Adoption of Recommendations, 41352-41361 [2013-16541]
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Notices
Federal Register
Vol. 78, No. 132
Wednesday, July 10, 2013
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
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ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES
Adoption of Recommendations
Administrative Conference of
the United States.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
The Administrative
Conference of the United States adopted
four recommendations at its Fifty-eighth
Plenary Session. The appended
recommendations address ways to
improve the adjudication of Social
Security disability benefits, best
practices for use of benefit-cost analysis
in rulemaking by independent
regulatory agencies, transparency in
agencies’ scientific decisionmaking, and
best practices for agencies with respect
to the administrative record in informal
rulemaking.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
Recommendation 2013–1, Amber
Williams; for Recommendations 2013–2
and 2013–3, Reeve Bull; for
Recommendation 2013–4, Stephanie
Tatham. For all four recommendations
the address and phone number are:
Administrative Conference of the
United States, Suite 706 South, 1120
20th Street NW., Washington, DC 20036;
Telephone 202–480–2080.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
Administrative Conference Act, 5 U.S.C.
591–596, established the Administrative
Conference of the United States. The
Conference studies the efficiency,
adequacy, and fairness of the
administrative procedures used by
Federal agencies and makes
recommendations for improvements to
agencies, the President, Congress, and
the Judicial Conference of the United
States (5 U.S.C. 594(1)). For further
information about the Conference and
its activities, see https://www.acus.gov.
At its Fifty-eighth Plenary Session,
held June 13–14, 2013, the Assembly of
the Conference adopted four
recommendations. Recommendation
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SUMMARY:
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2013–1, ‘‘Improving Consistency in
Social Security Disability
Adjudications,’’ identifies ways to
improve the adjudication of Social
Security disability benefits claims
before administrative law judges and the
Appeals Council, suggests changes to
the evaluation of opinion evidence from
medical professionals, and encourages
the agency to enhance data capture and
reporting.
Recommendation 2013–2, ‘‘BenefitCost Analysis at Independent
Regulatory Agencies,’’ highlights a
series of best practices directed at
independent regulatory agencies in the
preparation of benefit-cost analyses that
accompany proposed and final rules.
Recommendation 2013–3, ‘‘Science in
the Administrative Process,’’ promotes
transparency in agencies’ scientific
decision-making, including: articulation
of questions to be informed by science
information; attribution for agency
personnel who contributed to scientific
analyses; public access to underlying
data and literature; and conflict of
interest disclosures for privately funded
research used by the agencies in
licensing, rulemaking, or other
administrative processes.
Recommendation 2013–4, ‘‘The
Administrative Record in Informal
Rulemaking,’’ offers best practices for
agencies in the compilation,
preservation, and certification of records
in informal rulemaking, and supports
the judicial presumption of regularity
for agency administrative records except
in certain limited circumstances.
The Appendix (below) sets forth the
full texts of these four
recommendations. The Conference will
transmit them to affected agencies and
to appropriate committees of the United
States Congress. The recommendations
are not binding, so the relevant
agencies, the Congress, and the courts
will make decisions on their
implementation.
The Conference based these
recommendations on research reports
that it has posted at: https://
www.acus.gov/meetings-and-events/
plenary-meeting/58th-plenary-session/.
A video of the Plenary Session is
available at the same web address, and
a transcript of the Plenary Session will
be posted once it is available.
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Dated: July 3, 2013.
Paul R. Verkuil,
Chairman.
APPENDIX—RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES
Administrative Conference Recommendation
2013–1
Improving Consistency in Social Security
Disability Adjudications
Adopted June 13, 2013
The Administrative Conference of the
United States (Conference) has undertaken
many studies over the years relating to the
Social Security disability benefits system.1 It
has issued a number of recommendations
specifically directed at improving the Social
Security Administration’s (SSA’s) initial
application and appeals processes,2 as well
as other recommendations more generally
designed to improve agency adjudicatory
procedures.3 The Conference last issued a
recommendation on the Social Security
disability benefits system over twenty years
ago. The system has grown substantially
since that time. Approximately 3.3 million
disability claims are now filed annually,4
which represents a 57% increase since 1990.5
In a program of this size, adjudicating
disability benefits claims in a fair, consistent,
1 The Social Security Act created two programs—
Social Security Disability Insurance and
Supplemental Security Income—to provide
monetary benefits to persons with disabilities who
satisfy these programs’ respective requirements. See
42 U.S.C. 401(b), 1381 (2011).
2 These recommendations include:
Recommendation 91–3, The Social Security
Representative Payee Program, 56 FR 33847 (July
24, 1991); Recommendation 90–4, Social Security
Disability Program Appeals Process: Supplementary
Recommendation, 55 FR 34213 (Aug. 22, 1990);
Recommendation 89–10, Improved Use of Medical
Personnel in Social Security Disability, 55 FR 1665
(Jan. 18, 1990 (as amended)); Recommendation 87–
7, A New Role for the Social Security Appeals
Council, 52 FR 49143 (Dec. 30, 1987) [hereinafter
ACUS Recommendation 87–7]; and
Recommendation 78–2, Procedures for Determining
Social Security Disability Claims, 43 FR 27508 (June
26, 1978).
3 See, e.g., Recommendation 2011–4, Agency Use
of Video Hearings: Best Practices and Possibilities
for Expansion, 76 FR 48789 (Aug. 9, 2011);
Recommendation 89–8, Agency Practices and
Procedures for the Indexing and Public Availability
of Adjudicatory Decisions, 54 FR 53495 (Dec. 29,
1989); Recommendation 86–7, Case Management as
a Tool for Improving Agency Adjudication, 51 FR
46989 (Dec. 30, 1986); Recommendation 73–3,
Quality Assurance Systems in the Adjudication of
Claims of Entitlement to Benefits or Compensation,
38 FR 16840 (June 27, 1973).
4 Soc. Sec. Admin., Annual Performance Plan for
FY 2013 and Revised Performance Plan for FY
2012, at 11 (2012).
5 Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., Aspects of Disability
Decision Making: Data and Materials 6 tbls. 1a & 1b
(Feb. 2012) [hereinafter SSAB 2012 Report].
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and timely manner is a monumental
challenge.
Those cases flow through a nationwide,
multi-step process, by which SSA determines
whether a claimant is disabled and eligible
for benefits. State agencies make initial
disability determinations using federal
guidelines. Claimants may file (and pursue)
their own claims or they may choose to enlist
the assistance of a representative, who may
or may not be a lawyer.6 If benefits are
denied, claimants may request
reconsideration (in most states). If benefits
are denied after reconsideration, claimants
may request a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). ALJs
adjudicate nearly 800,000 cases a year.7 In
FY 2011, about 56% of disability benefits
claims were allowed at the ALJ hearing
stage,8 though more recent figures show a
decline in this rate.9 ALJ hearings, which
may be in-person or by video
teleconferencing, are conducted using a de
novo standard of review, and generally
follow the Administrative Procedure Act’s
adjudication procedures. Although ALJs
preside at the hearings, decisionwriters
typically write decisions for ALJs based on
instructions from them. Usually,
decisionwriters are not assigned to specific
ALJs, but serve instead as part of a ‘‘pool’’ in
each hearing office from which writing
assignments for decisions are made.
Appeals Council review is the final step in
the administrative process. The Appeals
Council is comprised of about 125 appellate
adjudicators who typically take action—
without oral argument—individually or in
two-member panels.10 The Appeals Council
has discretionary authority to grant, deny, or
dismiss a claimant’s request for review, as
well as remand the case back to an ALJ or
issue a decision.11 In FY 2012, the Appeals
6 The administrative process for adjudication of
Social Security disability claims is nonadversarial
in nature. See, e.g., 20 CFR 404.900(b), 416.1400(b)
(2012) (describing agency’s administrative review
process as ‘‘informal’’ and ‘‘nonadversary’’);
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339 (1976)
(‘‘The hearing is nonadversary and the SSA is not
represented by counsel.’’); Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 403 (1971) (‘‘We bear in mind that
[SSA] operates essentially, and is intended so to do,
as an adjudicator and not as an advocate or
adversary.’’).
7 SSAB 2012 Report, supra note 5, at 13.
8 Harold Krent & Scott Morris, Statistical
Appendix: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge
Disposition and Favorable Rates in Fiscal Years
2009 to 2011 13, 14 tbl. A–8 (2013) [hereinafter
Statistical Appendix].
9 Harold Krent & Scott Morris, Achieving Greater
Consistency in Social Security Disability: An
Empirical Study and Suggested Reforms 8 (2013)
(noting a 50% allowance rate in FY 2012).
10 See 20 CFR 422.205 (2012) (prescribing
Appeals Council review procedures); see also
Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth
Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and
Utility of the Soc. Sec. Admin.’s Appeals Council,
17 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 199, 253–54 (1990).
11 The Conference believes that its 1987
conclusion, that a ‘‘principal mandate’’ of the
Appeals Council is ‘‘to recommend and, where
appropriate, develop and implement adjudicatory
principles and decisional standards for the
disability determination process’’ remains valid
today. See ACUS Recommendation 87–7, supra
note 2.
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Council processed over 166,000 requests for
review, a 30.7% increase from FY 2011.12 In
addition to processing requests for review,
the Appeals Council has authority to review
all types of unappealed decisions (i.e.,
allowances or benefit denials) on its ‘‘own
motion’’ through use of random or selective
sampling techniques.13 Currently, the
Appeals Council’s ‘‘own motion’’ review
docket draws from a national random sample
of ALJ allowance decisions as a quality
assurance mechanism; the Appeals Council
has not yet reviewed unappealed ALJ denial
decisions, and has declined to use its
selective sampling authority to identify and
review unappealed cases with a high
likelihood of error in recent years.14 In FY
2012, the Appeals Council completed
random review of 7,074 ALJ allowance
decisions.15 The Appeals Council publishes
its decisions only rarely, in the form of
Appeals Council Interpretations (ACIs), and
its decisions sometimes serve as the basis for
Social Security Rulings. Claimants who
disagree with the final administrative
decision may seek initial judicial review in
federal district court.
Adjudicators and other agency employees
at both the ALJ hearing level and Appeals
Council level use electronic case
12 Soc. Sec. Admin., Office of Appellate
Operations, Executive Director’s Broadcast, at 1
(Oct. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Exec. Dir. Broadcast]. Of
these 166,000 requests for review, the Appeals
Council dismissed or denied 78.3% of the requests,
remanded 18.6% of the cases back to ALJs, and
issued decisions (i.e., fully favorable, partially
favorable, or unfavorable) in 2.6% of the cases. Id.
at 2.
13 As the name connotes, random sampling
involves selection of hearing level cases for Appeals
Council review from a national pool without regard
for case characteristics or correctness, other than
broad categories designed to assure randomness
(e.g., allowances within a given date range). By
contrast, selective sampling is specifically designed
to identify cases for review that ‘‘exhibit
problematic issues or fact patterns that increase the
likelihood of error.’’ 20 CFR 404.969(b)(1),
416.1469(b)(1) (2012) (detailing the Appeals
Council’s ‘‘own motion’’ review authority and
procedures); see also Soc. Sec. Admin.,
Identification and Referral of Cases Under Appeals
Council’s Own Motion Review Authority, 63 FR
36560 (July 7, 1998). These procedures are
established pursuant to the Social Security Act’s
broad grant of authority to the Commissioner to
establish hearing procedures and, on his or her own
motion, hold hearings or conduct other proceedings
as necessary for the proper administration of the
program. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 405(b)(1), 1383(c)(1)(A)
(2011).
14 This recommendation suggests that, to enhance
decisional accuracy and consistency, SSA expand
the Appeals Council’s use of ‘‘own motion’’ review
of unappealed ALJ decisions through selective
sampling based on announced, neutral, and
objective criteria that identify problematic issues,
fact patterns, or case characteristics. Under this
recommendation, focused review might be
warranted, for example, based on: the subject matter
of a claim, the manner in which a hearing was held,
or statistical analyses showing a high likelihood of
error or significantly anomalous outcomes.
15 Exec. Dir. Broadcast, supra note 12, at 3. The
Appeals Council agreed with the decisions of ALJs
82.5% of the time, and either remanded or issued
corrective decisions approximately 16% of the time.
At the end of the FY 2012, there were 741 ‘‘own
motion’’ review cases still pending final action. Id.
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management systems to help manage their
workflow and to provide case-related
management information. The current system
in use at the hearing level is the Case
Processing Management System (CPMS),
while the Appeals Council level uses the
Appeals Council Review Processing System
(ARPS). Not only do adjudicators and other
staff use CPMS and ARPS in their day-to-day
work, but the agency also uses data from
these systems to identify and address trends
and anomalies existing at the various levels
of agency adjudication. While SSA has
endeavored to build effective data reporting
systems, limitations still exist that relate to
data capture and linking the various systems.
Not only does SSA process an
extraordinary number of claims through a
national, multi-tiered system, but, in doing
so, the agency tries to ensure that
decisionmaking is consistent and accurate at
all levels of adjudication, and that legally
sufficient decisions are issued that can
withstand review by federal courts.
Consistency and accuracy, however, have
suffered under the strain of administering
such a sprawling program. To be sure, an ALJ
faces an enormous task in adjudicating
hundreds of cases annually.16 Nonetheless,
divergent allowance rates among ALJs
suggest that claims are being resolved in an
inconsistent, if not inaccurate, manner.17 The
Appeals Council similarly struggles to fulfill
its error-correction and quality-review roles.
That these steps may have room for
improvement is evidenced by the 45% rate
at which cases are remanded back to the
agency from federal courts in recent years.18
Bringing greater consistency and accuracy to
the disability claims adjudication process
will enhance the fairness and integrity of the
program.
One area of particular concern—due to its
apparent contribution to a high remand
rate—is SSA’s treating source rule, which
generally affords ‘‘controlling weight’’ to the
opinions of a claimant’s treating physician,
psychologist, or other acceptable medical
source.19 In the early 1990s, SSA sought to
bring greater clarity and uniformity to the
assessment of medical evidence by
establishing regulatory standards for such
evaluations. In practice, however, this
evidentiary rule has not delivered on its
promise of improving consistency. In recent
years, erroneous application of the treating
source rule has been cited as the basis for
16 On average, for FY 2009–FY 2011, ALJs issued
538.9 dispositions per year. See Statistical
Appendix, supra note 8, at 6, 8 tbl. A–2.
17 In recent years, while the distribution of yearly
allowance disposition rates has been approximately
normal (i.e., a mean of 56%), the distribution covers
a wide range of allowance rates, with 95% of the
rates falling between 26% and 85%. See id. at 13,
14 fig. A–8 (analyzing allowance rates for FY 2009–
FY 2011). The lowest allowance rate was 4% and
the highest allowance rate was 98%. See id.
18 See id. at 54 tbl. A–24. Policy compliance
among ALJs has improved in recent years. See
Michael J. Astrue, former Comm’r, Soc. Sec.
Admin., Address at the Social Security Advisory
Board Forum: Straight Talk about ‘‘Disability
Reform.’’ (Mar. 8, 2013), available at https://www.
ssab.gov/Portals/0/2013Forum/Presentations/
Astrue%20Speech%203-8-13.pdf.
19 See 20 CFR 404.1527(c), 416.927(c) (2012).
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remand by the Appeals Council at a 10%
frequency rate, and the frequency rate with
which it is cited by federal courts is even
higher at 35%.20 Dramatic changes in the
American health care system over the past
twenty years also call into question the
ongoing efficacy of the special deference
afforded to the opinions of treating sources.
Individuals typically visit multiple medical
professionals in a variety of settings for their
health care needs and less frequently develop
a sustained relationship with one
physician.21 Moreover, difficulty in
determining who among a wide range of
medical professionals should be considered a
treating source has bedeviled ALJs and
reviewing courts, contributing to high
remand rates.22
This recommendation finds its genesis in
SSA’s request that the Conference study the
role of the Appeals Council in reviewing
cases to reduce any observed variances
among adjudicative decisions at the hearing
level, as well as the efficacy of SSA’s treating
source rule. These studies also revealed other
areas that appear ripe for recommendation.
While SSA has enacted various initiatives to
increase consistency and has issued rulings
to clarify its regulations, the size and
complexity of the system leave more work to
be done. The following recommendations
reaffirm certain portions of past
recommendations that remain valid and
relevant and also identify new approaches to
ensure consistency, accuracy, and fairness
across this massive decision system.
Recommendation
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ALJ Hearing Stage
1. Improving Adjudication Effectiveness
and Consistency. In order to promote greater
decisional consistency and streamline the
adjudication process at the ALJ hearing stage,
SSA should:
(a) Require claimant representatives (while
also permitting claimants without
representation) to submit pre-hearing briefs
in a standardized format that, among other
things, summarizes the medical evidence and
justification for the claimant’s eligibility for
benefits;
(b) expand the use of video hearings in a
manner consistent with sound technological
practices, because such hearings promote
efficiency and do not lead to a significant
difference in allowance rates from in-person
hearings. SSA should continue to advise
claimants that opting for video hearings often
results in faster scheduling of hearings (as
compared to in-person hearings) and more
convenient hearing locations; and
(c) assign decisionwriters and case
technicians to specific ALJs in a hearing
office (with Hearing Office Directors
continuing to supervise such support staff),
while maintaining flexibility to meet
operational needs.
20 See Office of the Chairman, Administrative
Conference of the United States, SSA Disability
Benefits Programs: Assessing the Efficacy of the
Treating Physician Rule, Appendix B, at A–4, A–
8 (2013).
21 See id. at 25–33.
22 See id. at 23–24, 33–35.
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Appeals Council
2. Balancing Error-Correction and Systemic
Review Functions. SSA should continue to
promote the consistent application of policy
to the adjudication of disability benefits
claims across a nationwide program. SSA
should ensure that the Appeals Council
strikes an appropriate balance between its
error-correction function when exercising
discretionary review of individual claimants’
requests for review, and its mandate to
improve organizational effectiveness,
decisional consistency, and communication
of agency policy through use of ‘‘own
motion’’ review (as to both allowances and
unappealed denials) and other types of
systemic quality assurance measures.
3. Enhancing Communication. SSA should
make clear that an essential function of the
Appeals Council is both to focus on
consistent application of Social Security
regulations and policies on a systemic basis,
and to disseminate advice and guidance to
SSA policymakers, ALJs, and other lowerlevel decisionmakers. The Appeals Council
should advise and assist policymakers and
decisionmakers by:
(a) Issuing Appeals Council Interpretations
(ACIs), with greater frequency, in order to:
Address policy gaps; promote greater
consistency and uniformity throughout the
adjudicatory process; and establish
precedents upon which claimants and their
representatives may rely. Such ACIs should
be circulated within the agency and made
publicly available through posting on SSA’s
Web site or other similar means of public
dissemination;
(b) publishing selected ALJ or Appeals
Council decisions to serve as model
decisions (e.g., they are well-reasoned and
clear), or to provide needed policy
clarifications. Consistent with statutory
obligations to maintain the privacy of
sensitive information, such publications
should not include personally identifiable
information;
(c) continuing, to the greatest extent
feasible, to send cases that have been
remanded from the Appeals Council or
federal courts back to the same ALJs who
initially adjudicated such claims for
additional proceedings as required. If an ALJ
who initially decided a claim will not be
presiding over a case post-remand, SSA
should nonetheless ensure that he or she still
receives notification of the remand decision.
Decisionwriters who were involved in
drafting a remanded decision should also
receive notification of remand decisions; and
(d) developing a program for ALJs to serve
extended voluntary details on the Appeals
Council in order to introduce a measure of
peer review, enrich ALJ understanding of the
appeals process, and benefit the Appeals
Council by introducing the perspectives and
insights of ALJs. In support of that effort,
SSA should seek a waiver from the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) of its
durational (120-day) limit on details, which,
if granted, would enable detailed ALJs to gain
a deeper knowledge of the Appeals Council
than is possible under a shorter detail period.
OPM should give favorable consideration to
such a request.
4. Expanding Focused ‘‘Own Motion’’
Review. In order to focus attention on the
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unappealed decisions that most warrant
review, thereby enhancing both accuracy and
consistency, SSA should expand the Appeals
Council’s use of its ‘‘own motion’’ review by
using selective review in a manner consistent
with ALJ decisional independence. The
Appeals Council should use announced,
neutral, and objective criteria, including
statistical assessments, to identify
problematic issues or fact patterns that
increase the likelihood of error and, thereby,
warrant focused review. In addition, SSA
should review unappealed decisions that
raise issues whose resolution likely would
provide guidance to ALJs and adjudicators.
In expanding its ‘‘own motion’’ review, SSA
must ensure that (i) selection-of-review
criteria are developed in a neutral fashion
without targeting particular ALJs or other
decisionmakers, and that (ii) inclusion of
cases in such review does not serve as the
basis for evaluation or discipline. Thus, if
necessary, SSA should revise its regulations
through notice-and-comment rulemaking to
clarify and expand the Appeals Council’s use
of selective sampling to identify for review
decisions that:
(a) Raise issues for which resolution by the
Appeals Council would provide policy
clarifications to agency adjudicators or the
public;
(b) appear, based on statistical or
predictive analysis of case characteristics, to
have a likelihood of error or lack of policy
compliance; or
(c) otherwise raise challenging issues of
fact or law, or have case characteristics, that
increase the likelihood of error.
Use of Opinion Evidence From Medical
Professionals (Treating Source Rule)
5. Evaluating Medical Source Opinions.
SSA should revise its regulations through
notice-and-comment rulemaking to eliminate
the controlling weight aspect of the treating
source rule in favor of a more flexible
approach based on specific regulatory factors.
SSA should give ALJs greater discretion and
flexibility when determining the appropriate
weight to afford opinions from treating
sources (which may or may not be
determinative), consistent with the factors
enumerated in the current regulatory scheme
for evaluation of opinions of acceptable
medical sources who are not deemed
‘‘treating’’ sources. Such factors should
include: (i) Length of the treatment
relationship and frequency of examination;
(ii) nature and extent of the treatment
relationship; (iii) supportability of the
medical source’s opinion; (iv) consistency of
the medical source’s opinion; (v)
specialization of the medical source; and (vi)
any other factors that may support or
contradict a medical source’s opinion. In all
cases, ALJs should articulate the bases for the
weight given to opinions from medical
sources.
6. Recognizing the Value of Other Medical
Sources. SSA’s existing regulatory scheme,
which assigns second-tier evidentiary value
to the opinions of nurse practitioners (NPs),
physician assistants (PAs), and licensed
clinical social workers (LCSWs) because they
are not considered ‘‘acceptable medical
sources,’’ should be reconsidered to reflect
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the realities of the current health care system.
For many Social Security disability
claimants, these medical professionals are
the de facto ‘‘treating source’’ of medical care
for physical and mental illnesses. SSA
should:
(a) Revise its regulations through noticeand-comment rulemaking to add NPs, PAs,
and LCSWs as ‘‘acceptable medical sources,’’
consistent with their respective state lawbased licensure and scopes of practice; or
(b) issue a new Social Security ruling or
other interpretive policy statement that
makes clear, for agency adjudicators, federal
courts, and the public, the value of, as well
as the weight to be afforded, the opinions of
these three types of medical professionals.
Statistical Quality Assurance Measures
7. Enhancing Data Reporting Systems. SSA
should enhance its current data reporting
systems in order to develop a more robust
statistical quality assurance program. To
enhance its current data reporting systems,
such as the Case Processing Management
System (CPMS) and the Appeals Council
Review Processing System (ARPS), or any
respective follow-on systems, SSA should
determine how to associate types of cases
and issues, regions, hearing offices,
adjudicators, procedural elements and
benchmarks, and decisional outcomes
together. The goal of such systems should not
only be objective evaluation of the agency’s
case processing operation, but also the
effective utilization of data to inform policy
formation and operational consistency.
8. Capturing Additional Data. SSA should
specifically address the limitations of CPMS,
ARPS, and any respective follow-on systems
by ensuring that these data reporting systems
capture (as appropriate):
(a) Information related to any prior
hearings;
(b) whether a decision involved a hearing
or on-the-record decision;
(c) whether new evidence was submitted
by a claimant after his or her hearing to the
ALJ or to the Appeals Council; and
(d) data or other tracking mechanisms
enabling ARPS and CPMS data to be related
to a single claim through all case processing
stages, including hearings, Appeals Council
review, and remand by the Appeals Council
or federal courts.
9. Encouraging Employee Feedback. SSA
should encourage feedback from SSA
employees to identify other types of caserelated data that should be captured and to
suggest ways to facilitate the linking of SSA’s
multiple data reporting systems in order to
improve overall data quality and quality
assurance capabilities.
Administrative Conference Recommendation
2013–2
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Benefit-Cost Analysis at Independent
Regulatory Agencies
Adopted June 13, 2013
Benefit-cost analysis (also known as costbenefit analysis) is one of the primary tools
used in regulatory analysis to anticipate and
evaluate the likely consequences of rules.1
1 See Office of Management and Budget, Circular
A–4 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at https://
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Although some regulatory benefits and costs
are difficult to quantify or monetize, those
preparing such analyses generally attempt to
estimate the overall benefits that a proposed
or final rule would create as well as the
aggregate costs that it would impose on
society, and then determine whether the
former justify the latter. Some observers have
disputed its utility in rulemaking,2 but
benefit-cost analysis (and other forms of
regulatory analysis) can help ensure that
decisionmakers fully contemplate the risks
and rewards of any proposed regulatory
strategy.3 Benefit-cost analysis can also
improve transparency, helping to ensure that
the public and Congress understand why
regulatory decisions are made.
For more than 30 years, Cabinet
departments and other executive agencies
like the Environmental Protection Agency
(but not independent regulatory agencies 4
such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC))
have been required by executive orders to
conduct benefit-cost or other types of
regulatory analyses for their ‘‘major’’ or
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/
[hereinafter ‘‘OMB Circular A–4’’]. Much of the
literature on regulatory analysis, including prior
recommendations of the Administrative
Conference, uses the term ‘‘cost-benefit analysis’’ in
lieu of, or in addition to, ‘‘benefit-cost analysis.’’
Circular A–4 uses the term ‘‘benefit-cost analysis,’’
and this recommendation will therefore utilize the
same terminology.
2 Critics of benefit-cost analysis contend that it
ignores values that cannot be easily quantified, that
benefits can often be difficult to monetize, that it
tends to overestimate costs, and that it undervalues
future benefits through the application of
discounting methodologies. See, e.g., Frank
Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless:
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection,
150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553, 1557–60, 1580–81 (2001).
3 See Administrative Conference of the United
States, Recommendation 79–4, Public Disclosure
Concerning the Use of Cost-Benefit and Similar
Analyses in Regulation, 44 FR 38826 (July 3, 1979)
(‘‘Wise decisionmaking presupposes that the
potential benefits and costs of the actions under
consideration will be identified, will be quantified
if feasible, and will be appraised in relation to each
other.’’); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information
& Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 Harv.
L. Rev. 1838, 1846 (2013) (‘‘Cost-benefit analysis
can be exceedingly important, and in the Obama
Administration, several steps were taken to
strengthen it, contributing to a situation in which
the net benefits of economically significant rules
were extraordinarily high.’’); cf. Richard L. Revesz
& Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How
Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the
Environment and Our Health 10 (2008) (‘‘Although
cost-benefit analysis, as currently practiced, is . . .
biased against regulation, those biases are not
inherent to the methodology. If those biases were
identified and eliminated, cost-benefit analysis
would become a powerful tool for neutral policy
analysis.’’).
4 As a general matter, ‘‘independent regulatory
agencies’’ are those whose heads possess ‘‘for
cause’’ removal protection and that enjoy some
degree of independence from the executive branch.
David E. Lewis & Jennifer L. Selin, ACUS
Sourcebook of United States Executive Agencies 49
(1st ed., 2d Printing Mar. 2013). Under Executive
Order 12,866, 58 FR 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993), the term
‘‘agency’’ excludes independent regulatory
agencies. Id. § 3(b). However, independent
regulatory agencies are covered by the planning
requirements in section 4 of the executive order.
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‘‘economically significant’’ rules.5 In 1981,
President Ronald Reagan issued Executive
Order (EO) 12,291,6 which instructed
covered executive agencies to prepare
regulatory impact analyses of their draft
proposed and final major rules (including a
description of benefits and costs), and to
submit all of their draft rules to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
within the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) before publication in the Federal
Register. Subsequent administrations have
reaffirmed the importance of benefit-cost
analysis and OIRA review. Currently, EO
12,866, issued by President William Jefferson
Clinton in 1993, requires Cabinet
departments and other covered executive
agencies to ‘‘assess both the costs and
benefits of the intended regulation and,
recognizing that some costs and benefits are
difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a
regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs.’’ 7 It also
requires them to assess the costs and benefits
of ‘‘significant’’ draft proposed and final
rules submitted to OIRA for review, and to
conduct more thorough analysis of
economically significant draft proposed and
final rules.8
As noted previously, independent
regulatory agencies traditionally have not
been subject to the formal benefit-cost
analysis requirements imposed by executive
order, although several recent Presidents
have encouraged those agencies to
voluntarily apply the principles contained in
the relevant executive orders.9 Virtually all
5 ‘‘Major’’ and ‘‘economically significant’’ rules
include (but are not limited to) rules likely to result
in annual costs, benefits, or transfer payments of
$100 million or more. See Congressional Review
Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2); Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra
note 4, § 3(f)(1). Transfer payments are monetary
payments from one group to another that do not
affect total resources available to society. See OMB
Circular A–4, supra note 1. The most common form
is the transfer of federal funds to the recipients of
those funds (e.g., grants, food stamps, Medicare or
Medicaid funds, and crop payments). In 2010, more
than one-third of all major rules were so categorized
because of the amount of transfer payments. See
U.S. Cong. Research Service, REINS Act: Number
and Types of ‘‘Major Rules’’ in Recent Years,
R41651, Feb. 21, 2011, by Curtis W. Copeland and
Maeve Carey.
6 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 FR 13193 (Feb. 17,
1981) (revoked by § 11 of EO 12,866).
7 Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 4, § 1(b)(6).
8 Id. § 6(a)(3); see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76
FR 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011) (President Obama) (stating
that the benefits of proposed and final rules must
‘‘justify’’ the costs); Administrative Conference of
the United States, Recommendation 88–9,
Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking, 54 FR
5207 (Feb. 2, 1989) (suggesting guidelines for the
enhanced openness of executive regulatory review
and recommending the reconsideration of existing
rules looking toward the repeal of unnecessary
regulations).
9 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 FR 41,587
(July 14, 2011) (stating that independent regulatory
agencies ‘‘should promote’’ the goal, articulated in
EO 13,563, of producing a ‘‘regulatory system that
protects public health, welfare, safety, and our
environment while promoting economic growth,
innovation, competitiveness, and job creation’’ and
‘‘should comply’’ with the provisions in EO 13,563
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TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
independent regulatory agencies are subject
to certain crosscutting statutes that may
require some type of regulatory analysis,
such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act 10 and
the Paperwork Reduction Act.11 In addition,
some independent regulatory agencies’
organic acts or other statutes require them to
conduct benefit-cost analyses or to consider
certain economic effects of their regulations,
although the requirements vary significantly
from agency to agency. For instance, some
agencies (e.g., the Consumer Product Safety
Commission) are required by statute to
prepare a formal regulatory analysis
statement that describes expected costs and
benefits prior to issuing certain rules.12 Other
agencies (e.g., the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC))
are required by statute to ‘‘consider’’ costs
and benefits or other factors associated with
some of their rules.13 Still other agencies
(e.g., the Federal Communications
Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission) are not subject to any formal
regulatory analysis requirements for most of
their rules.
The Administrative Conference believes
that it is in the interest of the independent
regulatory agencies, the executive branch,
Congress, the courts, and the public that
independent regulatory agencies’ current
practices relating to benefit-cost analysis be
documented. In this light, the report
supporting the recommendation examined
efforts by independent regulatory agencies to
analyze regulatory benefits and costs in
recent major rules.14 It also examined
whether the agencies factor benefits and costs
into their decisionmaking. The report
indicated that, in many instances,
independent regulatory agencies quantify at
least some of the costs (and, to a lesser
extent, the benefits) created by the major
rules they adopt and, in other instances, such
agencies usually provide at least qualitative
descriptions of the associated benefits and
costs. The report also discusses several
factors that the agencies said affected their
ability to quantify and monetize regulatory
costs and benefits. For example, several
agencies mentioned the Paperwork
Reduction Act approval process as inhibiting
their ability to gather the data needed to
prepare regulatory analyses in a timely
fashion.15
regarding public participation, integration and
innovation, flexible approaches, and science ‘‘[t]o
the extent permitted by law’’).
10 5 U.S.C. 601–12.
11 44 U.S.C. 3501–21.
12 15 U.S.C. 2058(f).
13 CFTC is required to ‘‘consider the costs and
benefits’’ of the agency’s action before issuing
certain rules and orders. 7 U.S.C. 19(a). The SEC is
required, when it is engaged in rulemaking under
certain statutory provisions, to ‘‘consider, in
addition to the protection of investors, whether the
action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.’’ 15 U.S.C. 77b(b). Interpretation
of these provisions has been a matter of debate.
14 See Curtis W. Copeland, Economic Analysis
and Independent Regulatory Agencies 60–107 (Mar.
29, 2013), available at https://acus.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/Copeland%20CBA%20Report%20
3-29-13.pdf.
15 Cf. Administrative Conference of the United
States, Recommendation 2012–4, Paperwork
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This recommendation encourages agencies
to voluntarily adopt certain practices that
some independent regulatory agencies (and
other agencies) have developed when
conducting regulatory analyses for major
rules. The Conference recognizes that
increasing he attention paid to the economic
impact of proposed and final rules might
well require substantial use of limited agency
resources. This might require independent
agencies to make significant tradeoffs among
competing priorities and may delay the
rulemaking process. Nevertheless, some
independent regulatory agencies are already
subject to benefit-cost and other types of
regulatory analysis requirements, and others
have voluntarily conducted such analyses,
and the Conference therefore wishes to
highlight innovative practices undertaken by
these agencies.16
The recommendation, first, identifies
various policies and practices used in several
of the independent regulatory agencies and
offers a series of proposals to encourage their
use in other agencies. For example, it
recommends that each independent
regulatory agency develop written guidance
on the preparation of benefit-cost and other
types of regulatory analyses. Such guidance
should be designed to help ensure that any
regulatory analysis the agency undertakes is
soundly developed, transparent, consistently
conducted, and contributes to agency
compliance with applicable statutes and
other rulemaking requirements. Second, the
recommendation highlights a series of
analytical practices that OMB Circular A–4
recommends to Cabinet departments and
other executive agencies for their major rules,
and the recommendation encourages
independent regulatory agencies to consider
whether those practices may be useful in the
development of their major rules. For
example, it recommends that agencies’
analyses be as transparent and reproducible
as practicable, subject to the limitations of
law and applicable policies (including
preventing the disclosure of proprietary
information or trade secrets, or other
confidential information). The
recommendation does not seek to establish a
one-size-fits-all approach to regulatory
analysis, and recognizes that each agency
must tailor the analyses it conducts to accord
with relevant statutory requirements, its own
regulatory priorities, and the potential impact
of the analysis on regulatory decisionmaking
to ensure proper use of limited agency
resources. Finally, the recommendation
proposes that, to the extent Congress decides
to impose or endorse new regulatory analysis
requirements on independent regulatory
agencies, Congress should consider giving
those agencies the discretion to scale the
analyses to the significance of the rules, and
should consider the agency resources needed
to satisfy such requirements.17
Reduction Act, ¶ 3, 77 FR 47800, 47808 (Aug. 10,
2012) (recommending that agencies ‘‘use all
available processes for OMB approval for
information gathering’’).
16 See, e.g., Copeland, supra note 14, at 99
(describing the Federal Communications
Commission’s increased usage of benefit-cost
analysis in light of EO 13,579).
17 Between January 2007 and December 2012,
federal agencies published 19,246 final rules, of
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Recommendation
Encouraging the Diffusion of Certain Policies
and Practices
1. Each independent regulatory agency
should develop and keep up to date written
guidance regarding the preparation of
benefit-cost and other types of regulatory
analyses. That guidance should be tailored to
the agency’s particular statutory and
regulatory environment. To accomplish this
goal, independent regulatory agencies may
choose whether or not to adopt or adapt the
regulatory analysis practices described in
OMB Circular A–4 or any successor
government-wide guidance.
2. If an independent regulatory agency
prepares a regulatory analysis for a proposed
or final rule, the analysis should be
developed as early in the rulemaking process
as reasonably practical. Once prepared, the
analysis may need to be updated as the
agency becomes aware of new information
that may affect the rulemaking, or if changes
are made to the substance of the rule.
3. If an independent regulatory agency
determines that additional analytical
expertise or experience may be helpful to
prepare a regulatory analysis (e.g.,
determining how certain costs or benefits
could be quantified or monetized), it should,
to the extent appropriate, consult with other
governmental entities with expertise in this
area.
4. Consistent with applicable laws and the
procedures and flexibilities permitted in the
Paperwork Reduction Act, independent
regulatory agencies and OIRA should
facilitate the timely collection of information
necessary to develop the agencies’ regulatory
analyses.
Recommended Practices for Major Rules
5. Independent regulatory agencies should
consider the appropriateness of the analytical
guidance provided in OMB Circular A–4
when developing regulatory analyses for
major rules. They should consider
structuring their analyses of those rules in
terms of three general principles: (a) Identify
the need for the regulation; (b) examine
plausible alternative regulatory approaches;
and (c) estimate, to the extent possible, the
benefits and costs of the proposed rule and
the primary alternatives.
6. Consistent with applicable laws and
agency resources, independent regulatory
agencies should consider including in their
regulatory analyses assessments of the impact
of not only those actions that are within the
agency’s statutory discretion but also of those
actions that are statutorily mandated.
Agencies should consider showing the effects
of both types of actions in order to improve
regulatory transparency.
7. Subject to the limitations of law and
applicable policies, independent regulatory
agencies’ regulatory analyses should be as
which 485 were considered ‘‘major’’ rules. See
Copeland, supra note 14, at Table 1. Expanding the
rules on which regulatory analysis is required from
‘‘economically significant’’ or ‘‘major’’ rules to rules
considered ‘‘significant’’ under EO 12,866 would
likely quintuple the number of analyses required.
See https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eoCountsSearch for data on this issue.
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transparent and reproducible as practicable.
In particular, agencies should consider
disclosing how the analyses were conducted,
posting the analyses on their Web sites and
other appropriate online fora, and
summarizing the methods and results in the
preambles of the notice of proposed
rulemaking and the final rule.
8. Independent regulatory agencies should
consider including in the preambles of the
notice of proposed rulemaking and the final
rule a summary statement or table concisely
showing the agencies’ overall estimates of the
expected total benefits, costs, and transfer
payments of regulatory actions and the
primary alternatives, including any benefits
or costs that could not be quantified or
monetized.
Recommendations to Congress
9. If Congress decides to establish or
endorse new requirements that independent
regulatory agencies prepare benefit-cost
analyses of their proposed or final rules, it
should recognize that agencies need (a) the
flexibility to scale the analyses to the
significance of the rules and (b) the resources
to satisfy such requirements.
Administrative Conference Recommendation
2013–3
Science in the Administrative Process
TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Adopted June 14, 2013
Over the last three decades, several
authorities made recommendations for
improving transparency in the use of
science 1 in the administrative process.2
Partially in response to these
recommendations, the executive branch and
Congress have made a number of reforms to
the scientific process undergirding agency
decisionmaking. In 2009, President Obama
issued a memorandum directing that, ‘‘[t]o
the extent permitted by law, there should be
transparency in the preparation,
identification, and use of scientific and
technological information in
policymaking.’’ 3 ‘‘Each agency should [also]
1 The scope of this recommendation is limited to
the ‘‘natural sciences’’ (e.g., chemistry, physics,
medical science, geology, etc.), mathematics,
statistics, computer science, and other allied fields.
It is based upon a report that deals with agency
research and decisionmaking related to the natural
sciences. Wendy Wagner, Science in Regulation: A
Study of Agency Decisionmaking Approaches (Feb.
18, 2013), available at https://www.acus.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/Science%20in%20
Regulation_Final%20Report_2_18_13_0.pdf.
2 See e.g. Nat’l Research Council, Review of the
Environmental Protection Agency’s Draft IRIS
Assessment of Formaldehyde (2011); Comm. on
Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants, Nat’l
Research Council, Science and Judgment in Risk
Assessment (1994); Nat’l Research Council, Risk
Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing
the Process (1983); Bipartisan Policy Ctr.,
Improving the Use of Science in Regulatory Policy
16, 41–42 (2009) [hereinafter ‘‘BPC Report’’]; see
also Ctr. for Effective Gov’t, Advancing the Public
Interest through Regulatory Reform:
Recommendations for President-Elect Obama and
the 111th Congress 26, 34, 47 (2008).
3 Memorandum from the Admin. of Barack H.
Obama for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies on Scientific Integrity, Daily Comp. Pres.
Docs., 2009 DCPD No. 00137 (Mar. 9, 2009)
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have appropriate rules and procedures to
ensure the integrity of the scientific process
within the agency.’’ 4 The Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP) elaborated
upon this memorandum in 2010, instructing
agencies to ‘‘communicate scientific and
technological findings by including a clear
explication of underlying assumptions;
accurate contextualization of uncertainties;
and a description of the probabilities
associated with both optimistic and
pessimistic projections.’’ 5
At base, these initiatives demand
heightened transparency of agencies’ use of
science as a central means of ensuring the
basic accountability of agency regulation. If
an agency identifies the role that scientific
information plays in its ultimate decision
and explains how it ensured that its scientific
analysis was rigorous, then the public has a
basis against which it can evaluate both the
scientific and policy judgments underlying
the agency’s decision. This transparency
allows those outside the agency to assess
whether the agency’s policy decision
comports with the authorizing law and the
scientific record. A transparent
decisionmaking process also advances other
institutional and scientific goals, such as
identifying promising areas for future
research and serving as a bulwark against
misuse of science for political ends.6
Despite these important initiatives, a study
commissioned by the Administrative
Conference 7 (and public meetings that
considered questions it raised) revealed that
agency decisionmaking processes would
benefit from further improvements. Drawing
on this learning, the recommendation offers
several proposals for enhancing the
transparency of agencies’ use of science. At
the same time, the Conference recognizes that
agencies’ abilities to implement this
recommendation may be affected by resource
limitations.
First, the recommendation highlights a
number of innovative practices undertaken
by different federal agencies to enhance the
transparency of their scientific
decisionmaking processes. As a general
matter, agencies should articulate the specific
questions to be informed by scientific
information, specify study designs for new
research, and establish criteria for weighing
existing studies.8 Agencies should identify
[hereinafter ‘‘Obama Scientific Integrity Memo’’],
available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD200900137/pdf/DCPD-200900137.pdf.
4 Id.
5 Memorandum from John P. Holdren, Director of
the Office of Science and Technology Policy, to the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on
Scientific Integrity (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
https://www.whitehouse. gov/sites/default/files/
microsites/ostp/scientific-integrity-memo12172010.pdf. To effectuate this and a number of
other responsibilities, agencies were asked to report
back to OSTP on the actions taken to develop and
implement their scientific integrity policies by
April 2011.
6 BPC Report, supra note 2, at 3.
7 Wagner, supra note 1.
8 In so doing, agencies should endeavor to explain
the relationship between scientific research and the
policy decisions the research is intended to inform.
Nat’l Research Council, Comm. on the Institutional
Means for Assessment of Risks to Public Health,
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scientific reports or data upon which they
relied and material literature that they
considered, but upon which they did not
rely, to the extent practicable and permitted
by law.9 Agencies should establish
checkpoints (i.e., times for closing off
consideration of additional research or
debate prior to making a final regulatory
decision) and policies for reopening that
consideration. Agencies should also consider
extending attribution to individual staff who
participate in the preparation of scientific
reports and taking other steps to promote
robust debate among agency scientists.10 In
addition, agencies should share best practices
with other agencies and should recommend
the removal of any legal impediments to
Risk Assessment in the Federal Government:
Managing the Process 7 (1983).
9 See Administrative Conference of the United
States, Recommendation 2011–1, Legal
Considerations in E-Rulemaking, ¶ 4, 76 FR 48789,
48789 (Aug. 9, 2011); see also Exec. Order. No.
13,642, Making Open and Machine Readable the
New Default for Government Information, 78 FR
28111 (May 14, 2013); Memorandum from John P.
Holdren, Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, to the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies on Increasing Access to
the Results of Federally Funded Research (Feb. 22,
2013) (calling for agency plans to permit public
access to research papers funded in whole or in part
with federal monies). As a general matter, the
agency should make publicly available any
scientific literature it considered, including
literature it reviewed but upon which it ultimately
did not rely. For purposes of the recommendation,
literature that an agency ‘‘considered’’ includes not
only any study an agency official relied upon but
also any study an agency official reviewed but
ultimately determined not to rely upon (because it
was deemed to be outside the scope of the scientific
study at hand, was not considered sufficiently
reliable, or was otherwise rejected by the agency
official). Cf. Administrative Conference of the
United States, Recommendation 2013–4, The
Administrative Record in Informal Rulemaking, l
FR lll (providing a similar definition of
‘‘consider’’ in the context of the administrative
record in informal rulemaking). If an agency official
merely had access to a study but did not
specifically analyze it to determine its relevance,
that study has not been ‘‘considered’’ within the
meaning of the recommendation for purposes of
making such literature publicly available.
10 In response to President Obama’s call for
agencies to develop ‘‘appropriate rules and
procedures to ensure the integrity of the scientific
process,’’ Obama Scientific Integrity Memo, supra
note 3, a number of agencies have promulgated
integrity policies to promote open debate among
agency scientists. See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Scientific Integrity Policy (Feb. 2012), available at
https://epa.gov/osa/pdfs/epa_scientific_integrity
_policy_20120115.pdf; Food and Drug Admin.,
Scientific Integrity at FDA, FDA Staff Manual
Guides, Volume IV—Agency Program Directives 2
(2012), available at https://www.fda.gov/
ScienceResearch/AboutScienceResearchatFDA/
ucm306446.htm; Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric
Admin., Scientific Integrity (Dec. 7, 2011), available
at https://www.corporateservices.noaa.gov/ames/
administrative_orders/chapter_202/202-735-D.pdf;
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Collaborative Work
Environment Program, https://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/values.html#open (last updated May 4, 2012);
see also Francesca T. Grifo, Federal Agency
Scientific Integrity Policies: A Comparative
Analysis (Mar. 2013), https://www.ucsusa.org/assets/
documents/scientific_integrity/SI-policiescomparative-analysis.pdf.
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promoting transparency in decisions in
which science is an important element.11
Second, the recommendation offers a series
of proposals to bring greater congruity to the
treatment of publicly and privately funded
scientific research. Specifically, it encourages
the disclosure of data underlying scientific
research, including both privately funded
and federally funded research, that an agency
is considering (to the extent practicable and
permitted by law).12 Similarly, it
recommends extending conflict of interest
disclosure norms to private parties who
submit studies used by an agency.
Recommendation
TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Suggested Agency Practices Regarding the
Use of Science in the Administrative Process
1. Explaining Agency Scientific
Decisionmaking. Agencies should explain in
proposed and final decision documents how
they ensured rigorous review of the scientific
information underlying each scienceintensive regulatory project. This includes a
statement of how each agency evaluated the
scientific information used in its analysis;
how the agency made that information
available to reviewers and the public; how
the analysis was reviewed by experts and
interested parties; and how the agency
ensured that the final decision was supported
by the scientific record.
2. Assuring Transparent Assessments. At
an early stage in their decisionmaking
processes, agencies should identify the
specific policy questions that may be
informed by science; describe the design of
the assessments needed to characterize risks
and inform policy decisions; and describe the
criteria to be used in reviewing and weighing
existing studies. When completed,
assessments should: Identify other
appropriate analytical choices and explain
why they were not chosen; provide a
synthesis of the available evidence and
relevant literature guided by the assessment
design or criteria; identify significant
assumptions and choices of analytical
techniques; provide a statement of remaining
uncertainties; and discuss how different
plausible choices might change the results of
the assessment. Where possible, agencies
should also explain the relationship between
their scientific findings and the final policy
choice. Agencies should strive to
communicate this information in a manner
that is clear to the general public.
3. Disclosing Underlying Studies and Data.
To the extent practicable and permitted by
law and applicable policies, each agency
should identify and make publicly available
(on the agency Web site or some other widely
available forum) references to the scientific
literature, underlying data, models, and
research results that it considered. In so
11 See Wagner, supra note 1, at 135–38
(identifying a number of external legal impediments
to promoting transparency, including short
statutory deadlines, limits on dissemination of
scientific studies, resource limitations, and caps on
the number of discretionary advisory committees
agencies can constitute).
12 Legal restrictions that may limit agencies’
ability to provide such disclosures include, among
other things, protections for personal privacy, trade
secrets, and confidential business information.
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doing, the agency should list all information
upon which it relied in reaching its
conclusions, as well as any information
material to the scientific analysis that it
considered but upon which it ultimately did
not rely. Consistent with the limitations in
the Information Quality Act (IQA) guidelines
issued by the Office of Management and
Budget and its own IQA guidelines, each
agency should ensure that members of the
public have access to the information
necessary to reproduce or assess the agency’s
technical or scientific conclusions.
4. Checkpoints and Explanations. Agencies
should consider establishing explicit
checkpoints for regulatory projects, defining
both the conditions under which they intend
to close their consideration of research or
debate in order to reach a decision and when
they might reopen that consideration,
particularly in cases when they are not
bound by judicially enforceable deadlines. In
any case, agencies should explain their
decisions to initiate, stop, or reopen
consideration of research or debate. Such
explanations should reference significant
relevant ongoing research or other relevant
factors.
5. Identifying Future Projects. For scienceintensive projects, agencies should identify
specific types of future research that may be
needed to reduce significant uncertainties in
order to advance understanding of the issues.
6. Attribution for Agency Personnel.
Agency personnel play an important role in
producing their respective agencies’
scientific analyses. Agencies should consider
providing their personnel with some form of
consensual attribution for reports or analyses
to which they contribute in a significant way.
If appropriate, such attributions should be
made for personnel who contributed in a
significant way to a technical or scientific
report, including not only scientists but also
economists, lawyers, and other contributors.
Reviewers and other contributors could be
identified by name and general contribution.
7. Encouraging Debate. Agencies should
encourage vigorous debate among agency
scientists and should explore ways of
incorporating the diversity of that debate in
any resulting work product. Agency
employees should be encouraged to publish
their scientific work in the peer reviewed
literature, provided that they follow
applicable agency procedures and that
confidential governmental deliberations are
not compromised. Dissenting staff members
should be protected from reprisals.
8. Sharing of Agency Best Practices.
Agencies should identify and publicize the
innovations they have developed for
transparently incorporating science into their
regulatory decisions. OSTP, an interagency
group headed by OSTP, or another body
should consider occasionally convening
agency representatives to discuss and share
best practices.
9. Addressing Legal Obstacles to
Transparent Decisionmaking. Agencies
should identify legal obstacles that may
impede otherwise appropriate public access
to the scientific information underlying
agency analyses or that may prevent the
agencies’ development of scientifically robust
decisionmaking processes. Agencies should
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recommend appropriate actions to eliminate
such impediments, including revisions in
existing law, to the Executive Office of the
President.
Agency Disclosures To Enhance the
Transparency of Research
10. Data Disclosure. To the extent
practicable and in compliance with
applicable legal restrictions, privileges,
protections, and authorities, agencies should
seek to provide disclosure of data underlying
scientific research, including both privately
and federally funded research being
considered by the agencies. Where
practicable, such information should be
disclosed in machine-readable format. Where
such data are not subject to legal or other
protections, and the data’s owners
nonetheless will not provide such access,
agencies should note that fact and explain
why they used the results if they chose to do
so. Agencies should review their confidential
business information policies to ensure that
they include appropriate mechanisms to
prevent over-claiming.
11. Conflict of Interest Disclosure. Agencies
should require conflict of interest disclosures
on all scientific research submitted to inform
an agency’s licensing, regulatory, or other
decisionmaking processes. This disclosure
should be similar to the conflict of interest
disclosure required by some scientific
journals, such as that used by the
International Committee of Medical Journal
Editors. The regulatory conflict of interest
disclosure should also, where permitted by
law, identify whether the experimenter or
author had the legal right without approval
of the sponsor of the research to: design the
research; collect the data; interpret the data;
and author, publish or otherwise disseminate
the resulting report or full dataset. To the
extent that a party other than the principal
investigator (e.g., the study sponsor or
funder) had control over the design or
publication of the study, agencies should
disclose this fact and specify the nature of
the control such an entity exercised.
Administrative Conference Recommendation
2013–4
The Administrative Record in Informal
Rulemaking
Adopted June 14, 2013
The administrative record in informal
rulemaking plays an essential role in
informing the public of potential agency
action and in improving the public’s ability
to understand and participate in agency
decisionmaking. As well, the administrative
record can be essential to judicial review of
agency decisionmaking under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which
directs courts to ‘‘review the whole record or
those parts of it cited by a party’’ to
determine whether challenged agency action
is lawful.1 This statutory language was
originally understood as referring to formal
proceedings. However, the Supreme Court
has long interpreted this APA provision as
also encompassing the ‘‘administrative
record’’ in informal agency proceedings,
15
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whether reviewable by statute or as final
agency actions under 5 U.S.C. 704.2 This
application to informal proceedings has
given rise to uncertainty and experimentation
as agencies and courts have worked to
implement the administrative record
concept—at times inconsistently. As a result,
confusion has arisen about the compilation
and uses of agency rulemaking records
maintained internally, public rulemaking
dockets, and administrative records for
judicial review. The differences among these
three types of records can be seen from their
descriptions below.
The Administrative Conference therefore
commissioned a study of federal agencies’
current practices in the development of
rulemaking records, public rulemaking
dockets, and administrative records for
judicial review.3 This recommendation and
the supporting report address these concepts
in the context of informal agency rulemaking
adopted pursuant to the notice-and-comment
procedures prescribed in 5 U.S.C. 553.4 The
recommendation does not address the record
for agency decisions made in other contexts,
such as in adjudication, formal rulemaking,
or guidance documents.
This recommendation builds upon earlier
Administrative Conference work in the areas
of rulemaking, recordkeeping, and
technological developments in managing
records. Administrative Conference
Recommendation 74–4, Preenforcement
Judicial Review of Rules of General
Applicability, identified the administrative
materials that should be available to a court
that was evaluating, on preenforcement
review, the factual basis for agency rules of
general applicability.5 That recommendation
was receptive to judicial development of the
concept of a ‘‘record’’ on review of informal
agency rulemakings. In Recommendation 93–
4, Improving the Environment for Agency
Rulemaking, the Administrative Conference
advised agencies to establish and manage
rulemaking files ‘‘so that maximum
disclosure to the public is achieved during
the comment period and so that a usable and
reliable file is available for purposes of
judicial review.’’ 6 A number of
Administrative Conference recommendations
also have examined the use of technology in
acquiring, releasing, and managing agency
2 Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
419 (1971).
3 Leland E. Beck, Agency Practices and Judicial
Review of Administrative Records in Informal
Rulemaking (May 14, 2013) (report to the
Administrative Conference of the United States)
[hereinafter Beck Report].
4 5 U.S.C. 553(b)–(d). It may also have application
to ‘‘hybrid’’ rulemaking statutes that require
additional procedures beyond those in § 553 but
less than those in formal rulemaking under 5 U.S.C.
556–57.
5 Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 74–4, Preenforcement Judicial
Review of Rules of General Applicability, 39 FR
23,044 (June 26, 1974), based on consultant’s report
published as Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of
Informal Rulemaking, 60 Va. L. Rev. 185 (1974).
6 Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 93–4, Improving the Environment
for Agency Rulemaking, 59 FR 4670 (Feb. 1, 1994),
correction published, 59 FR 8507 (Feb. 22, 1994).
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records.7 Most recently, the Conference
examined legal considerations associated
with the use of digital technologies in the
development and implementation of informal
rulemakings.8
This recommendation synthesizes and
updates the Conference’s prior
recommendations in these areas. It is
grounded in empirical research, supported by
a survey questionnaire on present agency
recordkeeping practices, as well as by a
review of existing agency guidance.9 The
Conference has identified and recommends
best practices for all rulemaking agencies in
the areas of record compilation, preservation,
and certification. The recommendation also
advises agencies to develop guidance to aid
agency personnel as they compile rulemaking
and administrative records and public
rulemaking dockets and to increase public
understanding of agency recordkeeping.
Agencies engage in informal rulemaking
with differing frequencies, resources, and
technological capabilities. Many agencies are
in a period of transition, as they move from
paper to electronic recordkeeping.10
Attention to the design of information
technology resources that is mindful of the
principles and best practices set forth below
can aid agencies in recordkeeping, as well as
facilitate greater public understanding of
agency decisionmaking and more effective
judicial review. For the purposes of this
recommendation, the rulemaking record,
public rulemaking docket, and the
administrative record for judicial review are
defined as follows:
‘‘Rulemaking record’’ means the full record
of materials before the agency in an informal
rulemaking. The Conference contemplates
that, in addition to materials required by law
to be included in the rulemaking record, as
well as all comments and materials
submitted to the agency during comment
periods, any material that the agency
considered should be included as part of that
record.
‘‘Considered’’ entails review by an
individual with substantive responsibilities
7 Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 2011–2, Rulemaking Comments,
76 FR 48,791 (Aug. 9, 2011); Administrative
Conference of the United States, Recommendation
2011–1, Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, 76
FR 48,789 (Aug. 9, 2011); Administrative
Conference of the United States, Recommendation
90–5, Federal Agency Electronic Records
Management and Archives, 55 FR 53270 (Dec. 28,
1990); Administrative Conference of the United
States, Recommendation 88–10, Federal Agency
Use of Computers in Acquiring and Releasing
Information, 54 FR 5209 (Feb. 2, 1989).
8 Recommendation 2011–1, supra note 7.
9 Beck Report, supra note 3, at Section III.
10 The Office of Management and Budget and the
National Archives have directed federal agencies to
manage all permanent electronic records in an
electronic format to the fullest extent possible by
December 31, 2019, and to develop plans to do so
by December 31, 2013. Memorandum from Jeffrey
D. Zients, Acting Director, Office of Management
and Budget, and David S. Ferriero, Archivist of the
United States, National Archives and Records
Administration, to the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies and Independent
Agencies concerning ‘‘Managing Government
Records Directive’’ M–12–18 (Aug. 24, 2012).
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in connection with the rulemaking.11 To say
that material was considered also entails
some minimum degree of attention to the
contents of a document. Thus, the
rulemaking record need not encompass every
document that rulemaking personnel
encountered while rummaging through a file
drawer, but it generally should include a
document that an individual with
substantive responsibilities reviewed in order
to evaluate its possible significance for the
rulemaking, unless the review disclosed that
the document was not germane to the subject
matter of the rulemaking. A document should
not be excluded from the rulemaking record
on the basis that the reviewer disagreed with
the factual or other analysis in the document,
or because the agency did not or will not rely
on it. Although the concept resists precise
definition, the term considered as used in
this recommendation should be interpreted
so as to fulfill its purpose of generating a
body of materials by which the rule can be
evaluated and to which the agency and
others may refer in the future.
‘‘Public rulemaking docket’’ means the
public version of the rulemaking record
managed by the agency, regardless of
location, such as online at Regulations.gov or
an agency Web site or available for physical
review in a docket room. The public
rulemaking docket includes all information
that the agency has made available for public
viewing. The Conference also urges agencies
to manage their public rulemaking dockets to
achieve maximum disclosure to the public.
However, the Conference recognizes that
prudential concerns may limit agencies from
displaying some information, such as certain
copyrighted or indecent materials, online. It
is a best practice for agencies to describe and
note online those materials that are not
displayed but are available for physical
inspection. Another agency best practice is to
include in the public rulemaking docket
materials generated and considered by the
agency after the close of the comment period
but prior to issuance of the final rule.12
‘‘Administrative record for judicial review’’
means the materials tendered by the agency
and certified to a court as the record on
11 The Conference first recommended inclusion of
materials ‘‘considered’’ by the agency in the
administrative record for judicial review in
Recommendation 74–4, supra note 5. Courts have
also relied on the concept of consideration in
defining the administrative record. Pac. Shores
Subdiv., Cal. Water Dist. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2006)
(citations omitted); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Chain
Drug Stores v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
631 F. Supp. 2d 23, 26 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing
Recommendation 74–4 in defining the
administrative record); cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657
F.2d 298, 394 n. 469 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing
Recommendation 74–4 as an approach to defining
the administrative record).
12 The present recommendation is not limited to
disclosures that the APA, as construed in widely
followed case law, may require. See Ass’n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors, 745 F.2d
677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (‘‘[A]t least the most
critical factual material that is used to support the
agency’s position on review must have been made
public in the proceeding. . . .’’). However, this
case law gives agencies an additional reason to
provide public disclosure of factual material in
some circumstances.
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review of the agency’s regulatory action. The
administrative record provided to the court
will include an affidavit, made by a certifying
official, attesting to the contents and
accuracy of the record being certified.13 It
should also include an index itemizing the
contents.14 Parties often rely on this index in
designating portions of the administrative
record for judicial review, such as for
inclusion in a joint appendix that will be
presented to the court. The designated
portions of the administrative record then
typically serve as the basis for the court’s
review, as provided in the Administrative
Procedure Act and as appropriate under the
rules of the reviewing court.15
Some materials in an agency’s rulemaking
record may be protected from public
disclosure by law or withheld from the
public on the basis of agency privilege. For
example, protected materials might include
classified information, confidential
supervisory or business information, or trade
secrets. Other materials might be withheld on
the basis of privilege, including attorneyclient privilege, the attorney work product
privilege, and the pre-decisional deliberative
process privilege. Agency practices regarding
the identification or inclusion of protected or
privileged materials in administrative records
and their accompanying indices vary.16 Some
agencies do not include or identify
deliberative or privileged materials in
administrative records for judicial review.17
Other agencies identify non-disclosed
materials specifically in a privilege log
provided with the index of the administrative
record for judicial review. Agencies have also
noted redactions of protected materials in the
administrative record for judicial review and
moved the court to permit filing of protected
materials, or a summary thereof, under seal.
Many agencies do not have a policy on
inclusion of protected or privileged materials
in an administrative record for judicial
review and manage such materials on a caseby-case basis. Case-by-case consideration
may occasionally be necessary, such as when
privileged materials are referenced as the
basis of the agency’s decision. Nonetheless,
the Conference recommends that agencies
develop a written policy for treatment of
protected or privileged materials, including
indexing, in public rulemaking dockets and
in certification of the administrative record
for judicial review, and that agencies make
this policy publicly available.
Compilation and preparation of the
administrative record for judicial review is
13 Beck
Report, supra note 3, at Section IV.A.
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14 Id.
15 5 U.S.C. 706 (‘‘. . . the court shall review the
whole record or those parts of it cited by a
party. . . .’’).
16 The variety of agency practices is described at
length in the Beck Report, supra note 3, at Section
IV.A.
17 Absent a showing of bad faith or improper
behavior, the agency practice of excluding predecisional materials from the administrative record
on judicial review enjoys substantial judicial
support. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served
on Office of Comptroller of Currency, 156 F.3d 1279
(D.C. Cir. 1998); San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace
v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 789 F.2d 26, 44–45
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc).
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properly within the province of the agency
and this process should be accorded a
presumption of regularity by the reviewing
court.18 Completion or supplementation of
the administrative record for judicial review
may be appropriate where a strong showing
has been made to overcome the presumption
of regularity in compilation. For example,
courts have permitted limited discovery on
the basis of a ‘‘strong showing of bad faith
or improper behavior’’ on the part of the
agency decisionmaker.19 Courts may also
inquire into allegations that the agency
omitted information from the administrative
record for judicial review that should have
been included.20
Completion or supplementation of the
administrative record for judicial review may
also be appropriate in other circumstances
not addressed in this recommendation. In a
previous recommendation, the Conference
has recognized that the reviewing court
should not invariably be confined to the
record on review in evaluating the factual
basis of a generally applicable rule on
preenforcement review.21 The Conference
has also acknowledged that, on direct review
by courts of appeals, the record on review
‘‘can usually be supplemented, if necessary,
by means other than an evidentiary trial in
a district court.’’ 22
Recommendation
Record Contents
1. The Rulemaking Record. In the absence
of a specific statutory requirement to the
contrary, the agency rulemaking record in an
informal rulemaking proceeding should
include:
(a) Notices pertaining to the rulemaking;
(b) comments and other materials
submitted to the agency related to the
rulemaking;
(c) transcripts or recordings, if any, of oral
presentations made in the course of a
rulemaking;
(d) reports or recommendations of any
relevant advisory committees;
(e) other materials required by statute,
executive order, or agency rule to be
considered or to be made public in
connection with the rulemaking; and
Citizens for Alternatives to Radioactive
Dumping v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 485 F.3d 1091,
1097 (10th Cir. 1985) (‘‘. . . designation of the
Administrative Record, like any established
administrative procedure, is entitled to a
presumption of administrative regularity.’’) (citation
omitted); Amfac Resorts, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of
Interior, 143 F.Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2001); see also
United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–
15 (1926) (‘‘The presumption of regularity supports
the official acts of public officers and, in the
absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts
presume that they have properly discharged their
official duties.’’).
19 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
20 See, e.g., Cape Cod Hospital v. Sebelius, 630
F.3d 203, 211–12 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ad Hoc Metals
Coalition v. Whitman, 227 F. Supp. 2d 134, 139–
40 (D.D.C. 2002).
21 Recommendation 74–4, supra note 5.
22 Administrative Conference of the United
States, Recommendation 75–3, The Choice of
Forum for Judicial Review of Administrative Action
¶ 5(a), 40 FR 27926 (July 2, 1975).
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(f) any other materials considered by the
agency during the course of the rulemaking.
2. The Public Rulemaking Docket.
Agencies should manage their public
rulemaking dockets to achieve maximum
public disclosure. Insofar as feasible, the
public rulemaking docket should include all
materials in the rulemaking record, subject to
legal limitations on disclosure, any claims of
privilege, or any exclusions allowed by law
that the agency chooses to invoke. In
addition, it may be prudent not to include
some sensitive information online and to
note instead that this material is available for
physical review in a reading room.
3. The Administrative Record for Judicial
Review. The administrative record provided
to the court on judicial review of informal
rulemaking should contain all of the
materials in the rulemaking record as set
forth in paragraph 1, except that agencies
need not include materials protected from
disclosure by law nor materials that the
agency has determined are subject to
withholding based on appropriate legal
standards, including privilege.
Rulemaking Recordkeeping
4. Agencies should begin compiling
rulemaking records no later than the date on
which an agency publishes the notice of
proposed rulemaking. Agencies should
include materials considered in preparation
of the notice of proposed rulemaking. For
example, agencies should include materials
received in response to an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking or a notice of inquiry,
if there is one, and considered in
development of the proposed rule. The
agency should continue compiling the
rulemaking record as long as the rule is
pending before the agency.
5. Agencies should designate one or more
custodians for rulemaking recordkeeping,
either on a rulemaking-by-rulemaking basis
or generally. Agencies should inform agency
personnel of the custodian(s) and direct them
to deposit rulemaking record materials with
the custodian(s), excepting if necessary
confidential information to which access is
restricted. The custodian(s) should document
the record compilation process.
Public Rulemaking Dockets
6. To the extent practicable, agencies
should index public rulemaking dockets for
informal rulemaking, at an appropriate level
of detail.
Record Preservation
7. The National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA) should amend its
agency guidance to address the official status
and legal value of records relating to informal
rulemaking, particularly administrative
records for judicial review.
8. Agencies using electronic records
management systems to manage rulemaking
records, such as the Federal Document
Management System or agency specific
systems, should work with NARA to ensure
the adequacy of such systems for
recordkeeping purposes and the transfer to
the National Archives of permanent records.
Agencies should review their records
schedules in light of developments in
electronic records management.
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Certification of Administrative Records for
Judicial Review
9. Agencies should develop procedures for
designating appropriate individuals, who
may or may not be record custodians, to
certify administrative records to the court in
case of judicial review of agency action.
Agency certifications should include an
index of contents of the administrative record
for judicial review.
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Agency Record Policies and Guidance
10. Agencies should develop a general
policy regarding treatment of protected or
privileged materials, including indexing, in
public rulemaking dockets and in
certification of the administrative record for
judicial review. Agencies should make this
policy available to the public and should
provide it to the Department of Justice, if the
Department represents the agency in
litigation.
11. Agencies that engage in informal
rulemaking should issue guidance to aid
personnel in implementing the above best
practices. Agencies should make their
guidance on informal rulemaking and
administrative recordkeeping available to the
public and should provide it to the
Department of Justice, if the Department
represents the agency in litigation. The level
of detail and contents of such guidance will
vary based on factors such as: The size of
typical agency rulemaking records;
institutional experience, or the lack thereof,
with record compilation and informal
rulemaking litigation; the need for
consistency across agency components in the
development and maintenance of rulemaking
records; and agency resources. However,
agencies should ensure that guidance
addresses at least the following:
(a) Essential components of the rulemaking
record, public rulemaking docket, and the
administrative record for judicial review;
(b) appropriate exclusions from the
rulemaking record, including guidance on
whether and when to exclude materials such
as personal notes or draft documents;
(c) timing of compilation and indexing
practices;
(d) management and segregation of
privileged materials, e.g., attorney work
product or pre-decisional deliberative
materials;
(e) management and segregation of
sensitive or protected materials, e.g.,
copyrighted, classified, protected personal, or
confidential supervisory or business
information;
(f) policies and procedures, if any, for the
protection of sensitive information submitted
by the public during the process of
rulemaking or otherwise contained in the
rulemaking record;
(g) preservation of rulemaking and
administrative records and public
rulemaking dockets;
(h) certification of the administrative
record for judicial review, including the
process for identifying the appropriate
certifying official; and
(i) relevant capabilities and limitations of
recordkeeping tools and technologies.
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Judicial Review
12. A reviewing court should afford the
administrative record for judicial review a
presumption of regularity.
13. In appropriate circumstances, a
reviewing court should permit or require
supplementation or completion of the record
on review. Supplementation or completion
may be appropriate when the presumption of
regularity has been rebutted, such as in cases
where there is a strong showing that an
agency has acted improperly or in bad faith
or there are credible allegations that the
administrative record for judicial review is
incomplete.
[FR Doc. 2013–16541 Filed 7–9–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6110–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service
[Docket No. APHIS–2013–0054]
Notice of Request for Extension of
Approval of an Information Collection;
Interstate Movement of Fruit From
Hawaii
Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service, USDA.
ACTION: Extension of approval of an
information collection; comment
request.
AGENCY:
In accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, this
notice announces the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service’s intention to
request an extension of approval of an
information collection associated with
the regulations for the interstate
movement of fruit from Hawaii.
DATES: We will consider all comments
that we receive on or before September
9, 2013.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
by either of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=APHIS-2013-00540001.
• Postal Mail/Commercial Delivery:
Send your comment to Docket No.
APHIS–2013–0054, Regulatory Analysis
and Development, PPD, APHIS, Station
3A–03.8, 4700 River Road, Unit 118,
Riverdale, MD 20737–1238.
Supporting documents and any
comments we receive on this docket
may be viewed at https://
www.regulations.gov/
#!docketDetail;D=APHIS-2013-0054 or
in our reading room, which is located in
room 1141 of the USDA South Building,
14th Street and Independence Avenue
SW., Washington, DC. Normal reading
room hours are 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.,
SUMMARY:
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Monday through Friday, except
holidays. To be sure someone is there to
help you, please call (202) 799–7039
before coming.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
information on the regulations for the
interstate movement of fruit from
Hawaii, contact Mr. David Lamb,
Regulatory Coordination Specialist,
RPM, PPQ, APHIS, 4700 River Road,
Unit 133, Riverdale, MD 20737; (301)
851–2103. For copies of more detailed
information on the information
collection, contact Mrs. Celeste Sickles,
APHIS’ Information Collection
Coordinator, at (301) 851–2908.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Title: Interstate Movement of Fruit
From Hawaii.
OMB Number: 0579–0331.
Type of Request: Extension of
approval of an information collection.
Abstract: The Plant Protection Act (7
U.S.C. 7701 et seq.) authorizes the
Secretary of Agriculture to restrict the
importation, entry, or interstate
movement of plants, plant products, and
other articles to prevent the
introduction of plant pests into the
United States or their dissemination
within the United States. The
regulations in 7 CFR part 318, State of
Hawaii and Territories Quarantine
Notices, prohibit or restrict the
interstate movement of fruits,
vegetables, and other products from
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, and Guam to the continental
United States to prevent the spread of
plant pests or noxious weeds.
In accordance with the regulations in
§ 318.13–26, breadfruit, jackfruit, fresh
pods of cowpea and its relatives, dragon
fruit, mangosteen, moringa pods, and
melon must meet certain conditions for
interstate movement from Hawaii into
the continental United States. These
conditions involve information
collection activities, including
certificates and limited permits.
We are asking the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) to
approve our use of these information
collection activities for an additional 3
years.
The purpose of this notice is to solicit
comments from the public (as well as
affected agencies) concerning our
information collection. These comments
will help us:
(1) Evaluate whether the collection of
information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the
Agency, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
(2) Evaluate the accuracy of our
estimate of the burden of the collection
of information, including the validity of
the methodology and assumptions used;
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10JYN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 132 (Wednesday, July 10, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 41352-41361]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-16541]
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Notices
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains documents other than rules
or proposed rules that are applicable to the public. Notices of hearings
and investigations, committee meetings, agency decisions and rulings,
delegations of authority, filing of petitions and applications and agency
statements of organization and functions are examples of documents
appearing in this section.
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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 132 / Wednesday, July 10, 2013 /
Notices
[[Page 41352]]
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
Adoption of Recommendations
AGENCY: Administrative Conference of the United States.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: The Administrative Conference of the United States adopted
four recommendations at its Fifty-eighth Plenary Session. The appended
recommendations address ways to improve the adjudication of Social
Security disability benefits, best practices for use of benefit-cost
analysis in rulemaking by independent regulatory agencies, transparency
in agencies' scientific decisionmaking, and best practices for agencies
with respect to the administrative record in informal rulemaking.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For Recommendation 2013-1, Amber
Williams; for Recommendations 2013-2 and 2013-3, Reeve Bull; for
Recommendation 2013-4, Stephanie Tatham. For all four recommendations
the address and phone number are: Administrative Conference of the
United States, Suite 706 South, 1120 20th Street NW., Washington, DC
20036; Telephone 202-480-2080.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Administrative Conference Act, 5 U.S.C.
591-596, established the Administrative Conference of the United
States. The Conference studies the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness
of the administrative procedures used by Federal agencies and makes
recommendations for improvements to agencies, the President, Congress,
and the Judicial Conference of the United States (5 U.S.C. 594(1)). For
further information about the Conference and its activities, see https://www.acus.gov.
At its Fifty-eighth Plenary Session, held June 13-14, 2013, the
Assembly of the Conference adopted four recommendations. Recommendation
2013-1, ``Improving Consistency in Social Security Disability
Adjudications,'' identifies ways to improve the adjudication of Social
Security disability benefits claims before administrative law judges
and the Appeals Council, suggests changes to the evaluation of opinion
evidence from medical professionals, and encourages the agency to
enhance data capture and reporting.
Recommendation 2013-2, ``Benefit-Cost Analysis at Independent
Regulatory Agencies,'' highlights a series of best practices directed
at independent regulatory agencies in the preparation of benefit-cost
analyses that accompany proposed and final rules.
Recommendation 2013-3, ``Science in the Administrative Process,''
promotes transparency in agencies' scientific decision-making,
including: articulation of questions to be informed by science
information; attribution for agency personnel who contributed to
scientific analyses; public access to underlying data and literature;
and conflict of interest disclosures for privately funded research used
by the agencies in licensing, rulemaking, or other administrative
processes.
Recommendation 2013-4, ``The Administrative Record in Informal
Rulemaking,'' offers best practices for agencies in the compilation,
preservation, and certification of records in informal rulemaking, and
supports the judicial presumption of regularity for agency
administrative records except in certain limited circumstances.
The Appendix (below) sets forth the full texts of these four
recommendations. The Conference will transmit them to affected agencies
and to appropriate committees of the United States Congress. The
recommendations are not binding, so the relevant agencies, the
Congress, and the courts will make decisions on their implementation.
The Conference based these recommendations on research reports that
it has posted at: https://www.acus.gov/meetings-and-events/plenary-meeting/58th-plenary-session/. A video of the Plenary Session is
available at the same web address, and a transcript of the Plenary
Session will be posted once it is available.
Dated: July 3, 2013.
Paul R. Verkuil,
Chairman.
APPENDIX--RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES
Administrative Conference Recommendation 2013-1
Improving Consistency in Social Security Disability Adjudications
Adopted June 13, 2013
The Administrative Conference of the United States (Conference)
has undertaken many studies over the years relating to the Social
Security disability benefits system.\1\ It has issued a number of
recommendations specifically directed at improving the Social
Security Administration's (SSA's) initial application and appeals
processes,\2\ as well as other recommendations more generally
designed to improve agency adjudicatory procedures.\3\ The
Conference last issued a recommendation on the Social Security
disability benefits system over twenty years ago. The system has
grown substantially since that time. Approximately 3.3 million
disability claims are now filed annually,\4\ which represents a 57%
increase since 1990.\5\ In a program of this size, adjudicating
disability benefits claims in a fair, consistent,
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and timely manner is a monumental challenge.
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\1\ The Social Security Act created two programs--Social
Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income--to
provide monetary benefits to persons with disabilities who satisfy
these programs' respective requirements. See 42 U.S.C. 401(b), 1381
(2011).
\2\ These recommendations include: Recommendation 91-3, The
Social Security Representative Payee Program, 56 FR 33847 (July 24,
1991); Recommendation 90-4, Social Security Disability Program
Appeals Process: Supplementary Recommendation, 55 FR 34213 (Aug. 22,
1990); Recommendation 89-10, Improved Use of Medical Personnel in
Social Security Disability, 55 FR 1665 (Jan. 18, 1990 (as amended));
Recommendation 87-7, A New Role for the Social Security Appeals
Council, 52 FR 49143 (Dec. 30, 1987) [hereinafter ACUS
Recommendation 87-7]; and Recommendation 78-2, Procedures for
Determining Social Security Disability Claims, 43 FR 27508 (June 26,
1978).
\3\ See, e.g., Recommendation 2011-4, Agency Use of Video
Hearings: Best Practices and Possibilities for Expansion, 76 FR
48789 (Aug. 9, 2011); Recommendation 89-8, Agency Practices and
Procedures for the Indexing and Public Availability of Adjudicatory
Decisions, 54 FR 53495 (Dec. 29, 1989); Recommendation 86-7, Case
Management as a Tool for Improving Agency Adjudication, 51 FR 46989
(Dec. 30, 1986); Recommendation 73-3, Quality Assurance Systems in
the Adjudication of Claims of Entitlement to Benefits or
Compensation, 38 FR 16840 (June 27, 1973).
\4\ Soc. Sec. Admin., Annual Performance Plan for FY 2013 and
Revised Performance Plan for FY 2012, at 11 (2012).
\5\ Soc. Sec. Advisory Bd., Aspects of Disability Decision
Making: Data and Materials 6 tbls. 1a & 1b (Feb. 2012) [hereinafter
SSAB 2012 Report].
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Those cases flow through a nationwide, multi-step process, by
which SSA determines whether a claimant is disabled and eligible for
benefits. State agencies make initial disability determinations
using federal guidelines. Claimants may file (and pursue) their own
claims or they may choose to enlist the assistance of a
representative, who may or may not be a lawyer.\6\ If benefits are
denied, claimants may request reconsideration (in most states). If
benefits are denied after reconsideration, claimants may request a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). ALJs adjudicate
nearly 800,000 cases a year.\7\ In FY 2011, about 56% of disability
benefits claims were allowed at the ALJ hearing stage,\8\ though
more recent figures show a decline in this rate.\9\ ALJ hearings,
which may be in-person or by video teleconferencing, are conducted
using a de novo standard of review, and generally follow the
Administrative Procedure Act's adjudication procedures. Although
ALJs preside at the hearings, decisionwriters typically write
decisions for ALJs based on instructions from them. Usually,
decisionwriters are not assigned to specific ALJs, but serve instead
as part of a ``pool'' in each hearing office from which writing
assignments for decisions are made.
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\6\ The administrative process for adjudication of Social
Security disability claims is nonadversarial in nature. See, e.g.,
20 CFR 404.900(b), 416.1400(b) (2012) (describing agency's
administrative review process as ``informal'' and ``nonadversary'');
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339 (1976) (``The hearing is
nonadversary and the SSA is not represented by counsel.'');
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 403 (1971) (``We bear in mind
that [SSA] operates essentially, and is intended so to do, as an
adjudicator and not as an advocate or adversary.'').
\7\ SSAB 2012 Report, supra note 5, at 13.
\8\ Harold Krent & Scott Morris, Statistical Appendix: Analysis
of Administrative Law Judge Disposition and Favorable Rates in
Fiscal Years 2009 to 2011 13, 14 tbl. A-8 (2013) [hereinafter
Statistical Appendix].
\9\ Harold Krent & Scott Morris, Achieving Greater Consistency
in Social Security Disability: An Empirical Study and Suggested
Reforms 8 (2013) (noting a 50% allowance rate in FY 2012).
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Appeals Council review is the final step in the administrative
process. The Appeals Council is comprised of about 125 appellate
adjudicators who typically take action--without oral argument--
individually or in two-member panels.\10\ The Appeals Council has
discretionary authority to grant, deny, or dismiss a claimant's
request for review, as well as remand the case back to an ALJ or
issue a decision.\11\ In FY 2012, the Appeals Council processed over
166,000 requests for review, a 30.7% increase from FY 2011.\12\ In
addition to processing requests for review, the Appeals Council has
authority to review all types of unappealed decisions (i.e.,
allowances or benefit denials) on its ``own motion'' through use of
random or selective sampling techniques.\13\ Currently, the Appeals
Council's ``own motion'' review docket draws from a national random
sample of ALJ allowance decisions as a quality assurance mechanism;
the Appeals Council has not yet reviewed unappealed ALJ denial
decisions, and has declined to use its selective sampling authority
to identify and review unappealed cases with a high likelihood of
error in recent years.\14\ In FY 2012, the Appeals Council completed
random review of 7,074 ALJ allowance decisions.\15\ The Appeals
Council publishes its decisions only rarely, in the form of Appeals
Council Interpretations (ACIs), and its decisions sometimes serve as
the basis for Social Security Rulings. Claimants who disagree with
the final administrative decision may seek initial judicial review
in federal district court.
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\10\ See 20 CFR 422.205 (2012) (prescribing Appeals Council
review procedures); see also Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow,
The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and Utility
of the Soc. Sec. Admin.'s Appeals Council, 17 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
199, 253-54 (1990).
\11\ The Conference believes that its 1987 conclusion, that a
``principal mandate'' of the Appeals Council is ``to recommend and,
where appropriate, develop and implement adjudicatory principles and
decisional standards for the disability determination process''
remains valid today. See ACUS Recommendation 87-7, supra note 2.
\12\ Soc. Sec. Admin., Office of Appellate Operations, Executive
Director's Broadcast, at 1 (Oct. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Exec. Dir.
Broadcast]. Of these 166,000 requests for review, the Appeals
Council dismissed or denied 78.3% of the requests, remanded 18.6% of
the cases back to ALJs, and issued decisions (i.e., fully favorable,
partially favorable, or unfavorable) in 2.6% of the cases. Id. at 2.
\13\ As the name connotes, random sampling involves selection of
hearing level cases for Appeals Council review from a national pool
without regard for case characteristics or correctness, other than
broad categories designed to assure randomness (e.g., allowances
within a given date range). By contrast, selective sampling is
specifically designed to identify cases for review that ``exhibit
problematic issues or fact patterns that increase the likelihood of
error.'' 20 CFR 404.969(b)(1), 416.1469(b)(1) (2012) (detailing the
Appeals Council's ``own motion'' review authority and procedures);
see also Soc. Sec. Admin., Identification and Referral of Cases
Under Appeals Council's Own Motion Review Authority, 63 FR 36560
(July 7, 1998). These procedures are established pursuant to the
Social Security Act's broad grant of authority to the Commissioner
to establish hearing procedures and, on his or her own motion, hold
hearings or conduct other proceedings as necessary for the proper
administration of the program. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 405(b)(1),
1383(c)(1)(A) (2011).
\14\ This recommendation suggests that, to enhance decisional
accuracy and consistency, SSA expand the Appeals Council's use of
``own motion'' review of unappealed ALJ decisions through selective
sampling based on announced, neutral, and objective criteria that
identify problematic issues, fact patterns, or case characteristics.
Under this recommendation, focused review might be warranted, for
example, based on: the subject matter of a claim, the manner in
which a hearing was held, or statistical analyses showing a high
likelihood of error or significantly anomalous outcomes.
\15\ Exec. Dir. Broadcast, supra note 12, at 3. The Appeals
Council agreed with the decisions of ALJs 82.5% of the time, and
either remanded or issued corrective decisions approximately 16% of
the time. At the end of the FY 2012, there were 741 ``own motion''
review cases still pending final action. Id.
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Adjudicators and other agency employees at both the ALJ hearing
level and Appeals Council level use electronic case management
systems to help manage their workflow and to provide case-related
management information. The current system in use at the hearing
level is the Case Processing Management System (CPMS), while the
Appeals Council level uses the Appeals Council Review Processing
System (ARPS). Not only do adjudicators and other staff use CPMS and
ARPS in their day-to-day work, but the agency also uses data from
these systems to identify and address trends and anomalies existing
at the various levels of agency adjudication. While SSA has
endeavored to build effective data reporting systems, limitations
still exist that relate to data capture and linking the various
systems.
Not only does SSA process an extraordinary number of claims
through a national, multi-tiered system, but, in doing so, the
agency tries to ensure that decisionmaking is consistent and
accurate at all levels of adjudication, and that legally sufficient
decisions are issued that can withstand review by federal courts.
Consistency and accuracy, however, have suffered under the strain of
administering such a sprawling program. To be sure, an ALJ faces an
enormous task in adjudicating hundreds of cases annually.\16\
Nonetheless, divergent allowance rates among ALJs suggest that
claims are being resolved in an inconsistent, if not inaccurate,
manner.\17\ The Appeals Council similarly struggles to fulfill its
error-correction and quality-review roles. That these steps may have
room for improvement is evidenced by the 45% rate at which cases are
remanded back to the agency from federal courts in recent years.\18\
Bringing greater consistency and accuracy to the disability claims
adjudication process will enhance the fairness and integrity of the
program.
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\16\ On average, for FY 2009-FY 2011, ALJs issued 538.9
dispositions per year. See Statistical Appendix, supra note 8, at 6,
8 tbl. A-2.
\17\ In recent years, while the distribution of yearly allowance
disposition rates has been approximately normal (i.e., a mean of
56%), the distribution covers a wide range of allowance rates, with
95% of the rates falling between 26% and 85%. See id. at 13, 14 fig.
A-8 (analyzing allowance rates for FY 2009-FY 2011). The lowest
allowance rate was 4% and the highest allowance rate was 98%. See
id.
\18\ See id. at 54 tbl. A-24. Policy compliance among ALJs has
improved in recent years. See Michael J. Astrue, former Comm'r, Soc.
Sec. Admin., Address at the Social Security Advisory Board Forum:
Straight Talk about ``Disability Reform.'' (Mar. 8, 2013), available
at https://www.ssab.gov/Portals/0/2013Forum/Presentations/Astrue%20Speech%203-8-13.pdf.
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One area of particular concern--due to its apparent contribution
to a high remand rate--is SSA's treating source rule, which
generally affords ``controlling weight'' to the opinions of a
claimant's treating physician, psychologist, or other acceptable
medical source.\19\ In the early 1990s, SSA sought to bring greater
clarity and uniformity to the assessment of medical evidence by
establishing regulatory standards for such evaluations. In practice,
however, this evidentiary rule has not delivered on its promise of
improving consistency. In recent years, erroneous application of the
treating source rule has been cited as the basis for
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remand by the Appeals Council at a 10% frequency rate, and the
frequency rate with which it is cited by federal courts is even
higher at 35%.\20\ Dramatic changes in the American health care
system over the past twenty years also call into question the
ongoing efficacy of the special deference afforded to the opinions
of treating sources. Individuals typically visit multiple medical
professionals in a variety of settings for their health care needs
and less frequently develop a sustained relationship with one
physician.\21\ Moreover, difficulty in determining who among a wide
range of medical professionals should be considered a treating
source has bedeviled ALJs and reviewing courts, contributing to high
remand rates.\22\
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\19\ See 20 CFR 404.1527(c), 416.927(c) (2012).
\20\ See Office of the Chairman, Administrative Conference of
the United States, SSA Disability Benefits Programs: Assessing the
Efficacy of the Treating Physician Rule, Appendix B, at A-4, A-8
(2013).
\21\ See id. at 25-33.
\22\ See id. at 23-24, 33-35.
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This recommendation finds its genesis in SSA's request that the
Conference study the role of the Appeals Council in reviewing cases
to reduce any observed variances among adjudicative decisions at the
hearing level, as well as the efficacy of SSA's treating source
rule. These studies also revealed other areas that appear ripe for
recommendation. While SSA has enacted various initiatives to
increase consistency and has issued rulings to clarify its
regulations, the size and complexity of the system leave more work
to be done. The following recommendations reaffirm certain portions
of past recommendations that remain valid and relevant and also
identify new approaches to ensure consistency, accuracy, and
fairness across this massive decision system.
Recommendation
ALJ Hearing Stage
1. Improving Adjudication Effectiveness and Consistency. In
order to promote greater decisional consistency and streamline the
adjudication process at the ALJ hearing stage, SSA should:
(a) Require claimant representatives (while also permitting
claimants without representation) to submit pre-hearing briefs in a
standardized format that, among other things, summarizes the medical
evidence and justification for the claimant's eligibility for
benefits;
(b) expand the use of video hearings in a manner consistent with
sound technological practices, because such hearings promote
efficiency and do not lead to a significant difference in allowance
rates from in-person hearings. SSA should continue to advise
claimants that opting for video hearings often results in faster
scheduling of hearings (as compared to in-person hearings) and more
convenient hearing locations; and
(c) assign decisionwriters and case technicians to specific ALJs
in a hearing office (with Hearing Office Directors continuing to
supervise such support staff), while maintaining flexibility to meet
operational needs.
Appeals Council
2. Balancing Error-Correction and Systemic Review Functions. SSA
should continue to promote the consistent application of policy to
the adjudication of disability benefits claims across a nationwide
program. SSA should ensure that the Appeals Council strikes an
appropriate balance between its error-correction function when
exercising discretionary review of individual claimants' requests
for review, and its mandate to improve organizational effectiveness,
decisional consistency, and communication of agency policy through
use of ``own motion'' review (as to both allowances and unappealed
denials) and other types of systemic quality assurance measures.
3. Enhancing Communication. SSA should make clear that an
essential function of the Appeals Council is both to focus on
consistent application of Social Security regulations and policies
on a systemic basis, and to disseminate advice and guidance to SSA
policymakers, ALJs, and other lower-level decisionmakers. The
Appeals Council should advise and assist policymakers and
decisionmakers by:
(a) Issuing Appeals Council Interpretations (ACIs), with greater
frequency, in order to: Address policy gaps; promote greater
consistency and uniformity throughout the adjudicatory process; and
establish precedents upon which claimants and their representatives
may rely. Such ACIs should be circulated within the agency and made
publicly available through posting on SSA's Web site or other
similar means of public dissemination;
(b) publishing selected ALJ or Appeals Council decisions to
serve as model decisions (e.g., they are well-reasoned and clear),
or to provide needed policy clarifications. Consistent with
statutory obligations to maintain the privacy of sensitive
information, such publications should not include personally
identifiable information;
(c) continuing, to the greatest extent feasible, to send cases
that have been remanded from the Appeals Council or federal courts
back to the same ALJs who initially adjudicated such claims for
additional proceedings as required. If an ALJ who initially decided
a claim will not be presiding over a case post-remand, SSA should
nonetheless ensure that he or she still receives notification of the
remand decision. Decisionwriters who were involved in drafting a
remanded decision should also receive notification of remand
decisions; and
(d) developing a program for ALJs to serve extended voluntary
details on the Appeals Council in order to introduce a measure of
peer review, enrich ALJ understanding of the appeals process, and
benefit the Appeals Council by introducing the perspectives and
insights of ALJs. In support of that effort, SSA should seek a
waiver from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) of its
durational (120-day) limit on details, which, if granted, would
enable detailed ALJs to gain a deeper knowledge of the Appeals
Council than is possible under a shorter detail period. OPM should
give favorable consideration to such a request.
4. Expanding Focused ``Own Motion'' Review. In order to focus
attention on the unappealed decisions that most warrant review,
thereby enhancing both accuracy and consistency, SSA should expand
the Appeals Council's use of its ``own motion'' review by using
selective review in a manner consistent with ALJ decisional
independence. The Appeals Council should use announced, neutral, and
objective criteria, including statistical assessments, to identify
problematic issues or fact patterns that increase the likelihood of
error and, thereby, warrant focused review. In addition, SSA should
review unappealed decisions that raise issues whose resolution
likely would provide guidance to ALJs and adjudicators. In expanding
its ``own motion'' review, SSA must ensure that (i) selection-of-
review criteria are developed in a neutral fashion without targeting
particular ALJs or other decisionmakers, and that (ii) inclusion of
cases in such review does not serve as the basis for evaluation or
discipline. Thus, if necessary, SSA should revise its regulations
through notice-and-comment rulemaking to clarify and expand the
Appeals Council's use of selective sampling to identify for review
decisions that:
(a) Raise issues for which resolution by the Appeals Council
would provide policy clarifications to agency adjudicators or the
public;
(b) appear, based on statistical or predictive analysis of case
characteristics, to have a likelihood of error or lack of policy
compliance; or
(c) otherwise raise challenging issues of fact or law, or have
case characteristics, that increase the likelihood of error.
Use of Opinion Evidence From Medical Professionals (Treating Source
Rule)
5. Evaluating Medical Source Opinions. SSA should revise its
regulations through notice-and-comment rulemaking to eliminate the
controlling weight aspect of the treating source rule in favor of a
more flexible approach based on specific regulatory factors. SSA
should give ALJs greater discretion and flexibility when determining
the appropriate weight to afford opinions from treating sources
(which may or may not be determinative), consistent with the factors
enumerated in the current regulatory scheme for evaluation of
opinions of acceptable medical sources who are not deemed
``treating'' sources. Such factors should include: (i) Length of the
treatment relationship and frequency of examination; (ii) nature and
extent of the treatment relationship; (iii) supportability of the
medical source's opinion; (iv) consistency of the medical source's
opinion; (v) specialization of the medical source; and (vi) any
other factors that may support or contradict a medical source's
opinion. In all cases, ALJs should articulate the bases for the
weight given to opinions from medical sources.
6. Recognizing the Value of Other Medical Sources. SSA's
existing regulatory scheme, which assigns second-tier evidentiary
value to the opinions of nurse practitioners (NPs), physician
assistants (PAs), and licensed clinical social workers (LCSWs)
because they are not considered ``acceptable medical sources,''
should be reconsidered to reflect
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the realities of the current health care system. For many Social
Security disability claimants, these medical professionals are the
de facto ``treating source'' of medical care for physical and mental
illnesses. SSA should:
(a) Revise its regulations through notice-and-comment rulemaking
to add NPs, PAs, and LCSWs as ``acceptable medical sources,''
consistent with their respective state law-based licensure and
scopes of practice; or
(b) issue a new Social Security ruling or other interpretive
policy statement that makes clear, for agency adjudicators, federal
courts, and the public, the value of, as well as the weight to be
afforded, the opinions of these three types of medical
professionals.
Statistical Quality Assurance Measures
7. Enhancing Data Reporting Systems. SSA should enhance its
current data reporting systems in order to develop a more robust
statistical quality assurance program. To enhance its current data
reporting systems, such as the Case Processing Management System
(CPMS) and the Appeals Council Review Processing System (ARPS), or
any respective follow-on systems, SSA should determine how to
associate types of cases and issues, regions, hearing offices,
adjudicators, procedural elements and benchmarks, and decisional
outcomes together. The goal of such systems should not only be
objective evaluation of the agency's case processing operation, but
also the effective utilization of data to inform policy formation
and operational consistency.
8. Capturing Additional Data. SSA should specifically address
the limitations of CPMS, ARPS, and any respective follow-on systems
by ensuring that these data reporting systems capture (as
appropriate):
(a) Information related to any prior hearings;
(b) whether a decision involved a hearing or on-the-record
decision;
(c) whether new evidence was submitted by a claimant after his
or her hearing to the ALJ or to the Appeals Council; and
(d) data or other tracking mechanisms enabling ARPS and CPMS
data to be related to a single claim through all case processing
stages, including hearings, Appeals Council review, and remand by
the Appeals Council or federal courts.
9. Encouraging Employee Feedback. SSA should encourage feedback
from SSA employees to identify other types of case-related data that
should be captured and to suggest ways to facilitate the linking of
SSA's multiple data reporting systems in order to improve overall
data quality and quality assurance capabilities.
Administrative Conference Recommendation 2013-2
Benefit-Cost Analysis at Independent Regulatory Agencies
Adopted June 13, 2013
Benefit-cost analysis (also known as cost-benefit analysis) is
one of the primary tools used in regulatory analysis to anticipate
and evaluate the likely consequences of rules.\1\ Although some
regulatory benefits and costs are difficult to quantify or monetize,
those preparing such analyses generally attempt to estimate the
overall benefits that a proposed or final rule would create as well
as the aggregate costs that it would impose on society, and then
determine whether the former justify the latter. Some observers have
disputed its utility in rulemaking,\2\ but benefit-cost analysis
(and other forms of regulatory analysis) can help ensure that
decisionmakers fully contemplate the risks and rewards of any
proposed regulatory strategy.\3\ Benefit-cost analysis can also
improve transparency, helping to ensure that the public and Congress
understand why regulatory decisions are made.
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\1\ See Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4 (Sept. 17,
2003), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars--a004--
a-4/ [hereinafter ``OMB Circular A-4'']. Much of the literature on
regulatory analysis, including prior recommendations of the
Administrative Conference, uses the term ``cost-benefit analysis''
in lieu of, or in addition to, ``benefit-cost analysis.'' Circular
A-4 uses the term ``benefit-cost analysis,'' and this recommendation
will therefore utilize the same terminology.
\2\ Critics of benefit-cost analysis contend that it ignores
values that cannot be easily quantified, that benefits can often be
difficult to monetize, that it tends to overestimate costs, and that
it undervalues future benefits through the application of
discounting methodologies. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa
Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553, 1557-60, 1580-81
(2001).
\3\ See Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 79-4, Public Disclosure Concerning the Use of Cost-
Benefit and Similar Analyses in Regulation, 44 FR 38826 (July 3,
1979) (``Wise decisionmaking presupposes that the potential benefits
and costs of the actions under consideration will be identified,
will be quantified if feasible, and will be appraised in relation to
each other.''); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information &
Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1838,
1846 (2013) (``Cost-benefit analysis can be exceedingly important,
and in the Obama Administration, several steps were taken to
strengthen it, contributing to a situation in which the net benefits
of economically significant rules were extraordinarily high.''); cf.
Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How
Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our
Health 10 (2008) (``Although cost-benefit analysis, as currently
practiced, is . . . biased against regulation, those biases are not
inherent to the methodology. If those biases were identified and
eliminated, cost-benefit analysis would become a powerful tool for
neutral policy analysis.'').
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For more than 30 years, Cabinet departments and other executive
agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (but not
independent regulatory agencies \4\ such as the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC)) have been required by executive orders to conduct
benefit-cost or other types of regulatory analyses for their
``major'' or ``economically significant'' rules.\5\ In 1981,
President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order (EO) 12,291,\6\ which
instructed covered executive agencies to prepare regulatory impact
analyses of their draft proposed and final major rules (including a
description of benefits and costs), and to submit all of their draft
rules to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before publication
in the Federal Register. Subsequent administrations have reaffirmed
the importance of benefit-cost analysis and OIRA review. Currently,
EO 12,866, issued by President William Jefferson Clinton in 1993,
requires Cabinet departments and other covered executive agencies to
``assess both the costs and benefits of the intended regulation and,
recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify,
propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.''
\7\ It also requires them to assess the costs and benefits of
``significant'' draft proposed and final rules submitted to OIRA for
review, and to conduct more thorough analysis of economically
significant draft proposed and final rules.\8\
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\4\ As a general matter, ``independent regulatory agencies'' are
those whose heads possess ``for cause'' removal protection and that
enjoy some degree of independence from the executive branch. David
E. Lewis & Jennifer L. Selin, ACUS Sourcebook of United States
Executive Agencies 49 (1st ed., 2d Printing Mar. 2013). Under
Executive Order 12,866, 58 FR 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993), the term
``agency'' excludes independent regulatory agencies. Id. Sec. 3(b).
However, independent regulatory agencies are covered by the planning
requirements in section 4 of the executive order.
\5\ ``Major'' and ``economically significant'' rules include
(but are not limited to) rules likely to result in annual costs,
benefits, or transfer payments of $100 million or more. See
Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2); Exec. Order No. 12,866,
supra note 4, Sec. 3(f)(1). Transfer payments are monetary payments
from one group to another that do not affect total resources
available to society. See OMB Circular A-4, supra note 1. The most
common form is the transfer of federal funds to the recipients of
those funds (e.g., grants, food stamps, Medicare or Medicaid funds,
and crop payments). In 2010, more than one-third of all major rules
were so categorized because of the amount of transfer payments. See
U.S. Cong. Research Service, REINS Act: Number and Types of ``Major
Rules'' in Recent Years, R41651, Feb. 21, 2011, by Curtis W.
Copeland and Maeve Carey.
\6\ Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 FR 13193 (Feb. 17, 1981) (revoked
by Sec. 11 of EO 12,866).
\7\ Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 4, Sec. 1(b)(6).
\8\ Id. Sec. 6(a)(3); see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 FR
3821 (Jan. 21, 2011) (President Obama) (stating that the benefits of
proposed and final rules must ``justify'' the costs); Administrative
Conference of the United States, Recommendation 88-9, Presidential
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 54 FR 5207 (Feb. 2, 1989) (suggesting
guidelines for the enhanced openness of executive regulatory review
and recommending the reconsideration of existing rules looking
toward the repeal of unnecessary regulations).
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As noted previously, independent regulatory agencies
traditionally have not been subject to the formal benefit-cost
analysis requirements imposed by executive order, although several
recent Presidents have encouraged those agencies to voluntarily
apply the principles contained in the relevant executive orders.\9\
Virtually all
[[Page 41356]]
independent regulatory agencies are subject to certain crosscutting
statutes that may require some type of regulatory analysis, such as
the Regulatory Flexibility Act \10\ and the Paperwork Reduction
Act.\11\ In addition, some independent regulatory agencies' organic
acts or other statutes require them to conduct benefit-cost analyses
or to consider certain economic effects of their regulations,
although the requirements vary significantly from agency to agency.
For instance, some agencies (e.g., the Consumer Product Safety
Commission) are required by statute to prepare a formal regulatory
analysis statement that describes expected costs and benefits prior
to issuing certain rules.\12\ Other agencies (e.g., the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)) are required by statute to ``consider'' costs and
benefits or other factors associated with some of their rules.\13\
Still other agencies (e.g., the Federal Communications Commission
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) are not subject to any formal
regulatory analysis requirements for most of their rules.
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\9\ See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 FR 41,587 (July 14,
2011) (stating that independent regulatory agencies ``should
promote'' the goal, articulated in EO 13,563, of producing a
``regulatory system that protects public health, welfare, safety,
and our environment while promoting economic growth, innovation,
competitiveness, and job creation'' and ``should comply'' with the
provisions in EO 13,563 regarding public participation, integration
and innovation, flexible approaches, and science ``[t]o the extent
permitted by law'').
\10\ 5 U.S.C. 601-12.
\11\ 44 U.S.C. 3501-21.
\12\ 15 U.S.C. 2058(f).
\13\ CFTC is required to ``consider the costs and benefits'' of
the agency's action before issuing certain rules and orders. 7
U.S.C. 19(a). The SEC is required, when it is engaged in rulemaking
under certain statutory provisions, to ``consider, in addition to
the protection of investors, whether the action will promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.'' 15 U.S.C. 77b(b).
Interpretation of these provisions has been a matter of debate.
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The Administrative Conference believes that it is in the
interest of the independent regulatory agencies, the executive
branch, Congress, the courts, and the public that independent
regulatory agencies' current practices relating to benefit-cost
analysis be documented. In this light, the report supporting the
recommendation examined efforts by independent regulatory agencies
to analyze regulatory benefits and costs in recent major rules.\14\
It also examined whether the agencies factor benefits and costs into
their decisionmaking. The report indicated that, in many instances,
independent regulatory agencies quantify at least some of the costs
(and, to a lesser extent, the benefits) created by the major rules
they adopt and, in other instances, such agencies usually provide at
least qualitative descriptions of the associated benefits and costs.
The report also discusses several factors that the agencies said
affected their ability to quantify and monetize regulatory costs and
benefits. For example, several agencies mentioned the Paperwork
Reduction Act approval process as inhibiting their ability to gather
the data needed to prepare regulatory analyses in a timely
fashion.\15\
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\14\ See Curtis W. Copeland, Economic Analysis and Independent
Regulatory Agencies 60-107 (Mar. 29, 2013), available at https://acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Copeland%20CBA%20Report%203-29-13.pdf.
\15\ Cf. Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 2012-4, Paperwork Reduction Act, ] 3, 77 FR 47800,
47808 (Aug. 10, 2012) (recommending that agencies ``use all
available processes for OMB approval for information gathering'').
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This recommendation encourages agencies to voluntarily adopt
certain practices that some independent regulatory agencies (and
other agencies) have developed when conducting regulatory analyses
for major rules. The Conference recognizes that increasing he
attention paid to the economic impact of proposed and final rules
might well require substantial use of limited agency resources. This
might require independent agencies to make significant tradeoffs
among competing priorities and may delay the rulemaking process.
Nevertheless, some independent regulatory agencies are already
subject to benefit-cost and other types of regulatory analysis
requirements, and others have voluntarily conducted such analyses,
and the Conference therefore wishes to highlight innovative
practices undertaken by these agencies.\16\
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\16\ See, e.g., Copeland, supra note 14, at 99 (describing the
Federal Communications Commission's increased usage of benefit-cost
analysis in light of EO 13,579).
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The recommendation, first, identifies various policies and
practices used in several of the independent regulatory agencies and
offers a series of proposals to encourage their use in other
agencies. For example, it recommends that each independent
regulatory agency develop written guidance on the preparation of
benefit-cost and other types of regulatory analyses. Such guidance
should be designed to help ensure that any regulatory analysis the
agency undertakes is soundly developed, transparent, consistently
conducted, and contributes to agency compliance with applicable
statutes and other rulemaking requirements. Second, the
recommendation highlights a series of analytical practices that OMB
Circular A-4 recommends to Cabinet departments and other executive
agencies for their major rules, and the recommendation encourages
independent regulatory agencies to consider whether those practices
may be useful in the development of their major rules. For example,
it recommends that agencies' analyses be as transparent and
reproducible as practicable, subject to the limitations of law and
applicable policies (including preventing the disclosure of
proprietary information or trade secrets, or other confidential
information). The recommendation does not seek to establish a one-
size-fits-all approach to regulatory analysis, and recognizes that
each agency must tailor the analyses it conducts to accord with
relevant statutory requirements, its own regulatory priorities, and
the potential impact of the analysis on regulatory decisionmaking to
ensure proper use of limited agency resources. Finally, the
recommendation proposes that, to the extent Congress decides to
impose or endorse new regulatory analysis requirements on
independent regulatory agencies, Congress should consider giving
those agencies the discretion to scale the analyses to the
significance of the rules, and should consider the agency resources
needed to satisfy such requirements.\17\
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\17\ Between January 2007 and December 2012, federal agencies
published 19,246 final rules, of which 485 were considered ``major''
rules. See Copeland, supra note 14, at Table 1. Expanding the rules
on which regulatory analysis is required from ``economically
significant'' or ``major'' rules to rules considered ``significant''
under EO 12,866 would likely quintuple the number of analyses
required. See https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearch for
data on this issue.
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Recommendation
Encouraging the Diffusion of Certain Policies and Practices
1. Each independent regulatory agency should develop and keep up
to date written guidance regarding the preparation of benefit-cost
and other types of regulatory analyses. That guidance should be
tailored to the agency's particular statutory and regulatory
environment. To accomplish this goal, independent regulatory
agencies may choose whether or not to adopt or adapt the regulatory
analysis practices described in OMB Circular A-4 or any successor
government-wide guidance.
2. If an independent regulatory agency prepares a regulatory
analysis for a proposed or final rule, the analysis should be
developed as early in the rulemaking process as reasonably
practical. Once prepared, the analysis may need to be updated as the
agency becomes aware of new information that may affect the
rulemaking, or if changes are made to the substance of the rule.
3. If an independent regulatory agency determines that
additional analytical expertise or experience may be helpful to
prepare a regulatory analysis (e.g., determining how certain costs
or benefits could be quantified or monetized), it should, to the
extent appropriate, consult with other governmental entities with
expertise in this area.
4. Consistent with applicable laws and the procedures and
flexibilities permitted in the Paperwork Reduction Act, independent
regulatory agencies and OIRA should facilitate the timely collection
of information necessary to develop the agencies' regulatory
analyses.
Recommended Practices for Major Rules
5. Independent regulatory agencies should consider the
appropriateness of the analytical guidance provided in OMB Circular
A-4 when developing regulatory analyses for major rules. They should
consider structuring their analyses of those rules in terms of three
general principles: (a) Identify the need for the regulation; (b)
examine plausible alternative regulatory approaches; and (c)
estimate, to the extent possible, the benefits and costs of the
proposed rule and the primary alternatives.
6. Consistent with applicable laws and agency resources,
independent regulatory agencies should consider including in their
regulatory analyses assessments of the impact of not only those
actions that are within the agency's statutory discretion but also
of those actions that are statutorily mandated. Agencies should
consider showing the effects of both types of actions in order to
improve regulatory transparency.
7. Subject to the limitations of law and applicable policies,
independent regulatory agencies' regulatory analyses should be as
[[Page 41357]]
transparent and reproducible as practicable. In particular, agencies
should consider disclosing how the analyses were conducted, posting
the analyses on their Web sites and other appropriate online fora,
and summarizing the methods and results in the preambles of the
notice of proposed rulemaking and the final rule.
8. Independent regulatory agencies should consider including in
the preambles of the notice of proposed rulemaking and the final
rule a summary statement or table concisely showing the agencies'
overall estimates of the expected total benefits, costs, and
transfer payments of regulatory actions and the primary
alternatives, including any benefits or costs that could not be
quantified or monetized.
Recommendations to Congress
9. If Congress decides to establish or endorse new requirements
that independent regulatory agencies prepare benefit-cost analyses
of their proposed or final rules, it should recognize that agencies
need (a) the flexibility to scale the analyses to the significance
of the rules and (b) the resources to satisfy such requirements.
Administrative Conference Recommendation 2013-3
Science in the Administrative Process
Adopted June 14, 2013
Over the last three decades, several authorities made
recommendations for improving transparency in the use of science \1\
in the administrative process.\2\ Partially in response to these
recommendations, the executive branch and Congress have made a
number of reforms to the scientific process undergirding agency
decisionmaking. In 2009, President Obama issued a memorandum
directing that, ``[t]o the extent permitted by law, there should be
transparency in the preparation, identification, and use of
scientific and technological information in policymaking.'' \3\
``Each agency should [also] have appropriate rules and procedures to
ensure the integrity of the scientific process within the agency.''
\4\ The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) elaborated
upon this memorandum in 2010, instructing agencies to ``communicate
scientific and technological findings by including a clear
explication of underlying assumptions; accurate contextualization of
uncertainties; and a description of the probabilities associated
with both optimistic and pessimistic projections.'' \5\
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\1\ The scope of this recommendation is limited to the ``natural
sciences'' (e.g., chemistry, physics, medical science, geology,
etc.), mathematics, statistics, computer science, and other allied
fields. It is based upon a report that deals with agency research
and decisionmaking related to the natural sciences. Wendy Wagner,
Science in Regulation: A Study of Agency Decisionmaking Approaches
(Feb. 18, 2013), available at https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Science%20in%20Regulation_Final%20Report_2_18_13_0.pdf.
\2\ See e.g. Nat'l Research Council, Review of the Environmental
Protection Agency's Draft IRIS Assessment of Formaldehyde (2011);
Comm. on Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants, Nat'l Research
Council, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (1994); Nat'l
Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government:
Managing the Process (1983); Bipartisan Policy Ctr., Improving the
Use of Science in Regulatory Policy 16, 41-42 (2009) [hereinafter
``BPC Report'']; see also Ctr. for Effective Gov't, Advancing the
Public Interest through Regulatory Reform: Recommendations for
President-Elect Obama and the 111th Congress 26, 34, 47 (2008).
\3\ Memorandum from the Admin. of Barack H. Obama for the Heads
of Executive Departments and Agencies on Scientific Integrity, Daily
Comp. Pres. Docs., 2009 DCPD No. 00137 (Mar. 9, 2009) [hereinafter
``Obama Scientific Integrity Memo''], available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-200900137/pdf/DCPD-200900137.pdf.
\4\ Id.
\5\ Memorandum from John P. Holdren, Director of the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, to the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies on Scientific Integrity (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
https://www.whitehouse. gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/
scientific-integrity-memo-12172010.pdf. To effectuate this and a
number of other responsibilities, agencies were asked to report back
to OSTP on the actions taken to develop and implement their
scientific integrity policies by April 2011.
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At base, these initiatives demand heightened transparency of
agencies' use of science as a central means of ensuring the basic
accountability of agency regulation. If an agency identifies the
role that scientific information plays in its ultimate decision and
explains how it ensured that its scientific analysis was rigorous,
then the public has a basis against which it can evaluate both the
scientific and policy judgments underlying the agency's decision.
This transparency allows those outside the agency to assess whether
the agency's policy decision comports with the authorizing law and
the scientific record. A transparent decisionmaking process also
advances other institutional and scientific goals, such as
identifying promising areas for future research and serving as a
bulwark against misuse of science for political ends.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ BPC Report, supra note 2, at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite these important initiatives, a study commissioned by the
Administrative Conference \7\ (and public meetings that considered
questions it raised) revealed that agency decisionmaking processes
would benefit from further improvements. Drawing on this learning,
the recommendation offers several proposals for enhancing the
transparency of agencies' use of science. At the same time, the
Conference recognizes that agencies' abilities to implement this
recommendation may be affected by resource limitations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Wagner, supra note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, the recommendation highlights a number of innovative
practices undertaken by different federal agencies to enhance the
transparency of their scientific decisionmaking processes. As a
general matter, agencies should articulate the specific questions to
be informed by scientific information, specify study designs for new
research, and establish criteria for weighing existing studies.\8\
Agencies should identify scientific reports or data upon which they
relied and material literature that they considered, but upon which
they did not rely, to the extent practicable and permitted by
law.\9\ Agencies should establish checkpoints (i.e., times for
closing off consideration of additional research or debate prior to
making a final regulatory decision) and policies for reopening that
consideration. Agencies should also consider extending attribution
to individual staff who participate in the preparation of scientific
reports and taking other steps to promote robust debate among agency
scientists.\10\ In addition, agencies should share best practices
with other agencies and should recommend the removal of any legal
impediments to
[[Page 41358]]
promoting transparency in decisions in which science is an important
element.\11\
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\8\ In so doing, agencies should endeavor to explain the
relationship between scientific research and the policy decisions
the research is intended to inform. Nat'l Research Council, Comm. on
the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to Public Health,
Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process 7
(1983).
\9\ See Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 2011-1, Legal Considerations in E-Rulemaking, ] 4, 76
FR 48789, 48789 (Aug. 9, 2011); see also Exec. Order. No. 13,642,
Making Open and Machine Readable the New Default for Government
Information, 78 FR 28111 (May 14, 2013); Memorandum from John P.
Holdren, Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, to
the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Increasing Access
to the Results of Federally Funded Research (Feb. 22, 2013) (calling
for agency plans to permit public access to research papers funded
in whole or in part with federal monies). As a general matter, the
agency should make publicly available any scientific literature it
considered, including literature it reviewed but upon which it
ultimately did not rely. For purposes of the recommendation,
literature that an agency ``considered'' includes not only any study
an agency official relied upon but also any study an agency official
reviewed but ultimately determined not to rely upon (because it was
deemed to be outside the scope of the scientific study at hand, was
not considered sufficiently reliable, or was otherwise rejected by
the agency official). Cf. Administrative Conference of the United
States, Recommendation 2013-4, The Administrative Record in Informal
Rulemaking, -- FR ------ (providing a similar definition of
``consider'' in the context of the administrative record in informal
rulemaking). If an agency official merely had access to a study but
did not specifically analyze it to determine its relevance, that
study has not been ``considered'' within the meaning of the
recommendation for purposes of making such literature publicly
available.
\10\ In response to President Obama's call for agencies to
develop ``appropriate rules and procedures to ensure the integrity
of the scientific process,'' Obama Scientific Integrity Memo, supra
note 3, a number of agencies have promulgated integrity policies to
promote open debate among agency scientists. See, e.g., Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Scientific Integrity Policy (Feb. 2012), available at https://epa.gov/osa/pdfs/epa_scientific_integrity_policy_20120115.pdf;
Food and Drug Admin., Scientific Integrity at FDA, FDA Staff Manual
Guides, Volume IV--Agency Program Directives 2 (2012), available at
https://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/AboutScienceResearchatFDA/ucm306446.htm; Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Scientific
Integrity (Dec. 7, 2011), available at https://www.corporateservices.noaa.gov/ames/administrative_orders/chapter_202/202-735-D.pdf; Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Collaborative Work
Environment Program, https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/values.html#open
(last updated May 4, 2012); see also Francesca T. Grifo, Federal
Agency Scientific Integrity Policies: A Comparative Analysis (Mar.
2013), https://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/SI-policies-comparative-analysis.pdf.
\11\ See Wagner, supra note 1, at 135-38 (identifying a number
of external legal impediments to promoting transparency, including
short statutory deadlines, limits on dissemination of scientific
studies, resource limitations, and caps on the number of
discretionary advisory committees agencies can constitute).
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Second, the recommendation offers a series of proposals to bring
greater congruity to the treatment of publicly and privately funded
scientific research. Specifically, it encourages the disclosure of
data underlying scientific research, including both privately funded
and federally funded research, that an agency is considering (to the
extent practicable and permitted by law).\12\ Similarly, it
recommends extending conflict of interest disclosure norms to
private parties who submit studies used by an agency.
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\12\ Legal restrictions that may limit agencies' ability to
provide such disclosures include, among other things, protections
for personal privacy, trade secrets, and confidential business
information.
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Recommendation
Suggested Agency Practices Regarding the Use of Science in the
Administrative Process
1. Explaining Agency Scientific Decisionmaking. Agencies should
explain in proposed and final decision documents how they ensured
rigorous review of the scientific information underlying each
science-intensive regulatory project. This includes a statement of
how each agency evaluated the scientific information used in its
analysis; how the agency made that information available to
reviewers and the public; how the analysis was reviewed by experts
and interested parties; and how the agency ensured that the final
decision was supported by the scientific record.
2. Assuring Transparent Assessments. At an early stage in their
decisionmaking processes, agencies should identify the specific
policy questions that may be informed by science; describe the
design of the assessments needed to characterize risks and inform
policy decisions; and describe the criteria to be used in reviewing
and weighing existing studies. When completed, assessments should:
Identify other appropriate analytical choices and explain why they
were not chosen; provide a synthesis of the available evidence and
relevant literature guided by the assessment design or criteria;
identify significant assumptions and choices of analytical
techniques; provide a statement of remaining uncertainties; and
discuss how different plausible choices might change the results of
the assessment. Where possible, agencies should also explain the
relationship between their scientific findings and the final policy
choice. Agencies should strive to communicate this information in a
manner that is clear to the general public.
3. Disclosing Underlying Studies and Data. To the extent
practicable and permitted by law and applicable policies, each
agency should identify and make publicly available (on the agency
Web site or some other widely available forum) references to the
scientific literature, underlying data, models, and research results
that it considered. In so doing, the agency should list all
information upon which it relied in reaching its conclusions, as
well as any information material to the scientific analysis that it
considered but upon which it ultimately did not rely. Consistent
with the limitations in the Information Quality Act (IQA) guidelines
issued by the Office of Management and Budget and its own IQA
guidelines, each agency should ensure that members of the public
have access to the information necessary to reproduce or assess the
agency's technical or scientific conclusions.
4. Checkpoints and Explanations. Agencies should consider
establishing explicit checkpoints for regulatory projects, defining
both the conditions under which they intend to close their
consideration of research or debate in order to reach a decision and
when they might reopen that consideration, particularly in cases
when they are not bound by judicially enforceable deadlines. In any
case, agencies should explain their decisions to initiate, stop, or
reopen consideration of research or debate. Such explanations should
reference significant relevant ongoing research or other relevant
factors.
5. Identifying Future Projects. For science-intensive projects,
agencies should identify specific types of future research that may
be needed to reduce significant uncertainties in order to advance
understanding of the issues.
6. Attribution for Agency Personnel. Agency personnel play an
important role in producing their respective agencies' scientific
analyses. Agencies should consider providing their personnel with
some form of consensual attribution for reports or analyses to which
they contribute in a significant way. If appropriate, such
attributions should be made for personnel who contributed in a
significant way to a technical or scientific report, including not
only scientists but also economists, lawyers, and other
contributors. Reviewers and other contributors could be identified
by name and general contribution.
7. Encouraging Debate. Agencies should encourage vigorous debate
among agency scientists and should explore ways of incorporating the
diversity of that debate in any resulting work product. Agency
employees should be encouraged to publish their scientific work in
the peer reviewed literature, provided that they follow applicable
agency procedures and that confidential governmental deliberations
are not compromised. Dissenting staff members should be protected
from reprisals.
8. Sharing of Agency Best Practices. Agencies should identify
and publicize the innovations they have developed for transparently
incorporating science into their regulatory decisions. OSTP, an
interagency group headed by OSTP, or another body should consider
occasionally convening agency representatives to discuss and share
best practices.
9. Addressing Legal Obstacles to Transparent Decisionmaking.
Agencies should identify legal obstacles that may impede otherwise
appropriate public access to the scientific information underlying
agency analyses or that may prevent the agencies' development of
scientifically robust decisionmaking processes. Agencies should
recommend appropriate actions to eliminate such impediments,
including revisions in existing law, to the Executive Office of the
President.
Agency Disclosures To Enhance the Transparency of Research
10. Data Disclosure. To the extent practicable and in compliance
with applicable legal restrictions, privileges, protections, and
authorities, agencies should seek to provide disclosure of data
underlying scientific research, including both privately and
federally funded research being considered by the agencies. Where
practicable, such information should be disclosed in machine-
readable format. Where such data are not subject to legal or other
protections, and the data's owners nonetheless will not provide such
access, agencies should note that fact and explain why they used the
results if they chose to do so. Agencies should review their
confidential business information policies to ensure that they
include appropriate mechanisms to prevent over-claiming.
11. Conflict of Interest Disclosure. Agencies should require
conflict of interest disclosures on all scientific research
submitted to inform an agency's licensing, regulatory, or other
decisionmaking processes. This disclosure should be similar to the
conflict of interest disclosure required by some scientific
journals, such as that used by the International Committee of
Medical Journal Editors. The regulatory conflict of interest
disclosure should also, where permitted by law, identify whether the
experimenter or author had the legal right without approval of the
sponsor of the research to: design the research; collect the data;
interpret the data; and author, publish or otherwise disseminate the
resulting report or full dataset. To the extent that a party other
than the principal investigator (e.g., the study sponsor or funder)
had control over the design or publication of the study, agencies
should disclose this fact and specify the nature of the control such
an entity exercised.
Administrative Conference Recommendation 2013-4
The Administrative Record in Informal Rulemaking
Adopted June 14, 2013
The administrative record in informal rulemaking plays an
essential role in informing the public of potential agency action
and in improving the public's ability to understand and participate
in agency decisionmaking. As well, the administrative record can be
essential to judicial review of agency decisionmaking under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which directs courts to ``review
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party'' to
determine whether challenged agency action is lawful.\1\ This
statutory language was originally understood as referring to formal
proceedings. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted this
APA provision as also encompassing the ``administrative record'' in
informal agency proceedings,
[[Page 41359]]
whether reviewable by statute or as final agency actions under 5
U.S.C. 704.\2\ This application to informal proceedings has given
rise to uncertainty and experimentation as agencies and courts have
worked to implement the administrative record concept--at times
inconsistently. As a result, confusion has arisen about the
compilation and uses of agency rulemaking records maintained
internally, public rulemaking dockets, and administrative records
for judicial review. The differences among these three types of
records can be seen from their descriptions below.
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\1\ 5 U.S.C. 706.
\2\ Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971).
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The Administrative Conference therefore commissioned a study of
federal agencies' current practices in the development of rulemaking
records, public rulemaking dockets, and administrative records for
judicial review.\3\ This recommendation and the supporting report
address these concepts in the context of informal agency rulemaking
adopted pursuant to the notice-and-comment procedures prescribed in
5 U.S.C. 553.\4\ The recommendation does not address the record for
agency decisions made in other contexts, such as in adjudication,
formal rulemaking, or guidance documents.
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\3\ Leland E. Beck, Agency Practices and Judicial Review of
Administrative Records in Informal Rulemaking (May 14, 2013) (report
to the Administrative Conference of the United States) [hereinafter
Beck Report].
\4\ 5 U.S.C. 553(b)-(d). It may also have application to
``hybrid'' rulemaking statutes that require additional procedures
beyond those in Sec. 553 but less than those in formal rulemaking
under 5 U.S.C. 556-57.
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This recommendation builds upon earlier Administrative
Conference work in the areas of rulemaking, recordkeeping, and
technological developments in managing records. Administrative
Conference Recommendation 74-4, Preenforcement Judicial Review of
Rules of General Applicability, identified the administrative
materials that should be available to a court that was evaluating,
on preenforcement review, the factual basis for agency rules of
general applicability.\5\ That recommendation was receptive to
judicial development of the concept of a ``record'' on review of
informal agency rulemakings. In Recommendation 93-4, Improving the
Environment for Agency Rulemaking, the Administrative Conference
advised agencies to establish and manage rulemaking files ``so that
maximum disclosure to the public is achieved during the comment
period and so that a usable and reliable file is available for
purposes of judicial review.'' \6\ A number of Administrative
Conference recommendations also have examined the use of technology
in acquiring, releasing, and managing agency records.\7\ Most
recently, the Conference examined legal considerations associated
with the use of digital technologies in the development and
implementation of informal rulemakings.\8\
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\5\ Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 74-4, Preenforcement Judicial Review of Rules of
General Applicability, 39 FR 23,044 (June 26, 1974), based on
consultant's report published as Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of
Informal Rulemaking, 60 Va. L. Rev. 185 (1974).
\6\ Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 93-4, Improving the Environment for Agency
Rulemaking, 59 FR 4670 (Feb. 1, 1994), correction published, 59 FR
8507 (Feb. 22, 1994).
\7\ Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 2011-2, Rulemaking Comments, 76 FR 48,791 (Aug. 9,
2011); Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 2011-1, Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, 76 FR
48,789 (Aug. 9, 2011); Administrative Conference of the United
States, Recommendation 90-5, Federal Agency Electronic Records
Management and Archives, 55 FR 53270 (Dec. 28, 1990); Administrative
Conference of the United States, Recommendation 88-10, Federal
Agency Use of Computers in Acquiring and Releasing Information, 54
FR 5209 (Feb. 2, 1989).
\8\ Recommendation 2011-1, supra note 7.
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This recommendation synthesizes and updates the Conference's
prior recommendations in these areas. It is grounded in empirical
research, supported by a survey questionnaire on present agency
recordkeeping practices, as well as by a review of existing agency
guidance.\9\ The Conference has identified and recommends best
practices for all rulemaking agencies in the areas of record
compilation, preservation, and certification. The recommendation
also advises agencies to develop guidance to aid agency personnel as
they compile rulemaking and administrative records and public
rulemaking dockets and to increase public understanding of agency
recordkeeping.
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\9\ Beck Report, supra note 3, at Section III.
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Agencies engage in informal rulemaking with differing
frequencies, resources, and technological capabilities. Many
agencies are in a period of transition, as they move from paper to
electronic recordkeeping.\10\ Attention to the design of information
technology resources that is mindful of the principles and best
practices set forth below can aid agencies in recordkeeping, as well
as facilitate greater public understanding of agency decisionmaking
and more effective judicial review. For the purposes of this
recommendation, the rulemaking record, public rulemaking docket, and
the administrative record for judicial review are defined as
follows:
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\10\ The Office of Management and Budget and the National
Archives have directed federal agencies to manage all permanent
electronic records in an electronic format to the fullest extent
possible by December 31, 2019, and to develop plans to do so by
December 31, 2013. Memorandum from Jeffrey D. Zients, Acting
Director, Office of Management and Budget, and David S. Ferriero,
Archivist of the United States, National Archives and Records
Administration, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
and Independent Agencies concerning ``Managing Government Records
Directive'' M-12-18 (Aug. 24, 2012).
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``Rulemaking record'' means the full record of materials before
the agency in an informal rulemaking. The Conference contemplates
that, in addition to materials required by law to be included in the
rulemaking record, as well as all comments and materials submitted
to the agency during comment periods, any material that the agency
considered should be included as part of that record.
``Considered'' entails review by an individual with substantive
responsibilities in connection with the rulemaking.\11\ To say that
material was considered also entails some minimum degree of
attention to the contents of a document. Thus, the rulemaking record
need not encompass every document that rulemaking personnel
encountered while rummaging through a file drawer, but it generally
should include a document that an individual with substantive
responsibilities reviewed in order to evaluate its possible
significance for the rulemaking, unless the review disclosed that
the document was not germane to the subject matter of the
rulemaking. A document should not be excluded from the rulemaking
record on the basis that the reviewer disagreed with the factual or
other analysis in the document, or because the agency did not or
will not rely on it. Although the concept resists precise
definition, the term considered as used in this recommendation
should be interpreted so as to fulfill its purpose of generating a
body of materials by which the rule can be evaluated and to which
the agency and others may refer in the future.
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\11\ The Conference first recommended inclusion of materials
``considered'' by the agency in the administrative record for
judicial review in Recommendation 74-4, supra note 5. Courts have
also relied on the concept of consideration in defining the
administrative record. Pac. Shores Subdiv., Cal. Water Dist. v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2006)
(citations omitted); see also Nat'l Ass'n of Chain Drug Stores v.
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 631 F. Supp. 2d 23, 26 (D.D.C.
2009) (citing Recommendation 74-4 in defining the administrative
record); cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 394 n. 469 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (discussing Recommendation 74-4 as an approach to
defining the administrative record).
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``Public rulemaking docket'' means the public version of the
rulemaking record managed by the agency, regardless of location,
such as online at Regulations.gov or an agency Web site or available
for physical review in a docket room. The public rulemaking docket
includes all information that the agency has made available for
public viewing. The Conference also urges agencies to manage their
public rulemaking dockets to achieve maximum disclosure to the
public. However, the Conference recognizes that prudential concerns
may limit agencies from displaying some information, such as certain
copyrighted or indecent materials, online. It is a best practice for
agencies to describe and note online those materials that are not
displayed but are available for physical inspection. Another agency
best practice is to include in the public rulemaking docket
materials generated and considered by the agency after the close of
the comment period but prior to issuance of the final rule.\12\
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\12\ The present recommendation is not limited to disclosures
that the APA, as construed in widely followed case law, may require.
See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors, 745
F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (``[A]t least the most critical
factual material that is used to support the agency's position on
review must have been made public in the proceeding. . . .'').
However, this case law gives agencies an additional reason to
provide public disclosure of factual material in some circumstances.
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``Administrative record for judicial review'' means the
materials tendered by the agency and certified to a court as the
record on
[[Page 41360]]
review of the agency's regulatory action. The administrative record
provided to the court will include an affidavit, made by a
certifying official, attesting to the contents and accuracy of the
record being certified.\13\ It should also include an index
itemizing the contents.\14\ Parties often rely on this index in
designating portions of the administrative record for judicial
review, such as for inclusion in a joint appendix that will be
presented to the court. The designated portions of the
administrative record then typically serve as the basis for the
court's review, as provided in the Administrative Procedure Act and
as appropriate under the rules of the reviewing court.\15\
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\13\ Beck Report, supra note 3, at Section IV.A.
\14\ Id.
\15\ 5 U.S.C. 706 (``. . . the court shall review the whole
record or those parts of it cited by a party. . . .'').
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Some materials in an agency's rulemaking record may be protected
from public disclosure by law or withheld from the public on the
basis of agency privilege. For example, protected materials might
include classified information, confidential supervisory or business
information, or trade secrets. Other materials might be withheld on
the basis of privilege, including attorney-client privilege, the
attorney work product privilege, and the pre-decisional deliberative
process privilege. Agency practices regarding the identification or
inclusion of protected or privileged materials in administrative
records and their accompanying indices vary.\16\ Some agencies do
not include or identify deliberative or privileged materials in
administrative records for judicial review.\17\ Other agencies
identify non-disclosed materials specifically in a privilege log
provided with the index of the administrative record for judicial
review. Agencies have also noted redactions of protected materials
in the administrative record for judicial review and moved the court
to permit filing of protected materials, or a summary thereof, under
seal. Many agencies do not have a policy on inclusion of protected
or privileged materials in an administrative record for judicial
review and manage such materials on a case-by-case basis. Case-by-
case consideration may occasionally be necessary, such as when
privileged materials are referenced as the basis of the agency's
decision. Nonetheless, the Conference recommends that agencies
develop a written policy for treatment of protected or privileged
materials, including indexing, in public rulemaking dockets and in
certification of the administrative record for judicial review, and
that agencies make this policy publicly available.
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\16\ The variety of agency practices is described at length in
the Beck Report, supra note 3, at Section IV.A.
\17\ Absent a showing of bad faith or improper behavior, the
agency practice of excluding pre-decisional materials from the
administrative record on judicial review enjoys substantial judicial
support. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Office of
Comptroller of Currency, 156 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1998); San Luis
Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 789 F.2d 26,
44-45 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc).
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Compilation and preparation of the administrative record for
judicial review is properly within the province of the agency and
this process should be accorded a presumption of regularity by the
reviewing court.\18\ Completion or supplementation of the
administrative record for judicial review may be appropriate where a
strong showing has been made to overcome the presumption of
regularity in compilation. For example, courts have permitted
limited discovery on the basis of a ``strong showing of bad faith or
improper behavior'' on the part of the agency decisionmaker.\19\
Courts may also inquire into allegations that the agency omitted
information from the administrative record for judicial review that
should have been included.\20\
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\18\ See Citizens for Alternatives to Radioactive Dumping v.
U.S. Dep't of Energy, 485 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 1985) (``. . .
designation of the Administrative Record, like any established
administrative procedure, is entitled to a presumption of
administrative regularity.'') (citation omitted); Amfac Resorts, LLC
v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 143 F.Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2001); see
also United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)
(``The presumption of regularity supports the official acts of
public officers and, in the absence of clear evidence to the
contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their
official duties.'').
\19\ Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
420 (1971).
\20\ See, e.g., Cape Cod Hospital v. Sebelius, 630 F.3d 203,
211-12 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ad Hoc Metals Coalition v. Whitman, 227 F.
Supp. 2d 134, 139-40 (D.D.C. 2002).
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Completion or supplementation of the administrative record for
judicial review may also be appropriate in other circumstances not
addressed in this recommendation. In a previous recommendation, the
Conference has recognized that the reviewing court should not
invariably be confined to the record on review in evaluating the
factual basis of a generally applicable rule on preenforcement
review.\21\ The Conference has also acknowledged that, on direct
review by courts of appeals, the record on review ``can usually be
supplemented, if necessary, by means other than an evidentiary trial
in a district court.'' \22\
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\21\ Recommendation 74-4, supra note 5.
\22\ Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 75-3, The Choice of Forum for Judicial Review of
Administrative Action ] 5(a), 40 FR 27926 (July 2, 1975).
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Recommendation
Record Contents
1. The Rulemaking Record. In the absence of a specific statutory
requirement to the contrary, the agency rulemaking record in an
informal rulemaking proceeding should include:
(a) Notices pertaining to the rulemaking;
(b) comments and other materials submitted to the agency related
to the rulemaking;
(c) transcripts or recordings, if any, of oral presentations
made in the course of a rulemaking;
(d) reports or recommendations of any relevant advisory
committees;
(e) other materials required by statute, executive order, or
agency rule to be considered or to be made public in connection with
the rulemaking; and
(f) any other materials considered by the agency during the
course of the rulemaking.
2. The Public Rulemaking Docket. Agencies should manage their
public rulemaking dockets to achieve maximum public disclosure.
Insofar as feasible, the public rulemaking docket should include all
materials in the rulemaking record, subject to legal limitations on
disclosure, any claims of privilege, or any exclusions allowed by
law that the agency chooses to invoke. In addition, it may be
prudent not to include some sensitive information online and to note
instead that this material is available for physical review in a
reading room.
3. The Administrative Record for Judicial Review. The
administrative record provided to the court on judicial review of
informal rulemaking should contain all of the materials in the
rulemaking record as set forth in paragraph 1, except that agencies
need not include materials protected from disclosure by law nor
materials that the agency has determined are subject to withholding
based on appropriate legal standards, including privilege.
Rulemaking Recordkeeping
4. Agencies should begin compiling rulemaking records no later
than the date on which an agency publishes the notice of proposed
rulemaking. Agencies should include materials considered in
preparation of the notice of proposed rulemaking. For example,
agencies should include materials received in response to an advance
notice of proposed rulemaking or a notice of inquiry, if there is
one, and considered in development of the proposed rule. The agency
should continue compiling the rulemaking record as long as the rule
is pending before the agency.
5. Agencies should designate one or more custodians for
rulemaking recordkeeping, either on a rulemaking-by-rulemaking basis
or generally. Agencies should inform agency personnel of the
custodian(s) and direct them to deposit rulemaking record materials
with the custodian(s), excepting if necessary confidential
information to which access is restricted. The custodian(s) should
document the record compilation process.
Public Rulemaking Dockets
6. To the extent practicable, agencies should index public
rulemaking dockets for informal rulemaking, at an appropriate level
of detail.
Record Preservation
7. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)
should amend its agency guidance to address the official status and
legal value of records relating to informal rulemaking, particularly
administrative records for judicial review.
8. Agencies using electronic records management systems to
manage rulemaking records, such as the Federal Document Management
System or agency specific systems, should work with NARA to ensure
the adequacy of such systems for recordkeeping purposes and the
transfer to the National Archives of permanent records. Agencies
should review their records schedules in light of developments in
electronic records management.
[[Page 41361]]
Certification of Administrative Records for Judicial Review
9. Agencies should develop procedures for designating
appropriate individuals, who may or may not be record custodians, to
certify administrative records to the court in case of judicial
review of agency action. Agency certifications should include an
index of contents of the administrative record for judicial review.
Agency Record Policies and Guidance
10. Agencies should develop a general policy regarding treatment
of protected or privileged materials, including indexing, in public
rulemaking dockets and in certification of the administrative record
for judicial review. Agencies should make this policy available to
the public and should provide it to the Department of Justice, if
the Department represents the agency in litigation.
11. Agencies that engage in informal rulemaking should issue
guidance to aid personnel in implementing the above best practices.
Agencies should make their guidance on informal rulemaking and
administrative recordkeeping available to the public and should
provide it to the Department of Justice, if the Department
represents the agency in litigation. The level of detail and
contents of such guidance will vary based on factors such as: The
size of typical agency rulemaking records; institutional experience,
or the lack thereof, with record compilation and informal rulemaking
litigation; the need for consistency across agency components in the
development and maintenance of rulemaking records; and agency
resources. However, agencies should ensure that guidance addresses
at least the following:
(a) Essential components of the rulemaking record, public
rulemaking docket, and the administrative record for judicial
review;
(b) appropriate exclusions from the rulemaking record, including
guidance on whether and when to exclude materials such as personal
notes or draft documents;
(c) timing of compilation and indexing practices;
(d) management and segregation of privileged materials, e.g.,
attorney work product or pre-decisional deliberative materials;
(e) management and segregation of sensitive or protected
materials, e.g., copyrighted, classified, protected personal, or
confidential supervisory or business information;
(f) policies and procedures, if any, for the protection of
sensitive information submitted by the public during the process of
rulemaking or otherwise contained in the rulemaking record;
(g) preservation of rulemaking and administrative records and
public rulemaking dockets;
(h) certification of the administrative record for judicial
review, including the process for identifying the appropriate
certifying official; and
(i) relevant capabilities and limitations of recordkeeping tools
and technologies.
Judicial Review
12. A reviewing court should afford the administrative record
for judicial review a presumption of regularity.
13. In appropriate circumstances, a reviewing court should
permit or require supplementation or completion of the record on
review. Supplementation or completion may be appropriate when the
presumption of regularity has been rebutted, such as in cases where
there is a strong showing that an agency has acted improperly or in
bad faith or there are credible allegations that the administrative
record for judicial review is incomplete.
[FR Doc. 2013-16541 Filed 7-9-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6110-01-P