Notice of Issuance of Final Determination Concerning Certain Hard Disk Drives and Self-Encrypting Drives, 51737-51740 [2013-20425]
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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Notices
Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Title
5, United States Code (Pub. L. 92–463).
MERPAC is an advisory committee
established under the Secretary’s
authority in section 871 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Title 6,
United States Code, section 451, and
chartered under the provisions of the
FACA. The Committee acts solely in an
advisory capacity to the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) through the Commandant of the
Coast Guard and the Director of
Commercial Regulations and Standards
on matters relating to personnel in the
U.S. merchant marine, including but not
limited to training, qualifications,
certification, documentation, and fitness
standards. The Committee will advise,
consult with, and make
recommendations reflecting its
independent judgment to the Secretary.
A copy of all meeting documentation
is available at https://homeport.uscg.mil
by using these key strokes: Missions;
Port and Waterways Safety; Advisory
Committees; MERPAC; and then use the
announcements key. Alternatively, you
may contact Mr. Breyer as noted in the
ADDRESSES section above.
Agenda
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Day 1
The agenda for the September 11,
2013, meeting is as follows:
(1) The full committee will meet
briefly to discuss the working groups’
business/task statements, which are
listed under paragraph 2 (a)–(g) below.
(2) Working groups addressing the
following task statements, available for
viewing at https://homeport.uscg.mil/
merpac will meet to deliberate:
(a) Task Statement 30, Utilizing
Military Education, Training and
Assessment for the International
Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers (STCW) and U.S. Coast Guard
Certifications;
(b), Task Statement 58,
Communication between External
Stakeholders and the Mariner
Credentialing Program, as it Relates to
the National Maritime Center;
(c) Task Statement 78, Consideration
of the International Labor Organization’s
Maritime Labour Convention, 2006;
(d) Task Statement 80, Crew Training
Requirements Onboard Natural GasFueled Vessels Other Than Liquefied
Natural Gas Carriers.
(e) Task Statement 81, Development
of Competency Requirements for Vessel
Personnel Working Within the Polar
Regions;
(f) Task Statement 82, Review and
submit recommendations for proposed
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revisions to CG–719K, Merchant
Mariner Credential Medical Evaluation
Report and CG–719K/E, Merchant
Mariner Evaluation of Fitness for Entry
Level Ratings; and
(g) Task Statement 83, Development
of competency requirements to meet
STCW Chief Engineer III/2 for personnel
working on small vessels with high
horsepower.
(3) Public comment period. This will
be held prior to the Reports of working
groups.
(4) Reports of working groups. At the
end of the day, the working groups will
report to the full committee on what
was accomplished in their meetings.
The full committee will not take action
on these reports on this date. Any
official action taken as a result of this
working group meeting will be taken on
day 2 of the meeting.
(5) Adjournment of meeting.
Day 2
The agenda for the September 12,
committee meeting is as follows:
(1) Introduction;
(2) Remarks from Coast Guard
Leadership;
(3) Roll call of committee members
and determination of a quorum;
(4) Designated Federal Officer (DFO)
announcements;
(5) Reports from the following
working groups;
(a) Task Statement 30, Utilizing
Military Education, Training and
Assessment for STCW and U.S. Coast
Guard Certifications;
(b) Task Statement 58,
Communication between External
Stakeholders and the Mariner
Credentialing Program, as it Relates to
the National Maritime Center;
(c) Task Statement 78, Consideration
of the International Labor Organization’s
Maritime Labour Convention, 2006;
(d) Task Statement 80, Crew Training
Requirements Onboard Natural GasFueled Vessels Other Than Liquefied
Natural Gas Carriers.
(e) Task Statement 81, Development
of Competency Requirements for Vessel
Personnel Working Within the Polar
Regions;
(f) Task Statement 82, Review and
submit recommendations for proposed
revisions to CG–719K, Merchant
Mariner Credential Medical Evaluation
Report and CG–719K/E, Merchant
Mariner Evaluation of Fitness for Entry
Level Ratings; and
(g) Task Statement 83, Development
of competency requirements to meet
STCW Chief Engineer III/2 for personnel
working on small vessels with high
horsepower.
(6) Other items for discussion:
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(a) Report on National Maritime
Center (NMC) activities from NMC
Commanding Officer, such as the net
processing time it takes for a mariner to
receive his or her credential after
application submittal;
(b) Report on Mariner Credentialing
Program Policy Division activities, such
as its current initiatives and projects;
(c) Report on International Maritime
Organization (IMO)/International Labor
Organization (ILO issues related to the
merchant marine industry;
(d) Report on the implementation of
the 2010 amendments to the STCW
Convention; and
(e) Briefings about on-going Coast
Guard projects related to personnel in
the U.S. Merchant Marine, such as
possible Task Statements concerning:
• Correction of merchant mariner
credentials issued with clear errors;
• Review of draft update to Volume
III of the Marine Safety Manual,
Chapters 20 to 26; and
• Seafarer fatigue
(7) Public comment period/
presentations.
(8) Discussion of working group
recommendations. The committee will
review the information presented on
each issue, deliberate on any
recommendations presented by the
working groups and approve/formulate
recommendations for the Department’s
consideration. Official action on these
recommendations may be taken on this
date.
(9) Closing remarks/plans for next
meeting.
(10) Adjournment of meeting.
A copy of all meeting documentation
is available at https://homeport.uscg.mil/
merpac. Alternatively, you may contact
Mr. Breyer as noted in the ADDRESSES
section above.
Dated: August 15, 2013.
J. G. Lantz,
Director of Commercial Regulations and
Standards.
[FR Doc. 2013–20350 Filed 8–20–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110–04–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Notice of Issuance of Final
Determination Concerning Certain
Hard Disk Drives and Self-Encrypting
Drives
U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Department of Homeland
Security.
ACTION: Notice of final determination.
AGENCY:
E:\FR\FM\21AUN1.SGM
21AUN1
51738
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Notices
This document provides
notice that U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (‘‘CBP’’) has issued a final
determination concerning the country of
origin of certain digital storage devices
known as hard disk drives (‘‘HDDs’’)
and self-encrypting drives (‘‘SEDs’’).
Based upon the facts presented, CBP has
concluded that the programming
operations performed in the United
States, using U.S.-origin firmware,
substantially transform non-TAA
country HDDs. Therefore, the country of
origin of the HDDs and SEDs is the
United States for purposes of U.S.
Government procurement.
SUMMARY:
The final determination was
issued on August 14, 2013. A copy of
the final determination is attached. Any
party-at-interest, as defined in 19 CFR
177.22(d), may seek judicial review of
this final determination on or before
September 20, 2013.
DATES:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Heather K. Pinnock, Valuation and
Special Programs Branch: (202) 325–
0034.
Notice is
hereby given that on August 14, 2013,
pursuant to subpart B of Part 177, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection
Regulations (19 CFR part 177, subpart
B), CBP issued a final determination
concerning the country of origin of
certain digital storage devices known as
HDDs and SEDs, which may be offered
to the U.S. Government under an
undesignated government procurement
contract. This final determination, HQ
H241362, was issued under procedures
set forth at 19 CFR Part 177, subpart B,
which implements Title III of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, as amended
(19 U.S.C. 2511–18). In the final
determination, CBP concluded that,
based upon the facts presented, the
programming operations performed in
the United States, using U.S.-origin
firmware, substantially transform nonTAA country HDDs. Therefore, the
country of origin of the HDDs and SEDs
is the United States for purposes of U.S.
Government procurement.
Section 177.29, CBP Regulations (19
CFR 177.29), provides that a notice of
final determination shall be published
in the Federal Register within 60 days
of the date the final determination is
issued. Section 177.30, CBP Regulations
(19 CFR 177.30), provides that any
party-at-interest, as defined in 19 CFR
177.22(d), may seek judicial review of a
final determination within 30 days of
publication of such determination in the
Federal Register.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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Jkt 229001
Dated: August 14, 2013.
Sandra L. Bell,
Executive Director, Regulations and Rulings,
Office of International Trade
Attachment
HQ H241362
MAR OT:RR:CTF:VS H241362 HkP
CATEGORY: Origin
Stuart P. Seidel, Esq.
Baker & McKenzie
815 Connecticut Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20006–4078
RE: Government Procurement; Trade
Agreements Act; Country of Origin of Hard
Disk Drives and Self-Encryption Drives;
Substantial Transformation
Dear Mr. Seidel:
This is in response to your letter, dated
April 24, 2013, requesting a final
determination on behalf of Seagate
Technology, LLC (‘‘Seagate’’), pursuant to
subpart B of part 177 of the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (‘‘CBP’’) Regulations (19
C.F.R. Part 177). Under these regulations,
which implement Title III of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA), as amended
(19 U.S.C. § 2511 et seq.), CBP issues country
of origin advisory rulings and final
determinations as to whether an article is or
would be a product of a designated country
or instrumentality for the purposes of
granting waivers of certain ‘‘Buy American’’
restrictions in U.S. law or practice for
products offered for sale to the U.S.
Government. In reaching our decision, we
have taken into account additional
information submitted on June 3, 2013.
This final determination concerns the
country of origin of three lines of Seagate’s
Hard Disk Drives (‘‘HDDs’’) designated as: (1)
‘‘Mission Critical’’; (2) ‘‘Business Critical’’;
and, (3) ‘‘Personal Storage’’. We note that as
a U.S. importer, Seagate is a party-at-interest
within the meaning of 19 C.F.R.
§ 177.22(d)(1) and is entitled to request this
final determination. Your request for
confidential treatment regarding all cost and
price information contained in your request
is granted and such information will not be
disclosed to the public.
FACTS:
Seagate imports fully assembled HDDs
from [non-TAA country] or [non-TAA
country]. An HDD is a digital storage device.
The products at issue are three lines of HDDs:
(1) Mission Critical, sold under the brand
names ‘‘Cheetah’’, ‘‘Savvio’’, and ‘‘Enterprise
Performance’’; (2) Business Critical, sold
under the brand names ‘‘Constellation’’,
‘‘Enterprise Capacity’’, and ‘‘Enterprise
Value’’; and, (3) Personal Storage, sold under
the brand names ‘‘Barracuda’’ and
‘‘Desktop’’.
HDDs are designed in the United States
and assembled either in [non-TAA country]
or [non-TAA country] from components
manufactured by Seagate outside the United
States or obtained by Seagate from suppliers
in Asia. The assembly process in [non-TAA
country] or [non-TAA country] is as follows:
The Head Disk Assembly (‘‘HDA’’), usually
comprised of two magnetic recording media
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(‘‘Media’’) and three read/write recording
heads (‘‘Heads’’), a head actuator assembly,
and an airtight metal enclosure is assembled
in minutes.
The HDA is mated to a printed circuit
board (‘‘PCB’’) containing disk drive
electronics to create an HDD. It is assembled
in seconds.
The HDD is loaded into the factory testing
system, and testing firmware is downloaded
onto the HDD to facilitate media
certifications. The HDD stays in a sequence
of media certification operations for one or
more days, as necessary.
Following successful media certification,
the HDD testing firmware is replaced with
generic, basic firmware that only allows the
HDD’s computer interface functions to be
tested. Testing lasts between [xxx] and [xxx].
After testing, the generic firmware is
removed and the drive is ‘‘forced blocked’’,
that is, it is blocked from being able to have
software loaded onto it or to be further tested.
It is stated that force blocking renders the
HDD unable to function as a storage drive.
The Heads in the HDA incorporate
semiconductor, magnetic, mechanical, and
manufacturing process design into an
integrated recording reader and writer. It
takes approximately [xxx] hours to design a
Head, [xxx] of which are allocated to design
work in the U.S., [xxx] hours to design work
in [non-TAA country], and [xxx] hours to
design work in [non-TAA country]. The
Media in the HDA incorporates thin film
magnetics, mechanical surface design and
manufacturing process design. It takes
approximately [xxx] hours to design Media,
[xxx] of which are allocated to work done in
the U.S., [xxx] hours to work done in [TAA
country], and [xxx] hours to work done in
[non-TAA country].
Fully assembled HDDs are shipped to the
United States. According to the information
submitted, in their imported condition, HDDs
cannot function as storage media. The disk
heads cannot move, data cannot be stored or
retrieved and, were the HDDs to be installed
on computers or networks, they would not be
recognized or listed. They do, however, have
a rudimentary serial port that enables the
HDD to communicate with a computer using
a proprietary Seagate protocol so that
firmware may be installed and tests
performed.
In the U.S., the imported HDD is
unblocked and programmed with two types
of firmware:
1. Servo Firmware, which controls all
motor, preamp and servo functions without
which the motors, Media, and Heads will not
operate and the HDD will not work; and
2. Non-Security Controller Firmware,
which manages all communications between
the host and target drives as well as all data
within the drive. It allows data files to be
stored on the Media in the HDD, to be found
and listed within applications, and to be
saved, retrieved and overwritten.
Installation and testing of the Servo and
Non-Security Controller Firmware takes
between [xxx] and [xxx], depending on the
capacity and model of the HDD. Both types
of firmware are developed in the U.S. and
[TAA country]. Approximately 80% of the
work hours spent on combined firmware
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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Notices
design is allocated to work performed in the
United States at Seagate’s design centers and
approximately 20% to work performed in
[TAA country]. Combined, the compiled
firmware code is approximately 2 MB in size
and contains approximately one million lines
of code. The firmware loaded onto the HDD
in the U.S. makes the HDD a fully functional,
generic storage device.
During programming operations,
approximately 25% of the generic HDDs are
reformatted based on specific customer
requirements, such as security features,
format sizes, and format modes. Customerspecific code is developed in the United
States. Security Controller Firmware, which
may be added on to Non-Security Controller
Firmware as a part of a customer’s code,
allows the HDDs to be secured through
encryption, which involves enabling an
encryption program and security interface,
locking the debug ports, and loading
credentials and certificates. The Security
Controller Firmware is written in the U.S.
(85–90%) and in [TAA country] (10–15%),
based on architecture totally designed in the
U.S. involving thousands of hours and
millions of dollars. After the HDDs are
configured to customer security
requirements, the HDDs are known as selfencrypting drives (SEDs). SEDs encrypt data
as it is being written and decrypts data as it
is being read.
After programming is complete, the HDDs
and SEDs are validated or tested. A final
quality assurance inspection is performed,
after which the HDDs and SEDs receive new
part numbers and labels, and are sold.
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ISSUE:
What is the country of origin of Seagate’s
Hard Disk Drives and Self-Encrypting Drives
for purposes of U.S. Government
procurement?
LAW AND ANALYSIS:
Pursuant to Subpart B of Part 177, 19 CFR
§ 177.21 et seq., which implements Title III
of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, as
amended (19 U.S.C. § 2511 et seq.), CBP
issues country of origin advisory rulings and
final determinations as to whether an article
is or would be a product of a designated
country or instrumentality for the purposes
of granting waivers of certain ‘‘Buy
American’’ restrictions in U.S. law or
practice for products offered for sale to the
U.S. Government.
Under the rule of origin set forth under 19
U.S.C. § 2518(4)(B):
An article is a product of a country or
instrumentality only if (i) it is wholly the
growth, product, or manufacture of that
country or instrumentality, or (ii) in the case
of an article which consists in whole or in
part of materials from another country or
instrumentality, it has been substantially
transformed into a new and different article
of commerce with a name, character, or use
distinct from that of the article or articles
from which it was so transformed.
See also 19 C.F.R. § 177.22(a).
In rendering advisory rulings and final
determinations for purposes of U.S.
Government procurement, CBP applies the
provisions of subpart B of Part 177 consistent
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with the Federal Procurement Regulations.
See 19 C.F.R. § 177.21. In this regard, CBP
recognizes that the Federal Procurement
Regulations restrict the U.S. Government’s
purchase of products to U.S.-made or
designated country end products for
acquisitions subject to the TAA. See 48
C.F.R. § 25.403(c)(1). The Federal
Procurement Regulations define ‘‘U.S.-made
end product’’ as:
[A]n article that is mined, produced, or
manufactured in the United States or that is
substantially transformed in the United
States into a new and different article of
commerce with a name, character, or use
distinct from that of the article or articles
from which it was transformed.
In order to determine whether a substantial
transformation occurs when components of
various origins are assembled into completed
products, CBP considers the totality of the
circumstances and makes such
determinations on a case-by-case basis. The
country of origin of the item’s components,
extent of the processing that occurs within a
country, and whether such processing
renders a product with a new name,
character, and use are primary considerations
in such cases. Additionally, factors such as
the resources expended on product design
and development, the extent and nature of
post-assembly inspection and testing
procedures, and worker skill required during
the actual manufacturing process will be
considered when determining whether a
substantial transformation has occurred. No
one factor is determinative.
In Data General v. United States, 4 Ct. Int’l
Trade 182 (1982), the court determined that
for purposes of determining eligibility under
item 807.00, Tariff Schedules of the United
States (predecessor to subheading
9802.00.80, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of
the United States), the programming of a
foreign PROM (Programmable Read-Only
Memory chip) in the United States
substantially transformed the PROM into a
U.S. article. In programming the imported
PROMs, the U.S. engineers systematically
caused various distinct electronic
interconnections to be formed within each
integrated circuit. The programming
bestowed upon each circuit its electronic
function, that is, its ‘‘memory’’ which could
be retrieved. A distinct physical change was
effected in the PROM by the opening or
closing of the fuses, depending on the
method of programming. This physical
alteration, not visible to the naked eye, could
be discerned by electronic testing of the
PROM. The court noted that the programs
were designed by a U.S. project engineer
with many years of experience in ‘‘designing
and building hardware.’’ While replicating
the program pattern from a ‘‘master’’ PROM
may be a quick one-step process, the
development of the pattern and the
production of the ‘‘master’’ PROM required
much time and expertise. The court noted
that it was undisputed that programming
altered the character of a PROM. The essence
of the article, its interconnections or stored
memory, was established by programming.
The court concluded that altering the nonfunctioning circuitry comprising a PROM
through technological expertise in order to
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51739
produce a functioning read only memory
device, possessing a desired distinctive
circuit pattern, was no less a ‘‘substantial
transformation’’ than the manual
interconnection of transistors, resistors and
diodes upon a circuit board creating a similar
pattern.
In Texas Instruments v. United States, 681
F.2d 778, 782 (CCPA 1982), the court
observed that the substantial transformation
issue is a ‘‘mixed question of technology and
customs law.’’
In C.S.D. 84–85, 18 Cust. B. & Dec. 1044
(Apr. 2, 1984), CBP stated:
We are of the opinion that the rationale of
the court in the Data General case may be
applied in the present case to support the
principle that the essence of an integrated
circuit memory storage device is established
by programming . . . . [W]e are of the
opinion that the programming (or
reprogramming) of an EPROM results in a
new and different article of commerce which
would be considered to be a product of the
country where the programming or
reprogramming takes place.
Accordingly, the programming of a device
that changes or defines its use generally
constitutes substantial transformation. See
also Headquarters Ruling Letter (‘HQ’’)
558868, dated February 23, 1995
(programming of SecureID Card substantially
transforms the card because it gives the card
its character and use as part of a security
system and the programming is a permanent
change that cannot be undone); HQ 735027,
dated September 7, 1993 (programming blank
media (EEPROM) with instructions that
allow it to perform certain functions that
prevent piracy of software constitute
substantial transformation); and, HQ 733085,
dated July 13, 1990; but see HQ 732870,
dated March 19, 1990 (formatting a blank
diskette does not constitute substantial
transformation because it does not add value,
does not involve complex or highly technical
operations and did not create a new or
different product); HQ 734518, dated June 28,
1993, (motherboards are not substantially
transformed by the implanting of the central
processing unit on the board because,
whereas in Data General use was being
assigned to the PROM, the use of the
motherboard had already been determined
when the importer imported it).
HQ H052325, dated February 14, 2006,
concerned the country of origin of a switch
and a switch/router. The Brocade 7800
Extension Switch was assembled to
completion in China and programmed in the
U.S. with U.S.-origin operating system (OS)
software and customer specified firmware
and software. The Brocade FX8–24 switch/
router contained a PCBA that was assembled
and programmed in China and shipped to the
U.S., where it was assembled with other
components to make the final product. The
completed unit was then programmed with
U.S.-origin OS software and customer
firmware and software. In both cases, the
U.S.-origin OS software provided the devices
with their functionality. Customs found that
in both cases, the processing performed in
the United States, including the downloading
of the U.S.-origin OS software, resulted in a
substantial transformation of the foreign
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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Notices
origin components, and that the United
States was the country of origin.
In HQ H175415, dated October 4, 2011,
hardware components were assembled into
complete Ethernet switches in China. The
switches were then shipped to the U.S.,
where they were programmed with EOS
software, developed in the U.S. The U.S.origin EOS software enabled the imported
switches to interact with other network
switches through network switching and
routing, and allowed for the management of
functions such as network performance
monitoring and security and access control.
Without this software, the imported devices
could not function as Ethernet switches. As
a result of the programming performed in the
U.S., with software developed in the U.S.,
CBP found that the imported switches were
substantially transformed in the U.S.
In HQ H215555 (July 13, 2012), fully
assembled SheevaPlug microcomputers were
imported into the United States, where they
were programmed with Pwnie Express
proprietary software developed in the U.S.
The custom software provided a web-based
interface for configuring the microcomputers
into Pwn Plugs. In addition, the U.S. software
allowed Pwn Plugs to provide secure,
persistent and reliable remote access over a
variety of network protocols and customer
environments. Without the U.S.-origin Pwnie
Express software, an imported
microcomputer could not function as a Pwn
Plug. As a result of the programming
performed in the U.S., with software
developed in the U.S., we found that the
imported microcomputers were substantially
transformed in the U.S. and that the country
of origin of Pwn Plugs was the United States.
In this case, fully assembled digital storage
devices are imported into the United States.
Mechanically, the HDDs consist of magnetic
heads and a PBC. Their purpose is to store
data. Accordingly, in their imported
condition they are completely nonfunctional, in that, their disk heads cannot
move, they cannot store or retrieve data, and
they cannot be recognized or listed by a
computer or network. The imported HDDs
only have a basic ability to communicate
through a serial port using a proprietary
Seagate protocol that is used solely to install
firmware and to test the devices. They are
programmed in the U.S. with U.S.-origin
Servo firmware, which causes the HDD to
function mechanically by controlling the
motors, preamp and servo mechanisms,
which operate the recording media and disk
heads in the HDA. They are also programmed
in the U.S. with U.S.-origin Controller
firmware, which manages all communication
between the host and target drives as well as
all data management within the drive. In
particular, Controller firmware allows data
files to be stored on the recording media in
the HDA, found and listed within
applications, and saved, retrieved and
overwritten. Together, the U.S.-origin
firmware causes the imported HDDs to
function as digital storage devices. As a result
of the programming performed in the U.S.,
with software primarily developed in the
U.S., we find that the imported HDDs are
substantially transformed in the U.S. See
Data General, C.S.D. 84–85, HQ 215555, HQ
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052325, HQ 558868, HQ 735027, and HQ
733085. The country of origin of the HDDs
is the United States.
Counsel also argues that SEDs are different
products than standard HDDs because they
undergo an additional substantial
transformation. Specifically, counsel states
that the U.S.-origin security firmware with
which HDD is programmed in the U.S.
converts a standard HDD into a SED, a
controlled encryption device for U.S. export
control purposes. In addition, counsel states
that the SED performs different functions
than a standard HDD, has different labeling
and part numbers, is marketed and sold in a
different market than the HDD (a separate
portion of the Seagate website is devoted to
security devices such as SEDs), and is priced
differently. We agree. To the extent that the
HDDs are programmed with additional U.S.origin security firmware, the country of
origin of the SEDs will be the United States.
Nonetheless, this determination concerns
whether the HDDs and SEDs are products of
a designated country or instrumentality for
the purposes of granting waivers of certain
‘‘Buy American’’ restrictions in U.S. law or
practice for products offered for sale to the
U.S. Government. Consequently, the question
of whether additional programming
performed in the U.S., using U.S.-origin
firmware incorporating an encryption code,
transforms the HDD into a SED subject to
U.S. export control jurisdiction is outside the
scope of this determination.
Please be advised that whether the HDDs
may be marked ‘‘Made in the U.S.A.’’ or with
similar words, is an issue under the authority
of the Federal Trade Commission (‘‘FTC’’).
We suggest that you contact the FTC,
Division of Enforcement, 6th and
Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC
20508, on the propriety of markings
indicating that articles are made in the
United States.
HOLDING:
Based on the facts provided, the
programming operations performed in the
United States impart the essential character
to Seagate’s hard disk drives. As such, the
HDDs are considered products of the United
States for purposes of U.S. Government
procurement.
Notice of this final determination will be
given in the Federal Register, as required by
19 C.F.R. § 177.29. Any party-at-interest other
than the party which requested this final
determination may request, pursuant to 19
C.F.R. § 177.31, that CBP reexamine the
matter anew and issue a new final
determination. Pursuant to 19 C.F.R.
§ 177.30, any party-at-interest may, within 30
days of publication of the Federal Register
Notice referenced above, seek judicial review
of this final determination before the Court
of International Trade.
Sincerely,
Sandra L. Bell,
Executive Director Regulations and Rulings
Office of International Trade
[FR Doc. 2013–20425 Filed 8–20–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111–14–P
PO 00000
Frm 00035
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Geological Survey
[GX13N05ESB0500]
Agency Information Collection
Activities: Comment Request
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS),
Interior.
ACTION: Notice of a new information
collection, Registry of Climate Change
Vulnerability Assessments.
AGENCY:
We (the U.S. Geological
Survey) will ask the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) to
approve the information collection (IC)
described below. To comply with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA)
and as part of our continuing efforts to
reduce paperwork and respondent
burden, we invite the general public and
other Federal agencies to take this
opportunity to comment on this IC.
DATES: Submit written comments on or
before October 21, 2013.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
on this IC to the Information Collection
Clearance Officer, U.S. Geological
Survey, 12201 Sunrise Valley Drive, MS
807, Reston, VA 20192 (mail); (703)
648–7197 (fax); or dgovoni@usgs.gov
(email). Please reference ‘‘Information
Collection 1028—NEW, Registry of
Climate Change Vulnerability
Assessments’’ in the subject line.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
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Change and Wildlife Science Center,
U.S. Geological Survey, 12201 Sunrise
Valley Drive, Mail Stop 400, Reston, VA
20192 (mail); 703–648–4083 (phone); or
lthompson@usgs.gov (email).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
I. Abstract
The USGS proposes to collect
information on existing assessments of
the vulnerability of various resources
and societal assets to climate change
(hereafter VA or ‘‘vulnerability
assessments’’). This information will
include organization conducting the
study, its location, the topical focus of
the assessment, methodology and
supporting data used, and point of
contact information. Because many
governmental and nongovernmental
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assessments, and because their
conclusions, methodologies, and related
data assets may be of interest or utility
to others contemplating such
assessments, the USGS will make the
information collected available on the
Web in the form of a simple registrytype database. Users, including the
E:\FR\FM\21AUN1.SGM
21AUN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 162 (Wednesday, August 21, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 51737-51740]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-20425]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Notice of Issuance of Final Determination Concerning Certain Hard
Disk Drives and Self-Encrypting Drives
AGENCY: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland
Security.
ACTION: Notice of final determination.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 51738]]
SUMMARY: This document provides notice that U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (``CBP'') has issued a final determination concerning the
country of origin of certain digital storage devices known as hard disk
drives (``HDDs'') and self-encrypting drives (``SEDs''). Based upon the
facts presented, CBP has concluded that the programming operations
performed in the United States, using U.S.-origin firmware,
substantially transform non-TAA country HDDs. Therefore, the country of
origin of the HDDs and SEDs is the United States for purposes of U.S.
Government procurement.
DATES: The final determination was issued on August 14, 2013. A copy of
the final determination is attached. Any party-at-interest, as defined
in 19 CFR 177.22(d), may seek judicial review of this final
determination on or before September 20, 2013.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Heather K. Pinnock, Valuation and
Special Programs Branch: (202) 325-0034.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that on August 14,
2013, pursuant to subpart B of Part 177, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Regulations (19 CFR part 177, subpart B), CBP issued a final
determination concerning the country of origin of certain digital
storage devices known as HDDs and SEDs, which may be offered to the
U.S. Government under an undesignated government procurement contract.
This final determination, HQ H241362, was issued under procedures set
forth at 19 CFR Part 177, subpart B, which implements Title III of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2511-18). In the
final determination, CBP concluded that, based upon the facts
presented, the programming operations performed in the United States,
using U.S.-origin firmware, substantially transform non-TAA country
HDDs. Therefore, the country of origin of the HDDs and SEDs is the
United States for purposes of U.S. Government procurement.
Section 177.29, CBP Regulations (19 CFR 177.29), provides that a
notice of final determination shall be published in the Federal
Register within 60 days of the date the final determination is issued.
Section 177.30, CBP Regulations (19 CFR 177.30), provides that any
party-at-interest, as defined in 19 CFR 177.22(d), may seek judicial
review of a final determination within 30 days of publication of such
determination in the Federal Register.
Dated: August 14, 2013.
Sandra L. Bell,
Executive Director, Regulations and Rulings, Office of International
Trade
Attachment
HQ H241362
MAR OT:RR:CTF:VS H241362 HkP
CATEGORY: Origin
Stuart P. Seidel, Esq.
Baker & McKenzie
815 Connecticut Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20006-4078
RE: Government Procurement; Trade Agreements Act; Country of Origin
of Hard Disk Drives and Self-Encryption Drives; Substantial
Transformation
Dear Mr. Seidel:
This is in response to your letter, dated April 24, 2013,
requesting a final determination on behalf of Seagate Technology,
LLC (``Seagate''), pursuant to subpart B of part 177 of the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (``CBP'') Regulations (19 C.F.R. Part
177). Under these regulations, which implement Title III of the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA), as amended (19 U.S.C. Sec. 2511
et seq.), CBP issues country of origin advisory rulings and final
determinations as to whether an article is or would be a product of
a designated country or instrumentality for the purposes of granting
waivers of certain ``Buy American'' restrictions in U.S. law or
practice for products offered for sale to the U.S. Government. In
reaching our decision, we have taken into account additional
information submitted on June 3, 2013.
This final determination concerns the country of origin of three
lines of Seagate's Hard Disk Drives (``HDDs'') designated as: (1)
``Mission Critical''; (2) ``Business Critical''; and, (3) ``Personal
Storage''. We note that as a U.S. importer, Seagate is a party-at-
interest within the meaning of 19 C.F.R. Sec. 177.22(d)(1) and is
entitled to request this final determination. Your request for
confidential treatment regarding all cost and price information
contained in your request is granted and such information will not
be disclosed to the public.
FACTS:
Seagate imports fully assembled HDDs from [non-TAA country] or
[non-TAA country]. An HDD is a digital storage device. The products
at issue are three lines of HDDs: (1) Mission Critical, sold under
the brand names ``Cheetah'', ``Savvio'', and ``Enterprise
Performance''; (2) Business Critical, sold under the brand names
``Constellation'', ``Enterprise Capacity'', and ``Enterprise
Value''; and, (3) Personal Storage, sold under the brand names
``Barracuda'' and ``Desktop''.
HDDs are designed in the United States and assembled either in
[non-TAA country] or [non-TAA country] from components manufactured
by Seagate outside the United States or obtained by Seagate from
suppliers in Asia. The assembly process in [non-TAA country] or
[non-TAA country] is as follows:
The Head Disk Assembly (``HDA''), usually comprised of two
magnetic recording media (``Media'') and three read/write recording
heads (``Heads''), a head actuator assembly, and an airtight metal
enclosure is assembled in minutes.
The HDA is mated to a printed circuit board (``PCB'') containing
disk drive electronics to create an HDD. It is assembled in seconds.
The HDD is loaded into the factory testing system, and testing
firmware is downloaded onto the HDD to facilitate media
certifications. The HDD stays in a sequence of media certification
operations for one or more days, as necessary.
Following successful media certification, the HDD testing
firmware is replaced with generic, basic firmware that only allows
the HDD's computer interface functions to be tested. Testing lasts
between [xxx] and [xxx].
After testing, the generic firmware is removed and the drive is
``forced blocked'', that is, it is blocked from being able to have
software loaded onto it or to be further tested. It is stated that
force blocking renders the HDD unable to function as a storage
drive.
The Heads in the HDA incorporate semiconductor, magnetic,
mechanical, and manufacturing process design into an integrated
recording reader and writer. It takes approximately [xxx] hours to
design a Head, [xxx] of which are allocated to design work in the
U.S., [xxx] hours to design work in [non-TAA country], and [xxx]
hours to design work in [non-TAA country]. The Media in the HDA
incorporates thin film magnetics, mechanical surface design and
manufacturing process design. It takes approximately [xxx] hours to
design Media, [xxx] of which are allocated to work done in the U.S.,
[xxx] hours to work done in [TAA country], and [xxx] hours to work
done in [non-TAA country].
Fully assembled HDDs are shipped to the United States. According
to the information submitted, in their imported condition, HDDs
cannot function as storage media. The disk heads cannot move, data
cannot be stored or retrieved and, were the HDDs to be installed on
computers or networks, they would not be recognized or listed. They
do, however, have a rudimentary serial port that enables the HDD to
communicate with a computer using a proprietary Seagate protocol so
that firmware may be installed and tests performed.
In the U.S., the imported HDD is unblocked and programmed with
two types of firmware:
1. Servo Firmware, which controls all motor, preamp and servo
functions without which the motors, Media, and Heads will not
operate and the HDD will not work; and
2. Non-Security Controller Firmware, which manages all
communications between the host and target drives as well as all
data within the drive. It allows data files to be stored on the
Media in the HDD, to be found and listed within applications, and to
be saved, retrieved and overwritten.
Installation and testing of the Servo and Non-Security
Controller Firmware takes between [xxx] and [xxx], depending on the
capacity and model of the HDD. Both types of firmware are developed
in the U.S. and [TAA country]. Approximately 80% of the work hours
spent on combined firmware
[[Page 51739]]
design is allocated to work performed in the United States at
Seagate's design centers and approximately 20% to work performed in
[TAA country]. Combined, the compiled firmware code is approximately
2 MB in size and contains approximately one million lines of code.
The firmware loaded onto the HDD in the U.S. makes the HDD a fully
functional, generic storage device.
During programming operations, approximately 25% of the generic
HDDs are reformatted based on specific customer requirements, such
as security features, format sizes, and format modes. Customer-
specific code is developed in the United States. Security Controller
Firmware, which may be added on to Non-Security Controller Firmware
as a part of a customer's code, allows the HDDs to be secured
through encryption, which involves enabling an encryption program
and security interface, locking the debug ports, and loading
credentials and certificates. The Security Controller Firmware is
written in the U.S. (85-90%) and in [TAA country] (10-15%), based on
architecture totally designed in the U.S. involving thousands of
hours and millions of dollars. After the HDDs are configured to
customer security requirements, the HDDs are known as self-
encrypting drives (SEDs). SEDs encrypt data as it is being written
and decrypts data as it is being read.
After programming is complete, the HDDs and SEDs are validated
or tested. A final quality assurance inspection is performed, after
which the HDDs and SEDs receive new part numbers and labels, and are
sold.
ISSUE:
What is the country of origin of Seagate's Hard Disk Drives and
Self-Encrypting Drives for purposes of U.S. Government procurement?
LAW AND ANALYSIS:
Pursuant to Subpart B of Part 177, 19 CFR Sec. 177.21 et seq.,
which implements Title III of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, as
amended (19 U.S.C. Sec. 2511 et seq.), CBP issues country of origin
advisory rulings and final determinations as to whether an article
is or would be a product of a designated country or instrumentality
for the purposes of granting waivers of certain ``Buy American''
restrictions in U.S. law or practice for products offered for sale
to the U.S. Government.
Under the rule of origin set forth under 19 U.S.C. Sec.
2518(4)(B):
An article is a product of a country or instrumentality only if
(i) it is wholly the growth, product, or manufacture of that country
or instrumentality, or (ii) in the case of an article which consists
in whole or in part of materials from another country or
instrumentality, it has been substantially transformed into a new
and different article of commerce with a name, character, or use
distinct from that of the article or articles from which it was so
transformed.
See also 19 C.F.R. Sec. 177.22(a).
In rendering advisory rulings and final determinations for
purposes of U.S. Government procurement, CBP applies the provisions
of subpart B of Part 177 consistent with the Federal Procurement
Regulations. See 19 C.F.R. Sec. 177.21. In this regard, CBP
recognizes that the Federal Procurement Regulations restrict the
U.S. Government's purchase of products to U.S.-made or designated
country end products for acquisitions subject to the TAA. See 48
C.F.R. Sec. 25.403(c)(1). The Federal Procurement Regulations
define ``U.S.-made end product'' as:
[A]n article that is mined, produced, or manufactured in the
United States or that is substantially transformed in the United
States into a new and different article of commerce with a name,
character, or use distinct from that of the article or articles from
which it was transformed.
In order to determine whether a substantial transformation
occurs when components of various origins are assembled into
completed products, CBP considers the totality of the circumstances
and makes such determinations on a case-by-case basis. The country
of origin of the item's components, extent of the processing that
occurs within a country, and whether such processing renders a
product with a new name, character, and use are primary
considerations in such cases. Additionally, factors such as the
resources expended on product design and development, the extent and
nature of post-assembly inspection and testing procedures, and
worker skill required during the actual manufacturing process will
be considered when determining whether a substantial transformation
has occurred. No one factor is determinative.
In Data General v. United States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 182 (1982),
the court determined that for purposes of determining eligibility
under item 807.00, Tariff Schedules of the United States
(predecessor to subheading 9802.00.80, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of
the United States), the programming of a foreign PROM (Programmable
Read-Only Memory chip) in the United States substantially
transformed the PROM into a U.S. article. In programming the
imported PROMs, the U.S. engineers systematically caused various
distinct electronic interconnections to be formed within each
integrated circuit. The programming bestowed upon each circuit its
electronic function, that is, its ``memory'' which could be
retrieved. A distinct physical change was effected in the PROM by
the opening or closing of the fuses, depending on the method of
programming. This physical alteration, not visible to the naked eye,
could be discerned by electronic testing of the PROM. The court
noted that the programs were designed by a U.S. project engineer
with many years of experience in ``designing and building
hardware.'' While replicating the program pattern from a ``master''
PROM may be a quick one-step process, the development of the pattern
and the production of the ``master'' PROM required much time and
expertise. The court noted that it was undisputed that programming
altered the character of a PROM. The essence of the article, its
interconnections or stored memory, was established by programming.
The court concluded that altering the non-functioning circuitry
comprising a PROM through technological expertise in order to
produce a functioning read only memory device, possessing a desired
distinctive circuit pattern, was no less a ``substantial
transformation'' than the manual interconnection of transistors,
resistors and diodes upon a circuit board creating a similar
pattern.
In Texas Instruments v. United States, 681 F.2d 778, 782 (CCPA
1982), the court observed that the substantial transformation issue
is a ``mixed question of technology and customs law.''
In C.S.D. 84-85, 18 Cust. B. & Dec. 1044 (Apr. 2, 1984), CBP
stated:
We are of the opinion that the rationale of the court in the
Data General case may be applied in the present case to support the
principle that the essence of an integrated circuit memory storage
device is established by programming . . . . [W]e are of the opinion
that the programming (or reprogramming) of an EPROM results in a new
and different article of commerce which would be considered to be a
product of the country where the programming or reprogramming takes
place.
Accordingly, the programming of a device that changes or defines
its use generally constitutes substantial transformation. See also
Headquarters Ruling Letter (`HQ'') 558868, dated February 23, 1995
(programming of SecureID Card substantially transforms the card
because it gives the card its character and use as part of a
security system and the programming is a permanent change that
cannot be undone); HQ 735027, dated September 7, 1993 (programming
blank media (EEPROM) with instructions that allow it to perform
certain functions that prevent piracy of software constitute
substantial transformation); and, HQ 733085, dated July 13, 1990;
but see HQ 732870, dated March 19, 1990 (formatting a blank diskette
does not constitute substantial transformation because it does not
add value, does not involve complex or highly technical operations
and did not create a new or different product); HQ 734518, dated
June 28, 1993, (motherboards are not substantially transformed by
the implanting of the central processing unit on the board because,
whereas in Data General use was being assigned to the PROM, the use
of the motherboard had already been determined when the importer
imported it).
HQ H052325, dated February 14, 2006, concerned the country of
origin of a switch and a switch/router. The Brocade 7800 Extension
Switch was assembled to completion in China and programmed in the
U.S. with U.S.-origin operating system (OS) software and customer
specified firmware and software. The Brocade FX8-24 switch/router
contained a PCBA that was assembled and programmed in China and
shipped to the U.S., where it was assembled with other components to
make the final product. The completed unit was then programmed with
U.S.-origin OS software and customer firmware and software. In both
cases, the U.S.-origin OS software provided the devices with their
functionality. Customs found that in both cases, the processing
performed in the United States, including the downloading of the
U.S.-origin OS software, resulted in a substantial transformation of
the foreign
[[Page 51740]]
origin components, and that the United States was the country of
origin.
In HQ H175415, dated October 4, 2011, hardware components were
assembled into complete Ethernet switches in China. The switches
were then shipped to the U.S., where they were programmed with EOS
software, developed in the U.S. The U.S.-origin EOS software enabled
the imported switches to interact with other network switches
through network switching and routing, and allowed for the
management of functions such as network performance monitoring and
security and access control. Without this software, the imported
devices could not function as Ethernet switches. As a result of the
programming performed in the U.S., with software developed in the
U.S., CBP found that the imported switches were substantially
transformed in the U.S.
In HQ H215555 (July 13, 2012), fully assembled SheevaPlug
microcomputers were imported into the United States, where they were
programmed with Pwnie Express proprietary software developed in the
U.S. The custom software provided a web-based interface for
configuring the microcomputers into Pwn Plugs. In addition, the U.S.
software allowed Pwn Plugs to provide secure, persistent and
reliable remote access over a variety of network protocols and
customer environments. Without the U.S.-origin Pwnie Express
software, an imported microcomputer could not function as a Pwn
Plug. As a result of the programming performed in the U.S., with
software developed in the U.S., we found that the imported
microcomputers were substantially transformed in the U.S. and that
the country of origin of Pwn Plugs was the United States.
In this case, fully assembled digital storage devices are
imported into the United States. Mechanically, the HDDs consist of
magnetic heads and a PBC. Their purpose is to store data.
Accordingly, in their imported condition they are completely non-
functional, in that, their disk heads cannot move, they cannot store
or retrieve data, and they cannot be recognized or listed by a
computer or network. The imported HDDs only have a basic ability to
communicate through a serial port using a proprietary Seagate
protocol that is used solely to install firmware and to test the
devices. They are programmed in the U.S. with U.S.-origin Servo
firmware, which causes the HDD to function mechanically by
controlling the motors, preamp and servo mechanisms, which operate
the recording media and disk heads in the HDA. They are also
programmed in the U.S. with U.S.-origin Controller firmware, which
manages all communication between the host and target drives as well
as all data management within the drive. In particular, Controller
firmware allows data files to be stored on the recording media in
the HDA, found and listed within applications, and saved, retrieved
and overwritten. Together, the U.S.-origin firmware causes the
imported HDDs to function as digital storage devices. As a result of
the programming performed in the U.S., with software primarily
developed in the U.S., we find that the imported HDDs are
substantially transformed in the U.S. See Data General, C.S.D. 84-
85, HQ 215555, HQ 052325, HQ 558868, HQ 735027, and HQ 733085. The
country of origin of the HDDs is the United States.
Counsel also argues that SEDs are different products than
standard HDDs because they undergo an additional substantial
transformation. Specifically, counsel states that the U.S.-origin
security firmware with which HDD is programmed in the U.S. converts
a standard HDD into a SED, a controlled encryption device for U.S.
export control purposes. In addition, counsel states that the SED
performs different functions than a standard HDD, has different
labeling and part numbers, is marketed and sold in a different
market than the HDD (a separate portion of the Seagate website is
devoted to security devices such as SEDs), and is priced
differently. We agree. To the extent that the HDDs are programmed
with additional U.S.-origin security firmware, the country of origin
of the SEDs will be the United States.
Nonetheless, this determination concerns whether the HDDs and
SEDs are products of a designated country or instrumentality for the
purposes of granting waivers of certain ``Buy American''
restrictions in U.S. law or practice for products offered for sale
to the U.S. Government. Consequently, the question of whether
additional programming performed in the U.S., using U.S.-origin
firmware incorporating an encryption code, transforms the HDD into a
SED subject to U.S. export control jurisdiction is outside the scope
of this determination.
Please be advised that whether the HDDs may be marked ``Made in
the U.S.A.'' or with similar words, is an issue under the authority
of the Federal Trade Commission (``FTC''). We suggest that you
contact the FTC, Division of Enforcement, 6th and Pennsylvania
Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20508, on the propriety of markings
indicating that articles are made in the United States.
HOLDING:
Based on the facts provided, the programming operations
performed in the United States impart the essential character to
Seagate's hard disk drives. As such, the HDDs are considered
products of the United States for purposes of U.S. Government
procurement.
Notice of this final determination will be given in the Federal
Register, as required by 19 C.F.R. Sec. 177.29. Any party-at-
interest other than the party which requested this final
determination may request, pursuant to 19 C.F.R. Sec. 177.31, that
CBP reexamine the matter anew and issue a new final determination.
Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. Sec. 177.30, any party-at-interest may,
within 30 days of publication of the Federal Register Notice
referenced above, seek judicial review of this final determination
before the Court of International Trade.
Sincerely,
Sandra L. Bell,
Executive Director Regulations and Rulings Office of International
Trade
[FR Doc. 2013-20425 Filed 8-20-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-14-P