Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Requirements Relating to Supply Chain Risk (DFARS Case 2012-D050), 69267-69273 [2013-27311]
Download as PDF
Vol. 78
Monday,
No. 222
November 18, 2013
Part III
Department of Defense
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES3
Defense Acquisition Regulations System
48 CFR Parts 204, 208, 212 et al.
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Interim Rule and Final
Rules
VerDate Mar<15>2010
20:41 Nov 15, 2013
Jkt 232001
PO 00000
Frm 00001
Fmt 4717
Sfmt 4717
E:\FR\FM\18NOR3.SGM
18NOR3
69268
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 222 / Monday, November 18, 2013 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Defense Acquisition Regulations
System
48 CFR Parts 208, 212, 215, 233, 239,
244, and 252
RIN 0750–AH96
Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement: Requirements
Relating to Supply Chain Risk (DFARS
Case 2012–D050)
Defense Acquisition
Regulations System, Department of
Defense (DoD).
ACTION: Interim rule.
AGENCY:
DoD is issuing an interim rule
amending the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(DFARS) to implement a section of the
National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, as
amended by the NDAA for FY 2013.
This interim rule allows DoD to
consider the impact of supply chain risk
in specified types of procurements
related to national security systems.
DATES: Effective November 18, 2013.
Comment date: Comments on the
interim rule should be submitted in
writing to the address shown below on
or before January 17, 2014, to be
considered in the formation of a final
rule.
SUMMARY:
Submit comments
identified by DFARS Case 2012–D050,
using any of the following methods:
Æ Regulations.gov: https://
www.regulations.gov. Submit comments
via the Federal eRulemaking portal by
entering ‘‘DFARS Case 2012–D050’’
under the heading ‘‘Enter keyword or
ID’’ and selecting ‘‘Search.’’ Select the
link ‘‘Submit a Comment’’ that
corresponds with ‘‘DFARS Case 2012–
D050.’’ Follow the instructions provided
at the ‘‘Submit a Comment’’ screen.
Please include your name, company
name (if any), and ‘‘DFARS Case 2012–
D050’’ on your attached document.
Æ Email: dfars@osd.mil. Include
DFARS Case 2012–D050 in the subject
line of the message.
Æ Fax: 571–372–6094.
Æ Mail: Defense Acquisition
Regulations System, Attn: Dustin Pitsch,
OUSD(AT&L)DPAP/DARS, Room
3B855, 3060 Defense Pentagon,
Washington, DC 20301–3060.
Comments received generally will be
posted without change to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided. To
confirm receipt of your comment(s),
please check www.regulations.gov,
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES3
ADDRESSES:
VerDate Mar<15>2010
20:41 Nov 15, 2013
Jkt 232001
approximately two to three days after
submission to verify posting (except
allow 30 days for posting of comments
submitted by mail).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Dustin Pitsch, Defense Acquisition
Regulations System,
OUSD(AT&L)DPAP/DARS, Room
3B855, 3060 Defense Pentagon,
Washington, DC 20301–3060, telephone
571–372–6090.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
This interim rule amends the DFARS
to implement section 806 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2011 (Pub. L. 111–383),
entitled ‘‘Requirements for Information
Relating to Supply Chain Risk,’’ as
amended by section 806 of the NDAA
for FY 2013 (Pub. L. 112–239), and
allows DoD to consider the impact of
supply chain risk in specified types of
procurements related to national
security systems. Section 806 defines
supply chain risk as ‘‘the risk that an
adversary may sabotage, maliciously
introduce unwanted function, or
otherwise subvert the design, integrity,
manufacturing, production, distribution,
installation, operation, or maintenance
of a covered system so as to surveil,
deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the
function, use, or operation of such
system.’’
II. Discussion and Analysis
This DFARS change is necessary to
implement the authorities provided to
DoD by section 806, enabling DoD to
establish a pilot program to mitigate
supply chain risk, which is set to expire
on September 30, 2018. These
authorities are in addition to other
available mitigations, which may not be
adequate to protect against the
malicious actions referred to in the
definition of supply chain risk.
Section 806 actions are permitted in
procurements related to National
Security Systems (NSS) (see 44 U.S.C.
3542(b)) that include a requirement
relating to supply chain risk. This rule
implements section 806’s three supplychain risk-management approaches as
follows:
(1) The exclusion of a source that fails
to meet qualification standards
established in accordance with the
requirements of 10 U.S.C. 2319, for the
purpose of reducing supply chain risk
in the acquisition of covered systems.
(2) The exclusion of a source that fails
to achieve an acceptable rating with
regard to an evaluation factor providing
for the consideration of supply chain
risk in the evaluation of proposals for
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
the award of a contract or the issuance
of a task or delivery order.
(3) The decision to withhold consent
for a contractor to subcontract with a
particular source or to direct a
contractor for a covered system to
exclude a particular source from
consideration for a subcontract under
the contract.
The rule establishes a new provision
and clause (see DFARS 239.7306) for
inclusion in all solicitations and
contracts, including contracts for
commercial items or commercial off-theshelf items involving the development
or delivery of any information
technology, whether acquired as a
service or as a supply, because portions
of these contracts may be used to
support or link with one or more NSS.
Another reason for including the
provision and clause in all DoD
solicitations and contracts for
information technology is to manage the
operational security risks of including
the provision and clause only in
procurements for very sensitive DoD
procurements, thereby identifying those
very procurements as a target for the
risk section 806 aims to deter.
However, several limiting provisions
exist before the Government can
exercise its authorities under section
806. First, use of section 806 authorities
is limited to the procurement of NSS or
of covered items of supply used within
NSS. Section 806 defines a ‘‘covered
item of supply’’ as ‘‘an item of
information technology . . . that is
purchased for inclusion in (an NSS),
and the loss of integrity of which could
result in a supply chain risk’’ to the
entire system. Therefore, though the
clause will be inserted in all
information-technology contracts, these
authorities will not be able to be utilized
for all information and communication
technology in all systems, but rather
only in those meeting the criteria stated
above.
Second, the decision to exclude a
source under section 806 can only be
made by the ‘‘head of a covered
agency,’’ limited by definition to the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries
of the military departments with
delegation limited to officials at or
above the level of the service acquisition
executive for the agency.
Third, the head of a covered agency
seeking to exercise the authority of
section 806 must obtain a joint
recommendation from the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L))
and the Chief Information Officer of the
Department of Defense (DoD CIO), based
on a risk assessment from the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
E:\FR\FM\18NOR3.SGM
18NOR3
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 222 / Monday, November 18, 2013 / Rules and Regulations
(USD(I)) that there is significant supply
chain risk to a particular NSS.
Fourth, the head of a covered agency,
with the concurrence of the
USD(AT&L), must make a written
determination that the use of section
806 authority is ‘‘necessary to protect
national security by reducing supply
chain risk’’ and that ‘‘less intrusive
measures are not reasonably available to
reduce such supply chain risk.’’
Fifth, notice of each determination to
exercise section 806 authorities must be
provided in advance to the appropriate
congressional committees.
Finally, section 806 expires on
September 30, 2018 (see section 806 of
FY 2013 NDAA, Public Law 112–239).
Section 806 also provides that the
head of a covered agency may ‘‘limit,
notwithstanding any other provision of
law, in whole or in part, the disclosure
of information relating to the basis for
carrying out a covered procurement
action’’ if the head of a covered agency,
with the concurrence of the USD
(AT&L), determines in writing that ‘‘the
risk to national security due to
disclosure of such information
outweighs the risk due to not disclosing
such information.’’
If the Government exercises the
authority provided to limit disclosure of
information, no action undertaken by
the Government under such authority
shall be subject to review in a bid
protest before the Government
Accountability Office or in any Federal
court.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES3
III. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
Executive Orders (E.O.s) 12866 and
13563 direct agencies to assess all costs
and benefits of available regulatory
alternatives and, if regulation is
necessary, to select regulatory
approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety
effects, distributive impacts, and
equity). E.O. 13563 emphasizes the
importance of quantifying both costs
and benefits, of reducing costs, of
harmonizing rules, and of promoting
flexibility. This is a significant
regulatory action and, therefore, was
subject to review under section 6(b) of
E.O. 12866, Regulatory Planning and
Review, dated September 30, 1993. This
rule is not a major rule under 5 U.S.C.
804.
IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act
DoD does not expect this interim rule
to have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities
within the meaning of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601, et seq.,
because companies have an existing
VerDate Mar<15>2010
20:41 Nov 15, 2013
Jkt 232001
interest in having a supply chain that it
can rely on to provide it with material
and supplies that allow the contractor to
ultimately supply its customers with
products that are safe and that do not
impose threats or risks to government
information systems.
However, an Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) has been
prepared because there is a growing
interest by both the Government and
industry in establishing cost efficient
ways to protect the supply chain related
to information technology purchases.
Congress has recognized a growing
concern for risks to the supply chain for
technology contracts supporting the
Department of Defense (DoD). Congress
has defined supply chain risk as ‘‘the
risk that an adversary may sabotage,
maliciously introduce unwanted
function, or otherwise subvert the
design, integrity, manufacturing,
production, distribution, installation,
operation, or maintenance of a covered
system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or
otherwise degrade the function, use, or
operation of such system.’’ (See section
806(e)(4) of Pub. L. 111–383.)
The objective of this rule is to protect
DoD against risks arising out of the
supply chain.
The legal basis for this rule is section
806 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year (FY) 2011 (Pub. L. 111–383), as
amended by section 806 of the NDAA
for FY 2013 (Pub. L. 112–239).
Additionally, the Department of Defense
Instruction (DoDI) 5200.44, Protection of
Mission Critical Functions to Achieve
Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN),
recognizes the need to improve supply
chain risk management (SCRM). In
doing so, the DoDI requires, among
other things, implementation of section
806 in the DFARS and in appropriate
solicitation and contract language.
This rule applies to contractors
involved in the development or delivery
of any information technology, whether
acquired by DoD as a service or as a
supply. This includes commercial
purchases as well as purchases of
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
services or supplies.
This rule does not require any specific
reporting, recordkeeping or compliance
requirements. It does, however,
recognize the need for information
technology contractors to implement
appropriate safeguards and
countermeasures to minimize supply
chain risk. This rule, by itself, does not
require contractors to deploy additional
supply chain risk protections, but leaves
it up to the individual contractors to
take the steps they think are necessary
to maintain existing or otherwise
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
69269
required safeguards and
countermeasures as necessary for their
own particular industrial methods to
protect their supply chain.
The rule does not duplicate, overlap,
or conflict with any other Federal rules.
Consistent with the stated objectives
of section 806 and the DoDI, no viable
alternatives exist.
Possible alternatives considered
included having all contractors report,
on all contracts, the nature of the supply
chain risk mitigation efforts they have
applied to their manufacturing
processes. This would be unduly
burdensome for both contractors and the
Government.
Another alternative is not to have
section 806 clauses apply to commercial
and COTS items or purchases below the
simplified acquisition threshold.
However, the requirements of section
806 should apply to contracts and
subcontracts at or below the simplified
acquisition threshold because the
malicious introduction of unwanted
functions may occur at any dollar
threshold. Therefore, it would not be in
the best interest of the Federal
Government to exempt contracts and
subcontracts at or below the simplified
acquisition threshold from this
requirement.
In a like manner, the requirements of
section 806 should apply to the
procurement of commercial items
(including COTS items) because the
intent of the statute is to protect the
supply chain which in turn protects all
NSS. Commercial and COTS
information technology supplies and
services often become part of NSSs.
Protection of the NSSs using the
authority of section 806 requires
application in all information
technology supply and services
contacts. Therefore, exempting
commercial (including COTS) items
from application of the statute would
negate the intended effect of the statute.
DoD invites comments from small
business concerns and other interested
parties on the expected impact of this
rule on small entities.
DoD will also consider comments
from small entities concerning the
existing regulations in subparts affected
by this rule in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
610. Interested parties must submit such
comments separately and should cite 5
U.S.C. 610 (DFARS Case 2012–D050) in
correspondence.
V. Paperwork Reduction Act
The rule does not contain any
information collection requirements that
require the approval of the Office of
Management and Budget under the
E:\FR\FM\18NOR3.SGM
18NOR3
69270
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 222 / Monday, November 18, 2013 / Rules and Regulations
Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C.
chapter 35.
List of Subjects in 48 CFR Parts 208,
212, 215, 233, 239, 244, and 252
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES3
VI. Determination To Issue an Interim
Rule
A determination has been made under
the authority of the Secretary of Defense
that urgent and compelling reasons exist
to promulgate this interim rule without
prior opportunity for public comment.
This action is necessary because of the
urgent need to protect the National
Security Systems (NSS) and the
integrity of the supply chain to NSS. It
is necessary to reduce supply chain risk
in the acquisition of sensitive
information technology systems that are
used for intelligence or cryptologic
activities; used for command and
control of military forces; or from an
integral part of a weapon system by
avoiding sabotage, maliciously
introducing unwanted functions, or
other subversion of the design, integrity,
manufacturing, production, installation,
operation or maintenance of systems.
Such acquisition decisions are made
daily and, like other cybersecurity
measures, the costs to mitigate supply
chain risk after a system is already in
operation can be very high. In addition,
as this is a pilot authority set to expire
on September 30, 2018, and the
Congress has requested a report on the
effectiveness of the authority not later
than January 1, 2017, therefore DoD
must make this tool available
immediately to begin the pilot program
and gather feedback for the report to
Congress.
The globalization of information
technology has increased the
vulnerability of DoD to attacks on its
systems and networks. Failure to
implement this rule may cause harm to
the Government and to individuals
relying on the integrity of NSS, for
example, the risk of allowing the
malicious insertion of software code or
an unwanted function designed to
degrade DOD’s sensitive systems. DoD
has proceeded cautiously to ensure that
this rule very closely mirrors the
authorities provided in the statute and
has little leeway to vary from those
terms. However, pursuant to 41 U.S.C.
1707 and FAR 1.501–3(b), DoD will
consider public comments received in
response to this interim rule in the
formation of the final rule.
Government procurement.
Manuel Quinones,
Editor, Defense Acquisition Regulations
System.
Therefore, 48 CFR parts 208, 212, 215,
233, 239, 244, and 252 are amended as
follows:
■ 1. The authority citation for 48 CFR
parts 208, 212, 215, 233, 239, 244, and
252 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 41 U.S.C. 1303 and 48 CFR
Chapter 1.
PART 208—REQUIRED SOURCES OF
SUPPLIES AND SERVICES
2. Add section 208.405 to read as
follows:
■
208.405 Ordering procedures for Federal
Supply Schedules.
In all orders and blanket purchase
agreements involving the development
or delivery of any information
technology, whether acquired as a
service or as a supply, consider the need
for an evaluation factor regarding
supply chain risk (see subpart 239.73).
■ 3. Amend section 208.7402 by—
■ a. Designating the text as paragraph
(1); and
■ b. Adding new paragraph (2) to read
as follows:
208.7402
General.
(1) * * *
(2) In all orders and blanket purchase
agreements involving the development
or delivery of any information
technology, whether acquired as a
service or as a supply, consider the need
for an evaluation factor regarding
supply chain risk (see subpart 239.73).
PART 212—ACQUISITION OF
COMMERCIAL ITEMS
4. Amend section 212.301 by—
a. Revising paragraph (f)(xiv);
b. Redesignating—
i. Paragraphs (f)(liii) through (lxv) as
(lvi) through (lxvii); and
■ ii. Paragraphs (f)(xv) through (lii) as
(f)(xvi) through (liii).
■ c. Adding new paragraphs (f)(xv),
(liv), and (lv).
Revision and additions to read as
follows:
■
■
■
■
212.301 Solicitation provisions and
contract clauses for the acquisition of
commercial items.
(f) * * *
(xiv) Use the provision 252.215–7008,
Only One Offer, as prescribed at
215.408(4);
VerDate Mar<15>2010
20:41 Nov 15, 2013
Jkt 232001
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
(xv) Use the clause at 252.219–7003,
Small Business Subcontracting Plan
(DoD Contracts), as prescribed in
219.708(b)(1)(A)(1), to comply with 15
U.S.C. 637. Use the clause with its
Alternate I when prescribed in
219.708(b)(1)(A)(2).
*
*
*
*
*
(liv) Use the provision at 252.239–
7017, Notice of Supply Chain Risk, as
prescribed in 239.7306(a), to comply
with section 806 of Public Law 111–383,
in all solicitations for contracts
involving the development or delivery
of any information technology, whether
acquired as a service or as a supply.
(lv) Use the clause at 252.239–7018,
Supply Chain Risk, as prescribed in
239.7306(b), to comply with section 806
of Public Law 111–383, in all
solicitations and contracts involving the
development or delivery of any
information technology, whether
acquired as a service or as a supply.
*
*
*
*
*
PART 215—CONTRACTING BY
NEGOTIATION
5. Amend section 215.304 by adding
new paragraph (c)(v) to read as follows:
■
215.304 Evaluation factors and significant
subfactors.
(c) * * *
(v) In all solicitations and contracts
involving the development or delivery
of any information technology, whether
acquired as a service or as a supply,
consider the need for an evaluation
factor regarding supply chain risk (see
subpart 239.73).
■ 6. Add new subpart 215.5 to read as
follows:
Subpart 215.5—Preaward, Award, and
Postaward Notifications, Protests, and
Mistakes
Sec.
215.503 Notifications to unsuccessful
offerors.
215.506 Postaward debriefing of offerors.
Subpart 215.5—Preaward, Award, and
Postaward Notifications, Protests, and
Mistakes
215.503 Notifications to unsuccessful
offerors.
If the Government exercises the
authority provided in 239.7305(d), the
notifications to unsuccessful offerors,
either preaward or postaward, shall not
reveal any information that is
determined to be withheld from
disclosure in accordance with section
806 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,
as amended by section 806 of the
E:\FR\FM\18NOR3.SGM
18NOR3
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 222 / Monday, November 18, 2013 / Rules and Regulations
National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 (see subpart 239.73).
215.506
Postaward debriefing of offerors.
(e) If the Government exercises the
authority provided in 239.7305(d), the
debriefing shall not reveal any
information that is determined to be
withheld from disclosure in accordance
with section 806 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,
as amended by section 806 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 (see subpart 239.73).
PART 233—PROTESTS, DISPUTES,
AND APPEALS
7. Add new section 233.102 to read as
follows:
■
233.102
General.
If the Government exercises the
authority provided in 239.7305(d) to
limit disclosure of information, no
action undertaken by the Government
under such authority shall be subject to
review in a bid protest before the
Government Accountability Office or in
any Federal court (see subpart 239.73).
PART 239—ACQUISITION OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
8. Add new subpart 239.73 to read as
follows:
■
Subpart 239.73—Requirements for
Information Relating to Supply Chain Risk
Sec.
239.7300 Scope of subpart.
239.7301 Applicability.
239.7302 Definitions.
239.7303 Authorized individuals.
239.7304 Determination and notification.
239.7305 Exclusion and limitation on
disclosure.
239.7306 Solicitation provision and
contract clause.
Subpart 239.73—Requirements for
Information Relating to Supply Chain
Risk
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES3
239.7300
Scope of subpart.
(a) This subpart implements section
806 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011
(Pub. L. 111–383) and elements of DoD
Instruction 5200.44, Protection of
Mission Critical Functions to Achieve
Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN), at
(https://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/pdf/520044p.pdf).
(b) The authority provided in this
subpart expires on September 30, 2018
(see section 806(a) of Pub. L. 112–239).
239.7301
Applicability.
Notwithstanding FAR 39.001, this
subpart shall be applied to acquisition
VerDate Mar<15>2010
20:41 Nov 15, 2013
Jkt 232001
of information technology for national
security systems, as that term is defined
at 44 U.S.C. 3542(b), for procurements
involving—
(a) A source selection for a covered
system or a covered item involving
either a performance specification (see
10 U.S.C. 2305(a)(1)(C)(ii)), or an
evaluation factor (see 10 U.S.C.
2305(a)(2)(A)), relating to supply chain
risk;
(b) The consideration of proposals for
and issuance of a task or delivery order
for a covered system or a covered item
where the task or delivery order contract
concerned includes a requirement
relating to supply chain risk (see 10
U.S.C. 2304c(d)(3) and FAR
16.505(b)(1)(iv)(D)); or
(c) Any contract action involving a
contract for a covered system or a
covered item where such contract
includes a requirement relating to
supply chain risk.
239.7302
Definitions.
As used in this subpart—
Covered item means an item of
information technology that is
purchased for inclusion in a covered
system, and the loss of integrity of
which could result in a supply chain
risk for a covered system (see section
806(e)(6) of Pub. L. 111–383).
Covered system means a national
security system, as that term is defined
at 44 U.S.C. 3542(b) (see section
806(e)(5) of Pub. L. 111–38). It is any
information system, including any
telecommunications system, used or
operated by an agency or by a contractor
of an agency, or other organization on
behalf of an agency—
(1) The function, operation, or use of
which—
(i) Involves intelligence activities;
(ii) Involves cryptologic activities
related to national security;
(iii) Involves command and control of
military forces;
(iv) Involves equipment that is an
integral part of a weapon or weapons
system; or
(v) Is critical to the direct fulfillment
of military or intelligence missions but
this does not include a system that is to
be used for routine administrative and
business applications, including
payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel
management applications; or
(2) Is protected at all times by
procedures established for information
that have been specifically authorized
under criteria established by an
Executive order or an Act of Congress to
be kept classified in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy.
Information technology, in lieu of the
definition at FAR 2.1, and supply chain
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
69271
risk, are defined in the clause at
252.239–7018, Supply Chain Risk.
239.7303
Authorized individuals.
(a) Subject to 239.7304, the following
individuals are authorized to take the
actions authorized by 239.7305:
(1) The Secretary of Defense.
(2) The Secretary of the Army.
(3) The Secretary of the Navy.
(4) The Secretary of the Air Force.
(b) The individuals authorized at
paragraph (a) may not delegate the
authority to take the actions at 239.7305
or the responsibility for making the
determination required by 239.7304 to
an official below the level of—
(1) For the Department of Defense, the
Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics;
and,
(2) For the military departments, the
senior acquisition executive for the
department concerned.
239.7304
Determination and notification.
The individuals authorized in
239.7303 may exercise the authority
provided in 239.7305 only after—
(a) Obtaining a joint recommendation
by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
and the Chief Information Officer of the
Department of Defense, on the basis of
a risk assessment by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence,
that there is a significant supply chain
risk to a covered system;
(b) Making a determination in writing,
in unclassified or classified form, with
the concurrence of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, that—
(1) Use of the authority in
239.7305(a)(b) or (c) is necessary to
protect national security by reducing
supply chain risk;
(2) Less intrusive measures are not
reasonably available to reduce such
supply chain risk; and
(3) In a case where the individual
authorized in 239.7303 plans to limit
disclosure of information under
239.7305(d), the risk to national security
due to the disclosure of such
information outweighs the risk due to
not disclosing such information; and
(c)(1) Providing a classified or
unclassified notice of the determination
made under paragraph (b) of this
section—
(i) In the case of a covered system
included in the National Intelligence
Program or the Military Intelligence
Program, to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate, the
Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of
Representatives, and the congressional
defense committees; and
E:\FR\FM\18NOR3.SGM
18NOR3
69272
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 222 / Monday, November 18, 2013 / Rules and Regulations
(ii) In the case of a covered system not
otherwise included in paragraph (a) of
this section, to the congressional
defense committees; and
(2) The notice shall include—
(i) The following information (see 10
U.S.C. 2304(f)(3)):
(A) A description of the agency’s
needs.
(B) An identification of the statutory
exception from the requirement to use
competitive procedures and a
demonstration, based on the proposed
contractor’s qualifications or the nature
of the procurement, of the reasons for
using that exception.
(C) A determination that the
anticipated cost will be fair and
reasonable.
(D) A description of the market survey
conducted or a statement of the reasons
a market survey was not conducted.
(E) A listing of the sources, if any, that
expressed in writing an interest in the
procurement.
(F) A statement of the actions, if any,
the agency may take to remove or
overcome any barrier to competition
before a subsequent procurement for
such needs;
(ii) The joint recommendation by the
Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
and the Chief Information Officer of the
Department of Defense as specified in
paragraph (a);
(iii) A summary of the risk assessment
by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence that serves as the basis for
the joint recommendation specified in
paragraph (a); and
(iv) A summary of the basis for the
determination, including a discussion of
less intrusive measures that were
considered and why they were not
reasonably available to reduce supply
chain risk.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES3
239.7305 Exclusion and limitation on
disclosure.
Subject to 239.7304, the individuals
authorized in 239.7303 may, in the
course of conducting a covered
procurement—
(a) Exclude a source that fails to meet
qualification standards established in
accordance with the requirements of 10
U.S.C. 2319, for the purpose of reducing
supply chain risk in the acquisition of
covered systems;
(b) Exclude a source that fails to
achieve an acceptable rating with regard
to an evaluation factor providing for the
consideration of supply chain risk in the
evaluation of proposals for the award of
a contract or the issuance of a task or
delivery order;
(c) Withhold consent for a contractor
to subcontract with a particular source
VerDate Mar<15>2010
20:41 Nov 15, 2013
Jkt 232001
or direct a contractor for a covered
system to exclude a particular source
from consideration for a subcontract
under the contract; and
(d) Limit, notwithstanding any other
provision of law, in whole or in part, the
disclosure of information relating to the
basis for carrying out any of the actions
authorized by paragraphs (a) through (c)
of this section, and if such disclosures
are so limited—
(1) No action undertaken by the
individual authorized under such
authority shall be subject to review in a
bid protest before the Government
Accountability Office or in any Federal
court; and
(2) The authorized individual shall—
(i) Notify appropriate parties of a
covered procurement action and the
basis for such action only to the extent
necessary to effectuate the covered
procurement action;
(ii) Notify other Department of
Defense components or other Federal
agencies responsible for procurements
that may be subject to the same or
similar supply chain risk, in a manner
and to the extent consistent with the
requirements of national security; and
(iii) Ensure the confidentiality of any
such notifications.
239.7306 Solicitation provision and
contract clause.
(a) Insert the provision at 252.239–
7017, Notice of Supply Chain Risk, in
all solicitations, including solicitations
using FAR part 12 procedures for the
acquisition of commercial items, that
involve the development or delivery of
any information technology whether
acquired as a service or as a supply.
(b) Insert the clause at 252.239–7018,
Supply Chain Risk, in all solicitations
and contracts, including solicitations
and contracts using FAR part 12
procedures for the acquisition of
commercial items, that involve the
development or delivery of any
information technology whether
acquired as a service or as a supply.
PART 244—SUBCONTRACTING
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
9. Add new sections 244.201 and
244.201–1 to subpart 244.2 to read as
follows:
■
244.201 Consent and advance notification
requirements.
244.201–1
Consent requirements.
In all solicitations and contracts
involving the development or delivery
of any information technology, whether
acquired as a service or as a supply,
consider the need for a consent to
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
subcontract requirement regarding
supply chain risk (see subpart 239.73).
PART 252—SOLICITATION
PROVISIONS AND CONTRACT
CLAUSES
10. Add section 252.239–7017 to read
as follows:
■
252.239–7017
Notice of supply chain risk.
As prescribed in 239.7306(a), use the
following provision:
NOTICE OF SUPPLY CHAIN RISK
(NOV 2013)
(a) Definition. Supply chain risk, as used in
this provision, means the risk that an
adversary may sabotage, maliciously
introduce unwanted function, or otherwise
subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing,
production, distribution, installation,
operation, or maintenance of a national
security system (as that term is defined at 44
U.S.C. 3542(b)) so as to surveil, deny,
disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function,
use, or operation of such system.
(b) In order to manage supply chain risk,
the Government may use the authorities
provided by section 806 of Public Law 111–
383. In exercising these authorities, the
Government may consider information,
public and non-public, including all-source
intelligence, relating to an offeror and its
supply chain.
(c) If the Government exercises the
authority provided in section 806 of Pub. L.
111–383 to limit disclosure of information,
no action undertaken by the Government
under such authority shall be subject to
review in a bid protest before the
Government Accountability Office or in any
Federal court.
(End of provision)
■ 11. Add section 252.239–7018 to read
as follows:
252.239–7018
Supply chain risk.
As prescribed in 239.7306(b), use the
following clause:
SUPPLY CHAIN RISK (NOV 2013)
(a) Definitions. As used in this clause—
Information technology (see 40 U.S.C
11101(6)) means, in lieu of the definition at
FAR 2.1, any equipment, or interconnected
system(s) or subsystem(s) of equipment, that
is used in the automatic acquisition, storage,
analysis, evaluation, manipulation,
management, movement, control, display,
switching, interchange, transmission, or
reception of data or information by the
agency.
(1) For purposes of this definition,
equipment is used by an agency if the
equipment is used by the agency directly or
is used by a contractor under a contract with
the agency that requires—
(i) Its use; or
(ii) To a significant extent, its use in the
performance of a service or the furnishing of
a product.
(2) The term ‘‘information technology’’
includes computers, ancillary equipment
E:\FR\FM\18NOR3.SGM
18NOR3
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 222 / Monday, November 18, 2013 / Rules and Regulations
(including imaging peripherals, input,
output, and storage devices necessary for
security and surveillance), peripheral
equipment designed to be controlled by the
central processing unit of a computer,
software, firmware and similar procedures,
services (including support services), and
related resources.
(3) The term ‘‘information technology’’
does not include any equipment acquired by
a contractor incidental to a contract.
Supply chain risk means the risk that an
adversary may sabotage, maliciously
introduce unwanted function, or otherwise
subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing,
production, distribution, installation,
operation, or maintenance of a national
security system (as that term is defined at 44
U.S.C. 3542(b)) so as to surveil, deny,
disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function,
use, or operation of such system.
(b) The Contractor shall maintain controls
in the provision of supplies and services to
the Government to minimize supply chain
risk.
(c) In order to manage supply chain risk,
the Government may use the authorities
provided by section 806 of Public Law 111–
383. In exercising these authorities, the
Government may consider information,
public and non-public, including all-source
intelligence, relating to a Contractor’s supply
chain.
(d) If the Government exercises the
authority provided in section 806 of Public
Law 111–383 to limit disclosure of
information, no action undertaken by the
Government under such authority shall be
subject to review in a bid protest before the
Government Accountability Office or in any
Federal court.
(e) The Contractor shall include the
substance of this clause, including this
paragraph (e), in all subcontracts involving
the development or delivery of any
information technology, whether acquired as
a service or as a supply.
(DFARS) to add a new subpart and
associated contract clause to address
requirements for safeguarding
unclassified controlled technical
information.
Effective November 18, 2013.
Mr.
Dustin Pitsch, Defense Acquisition
Regulations System,
OUSD(AT&L)DPAP/DARS, Room
3B855, 3060 Defense Pentagon,
Washington, DC 20301–3060.
Telephone 571–372–6090; facsimile
571–372–6101.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
DATES:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
I. Background
48 CFR Parts 204, 212, and 252
DoD published a proposed rule in the
Federal Register at 76 FR 38089 on June
29, 2011, to implement adequate
security measures to safeguard
unclassified DoD information within
contractor information systems from
unauthorized access and disclosure, and
to prescribe reporting to DoD with
regard to certain cyber intrusion events
that affect DoD information resident on
or transiting through contractor
unclassified information systems. After
comments were received on the
proposed rule it was decided that the
scope of the rule would be modified to
reduce the categories of information
covered. This final rule addresses
safeguarding requirements that cover
only unclassified controlled technical
information and reporting the
compromise of unclassified controlled
technical information.
Controlled technical information is
technical data, computer software, and
any other technical information covered
by DoD Directive 5230.24, Distribution
Statements on Technical Documents, at
https://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/pdf/523024p.pdf, and DoD
Directive 5230.25, Withholding of
Unclassified Technical Data from Public
Disclosure, at https://www.dtic.mil/whs/
directives/corres/pdf/523025p.pdf.
Forty-nine respondents submitted
public comments in response to the
proposed rule.
RIN 0750–AG47
II. Discussion and Analysis
Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement: Safeguarding
Unclassified Controlled Technical
Information (DFARS Case 2011–D039)
DoD reviewed the public comments in
the development of the final rule. A
discussion of the comments and the
changes made to the rule as a result of
those comments is provided, as follows:
(End of clause)
[FR Doc. 2013–27311 Filed 11–15–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES3
Defense Acquisition Regulations
System
Defense Acquisition
Regulations System, Department of
Defense (DoD).
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
DoD is issuing a final rule
amending the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement
SUMMARY:
VerDate Mar<15>2010
20:41 Nov 15, 2013
Jkt 232001
A. Significant Changes From the
Proposed Rule
• The final rule reflects changes to
subpart 204.73, in lieu of 204.74 as
stated in the proposed rule, to conform
to the current DFARS baseline
numbering sequence. Subpart 204.73 is
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
69273
now titled ‘‘Safeguarding Unclassified
Controlled Technical Information’’.
• New definitions are included for:
‘‘controlled technical information’’,
‘‘cyber incident’’ and ‘‘technical
information’’.
• These definitions published in the
proposed rule are no longer included:
‘‘authentication,’’ ‘‘clearing
information,’’ ‘‘critical program
information,’’ ‘‘cyber,’’ ‘‘data,’’ ‘‘DoD
information,’’ ‘‘Government
information,’’ ‘‘incident,’’
‘‘information,’’ ‘‘information system,’’
‘‘intrusion,’’ ‘‘nonpublic information,’’
‘‘safeguarding,’’ ‘‘threat,’’ and ‘‘voice’’.
• DFARS 204.7302 is modified to
account for the reduced scope to limit
the application of safeguarding controls
to unclassified controlled technical
information, which is marked in
accordance with DoD Instruction
5230.24, Distribution Statements on
Technical Documents.
• The ‘‘procedures’’ section,
previously at DFARS 204.7403 in the
proposed rule, is no longer included.
• DFARS 204.7303, Contract Clause,
prescribes only one clause, 252.204–
7012, Safeguarding of Unclassified
Controlled Technical Information,
which is a modification of the
previously proposed ‘‘Enhanced’’
safeguarding clause. The previously
proposed ‘‘Basic’’ safeguarding clause is
removed and the proposed controls will
be implemented through FAR case
2011–020, Basic Safeguarding of
Contractor Information Systems.
• A list is added specifying the 13
pieces of information required for
reporting.
• The time period a contractor must
retain incident information to allow for
DoD to request information necessary to
conduct a damage assessment or decline
interest is set at 90 days in the clause
at 252.204–7012(d)(4)(iii).
• Additional information regarding
DoD’s damage assessment activities is
added at 252.204–7012(d)(5).
B. Analysis of Public Comments
1. Align With Implementation of
Executive Order on Controlled
Unclassified Information
Comment: Numerous respondents
indicated concerns that the proposed
rule for DoD unclassified information
was in advance of the Governmentwide
guidance that the National Archives and
Records Administration is developing
for controlled unclassified information
(CUI). Further, they suggested that DoD
delay its efforts and instead pursue
alignment with the Federal CUI policy
effort, in order to avoid confusion and
disconnects on information categories
E:\FR\FM\18NOR3.SGM
18NOR3
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 222 (Monday, November 18, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 69267-69273]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-27311]
[[Page 69267]]
Vol. 78
Monday,
No. 222
November 18, 2013
Part III
Department of Defense
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense Acquisition Regulations System
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
48 CFR Parts 204, 208, 212 et al.
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Interim Rule and
Final Rules
Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 222 / Monday, November 18, 2013 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 69268]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Defense Acquisition Regulations System
48 CFR Parts 208, 212, 215, 233, 239, 244, and 252
RIN 0750-AH96
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Requirements
Relating to Supply Chain Risk (DFARS Case 2012-D050)
AGENCY: Defense Acquisition Regulations System, Department of Defense
(DoD).
ACTION: Interim rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: DoD is issuing an interim rule amending the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) to implement a section of the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, as
amended by the NDAA for FY 2013. This interim rule allows DoD to
consider the impact of supply chain risk in specified types of
procurements related to national security systems.
DATES: Effective November 18, 2013.
Comment date: Comments on the interim rule should be submitted in
writing to the address shown below on or before January 17, 2014, to be
considered in the formation of a final rule.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments identified by DFARS Case 2012-D050, using
any of the following methods:
[cir] Regulations.gov: https://www.regulations.gov. Submit comments
via the Federal eRulemaking portal by entering ``DFARS Case 2012-D050''
under the heading ``Enter keyword or ID'' and selecting ``Search.''
Select the link ``Submit a Comment'' that corresponds with ``DFARS Case
2012-D050.'' Follow the instructions provided at the ``Submit a
Comment'' screen. Please include your name, company name (if any), and
``DFARS Case 2012-D050'' on your attached document.
[cir] Email: dfars@osd.mil. Include DFARS Case 2012-D050 in the
subject line of the message.
[cir] Fax: 571-372-6094.
[cir] Mail: Defense Acquisition Regulations System, Attn: Dustin
Pitsch, OUSD(AT&L)DPAP/DARS, Room 3B855, 3060 Defense Pentagon,
Washington, DC 20301-3060.
Comments received generally will be posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information provided. To
confirm receipt of your comment(s), please check www.regulations.gov,
approximately two to three days after submission to verify posting
(except allow 30 days for posting of comments submitted by mail).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dustin Pitsch, Defense Acquisition
Regulations System, OUSD(AT&L)DPAP/DARS, Room 3B855, 3060 Defense
Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-3060, telephone 571-372-6090.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
This interim rule amends the DFARS to implement section 806 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Pub. L. 111-
383), entitled ``Requirements for Information Relating to Supply Chain
Risk,'' as amended by section 806 of the NDAA for FY 2013 (Pub. L. 112-
239), and allows DoD to consider the impact of supply chain risk in
specified types of procurements related to national security systems.
Section 806 defines supply chain risk as ``the risk that an adversary
may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise
subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution,
installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system so as to
surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or
operation of such system.''
II. Discussion and Analysis
This DFARS change is necessary to implement the authorities
provided to DoD by section 806, enabling DoD to establish a pilot
program to mitigate supply chain risk, which is set to expire on
September 30, 2018. These authorities are in addition to other
available mitigations, which may not be adequate to protect against the
malicious actions referred to in the definition of supply chain risk.
Section 806 actions are permitted in procurements related to
National Security Systems (NSS) (see 44 U.S.C. 3542(b)) that include a
requirement relating to supply chain risk. This rule implements section
806's three supply-chain risk-management approaches as follows:
(1) The exclusion of a source that fails to meet qualification
standards established in accordance with the requirements of 10 U.S.C.
2319, for the purpose of reducing supply chain risk in the acquisition
of covered systems.
(2) The exclusion of a source that fails to achieve an acceptable
rating with regard to an evaluation factor providing for the
consideration of supply chain risk in the evaluation of proposals for
the award of a contract or the issuance of a task or delivery order.
(3) The decision to withhold consent for a contractor to
subcontract with a particular source or to direct a contractor for a
covered system to exclude a particular source from consideration for a
subcontract under the contract.
The rule establishes a new provision and clause (see DFARS
239.7306) for inclusion in all solicitations and contracts, including
contracts for commercial items or commercial off-the-shelf items
involving the development or delivery of any information technology,
whether acquired as a service or as a supply, because portions of these
contracts may be used to support or link with one or more NSS. Another
reason for including the provision and clause in all DoD solicitations
and contracts for information technology is to manage the operational
security risks of including the provision and clause only in
procurements for very sensitive DoD procurements, thereby identifying
those very procurements as a target for the risk section 806 aims to
deter.
However, several limiting provisions exist before the Government
can exercise its authorities under section 806. First, use of section
806 authorities is limited to the procurement of NSS or of covered
items of supply used within NSS. Section 806 defines a ``covered item
of supply'' as ``an item of information technology . . . that is
purchased for inclusion in (an NSS), and the loss of integrity of which
could result in a supply chain risk'' to the entire system. Therefore,
though the clause will be inserted in all information-technology
contracts, these authorities will not be able to be utilized for all
information and communication technology in all systems, but rather
only in those meeting the criteria stated above.
Second, the decision to exclude a source under section 806 can only
be made by the ``head of a covered agency,'' limited by definition to
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military
departments with delegation limited to officials at or above the level
of the service acquisition executive for the agency.
Third, the head of a covered agency seeking to exercise the
authority of section 806 must obtain a joint recommendation from the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)) and the Chief Information Officer of the Department of
Defense (DoD CIO), based on a risk assessment from the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence
[[Page 69269]]
(USD(I)) that there is significant supply chain risk to a particular
NSS.
Fourth, the head of a covered agency, with the concurrence of the
USD(AT&L), must make a written determination that the use of section
806 authority is ``necessary to protect national security by reducing
supply chain risk'' and that ``less intrusive measures are not
reasonably available to reduce such supply chain risk.''
Fifth, notice of each determination to exercise section 806
authorities must be provided in advance to the appropriate
congressional committees.
Finally, section 806 expires on September 30, 2018 (see section 806
of FY 2013 NDAA, Public Law 112-239).
Section 806 also provides that the head of a covered agency may
``limit, notwithstanding any other provision of law, in whole or in
part, the disclosure of information relating to the basis for carrying
out a covered procurement action'' if the head of a covered agency,
with the concurrence of the USD (AT&L), determines in writing that
``the risk to national security due to disclosure of such information
outweighs the risk due to not disclosing such information.''
If the Government exercises the authority provided to limit
disclosure of information, no action undertaken by the Government under
such authority shall be subject to review in a bid protest before the
Government Accountability Office or in any Federal court.
III. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
Executive Orders (E.O.s) 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess
all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if
regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize
net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public
health and safety effects, distributive impacts, and equity). E.O.
13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and benefits,
of reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting flexibility.
This is a significant regulatory action and, therefore, was subject to
review under section 6(b) of E.O. 12866, Regulatory Planning and
Review, dated September 30, 1993. This rule is not a major rule under 5
U.S.C. 804.
IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act
DoD does not expect this interim rule to have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities within the
meaning of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601, et seq.,
because companies have an existing interest in having a supply chain
that it can rely on to provide it with material and supplies that allow
the contractor to ultimately supply its customers with products that
are safe and that do not impose threats or risks to government
information systems.
However, an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) has been
prepared because there is a growing interest by both the Government and
industry in establishing cost efficient ways to protect the supply
chain related to information technology purchases. Congress has
recognized a growing concern for risks to the supply chain for
technology contracts supporting the Department of Defense (DoD).
Congress has defined supply chain risk as ``the risk that an adversary
may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise
subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution,
installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system so as to
surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or
operation of such system.'' (See section 806(e)(4) of Pub. L. 111-383.)
The objective of this rule is to protect DoD against risks arising
out of the supply chain.
The legal basis for this rule is section 806 of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 (Pub. L.
111-383), as amended by section 806 of the NDAA for FY 2013 (Pub. L.
112-239). Additionally, the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI)
5200.44, Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted
Systems and Networks (TSN), recognizes the need to improve supply chain
risk management (SCRM). In doing so, the DoDI requires, among other
things, implementation of section 806 in the DFARS and in appropriate
solicitation and contract language.
This rule applies to contractors involved in the development or
delivery of any information technology, whether acquired by DoD as a
service or as a supply. This includes commercial purchases as well as
purchases of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) services or supplies.
This rule does not require any specific reporting, recordkeeping or
compliance requirements. It does, however, recognize the need for
information technology contractors to implement appropriate safeguards
and countermeasures to minimize supply chain risk. This rule, by
itself, does not require contractors to deploy additional supply chain
risk protections, but leaves it up to the individual contractors to
take the steps they think are necessary to maintain existing or
otherwise required safeguards and countermeasures as necessary for
their own particular industrial methods to protect their supply chain.
The rule does not duplicate, overlap, or conflict with any other
Federal rules.
Consistent with the stated objectives of section 806 and the DoDI,
no viable alternatives exist.
Possible alternatives considered included having all contractors
report, on all contracts, the nature of the supply chain risk
mitigation efforts they have applied to their manufacturing processes.
This would be unduly burdensome for both contractors and the
Government.
Another alternative is not to have section 806 clauses apply to
commercial and COTS items or purchases below the simplified acquisition
threshold. However, the requirements of section 806 should apply to
contracts and subcontracts at or below the simplified acquisition
threshold because the malicious introduction of unwanted functions may
occur at any dollar threshold. Therefore, it would not be in the best
interest of the Federal Government to exempt contracts and subcontracts
at or below the simplified acquisition threshold from this requirement.
In a like manner, the requirements of section 806 should apply to
the procurement of commercial items (including COTS items) because the
intent of the statute is to protect the supply chain which in turn
protects all NSS. Commercial and COTS information technology supplies
and services often become part of NSSs. Protection of the NSSs using
the authority of section 806 requires application in all information
technology supply and services contacts. Therefore, exempting
commercial (including COTS) items from application of the statute would
negate the intended effect of the statute.
DoD invites comments from small business concerns and other
interested parties on the expected impact of this rule on small
entities.
DoD will also consider comments from small entities concerning the
existing regulations in subparts affected by this rule in accordance
with 5 U.S.C. 610. Interested parties must submit such comments
separately and should cite 5 U.S.C. 610 (DFARS Case 2012-D050) in
correspondence.
V. Paperwork Reduction Act
The rule does not contain any information collection requirements
that require the approval of the Office of Management and Budget under
the
[[Page 69270]]
Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. chapter 35.
VI. Determination To Issue an Interim Rule
A determination has been made under the authority of the Secretary
of Defense that urgent and compelling reasons exist to promulgate this
interim rule without prior opportunity for public comment. This action
is necessary because of the urgent need to protect the National
Security Systems (NSS) and the integrity of the supply chain to NSS. It
is necessary to reduce supply chain risk in the acquisition of
sensitive information technology systems that are used for intelligence
or cryptologic activities; used for command and control of military
forces; or from an integral part of a weapon system by avoiding
sabotage, maliciously introducing unwanted functions, or other
subversion of the design, integrity, manufacturing, production,
installation, operation or maintenance of systems. Such acquisition
decisions are made daily and, like other cybersecurity measures, the
costs to mitigate supply chain risk after a system is already in
operation can be very high. In addition, as this is a pilot authority
set to expire on September 30, 2018, and the Congress has requested a
report on the effectiveness of the authority not later than January 1,
2017, therefore DoD must make this tool available immediately to begin
the pilot program and gather feedback for the report to Congress.
The globalization of information technology has increased the
vulnerability of DoD to attacks on its systems and networks. Failure to
implement this rule may cause harm to the Government and to individuals
relying on the integrity of NSS, for example, the risk of allowing the
malicious insertion of software code or an unwanted function designed
to degrade DOD's sensitive systems. DoD has proceeded cautiously to
ensure that this rule very closely mirrors the authorities provided in
the statute and has little leeway to vary from those terms. However,
pursuant to 41 U.S.C. 1707 and FAR 1.501-3(b), DoD will consider public
comments received in response to this interim rule in the formation of
the final rule.
List of Subjects in 48 CFR Parts 208, 212, 215, 233, 239, 244, and
252
Government procurement.
Manuel Quinones,
Editor, Defense Acquisition Regulations System.
Therefore, 48 CFR parts 208, 212, 215, 233, 239, 244, and 252 are
amended as follows:
0
1. The authority citation for 48 CFR parts 208, 212, 215, 233, 239,
244, and 252 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 41 U.S.C. 1303 and 48 CFR Chapter 1.
PART 208--REQUIRED SOURCES OF SUPPLIES AND SERVICES
0
2. Add section 208.405 to read as follows:
208.405 Ordering procedures for Federal Supply Schedules.
In all orders and blanket purchase agreements involving the
development or delivery of any information technology, whether acquired
as a service or as a supply, consider the need for an evaluation factor
regarding supply chain risk (see subpart 239.73).
0
3. Amend section 208.7402 by--
0
a. Designating the text as paragraph (1); and
0
b. Adding new paragraph (2) to read as follows:
208.7402 General.
(1) * * *
(2) In all orders and blanket purchase agreements involving the
development or delivery of any information technology, whether acquired
as a service or as a supply, consider the need for an evaluation factor
regarding supply chain risk (see subpart 239.73).
PART 212--ACQUISITION OF COMMERCIAL ITEMS
0
4. Amend section 212.301 by--
0
a. Revising paragraph (f)(xiv);
0
b. Redesignating--
0
i. Paragraphs (f)(liii) through (lxv) as (lvi) through (lxvii); and
0
ii. Paragraphs (f)(xv) through (lii) as (f)(xvi) through (liii).
0
c. Adding new paragraphs (f)(xv), (liv), and (lv).
Revision and additions to read as follows:
212.301 Solicitation provisions and contract clauses for the
acquisition of commercial items.
(f) * * *
(xiv) Use the provision 252.215-7008, Only One Offer, as prescribed
at 215.408(4);
(xv) Use the clause at 252.219-7003, Small Business Subcontracting
Plan (DoD Contracts), as prescribed in 219.708(b)(1)(A)(1), to comply
with 15 U.S.C. 637. Use the clause with its Alternate I when prescribed
in 219.708(b)(1)(A)(2).
* * * * *
(liv) Use the provision at 252.239-7017, Notice of Supply Chain
Risk, as prescribed in 239.7306(a), to comply with section 806 of
Public Law 111-383, in all solicitations for contracts involving the
development or delivery of any information technology, whether acquired
as a service or as a supply.
(lv) Use the clause at 252.239-7018, Supply Chain Risk, as
prescribed in 239.7306(b), to comply with section 806 of Public Law
111-383, in all solicitations and contracts involving the development
or delivery of any information technology, whether acquired as a
service or as a supply.
* * * * *
PART 215--CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION
0
5. Amend section 215.304 by adding new paragraph (c)(v) to read as
follows:
215.304 Evaluation factors and significant subfactors.
(c) * * *
(v) In all solicitations and contracts involving the development or
delivery of any information technology, whether acquired as a service
or as a supply, consider the need for an evaluation factor regarding
supply chain risk (see subpart 239.73).
0
6. Add new subpart 215.5 to read as follows:
Subpart 215.5--Preaward, Award, and Postaward Notifications, Protests,
and Mistakes
Sec.
215.503 Notifications to unsuccessful offerors.
215.506 Postaward debriefing of offerors.
Subpart 215.5--Preaward, Award, and Postaward Notifications,
Protests, and Mistakes
215.503 Notifications to unsuccessful offerors.
If the Government exercises the authority provided in 239.7305(d),
the notifications to unsuccessful offerors, either preaward or
postaward, shall not reveal any information that is determined to be
withheld from disclosure in accordance with section 806 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, as amended by section
806 of the
[[Page 69271]]
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (see subpart
239.73).
215.506 Postaward debriefing of offerors.
(e) If the Government exercises the authority provided in
239.7305(d), the debriefing shall not reveal any information that is
determined to be withheld from disclosure in accordance with section
806 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, as
amended by section 806 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 (see subpart 239.73).
PART 233--PROTESTS, DISPUTES, AND APPEALS
0
7. Add new section 233.102 to read as follows:
233.102 General.
If the Government exercises the authority provided in 239.7305(d)
to limit disclosure of information, no action undertaken by the
Government under such authority shall be subject to review in a bid
protest before the Government Accountability Office or in any Federal
court (see subpart 239.73).
PART 239--ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
0
8. Add new subpart 239.73 to read as follows:
Subpart 239.73--Requirements for Information Relating to Supply Chain
Risk
Sec.
239.7300 Scope of subpart.
239.7301 Applicability.
239.7302 Definitions.
239.7303 Authorized individuals.
239.7304 Determination and notification.
239.7305 Exclusion and limitation on disclosure.
239.7306 Solicitation provision and contract clause.
Subpart 239.73--Requirements for Information Relating to Supply
Chain Risk
239.7300 Scope of subpart.
(a) This subpart implements section 806 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Pub. L. 111-383) and elements
of DoD Instruction 5200.44, Protection of Mission Critical Functions to
Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN), at (https://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520044p.pdf).
(b) The authority provided in this subpart expires on September 30,
2018 (see section 806(a) of Pub. L. 112-239).
239.7301 Applicability.
Notwithstanding FAR 39.001, this subpart shall be applied to
acquisition of information technology for national security systems, as
that term is defined at 44 U.S.C. 3542(b), for procurements involving--
(a) A source selection for a covered system or a covered item
involving either a performance specification (see 10 U.S.C.
2305(a)(1)(C)(ii)), or an evaluation factor (see 10 U.S.C.
2305(a)(2)(A)), relating to supply chain risk;
(b) The consideration of proposals for and issuance of a task or
delivery order for a covered system or a covered item where the task or
delivery order contract concerned includes a requirement relating to
supply chain risk (see 10 U.S.C. 2304c(d)(3) and FAR
16.505(b)(1)(iv)(D)); or
(c) Any contract action involving a contract for a covered system
or a covered item where such contract includes a requirement relating
to supply chain risk.
239.7302 Definitions.
As used in this subpart--
Covered item means an item of information technology that is
purchased for inclusion in a covered system, and the loss of integrity
of which could result in a supply chain risk for a covered system (see
section 806(e)(6) of Pub. L. 111-383).
Covered system means a national security system, as that term is
defined at 44 U.S.C. 3542(b) (see section 806(e)(5) of Pub. L. 111-38).
It is any information system, including any telecommunications system,
used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency, or other
organization on behalf of an agency--
(1) The function, operation, or use of which--
(i) Involves intelligence activities;
(ii) Involves cryptologic activities related to national security;
(iii) Involves command and control of military forces;
(iv) Involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or
weapons system; or
(v) Is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or
intelligence missions but this does not include a system that is to be
used for routine administrative and business applications, including
payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management applications; or
(2) Is protected at all times by procedures established for
information that have been specifically authorized under criteria
established by an Executive order or an Act of Congress to be kept
classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.
Information technology, in lieu of the definition at FAR 2.1, and
supply chain risk, are defined in the clause at 252.239-7018, Supply
Chain Risk.
239.7303 Authorized individuals.
(a) Subject to 239.7304, the following individuals are authorized
to take the actions authorized by 239.7305:
(1) The Secretary of Defense.
(2) The Secretary of the Army.
(3) The Secretary of the Navy.
(4) The Secretary of the Air Force.
(b) The individuals authorized at paragraph (a) may not delegate
the authority to take the actions at 239.7305 or the responsibility for
making the determination required by 239.7304 to an official below the
level of--
(1) For the Department of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and,
(2) For the military departments, the senior acquisition executive
for the department concerned.
239.7304 Determination and notification.
The individuals authorized in 239.7303 may exercise the authority
provided in 239.7305 only after--
(a) Obtaining a joint recommendation by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Chief
Information Officer of the Department of Defense, on the basis of a
risk assessment by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence,
that there is a significant supply chain risk to a covered system;
(b) Making a determination in writing, in unclassified or
classified form, with the concurrence of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, that--
(1) Use of the authority in 239.7305(a)(b) or (c) is necessary to
protect national security by reducing supply chain risk;
(2) Less intrusive measures are not reasonably available to reduce
such supply chain risk; and
(3) In a case where the individual authorized in 239.7303 plans to
limit disclosure of information under 239.7305(d), the risk to national
security due to the disclosure of such information outweighs the risk
due to not disclosing such information; and
(c)(1) Providing a classified or unclassified notice of the
determination made under paragraph (b) of this section--
(i) In the case of a covered system included in the National
Intelligence Program or the Military Intelligence Program, to the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the
congressional defense committees; and
[[Page 69272]]
(ii) In the case of a covered system not otherwise included in
paragraph (a) of this section, to the congressional defense committees;
and
(2) The notice shall include--
(i) The following information (see 10 U.S.C. 2304(f)(3)):
(A) A description of the agency's needs.
(B) An identification of the statutory exception from the
requirement to use competitive procedures and a demonstration, based on
the proposed contractor's qualifications or the nature of the
procurement, of the reasons for using that exception.
(C) A determination that the anticipated cost will be fair and
reasonable.
(D) A description of the market survey conducted or a statement of
the reasons a market survey was not conducted.
(E) A listing of the sources, if any, that expressed in writing an
interest in the procurement.
(F) A statement of the actions, if any, the agency may take to
remove or overcome any barrier to competition before a subsequent
procurement for such needs;
(ii) The joint recommendation by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Chief Information
Officer of the Department of Defense as specified in paragraph (a);
(iii) A summary of the risk assessment by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence that serves as the basis for the joint
recommendation specified in paragraph (a); and
(iv) A summary of the basis for the determination, including a
discussion of less intrusive measures that were considered and why they
were not reasonably available to reduce supply chain risk.
239.7305 Exclusion and limitation on disclosure.
Subject to 239.7304, the individuals authorized in 239.7303 may, in
the course of conducting a covered procurement--
(a) Exclude a source that fails to meet qualification standards
established in accordance with the requirements of 10 U.S.C. 2319, for
the purpose of reducing supply chain risk in the acquisition of covered
systems;
(b) Exclude a source that fails to achieve an acceptable rating
with regard to an evaluation factor providing for the consideration of
supply chain risk in the evaluation of proposals for the award of a
contract or the issuance of a task or delivery order;
(c) Withhold consent for a contractor to subcontract with a
particular source or direct a contractor for a covered system to
exclude a particular source from consideration for a subcontract under
the contract; and
(d) Limit, notwithstanding any other provision of law, in whole or
in part, the disclosure of information relating to the basis for
carrying out any of the actions authorized by paragraphs (a) through
(c) of this section, and if such disclosures are so limited--
(1) No action undertaken by the individual authorized under such
authority shall be subject to review in a bid protest before the
Government Accountability Office or in any Federal court; and
(2) The authorized individual shall--
(i) Notify appropriate parties of a covered procurement action and
the basis for such action only to the extent necessary to effectuate
the covered procurement action;
(ii) Notify other Department of Defense components or other Federal
agencies responsible for procurements that may be subject to the same
or similar supply chain risk, in a manner and to the extent consistent
with the requirements of national security; and
(iii) Ensure the confidentiality of any such notifications.
239.7306 Solicitation provision and contract clause.
(a) Insert the provision at 252.239-7017, Notice of Supply Chain
Risk, in all solicitations, including solicitations using FAR part 12
procedures for the acquisition of commercial items, that involve the
development or delivery of any information technology whether acquired
as a service or as a supply.
(b) Insert the clause at 252.239-7018, Supply Chain Risk, in all
solicitations and contracts, including solicitations and contracts
using FAR part 12 procedures for the acquisition of commercial items,
that involve the development or delivery of any information technology
whether acquired as a service or as a supply.
PART 244--SUBCONTRACTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
0
9. Add new sections 244.201 and 244.201-1 to subpart 244.2 to read as
follows:
244.201 Consent and advance notification requirements.
244.201-1 Consent requirements.
In all solicitations and contracts involving the development or
delivery of any information technology, whether acquired as a service
or as a supply, consider the need for a consent to subcontract
requirement regarding supply chain risk (see subpart 239.73).
PART 252--SOLICITATION PROVISIONS AND CONTRACT CLAUSES
0
10. Add section 252.239-7017 to read as follows:
252.239-7017 Notice of supply chain risk.
As prescribed in 239.7306(a), use the following provision:
NOTICE OF SUPPLY CHAIN RISK (NOV 2013)
(a) Definition. Supply chain risk, as used in this provision,
means the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce
unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity,
manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or
maintenance of a national security system (as that term is defined
at 44 U.S.C. 3542(b)) so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise
degrade the function, use, or operation of such system.
(b) In order to manage supply chain risk, the Government may use
the authorities provided by section 806 of Public Law 111-383. In
exercising these authorities, the Government may consider
information, public and non-public, including all-source
intelligence, relating to an offeror and its supply chain.
(c) If the Government exercises the authority provided in
section 806 of Pub. L. 111-383 to limit disclosure of information,
no action undertaken by the Government under such authority shall be
subject to review in a bid protest before the Government
Accountability Office or in any Federal court.
(End of provision)
0
11. Add section 252.239-7018 to read as follows:
252.239-7018 Supply chain risk.
As prescribed in 239.7306(b), use the following clause:
SUPPLY CHAIN RISK (NOV 2013)
(a) Definitions. As used in this clause--
Information technology (see 40 U.S.C 11101(6)) means, in lieu of
the definition at FAR 2.1, any equipment, or interconnected
system(s) or subsystem(s) of equipment, that is used in the
automatic acquisition, storage, analysis, evaluation, manipulation,
management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange,
transmission, or reception of data or information by the agency.
(1) For purposes of this definition, equipment is used by an
agency if the equipment is used by the agency directly or is used by
a contractor under a contract with the agency that requires--
(i) Its use; or
(ii) To a significant extent, its use in the performance of a
service or the furnishing of a product.
(2) The term ``information technology'' includes computers,
ancillary equipment
[[Page 69273]]
(including imaging peripherals, input, output, and storage devices
necessary for security and surveillance), peripheral equipment
designed to be controlled by the central processing unit of a
computer, software, firmware and similar procedures, services
(including support services), and related resources.
(3) The term ``information technology'' does not include any
equipment acquired by a contractor incidental to a contract.
Supply chain risk means the risk that an adversary may sabotage,
maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the
design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution,
installation, operation, or maintenance of a national security
system (as that term is defined at 44 U.S.C. 3542(b)) so as to
surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or
operation of such system.
(b) The Contractor shall maintain controls in the provision of
supplies and services to the Government to minimize supply chain
risk.
(c) In order to manage supply chain risk, the Government may use
the authorities provided by section 806 of Public Law 111-383. In
exercising these authorities, the Government may consider
information, public and non-public, including all-source
intelligence, relating to a Contractor's supply chain.
(d) If the Government exercises the authority provided in
section 806 of Public Law 111-383 to limit disclosure of
information, no action undertaken by the Government under such
authority shall be subject to review in a bid protest before the
Government Accountability Office or in any Federal court.
(e) The Contractor shall include the substance of this clause,
including this paragraph (e), in all subcontracts involving the
development or delivery of any information technology, whether
acquired as a service or as a supply.
(End of clause)
[FR Doc. 2013-27311 Filed 11-15-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P