Exemption of Records Systems Under the Privacy Act, 69753-69755 [2013-27130]

Agencies

• Department of Justice

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 225 (Thursday, November 21, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 69753-69755]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-27130]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

28 CFR Part 16

[CPCLO Order No. 006-2013]


Exemption of Records Systems Under the Privacy Act

AGENCY: Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task 
Forces (OCDETF), Department of Justice.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of Justice (the Department or DOJ) amends its 
Privacy Act regulations for two Privacy Act systems of records 
previously entitled the ``Drug Enforcement Task Force Evaluation and 
Reporting System,'' JUSTICE/DAG-003, and the

[[Page 69754]]

``Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Fusion Center and 
International Organized Crime Intelligence and Operations Center 
System,'' JUSTICE/CRM-028. These amendments reflect a recent 
reorganization of the Department establishing the Executive Office for 
OCDETF as a separate DOJ component, and transferring responsibility for 
these systems from the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) and 
the Criminal Division to this component. In light of this departmental 
reorganization, JUSTICE/DAG-003 has been renumbered to JUSTICE/OCDETF-
001 and renamed as the ``Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces 
Management Information System (OCDETF MIS),'' and JUSTICE/CRM-028 has 
been renumbered to JUSTICE/OCDETF-002 while retaining the same name. 
When under the responsibility of ODAG and the Criminal Division, these 
systems were exempted from certain provisions of the Privacy Act of 
1974 by exemptions placed in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 
sections containing exemptions for ODAG's and the Criminal Division's 
Privacy Act systems. These amendments remove references to these 
systems from the CFR sections for ODAG and Criminal Division exemptions 
and add a new section for OCDETF exemptions, which continues comparable 
exemptions for these systems in order to avoid interference with the 
law enforcement functions and responsibilities of the Executive office 
for OCDETF.

DATES: This final rule is effective November 21, 2013.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jill Aronica, Chief Information 
Systems Section, Executive Office for OCDETF, phone 202-514-1860.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Department published a notice of 
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) reflecting these amendments in the Federal 
Register at 78 FR 56852, Sept. 16, 2013. (The Department also published 
amended system of records notices (SORNs) for JUSTICE/OCDETF-001 at 78 
FR 56737, Sept. 13, 2013, and for JUSTICE/OCDETF-002 at 78 FR 56926, 
Sept. 16, 2013.) The Department invited public comments on the NPRM 
(and the SORNs). The comment periods closed on October 15, 2013, for 
JUSTICE/OCDETF-001 and on October 16, 2013, for JUSTICE/OCDETF-002 and 
the NPRM. The United States Postal Service and the government Web site 
for receiving electronic comments continued to operate as usual 
throughout the public comment periods. No comments were received on 
either the NPRM or the SORNs.

List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 16

    Administrative practice and procedure, Courts, Freedom of 
information, Privacy, Sunshine Act.

    Pursuant to the authority vested in the Attorney General by 5 
U.S.C. 552a and delegated to me by Attorney General Order 2940-2008, 
the Department of Justice proposes to amend 28 CFR part 16 as follows:

PART 16--[AMENDED]

0
1. The authority citation for part 16 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301, 552, 552a, 552b(g), 553; 18 U.S.C. 
4203(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, 534; 31 U.S.C. 3717, 9701.

Subpart E--Exemption of Records Systems Under the Privacy Act

0
2. Amend Sec.  16.71 as follows:
0
a. Revise paragraph (c);
0
b. Remove the first two sentences of paragraph (d);
0
c. Remove existing paragraph (e)(7); and
0
d. Redesignate paragraph (e)(8) as paragraph (e)(7).
    The revision reads as follows:


Sec.  16.71  Exemption of the Office of the Deputy Attorney General 
System--limited access.

* * * * *
    (c) The General Files System of the Office of the Deputy Attorney 
General (JUSTICE/DAG-013) is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); 
(d); (e)(1), (2), (3) and (5); and (g).
* * * * *


Sec.  16.91  [Amended]

0
3. Amend Sec.  16.91 by removing paragraphs (u) and (v).


Sec.  16.135  [Added]

0
4. Add Sec.  16.135 to subpart E to read as follows:


Sec.  16.135  Exemptions of Executive Office for Organized Crime Drug 
Enforcement Task Forces Systems.

    (a) The following systems of records are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 
552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), 
(4)(G), (H), and (I), (5), and (8); (f); and (g):
    (1) The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Management 
Information System (OCDETF MIS) (JUSTICE/OCDETF-001); and
    (2) The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Fusion Center 
and International Organized Crime Intelligence and Operations Center 
System (JUSTICE/OCDETF-002).
    (b) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information is 
subject to exemption under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and/or (k).
    (c) Exemptions from the particular paragraphs of this section are 
justified for the following reasons:
    (1) From paragraph (c)(3) of this section because to provide the 
subject with an accounting of disclosures of records in these systems 
could inform that individual of the existence, nature, or scope of an 
actual or potential law enforcement or counterintelligence 
investigation by the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, the 
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Fusion Center, the 
International Organized Crime Intelligence and Operations Center, or 
the recipient agency, and could permit that individual to take measures 
to avoid detection or apprehension, to learn of the identity of 
witnesses and informants, or to destroy evidence, and would therefore 
present a serious impediment to law enforcement or counterintelligence 
efforts. In addition, disclosure of the accounting would amount to 
notice to the individual of the existence of a record. Moreover, 
release of an accounting may reveal information that is properly 
classified pursuant to Executive Order.
    (2) From paragraph (c)(4) of this section because this paragraph is 
inapplicable to the extent that an exemption is being claimed for 
paragraphs (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) of this section.
    (3) From paragraph (d)(1) of this section because disclosure of 
records in the system could alert the subject of an actual or potential 
criminal, civil, or regulatory violation of the existence of that 
investigation, of the nature and scope of the information and evidence 
obtained as to his or her activities, of the identity of confidential 
witnesses and informants, of the investigative interest of the 
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, the Organized Crime Drug 
Enforcement Task Force Fusion Center, the International Organized Crime 
Intelligence and Operations Center, and other intelligence or law 
enforcement agencies (including those responsible for civil proceedings 
related to laws against drug trafficking or related financial crimes or 
international organized crime); could lead to the destruction of 
evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, 
and/or flight of the subject; could reveal the details of a sensitive 
investigative or intelligence technique, or the identity of a 
confidential source; or could otherwise impede,

[[Page 69755]]

compromise, or interfere with investigative efforts and other related 
law enforcement and/or intelligence activities. In addition, disclosure 
could invade the privacy of third parties and/or endanger the life, 
health, and physical safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential 
informants, witnesses, and potential crime victims. Access to records 
could also result in the release of information properly classified 
pursuant to Executive Order.
    (4) From paragraph (d)(2) of this section because amendment of the 
records thought to be inaccurate, irrelevant, incomplete, or untimely 
would also interfere with ongoing investigations, criminal or civil law 
enforcement proceedings, and other law enforcement activities; would 
impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, 
analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised; 
and may impact information properly classified pursuant to Executive 
Order.
    (5) From paragraphs (d)(3) and (4) of this section because these 
paragraphs are inapplicable to the extent that exemption is claimed 
from paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) of this section and for the reasons 
stated in paragraphs (c)(3) and (c)(4) of this section.
    (6) From paragraph (e)(1) of this section because, in the course of 
their acquisition, collation, and analysis of information under the 
statutory authority granted, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task 
Forces, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Fusion Center, 
and the International Organized Crime Intelligence and Operations 
Center will occasionally obtain information, including information 
properly classified pursuant to Executive Order, that concerns actual 
or potential violations of law that are not strictly within their 
statutory or other authority or may compile and maintain information 
which may not be relevant to a specific investigation or prosecution. 
This is because it is impossible to determine in advance what 
information collected during an investigation or in support of these 
mission activities will be important or crucial to an investigation. In 
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain 
such information in these systems of records because it can aid in 
establishing patterns of criminal activity of a suspect and can provide 
valuable leads for federal and other law enforcement agencies. This 
consideration applies equally to information acquired from, or collated 
or analyzed for, both law enforcement agencies and agencies of the U.S. 
foreign intelligence community and military community.
    (7) From paragraph (e)(2) of this section because in a criminal, 
civil, or regulatory investigation, prosecution, or proceeding, the 
requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent 
practicable from the subject individual would present a serious 
impediment to law enforcement because the subject of the investigation, 
prosecution, or proceeding would be placed on notice as to the 
existence and nature of the investigation, prosecution, or proceeding 
and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension, to 
influence witnesses improperly, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate 
testimony. Moreover, thorough and effective investigation and 
prosecution may require seeking information from a number of different 
sources.
    (8) From paragraph (e)(3) of this section because to comply with 
the requirements of this paragraph during the course of an 
investigation could impede the information-gathering process, thus 
hampering the investigation or intelligence gathering. Disclosure to an 
individual of investigative interest would put the subject on notice of 
that fact and allow the subject an opportunity to engage in conduct 
intended to impede that activity or avoid apprehension. Disclosure to 
other individuals would likewise put them on notice of what might still 
be a sensitive law enforcement interest and could result in the further 
intentional or accidental disclosure to the subject or other 
inappropriate recipients, convey information that might constitute 
unwarranted invasions of the personal privacy of other persons, 
unnecessarily burden law enforcement personnel in information-
collection activities, and chill the willingness of witnesses to 
cooperate.
    (9) From paragraphs (e)(4)(G) and (H) of this section because this 
system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of paragraph 
(d) of this section.
    (10) From paragraph (e)(4)(I) to the extent that this subsection 
could be interpreted to require more detail regarding system record 
sources than has been published in the Federal Register. Should this 
subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is 
necessary to protect the sources of law enforcement and intelligence 
information and to protect the privacy and safety of witnesses and 
informants and other information sources. Further, greater specificity 
could compromise other sensitive law enforcement information, 
techniques, and processes.
    (11) From subsection (e)(5) because the acquisition, collation, and 
analysis of information for law enforcement purposes from various 
agencies does not permit a determination in advance or a prediction of 
what information will be matched with other information and thus 
whether it is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the 
passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may 
acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to 
light, and the accuracy of such information can often only be 
determined in a court of law. The restrictions imposed by subsection 
(e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained investigators, 
intelligence analysts, and government attorneys to exercise their 
judgment in collating and analyzing information and would impede the 
development of criminal or other intelligence necessary for effective 
law enforcement.
    (12) From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice 
requirements could present a serious impediment to law enforcement by 
revealing investigative techniques, procedures, evidence, or interest, 
and by interfering with the ability to issue warrants or subpoenas; 
could give persons sufficient warning to evade investigative efforts; 
and would pose an unacceptable administrative burden on the maintenance 
of these records and the conduct of the underlying investigations.
    (13) From subsections (f) and (g) because these subsections are 
inapplicable to the extent that the system is exempt from other 
specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

    Dated: November 7, 2013.
Joo Y. Chung,
Acting Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer, United States 
Department of Justice.
[FR Doc. 2013-27130 Filed 11-20-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-NY-P