Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point Unit 2, LLC, Issuance of Director's Decision, 37591-37592 [2013-14875]

Download as PDF Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 120 / Friday, June 21, 2013 / Notices Purpose of Meeting: To study data, programs, policies, and other information pertinent to the National Science Foundation and to provide advice and recommendations concerning research in mathematics and physical sciences. Agenda State of the Directorate for Mathematical and Physical Sciences (MPS): FY 13, 14, and 15 Report on the NSF Strategic Plan Briefing on the NRC Magnet Science Report Update from StatsNSF Subcommittee Update from Synchrotron Science Subcommittee Update from Food Systems Subcommittee Update from Optics and Photonics Subcommittee Briefing on the NRC Math 2025 Report Report from the Career Task Force ACCI Interface: Planning for Joint Meeting Nov. 7–8, 2013 New challenges/subcommittees Dated: June 18, 2013. Susanne Bolton, Committee Management Officer. [FR Doc. 2013–14839 Filed 6–20–13; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7555–01–P NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION Making the Most of Big Data: Request for Information The National Coordination Office (NCO) for Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD), National Science Foundation. ACTION: Notice. AGENCY: TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wendy Wigen at 703–292–4873 or wigen@nitrd.gov. Individuals who use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) may call the Federal Information Relay Service (FIRS) at 1–800–877–8339 between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern time, Monday through Friday. DATES: Deadline date for submission of summaries is September 2, 2013. SUMMARY: Federal Request for Information (RFI) on Big Data highimpact collaborations and areas for expanded collaboration between the public and private sectors. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Overview: Aiming to make the most of the explosion of Big Data and the tools needed to analyze it, the Obama Administration announced a ‘‘National Big Data Research and Development Initiative’’ on March 29, 2012. To launch the initiative, six Federal departments and agencies announced more than $200 million in new commitments that, together, promise to greatly improve and develop the tools, techniques, and human capital needed to move from data to knowledge to VerDate Mar<15>2010 18:32 Jun 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 action. The Administration is also working to ‘‘liberate’’ government data and voluntarily-contributed corporate data to fuel entrepreneurship, create jobs, and improve the lives of Americans in tangible ways. For additional information about the launch of the Big Data Initiative see the OSTP Fact Sheet and Press Release. As we enter the second year of the Big Data Initiative, the Administration is encouraging multiple stakeholders including federal agencies, private industry, academia, state and local government, non-profits, and foundations, to develop and participate in Big Data innovation projects across the country. Later this year, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), NSF, and other agencies in the Networking and Information Technology R&D (NITRD) program plan to convene an event that highlights high-impact collaborations and identifies areas for expanded collaboration between the public and private sectors. The Administration is particularly interested in projects and initiatives that: • Advance technologies that support Big Data and data analytics; • Educate and expand the Big Data workforce; • Develop, demonstrate and evaluate applications of Big Data that improve key outcomes in economic growth, job creation, education, health, energy, sustainability, public safety, advanced manufacturing, science and engineering, and global development; • Demonstrate the role that prizes and challenges can play in deriving new insights from Big Data; and • Foster regional innovation. Description: Please submit a two-page summary of projects to bigdataprojects@nitrd.gov. The summary should identify: 1. The goal of the project, with metrics for evaluating the success or failure of the project; 2. The multiple stakeholders that will participate in the project and their respective roles and responsibilities; 3. Initial financial and in-kind resources that the stakeholders are prepared to commit to this project; and 4. A principal point of contact for the partnership. The submission should also indicate whether NITRD can post the project description to a public Web site. Unless otherwise noted, submissions with sensitive material (e.g., trade secrets, or privileged or confidential commercial or financial information) will be protected from disclosure. This announcement is posted solely for information and planning purposes; PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 37591 it does not constitute a formal solicitation for grants, contracts, or cooperative agreements. Submitted by the National Science Foundation for the National Coordination Office (NCO) for Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) on June 17, 2013. Suzanne H. Plimpton, Reports Clearance Officer, National Science Foundation. [FR Doc. 2013–14746 Filed 6–20–13; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7555–01–P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC–2012–0284; Docket No. 50–247; License No. DPR–26] Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point Unit 2, LLC, Issuance of Director’s Decision Notice is hereby given that the Deputy Director, Reactor Safety Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a Director’s Decision on a petition filed by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., (hereafter referred to as ‘‘the petitioner’’). The petition, dated April 16, 2012 (available as Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12108A052), concerns the operation of Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 (Indian Point 2), owned by Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and operated by Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. The petitioner requested that the NRC order the licensee for Indian Point 2 to remove the passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs) from the containment building and replace them with electrically powered thermal hydrogen recombiners because the PAR system could have unintended ignitions in the event of a severe reactor accident, which in turn could cause a hydrogen detonation. The petitioner stated that experimental data demonstrates that Indian Point 2’s two PAR units could have at least one unintended ignition on their catalytic surfaces following a severe reactor accident. As the basis for the request, the petitioner stated, in part, that: • The PAR systems are simple devices consisting of catalyst surfaces where spontaneous catalytic reactions occur in the presence of hydrogen and oxygen to form water vapor. PARs are passive systems and do not need external power supplies or operator E:\FR\FM\21JNN1.SGM 21JNN1 TKELLEY on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 37592 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 120 / Friday, June 21, 2013 / Notices action to function. As a consequence, control room operators cannot deactivate them or remove them from service. • The PARs at Indian Point 2 are capable of controlling hydrogen generated from the NRC’s design-basis accident as described in the Indian Point 2 updated final safety analysis report. The focus of the petition regards the behavior of PARs following a severe reactor accident. • Following a severe reactor accident, hydrogen generation rates could overwhelm the PARs at Indian Point 2. As a result, the containment atmosphere could have elevated concentrations of hydrogen gas approaching eight to 10 percent or greater. • The petition cites data from tests, including work sponsored by the NRC at the Sandia National Laboratory’s Surtsey test facility, where PARs were observed to have unintended ignitions in environments containing elevated levels of hydrogen gas (i.e., eight to 10 percent). According to the petitioner, ignitions could lead to detonations. • The NRC has not published any documentation indicating that the issue of PAR ignitions has been studied and resolved. • Removal of the PARs at Indian Point 2 will lead to a safer post-accident condition because a potential source of ignition would be removed. Furthermore, if the PARs are replaced by electrically powered hydrogen thermal recombiners, control-room operators would have the option of deactivating them because electrically powered hydrogen thermal recombiners can also have unintended ignitions. The NRC sent a copy of the proposed Director’s Decision to the petitioner and the licensee for comment on March 29, 2013. The Petitioner and the licensee were asked to provide comments within 30 days on any part of the proposed Director’s Decision that was considered to be erroneous or any issues in the petition that were not addressed. Comments were not received from either the Petitioner or the licensee. The Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation denied the petitioner’s request to order the removal of the two PAR units from the Indian Point 2 containment building and replace them with electrically powered thermal hydrogen recombiners. The NRC staff has reviewed the petition and does not agree that the presence of PARs represents a sufficient risk to warrant their removal by order. Following a severe reactor accident, multiple ignition sources, besides PARs, would be present in containment to initiate combustion at lower flammability VerDate Mar<15>2010 18:32 Jun 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 limits, which would be expected to keep hydrogen concentrations below detonable levels. Furthermore, the NRC staff believes that the presence of PARs could prove beneficial in the event of an extended station blackout. The Director’s Decision (DD–13–01) under part 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, ‘‘Requests for Action under This Subpart,’’ explains the reasons for this decision. The complete text is available in ADAMS under Accession No. ML13128A436 for inspection at the Commission’s Public Document Room located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, and online in the NRC library at http://www.nrc.gov/ reading-rm.html. The NRC will file a copy of the Director’s Decision with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission’s review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206. As a provision of this regulation, the Director’s Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of the Decision unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Director’s Decision in that time. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of June 2013. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Jennifer L. Uhle, Deputy Director, Reactor Safety Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. 2013–14875 Filed 6–20–13; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. 50–285; NRC–2013–0130] Omaha Public Power District, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1; Exemption 1.0 Background Omaha Public Power District (OPPD, the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License, which authorizes operation of Fort Calhoun Station (FCS), Unit 1. The license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) now or hereafter in effect. The facility consists of one pressurized-water reactor located in Washington County, Nebraska. 2.0 Request/Action Section 26.205(d)(3) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), requires licensees to ensure that individuals who perform duties PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 identified in 10 CFR 26.4(a)(1) through (a)(5) to comply with the requirements for maximum average work hours in 10 CFR 26.205(d)(7). However, 10 CFR 26.205(d)(4) provides that during the first 60 days of a unit outage, licensees need not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 26.205(d)(7) for individuals specified in 10 CFR 26.4(a)(1) through (a)(4), while those individuals are working on outage activities. The less restrictive requirements of 10 CFR 26.205(d)(4) and (d)(5) are permitted to be applied during the first 60 days of a unit outage following a period of normal plant operation in which the workload and overtime levels are controlled by 10 CFR 26.205(d)(3). The regulations in 10 CFR 26.205(d)(4) also require licensees to ensure that the individuals specified in 10 CFR 26.4(a)(1) through (a)(3) have at least 3 days off in each successive (i.e., non-rolling) 15-day period and that the individuals specified in 10 CFR 26.4(a)(4) have at least 1 day off in any 7-day period. Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.73, ‘‘Fatigue Management for Nuclear Power Plant Personnel,’’ March 2009 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML083450028), endorses Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 06–11, Revision 1, ‘‘Managing Personnel Fatigue at Nuclear Power Reactor Sites,’’ October 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML083110161), with clarifications, additions and exceptions. Position 10 of RG 5.73 ‘‘C. Regulatory Position’’ provides an acceptable alternate method to the method stated in the NEI 06–11, Section 8.3, for transitioning individuals who are working an outage at one site onto an outage at another site. By letter dated October 10, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12284A344), the licensee requested a one-time exemption in accordance with 10 CFR 26.9 from the specific requirements of 10 CFR 26.205(d)(7). Currently, 10 CFR 26.205(d)(4) and (d)(5) permit the use of less restrictive working hour limitations during the first 60 days of a unit outage, in lieu of the requirements of 10 CFR 26.205(d)(7). The proposed exemption would allow the use of the less restrictive working hour limitations described in 10 CFR 26.205(d)(4) and (d)(5) to support activities required for plant startup from the current extended outage, for a period not to exceed 60 days. The exemption would apply to the operations, chemistry, radiation protection, security, fire brigade, and maintenance personnel as defined in 10 CFR 26.4(a)(1) through (a)(5). The licensee is requesting this one-time exemption to facilitate the licensee in its efforts to complete work activities E:\FR\FM\21JNN1.SGM 21JNN1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 120 (Friday, June 21, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 37591-37592]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-14875]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2012-0284; Docket No. 50-247; License No. DPR-26]


Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 
Unit 2, LLC, Issuance of Director's Decision

    Notice is hereby given that the Deputy Director, Reactor Safety 
Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) has issued a Director's Decision on a petition filed 
by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., (hereafter referred to 
as ``the petitioner''). The petition, dated April 16, 2012 (available 
as Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession 
No. ML12108A052), concerns the operation of Indian Point Nuclear 
Generating Unit No. 2 (Indian Point 2), owned by Entergy Nuclear Indian 
Point 2, LLC, and operated by Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
    The petitioner requested that the NRC order the licensee for Indian 
Point 2 to remove the passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs) from the 
containment building and replace them with electrically powered thermal 
hydrogen recombiners because the PAR system could have unintended 
ignitions in the event of a severe reactor accident, which in turn 
could cause a hydrogen detonation. The petitioner stated that 
experimental data demonstrates that Indian Point 2's two PAR units 
could have at least one unintended ignition on their catalytic surfaces 
following a severe reactor accident.
    As the basis for the request, the petitioner stated, in part, that:
     The PAR systems are simple devices consisting of catalyst 
surfaces where spontaneous catalytic reactions occur in the presence of 
hydrogen and oxygen to form water vapor. PARs are passive systems and 
do not need external power supplies or operator

[[Page 37592]]

action to function. As a consequence, control room operators cannot 
deactivate them or remove them from service.
     The PARs at Indian Point 2 are capable of controlling 
hydrogen generated from the NRC's design-basis accident as described in 
the Indian Point 2 updated final safety analysis report. The focus of 
the petition regards the behavior of PARs following a severe reactor 
accident.
     Following a severe reactor accident, hydrogen generation 
rates could overwhelm the PARs at Indian Point 2. As a result, the 
containment atmosphere could have elevated concentrations of hydrogen 
gas approaching eight to 10 percent or greater.
     The petition cites data from tests, including work 
sponsored by the NRC at the Sandia National Laboratory's Surtsey test 
facility, where PARs were observed to have unintended ignitions in 
environments containing elevated levels of hydrogen gas (i.e., eight to 
10 percent). According to the petitioner, ignitions could lead to 
detonations.
     The NRC has not published any documentation indicating 
that the issue of PAR ignitions has been studied and resolved.
     Removal of the PARs at Indian Point 2 will lead to a safer 
post-accident condition because a potential source of ignition would be 
removed. Furthermore, if the PARs are replaced by electrically powered 
hydrogen thermal recombiners, control-room operators would have the 
option of deactivating them because electrically powered hydrogen 
thermal recombiners can also have unintended ignitions.
    The NRC sent a copy of the proposed Director's Decision to the 
petitioner and the licensee for comment on March 29, 2013. The 
Petitioner and the licensee were asked to provide comments within 30 
days on any part of the proposed Director's Decision that was 
considered to be erroneous or any issues in the petition that were not 
addressed. Comments were not received from either the Petitioner or the 
licensee.
    The Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
denied the petitioner's request to order the removal of the two PAR 
units from the Indian Point 2 containment building and replace them 
with electrically powered thermal hydrogen recombiners. The NRC staff 
has reviewed the petition and does not agree that the presence of PARs 
represents a sufficient risk to warrant their removal by order. 
Following a severe reactor accident, multiple ignition sources, besides 
PARs, would be present in containment to initiate combustion at lower 
flammability limits, which would be expected to keep hydrogen 
concentrations below detonable levels. Furthermore, the NRC staff 
believes that the presence of PARs could prove beneficial in the event 
of an extended station blackout.
    The Director's Decision (DD-13-01) under part 2.206 of Title 10 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations, ``Requests for Action under This 
Subpart,'' explains the reasons for this decision. The complete text is 
available in ADAMS under Accession No. ML13128A436 for inspection at 
the Commission's Public Document Room located at One White Flint North, 
Public File Area 01 F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland, and online in the NRC library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html.
    The NRC will file a copy of the Director's Decision with the 
Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance 
with 10 CFR 2.206. As a provision of this regulation, the Director's 
Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days 
after the date of the Decision unless the Commission, on its own 
motion, institutes a review of the Director's Decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of June 2013.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jennifer L. Uhle,
Deputy Director, Reactor Safety Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2013-14875 Filed 6-20-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P