Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point Unit 2, LLC, Issuance of Director's Decision, 37591-37592 [2013-14875]
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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 120 / Friday, June 21, 2013 / Notices
Purpose of Meeting: To study data,
programs, policies, and other information
pertinent to the National Science Foundation
and to provide advice and recommendations
concerning research in mathematics and
physical sciences.
Agenda
State of the Directorate for Mathematical and
Physical Sciences (MPS): FY 13, 14, and 15
Report on the NSF Strategic Plan
Briefing on the NRC Magnet Science Report
Update from StatsNSF Subcommittee
Update from Synchrotron Science
Subcommittee
Update from Food Systems Subcommittee
Update from Optics and Photonics
Subcommittee
Briefing on the NRC Math 2025 Report
Report from the Career Task Force
ACCI Interface: Planning for Joint Meeting
Nov. 7–8, 2013
New challenges/subcommittees
Dated: June 18, 2013.
Susanne Bolton,
Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 2013–14839 Filed 6–20–13; 8:45 am]
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NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
Making the Most of Big Data: Request
for Information
The National Coordination
Office (NCO) for Networking and
Information Technology Research and
Development (NITRD), National Science
Foundation.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
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wigen@nitrd.gov. Individuals who use a
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Relay Service (FIRS) at 1–800–877–8339
between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern time,
Monday through Friday.
DATES: Deadline date for submission of
summaries is September 2, 2013.
SUMMARY: Federal Request for
Information (RFI) on Big Data highimpact collaborations and areas for
expanded collaboration between the
public and private sectors.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Overview: Aiming to make the most of
the explosion of Big Data and the tools
needed to analyze it, the Obama
Administration announced a ‘‘National
Big Data Research and Development
Initiative’’ on March 29, 2012. To
launch the initiative, six Federal
departments and agencies announced
more than $200 million in new
commitments that, together, promise to
greatly improve and develop the tools,
techniques, and human capital needed
to move from data to knowledge to
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action. The Administration is also
working to ‘‘liberate’’ government data
and voluntarily-contributed corporate
data to fuel entrepreneurship, create
jobs, and improve the lives of
Americans in tangible ways. For
additional information about the launch
of the Big Data Initiative see the OSTP
Fact Sheet and Press Release.
As we enter the second year of the Big
Data Initiative, the Administration is
encouraging multiple stakeholders
including federal agencies, private
industry, academia, state and local
government, non-profits, and
foundations, to develop and participate
in Big Data innovation projects across
the country. Later this year, the Office
of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP), NSF, and other agencies in the
Networking and Information
Technology R&D (NITRD) program plan
to convene an event that highlights
high-impact collaborations and
identifies areas for expanded
collaboration between the public and
private sectors. The Administration is
particularly interested in projects and
initiatives that:
• Advance technologies that support
Big Data and data analytics;
• Educate and expand the Big Data
workforce;
• Develop, demonstrate and evaluate
applications of Big Data that improve
key outcomes in economic growth, job
creation, education, health, energy,
sustainability, public safety, advanced
manufacturing, science and engineering,
and global development;
• Demonstrate the role that prizes and
challenges can play in deriving new
insights from Big Data; and
• Foster regional innovation.
Description: Please submit a two-page
summary of projects to
bigdataprojects@nitrd.gov. The
summary should identify:
1. The goal of the project, with
metrics for evaluating the success or
failure of the project;
2. The multiple stakeholders that will
participate in the project and their
respective roles and responsibilities;
3. Initial financial and in-kind
resources that the stakeholders are
prepared to commit to this project; and
4. A principal point of contact for the
partnership.
The submission should also indicate
whether NITRD can post the project
description to a public Web site. Unless
otherwise noted, submissions with
sensitive material (e.g., trade secrets, or
privileged or confidential commercial or
financial information) will be protected
from disclosure.
This announcement is posted solely
for information and planning purposes;
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37591
it does not constitute a formal
solicitation for grants, contracts, or
cooperative agreements.
Submitted by the National Science
Foundation for the National
Coordination Office (NCO) for
Networking and Information
Technology Research and Development
(NITRD) on June 17, 2013.
Suzanne H. Plimpton,
Reports Clearance Officer, National Science
Foundation.
[FR Doc. 2013–14746 Filed 6–20–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7555–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[NRC–2012–0284; Docket No. 50–247;
License No. DPR–26]
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,
Entergy Nuclear Indian Point Unit 2,
LLC, Issuance of Director’s Decision
Notice is hereby given that the Deputy
Director, Reactor Safety Programs,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) has issued a Director’s Decision
on a petition filed by the Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
(hereafter referred to as ‘‘the
petitioner’’). The petition, dated April
16, 2012 (available as Agencywide
Documents Access and Management
System (ADAMS) Accession No.
ML12108A052), concerns the operation
of Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit
No. 2 (Indian Point 2), owned by
Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC,
and operated by Entergy Nuclear
Operations, Inc.
The petitioner requested that the NRC
order the licensee for Indian Point 2 to
remove the passive autocatalytic
recombiners (PARs) from the
containment building and replace them
with electrically powered thermal
hydrogen recombiners because the PAR
system could have unintended ignitions
in the event of a severe reactor accident,
which in turn could cause a hydrogen
detonation. The petitioner stated that
experimental data demonstrates that
Indian Point 2’s two PAR units could
have at least one unintended ignition on
their catalytic surfaces following a
severe reactor accident.
As the basis for the request, the
petitioner stated, in part, that:
• The PAR systems are simple
devices consisting of catalyst surfaces
where spontaneous catalytic reactions
occur in the presence of hydrogen and
oxygen to form water vapor. PARs are
passive systems and do not need
external power supplies or operator
E:\FR\FM\21JNN1.SGM
21JNN1
TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
37592
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 120 / Friday, June 21, 2013 / Notices
action to function. As a consequence,
control room operators cannot
deactivate them or remove them from
service.
• The PARs at Indian Point 2 are
capable of controlling hydrogen
generated from the NRC’s design-basis
accident as described in the Indian
Point 2 updated final safety analysis
report. The focus of the petition regards
the behavior of PARs following a severe
reactor accident.
• Following a severe reactor accident,
hydrogen generation rates could
overwhelm the PARs at Indian Point 2.
As a result, the containment atmosphere
could have elevated concentrations of
hydrogen gas approaching eight to 10
percent or greater.
• The petition cites data from tests,
including work sponsored by the NRC at
the Sandia National Laboratory’s
Surtsey test facility, where PARs were
observed to have unintended ignitions
in environments containing elevated
levels of hydrogen gas (i.e., eight to 10
percent). According to the petitioner,
ignitions could lead to detonations.
• The NRC has not published any
documentation indicating that the issue
of PAR ignitions has been studied and
resolved.
• Removal of the PARs at Indian
Point 2 will lead to a safer post-accident
condition because a potential source of
ignition would be removed.
Furthermore, if the PARs are replaced
by electrically powered hydrogen
thermal recombiners, control-room
operators would have the option of
deactivating them because electrically
powered hydrogen thermal recombiners
can also have unintended ignitions.
The NRC sent a copy of the proposed
Director’s Decision to the petitioner and
the licensee for comment on March 29,
2013. The Petitioner and the licensee
were asked to provide comments within
30 days on any part of the proposed
Director’s Decision that was considered
to be erroneous or any issues in the
petition that were not addressed.
Comments were not received from
either the Petitioner or the licensee.
The Deputy Director of the Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation denied the
petitioner’s request to order the removal
of the two PAR units from the Indian
Point 2 containment building and
replace them with electrically powered
thermal hydrogen recombiners. The
NRC staff has reviewed the petition and
does not agree that the presence of PARs
represents a sufficient risk to warrant
their removal by order. Following a
severe reactor accident, multiple
ignition sources, besides PARs, would
be present in containment to initiate
combustion at lower flammability
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:32 Jun 20, 2013
Jkt 229001
limits, which would be expected to keep
hydrogen concentrations below
detonable levels. Furthermore, the NRC
staff believes that the presence of PARs
could prove beneficial in the event of an
extended station blackout.
The Director’s Decision (DD–13–01)
under part 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code
of Federal Regulations, ‘‘Requests for
Action under This Subpart,’’ explains
the reasons for this decision. The
complete text is available in ADAMS
under Accession No. ML13128A436 for
inspection at the Commission’s Public
Document Room located at One White
Flint North, Public File Area 01 F21,
11555 Rockville Pike (first floor),
Rockville, Maryland, and online in the
NRC library at https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm.html.
The NRC will file a copy of the
Director’s Decision with the Secretary of
the Commission for the Commission’s
review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206. As a provision of this regulation,
the Director’s Decision will constitute
the final action of the Commission 25
days after the date of the Decision
unless the Commission, on its own
motion, institutes a review of the
Director’s Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day
of June 2013.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jennifer L. Uhle,
Deputy Director, Reactor Safety Programs,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2013–14875 Filed 6–20–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–285; NRC–2013–0130]
Omaha Public Power District, Fort
Calhoun Station, Unit 1; Exemption
1.0 Background
Omaha Public Power District (OPPD,
the licensee) is the holder of Facility
Operating License, which authorizes
operation of Fort Calhoun Station (FCS),
Unit 1. The license provides, among
other things, that the facility is subject
to all rules, regulations, and orders of
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) now or hereafter in
effect.
The facility consists of one
pressurized-water reactor located in
Washington County, Nebraska.
2.0 Request/Action
Section 26.205(d)(3) of Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),
requires licensees to ensure that
individuals who perform duties
PO 00000
Frm 00089
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
identified in 10 CFR 26.4(a)(1) through
(a)(5) to comply with the requirements
for maximum average work hours in 10
CFR 26.205(d)(7). However, 10 CFR
26.205(d)(4) provides that during the
first 60 days of a unit outage, licensees
need not meet the requirements of 10
CFR 26.205(d)(7) for individuals
specified in 10 CFR 26.4(a)(1) through
(a)(4), while those individuals are
working on outage activities. The less
restrictive requirements of 10 CFR
26.205(d)(4) and (d)(5) are permitted to
be applied during the first 60 days of a
unit outage following a period of normal
plant operation in which the workload
and overtime levels are controlled by 10
CFR 26.205(d)(3). The regulations in 10
CFR 26.205(d)(4) also require licensees
to ensure that the individuals specified
in 10 CFR 26.4(a)(1) through (a)(3) have
at least 3 days off in each successive
(i.e., non-rolling) 15-day period and that
the individuals specified in 10 CFR
26.4(a)(4) have at least 1 day off in any
7-day period.
Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.73, ‘‘Fatigue
Management for Nuclear Power Plant
Personnel,’’ March 2009 (Agencywide
Documents Access and Management
System (ADAMS) Accession No.
ML083450028), endorses Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI) 06–11, Revision 1,
‘‘Managing Personnel Fatigue at Nuclear
Power Reactor Sites,’’ October 2008
(ADAMS Accession No. ML083110161),
with clarifications, additions and
exceptions. Position 10 of RG 5.73 ‘‘C.
Regulatory Position’’ provides an
acceptable alternate method to the
method stated in the NEI 06–11, Section
8.3, for transitioning individuals who
are working an outage at one site onto
an outage at another site.
By letter dated October 10, 2012
(ADAMS Accession No. ML12284A344),
the licensee requested a one-time
exemption in accordance with 10 CFR
26.9 from the specific requirements of
10 CFR 26.205(d)(7). Currently, 10 CFR
26.205(d)(4) and (d)(5) permit the use of
less restrictive working hour limitations
during the first 60 days of a unit outage,
in lieu of the requirements of 10 CFR
26.205(d)(7). The proposed exemption
would allow the use of the less
restrictive working hour limitations
described in 10 CFR 26.205(d)(4) and
(d)(5) to support activities required for
plant startup from the current extended
outage, for a period not to exceed 60
days. The exemption would apply to the
operations, chemistry, radiation
protection, security, fire brigade, and
maintenance personnel as defined in 10
CFR 26.4(a)(1) through (a)(5). The
licensee is requesting this one-time
exemption to facilitate the licensee in its
efforts to complete work activities
E:\FR\FM\21JNN1.SGM
21JNN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 120 (Friday, June 21, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 37591-37592]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-14875]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[NRC-2012-0284; Docket No. 50-247; License No. DPR-26]
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point
Unit 2, LLC, Issuance of Director's Decision
Notice is hereby given that the Deputy Director, Reactor Safety
Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has issued a Director's Decision on a petition filed
by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., (hereafter referred to
as ``the petitioner''). The petition, dated April 16, 2012 (available
as Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession
No. ML12108A052), concerns the operation of Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit No. 2 (Indian Point 2), owned by Entergy Nuclear Indian
Point 2, LLC, and operated by Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
The petitioner requested that the NRC order the licensee for Indian
Point 2 to remove the passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs) from the
containment building and replace them with electrically powered thermal
hydrogen recombiners because the PAR system could have unintended
ignitions in the event of a severe reactor accident, which in turn
could cause a hydrogen detonation. The petitioner stated that
experimental data demonstrates that Indian Point 2's two PAR units
could have at least one unintended ignition on their catalytic surfaces
following a severe reactor accident.
As the basis for the request, the petitioner stated, in part, that:
The PAR systems are simple devices consisting of catalyst
surfaces where spontaneous catalytic reactions occur in the presence of
hydrogen and oxygen to form water vapor. PARs are passive systems and
do not need external power supplies or operator
[[Page 37592]]
action to function. As a consequence, control room operators cannot
deactivate them or remove them from service.
The PARs at Indian Point 2 are capable of controlling
hydrogen generated from the NRC's design-basis accident as described in
the Indian Point 2 updated final safety analysis report. The focus of
the petition regards the behavior of PARs following a severe reactor
accident.
Following a severe reactor accident, hydrogen generation
rates could overwhelm the PARs at Indian Point 2. As a result, the
containment atmosphere could have elevated concentrations of hydrogen
gas approaching eight to 10 percent or greater.
The petition cites data from tests, including work
sponsored by the NRC at the Sandia National Laboratory's Surtsey test
facility, where PARs were observed to have unintended ignitions in
environments containing elevated levels of hydrogen gas (i.e., eight to
10 percent). According to the petitioner, ignitions could lead to
detonations.
The NRC has not published any documentation indicating
that the issue of PAR ignitions has been studied and resolved.
Removal of the PARs at Indian Point 2 will lead to a safer
post-accident condition because a potential source of ignition would be
removed. Furthermore, if the PARs are replaced by electrically powered
hydrogen thermal recombiners, control-room operators would have the
option of deactivating them because electrically powered hydrogen
thermal recombiners can also have unintended ignitions.
The NRC sent a copy of the proposed Director's Decision to the
petitioner and the licensee for comment on March 29, 2013. The
Petitioner and the licensee were asked to provide comments within 30
days on any part of the proposed Director's Decision that was
considered to be erroneous or any issues in the petition that were not
addressed. Comments were not received from either the Petitioner or the
licensee.
The Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
denied the petitioner's request to order the removal of the two PAR
units from the Indian Point 2 containment building and replace them
with electrically powered thermal hydrogen recombiners. The NRC staff
has reviewed the petition and does not agree that the presence of PARs
represents a sufficient risk to warrant their removal by order.
Following a severe reactor accident, multiple ignition sources, besides
PARs, would be present in containment to initiate combustion at lower
flammability limits, which would be expected to keep hydrogen
concentrations below detonable levels. Furthermore, the NRC staff
believes that the presence of PARs could prove beneficial in the event
of an extended station blackout.
The Director's Decision (DD-13-01) under part 2.206 of Title 10 of
the Code of Federal Regulations, ``Requests for Action under This
Subpart,'' explains the reasons for this decision. The complete text is
available in ADAMS under Accession No. ML13128A436 for inspection at
the Commission's Public Document Room located at One White Flint North,
Public File Area 01 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville,
Maryland, and online in the NRC library at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html.
The NRC will file a copy of the Director's Decision with the
Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance
with 10 CFR 2.206. As a provision of this regulation, the Director's
Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days
after the date of the Decision unless the Commission, on its own
motion, institutes a review of the Director's Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of June 2013.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jennifer L. Uhle,
Deputy Director, Reactor Safety Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2013-14875 Filed 6-20-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P