risk Analysis, Office of Nuclear Regulatory 
Research.
[FR Doc. 2013-28065 Filed 11-22-13; 8:45 am]
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