Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Safeguarding Unclassified Controlled Technical Information (DFARS Case 2011-D039), 69273-69282 [2013-27313]

Agencies

• Defense Acquisition Regulations System
• DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 222 (Monday, November 18, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 69273-69282]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-27313]


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Defense Acquisition Regulations System

48 CFR Parts 204, 212, and 252

RIN 0750-AG47


Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Safeguarding 
Unclassified Controlled Technical Information (DFARS Case 2011-D039)

AGENCY: Defense Acquisition Regulations System, Department of Defense 
(DoD).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: DoD is issuing a final rule amending the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) to add a new subpart and 
associated contract clause to address requirements for safeguarding 
unclassified controlled technical information.

DATES: Effective November 18, 2013.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Dustin Pitsch, Defense Acquisition 
Regulations System, OUSD(AT&L)DPAP/DARS, Room 3B855, 3060 Defense 
Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-3060. Telephone 571-372-6090; facsimile 
571-372-6101.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    DoD published a proposed rule in the Federal Register at 76 FR 
38089 on June 29, 2011, to implement adequate security measures to 
safeguard unclassified DoD information within contractor information 
systems from unauthorized access and disclosure, and to prescribe 
reporting to DoD with regard to certain cyber intrusion events that 
affect DoD information resident on or transiting through contractor 
unclassified information systems. After comments were received on the 
proposed rule it was decided that the scope of the rule would be 
modified to reduce the categories of information covered. This final 
rule addresses safeguarding requirements that cover only unclassified 
controlled technical information and reporting the compromise of 
unclassified controlled technical information.
    Controlled technical information is technical data, computer 
software, and any other technical information covered by DoD Directive 
5230.24, Distribution Statements on Technical Documents, at https://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/523024p.pdf, and DoD Directive 
5230.25, Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data from Public 
Disclosure, at https://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/523025p.pdf.
    Forty-nine respondents submitted public comments in response to the 
proposed rule.

II. Discussion and Analysis

    DoD reviewed the public comments in the development of the final 
rule. A discussion of the comments and the changes made to the rule as 
a result of those comments is provided, as follows:

A. Significant Changes From the Proposed Rule

     The final rule reflects changes to subpart 204.73, in lieu 
of 204.74 as stated in the proposed rule, to conform to the current 
DFARS baseline numbering sequence. Subpart 204.73 is now titled 
``Safeguarding Unclassified Controlled Technical Information''.
     New definitions are included for: ``controlled technical 
information'', ``cyber incident'' and ``technical information''.
     These definitions published in the proposed rule are no 
longer included: ``authentication,'' ``clearing information,'' 
``critical program information,'' ``cyber,'' ``data,'' ``DoD 
information,'' ``Government information,'' ``incident,'' 
``information,'' ``information system,'' ``intrusion,'' ``nonpublic 
information,'' ``safeguarding,'' ``threat,'' and ``voice''.
     DFARS 204.7302 is modified to account for the reduced 
scope to limit the application of safeguarding controls to unclassified 
controlled technical information, which is marked in accordance with 
DoD Instruction 5230.24, Distribution Statements on Technical 
Documents.
     The ``procedures'' section, previously at DFARS 204.7403 
in the proposed rule, is no longer included.
     DFARS 204.7303, Contract Clause, prescribes only one 
clause, 252.204-7012, Safeguarding of Unclassified Controlled Technical 
Information, which is a modification of the previously proposed 
``Enhanced'' safeguarding clause. The previously proposed ``Basic'' 
safeguarding clause is removed and the proposed controls will be 
implemented through FAR case 2011-020, Basic Safeguarding of Contractor 
Information Systems.
     A list is added specifying the 13 pieces of information 
required for reporting.
     The time period a contractor must retain incident 
information to allow for DoD to request information necessary to 
conduct a damage assessment or decline interest is set at 90 days in 
the clause at 252.204-7012(d)(4)(iii).
     Additional information regarding DoD's damage assessment 
activities is added at 252.204-7012(d)(5).

B. Analysis of Public Comments

1. Align With Implementation of Executive Order on Controlled 
Unclassified Information
    Comment: Numerous respondents indicated concerns that the proposed 
rule for DoD unclassified information was in advance of the 
Governmentwide guidance that the National Archives and Records 
Administration is developing for controlled unclassified information 
(CUI). Further, they suggested that DoD delay its efforts and instead 
pursue alignment with the Federal CUI policy effort, in order to avoid 
confusion and disconnects on information categories

[[Page 69274]]

and protections, and to prevent burdensome or duplicative costs to the 
contractors.
    Response: To date, Federal CUI policy has not yet been promulgated 
for Federal Government agencies and it is unknown when Federal policy 
will be developed for industry as it relates to CUI. This rule has been 
rescoped to cover safeguarding unclassified controlled technical 
information, which DoD has determined to be of utmost importance and 
which DoD has existing authority to protect.
2. Deconflict With Other Policy Memos, DoD Instructions (DoDI) or DoD 
Directives (DoDD)
    Comment: Respondents suggested that the rule conflicts with 
policies including DoDI/DoDD 5230.24/5230.25, DoD 5000 series, DoD 
8570.01-M, Directives (DoDD), National Industrial Security Operating 
Manual (NISPOM), DoD Information Assurance Certification and 
Accreditation Process (DIACAP), and Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA).
    Response: The DFARS rule has been adjusted to use the marking 
framework established by DoDI 5230.24. DoD was unable to identify any 
other policy conflicts with this revised rule.
    Comment: Several respondents suggested that the variety of National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) controls from several 
categories leads to a wide interpretation, which will be burdensome on 
personnel and there were suggestions that this hurts competition as 
less sophisticated firms are unable to enter the market. Another 
respondent suggested NIST controls should not be specified, and should 
be selectable by the program office. A respondent suggested that a list 
of controls is not sufficient and context/guidance is needed.
    Response: The NIST security controls identified represent the 
minimum acceptable level of protection, though the clause allows for 
flexibility. If a control is not implemented, the contractor shall 
submit to the contracting officer a written explanation of how either 
the required security control identified is not applicable, or how an 
alternative control or protective measure is used to achieve equivalent 
protection.
    Comment: Several respondents variously observed that some of the 
DFARS requirements are more stringent than the NISPOM.
    Response: This rule has requirements to protect unclassified 
information stored and transmitted through unclassified networks and 
therefore does not align with the protection requirements in the 
NISPOM.
3. Policy Regarding Outsourcing, Cloud Computing, Reuse, Orphaned Works 
Etc.
    Comment: A respondent requested clarification if use of outsourced 
information technology (IT) infrastructure, to include use of cloud 
computing, constitutes a release of information to the vendor that 
would be covered under the restriction on releasing information outside 
the Contractor's organization, and, if permitted, would the outsourced 
vendor be required to meet the safeguarding requirements specified in 
the clause.
    Response: An Internet Service Provider (ISP) or cloud service 
provider constitutes a subcontractor in this context. The contractor is 
responsible for ensuring that the subcontractor complies with the 
requirements of this rule within the scope of this rule.
    Comment: A respondent suggested the proposed rule constrains reuse 
of DoD information between contracts, and adds unnecessary additional 
DoD costs.
    Response: The need-to-know requirement included in the proposed 
rule has been removed alleviating the concern for constraints on reuse 
of information. This rule is deemed necessary for the protection of 
unclassified controlled technical information and it is understood that 
implementing these controls may increase costs to DoD.
4. Consequence of Noncompliance
    Comment: A number of respondents commented on the lack of oversight 
and certification of compliance with the NIST controls in the rule.
    Response: The rule does not intend to change existing penalties or 
remedies for noncompliance with contract requirements.
5. Government Agency Responsible for Oversight
    Comment: Two respondents suggested that the rule should identify 
how and by which entity audits or reviews of the safeguards will be 
conducted.
    Response: The contract administration office is responsible for 
ensuring that the contractor has a process in place for meeting the 
required safeguarding standards. Audits or reviews will be conducted at 
the discretion of the contracting officer in accordance with the terms 
of the contract.
6. Need To Clearly Categorize, Identify, and Mark
    Comment: Several respondents pointed out that DoD authority to 
define and mark CUI/FOUO (controlled unclassified information/for 
official use only) is poorly explained. FOUO is used as a catchall 
marking in DoD and managing this as a controlled designator is not 
practical. DoD is responsible for specifying a process for marking 
basic and enhanced criteria.
    Response: The final rule has been scoped to only refer to 
unclassified controlled technical information. Items will be marked in 
accordance with DoDI 5230.24.
7. Allowable Costs Under Cost Accounting Standards (CAS)
    Comment: One respondent asked if the cost associated with 
compliance to the DFARS changes is allowable under CAS.
    Response: Cost Accounting Standards address measurement, allocation 
and assignment of costs. FAR 31 and DFARS 231, specifically FAR 31.201-
2, address the allowability of costs. There is nothing in FAR 31 or 
DFARS 231 that would make costs of compliance with DFARS unallowable if 
the costs are incurred in accordance with FAR 31.201-2. While we cannot 
know in advance if a company will incur costs in accordance with FAR 
31.201-2, there is nothing included in the final rule that would cause 
or compel a company to incur costs that would be in violation of FAR 
31.201-2.
    Comment: Several respondents stated that DoD needs to account for/
provide funding for the additional costs of implementation.
    Response: Implementation of this rule may increase contractor costs 
that would be accounted for through the normal course of business.
8. Applicability to Commercial Items
    Comment: One respondent suggested that subcontracts for commercial 
items should be exempt from the unclassified data restrictions added in 
this rule. Several respondents suggested exempting all purchases of 
commercially available off-the-shelf products from the data controls 
added by this rule.
    Response: The final rule is rescoped to focus on unclassified 
controlled technical information. Any unclassified controlled technical 
information that is shared with a contractor or subcontractor must be 
protected in accordance with the terms of the contract.

[[Page 69275]]

9. Threat Sharing
    Comment: A number of respondents were concerned that if the DoD did 
not provide threat information to companies then they would be unable 
to determine adequate security for the controlled information.
    Response: 32 CFR part 236 provides a voluntary framework for 
eligible companies to exchange cyber threat information with the 
Government. Threat information is not needed to determine adequate 
security; the select NIST 800-53 controls in clause 252.204-7012, or 
their equivalent as suggested by the contractor, are required for 
adequate security. In cases where the contractor has information 
(either obtained from DoD or any other source) that would suggest 
additional security is required to adequately protect technical 
information, they must take action to establish that additional 
security.
10. Sharing of Liability Between the Contractor and DoD
    Comment: A number of respondents were concerned that the contractor 
will assume the full cost and liability burden for costs associated 
with compliance with the rule.
    Response: In many cases, this contract requirement will be spread 
across and benefiting multiple contracts--costs associated with 
implementation will be allowable and chargeable to indirect cost pools. 
The Government does not intend to directly pay for the operating costs 
associated with the rule.
11. Concern for Creating Two Types of Unclassified (Basic and Enhanced)
    Comment: A respondent indicated that, under the proposed rule, all 
Government unclassified information must be compartmentalized in order 
to effectively enforce need-to-know discipline. In addition, however, 
the proposed rule recognized two classes of information, one warranting 
``basic'' protection and the second requiring ``enhanced'' protection. 
Further, the respondent indicated that the rule not only lacks clarity 
regarding identification and marking of the information to be 
protected, but also for designating the information as basic or 
enhanced. Additionally, the respondents recommended that uniform 
protocols need to be established, so documents can be sorted 
electronically into the proper categories.
    Response: The final rule clarifies that contractors are required to 
protect one category of unclassified information, which was previously 
specified within the enhanced safeguarding clause. A proposed rule 
addressing ``basic'' safeguarding was published in the Federal Register 
on Friday, August 24, 2012 (FAR 2011-020).
12. Applicability to Foreign Contractors
    Comment: One respondent was concerned about the impact of the rule 
on foreign contractors and on international information sharing 
agreements.
    Response: The technical information covered by the rule is already 
subject to dissemination controls that existing agreements would have 
to have accounted for. This rule does not have an impact on those 
information sharing agreements. In addition, the reporting associated 
with the rule is specifically focused on the information that was lost, 
not the cyber forensic aspects of an incident.
13. Applicability to Universities
    Comment: NIST SP 800-53 controls are inappropriate for academic 
settings and burdensome.
    Response: Academic institutions dealing with unclassified 
controlled technical information are not exempt from the controls of 
this rule. The protection of the information is equally necessary, 
regardless of whether the contractor is a university or a business 
concern.
14. Scope (204.7400 Redesignated 204.7300)
    Comment: The respondents recommend that this rule explicitly apply 
to systems containing controlled information and not the general 
information technology environment.
    Response: The rule has been revised to apply to systems that have 
unclassified controlled technical information resident on or transiting 
through them.
    Comment: Several respondents made suggestions on the scope of the 
proposed DFARS section 204.7400 including: university fundamental 
research should be exempt, the rule should apply only to new contracts, 
the safeguards should apply to Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and 
the protected information should be more specific and limited.
    DoD will not modify the Disclosure of Information clause at DFARS 
252.204-7000 in this rule. The clause at 252.204-7012 has been revised 
to apply to all contracts expected to be dealing with controlled 
technical information. Implementation of the rule does not direct 
modification of existing contracts. The clause does not apply to voice 
information, because voice information does not fall within the 
definition of controlled technical information.
15. Definitions (204.7401 Redesignated 204.7301)
    Comment: One respondent suggested adding the definition for 
``intrusion'' at DFARS 204.7401 in addition to where it already exists 
in the clause proposed at 252.204-70XX or adding a pointer to refer to 
the clause for definitions.
    Response: The definition of ``intrusion'' has been deleted because 
the term is no longer used in the case.
16. Policy (204.7402 Redesignated 204.7302)
    Comment: Two respondents stated that the phrase ``adequate 
security'' and ``certain cyber incidents'' are too vague and need 
clarification. Another respondent stated that the enhanced safeguarding 
requirements in the clause 252.204-70YY are too stringent for 
unclassified information and compliance would be a substantial burden.
    Response: The term ``adequate security'' is modified from the 
proposed rule to provide clarity. The final rule lays out the policy 
and definitions for the terms ``adequate security'' and ``cyber 
incident''. The criteria for reporting a cyber incident is established 
within the clause at 252.204-7012. DoD has determined that unclassified 
controlled technical information is vital to national security and must 
be protected.
17. Procedures
    Comment: Two respondents noted that DFARS 204.7403 in the proposed 
rule references procedures at PGI 204.74 that were not published with 
the proposed rule.
    Response: The ``procedures'' section is not included in the final 
rule. For future reference, when there is PGI associated with a 
proposed rule, it is available at https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/ 
under ``Publication Notices''.
18. Contract Clauses (204.7404 Redesignated 204.7303)
    Comment: Several respondents recommended making changes to the 
DFARS clause prescriptions. Two respondents stated that use of ``will 
potentially have unclassified DoD information'' is vague and will 
result in usage errors. Two respondents recommended an exemption for 
fundamental research contracts; two others recommended an exemption for 
small businesses. One respondent stated that it is not clear if the use 
of 252.204-70YY negates the need for 252.204-70XX.
    Response: The purpose of this rule is to protect the noted category 
of

[[Page 69276]]

unclassified information, as evidenced by inclusion whenever such 
information would potentially be present; the best means of addressing 
the identified potential for usage errors is to include the clause in 
all contracts. The clause at DFARS 252.204-7012 is now prescribed to go 
in all contracts and solicitations and the additional safeguarding 
measures will only apply when unclassified controlled technical 
information is present. This change does not affect the burden placed 
on contractors to identify which information must be protected. The 
contractor's size classification is not a sufficient reason to allow a 
contractor to fail to protect technical information as required by 
clause DFARS 252.204-7012. The basic clause previously at DFARS 
252.204-70XX has been removed and will be handled as a FAR rule under 
FAR case 2011-020. The clause previously referred to in the proposed 
rule as 252.204-70YY, Enhanced Safeguarding of Unclassified DoD 
Information, is now at DFARS 252.204-7012. Use of this clause will not 
negate the use of any other clauses.
19. Clarify the Disclosure of Information Clause (252.204-7000)
    Comment: A number of respondents submitted comments regarding the 
proposed changes to clause 252.204-7000, Disclosure of Information.
    Response: This final rule does not include any changes to the 
clause at 252.204-7000, Disclosure of Information.
20. Clarify the Basic Clause (Proposed 252.204-70XX)
    Comment: Sixteen respondents commented on concerns with the basic 
clause ranging from definitions, lack of specificity, and 
implementation issues to scope and cost burden.
    Response: The basic clause, at 252.204-70XX in the proposed rule, 
is not included in this final rule. A basic safeguarding requirement is 
being developed in FAR case 2011-020.
21. Clarify the Enhanced Clause Definitions
    Comment: Eight respondents commented that the definitions for 
``information technology,'' ``DoD information systems,'' ``incident,'' 
``intrusion,'' ``voice information,'' ``DoD information,'' ``non-public 
information,'' ``adequate security,'' and ``critical program 
information'' are too broad.
    Response: Many of the definitions used in this document are from 
DoD standards or regulations. The definitions for ``critical program 
information'', ``DoD information'', ``incident'', ``intrusion'' and 
``nonpublic information'' were removed as they were no longer necessary 
due to other revisions. The term ``adequate security'' is revised for 
clarity and consistency.
22. Safeguarding Requirements and Procedures
    Comment: Four respondents requested clarification on whether DoD is 
requiring contractors to perform and document a specific analysis to 
determine if additional controls are reasonably required, or is just 
reconfirming that the safeguarding standards may be augmented with 
additional controls. They also requested clarification regarding 
whether a formal risk assessment is warranted by this provision, and if 
so, whether it will be a qualitative assessment (OCTAVE) or 
quantitative assessment (NIST SP-800-30). There is concern as to 
whether the risk assessment and proposed enhanced security measures of 
one contractor will be shared with other contractors or those within 
the Defense Industrial Base Working Group.
    Response: The rule does not require a specific analysis to 
determine if additional controls are required. The intent is to require 
that if the contractor is aware, based on an already assessed risk or 
vulnerability that the specified controls are inadequate, then the 
contractor must implement additional controls to mitigate the specific 
shortcoming.
    Comment: A respondent questioned the provision that requires 
contractors with systems that do not meet the specified controls in the 
table to prepare a written determination that explains why the 
control(s) is not necessary, but only to provide the written 
determination to the contracting officer upon request, and suggested 
wording to be changed to require the determination to be included as 
part of their proposal.
    Response: The rule has been revised to require a written 
explanation when the contractor intends to deviate from the specified 
controls. Alternative or superior safeguarding controls will not be 
considered as a source selection criteria.
23. DoD Information Requiring Enhanced Safeguarding
    Comment: Respondents stated that enhanced safeguards would need to 
be applied to all systems. Comments also indicated that DFARS should 
not apply to International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and 
Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and information ``bearing 
current and prior designations indicating controlled access and 
dissemination.'' ITAR and EAR are regulated by Departments of State and 
Commerce; other categories of information in the DFARS are already 
protected by other regulations. ``Critical Program Information'' is 
poorly defined.
    Response: The rule has been revised so the safeguarding 
requirements only apply to systems that have unclassified controlled 
technical information resident on or transiting through them. The rule 
has also been revised to specify that contractors must protect 
controlled technical information. Additionally, the rule ensures that 
there are no conflicts with existing regulations. The term ``critical 
program information'' was not included in the final rule.
    Comment: A respondent noted a person communicating information 
requiring enhanced safeguarding would need to ensure that the recipient 
of that information also had a system with enhanced safeguarding, which 
would be challenging.
    Response: The contractor has an obligation to ensure that any 
recipient of information requiring enhanced safeguarding is authorized 
to receive the information, and that it be transferred with the 
appropriate security. It is the responsibility of the authorized 
recipient to safeguard that information appropriately subject to 
contractual requirements.
24. Enhanced Safeguarding Requirements
    Comment: The safeguarding controls must flow down to each 
subcontractor. All systems in the network would be required to meet 
enhanced safeguarding, increasing costs. Clarify that enhanced 
safeguarding only applies to systems where DoD information resides.
    Response: The enhanced safeguarding requirement only applies to 
systems that may have unclassified controlled technical information 
resident on or transiting through them.
    Comment: Several respondents noted the effort and resources 
required of a security program that is NIST SP 800-53 compliant and the 
imposition of controls that are not risk based. The respondents 
requested that DoD consider the financial burden of applying such a 
security infrastructure that is more appropriate to classified than 
unclassified information or to more than DoD information.
    Response: The rule does not require adoption of a NIST compliant 
security program. The rule uses the NIST SP 800-53 catalog of security 
controls as a reference to describe the specific security capabilities 
that a contractor's system should provide for enhanced safeguarding. 
The rule has been

[[Page 69277]]

modified to apply only to specified controlled technical information.
    Comment: A respondent recommended substantial expansion of the NIST 
controls listed in the table.
    Response: The substantial increase in specified controls is not 
warranted for the sensitivity of the information being protected. 
Additional controls can be added to any contract when the additional 
security is required, but broadly applying these additional controls is 
not justified or practical.
    Comment: A respondent noted that the enhanced safeguarding 
provisions appear to expand export controls and preclude use of the 
fundamental research exclusion.
    Response: The rule does not expand export controls and does not 
imply any restriction on fundamental research exclusions.
    Comment: A respondent noted that there is no explicit statement 
that this same level of safeguarding is required for subcontractors and 
recommends the rule specify that the prime contractor flow down the 
same safeguarding requirement to each level of subcontractor.
    Response: Under 252.204-7012 (g) the prime contractor is required 
to include the substance of this clause in all subcontracts, and each 
subcontractor must flow the clause down to the next tier.
    Comment: Several respondents stated that the requirements for 
enhanced safeguarding will require contractors to implement a Common 
Access Card (CAC)-like public key infrastructure (PKI) system on their 
unclassified networks, citing NIST 800-53 controls AU-10(5) and SC-
13(4), or the requirement requiring use of DoD-approved identity 
authentication credentials for authentication to DoD information 
systems.
    Response: There is no requirement for contractors to implement a 
PKI system on their unclassified networks processing DoD information. 
The NIST controls cited merely require that when using cryptography 
that the cryptographic algorithm meets NIST Federal Information 
Processing standards, or note that digital signatures can be used to 
ensure non-repudiation. None of the controls require PKI. If a 
contractor desires access to a DoD information system (one operated by 
or on behalf of DoD), then the authentication credentials must meet DoD 
standards, which typically requires a DoD-approved PKI certificate. 
This has been a long-standing requirement, but does not imply that the 
contractor system must implement PKI.
    Comment: A respondent noted that the supplementary information 
section of the proposed rule mentions encryption of data at rest, yet 
the cited NIST 800-53 for protection of data at rest (SC-28) does not 
require encryption.
    Response: The background information has been aligned in the final 
rule.
    Comment: A respondent recommends requiring compliance with FISMA to 
ensure that other important FISMA requirements are met.
    Response: FISMA applies only to Federal Government information and 
information systems or systems (or information operated or maintained 
by contractors on the Government's behalf). FISMA does not does not 
apply to the contractor information systems addressed under this rule.
    Comment: A respondent comments that the rule does not establish a 
clear link between the sensitivity of the information and the required 
level of identity assurance and suggests a set of categories for 
identity assurance that should be incorporated into the rule.
    Response: Based on information covered by the rule, the level of 
identity assurance (AC or Access Control controls) specified in the 
clause are considered the minimum requirements.
    Comment: A respondent notes that Defense Security Service requires 
that companies under a Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI)-
mitigation agreement comply with certain NIST SP 800-53 requirements, 
the majority of which are required under this rule, leading to 
confusion, redundancy and wasted resources.
    Response: If a company is already compliant with the NIST 800-53 
controls for systems that may have unclassified controlled technical 
information resident on or transiting through them, then they will meet 
the requirements of this rule.
    Comment: A respondent notes that the proposed rule is silent on 
prohibiting access to non-US persons, and questions whether companies 
(particularly those with a FOCI mitigation plan) can assume that 
foreign nationals and entities with a business need to know may access 
unclassified information unless otherwise subject to export control 
laws or expressly prohibited by the Government agency.
    Response: This rule has no impact on existing information sharing 
restrictions.
25. Other Requirements
    Comment: One respondent was concerned about conflicting obligations 
under provisions of the proposed rule and recommended that participants 
in the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber security/information 
assurance (CS/IA) program be exempt from complying with the proposed 
rule in order to prevent the imposition of conflicting obligations.
    Response: The final rule and the DIB CS/IA program Framework 
Agreement are mutually supportive means for safeguarding DoD 
information on DIB unclassified information systems. The DIB CS/IA 
program is voluntary and is executed under a bilateral agreement 
between an eligible DIB company and DoD. The DFARS language establishes 
contractor requirements executed under a DoD contract.
26. Cyber Incident Reporting
    Comment: Eleven respondents commented on the requirement to report 
incidents within 72 hours of detection. In addition, the DFARS requires 
indefinite retention of forensics data for the Government and the 
criteria for damage assessments are broad and unclear. The respondents 
would like to review and comment on report content or forms prior to 
publication and suggested that DoD look at DSS NISPOM reporting as an 
option/model.
    Response: The rule has been revised to clarify the reporting 
requirements and the timeframe for retaining data (90 days) of the 
potentially compromised data to support a damage assessment if the 
Government chooses to perform one.
27. Protection of Reported Information
    Comment: One respondent requests the Government address how 
contractor incident reporting information will be protected and how it 
will be used. The respondent also proposed that the sharing of files 
and images be voluntary as it is in the Framework Agreement.
    Response: Retaining files and images is an important element of the 
damage assessment process and is required by this rule. DoD will 
protect incident reporting information and any files or images in 
accordance with applicable statutes and regulations.
28. Third Party Information
    Comment: Two respondents are concerned about exposure of third-
party information in data provided by companies to the Government. One 
respondent recommended the deletion of the following: ``Absent written 
permission, the third-party information owner may have the right to 
pursue legal action against the Contractor (or its subcontractors) with 
access to the nonpublic information for breach or unauthorized 
disclosure.''

[[Page 69278]]

    Response: The third party information subparagraph has been removed 
because support contractors working for the DoD are required to sign 
non-disclosure agreements. DoD personnel are bound by regulation and 
statute to protect proprietary information and information furnished in 
confidence.
29. Subcontracts
    Comment: Three respondents note that the proposed rule requires the 
DFARS to apply to all subcontractors that may potentially have DoD 
information. In addition, notifications are required through the prime 
contractor. Potential issues exist with proprietary information and 
unauthorized disclosure of third party information.
    Response: The rule requires that prime contractors report when 
unclassified controlled technical information has potentially been 
compromised regardless of whether the incident occurred on a prime 
contractor's information system or on a subcontractor's information 
system.
30. Provide a Safe Harbor for Reported Incidents
    Comment: One respondent suggested that the rule provide explicit 
safe harbor in the event of a reported incident.
    Response: The rule states in DFARS 204.7302(b)(2) that ``A cyber 
incident that is properly reported by the contractor shall not, by 
itself, be interpreted under this clause as evidence that the 
contractor has failed to provide adequate information safeguards . . 
.'' The Government does not intend to provide any safe harbor 
statements.
31. Paperwork Burden
    Comment: A number of respondents stated in various qualitative 
terms that the costs of compliance with the rule would be too large.
    Response: The controls in the rule are taken from NIST 800-53 which 
closely parallels the ISO 27002 standard. As such, the controls 
represent mainstream industry practices. While there is cost associated 
with implementing information assurance controls, the use of industry 
practices provides assurance the costs are reasonable.
    Comment: Some respondents opined that few small businesses have the 
basic infrastructure in place to comply and that implementation of 
controls would represent a larger percentage of overhead for small 
businesses than for large.
    Response: The contractor's size classification is not a sufficient 
reason to allow a contractor to fail to protect technical information 
as required by clause 252.204-7012. The contractor at a minimum must 
institute the NIST (SP) 800-53 security controls identified in the 
table at 252.204-7012. If a control is not implemented, the contractor 
shall submit to the contracting officer a written explanation of how 
the required security control identified in the table at 252.204-7012 
is not applicable, or how an alternative control or protective measure 
is used to achieve equivalent protection.
    Comment: Some respondents stated that the value of controls cannot 
be measured and that the benefits will not offset the costs.
    Response: The purpose of the rule is to reduce the compromise of 
information. It is difficult to put a price on information and it is 
generally not calculated in any information protection regime. The 
benefits of particular controls are also difficult to quantify and 
further complicated by the `arms race' dynamic of information 
protection. It is not possible to determine the exact point at which 
benefits equal costs. Nevertheless, that does not preclude taking 
action to protect information and accrue the associated costs.
    Comment: One respondent provided an incident reporting rate of 
approximately 70 reports per company per year, with each report taking 
approximately 5 hours of company time to complete. This is in contrast 
to the proposed rule estimate of 0.5 incidents per company per year 
with a 1 hour burden per response.
    Response: Since the burden estimates were estimated for the 
proposed rule, more data has become available, in particular from 
voluntary reporting by defense industrial base companies to the Defense 
Cyber Crime Center. Data from this voluntary program suggests five 
reports per company per year with a 3.5 hour burden per response. 
Accordingly, DoD is revising its estimate upward to five reports per 
company per year with a 3.5 hour burden per response.
    Comment: One respondent provided a cost estimate for an appliance 
to capture images of auditable events of $25,000.
    Response: To lower the cost of data collection in the revised rule, 
DoD must request the data within 90 days. Without this request, there 
is no obligation to retain data beyond 90 days. Image capture equates 
to copying the hard drive of an affected machine. The cost of media 
with sufficient capability to capture a hard drive image of an affected 
machine is in the range of $100. Assuming an average across all 
businesses of 12 incidents per year affecting an average of one machine 
and a 90 day retention period results in the ability to capture and 
store 3 images. 3 x $100 = $300.
32. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
    Comment: Several respondents stated that this rule will be 
financially burdensome for small businesses to the point that they will 
not be able to participate. Two respondents stated that the numbers 
used in the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis grossly 
underestimate the number of businesses the rule will affect and the 
cost as a percentage of revenue that will be required to meet the 
requirements of the new rule. One respondent suggested that a gradually 
phased-in approach to implement these safeguards would ease the 
significant financial burden they impose.
    Response: This final rule was drafted with the aim of minimizing 
the burden of compliance on contractors while implementing the 
necessary safeguarding requirements.
33. Need for a Public Meeting
    Comment: Several respondents suggested that DoD further engage the 
industry stakeholders, including a suggestion to schedule a public 
meeting to discuss the rule.
    Response: Another public meeting will be considered prior to any 
future rules dealing with the safeguarding of information.
34. Drafting Recommendations
    Comment: One respondent recommends changing all instances of 
``unclassified Government information'' to ``DoD information''. Several 
respondents submitted lists of typos and errors in the proposed rule 
Federal Register notice.
    Response: These comments have been taken into account when drafting 
this final rule. The final rule uses the term ``unclassified controlled 
technical information.''
35. Out of Scope
    Comment: Three respondents made comments that had no relation to 
the subject rule.

C. Other Changes

    The final rule adds a new subpart at 204.73, Safeguarding 
Unclassified Controlled Technical Information, to conform to the 
current DFARS baseline. The proposed rule had anticipated adding the 
new subpart at 204.74.

III. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563

    Executive Orders (E.O.s) 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess 
all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if 
regulation is

[[Page 69279]]

necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits 
(including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety 
effects, distributive impacts, and equity). E.O. 13563 emphasizes the 
importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, of reducing costs, 
of harmonizing rules, and of promoting flexibility. This is a 
significant regulatory action and, therefore, was subject to review 
under section 6(b) of E.O. 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, dated 
September 30, 1993. This rule is not a major rule under 5 U.S.C. 804.

IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    A final regulatory flexibility analysis has been prepared 
consistent with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601, et seq., 
and is summarized as follows:
    The objective of this rule is for DoD to avoid compromise of 
unclassified computer networks on which DoD controlled technical 
information is resident on or transiting through contractor information 
systems, and to prevent the exfiltration of controlled technical 
information on such systems. The benefit of tracking and reporting DoD 
information compromises is to--
     Assess the impact of compromise;
     Facilitate information sharing and collaboration; and
     Standardize procedures for tracking and reporting 
compromise of information.
    Several respondents stated that this rule will be financially 
burdensome for small businesses, two respondents stated that the 
numbers used in the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis grossly 
underestimate the number of businesses the rule will affect and the 
cost as a percentage of revenue that will be required to meet the 
requirements of the new rule, and one respondent suggested that a 
gradually phased-in approach to implement these safeguards would ease 
the significant financial burden they impose.
    No changes were made to the final rule as a result of these 
comments. The estimated burden in the final regulatory flexibility 
analysis has been reduced because the scope of the rule was modified to 
reduce the categories of information covered and only addresses 
safeguarding requirements that cover the unclassified controlled 
technical information and reporting the compromise of unclassified 
controlled technical information. The final rule is drafted with the 
aim of minimizing the burden of compliance on contractors while 
implementing the necessary safeguarding requirements.
    This final rule requires information assurance planning, including 
reporting of information compromise for DoD contractors that handle DoD 
unclassified controlled technical information. This requirement flows 
down to subcontracts. DoD believes that most information passed down 
the supply chain will not require special handling and recognizes that 
most large contractors handling sensitive information already have 
sophisticated information assurance programs and can take credit for 
existing controls with minimal additional cost. However, most small 
businesses have less sophisticated programs and will realize costs 
meeting the additional requirements.
    Based on figures from the Defense Technical Information Center it 
is estimated that 6,555 contractors would be handling unclassified 
controlled technical information and therefore affected by this rule. 
Of the 6,555 contractors it is estimated that less than half of them 
are small entities. For the affected small entities a reasonable rule 
of thumb is that information technology security costs are 
approximately 0.5% of total revenues. Because there are economies of 
scale when it comes to information security, larger businesses 
generally pay only a fraction of that amount.

V. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The rule contains information collection requirements that require 
the approval of the Office of Management and Budget under the Paperwork 
Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. chapter 35). OMB has cleared this information 
collection under OMB Control Number 0704-0478, titled: Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Safeguarding Unclassified Controlled 
Technical Information.

List of Subjects in 48 CFR Parts 204, 212 and 252

    Government procurement.

Manuel Quinones,
Editor, Defense Acquisition Regulations System.

    Therefore, 48 CFR parts 204, 212, and 252 are amended as follows:

0
1. The authority citation for 48 CFR parts 204, 212, and 252 continues 
to read as follows:

    Authority:  41 U.S.C. 1303 and 48 CFR Chapter 1.

PART 204--ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

0
2. Add subpart 204.73 to read as follows:
Subpart 204.73--Safeguarding Unclassified Controlled Technical 
Information
Sec.
204.7300 Scope.
204.7301 Definitions.
204.7302 Policy.
204.7303 Contract clause.

Subpart 204.73--Safeguarding Unclassified Controlled Technical 
Information


204.7300  Scope.

    (a) This subpart applies to contracts and subcontracts requiring 
safeguarding of unclassified controlled technical information resident 
on or transiting through contractor unclassified information systems.
    (b) This subpart does not abrogate any existing contractor 
physical, personnel, or general administrative security operations 
governing the protection of unclassified DoD information, nor does it 
impact requirements of the National Industrial Security Program.


204.7301  Definitions.

    As used in this subpart--
    Adequate security means protective measures that are commensurate 
with the consequences and probability of loss, misuse, or unauthorized 
access to, or modification of information.
    Controlled technical information means technical information with 
military or space application that is subject to controls on the 
access, use, reproduction, modification, performance, display, release, 
disclosure, or dissemination. Controlled technical information is to be 
marked with one of the distribution statements B through F, in 
accordance with DoD Instruction 5230.24, Distribution Statements on 
Technical Documents. The term does not include information that is 
lawfully publicly available without restrictions.
    Cyber incident means actions taken through the use of computer 
networks that result in an actual or potentially adverse effect on an 
information system and/or the information residing therein.
    Technical information means technical data or computer software, as 
those terms are defined in the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013, Rights in 
Technical Data--Non Commercial Items, regardless of whether or not the 
clause is incorporated in this solicitation or contract. Examples of 
technical information include research and engineering data, 
engineering drawings, and associated lists, specifications, standards, 
process sheets, manuals, technical reports, technical orders, catalog-
item identifications, data sets, studies and analyses and related 
information, and

[[Page 69280]]

computer software executable code and source code.


204.7302  Policy.

    (a) DoD and its contractors and subcontractors will provide 
adequate security to safeguard unclassified controlled technical 
information on their unclassified information systems from unauthorized 
access and disclosure.
    (b) When safeguarding is applied to controlled technical 
information resident on or transiting contractor unclassified 
information systems--
    (1) Contractors must report to DoD certain cyber incidents that 
affect unclassified controlled technical information resident on or 
transiting contractor unclassified information systems. Detailed 
reporting criteria and requirements are set forth in the clause at 
252.204-7012, Safeguarding of Unclassified Controlled Technical 
Information.
    (2) A cyber incident that is properly reported by the contractor 
shall not, by itself, be interpreted under this clause as evidence that 
the contractor has failed to provide adequate information safeguards 
for unclassified controlled technical information, or has otherwise 
failed to meet the requirements of the clause at 252.204-7012. When a 
cyber incident is reported, the contracting officer shall consult with 
a security manager of the requiring activity prior to assessing 
contractor compliance. The contracting officer shall consider such 
cyber incidents in the context of an overall assessment of the 
contractor's compliance with the requirements of the clause at 252.204-
7012.


204.7303  Contract clause.

    Use the clause at 252.204-7012, Safeguarding of Unclassified 
Controlled Technical Information, in all solicitations and contracts, 
including solicitations and contracts using FAR part 12 procedures for 
the acquisition of commercial items.

PART 212--ACQUISITION OF COMMERCIAL ITEMS

0
3. Section 212.301 is amended by--
0
a. Redesignating paragraphs (f)(vi) through (lxvii) as (vii) through 
(lxviii); and
0
b. Adding new paragraph (f)(vi) to read as follows:


212.301  Solicitation provisions and contract clauses for the 
acquisition of commercial items.

    (f) * * *
    (vi) Use the clause at 252.204-7012, Safeguarding of Unclassified 
Controlled Technical Information, as prescribed in 204.7303.
* * * * *

PART 252--SOLICITATION PROVISIONS AND CONTRACT CLAUSES

0
4. Add section 252.204-7012 to read as follows:


252.204-7012  Safeguarding of unclassified controlled technical 
information.

    As prescribed in 204.7303, use the following clause: SAFEGUARDING 
OF UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED TECHNICAL INFORMATION (NOV 2013)
    (a) Definitions. As used in this clause--
    Adequate security means protective measures that are commensurate 
with the consequences and probability of loss, misuse, or unauthorized 
access to, or modification of information.
    Attribution information means information that identifies the 
Contractor, whether directly or indirectly, by the grouping of 
information that can be traced back to the Contractor (e.g., program 
description or facility locations).
    Compromise means disclosure of information to unauthorized persons, 
or a violation of the security policy of a system, in which 
unauthorized intentional or unintentional disclosure, modification, 
destruction, or loss of an object, or the copying of information to 
unauthorized media may have occurred.
    Contractor information system means an information system belonging 
to, or operated by or for, the Contractor.
    Controlled technical information means technical information with 
military or space application that is subject to controls on the 
access, use, reproduction, modification, performance, display, release, 
disclosure, or dissemination. Controlled technical information is to be 
marked with one of the distribution statements B-through-F, in 
accordance with DoD Instruction 5230.24, Distribution Statements on 
Technical Documents. The term does not include information that is 
lawfully publicly available without restrictions.
    Cyber incident means actions taken through the use of computer 
networks that result in an actual or potentially adverse effect on an 
information system and/or the information residing therein.
    Exfiltration means any unauthorized release of data from within an 
information system. This includes copying the data through covert 
network channels or the copying of data to unauthorized media.
    Media means physical devices or writing surfaces including, but is 
not limited to, magnetic tapes, optical disks, magnetic disks, large-
scale integration memory chips, and printouts onto which information is 
recorded, stored, or printed within an information system.
    Technical information means technical data or computer software, as 
those terms are defined in the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013, Rights in 
Technical Data--Non Commercial Items, regardless of whether or not the 
clause is incorporated in this solicitation or contract. Examples of 
technical information include research and engineering data, 
engineering drawings, and associated lists, specifications, standards, 
process sheets, manuals, technical reports, technical orders, catalog-
item identifications, data sets, studies and analyses and related 
information, and computer software executable code and source code.
    (b) Safeguarding requirements and procedures for unclassified 
controlled technical information. The Contractor shall provide adequate 
security to safeguard unclassified controlled technical information 
from compromise. To provide adequate security, the Contractor shall--
    (1) Implement information systems security in its project, 
enterprise, or company-wide unclassified information technology 
system(s) that may have unclassified controlled technical information 
resident on or transiting through them. The information systems 
security program shall implement, at a minimum--
    (i) The specified National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-53 security controls identified in 
the following table; or
    (ii) If a NIST control is not implemented, the Contractor shall 
submit to the Contracting Officer a written explanation of how--
    (A) The required security control identified in the following table 
is not applicable; or
    (B) An alternative control or protective measure is used to achieve 
equivalent protection.
    (2) Apply other information systems security requirements when the 
Contractor reasonably determines that information systems security 
measures, in addition to those identified in paragraph (b)(1) of this 
clause, may be required to provide adequate security in a dynamic 
environment based on an assessed risk or vulnerability.

[[Page 69281]]

Table 1--Minimum Security Controls for Safeguarding

    Minimum required security controls for unclassified controlled 
technical information requiring safeguarding in accordance with 
paragraph (d) of this clause. (A description of the security controls 
is in the NIST SP 800-53, ``Security and Privacy Controls for Federal 
Information Systems and Organizations'' (https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html).)
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Legend:

AC: Access Control
AT: Awareness and Training MP:
AU: Auditing and Accountability
CM: Configuration Management
CP: Contingency Planning
IA: Identification and Authentication
IR: Incident Response
MA: Maintenance
MP: Media Protection
PE: Physical & Environmental Protection
PM: Program Management
RA: Risk Assessment
SC: System & Communications Protection
SI: System & Information Integrity
    (c) Other requirements. This clause does not relieve the Contractor 
of the requirements specified by applicable statutes or other Federal 
and DoD safeguarding requirements for Controlled Unclassified 
Information as established by Executive Order 13556, as well as 
regulations and guidance established pursuant thereto.
    (d) Cyber incident and compromise reporting.
    (1) Reporting requirement. The Contractor shall report as much of 
the following information as can be obtained to the Department of 
Defense via (https://dibnet.dod.mil/) within 72 hours of discovery of 
any cyber incident, as described in paragraph (d)(2) of this clause, 
that affects unclassified controlled technical information resident on 
or transiting through the Contractor's unclassified information 
systems:
    (i) Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS).
    (ii) Contract numbers affected unless all contracts by the company 
are affected.
    (iii) Facility CAGE code if the location of the event is different 
than the prime Contractor location.
    (iv) Point of contact if different than the POC recorded in the 
System for Award Management (address, position, telephone, email).
    (v) Contracting Officer point of contact (address, position, 
telephone, email).
    (vi) Contract clearance level.
    (vii) Name of subcontractor and CAGE code if this was an incident 
on a subcontractor network.
    (viii) DoD programs, platforms or systems involved.
    (ix) Location(s) of compromise.
    (x) Date incident discovered.
    (xi) Type of compromise (e.g., unauthorized access, inadvertent 
release, other).
    (xii) Description of technical information compromised.
    (xiii) Any additional information relevant to the information 
compromise.
    (2) Reportable cyber incidents. Reportable cyber incidents include 
the following:
    (i) A cyber incident involving possible exfiltration, manipulation, 
or other loss or compromise of any unclassified controlled technical 
information resident on or transiting through Contractor's, or its 
subcontractors', unclassified information systems.
    (ii) Any other activities not included in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of 
this clause that allow unauthorized access to the Contractor's 
unclassified information system on which unclassified controlled 
technical information is resident on or transiting.
    (3) Other reporting requirements. This reporting in no way 
abrogates the Contractor's responsibility for additional safeguarding 
and cyber incident reporting requirements pertaining to its 
unclassified information systems under other clauses that may apply to 
its contract, or as a result of other U.S. Government legislative and 
regulatory requirements that may apply (e.g., as cited in paragraph (c) 
of this clause).
    (4) Contractor actions to support DoD damage assessment. In 
response to the reported cyber incident, the Contractor shall--
    (i) Conduct further review of its unclassified network for evidence 
of compromise resulting from a cyber incident to include, but is not 
limited to, identifying compromised computers, servers, specific data 
and users accounts. This includes analyzing information systems that 
were part of the compromise, as well as other information systems on 
the network that were accessed as a result of the compromise;
    (ii) Review the data accessed during the cyber incident to identify 
specific unclassified controlled technical information associated with 
DoD programs, systems or contracts, including military programs, 
systems and technology; and
    (iii) Preserve and protect images of known affected information 
systems and all relevant monitoring/packet capture data for at least 90 
days from the cyber incident to allow DoD to request information or 
decline interest.
    (5) DoD damage assessment activities. If DoD elects to conduct a 
damage assessment, the Contracting Officer will request that the 
Contractor point of contact identified in the incident report at (d)(1) 
of this clause provide all of the damage assessment information 
gathered in accordance with paragraph (d)(4) of this clause. The 
Contractor shall comply with damage assessment information requests. 
The requirement to share files and images exists unless there are legal 
restrictions that limit a company's ability to share digital media. The 
Contractor shall inform the Contracting Officer of the source, nature, 
and prescription of such limitations and the authority responsible.
    (e) Protection of reported information. Except to the extent that 
such information is lawfully publicly available without restrictions, 
the Government will protect information reported or otherwise provided 
to DoD under this clause in accordance with applicable statutes, 
regulations, and policies. The Contractor shall identify and mark 
attribution information reported or otherwise provided to the DoD. The 
Government may use information, including attribution information and 
disclose it only to authorized persons for purposes and activities 
consistent with this clause.
    (f) Nothing in this clause limits the Government's ability to 
conduct law enforcement or counterintelligence activities, or other 
lawful activities in the interest of homeland security and national 
security. The results of the activities described in this clause may be 
used to support an investigation and prosecution of any person or 
entity, including those attempting to infiltrate or compromise 
information on a contractor information system in violation of any 
statute.
    (g) Subcontracts. The Contractor shall include the substance of 
this clause, including this paragraph (g), in all subcontracts, 
including subcontracts for commercial items.
    (End of clause)

[FR Doc. 2013-27313 Filed 11-15-13; 8:45 am]
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