Sugar Program; Feedstock Flexibility Program for Bioenergy Producers, 45441-45447 [2013-18160]
Download as PDF
45441
Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
Vol. 78, No. 145
Monday, July 29, 2013
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains regulatory documents having general
applicability and legal effect, most of which
are keyed to and codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations, which is published under
50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by
the Superintendent of Documents. Prices of
new books are listed in the first FEDERAL
REGISTER issue of each week.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Commodity Credit Corporation
7 CFR Part 1435
RIN 0560–AH86
Sugar Program; Feedstock Flexibility
Program for Bioenergy Producers
Commodity Credit Corporation
and Farm Service Agency, USDA.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
This rule amends regulations
that specify the methods that the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
can use to dispose of its sugar inventory
and establishes the new Feedstock
Flexibility Program (FFP). Through FFP,
the Secretary is required to purchase
sugar and sell it to produce bioenergy as
a means to avoid forfeitures of sugar
loan collateral under the Sugar Program.
The FFP regulations are required by the
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of
2008 (the 2008 Farm Bill) amendments
to the Food Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 (the 2002 Farm
Bill), and as further amended by the
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012.
DATES: Effective date: July 29, 2013.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Barbara Fecso; telephone (202) 720–
4146. Persons with disabilities who
require alternative means for
communications (Braille, large print,
audio tape, etc.) should contact the
USDA Target Center at (202) 720–2600
(voice and TDD).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES
Background
Under the Sugar Program, domestic
sugar beet or sugarcane processors may
borrow from CCC, pledging their sugar
production as collateral for any such
loan, and then satisfy their loans either
by repaying the loan on or before loan
maturity or by transferring the title for
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:11 Jul 26, 2013
Jkt 229001
the collateral to CCC immediately
following loan maturity, also known as
‘‘forfeiture’’ of collateral (as specified in
7 CFR 1435.105). The Farm Service
Agency (FSA) administers the Sugar
Program for CCC. The regulations for
sugar loans in 7 CFR 1435 parts A and
B are not changing. CCC is required to
operate the Sugar Program, to the
maximum extent practicable at no cost
to the Federal government, by avoiding
forfeitures to CCC. If domestic sugar
market conditions are such that market
rates are less than forfeiture level,
current law requires CCC to use FFP to
purchase sugar and sell such sugar to
bioenergy producers to avoid forfeitures.
This final rule amends the Sugar
Program regulations to implement FFP
and to establish appropriate methods for
the disposition of sugar inventory that
CCC has acquired other than through
FFP. CCC may acquire sugar through
forfeiture of CCC sugar loans or through
sugar purchases to reduce the cost of the
Sugar Program under the cost reduction
options provided by section 1009 of the
Food Security Act of 1985 (7 U.S.C.
1308a, Pub. L. 99–198). Implementation
of FFP is required by the amendment by
section 9001 of the 2008 Farm Bill (Pub.
L. 110–246) to section 9010 of the 2002
Farm Bill (7 U.S.C. 8110, Pub. L. 107–
171), and as further amended by section
701(f)(9) of the American Taxpayer
Relief Act of 2012 (Pub. L. 112–240).
Regulations implementing FFP are in 7
CFR part 1435, ‘‘Sugar Program,’’ in new
subpart G, ‘‘Feedstock Flexibility
Program.’’ Regulations implementing
sugar disposition methods are in 7 CFR
part 1435 in new subpart E,
‘‘Disposition of CCC Inventory.’’
FFP addresses sugar surpluses sooner
than the current Sugar Program by
permanently removing such sugar from
the market for human consumption. The
current Sugar Program removes surplus
sugar from the market near the end of
the crop year as sugarcane and sugar
beet processors forfeit sugar loan
collateral to CCC. The acquired
inventory can be stored for resale to the
market upon improvement in market
prices. Under FFP, CCC may remove
surplus sugar from the market earlier in
the year, as FFP requires CCC to avoid
sugar loan forfeitures. FFP also requires
the surplus sugar to be used to produce
bioenergy, which precludes CCC’s resale
of inventory into the market for human
consumption.
PO 00000
Frm 00001
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
Current law provides USDA authority
for these programs through the 2013
sugar crop year (which runs from
October 1, 2013 to September 30, 2014).
Recent indications in the sugar market
suggest that forfeitures may occur in
crop year 2012. However, if sugar prices
remain below the forfeiture level, CCC
may be required to use FFP to purchase
sugar before August 1, 2013, the first
date that 2012-crop loans can be
forfeited to CCC. The last year in which
sugar loan forfeitures occurred was
2005. The methods specified in this rule
for both purchases under FFP and
disposition of CCC sugar inventory are
not expected to be used in most years.
CCC published a proposed rule in the
Federal Register on October 19, 2011
(76 FR 64839–64844), with respect to
the 2008 amendments that would
establish FFP and restrict CCC sugar
inventory disposition outlets to nonfood use under non-emergency shortage
conditions. CCC received six comments
on the proposed rule. The comments
and responses are discussed later in this
document. As explained below, no
major changes are being made in
response to comments, because CCC has
determined, based on the evenly
balanced opposing and supporting
comments for specific changes, that the
proposed rule equitably balances the
conflicting interests of sugar producers
and sugar users. CCC has made other
changes from the proposed rule in this
final rule clarifying the types of sugar
eligible for FFP and eliminating the
eligibility requirement that the eligible
bioenergy producers’ facility be located
in the United States.
Sugar Program Background
Administration of the current Sugar
Program requires CCC to balance
domestic supply with demand so that
U.S. sugar prices are no less than levels
specified in the 2008 Farm Bill and to
maintain an adequate domestic sugar
supply. This rule does not change CCC’s
management of sugar loans, sugar
marketing allotments, or import tariffrate quotas (TRQs). Specifically, this
rule introduces purchases and sales of
sugar for bioenergy production under
FFP as a proactive means for CCC to
avoid forfeitures. FFP is expected to be
unnecessary in most years, as USDA’s
long term projections indicate a
generally strong domestic sugar market
in the future.
E:\FR\FM\29JYR1.SGM
29JYR1
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES
45442
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 145 / Monday, July 29, 2013 / Rules and Regulations
Sugar Inventory Disposition
This rule adds a new subpart E,
‘‘General Disposition of CCC Inventory,’’
to 7 CFR part 1435 to implement the
2008 Farm Bill requirements and the
2012 amendments to the 2002 Farm Bill.
Subpart E applies to sugar in inventory
that CCC owns, such as sugar obtained
from forfeited loan collateral. CCC does
not expect to regularly use these
methods, as it is legislatively required to
operate FFP to avoid forfeitures.
As specified in Subpart E, CCC will
dispose of sugar held in CCC inventory
in ways that do not increase the
domestic supply of sugar for human
consumption, except in conditions of
emergency sugar shortages. CCC may,
under non-emergency conditions,
dispose of sugar held in inventory
through sales under FFP (new subpart
G), through the Processor Sugar
Payment-in-Kind (PIK) Program (7 CFR
part 1435 subpart F, which is not
changing), through buybacks of
Certificates of Quota Eligibility (CQEs),
which are issued under 15 CFR part
2011 to TRQ holding countries and
authorize sugar to enter the United
States under the TRQs, or through other
applicable CCC disposition authority in
such a way as not to increase the
domestic supply of sugar for human
consumption. Under the PIK disposal
option, CCC would swap sugar
inventory for retired sugarcane or sugar
beet acreage. CCC disposed of 473,000
tons of sugar inventory under a similar
PIK Program in fiscal year (FY) 2001
and FY 2002. Under the CQE option,
CCC would allow traders to swap CQEs
for sugar inventory. CCC disposed of
116,000 tons of sugar inventory under
CQE swaps in FY 2002 and FY 2003.
Both methods reduce sugar in the
domestic supply for human
consumption. The announcements of
the use of such methods to dispose of
sugar held in inventory will be placed
on the FSA Commodity Operations Web
site at https://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/
webapp?area=home&subject=coop&
topic=landing.
If there is an emergency shortage of
sugar for human consumption in the
domestic market, the Secretary may use
applicable CCC authority to dispose of
sugar inventory, including sales for
human consumption.
As amended by the 2008 Farm Bill,
section 9010 of the 2002 Farm Bill
specifies that an emergency shortage of
sugar for human consumption in the
United States market is one ‘‘caused by
a war, flood, hurricane, other natural
disaster, or other similar event.’’ CCC
did not propose to define ‘‘emergency
shortage’’ in the proposed rule, and
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:11 Jul 26, 2013
Jkt 229001
noted that the ‘‘similar event’’ clause
provides flexibility to respond to
shortages caused by manmade events. In
the background section of the proposed
rule, CCC requested comments on
whether CCC should define ‘‘emergency
shortage’’ in the rule, either by listing
the specific types of events that cause a
shortage or by specifying a formula
based on price or stock levels that
constitute a shortage. As discussed in
more detail later in this document, the
comments received were not in
agreement on whether there should be
a specific definition or what that
definition should be. Therefore, CCC
has retained the language of section
9010 in the final rule that specifies the
causes of an emergency shortage, but
has not adopted a specific formula for
what constitutes a shortage. CCC
therefore retains flexibility to make a
determination whether particular
circumstances constitute an ‘‘other
similar event’’ that has caused an
emergency shortage, and whether a
particular price or stock level
constitutes a shortage. There were no
comments received on any other sugar
disposition provisions specified in the
proposed rule. Consequently, CCC did
not make any substantive changes to
those provisions.
Subpart G—Feedstock Flexibility
Program
New subpart G specifies how CCC
will operate FFP. Through FFP, CCC
will buy sugar as needed to avoid
forfeitures of sugar loan collateral and
sell that sugar to bioenergy producers.
Bioenergy, as defined in section 9001 of
the 2008 Farm Bill, amending section
9010 of the 2002 Farm Bill, means fuel
grade ethanol and other biofuel.
As amended by the 2008 Farm Bill,
section 9010 of the 2002 Farm Bill
requires the Secretary to estimate, by
September 1 of each year, the likelihood
of sugar forfeitures for the following
crop year, and announce the quantity of
sugar to be made available for purchase
and sale for bioenergy production. In
addition, CCC will make quarterly
announcements of revised estimates of
such quantity. CCC’s purchase and sale
plans will be affected by the large
degree of uncertainty in USDA’s sugar
market projections made early in the
year. As specified in this rule, CCC will
update the estimated quantity of sugar
to be made available for purchase and
sale under FFP not later than January 1,
April 1, and July 1 of each year. Any
FFP purchases expected in calendar
year 2013 for the 2012 crop will be
announced in the quarterly updates in
FY 2013.
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
The 2008 Farm Bill amendments
specify that the only commodities
eligible to be made available for
purchase under FFP are ‘‘raw or refined,
or in-process sugar’’ that would
otherwise have been marketed for
human consumption in the United
States or could otherwise have been
used for the extraction of sugar
marketed for human consumption.
Applicable law requires that the
entity selling sugar to CCC be located in
the United States. The 2008 Farm Bill
amendments do not require that the
sugar buyer’s bioenergy facilities be
located in the United States. CCC
nevertheless initially proposed to limit
eligible buyers to those bioenergy
producers who would use the
purchased sugar to produce bioenergy
in their facilities in the United States.
This restriction was initially proposed
to benefit the American taxpayer, who
is paying for FFP, and CCC indeed
received one (favorable) comment
related to such proposed restriction.
However, section 9010 of the 2002 Farm
Bill, as amended, expressly provides
that the sale of sugar to bioenergy
producers must be conducted in a
manner that ensures the Sugar Program
is operated at no cost to the Federal
Government by avoiding forfeitures to
CCC. To restrict eligible buyers to those
bioenergy producers whose production
facilities are located in the United States
may restrict the pool of sugar buyers,
potentially increasing the cost to the
Federal Government and the likelihood
of forfeitures to CCC. Such a result
would be contrary to the interests of the
American taxpayer. Consequently, the
final rule does not adopt this restriction.
Ultimately, CCC estimates that few if
any prospective buyers would seek to
use the sugar to produce bioenergy at
facilities outside the United States, as it
is not expected to be cost-effective to
transport over longer distances sugar
that must be used for bioenergy
production.
Any biofuel producer that wishes to
participate in the Environmental
Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Renewable
Fuel Standard (RFS) program must
comply with EPA regulations, in 40 CFR
part 80; however, participation in RFS
is not a requirement for participation in
FFP. Assuming all of the applicable RFS
requirements are met, EPA has
confirmed that ethanol produced from
U.S. sugarcane would qualify for an
advanced fuel RIN, and that ethanol
produced from U.S. sugar produced
from U.S. sugar beets would qualify for
a conventional RIN, subject to certain
grandfathering provisions.
CCC will invite sugar producers to
sell sugar for FFP and shortly thereafter
E:\FR\FM\29JYR1.SGM
29JYR1
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 145 / Monday, July 29, 2013 / Rules and Regulations
invite bioenergy producers to bid on
purchasing sugar for bioenergy
production. The terms and conditions of
the sugar purchase and sale contracts
will be outlined in the dual invitations.
The invitations will be placed on the
FSA Commodity Operations Web site at
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?
area=home&subject=coop&
topic=landing. Alternatively, CCC may
negotiate contracts directly with sellers
or buyers, if CCC determines that such
negotiation, compared to other means,
either will reduce the likelihood of
forfeited sugar or reduce costs of
removing sugar from the market. CCC
may employ several contracting
strategies to discover the most costeffective strategy to manage FFP.
The 2008 Farm Bill amendments
require that purchasers of sugar under
FFP take possession within 30 days after
the date of purchase from CCC. CCC will
therefore attempt, when possible, to
identify a bioenergy producer (sugar
buyer) before CCC purchases sugar, and
require the buyer to take possession of
the sugar within 30 days of purchase.
Since the law prohibits CCC, to the
maximum extent possible, from paying
storage fees for FFP sugar, CCC will
structure the FFP contracts so that CCC
does not pay any storage fees. Specific
terms and conditions will be outlined in
the invitations to sell and buy sugar for
the FFP. For instance, potential sugar
buyers will have the opportunity to
discuss and arrange storage and load out
terms with the sugar seller prior to
placing bids. As specified in subpart E,
sugar acquired by CCC through methods
other than FFP, such as sugar loan
forfeitures, may also be sold for
bioenergy production through FFP.
Since the value of sugar required to be
sold for bioenergy production will likely
be less than the market price for sugar
used for human consumption, there is
an incentive for FFP sugar sold to
bioenergy producers to leak into the
domestic human consumption market.
Therefore, CCC will require proof from
each FFP bioenergy producer that the
sugar is used in the bioenergy facility
for the production of bioenergy.
Bioenergy producers, at minimum, will
be required to permit CCC access to the
bioenergy facility to verify compliance;
however, CCC may also require a
performance bond or a similar
instrument to assure that the purchased
sugar is used to produce bioenergy.
Specific terms and conditions of any
such bond or instrument will be
specified in the invitations to sell and
buy sugar for the FFP.
As noted above, CCC is not specifying
the precise contracting method or
language in the rule in order to maintain
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:11 Jul 26, 2013
Jkt 229001
maximum flexibility in achieving
program goals in the most cost effective
way.
Discussion of Comments
The comments CCC received in
response to the proposed rule were from
a representative of all sugar producers,
a representative of sugar beet
processors, a representative of
companies that use sugar and
sweeteners to manufacture foods and
beverages, and three members of the
general public. Half of the comments
offered specific suggestions to amend
the provisions in the proposed rule; the
rest generally opposed or supported the
Sugar Program. There was not a
consensus on any of the suggested
changes. There was general support for
many of the provisions in the proposed
rule, including how eligible forms of
sugar for FFP are defined and CCC’s
proposed flexible approach to how
purchases will be made if needed. Two
commenters recommended terminating
the Sugar Program, which CCC does not
have authority to do; another comment
generally supported FFP. The other
comments offered specific suggestions
to amend the rule or provided specific
suggestions on how the rule should be
implemented. The following provides a
summary of the issues in the comments
and CCC’s responses, including changes
being made to the final rule in response
to the comments.
Disposition of Sugar Inventory
Comment: CCC should leave
‘‘emergency shortage’’ undefined.
Leaving the term undefined would give
CCC the flexibility needed to operate the
program successfully and that linking
the term to a price formula is not
authorized by the 2008 Farm Bill
amendments. Defining the term in this
inventory disposal regulation might
automatically, and inappropriately, lead
to the same definition being applied to
the administration of the TRQs as
required by 7 U.S.C. 1359kk.
Response: The 2008 Farm Bill
amendments specify some of the
potential causes of an emergency
shortage, but do not define an
emergency shortage in terms of either
price or a supply disruption. Based on
a lack of consensus of commenters, this
rule does not define the term. (See
below, other commenters suggested that
this term be defined.) CCC also wishes
to maintain flexibility to determine
whether particular events and their
consequences give rise to an emergency
shortage of sugar for human
consumption in the United States
market.
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
45443
Comment: CCC should define the
term ‘‘emergency shortage’’ because
market participants deserve to have a
clear picture of CCC’s thinking on this
issue. Emergency shortage should be
defined the same way it is used when
CCC decides to increase the sugar TRQ.
The definition should define an
emergency shortage in terms of the
effects, not the cause (for example,
supply disruptions and price spikes). A
specific percentage price increase above
the loan forfeiture would be a useful
way to measure what price constitutes
an emergency shortage. Also, CCC
should consider declarations of force
majeure, plant closures, slowdowns,
and temporary shutdowns in production
lines as emergencies. CCC should
consider establishing a benchmark of
‘‘adequate supplies at reasonable
prices,’’ as already specified in the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States, to determine if a shortage
exists.
Response: The 2008 Farm Bill
amendments specify some of the causes
that can give rise to an emergency
shortage, but do not define what
constitutes a shortage in terms of its
effects. Other commenters suggested
that this term be left undefined. Based
on a lack of consensus of commenters,
this rule does not define the term. CCC
will use discretion to determine when
an emergency shortage exists, and not
define a specific formula or price level
in the rule. The 2008 Farm Bill
amendments require a triggering event
before CCC can declare an ‘‘emergency
shortage.’’ From past experience with
sugar shortages caused by disasters, CCC
recognizes that it must be flexible to
mitigate the unforeseen consequences of
disastrous events. However, CCC would
consider food manufacturing plant
closures and similar events as events
that could give rise to an emergency
shortage.
Comment: CCC should not limit
eligible causes of emergency shortages
to only the natural causes specifically
mentioned in the 2008 Farm Bill
amendments, since the amendments
also include references to ‘‘other natural
disaster, or other similar event.’’
However, the 2008 Farm Bill
amendments are clear that the triggering
event must be ‘‘similar’’—it does not
give CCC complete discretion to
consider any event or market condition
as the cause of an emergency shortage.
The courts have repeatedly upheld the
principle of ejusdem generis—that
where general words follow specific
ones, the general words must be
construed to include only objects
similar to those specified. The final rule
should use the 2008 Farm Bill
E:\FR\FM\29JYR1.SGM
29JYR1
45444
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 145 / Monday, July 29, 2013 / Rules and Regulations
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES
amendments language, but in
implementation, it must be clear that
mere high prices or low ending stocks
do not constitute a similar event to war
or hurricane. An eligible manmade
event causing a shortage of sugar must
be similar to a war, that is, an extreme
event that results in massive loss of life,
property destruction, or a severe
disruption of international trade—not
merely low ending stocks or high prices.
Similarly, an ‘‘other natural disaster’’
cause of sugar shortage must be on the
order of a flood or hurricane that causes
death and destruction, and not a more
localized event such as a tornado or hail
storm.
Response: CCC has decided not to
define the ‘‘emergency shortage’’ or its
causes in the regulation as there was no
consensus among commenters. CCC also
wishes to maintain flexibility to
determine whether particular events
and their consequences give rise to an
emergency shortage of sugar for human
consumption in the United States
market. The final rule uses the specific
language from the 2008 Farm Bill
amendments to specify what constitutes
a cause of an emergency shortage.
Feedstock Flexibility Program
In the proposed rule, CCC requested
comment on how CCC should calculate
a sugar market surplus, particularly for
the required September 1 estimate,
when uncertainties are greatest. CCC
also requested comments on appropriate
methods to estimate the likelihood of
forfeitures and to determine the quantity
of sugar to be purchased in each quarter.
In comments on the proposed rule, both
sugar producers and sugar users
supported estimating a surplus based on
comparing stocks to stock levels that
have resulted in forfeitures in the past.
Sugar producers supported a generally
flexible approach with no specific
numerical trigger for implementing FFP,
while sugar users supported an
unspecified numerical threshold above
the stock level that triggered forfeitures
in the past. In the absence of a
consensus on a specific formula for
determining that forfeitures are likely,
CCC retained the flexible language from
the proposed rule that does not specify
a formula CCC will use to determine the
quantity of sugar likely to be forfeited.
In the proposed rule, CCC asked for
comments on whether the regulations
should specify one particular method of
contracting for FFP purchases. There
was a consensus that FFP should have
the flexibility to determine the most
appropriate approach if and when the
program is needed.
Comment: The option provided in the
proposed rule that CCC declare a sugar
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:11 Jul 26, 2013
Jkt 229001
market surplus to be any stocks level
appearing in USDA’s World
Agricultural Supply and Demand
Estimates (WASDE) report that are over
and above the stock level expected to
result in forfeitures should be used.
Response: The WASDE stock levels
will certainly be considered in
analyzing whether a surplus exists. In
the absence of a consensus on any
specific formula as to what level
represents an expectation of forfeitures,
CCC has not specified a formula for
what constitutes a surplus in this rule.
Comment: The level of stocks that
produced forfeitures in the past may not
lead to forfeitures in the future. Stocks
can be, and have been, somewhat higher
than the traditional ideal level of 14.5
percent, or even 15.5 percent, without
leading to forfeitures. Use some
projected stock level above the level that
has triggered forfeitures in the past to
predict surpluses.
Response: In the absence of a
consensus on any specific formula as to
what level represents an expectation of
forfeitures, CCC has not specified what
constitutes a surplus in this rule.
Comment: CCC should not use any
numerical stipulation to specify the
likelihood of forfeitures or for
determining quantities to purchase.
Response: There is no formula
specified in the rule for what constitutes
a surplus. CCC will use objective criteria
based on market data to justify its
determination of forfeiture risk and
quantities to purchase.
Comment: We support CCC’s FFP
sugar purchase strategy of staggering
CCC purchases for biofuel as the market
unfolds, rather than one single
purchase.
Response: CCC is required by
applicable law to estimate the quantity
to be made available for purchase and
sale under FFP quarterly, but will take
a conservative approach early in the
year, as discussed in the background
section of the proposed rule.
Comment: CCC should wait until the
end of the FY, when forfeitures could
occur, to make any purchases for FFP.
Response: CCC will make quarterly
estimates of the quantity of eligible
sugar that will be made available for
purchase and sale under the FFP, and
announce by press release the quantity,
if any, and timing of availability of FFP
purchases and sales. If the projected
surplus is large, CCC will need to make
purchases before the end of the FY to
achieve the goal of avoiding sugar loan
forfeitures. CCC’s purchases will be
more conservative earlier in the year
than later, due to the greater level of
uncertainty early in the year. CCC
cannot wait to make FFP purchases only
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
when forfeitures would occur, for
example, in August for FY 2013,
because a principal goal of FFP is to
prevent forfeitures.
Comment: We support CCC’s proposal
that to be eligible for FFP, sugar must be
processed and located in the United
States from domestically-grown
sugarcane and sugar beets. Also, only
biofuel facilities within the U.S. should
be eligible to purchase sugar.
Response: CCC clarifies the language
in 7 CFR part 1435, subpart G that to be
eligible for FPP, the sugar seller must be
located in the United States. As
specified in this rule, eligible sugar for
FFP purchase must have been processed
in the United States from domesticallygrown sugarcane and sugar beets.
However, eligible buyers are not
required to use the purchased FFP sugar
in U.S. facilities. Section 9010 of the
2002 Farm Bill, as amended, expressly
provides that the sale of sugar to
bioenergy producers must be conducted
in a manner that ensures the Sugar
Program is operated at no cost to the
Federal Government by avoiding
forfeitures to CCC. To restrict eligible
buyers to those bioenergy producers
whose production facilities are located
in the United States may restrict the
pool of sugar buyers, potentially
increasing the cost to the Federal
Government and the likelihood of
forfeitures to CCC. Consequently, the
final rule does not adopt this restriction.
Comment: CCC needs to take a
flexible approach to contracting to
arrive at the most cost-efficient way to
manage FFP. We support the approach
in the proposed rule that FFP tender
offers will include both a seller and
buyer of sugar for bioenergy production
to minimize FFP costs. We also support
the strategy of pre-qualifying bioenergy
producers willing to buy FFP sugar.
Response: CCC will generally employ
competitive procedures to minimize
CCC costs. Since commenters supported
a flexible approach, CCC will not
specify a specific purchase method in
the rule.
Comment: CCC should evaluate offers
in light of the forfeiture equivalent price
so that sellers do not earn substantially
more for selling surplus sugar to FFP
than they would by forfeiting sugar to
CCC. CCC must structure the contracting
procedure to minimize the chance for
FFP sugar sellers to receive more than
they would if they forfeited sugar under
loan.
Response: CCC has the authority to
limit bid acceptance; no modification of
the rule is necessary to address this
comment. The terms of CCC’s sugar
purchase compared to the terms of
forfeiture will determine if CCC can
E:\FR\FM\29JYR1.SGM
29JYR1
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 145 / Monday, July 29, 2013 / Rules and Regulations
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES
expect to pay more or less under FFP
than the forfeiture proceeds. In 2000, a
year in which forfeitures previously
occurred, CCC limited acceptable offers
to less than the forfeiture proceeds,
resulting in CCC paying less, and in
some cases substantially less, for sugar
purchased by processors than the
proceeds later retained from forfeiture.
However, the storage cost restriction
and other FFP requirements may affect
CCC’s terms of purchase and CCC’s
determination of an acceptable offer.
Comment: CCC should include an
audit clause in the contract to purchase
sugar for bioenergy production to avoid
fraud and misuse and to ensure the
sugar does not enter the human
consumption chain.
Response: As specified in this rule,
each bioenergy producer that purchases
sugar through FFP must provide proof
to CCC that the sugar is used by such
producer for the production of
bioenergy.
Comment: The rule language is not
consistent. The language in the example
specified in § 1435.602(e), ‘‘Eligible
commodity to be purchased by CCC,’’ is
inconsistent with the proposed rule text
in the rest of that paragraph. The
example indicates that CCC would only
consider a percentage of the refined
sugar expected to be made from a sugar
bearing product, when the other
language in the same paragraph stated
that all of the expected sugar to be made
from the product would be considered
in evaluating a bid.
Response: CCC has corrected the
language so that the example is
consistent with the rest of the regulatory
text in that section.
Summary of Changes
In summary, as discussed above, CCC
is making minor changes to the
regulatory text in response to comments,
including a correction and several
clarifications. Sugar buyers and sugar
producers had opposing comments on
both sugar disposition and FFP, with
buyers generally wanting CCC to take
actions that would keep prices as low as
possible, and sellers wanting CCC to
take actions to support prices as high as
possible. Given these irreconcilable
opposing interests and lack of
consensus on approach, CCC has made
no substantive changes in response to
comments, because the evenly balanced
comments reflect that the proposed rule,
to the extent possible within the
requirements of applicable law,
balances the different stakeholder
interests.
CCC has made other changes from the
proposed rule, not in response to
comments, to clarify its evaluation of
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:11 Jul 26, 2013
Jkt 229001
the types of sugar eligible for FFP and
the location of eligible bioenergy
producers. CCC has also determined
that it should not limit eligible
bioenergy producers to those with
production facilities in the United
States. Such a limitation was
determined to unnecessarily limit
competition for CCC sugar and may
increase program costs.
Effective Date
The Administrative Procedure Act (5
U.S.C. 553) provides generally that
before rules are issued by Government
agencies, the rule must be published in
the Federal Register, and the required
publication of a substantive rule is to be
not less than 30 days before its effective
date. One of the exceptions is when the
agency finds good cause for not delaying
the effective date. CCC finds that there
is good cause for making this rule
effective less than 30 days after
publication in the Federal Register
because this rule allows CCC to prevent
sugar in the U.S. market from being
forfeited to CCC. The margin between
the raw sugar market price and the raw
sugar price level encouraging forfeiture
fell in 2012 from 13.8 to 1.6 cents per
pound. Therefore, to avoid possible
forfeitures for crop year 2012, this final
rule is effective when published in the
Federal Register.
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
Executive Order 12866, ‘‘Regulatory
Planning and Review,’’ and Executive
Order 13563, ‘‘Improving Regulation
and Regulatory Review,’’ direct agencies
to assess all costs and benefits of
available regulatory alternatives and, if
regulation is necessary, to select
regulatory approaches that maximize
net benefits (including potential
economic, environmental, public health
and safety effects, distributive impacts,
and equity). Executive Order 13563
emphasized the importance of
quantifying both costs and benefits, of
reducing costs, of harmonizing rules,
and of promoting flexibility.
The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) designated this rule as
significant under Executive Order 12866
and, therefore, OMB reviewed this rule.
A summary of the cost-benefit analysis
of this rule is provided below and is
available at https://www.regulations.gov
and from the contact listed above.
Summary of Costs and Benefits
Predicting conditions months into the
future is a process that involves
inevitable uncertainty, with variables
subject to change. Current baseline
projections developed by USDA
indicate that FFP authorities may be
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
45445
necessary only once during the 10-year
baseline period. The analysis estimated
a 76.9 percent chance of FFP being
activated in FY 2013.
FSA assumes that 300,000 tons of
CCC sugar loan collateral will be
forfeited in FY 2013 if FFP is not
implemented. FFP is expected to cost
CCC an estimated $54.5 million more
than using the least-cost surplus
management option. The total cost
associated with FFP is $92.3 million
(300,000 tons × 2,000 lbs × 15.38 cents
per lb = $92.3 million). Despite this
cost, FFP has at least one benefit that is
not available with other sugar supply
reduction methods. Specifically, FFP
will allow the generation of Renewable
Identification Numbers (RINs), which
will help gasoline and diesel blenders
meet their Renewable Fuels Standard
(RFS) mandates in 2014.
The current baseline projections
indicate that there are no sugar loan
forfeitures or CCC purchases of sugar for
ethanol expected from FY 2014–2023,
because projected raw cane and refined
beet sugar prices are above the
minimum prices that would result in
forfeitures. More specifically, FFP is
projected to be unneeded after FY 2013
because the domestic market is no
longer projected to be in surplus, and
the world market is projected to affect
domestic prices above rate levels
specified in the 2008 Farm Bill.
Expected growth in U.S. beet and
cane sugar production over the next
decade is projected to be very modest—
less than 5 percent over the projections
period. Sugar use is projected to grow
about 0.7 percent a year, or 7 percent
over the decade. Mexican imports are
expected to average 12.8 percent of U.S.
domestic sugar use. TRQ sugar imports
from U.S. commitments made to
member states of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and under existing
trade agreements are expected to
average 1.444 million short tons, raw
value (STRV) annually. World raw sugar
prices (Intercontinental Exchange No.
11, nearby futures) forecasts by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) are used in
the analysis, which average 21.58 cents
per pound through the projection
period, which is above the U.S. Sugar
Program’s support rate of 20.9 cents per
pound.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
In accordance with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601, FSA has
determined that there will not be a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
The entities that would be affected by
this rule are sugar producers and sugar
E:\FR\FM\29JYR1.SGM
29JYR1
45446
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 145 / Monday, July 29, 2013 / Rules and Regulations
bioenergy producers. The sugar
producers are not small businesses
according to the North American
Industry Classification System and the
U.S. Small Business Administration.
There are currently no commercial
bioenergy producers in the United
States who use sugar solely as a
feedstock, although sugar may be
blended with other feedstocks currently
used in the manufacture of bioenergy.
The bioenergy producers in the United
States who use other commodities as a
feedstock and that might be expected to
purchase sugar as a feedstock are not
small businesses.
Environmental Review
The environmental impacts of this
rule have been considered in a manner
consistent with the provisions of the
National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4321–4347), the
regulations of the Council on
Environmental Quality (40 CFR parts
1500–1508), and FSA regulations for
compliance with NEPA (7 CFR part
799). The changes to the Sugar Program
required by Title IX of the 2008 Farm
Bill identified in this rule are
considered non-discretionary.
Therefore, CCC has determined that
NEPA does not apply to this rule and no
environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement will be
prepared.
Executive Order 12372
This program is not subject to
Executive Order 12372,
‘‘Intergovernmental Review of Federal
Programs,’’ which requires consultation
with State and local officials. See the
notice related to 7 CFR part 3015,
subpart V, published in the Federal
Register on June 24, 1983 (48 FR 29115).
responsibilities among the various
levels of government. Nor would this
rule impose substantial direct
compliance costs on State and local
governments. Therefore, consultation
with the States is not required.
Executive Order 13175
This rule has been reviewed for
compliance with Executive Order
13175, ‘‘Consultation and Coordination
with Indian Tribal Governments.’’ The
policies in this rule do not have Tribal
implications that preempt Tribal law.
Unfunded Mandates
Title II of the Unfunded Mandate
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA, Pub. L.
104–4) requires Federal agencies to
assess the effects of their regulatory
actions on State, local, or Tribal
governments or the private sector.
Agencies generally must prepare a
written statement, including a cost
benefit analysis, for proposed and final
rules with Federal mandates that may
result in expenditures of $100 million or
more in any 1 year for State, local, or
Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or
to the private sector. UMRA generally
requires agencies to consider
alternatives and adopt the more cost
effective or least burdensome alternative
that achieves the objectives of the rule.
This rule contains no Federal mandates
under the regulatory provisions of Title
II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995 for State, local, and Tribal
government or the private sector.
Therefore, this rule is not subject to the
requirements of sections 202 and 205 of
UMRA.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES
Executive Order 12988
This rule has been reviewed under
Executive Order 12988, ‘‘Civil Justice
Reform.’’ This rule would not preempt
State and or local laws, and regulations,
or policies unless they present an
irreconcilable conflict with this rule.
The rule will not have retroactive effect.
Before any judicial action may be
brought regarding the provisions of this
rule, the administrative appeal
provisions of 7 CFR parts 11 and 780
must be exhausted.
Paperwork Reduction Act
We anticipate that in the next 3 years
fewer than 10 sugar producers will
participate in FFP by selling their sugar
to CCC. In addition, FSA estimates that
in each of the next 3 years, fewer than
10 bioenergy producers will participate
in FFP by buying sugar from CCC. Each
of these will use a different form to
collect different types of information.
Therefore, the Paperwork Reduction Act
exemption specified in 5 CFR 1320.3(c)
applies because fewer than 10 sugar
producers or 10 bioenergy producers are
expected to need to complete the
respective forms for selling or buying
sugar for FFP.
Executive Order 13132
This rule has been reviewed under
Executive Order 13132, ‘‘Federalism.’’
The policies contained in this rule will
not have any substantial direct effect on
States, the relationship between the
Federal government and the States, or
the distribution of power and
E-Government Act Compliance
CCC is committed to complying with
the E-Government Act, to promote the
use of the Internet and other
information technologies to provide
increased opportunities for citizen
access to Government information and
services, and for other purposes.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:11 Jul 26, 2013
Jkt 229001
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 1435
Loan programs-agriculture, Penalties,
Price support programs, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Sugar.
For the reasons discussed above, CCC
amends 7 CFR part 1435 as follows:
PART 1435—SUGAR PROGRAM
1. Revise the authority citation for part
1435 to read as follows:
■
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1359aa–1359jj, 7272,
and 8110; 15 U.S.C. 714b and 714c.
■
2. Add subpart E to read as follows:
Subpart E—Disposition of CCC Inventory
Sec.
1435.400 General statement.
1435.401 CCC sugar inventory disposition.
Subpart E—Disposition of CCC
Inventory
§ 1435.400
General statement.
This subpart will be applicable in the
event that raw, refined, or in-process
sugar is owned and held in CCC
inventory (accumulated under the
program authorized by section 156 of
the Federal Agriculture Improvement
and Reform Act, as amended) as
specified in subpart B of this part.
§ 1435.401 CCC sugar inventory
disposition.
(a) CCC will dispose of inventory in
the following manner, if CCC has not
determined there is an emergency
shortage of sugar for human
consumption in the domestic market:
(1) By sale to bioenergy producers
under the Feedstock Flexibility Program
as specified in subpart G of this part,
(2) By transfer to sugarcane and sugar
beet processors under the Processor
Sugar Payment-In-Kind Program as
specified in subpart F of this part,
(3) By the buyback of certificates of
quota eligibility (CQEs), or
(4) By the use of any other authority
for the disposition of CCC-owned sugar
for nonfood use or otherwise in a
manner that does not increase the net
quantity of sugar available for human
consumption in the United States.
(b) CCC may use any of its authority
for the disposition of CCC-owned sugar,
if CCC has determined there is an
emergency shortage of sugar for human
consumption in the domestic market
caused by war, flood, hurricane, or other
natural disaster, or similar event, as
determined by CCC.
■ 3. Add subpart G to read as follows:
Subpart G—Feedstock Flexibility Program
Sec.
1435.600 General statement.
1435.601 Sugar surplus determination and
public announcement.
E:\FR\FM\29JYR1.SGM
29JYR1
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 145 / Monday, July 29, 2013 / Rules and Regulations
1435.602
CCC.
1435.603
1435.604
1435.605
1435.606
1435.607
Eligible sugar to be purchased by
General statement.
(a) The provisions of this subpart will
be applied when CCC determines that
buying sugar is necessary to avoid
forfeitures of sugar pledged as collateral
for CCC sugar loans.
(b) This subpart will be applicable to:
(1) Any sugar seller who contracts
with CCC to sell sugar, and
(2) Any bioenergy producer who
contracts with CCC to purchase sugar
for the production of bioenergy.
§ 1435.601 Sugar surplus determination
and public announcement.
(a) CCC will estimate by September 1
the quantity of sugar that will be made
available for purchase and sale under
FFP for the following crop year.
(b) Not later than January 1, April 1,
and July 1 of the fiscal year, CCC will
re-estimate the quantity of sugar that
will be made available for purchase and
sale under the FFP for the crop year.
(c) CCC will announce by press
release the estimates in paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this section, which will reflect
CCC’s forecast of sugar likely to be
forfeited to CCC and any uncertainty
surrounding that forecast.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES
§ 1435.602
by CCC.
Eligible sugar to be purchased
(a) CCC will only purchase raw sugar,
refined sugar, or in-process sugar for
FFP that is eligible to be used as
collateral under the CCC Sugar Loan
Program, as specified in § 1435.102.
(b) Raw sugar, refined sugar, or inprocess sugar purchased directly from
any domestic sugar beet or sugarcane
processor that made the raw sugar,
refined sugar, or in-process sugar will be
credited against the processor’s sugar
marketing allocation. (The definition for
‘‘marketing’’ in § 1435.2 applies to this
subpart.)
(c) CCC will only purchase sugar
located in the United States.
(d) CCC will evaluate an offer to sell
sugar to CCC based upon CCC’s estimate
of the reduction in refined sugar supply
available for human consumption due to
the purchase. For example, if processing
thick juice (an in-process sugar) would
yield 70 percent sugar for human
consumption, then CCC will only
consider 70 percent of the volume of the
thick juice in evaluating the per unit
sales price.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:11 Jul 26, 2013
Jkt 229001
18 CFR Part 40
Eligible sugar seller.
(a) To be considered an eligible sugar
seller, the sugar seller must be located
in the United States.
(b) [Reserved]
Subpart G—Feedstock Flexibility
Program
§ 1435.600
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
§ 1435.603
Eligible sugar seller.
Eligible sugar buyer.
Competitive procedures.
Miscellaneous.
Appeals.
(e) CCC will only purchase the sugar
if such purchase would reduce the
likelihood of forfeitures of CCC sugar
loans, as determined by CCC.
45447
§ 1435.604
Eligible sugar buyer.
(a) To be considered an eligible sugar
buyer, the bioenergy producer must
produce bioenergy products, including
fuel grade ethanol or other biofuels.
(b) [Reserved]
§ 1435.605
Competitive procedures.
(a) CCC will generally issue tenders
for bids, before entering into contracts
with any eligible sugar seller or buyer,
with the intent of selecting the bid(s)
that represents the least cost to CCC of
removing sugar from the market.
(b) CCC may, at times, negotiate
contracts directly with sellers or buyers,
if CCC determines that such negotiation
will result in either reduced likelihood
of forfeited sugar under the CCC sugar
loan program or reduced costs of
removing sugar from the market, which
will reduce the likelihood of forfeitures
of sugar to CCC.
§ 1435.606
Miscellaneous.
(a) As a sugar buyer, a bioenergy
producer must take possession of the
sugar no more than 30 days from the
date of CCC’s purchase.
(b) CCC, to the maximum extent
practicable, will not pay storage fees for
the sugar purchased under this program.
A bioenergy producer must assume any
storage costs accrued from date of
contract to date of taking possession of
the sugar.
(c) Each bioenergy producer that
purchases sugar through FFP must
provide proof as specified by CCC that
the sugar has been used in the bioenergy
factory for the production of bioenergy
and permit access for USDA to verify
compliance.
§ 1435.607
Appeals.
(a) The administrative appeal
regulations of parts 11 and 780 of this
title apply to this part.
(b) [Reserved]
Signed on July 24, 2013.
Juan M. Garcia,
Administrator, Farm Service Agency, and
Executive Vice President, Commodity Credit
Corporation.
[FR Doc. 2013–18160 Filed 7–26–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410–05–P
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
[Docket No. RM12–19–000; Order No. 782]
Revisions to Modeling, Data, and
Analysis Reliability Standard
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
In this Final Rule, pursuant to
section 215 of the Federal Power Act,
the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (Commission) approves
Modeling, Data, and Analysis (MOD)
Reliability Standard MOD–028–2,
submitted to the Commission for
approval by the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC), the
Commission-certified Electric
Reliability Organization. The
Commission finds that the proposed
Reliability Standard represents an
improvement over the currentlyeffective standard, MOD–028–1 because
the proposed Reliability Standard
clarifies the timing and frequency of
Total Transfer Capability calculations
needed for Available Transfer Capability
calculations. The Commission also
approves NERC’s proposed
implementation plan and retirement of
the currently-effective standard.
DATES: This rule is effective September
27, 2013.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Rachel Bryant (Legal Information),
Office of General Counsel, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426, (202) 502–6155,
rachel.bryant@ferc.gov.
Syed Ahmad (Technical Information),
Office of Electric Reliability, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426, (202) 502–8718,
syed.ahmad@ferc.gov.
Christopher Young (Technical
Information), Office of Energy of
Energy Policy and Innovation, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC
20426, (202) 502–6403,
christopher.young@ferc.gov.
SUMMARY:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
144 FERC ¶ 61,027
United States Of America
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Before Commissioners: Jon Wellinghoff,
Chairman; Philip D. Moeller, John R.
Norris, Cheryl A. LaFleur, and Tony Clark.
E:\FR\FM\29JYR1.SGM
29JYR1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 145 (Monday, July 29, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 45441-45447]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-18160]
========================================================================
Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published
under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents.
Prices of new books are listed in the first FEDERAL REGISTER issue of each
week.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 145 / Monday, July 29, 2013 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 45441]]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Commodity Credit Corporation
7 CFR Part 1435
RIN 0560-AH86
Sugar Program; Feedstock Flexibility Program for Bioenergy
Producers
AGENCY: Commodity Credit Corporation and Farm Service Agency, USDA.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This rule amends regulations that specify the methods that the
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) can use to dispose of its sugar
inventory and establishes the new Feedstock Flexibility Program (FFP).
Through FFP, the Secretary is required to purchase sugar and sell it to
produce bioenergy as a means to avoid forfeitures of sugar loan
collateral under the Sugar Program. The FFP regulations are required by
the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (the 2008 Farm Bill)
amendments to the Food Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (the
2002 Farm Bill), and as further amended by the American Taxpayer Relief
Act of 2012.
DATES: Effective date: July 29, 2013.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Barbara Fecso; telephone (202) 720-
4146. Persons with disabilities who require alternative means for
communications (Braille, large print, audio tape, etc.) should contact
the USDA Target Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice and TDD).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Under the Sugar Program, domestic sugar beet or sugarcane
processors may borrow from CCC, pledging their sugar production as
collateral for any such loan, and then satisfy their loans either by
repaying the loan on or before loan maturity or by transferring the
title for the collateral to CCC immediately following loan maturity,
also known as ``forfeiture'' of collateral (as specified in 7 CFR
1435.105). The Farm Service Agency (FSA) administers the Sugar Program
for CCC. The regulations for sugar loans in 7 CFR 1435 parts A and B
are not changing. CCC is required to operate the Sugar Program, to the
maximum extent practicable at no cost to the Federal government, by
avoiding forfeitures to CCC. If domestic sugar market conditions are
such that market rates are less than forfeiture level, current law
requires CCC to use FFP to purchase sugar and sell such sugar to
bioenergy producers to avoid forfeitures.
This final rule amends the Sugar Program regulations to implement
FFP and to establish appropriate methods for the disposition of sugar
inventory that CCC has acquired other than through FFP. CCC may acquire
sugar through forfeiture of CCC sugar loans or through sugar purchases
to reduce the cost of the Sugar Program under the cost reduction
options provided by section 1009 of the Food Security Act of 1985 (7
U.S.C. 1308a, Pub. L. 99-198). Implementation of FFP is required by the
amendment by section 9001 of the 2008 Farm Bill (Pub. L. 110-246) to
section 9010 of the 2002 Farm Bill (7 U.S.C. 8110, Pub. L. 107-171),
and as further amended by section 701(f)(9) of the American Taxpayer
Relief Act of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-240). Regulations implementing FFP are
in 7 CFR part 1435, ``Sugar Program,'' in new subpart G, ``Feedstock
Flexibility Program.'' Regulations implementing sugar disposition
methods are in 7 CFR part 1435 in new subpart E, ``Disposition of CCC
Inventory.''
FFP addresses sugar surpluses sooner than the current Sugar Program
by permanently removing such sugar from the market for human
consumption. The current Sugar Program removes surplus sugar from the
market near the end of the crop year as sugarcane and sugar beet
processors forfeit sugar loan collateral to CCC. The acquired inventory
can be stored for resale to the market upon improvement in market
prices. Under FFP, CCC may remove surplus sugar from the market earlier
in the year, as FFP requires CCC to avoid sugar loan forfeitures. FFP
also requires the surplus sugar to be used to produce bioenergy, which
precludes CCC's resale of inventory into the market for human
consumption.
Current law provides USDA authority for these programs through the
2013 sugar crop year (which runs from October 1, 2013 to September 30,
2014). Recent indications in the sugar market suggest that forfeitures
may occur in crop year 2012. However, if sugar prices remain below the
forfeiture level, CCC may be required to use FFP to purchase sugar
before August 1, 2013, the first date that 2012-crop loans can be
forfeited to CCC. The last year in which sugar loan forfeitures
occurred was 2005. The methods specified in this rule for both
purchases under FFP and disposition of CCC sugar inventory are not
expected to be used in most years.
CCC published a proposed rule in the Federal Register on October
19, 2011 (76 FR 64839-64844), with respect to the 2008 amendments that
would establish FFP and restrict CCC sugar inventory disposition
outlets to non-food use under non-emergency shortage conditions. CCC
received six comments on the proposed rule. The comments and responses
are discussed later in this document. As explained below, no major
changes are being made in response to comments, because CCC has
determined, based on the evenly balanced opposing and supporting
comments for specific changes, that the proposed rule equitably
balances the conflicting interests of sugar producers and sugar users.
CCC has made other changes from the proposed rule in this final rule
clarifying the types of sugar eligible for FFP and eliminating the
eligibility requirement that the eligible bioenergy producers' facility
be located in the United States.
Sugar Program Background
Administration of the current Sugar Program requires CCC to balance
domestic supply with demand so that U.S. sugar prices are no less than
levels specified in the 2008 Farm Bill and to maintain an adequate
domestic sugar supply. This rule does not change CCC's management of
sugar loans, sugar marketing allotments, or import tariff-rate quotas
(TRQs). Specifically, this rule introduces purchases and sales of sugar
for bioenergy production under FFP as a proactive means for CCC to
avoid forfeitures. FFP is expected to be unnecessary in most years, as
USDA's long term projections indicate a generally strong domestic sugar
market in the future.
[[Page 45442]]
Sugar Inventory Disposition
This rule adds a new subpart E, ``General Disposition of CCC
Inventory,'' to 7 CFR part 1435 to implement the 2008 Farm Bill
requirements and the 2012 amendments to the 2002 Farm Bill. Subpart E
applies to sugar in inventory that CCC owns, such as sugar obtained
from forfeited loan collateral. CCC does not expect to regularly use
these methods, as it is legislatively required to operate FFP to avoid
forfeitures.
As specified in Subpart E, CCC will dispose of sugar held in CCC
inventory in ways that do not increase the domestic supply of sugar for
human consumption, except in conditions of emergency sugar shortages.
CCC may, under non-emergency conditions, dispose of sugar held in
inventory through sales under FFP (new subpart G), through the
Processor Sugar Payment-in-Kind (PIK) Program (7 CFR part 1435 subpart
F, which is not changing), through buybacks of Certificates of Quota
Eligibility (CQEs), which are issued under 15 CFR part 2011 to TRQ
holding countries and authorize sugar to enter the United States under
the TRQs, or through other applicable CCC disposition authority in such
a way as not to increase the domestic supply of sugar for human
consumption. Under the PIK disposal option, CCC would swap sugar
inventory for retired sugarcane or sugar beet acreage. CCC disposed of
473,000 tons of sugar inventory under a similar PIK Program in fiscal
year (FY) 2001 and FY 2002. Under the CQE option, CCC would allow
traders to swap CQEs for sugar inventory. CCC disposed of 116,000 tons
of sugar inventory under CQE swaps in FY 2002 and FY 2003. Both methods
reduce sugar in the domestic supply for human consumption. The
announcements of the use of such methods to dispose of sugar held in
inventory will be placed on the FSA Commodity Operations Web site at
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=home&subject=coop&topic=landing.
If there is an emergency shortage of sugar for human consumption in
the domestic market, the Secretary may use applicable CCC authority to
dispose of sugar inventory, including sales for human consumption.
As amended by the 2008 Farm Bill, section 9010 of the 2002 Farm
Bill specifies that an emergency shortage of sugar for human
consumption in the United States market is one ``caused by a war,
flood, hurricane, other natural disaster, or other similar event.'' CCC
did not propose to define ``emergency shortage'' in the proposed rule,
and noted that the ``similar event'' clause provides flexibility to
respond to shortages caused by manmade events. In the background
section of the proposed rule, CCC requested comments on whether CCC
should define ``emergency shortage'' in the rule, either by listing the
specific types of events that cause a shortage or by specifying a
formula based on price or stock levels that constitute a shortage. As
discussed in more detail later in this document, the comments received
were not in agreement on whether there should be a specific definition
or what that definition should be. Therefore, CCC has retained the
language of section 9010 in the final rule that specifies the causes of
an emergency shortage, but has not adopted a specific formula for what
constitutes a shortage. CCC therefore retains flexibility to make a
determination whether particular circumstances constitute an ``other
similar event'' that has caused an emergency shortage, and whether a
particular price or stock level constitutes a shortage. There were no
comments received on any other sugar disposition provisions specified
in the proposed rule. Consequently, CCC did not make any substantive
changes to those provisions.
Subpart G--Feedstock Flexibility Program
New subpart G specifies how CCC will operate FFP. Through FFP, CCC
will buy sugar as needed to avoid forfeitures of sugar loan collateral
and sell that sugar to bioenergy producers. Bioenergy, as defined in
section 9001 of the 2008 Farm Bill, amending section 9010 of the 2002
Farm Bill, means fuel grade ethanol and other biofuel.
As amended by the 2008 Farm Bill, section 9010 of the 2002 Farm
Bill requires the Secretary to estimate, by September 1 of each year,
the likelihood of sugar forfeitures for the following crop year, and
announce the quantity of sugar to be made available for purchase and
sale for bioenergy production. In addition, CCC will make quarterly
announcements of revised estimates of such quantity. CCC's purchase and
sale plans will be affected by the large degree of uncertainty in
USDA's sugar market projections made early in the year. As specified in
this rule, CCC will update the estimated quantity of sugar to be made
available for purchase and sale under FFP not later than January 1,
April 1, and July 1 of each year. Any FFP purchases expected in
calendar year 2013 for the 2012 crop will be announced in the quarterly
updates in FY 2013.
The 2008 Farm Bill amendments specify that the only commodities
eligible to be made available for purchase under FFP are ``raw or
refined, or in-process sugar'' that would otherwise have been marketed
for human consumption in the United States or could otherwise have been
used for the extraction of sugar marketed for human consumption.
Applicable law requires that the entity selling sugar to CCC be
located in the United States. The 2008 Farm Bill amendments do not
require that the sugar buyer's bioenergy facilities be located in the
United States. CCC nevertheless initially proposed to limit eligible
buyers to those bioenergy producers who would use the purchased sugar
to produce bioenergy in their facilities in the United States. This
restriction was initially proposed to benefit the American taxpayer,
who is paying for FFP, and CCC indeed received one (favorable) comment
related to such proposed restriction. However, section 9010 of the 2002
Farm Bill, as amended, expressly provides that the sale of sugar to
bioenergy producers must be conducted in a manner that ensures the
Sugar Program is operated at no cost to the Federal Government by
avoiding forfeitures to CCC. To restrict eligible buyers to those
bioenergy producers whose production facilities are located in the
United States may restrict the pool of sugar buyers, potentially
increasing the cost to the Federal Government and the likelihood of
forfeitures to CCC. Such a result would be contrary to the interests of
the American taxpayer. Consequently, the final rule does not adopt this
restriction. Ultimately, CCC estimates that few if any prospective
buyers would seek to use the sugar to produce bioenergy at facilities
outside the United States, as it is not expected to be cost-effective
to transport over longer distances sugar that must be used for
bioenergy production.
Any biofuel producer that wishes to participate in the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)
program must comply with EPA regulations, in 40 CFR part 80; however,
participation in RFS is not a requirement for participation in FFP.
Assuming all of the applicable RFS requirements are met, EPA has
confirmed that ethanol produced from U.S. sugarcane would qualify for
an advanced fuel RIN, and that ethanol produced from U.S. sugar
produced from U.S. sugar beets would qualify for a conventional RIN,
subject to certain grandfathering provisions.
CCC will invite sugar producers to sell sugar for FFP and shortly
thereafter
[[Page 45443]]
invite bioenergy producers to bid on purchasing sugar for bioenergy
production. The terms and conditions of the sugar purchase and sale
contracts will be outlined in the dual invitations. The invitations
will be placed on the FSA Commodity Operations Web site at https://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=home&subject=coop&topic=landing.
Alternatively, CCC may negotiate contracts directly with sellers or
buyers, if CCC determines that such negotiation, compared to other
means, either will reduce the likelihood of forfeited sugar or reduce
costs of removing sugar from the market. CCC may employ several
contracting strategies to discover the most cost-effective strategy to
manage FFP.
The 2008 Farm Bill amendments require that purchasers of sugar
under FFP take possession within 30 days after the date of purchase
from CCC. CCC will therefore attempt, when possible, to identify a
bioenergy producer (sugar buyer) before CCC purchases sugar, and
require the buyer to take possession of the sugar within 30 days of
purchase. Since the law prohibits CCC, to the maximum extent possible,
from paying storage fees for FFP sugar, CCC will structure the FFP
contracts so that CCC does not pay any storage fees. Specific terms and
conditions will be outlined in the invitations to sell and buy sugar
for the FFP. For instance, potential sugar buyers will have the
opportunity to discuss and arrange storage and load out terms with the
sugar seller prior to placing bids. As specified in subpart E, sugar
acquired by CCC through methods other than FFP, such as sugar loan
forfeitures, may also be sold for bioenergy production through FFP.
Since the value of sugar required to be sold for bioenergy
production will likely be less than the market price for sugar used for
human consumption, there is an incentive for FFP sugar sold to
bioenergy producers to leak into the domestic human consumption market.
Therefore, CCC will require proof from each FFP bioenergy producer that
the sugar is used in the bioenergy facility for the production of
bioenergy. Bioenergy producers, at minimum, will be required to permit
CCC access to the bioenergy facility to verify compliance; however, CCC
may also require a performance bond or a similar instrument to assure
that the purchased sugar is used to produce bioenergy. Specific terms
and conditions of any such bond or instrument will be specified in the
invitations to sell and buy sugar for the FFP.
As noted above, CCC is not specifying the precise contracting
method or language in the rule in order to maintain maximum flexibility
in achieving program goals in the most cost effective way.
Discussion of Comments
The comments CCC received in response to the proposed rule were
from a representative of all sugar producers, a representative of sugar
beet processors, a representative of companies that use sugar and
sweeteners to manufacture foods and beverages, and three members of the
general public. Half of the comments offered specific suggestions to
amend the provisions in the proposed rule; the rest generally opposed
or supported the Sugar Program. There was not a consensus on any of the
suggested changes. There was general support for many of the provisions
in the proposed rule, including how eligible forms of sugar for FFP are
defined and CCC's proposed flexible approach to how purchases will be
made if needed. Two commenters recommended terminating the Sugar
Program, which CCC does not have authority to do; another comment
generally supported FFP. The other comments offered specific
suggestions to amend the rule or provided specific suggestions on how
the rule should be implemented. The following provides a summary of the
issues in the comments and CCC's responses, including changes being
made to the final rule in response to the comments.
Disposition of Sugar Inventory
Comment: CCC should leave ``emergency shortage'' undefined. Leaving
the term undefined would give CCC the flexibility needed to operate the
program successfully and that linking the term to a price formula is
not authorized by the 2008 Farm Bill amendments. Defining the term in
this inventory disposal regulation might automatically, and
inappropriately, lead to the same definition being applied to the
administration of the TRQs as required by 7 U.S.C. 1359kk.
Response: The 2008 Farm Bill amendments specify some of the
potential causes of an emergency shortage, but do not define an
emergency shortage in terms of either price or a supply disruption.
Based on a lack of consensus of commenters, this rule does not define
the term. (See below, other commenters suggested that this term be
defined.) CCC also wishes to maintain flexibility to determine whether
particular events and their consequences give rise to an emergency
shortage of sugar for human consumption in the United States market.
Comment: CCC should define the term ``emergency shortage'' because
market participants deserve to have a clear picture of CCC's thinking
on this issue. Emergency shortage should be defined the same way it is
used when CCC decides to increase the sugar TRQ. The definition should
define an emergency shortage in terms of the effects, not the cause
(for example, supply disruptions and price spikes). A specific
percentage price increase above the loan forfeiture would be a useful
way to measure what price constitutes an emergency shortage. Also, CCC
should consider declarations of force majeure, plant closures,
slowdowns, and temporary shutdowns in production lines as emergencies.
CCC should consider establishing a benchmark of ``adequate supplies at
reasonable prices,'' as already specified in the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States, to determine if a shortage exists.
Response: The 2008 Farm Bill amendments specify some of the causes
that can give rise to an emergency shortage, but do not define what
constitutes a shortage in terms of its effects. Other commenters
suggested that this term be left undefined. Based on a lack of
consensus of commenters, this rule does not define the term. CCC will
use discretion to determine when an emergency shortage exists, and not
define a specific formula or price level in the rule. The 2008 Farm
Bill amendments require a triggering event before CCC can declare an
``emergency shortage.'' From past experience with sugar shortages
caused by disasters, CCC recognizes that it must be flexible to
mitigate the unforeseen consequences of disastrous events. However, CCC
would consider food manufacturing plant closures and similar events as
events that could give rise to an emergency shortage.
Comment: CCC should not limit eligible causes of emergency
shortages to only the natural causes specifically mentioned in the 2008
Farm Bill amendments, since the amendments also include references to
``other natural disaster, or other similar event.'' However, the 2008
Farm Bill amendments are clear that the triggering event must be
``similar''--it does not give CCC complete discretion to consider any
event or market condition as the cause of an emergency shortage. The
courts have repeatedly upheld the principle of ejusdem generis--that
where general words follow specific ones, the general words must be
construed to include only objects similar to those specified. The final
rule should use the 2008 Farm Bill
[[Page 45444]]
amendments language, but in implementation, it must be clear that mere
high prices or low ending stocks do not constitute a similar event to
war or hurricane. An eligible manmade event causing a shortage of sugar
must be similar to a war, that is, an extreme event that results in
massive loss of life, property destruction, or a severe disruption of
international trade--not merely low ending stocks or high prices.
Similarly, an ``other natural disaster'' cause of sugar shortage must
be on the order of a flood or hurricane that causes death and
destruction, and not a more localized event such as a tornado or hail
storm.
Response: CCC has decided not to define the ``emergency shortage''
or its causes in the regulation as there was no consensus among
commenters. CCC also wishes to maintain flexibility to determine
whether particular events and their consequences give rise to an
emergency shortage of sugar for human consumption in the United States
market. The final rule uses the specific language from the 2008 Farm
Bill amendments to specify what constitutes a cause of an emergency
shortage.
Feedstock Flexibility Program
In the proposed rule, CCC requested comment on how CCC should
calculate a sugar market surplus, particularly for the required
September 1 estimate, when uncertainties are greatest. CCC also
requested comments on appropriate methods to estimate the likelihood of
forfeitures and to determine the quantity of sugar to be purchased in
each quarter. In comments on the proposed rule, both sugar producers
and sugar users supported estimating a surplus based on comparing
stocks to stock levels that have resulted in forfeitures in the past.
Sugar producers supported a generally flexible approach with no
specific numerical trigger for implementing FFP, while sugar users
supported an unspecified numerical threshold above the stock level that
triggered forfeitures in the past. In the absence of a consensus on a
specific formula for determining that forfeitures are likely, CCC
retained the flexible language from the proposed rule that does not
specify a formula CCC will use to determine the quantity of sugar
likely to be forfeited.
In the proposed rule, CCC asked for comments on whether the
regulations should specify one particular method of contracting for FFP
purchases. There was a consensus that FFP should have the flexibility
to determine the most appropriate approach if and when the program is
needed.
Comment: The option provided in the proposed rule that CCC declare
a sugar market surplus to be any stocks level appearing in USDA's World
Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) report that are over
and above the stock level expected to result in forfeitures should be
used.
Response: The WASDE stock levels will certainly be considered in
analyzing whether a surplus exists. In the absence of a consensus on
any specific formula as to what level represents an expectation of
forfeitures, CCC has not specified a formula for what constitutes a
surplus in this rule.
Comment: The level of stocks that produced forfeitures in the past
may not lead to forfeitures in the future. Stocks can be, and have
been, somewhat higher than the traditional ideal level of 14.5 percent,
or even 15.5 percent, without leading to forfeitures. Use some
projected stock level above the level that has triggered forfeitures in
the past to predict surpluses.
Response: In the absence of a consensus on any specific formula as
to what level represents an expectation of forfeitures, CCC has not
specified what constitutes a surplus in this rule.
Comment: CCC should not use any numerical stipulation to specify
the likelihood of forfeitures or for determining quantities to
purchase.
Response: There is no formula specified in the rule for what
constitutes a surplus. CCC will use objective criteria based on market
data to justify its determination of forfeiture risk and quantities to
purchase.
Comment: We support CCC's FFP sugar purchase strategy of staggering
CCC purchases for biofuel as the market unfolds, rather than one single
purchase.
Response: CCC is required by applicable law to estimate the
quantity to be made available for purchase and sale under FFP
quarterly, but will take a conservative approach early in the year, as
discussed in the background section of the proposed rule.
Comment: CCC should wait until the end of the FY, when forfeitures
could occur, to make any purchases for FFP.
Response: CCC will make quarterly estimates of the quantity of
eligible sugar that will be made available for purchase and sale under
the FFP, and announce by press release the quantity, if any, and timing
of availability of FFP purchases and sales. If the projected surplus is
large, CCC will need to make purchases before the end of the FY to
achieve the goal of avoiding sugar loan forfeitures. CCC's purchases
will be more conservative earlier in the year than later, due to the
greater level of uncertainty early in the year. CCC cannot wait to make
FFP purchases only when forfeitures would occur, for example, in August
for FY 2013, because a principal goal of FFP is to prevent forfeitures.
Comment: We support CCC's proposal that to be eligible for FFP,
sugar must be processed and located in the United States from
domestically-grown sugarcane and sugar beets. Also, only biofuel
facilities within the U.S. should be eligible to purchase sugar.
Response: CCC clarifies the language in 7 CFR part 1435, subpart G
that to be eligible for FPP, the sugar seller must be located in the
United States. As specified in this rule, eligible sugar for FFP
purchase must have been processed in the United States from
domestically-grown sugarcane and sugar beets. However, eligible buyers
are not required to use the purchased FFP sugar in U.S. facilities.
Section 9010 of the 2002 Farm Bill, as amended, expressly provides that
the sale of sugar to bioenergy producers must be conducted in a manner
that ensures the Sugar Program is operated at no cost to the Federal
Government by avoiding forfeitures to CCC. To restrict eligible buyers
to those bioenergy producers whose production facilities are located in
the United States may restrict the pool of sugar buyers, potentially
increasing the cost to the Federal Government and the likelihood of
forfeitures to CCC. Consequently, the final rule does not adopt this
restriction.
Comment: CCC needs to take a flexible approach to contracting to
arrive at the most cost-efficient way to manage FFP. We support the
approach in the proposed rule that FFP tender offers will include both
a seller and buyer of sugar for bioenergy production to minimize FFP
costs. We also support the strategy of pre-qualifying bioenergy
producers willing to buy FFP sugar.
Response: CCC will generally employ competitive procedures to
minimize CCC costs. Since commenters supported a flexible approach, CCC
will not specify a specific purchase method in the rule.
Comment: CCC should evaluate offers in light of the forfeiture
equivalent price so that sellers do not earn substantially more for
selling surplus sugar to FFP than they would by forfeiting sugar to
CCC. CCC must structure the contracting procedure to minimize the
chance for FFP sugar sellers to receive more than they would if they
forfeited sugar under loan.
Response: CCC has the authority to limit bid acceptance; no
modification of the rule is necessary to address this comment. The
terms of CCC's sugar purchase compared to the terms of forfeiture will
determine if CCC can
[[Page 45445]]
expect to pay more or less under FFP than the forfeiture proceeds. In
2000, a year in which forfeitures previously occurred, CCC limited
acceptable offers to less than the forfeiture proceeds, resulting in
CCC paying less, and in some cases substantially less, for sugar
purchased by processors than the proceeds later retained from
forfeiture. However, the storage cost restriction and other FFP
requirements may affect CCC's terms of purchase and CCC's determination
of an acceptable offer.
Comment: CCC should include an audit clause in the contract to
purchase sugar for bioenergy production to avoid fraud and misuse and
to ensure the sugar does not enter the human consumption chain.
Response: As specified in this rule, each bioenergy producer that
purchases sugar through FFP must provide proof to CCC that the sugar is
used by such producer for the production of bioenergy.
Comment: The rule language is not consistent. The language in the
example specified in Sec. 1435.602(e), ``Eligible commodity to be
purchased by CCC,'' is inconsistent with the proposed rule text in the
rest of that paragraph. The example indicates that CCC would only
consider a percentage of the refined sugar expected to be made from a
sugar bearing product, when the other language in the same paragraph
stated that all of the expected sugar to be made from the product would
be considered in evaluating a bid.
Response: CCC has corrected the language so that the example is
consistent with the rest of the regulatory text in that section.
Summary of Changes
In summary, as discussed above, CCC is making minor changes to the
regulatory text in response to comments, including a correction and
several clarifications. Sugar buyers and sugar producers had opposing
comments on both sugar disposition and FFP, with buyers generally
wanting CCC to take actions that would keep prices as low as possible,
and sellers wanting CCC to take actions to support prices as high as
possible. Given these irreconcilable opposing interests and lack of
consensus on approach, CCC has made no substantive changes in response
to comments, because the evenly balanced comments reflect that the
proposed rule, to the extent possible within the requirements of
applicable law, balances the different stakeholder interests.
CCC has made other changes from the proposed rule, not in response
to comments, to clarify its evaluation of the types of sugar eligible
for FFP and the location of eligible bioenergy producers. CCC has also
determined that it should not limit eligible bioenergy producers to
those with production facilities in the United States. Such a
limitation was determined to unnecessarily limit competition for CCC
sugar and may increase program costs.
Effective Date
The Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553) provides generally
that before rules are issued by Government agencies, the rule must be
published in the Federal Register, and the required publication of a
substantive rule is to be not less than 30 days before its effective
date. One of the exceptions is when the agency finds good cause for not
delaying the effective date. CCC finds that there is good cause for
making this rule effective less than 30 days after publication in the
Federal Register because this rule allows CCC to prevent sugar in the
U.S. market from being forfeited to CCC. The margin between the raw
sugar market price and the raw sugar price level encouraging forfeiture
fell in 2012 from 13.8 to 1.6 cents per pound. Therefore, to avoid
possible forfeitures for crop year 2012, this final rule is effective
when published in the Federal Register.
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review,'' and
Executive Order 13563, ``Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,''
direct agencies to assess all costs and benefits of available
regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is necessary, to select
regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential
economic, environmental, public health and safety effects, distributive
impacts, and equity). Executive Order 13563 emphasized the importance
of quantifying both costs and benefits, of reducing costs, of
harmonizing rules, and of promoting flexibility.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) designated this rule as
significant under Executive Order 12866 and, therefore, OMB reviewed
this rule. A summary of the cost-benefit analysis of this rule is
provided below and is available at https://www.regulations.gov and from
the contact listed above.
Summary of Costs and Benefits
Predicting conditions months into the future is a process that
involves inevitable uncertainty, with variables subject to change.
Current baseline projections developed by USDA indicate that FFP
authorities may be necessary only once during the 10-year baseline
period. The analysis estimated a 76.9 percent chance of FFP being
activated in FY 2013.
FSA assumes that 300,000 tons of CCC sugar loan collateral will be
forfeited in FY 2013 if FFP is not implemented. FFP is expected to cost
CCC an estimated $54.5 million more than using the least-cost surplus
management option. The total cost associated with FFP is $92.3 million
(300,000 tons x 2,000 lbs x 15.38 cents per lb = $92.3 million).
Despite this cost, FFP has at least one benefit that is not available
with other sugar supply reduction methods. Specifically, FFP will allow
the generation of Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs), which will
help gasoline and diesel blenders meet their Renewable Fuels Standard
(RFS) mandates in 2014.
The current baseline projections indicate that there are no sugar
loan forfeitures or CCC purchases of sugar for ethanol expected from FY
2014-2023, because projected raw cane and refined beet sugar prices are
above the minimum prices that would result in forfeitures. More
specifically, FFP is projected to be unneeded after FY 2013 because the
domestic market is no longer projected to be in surplus, and the world
market is projected to affect domestic prices above rate levels
specified in the 2008 Farm Bill.
Expected growth in U.S. beet and cane sugar production over the
next decade is projected to be very modest--less than 5 percent over
the projections period. Sugar use is projected to grow about 0.7
percent a year, or 7 percent over the decade. Mexican imports are
expected to average 12.8 percent of U.S. domestic sugar use. TRQ sugar
imports from U.S. commitments made to member states of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and under existing trade agreements are expected to
average 1.444 million short tons, raw value (STRV) annually. World raw
sugar prices (Intercontinental Exchange No. 11, nearby futures)
forecasts by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) are used in the analysis, which average 21.58 cents per pound
through the projection period, which is above the U.S. Sugar Program's
support rate of 20.9 cents per pound.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601,
FSA has determined that there will not be a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities. The entities that would be
affected by this rule are sugar producers and sugar
[[Page 45446]]
bioenergy producers. The sugar producers are not small businesses
according to the North American Industry Classification System and the
U.S. Small Business Administration. There are currently no commercial
bioenergy producers in the United States who use sugar solely as a
feedstock, although sugar may be blended with other feedstocks
currently used in the manufacture of bioenergy. The bioenergy producers
in the United States who use other commodities as a feedstock and that
might be expected to purchase sugar as a feedstock are not small
businesses.
Environmental Review
The environmental impacts of this rule have been considered in a
manner consistent with the provisions of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347), the regulations of the Council
on Environmental Quality (40 CFR parts 1500-1508), and FSA regulations
for compliance with NEPA (7 CFR part 799). The changes to the Sugar
Program required by Title IX of the 2008 Farm Bill identified in this
rule are considered non-discretionary. Therefore, CCC has determined
that NEPA does not apply to this rule and no environmental assessment
or environmental impact statement will be prepared.
Executive Order 12372
This program is not subject to Executive Order 12372,
``Intergovernmental Review of Federal Programs,'' which requires
consultation with State and local officials. See the notice related to
7 CFR part 3015, subpart V, published in the Federal Register on June
24, 1983 (48 FR 29115).
Executive Order 12988
This rule has been reviewed under Executive Order 12988, ``Civil
Justice Reform.'' This rule would not preempt State and or local laws,
and regulations, or policies unless they present an irreconcilable
conflict with this rule. The rule will not have retroactive effect.
Before any judicial action may be brought regarding the provisions of
this rule, the administrative appeal provisions of 7 CFR parts 11 and
780 must be exhausted.
Executive Order 13132
This rule has been reviewed under Executive Order 13132,
``Federalism.'' The policies contained in this rule will not have any
substantial direct effect on States, the relationship between the
Federal government and the States, or the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Nor would this
rule impose substantial direct compliance costs on State and local
governments. Therefore, consultation with the States is not required.
Executive Order 13175
This rule has been reviewed for compliance with Executive Order
13175, ``Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal
Governments.'' The policies in this rule do not have Tribal
implications that preempt Tribal law.
Unfunded Mandates
Title II of the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA, Pub. L.
104-4) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their
regulatory actions on State, local, or Tribal governments or the
private sector. Agencies generally must prepare a written statement,
including a cost benefit analysis, for proposed and final rules with
Federal mandates that may result in expenditures of $100 million or
more in any 1 year for State, local, or Tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or to the private sector. UMRA generally requires agencies
to consider alternatives and adopt the more cost effective or least
burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule. This
rule contains no Federal mandates under the regulatory provisions of
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 for State, local,
and Tribal government or the private sector. Therefore, this rule is
not subject to the requirements of sections 202 and 205 of UMRA.
Paperwork Reduction Act
We anticipate that in the next 3 years fewer than 10 sugar
producers will participate in FFP by selling their sugar to CCC. In
addition, FSA estimates that in each of the next 3 years, fewer than 10
bioenergy producers will participate in FFP by buying sugar from CCC.
Each of these will use a different form to collect different types of
information. Therefore, the Paperwork Reduction Act exemption specified
in 5 CFR 1320.3(c) applies because fewer than 10 sugar producers or 10
bioenergy producers are expected to need to complete the respective
forms for selling or buying sugar for FFP.
E-Government Act Compliance
CCC is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, to promote
the use of the Internet and other information technologies to provide
increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information
and services, and for other purposes.
List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 1435
Loan programs-agriculture, Penalties, Price support programs,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Sugar.
For the reasons discussed above, CCC amends 7 CFR part 1435 as
follows:
PART 1435--SUGAR PROGRAM
0
1. Revise the authority citation for part 1435 to read as follows:
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1359aa-1359jj, 7272, and 8110; 15 U.S.C.
714b and 714c.
0
2. Add subpart E to read as follows:
Subpart E--Disposition of CCC Inventory
Sec.
1435.400 General statement.
1435.401 CCC sugar inventory disposition.
Subpart E--Disposition of CCC Inventory
Sec. 1435.400 General statement.
This subpart will be applicable in the event that raw, refined, or
in-process sugar is owned and held in CCC inventory (accumulated under
the program authorized by section 156 of the Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform Act, as amended) as specified in subpart B of
this part.
Sec. 1435.401 CCC sugar inventory disposition.
(a) CCC will dispose of inventory in the following manner, if CCC
has not determined there is an emergency shortage of sugar for human
consumption in the domestic market:
(1) By sale to bioenergy producers under the Feedstock Flexibility
Program as specified in subpart G of this part,
(2) By transfer to sugarcane and sugar beet processors under the
Processor Sugar Payment-In-Kind Program as specified in subpart F of
this part,
(3) By the buyback of certificates of quota eligibility (CQEs), or
(4) By the use of any other authority for the disposition of CCC-
owned sugar for nonfood use or otherwise in a manner that does not
increase the net quantity of sugar available for human consumption in
the United States.
(b) CCC may use any of its authority for the disposition of CCC-
owned sugar, if CCC has determined there is an emergency shortage of
sugar for human consumption in the domestic market caused by war,
flood, hurricane, or other natural disaster, or similar event, as
determined by CCC.
0
3. Add subpart G to read as follows:
Subpart G--Feedstock Flexibility Program
Sec.
1435.600 General statement.
1435.601 Sugar surplus determination and public announcement.
[[Page 45447]]
1435.602 Eligible sugar to be purchased by CCC.
1435.603 Eligible sugar seller.
1435.604 Eligible sugar buyer.
1435.605 Competitive procedures.
1435.606 Miscellaneous.
1435.607 Appeals.
Subpart G--Feedstock Flexibility Program
Sec. 1435.600 General statement.
(a) The provisions of this subpart will be applied when CCC
determines that buying sugar is necessary to avoid forfeitures of sugar
pledged as collateral for CCC sugar loans.
(b) This subpart will be applicable to:
(1) Any sugar seller who contracts with CCC to sell sugar, and
(2) Any bioenergy producer who contracts with CCC to purchase sugar
for the production of bioenergy.
Sec. 1435.601 Sugar surplus determination and public announcement.
(a) CCC will estimate by September 1 the quantity of sugar that
will be made available for purchase and sale under FFP for the
following crop year.
(b) Not later than January 1, April 1, and July 1 of the fiscal
year, CCC will re-estimate the quantity of sugar that will be made
available for purchase and sale under the FFP for the crop year.
(c) CCC will announce by press release the estimates in paragraphs
(a) and (b) of this section, which will reflect CCC's forecast of sugar
likely to be forfeited to CCC and any uncertainty surrounding that
forecast.
Sec. 1435.602 Eligible sugar to be purchased by CCC.
(a) CCC will only purchase raw sugar, refined sugar, or in-process
sugar for FFP that is eligible to be used as collateral under the CCC
Sugar Loan Program, as specified in Sec. 1435.102.
(b) Raw sugar, refined sugar, or in-process sugar purchased
directly from any domestic sugar beet or sugarcane processor that made
the raw sugar, refined sugar, or in-process sugar will be credited
against the processor's sugar marketing allocation. (The definition for
``marketing'' in Sec. 1435.2 applies to this subpart.)
(c) CCC will only purchase sugar located in the United States.
(d) CCC will evaluate an offer to sell sugar to CCC based upon
CCC's estimate of the reduction in refined sugar supply available for
human consumption due to the purchase. For example, if processing thick
juice (an in-process sugar) would yield 70 percent sugar for human
consumption, then CCC will only consider 70 percent of the volume of
the thick juice in evaluating the per unit sales price.
(e) CCC will only purchase the sugar if such purchase would reduce
the likelihood of forfeitures of CCC sugar loans, as determined by CCC.
Sec. 1435.603 Eligible sugar seller.
(a) To be considered an eligible sugar seller, the sugar seller
must be located in the United States.
(b) [Reserved]
Sec. 1435.604 Eligible sugar buyer.
(a) To be considered an eligible sugar buyer, the bioenergy
producer must produce bioenergy products, including fuel grade ethanol
or other biofuels.
(b) [Reserved]
Sec. 1435.605 Competitive procedures.
(a) CCC will generally issue tenders for bids, before entering into
contracts with any eligible sugar seller or buyer, with the intent of
selecting the bid(s) that represents the least cost to CCC of removing
sugar from the market.
(b) CCC may, at times, negotiate contracts directly with sellers or
buyers, if CCC determines that such negotiation will result in either
reduced likelihood of forfeited sugar under the CCC sugar loan program
or reduced costs of removing sugar from the market, which will reduce
the likelihood of forfeitures of sugar to CCC.
Sec. 1435.606 Miscellaneous.
(a) As a sugar buyer, a bioenergy producer must take possession of
the sugar no more than 30 days from the date of CCC's purchase.
(b) CCC, to the maximum extent practicable, will not pay storage
fees for the sugar purchased under this program. A bioenergy producer
must assume any storage costs accrued from date of contract to date of
taking possession of the sugar.
(c) Each bioenergy producer that purchases sugar through FFP must
provide proof as specified by CCC that the sugar has been used in the
bioenergy factory for the production of bioenergy and permit access for
USDA to verify compliance.
Sec. 1435.607 Appeals.
(a) The administrative appeal regulations of parts 11 and 780 of
this title apply to this part.
(b) [Reserved]
Signed on July 24, 2013.
Juan M. Garcia,
Administrator, Farm Service Agency, and Executive Vice President,
Commodity Credit Corporation.
[FR Doc. 2013-18160 Filed 7-26-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410-05-P