Sunshine Act Meeting, 41908-41911 [2013-16838]
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41908
Notices
Federal Register
Vol. 78, No. 134
Friday, July 12, 2013
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains documents other than rules or
proposed rules that are applicable to the
public. Notices of hearings and investigations,
committee meetings, agency decisions and
rulings, delegations of authority, filing of
petitions and applications and agency
statements of organization and functions are
examples of documents appearing in this
section.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service
[Docket No. APHIS–2012–0076]
Plants for Planting Whose Importation
Is Not Authorized Pending Pest Risk
Analysis; Notice of Availability of Data
Sheets for Taxa of Plants for Planting
That Are Quarantine Pests or Hosts of
Quarantine Pests
Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service, USDA.
ACTION: Notice of availability and
request for comments; reopening of
comment period.
AGENCY:
We are reopening the
comment period for a notice that made
available to the public data sheets
detailing the scientific evidence we
evaluated in making the determination
that certain taxa of plants for planting
are quarantine pests or hosts of
quarantine pests and, therefore, should
be added to our lists of plants for
planting whose importation is not
authorized pending pest risk analysis.
This action will allow interested
persons additional time to prepare and
submit comments.
DATES: The comment period for the
notice published May 6, 2013 (78 FR
26316) is reopened. We will consider all
comments that we receive on or before
August 12, 2013.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
by either of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=APHIS-2012-00760001.
• Postal Mail/Commercial Delivery:
Send your comment to Docket No.
APHIS–2012–0076, Regulatory Analysis
and Development, PPD, APHIS, Station
3A–03.8, 4700 River Road Unit 118,
Riverdale, MD 20737–1238.
Supporting documents and any
comments we receive on this docket
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SUMMARY:
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may be viewed at https://
www.regulations.gov/
#!docketDetail;D=APHIS-2012-0076 or
in our reading room, which is located in
room 1141 of the USDA South Building,
14th Street and Independence Avenue
SW., Washington, DC. Normal reading
room hours are 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except
holidays. To be sure someone is there to
help you, please call (202) 799–7039
before coming.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr.
Arnold Tschanz, Senior Regulatory
Policy Specialist, Plants for Planting
Policy, RPM, PPQ, APHIS, 4700 River
Road Unit 133, Riverdale, MD 20737–
1236; (301) 851–2179.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On May 6,
2013, we published in the Federal
Register (78 FR 26316–26317, Docket
No. APHIS–2012–0076) a notice that
made available to the public data sheets
detailing the scientific evidence we
evaluated in making the determination
that certain taxa of plants for planting
are quarantine pests or hosts of
quarantine pests and, therefore, should
be added to our lists of plants for
planting whose importation is not
authorized pending pest risk analysis.
Comments on the notice were
required to be received on or before July
5, 2013. We are reopening the comment
period on Docket No. APHIS–2012–
0076 for an additional 30 days. This
action will allow interested persons
additional time to prepare and submit
comments. We will also consider all
comments received between July 6,
2013 (the day after the close of the
original comment period) and the date
of this notice.
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 450 and 7701–7772
and 7781–7786; 21 U.S.C. 136 and 136a; 7
CFR 2.22, 2.80, and 371.3.
Done in Washington, DC, this 26th day of
June, 2013.
Kevin Shea,
Administrator, Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service.
[FR Doc. 2013–16722 Filed 7–11–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410–34–P
CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD
INVESTIGATION BOARD
Sunshine Act Meeting
TIME AND DATE:
July 25, 2013, 9:30 a.m.–
4:30 p.m. EDT.
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Ronald Reagan Building and
International Trade Center, Horizon
Room, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW.,
Washington, DC 20004.
STATUS: Open to the public.
MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: The
Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board (CSB) will convene
a public meeting on Thursday, July 25,
2013, starting at 9:30 a.m. EDT at the
Ronald Reagan Building and
International Trade Center, Horizon
Room, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW.,
Washington, DC 20004. Between 9:30
a.m. and 12:15 p.m., the Board will
consider and vote on the status
designations of the following three
recommendations issued by the CSB to
the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration: (1) 2001–05–I–DE–1
(revision of Process Safety Management
standard to clarify coverage of
atmospheric storage tanks connected to
process vessels); (2) 2005–04–I–TX–9
(revision of Process Safety Management
standard to require management of
change reviews for certain
organizational changes); and (3) 2010–
07–I–CT–1 (issuance of a general
industry and construction standards for
fuel gas safety).
Beginning at 1:30 p.m. EDT, the Board
will consider and vote on the status
designations of four recommendations
related to the issuance of a general
industry standard for combustible dusts
as follows (1) 2006–1–H–R1 (from
Combustible Dust Study); (2) 2008–5–I–
GA–R11 (from Imperial Sugar report);
(3) 2011–4–I–TN– and (4) 2011–4–I–
TN–R2 (from Hoeganaes case study),
and possibly other items at the
discretion of the Chair.
This notice is to provide information
to the public concerning the matters
related to the seven recommendations to
OSHA listed above, which will be
considered during the meeting. At the
meeting, the staff will present their
evaluations of the implementation of
these seven recommendations.
Following the staff presentations in the
morning and afternoon, the Board will
hear brief statements from OSHA,
interested stakeholders, and the public.
The Board will consider these analyses
and vote on the status to assign to each
recommendation according to Board
Order 22 [https://www.csb.gov/assets/
Record/BO_22.pdf.].
In addition, at this meeting, the CSB
will also consider the potential
PLACE:
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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 134 / Friday, July 12, 2013 / Notices
designation of a general industry
standard for combustible dust as a
‘‘Most Wanted Chemical Safety
Improvement’’ issue under Board Order
46 [https://www.csb.gov/assets/Record/
Order_046_(06122012).pdf].
The following section contains
summaries of the staff evaluations for
the recommendations that will be
presented to the Board for
consideration.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Recommendation to the U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration 2001–05–I–DE–1
Recommendation Text
Ensure coverage under the Process
Safety Management Standard (29 CFR
1910.119) of atmospheric storage tanks
that could be involved in a potential
catastrophic release as a result of being
interconnected to a covered process
with 10,000 pounds of a flammable
substance.
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Rationale for Recommendation
The recommendation followed a fatal
explosion involving a poorly
maintained and corroded atmospheric
aboveground tank containing spent
sulfuric acid and flammable
hydrocarbons at the Motiva Enterprises
refinery in Delaware City in July 2001.
The company considered the tank to be
exempt from the OSHA Process Safety
Management standard under the 1997
Meer decision. This decision was issued
by an administrative law judge of the
U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission. The decision,
exempts from PSM coverage,
‘‘flammable liquids stored in
atmospheric tanks or transferred which
are kept below their normal boiling
point without benefit of chilling or
refrigeration.’’ The CSB Motiva
investigation concluded that if Motiva
had adhered to a PSM standard
requirements for the tank, the accident
could have been avoided.
Summary of OSHA Response to the
Recommendation
OSHA does not agree that it is
necessary to revise the PSM standard in
order to clarify the issues of coverage of
tanks connected to processes. As an
alternative, OSHA reported to the CSB
in 2003 that it would issue a revised
PSM Compliance Directive that would
clarify to all its compliance officers and
to the regulated parties that tanks like
the one at Motiva (which OSHA
contended had a process function as
well as a storage function) were covered
under PSM. To date, however, OSHA
has not revised its compliance directive.
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An August 2012 communication from
the Assistant Secretary projected
completion of a revision in 6–9 months,
and the agency’s Spring 2013 regulatory
agenda indicates that it is considering
‘‘clarifying the PSM exception for
atmospheric storage tanks’’ as part of a
broader revision of its PSM standard, 29
CFR 1910.119.
Summary Evaluation
Because ten years have passed and
OSHA has yet to take any regulatory or
other actions which would address the
intent of the recommendation, CSB staff
propose that the Board vote to designate
Recommendation 2001–5–I–DE–R1 with
the status ‘‘Open-Unacceptable
Response.’’
Recommendation to the U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration 2005–04–I–TX–R9
Recommendation Text
Amend the OSHA PSM standard to
require that a management of change
(MOC) review be conducted for
organizational changes that may impact
process safety including:
(a) Major organizational changes such
as mergers, acquisitions, or
reorganizations;
(b) Personnel changes, including
changes in staffing levels or staff
experience; and
(c) Policy changes, such as budget
cutting.
Rationale for Recommendation
The CSB investigation of the 2005
explosions and fire at the former BP
refinery in Texas City, Texas revealed
that poorly managed corporate mergers,
leadership and organizational changes,
and budget cuts increased the risk of
catastrophic accidents at the site. The
CSB also noted that a 2002 survey
revealed that organizational change was
assessed in the Management of Change
(MOC) programs of only forty-four
percent (44%) of chemical processing
companies, strongly suggesting that
assessment of such organizational
factors are not widely used in the
industry. While OSHA’s Process Safety
Management (PSM) standard (29 CFR
1910.119) requires MOC analyses for
changes to ‘‘process chemicals,
technology, equipment, procedures;
and, changes to facilities that affect a
covered process,’’ the CSB concluded
that it does not explicitly require that
employers conduct MOC reviews for
organizational, personnel and policy
changes that could affect process safety.
Consequently, the CSB recommended
that OSHA amend the PSM standard to
clarify that MOC reviews must be
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41909
conducted for organizational, personnel,
and policy changes that may impact
process safety.
Summary of OSHA Response to the
Recommendation
OSHA responded that the PSM
standard already requires employers to
develop and implement MOC reviews to
determine the adequacy of all
contemplated changes with respect to
their safety and health impacts as they
relate to ‘‘process chemicals,
technology, equipment, procedures, and
facilities.’’ In OSHA’s view, these are
the types of changes encompassed by
the CSB recommendation. In addition,
OSHA sent a memorandum to all
Regional Administrators to clarify this
policy with regard to the coverage of
organizational changes under the PSM’s
management of change requirements.
The policy clarification was to be
provided to OSHA’s compliance
officers. OSHA’s Spring 2013 regulatory
agenda indicates that the agency is
considering expanding the scope of its
PSM standard to ‘‘require greater
organizational management of change
from employers.’’
Summary Evaluation
A policy memorandum to OSHA
Regional Administrators is not the
permanent regulatory change
envisioned by the Board, which sought
an explicit change in the requirements
of the standard through through
rulemaking procedures. For this reason,
staff propose that the Board vote to
designate Recommendation 2005–04–I–
TX–R9 with the status: ‘‘Open—
Unacceptable Response.’’
Urgent Recommendation to the U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration 2010–07–I–CT–UR1
Recommendation Text
Promulgate regulations that address
fuel gas safety for both construction and
general industry. At a minimum:
a. Prohibit the release of flammable gas to
the atmosphere for the purpose of cleaning
fuel gas piping.
b. Prohibit flammable gas venting or
purging indoors. Prohibit venting or purging
outdoors where fuel gas may form a
flammable atmosphere in the vicinity of
workers and/or ignition sources.
c. Prohibit any work activity in areas where
the concentration of flammable gas exceeds
a fixed low percentage of the lower explosive
limit (LEL) determined by appropriate
combustible gas monitoring.
d. Require that companies develop
flammable gas safety procedures and training
that involves contractors, workers, and their
representatives in decision-making.
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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 134 / Friday, July 12, 2013 / Notices
Rationale for Recommendation
The CSB investigated two natural gas
explosions (Kleen Energy Natural Gas
Explosion and ConAgra Natural Gas
Explosion and Ammonia Release) and
concluded that the fire and explosion
hazards of releasing flammable gas in
the presence of workers and ignition
sources can be largely or entirely
avoided through the use of currently
available inherently safer methods than
those currently in use in most
workplaces. These CSB reports focused
particularly on the hazards of gas
purging in industrial establishments and
‘‘gas blows’’ conducted during the
construction of gas-fired power plants;
reports of these investigations can be
found in the CSB Web page
(www.csb.gov). The CSB also found that
OSHA has three gas-specific standards
for flammable gases that are used far
less frequently in the workplace than
natural gas. These existing gas standards
apply to liquefied petroleum gases
(propane and butane, 1910.110),
hydrogen (1910.103) and acetylene
(1910.102). Yet the Agency has no
comprehensive fuel gas safety standard,
despite the fact that fuel gases pose
serious explosion and fire hazards and
are in much more widespread use in
OSHA-regulated workplaces.
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Summary of OSHA Response to the
Recommendation
OSHA’s initial response to the
recommendation described several
forceful enforcement actions affecting
the industry sector conducting ‘‘gas
blows’’ during the construction of
power plants—which the CSB
commended—but stated only that it
would ‘‘consider’’ a new fuel gas
standard during its next regulatory
review. In a subsequent notification,
however, OSHA reported that it did not
‘‘believe this is the appropriate time to
initiate the regulatory process.’’ Briefly
stated, OSHA indicated that ‘‘the most
prudent approach for OSHA is to
monitor the implementation’’ of two
recently revised NFPA standards and
‘‘evaluate their effectiveness at
controlling the targeted hazards, and
then determine if additional rulemaking
is necessary to protect workers.’’
Moreover, OSHA did not include fuel
gas rulemaking in the Agency’s most
recent regulatory agenda (Spring 2013),
indicating that it has no current
intention to begin rulemaking in this
arena.
Summary Evaluation
Per 42 U.S.C. 7412(6)(J), OSHA must
inform the CSB within 180 days
whether it will initiate rulemaking (and
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provide a timetable), or not initiate
rulemaking (and explain why). OSHA’s
latest response to the CSB
recommendation indicates that the
agency does not currently intend to
pursue rulemaking, and provides a
rationale for this decision.
CSB’s Board Order 22 obligates staff
to recommend an ‘‘Open- Unacceptable
Response’’ status for urgent
recommendations that ‘‘[have] not been
responded to in an acceptable manner
within 6 months and [are] not at a point
where completion is imminent.’’ In this
case, OSHA’s apparently indefinite
postponement of any regulatory action
on fuel gases is inconsistent with the
intent of the recommendation and staff
propose that the Board vote to change
the status of Recommendation 2010–07–
I–CT–UR1 to ‘‘Open-Unacceptable
Response.’’
Recommendations to the U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration Related to the
Prevention of Combustible Dust Fires
and Explosions
Recommendation Text
Recommendation 2006–1–H–R1 (from
the Combustible Dust Hazard
Investigation Study):
Issue a standard designed to prevent
combustible dust fires and explosions in
general industry. Base the standard on
current National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA) dust explosion standards (including
NFPA 654 and NFPA 484), and include at
least—hazard assessment,—engineering
controls,—housekeeping,—building
design,—explosion protection,—operating
procedures, and—worker training.
Recommendation 2008–5–I–GA–R11
(from the Imperial Sugar report):
Proceed expeditiously, consistent with the
Chemical Safety Board’s November 2006
recommendation and OSHA’s announced
intention to conduct rulemaking, to
promulgate a comprehensive standard to
reduce or eliminate hazards from fire and
explosion from combustible powders and
dust.
Recommendation 2011–4–I–TN–R1
(from the Hoeganaes case study):
Ensure that the forthcoming OSHA
Combustible Dust Standard includes
coverage for combustible metal dusts
including iron and steel powders.
Recommendation 2011–4–I–TN–R2
(from the Hoeganaes case study):
Develop and publish a proposed
combustible dust standard for general
industry within one year of the approval of
this case study.
Rationale for Recommendations
After investigating three deadly
combustible dust accidents that claimed
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the lives of fourteen workers in 2003,
the CSB conducted a comprehensive
combustible dust hazard investigation
study. Released in late 2006, the study
concluded that voluntary consensus
standards and enhanced regulatory
enforcement efforts are insufficient to
prevent dust fires and explosions that
occur across a broad range of industries.
The CSB therefore recommended that
OSHA issue a combustible dust general
industry standard. In 2009, after
investigating the catastrophic sugar dust
explosions at the Imperial Sugar
Refinery in Port Wentworth, Georgia
that killed 14 workers, the CSB issued
a second recommendation calling on
OSHA to ‘‘proceed expeditiously’’ with
the rulemaking. In 2011, following its
investigation of three iron dust-related
incidents at the Hoeganaes Corporation
facility in Gallatin, Tennessee, that
killed five workers, the CSB issued two
more recommendations to OSHA
regarding the dust rulemaking: one
calling for the inclusion of metal dust in
the scope of the standard, and a second
calling for issuance of a proposed rule
within one year.
Summary of OSHA Response to the
Recommendations
Initially resistant to the CSB’s
recommendation to develop a new
standard, in October 2007, OSHA
launched a National Emphasis Program
to improve regulatory enforcement in
workplaces handling combustible dust.
The program was revised and reissued
in March 2008 to better target affected
industries. That same month, OSHA
distributed a combustible dust Safety
and Health Information Bulletin (SHIB)
to approximately 30,000 workplaces
within industries with potential dust
hazards.
In April 2009, OSHA indicated that it
would commence a combustible dust
rulemaking, and issued an Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the
Federal Register in October 2009. That
winter, OSHA held a series of
stakeholder meetings, but twice
postponed the next step in the
rulemaking process, the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA) Panel Review. In May 2011,
OSHA held a Combustible Dust Expert
Forum in May 2011. In January 2012,
shortly after the release of CSB’s most
recent recommendations to the agency,
OSHA released its Fall 2011
Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, which
indicated that an estimated date for the
next step in the rulemaking process was
‘‘undetermined.’’ OSHA reiterated its
commitment to developing a standard,
however, in a June 14, 2012 letter to the
CSB, and its most recent Semiannual
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Regulatory Agenda estimates that the
SBREFA Panel Review will be held in
October 2013.
Summary Evaluation
OSHA has initiated a rulemaking to
issue a combustible dust standard and
continues to undertake noteworthy and
important regulatory enforcement and
educational efforts to prevent and
control combustible dust hazards in the
workplace. The federal rulemaking
process is complex; however, a
combustible dust general industry
standard is urgently needed to prevent
future fires and explosions from
claiming the lives of American workers.
In addition, more than six years have
passed since the CSB first issued a
recommendation for this standard.
Therefore, staff propose that the Board
vote to designate all four
recommendations with the status:
‘‘Open-Unacceptable Response.’’
No factual analyses, conclusions, or
findings presented by staff should be
considered final. Only after the Board
has considered the staff presentations
and voted to approve a change in status
of the recommendation should that
status be considered final.
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Additional Information
The meeting will be free and open to
the public. If you require a translator or
interpreter, please notify the individual
listed below as the ‘‘Contact Person for
Further Information,’’ at least five
business days prior to the meeting.
The CSB is an independent federal
agency charged with investigating
accidents and hazards that result, or
may result, in the catastrophic release of
extremely hazardous substances. The
agency’s Board Members are appointed
by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. CSB investigations look into all
aspects of chemical accidents and
hazards, including physical causes such
as equipment failure as well as
inadequacies in regulations, industry
standards, and safety management
systems.
PUBLIC COMMENT: Members of the public
are invited to make brief statements to
the Board at the conclusion of the staff
presentations in the morning and
afternoon. The time provided for public
statements will depend upon the
number of people who wish to speak.
Speakers should assume that their
presentations will be limited to five
minutes or less, and may submit written
statements for the record.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Hillary J. Cohen, Communications
Manager, hillary.cohen@csb.gov or (202)
446–8094. General information about
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the CSB can be found on the agency
Web site at: www.csb.gov.
Rafael Moure-Eraso,
Chairperson.
[FR Doc. 2013–16838 Filed 7–10–13; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6350–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
41911
authorized the proposed activity. If the
applicant wishes to seek authorization
for this activity, it will need to submit
an application for production authority,
pursuant to Section 400.23.
Dated: July 5, 2013.
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2013–16777 Filed 7–11–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P
Foreign-Trade Zones Board
[B–27–2013]
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Foreign-Trade Zone 161—Sedgwick
County, Kansas; Authorization of
Production Activity; Siemens Energy,
Inc. (Wind Turbine Nacelles and Hubs);
Hutchinson, Kansas
On March 7, 2013, Siemens Energy,
Inc., an operator of FTZ 161, submitted
a notification of proposed production
activity to the Foreign-Trade Zones
(FTZ) Board.
The notification was processed in
accordance with the regulations of the
FTZ Board (15 CFR part 400), including
notice in the Federal Register inviting
public comment (78 FR 20888, April 8,
2013). The FTZ Board has determined
that no further review of the activity is
warranted at this time. The production
activity described in the notification is
authorized, subject to the FTZ Act and
the FTZ Board’s regulations, including
Section 400.14.
Dated: July 8, 2013.
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2013–16784 Filed 7–11–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Foreign-Trade Zones Board
[B–25–2013]
Foreign-Trade Zone 39—Dallas-Fort
Worth, Texas; CSI Calendering, Inc.
(Rubber Coated Textile Fabric);
Arlington, Texas
On March 4, 2013, the Dallas/Fort
Worth International Airport Board,
grantee of FTZ 39, submitted a
notification of proposed production
activity to the Foreign-Trade Zones
(FTZ) Board on behalf of CSI
Calendering, Inc., in Arlington, Texas.
The notification was processed in
accordance with the regulations of the
FTZ Board (15 CFR part 400), including
notice in the Federal Register inviting
public comment (78 FR 18314, March
26, 2013). Pursuant to Section 400.37,
the FTZ Board has determined that
further review is warranted and has not
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National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
RIN 0648–XC008
Endangered and Threatened Species;
Recovery Plans
National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of availability.
AGENCY:
We, NMFS, announce the
adoption of an Endangered Species Act
(ESA) recovery plan for Lower Columbia
River Chinook salmon (Oncoryhnchus
tschawytscha), Lower Columbia coho
salmon (O. kisutch), and Columbia
River chum salmon (O. keta)
evolutionarily significant units (ESUs)
and the Lower Columbia River steelhead
(O. mykiss) distinct population segment
(DPS), all of which are listed as
threatened under the ESA. The
geographic area covered by the plan is
the Lower Columbia River mainstem
and tributaries downstream of (and
including) the White Salmon River in
Washington and the Hood River in
Oregon. As required by the ESA, the
plan contains objective, measurable
delisting criteria, site-specific
management actions necessary to
achieve the plan’s goals, and estimates
of the time and costs required to
implement recovery actions. The
Endangered Species Act (ESA) Recovery
Plan for Lower Columbia River Chinook
Salmon, Lower Columbia River Coho
Salmon, Columbia River Chum Salmon,
and Lower Columbia River Steelhead
(Plan) and our summary of and
responses to public comments on the
Proposed Plan are now available.
ADDRESSES: Electronic copies of the
Plan and a summary of and response to
public comments on the Proposed Plan
are available on-line at https://www.nwr.
noaa.gov/protected_species/salmon_
steelhead/recovery_planning_and_
implementation/lower_columbia_river/
lower_columbia_river_recovery_plan_
for_salmon_steelhead.html. A CD–ROM
SUMMARY:
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 134 (Friday, July 12, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 41908-41911]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-16838]
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CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD
Sunshine Act Meeting
TIME AND DATE: July 25, 2013, 9:30 a.m.-4:30 p.m. EDT.
PLACE: Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Horizon
Room, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20004.
STATUS: Open to the public.
MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board (CSB) will convene a public meeting on Thursday, July 25, 2013,
starting at 9:30 a.m. EDT at the Ronald Reagan Building and
International Trade Center, Horizon Room, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW.,
Washington, DC 20004. Between 9:30 a.m. and 12:15 p.m., the Board will
consider and vote on the status designations of the following three
recommendations issued by the CSB to the U.S. Occupational Safety and
Health Administration: (1) 2001-05-I-DE-1 (revision of Process Safety
Management standard to clarify coverage of atmospheric storage tanks
connected to process vessels); (2) 2005-04-I-TX-9 (revision of Process
Safety Management standard to require management of change reviews for
certain organizational changes); and (3) 2010-07-I-CT-1 (issuance of a
general industry and construction standards for fuel gas safety).
Beginning at 1:30 p.m. EDT, the Board will consider and vote on the
status designations of four recommendations related to the issuance of
a general industry standard for combustible dusts as follows (1) 2006-
1-H-R1 (from Combustible Dust Study); (2) 2008-5-I-GA-R11 (from
Imperial Sugar report); (3) 2011-4-I-TN- and (4) 2011-4-I-TN-R2 (from
Hoeganaes case study), and possibly other items at the discretion of
the Chair.
This notice is to provide information to the public concerning the
matters related to the seven recommendations to OSHA listed above,
which will be considered during the meeting. At the meeting, the staff
will present their evaluations of the implementation of these seven
recommendations. Following the staff presentations in the morning and
afternoon, the Board will hear brief statements from OSHA, interested
stakeholders, and the public. The Board will consider these analyses
and vote on the status to assign to each recommendation according to
Board Order 22 [https://www.csb.gov/assets/Record/BO_22.pdf.].
In addition, at this meeting, the CSB will also consider the
potential
[[Page 41909]]
designation of a general industry standard for combustible dust as a
``Most Wanted Chemical Safety Improvement'' issue under Board Order 46
[https://www.csb.gov/assets/Record/Order_046_(06122012).pdf].
The following section contains summaries of the staff evaluations
for the recommendations that will be presented to the Board for
consideration.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Recommendation to the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration 2001-05-I-DE-1
Recommendation Text
Ensure coverage under the Process Safety Management Standard (29
CFR 1910.119) of atmospheric storage tanks that could be involved in a
potential catastrophic release as a result of being interconnected to a
covered process with 10,000 pounds of a flammable substance.
Rationale for Recommendation
The recommendation followed a fatal explosion involving a poorly
maintained and corroded atmospheric aboveground tank containing spent
sulfuric acid and flammable hydrocarbons at the Motiva Enterprises
refinery in Delaware City in July 2001. The company considered the tank
to be exempt from the OSHA Process Safety Management standard under the
1997 Meer decision. This decision was issued by an administrative law
judge of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The
decision, exempts from PSM coverage, ``flammable liquids stored in
atmospheric tanks or transferred which are kept below their normal
boiling point without benefit of chilling or refrigeration.'' The CSB
Motiva investigation concluded that if Motiva had adhered to a PSM
standard requirements for the tank, the accident could have been
avoided.
Summary of OSHA Response to the Recommendation
OSHA does not agree that it is necessary to revise the PSM standard
in order to clarify the issues of coverage of tanks connected to
processes. As an alternative, OSHA reported to the CSB in 2003 that it
would issue a revised PSM Compliance Directive that would clarify to
all its compliance officers and to the regulated parties that tanks
like the one at Motiva (which OSHA contended had a process function as
well as a storage function) were covered under PSM. To date, however,
OSHA has not revised its compliance directive. An August 2012
communication from the Assistant Secretary projected completion of a
revision in 6-9 months, and the agency's Spring 2013 regulatory agenda
indicates that it is considering ``clarifying the PSM exception for
atmospheric storage tanks'' as part of a broader revision of its PSM
standard, 29 CFR 1910.119.
Summary Evaluation
Because ten years have passed and OSHA has yet to take any
regulatory or other actions which would address the intent of the
recommendation, CSB staff propose that the Board vote to designate
Recommendation 2001-5-I-DE-R1 with the status ``Open-Unacceptable
Response.''
Recommendation to the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration 2005-04-I-TX-R9
Recommendation Text
Amend the OSHA PSM standard to require that a management of change
(MOC) review be conducted for organizational changes that may impact
process safety including:
(a) Major organizational changes such as mergers, acquisitions, or
reorganizations;
(b) Personnel changes, including changes in staffing levels or
staff experience; and
(c) Policy changes, such as budget cutting.
Rationale for Recommendation
The CSB investigation of the 2005 explosions and fire at the former
BP refinery in Texas City, Texas revealed that poorly managed corporate
mergers, leadership and organizational changes, and budget cuts
increased the risk of catastrophic accidents at the site. The CSB also
noted that a 2002 survey revealed that organizational change was
assessed in the Management of Change (MOC) programs of only forty-four
percent (44%) of chemical processing companies, strongly suggesting
that assessment of such organizational factors are not widely used in
the industry. While OSHA's Process Safety Management (PSM) standard (29
CFR 1910.119) requires MOC analyses for changes to ``process chemicals,
technology, equipment, procedures; and, changes to facilities that
affect a covered process,'' the CSB concluded that it does not
explicitly require that employers conduct MOC reviews for
organizational, personnel and policy changes that could affect process
safety. Consequently, the CSB recommended that OSHA amend the PSM
standard to clarify that MOC reviews must be conducted for
organizational, personnel, and policy changes that may impact process
safety.
Summary of OSHA Response to the Recommendation
OSHA responded that the PSM standard already requires employers to
develop and implement MOC reviews to determine the adequacy of all
contemplated changes with respect to their safety and health impacts as
they relate to ``process chemicals, technology, equipment, procedures,
and facilities.'' In OSHA's view, these are the types of changes
encompassed by the CSB recommendation. In addition, OSHA sent a
memorandum to all Regional Administrators to clarify this policy with
regard to the coverage of organizational changes under the PSM's
management of change requirements. The policy clarification was to be
provided to OSHA's compliance officers. OSHA's Spring 2013 regulatory
agenda indicates that the agency is considering expanding the scope of
its PSM standard to ``require greater organizational management of
change from employers.''
Summary Evaluation
A policy memorandum to OSHA Regional Administrators is not the
permanent regulatory change envisioned by the Board, which sought an
explicit change in the requirements of the standard through through
rulemaking procedures. For this reason, staff propose that the Board
vote to designate Recommendation 2005-04-I-TX-R9 with the status:
``Open--Unacceptable Response.''
Urgent Recommendation to the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration 2010-07-I-CT-UR1
Recommendation Text
Promulgate regulations that address fuel gas safety for both
construction and general industry. At a minimum:
a. Prohibit the release of flammable gas to the atmosphere for
the purpose of cleaning fuel gas piping.
b. Prohibit flammable gas venting or purging indoors. Prohibit
venting or purging outdoors where fuel gas may form a flammable
atmosphere in the vicinity of workers and/or ignition sources.
c. Prohibit any work activity in areas where the concentration
of flammable gas exceeds a fixed low percentage of the lower
explosive limit (LEL) determined by appropriate combustible gas
monitoring.
d. Require that companies develop flammable gas safety
procedures and training that involves contractors, workers, and
their representatives in decision-making.
[[Page 41910]]
Rationale for Recommendation
The CSB investigated two natural gas explosions (Kleen Energy
Natural Gas Explosion and ConAgra Natural Gas Explosion and Ammonia
Release) and concluded that the fire and explosion hazards of releasing
flammable gas in the presence of workers and ignition sources can be
largely or entirely avoided through the use of currently available
inherently safer methods than those currently in use in most
workplaces. These CSB reports focused particularly on the hazards of
gas purging in industrial establishments and ``gas blows'' conducted
during the construction of gas-fired power plants; reports of these
investigations can be found in the CSB Web page (www.csb.gov). The CSB
also found that OSHA has three gas-specific standards for flammable
gases that are used far less frequently in the workplace than natural
gas. These existing gas standards apply to liquefied petroleum gases
(propane and butane, 1910.110), hydrogen (1910.103) and acetylene
(1910.102). Yet the Agency has no comprehensive fuel gas safety
standard, despite the fact that fuel gases pose serious explosion and
fire hazards and are in much more widespread use in OSHA-regulated
workplaces.
Summary of OSHA Response to the Recommendation
OSHA's initial response to the recommendation described several
forceful enforcement actions affecting the industry sector conducting
``gas blows'' during the construction of power plants--which the CSB
commended--but stated only that it would ``consider'' a new fuel gas
standard during its next regulatory review. In a subsequent
notification, however, OSHA reported that it did not ``believe this is
the appropriate time to initiate the regulatory process.'' Briefly
stated, OSHA indicated that ``the most prudent approach for OSHA is to
monitor the implementation'' of two recently revised NFPA standards and
``evaluate their effectiveness at controlling the targeted hazards, and
then determine if additional rulemaking is necessary to protect
workers.'' Moreover, OSHA did not include fuel gas rulemaking in the
Agency's most recent regulatory agenda (Spring 2013), indicating that
it has no current intention to begin rulemaking in this arena.
Summary Evaluation
Per 42 U.S.C. 7412(6)(J), OSHA must inform the CSB within 180 days
whether it will initiate rulemaking (and provide a timetable), or not
initiate rulemaking (and explain why). OSHA's latest response to the
CSB recommendation indicates that the agency does not currently intend
to pursue rulemaking, and provides a rationale for this decision.
CSB's Board Order 22 obligates staff to recommend an ``Open-
Unacceptable Response'' status for urgent recommendations that ``[have]
not been responded to in an acceptable manner within 6 months and [are]
not at a point where completion is imminent.'' In this case, OSHA's
apparently indefinite postponement of any regulatory action on fuel
gases is inconsistent with the intent of the recommendation and staff
propose that the Board vote to change the status of Recommendation
2010-07-I-CT-UR1 to ``Open-Unacceptable Response.''
Recommendations to the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration Related to the Prevention of Combustible Dust Fires and
Explosions
Recommendation Text
Recommendation 2006-1-H-R1 (from the Combustible Dust Hazard
Investigation Study):
Issue a standard designed to prevent combustible dust fires and
explosions in general industry. Base the standard on current
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) dust explosion standards
(including NFPA 654 and NFPA 484), and include at least--hazard
assessment,--engineering controls,--housekeeping,--building
design,--explosion protection,--operating procedures, and--worker
training.
Recommendation 2008-5-I-GA-R11 (from the Imperial Sugar report):
Proceed expeditiously, consistent with the Chemical Safety
Board's November 2006 recommendation and OSHA's announced intention
to conduct rulemaking, to promulgate a comprehensive standard to
reduce or eliminate hazards from fire and explosion from combustible
powders and dust.
Recommendation 2011-4-I-TN-R1 (from the Hoeganaes case study):
Ensure that the forthcoming OSHA Combustible Dust Standard
includes coverage for combustible metal dusts including iron and
steel powders.
Recommendation 2011-4-I-TN-R2 (from the Hoeganaes case study):
Develop and publish a proposed combustible dust standard for
general industry within one year of the approval of this case study.
Rationale for Recommendations
After investigating three deadly combustible dust accidents that
claimed the lives of fourteen workers in 2003, the CSB conducted a
comprehensive combustible dust hazard investigation study. Released in
late 2006, the study concluded that voluntary consensus standards and
enhanced regulatory enforcement efforts are insufficient to prevent
dust fires and explosions that occur across a broad range of
industries. The CSB therefore recommended that OSHA issue a combustible
dust general industry standard. In 2009, after investigating the
catastrophic sugar dust explosions at the Imperial Sugar Refinery in
Port Wentworth, Georgia that killed 14 workers, the CSB issued a second
recommendation calling on OSHA to ``proceed expeditiously'' with the
rulemaking. In 2011, following its investigation of three iron dust-
related incidents at the Hoeganaes Corporation facility in Gallatin,
Tennessee, that killed five workers, the CSB issued two more
recommendations to OSHA regarding the dust rulemaking: one calling for
the inclusion of metal dust in the scope of the standard, and a second
calling for issuance of a proposed rule within one year.
Summary of OSHA Response to the Recommendations
Initially resistant to the CSB's recommendation to develop a new
standard, in October 2007, OSHA launched a National Emphasis Program to
improve regulatory enforcement in workplaces handling combustible dust.
The program was revised and reissued in March 2008 to better target
affected industries. That same month, OSHA distributed a combustible
dust Safety and Health Information Bulletin (SHIB) to approximately
30,000 workplaces within industries with potential dust hazards.
In April 2009, OSHA indicated that it would commence a combustible
dust rulemaking, and issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
in the Federal Register in October 2009. That winter, OSHA held a
series of stakeholder meetings, but twice postponed the next step in
the rulemaking process, the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act (SBREFA) Panel Review. In May 2011, OSHA held a
Combustible Dust Expert Forum in May 2011. In January 2012, shortly
after the release of CSB's most recent recommendations to the agency,
OSHA released its Fall 2011 Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, which
indicated that an estimated date for the next step in the rulemaking
process was ``undetermined.'' OSHA reiterated its commitment to
developing a standard, however, in a June 14, 2012 letter to the CSB,
and its most recent Semiannual
[[Page 41911]]
Regulatory Agenda estimates that the SBREFA Panel Review will be held
in October 2013.
Summary Evaluation
OSHA has initiated a rulemaking to issue a combustible dust
standard and continues to undertake noteworthy and important regulatory
enforcement and educational efforts to prevent and control combustible
dust hazards in the workplace. The federal rulemaking process is
complex; however, a combustible dust general industry standard is
urgently needed to prevent future fires and explosions from claiming
the lives of American workers. In addition, more than six years have
passed since the CSB first issued a recommendation for this standard.
Therefore, staff propose that the Board vote to designate all four
recommendations with the status: ``Open-Unacceptable Response.''
No factual analyses, conclusions, or findings presented by staff
should be considered final. Only after the Board has considered the
staff presentations and voted to approve a change in status of the
recommendation should that status be considered final.
Additional Information
The meeting will be free and open to the public. If you require a
translator or interpreter, please notify the individual listed below as
the ``Contact Person for Further Information,'' at least five business
days prior to the meeting.
The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating
accidents and hazards that result, or may result, in the catastrophic
release of extremely hazardous substances. The agency's Board Members
are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. CSB
investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents and hazards,
including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as
inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management
systems.
Public Comment: Members of the public are invited to make brief
statements to the Board at the conclusion of the staff presentations in
the morning and afternoon. The time provided for public statements will
depend upon the number of people who wish to speak. Speakers should
assume that their presentations will be limited to five minutes or
less, and may submit written statements for the record.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Hillary J. Cohen, Communications
Manager, hillary.cohen@csb.gov or (202) 446-8094. General information
about the CSB can be found on the agency Web site at: www.csb.gov.
Rafael Moure-Eraso,
Chairperson.
[FR Doc. 2013-16838 Filed 7-10-13; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6350-01-P
