All Operating Boiling-Water Reactor Licensees With Mark I And Mark II Containments; Docket Nos. (As Shown In Attachment 1), License Nos. (As Shown In Attachment 1), EA-13-109; Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Effective Immediately), 35990-35996 [2013-14072]

Download as PDF 35990 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 115 / Friday, June 14, 2013 / Notices consultation with Federal, State, Tribal, and local agencies; (4) the NRC staff’s own independent review of information available since the preparation and publication of the 1978 FES–OL; and (5) the assessments summarized in this SFES, including consideration of public comments received during scoping and on the draft SFES. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of June 2013. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Robert J. Pascarelli, Chief, Plant Licensing Branch II–1, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. 2013–14088 Filed 6–13–13; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC–2013–0128] All Operating Boiling-Water Reactor Licensees With Mark I And Mark II Containments; Docket Nos. (As Shown In Attachment 1), License Nos. (As Shown In Attachment 1), EA–13–109; Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions (Effective Immediately) I. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES The Licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order hold licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) authorizing operation of nuclear power plants in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), ‘‘Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.’’ Specifically, these Licensees operate boiling-water reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and Mark II containment designs. II. The events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant following the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami highlight the possibility that events such as rare natural phenomena could challenge the traditional defense-indepth protections related to preventing accidents, mitigating accidents to prevent the release of radioactive materials, and taking actions to protect the public should a release occur. At Fukushima Dai-ichi, limitations in time and unpredictable conditions associated with the accident significantly hindered attempts by the operators to prevent core damage and containment failure. In VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:03 Jun 13, 2013 Jkt 229001 particular, the operators were unable to successfully operate the containment venting system. These problems, with venting the containments under the challenging conditions following the tsunami, contributed to the progression of the accident from inadequate cooling of the core leading to core damage, to compromising containment functions from overpressure and over-temperature conditions, and to the hydrogen explosions that destroyed the reactor buildings (secondary containments) of three of the Fukushima Dai-ichi units. The loss of the various barriers led to the release of radioactive materials, which further hampered operator efforts to arrest the accidents and ultimately led to the contamination of large areas surrounding the plant. Fortunately, the evacuation of local populations minimized the immediate danger to public health and safety from the loss of control of the large amount of radioactive materials within the reactor cores. The events at Fukushima reinforced the importance of reliable operation of hardened containment vents during emergency conditions, particularly, for small containments such as the Mark I and Mark II designs. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued Order EA–12–050 1 requiring the Licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order to implement requirements for a reliable hardened containment venting system (HCVS) for Mark I and Mark II containments. Order EA–12–050 required licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to install a reliable HCVS to support strategies for controlling containment pressure and preventing core damage following an event that causes a loss of heat removal systems (e.g., an extended loss of electrical power). The NRC determined that the issuance of EA–12– 050 and implementation of the requirements of that Order were necessary to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. While developing the requirements for a reliable HCVS in EA–12–050, the NRC acknowledged that questions remained about maintaining containment integrity and limiting the release of radioactive materials if the venting systems were used during severe accident conditions. The NRC staff presented options to address these issues, including the possible use of engineered filters to control releases, for 1 ‘‘Order Modifying Licenses With Regard To Reliable Hardened Containment Vents (Effective Immediately),’’ EA–12–050 (March 12, 2012) (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A043). PO 00000 Frm 00143 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 Commission consideration in SECY–12– 0157, ‘‘Consideration of Additional Requirements for Containment Venting Systems for Boiling Water Reactors with Mark I and Mark II Containments’’ (November 26, 2012). Option 2 in SECY–12–0157 was to modify EA–12– 050 to require severe accident capable vents (i.e., a reliable HCVS capable of operating under severe accident conditions). Other options discussed in SECY–12–0157 included the installation of engineered filtered containment venting systems (Option 3) and the development of a severe accident confinement strategy (Option 4). In the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) for SECY–12–0157, dated March 19, 2013, the Commission approved Option 2 and directed the staff to issue a modification to EA–12–050 requiring licensees subject to that Order to ‘‘upgrade or replace the reliable hardened vents required by Order EA– 12–050 with a containment venting system designed and installed to remain functional during severe accident conditions.’’ The requirements in this Order, in addition to providing a reliable HCVS to assist in preventing core damage when heat removal capability is lost (the purpose of EA–12–050), will ensure that venting functions are also available during severe accident conditions. Severe accident conditions include the elevated temperatures, pressures, radiation levels, and combustible gas concentrations, such as hydrogen and carbon monoxide, associated with accidents involving extensive core damage, including accidents involving a breach of the reactor vessel by molten core debris. Ensuring that the venting functions are available under severe accident conditions will support the strategies in the Mark I and Mark II severe accident management guidelines for the protection or recovery of the containment, which serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive materials. This Order will ensure that this additional severe accident venting capability is provided while also achieving, with minimal delays, the purpose of EA–12–050—to provide a reliable HCVS to control containment pressure and prevent core damage following the loss of heat removal functions. This Order rescinds the requirements imposed in Section IV and Attachment 2 of EA–12–050 and replaces them with the requirements in Section IV and Attachment 2 of this Order. Because the requirements in EA–12–050 are now reflected in this Order, licensees are no longer expected to comply with the E:\FR\FM\14JNN1.SGM 14JNN1 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 115 / Friday, June 14, 2013 / Notices mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES requirements in EA–12–050, including applicable schedule deadlines for submittals or implementation. This Order defines requirements related to containment venting before and during severe accident conditions, which is a subset of the issues related to containment performance during severe accidents outlined in SECY–12– 0157. Other issues include improving licensees’ severe accident management capabilities and filtering strategies to limit the release of radioactive materials when venting is necessary. For example, the importance of drywell flooding to prevent core debris that has breached the reactor vessel from causing containment failure by drywell liner melt-through in Mark I containments was discussed in SECY–12–0157 and during the related Commission meeting held on January 9, 2013. The remaining issues related to filtering strategies and severe accident management of BWR Mark I and II containments will be addressed through the rulemaking process, as directed by the Commission in its SRM for SECY–12–0157. The rulemaking process will commence in June 2013 when the NRC staff begins a series of public meetings to support developing the regulatory basis for the proposed rulemaking. III. The purpose of requiring reliable hardened vents in EA–12–050 was to prevent core damage when heat removal capability is lost due to conditions such as an extended loss of electrical power. In EA–12–050, the Commission determined that, in light of the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi and consistent with the NRC’s defense-in-depth strategy, installation of reliable hardened containment vents to help prevent core damage in BWRs with Mark I and Mark II containments was necessary to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety. This Order requires installation of reliable hardened vents that will not only assist in preventing core damage when heat removal capability is lost, but will also function in severe accident conditions (i.e., when core damage has occurred). The safety improvements to Mark I and Mark II containment venting systems required by this Order are intended to increase confidence in maintaining the containment function following core damage events. Although venting the containment during severe accident conditions could result in the release of radioactive materials, venting could also prevent containment structural and gross penetration leakage failures due to overpressurization that VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:03 Jun 13, 2013 Jkt 229001 would hamper accident management (e.g., continuing efforts to cool core debris) and ultimately result in larger, uncontrolled releases of radioactive material. Under the backfit provisions of 10 CFR 50.109, ‘‘Backfitting,’’ the NRC may require plant improvements beyond those needed to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety when engineering approaches are available to provide a cost-justified substantial safety improvement. The staff performed a detailed regulatory analysis of possible improvements to Mark I and Mark II reliable hardened containment vents, including the option of installing severe accident capable vents. That analysis is available in the NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at Accession No. ML12312A456. A summary of the staff’s cost-benefit evaluation was provided in SECY–12– 0157. As discussed in SECY–12–0157, the NRC’s determination that a venting system should be available during severe accident conditions considered both quantitative assessments of costs and benefits, as well as, various qualitative factors. Among the qualitative factors, one of the more important is enhancing the defense-indepth characteristics of Mark I and Mark II containments by addressing the relatively high probabilities that those containments would fail should an accident progress to melting the core. Other qualitative factors supporting installation of severe accident capable vents include addressing uncertainties in the understanding of severe accident events, supporting severe accident management and response, improving the control of hydrogen generated during severe accidents, improving readiness for external and multi-unit events, and reducing uncertainties about radiological releases and thereby improving emergency planning and response. The installation of a reliable, severe accident capable containment venting system, in combination with other actions such as ensuring drywell flooding capabilities, reduces the likelihood of containment failures and thereby enhances the defense-in-depth protections for plants with Mark I and Mark II containments. The Commission has determined that requiring BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to make the necessary plant modifications and procedure changes to provide a reliable hardened venting system that is capable of performing under severe accident conditions is a cost-justified substantial PO 00000 Frm 00144 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 35991 safety improvement. These modifications are needed to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property because they will give licensees greater capabilities to respond to severe accidents and limit the uncontrolled release of radioactive materials. In such situations, the Commission may act in accordance with its statutory authority under Section 161 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to require Licensees to take appropriate action to reduce the risks posed to the public from the operation of nuclear power plants. For Mark I containments, the preferred venting path is from the wetwell portion of containment because the water in the suppression pool provides a degree of decontamination before release to the environment. The benefits of the suppression pool in the scrubbing of possible releases when using the wetwell vents for pressure control were described in Generic Letter 89–16, ‘‘Installation of a Hardened Wetwell Vent.’’ In addition, the wetwell venting path has been incorporated into other parts of the mitigating strategies to address lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. During severe accidents involving molten core debris breaching the reactor vessel, mitigating strategies include injecting water into the containment to help prevent drywell liner melt-through, which would result in a release pathway directly into the reactor building. However, water injection can eventually increase the water level in the suppression pool to a point where venting from the wetwell would no longer be possible. Without venting, containment pressure would continue to increase, threatening containment failure. For this reason, current severe accident management guidelines for Mark I containments include provisions for venting from the drywell for containment pressure control if the capability of venting from the wetwell is not available. Because water injection in Mark II containments could similarly impede the ability to vent from the wetwell, the Mark II severe accident management guidelines also currently include provisions for use of both wetwell and drywell containment vents. In general, wetwell venting for Mark II containments provides similar benefits to Mark I containments in terms of scrubbing of possible releases. However, for Mark II containments, in the unlikely event of core debris melting through the reactor vessel, there is a potential for the core debris to cause a failure of drain line or downcomer pipe penetration in the floor, resulting in direct communication between the E:\FR\FM\14JNN1.SGM 14JNN1 mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 35992 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 115 / Friday, June 14, 2013 / Notices drywell and the wetwell volume above the water in the suppression pool. This condition, which is referred to as suppression pool bypass, is described in more detail in SECY–12–0157. In a suppression pool bypass scenario, the primary concern is the loss of the suppression pool as a means of filtering the release from the vents. This loss of filtering capability is an issue that will be resolved as part of the NRC rulemaking addressing broader severe accident management and filtering strategies, previously described. For the reasons discussed above, this Order requires Mark I and Mark II containments to have a wetwell venting system that remains functional during severe accident conditions. This Order also requires licensees with Mark I and Mark II containments to either install a severe accident capable drywell venting system or develop and implement a reliable containment venting strategy that makes it unlikely that a licensee would need to vent from the containment drywell during severe accident conditions. Although not required by this Order, licensees with Mark II containments may propose to provide the necessary containment venting capability and resolve concerns about suppression pool bypass scenarios by developing alternate approaches such as the installation of a containment drywell vent with an installed engineered filter. Licensees wishing to propose this or other alternatives may do so by requesting relaxation in accordance with Section IV of this Order. In recognition of the relative importance of venting capabilities from the wetwell and drywell, a phased approach to implementation is being used to minimize delays in implementing the requirements originally imposed by EA–12–050. Phase 1 involves upgrading the venting capabilities from the containment wetwell to provide reliable, severe accident capable hardened vents to assist in preventing core damage and, if necessary, to provide venting capability during severe accident conditions. Phase 2 involves providing additional protections for severe accident conditions through installation of a reliable, severe accident capable drywell vent system or the development of a reliable containment venting strategy that makes it unlikely that a licensee would need to vent from the containment drywell during severe accident conditions. Following the issuance of this Order, the NRC staff will work with stakeholders to develop detailed guidance on specific capabilities and VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:03 Jun 13, 2013 Jkt 229001 other aspects of implementing the requirements defined in Attachment 2 to this Order within the schedules defined in Section IV of this Order. This guidance will more fully define functional requirements (e.g., equipment specifications) as well as acceptable approaches to technical requirements such as designing the containment venting system to minimize the reliance on operator actions. The NRC anticipates issuing the final interim staff guidance (ISG) for Phase 1 of this Order by October 31, 2013, to support licensees preparing and submitting integrated plans in accordance with the schedule defined in Section IV. The NRC staff plans to subsequently review the integrated plans and document those reviews in safety evaluations. The NRC anticipates issuing the final ISG for Phase 2 of this Order by April 30, 2015, to support licensees preparing and submitting integrated plans related to the installation of severe accident containment drywell vents or implementing a reliable containment venting strategy that makes it unlikely that a licensee would need to vent from the containment drywell during severe accident conditions. The NRC has concluded that (1) the requirement to provide a reliable HCVS to prevent or limit core damage upon loss of heat removal capability is necessary to ensure reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety, and (2) the requirement that the reliable HCVS remain functional during severe accident conditions is a cost-justified substantial safety improvement under 10 CFR 50.109(a)(3). The NRC is therefore requiring Licensee actions. In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, the NRC finds that the public health, safety and interest require that this Order be made immediately effective. IV. Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 161b, 161i, 161o, and 182 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, ‘‘Orders,’’ and 10 CFR Part 50, it is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that all licenses identified in attachment 1 to this order are modified as follows: A. The requirements in Section IV and Attachment 2 of EA–12–050 are hereby rescinded. Licensees are no longer required to comply with those requirements. B. All Licensees shall, notwithstanding the provisions of any Commission regulation or license to the contrary, comply with the requirements described in Attachment 2 to this Order PO 00000 Frm 00145 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 except to the extent that a more stringent requirement is set forth in the license. These Licensees shall promptly start implementation of the requirements in Attachment 2 to this Order upon issuance of the associated final interim staff guidance (ISG) for each phase, and shall complete the two phases of implementation by the following dates: • Phase 1 (severe accident capable wetwell venting system): No later than startup from the second refueling outage that begins after June 30, 2014, or June 30, 2018, whichever comes first. • Phase 2, (severe accident capable drywell venting system): No later than startup from the first refueling outage that begins after June 30, 2017, or June 30, 2019, whichever comes first. C. 1. All Licensees shall, within twenty (20) days of the issuance date of the final ISG for Phase 1, notify the Commission (1) if they are unable to comply with any of the Phase 1 requirements described in Attachment 2, (2) if compliance with any of the Phase 1 requirements is unnecessary in their specific circumstances, or (3) if implementation of any of the Phase 1 requirements would cause the Licensee to be in violation of the provisions of any Commission regulation or the facility license. The notification shall provide the Licensee’s justification for seeking relief from or variation of any specific requirement. 2. Any Licensee that considers that implementation of any of the Phase 1 requirements described in Attachment 2 would adversely affect the safe and secure operation of the facility must notify the Commission, within twenty (20) days of the issuance date of the final ISG for Phase 1, of the adverse safety impact, the basis for the Licensee’s determination that the requirement has an adverse safety impact, and either a proposal for achieving the same objectives specified in the requirement in question, or a schedule for modifying the facility to address the adverse safety condition. If neither approach is appropriate, the Licensee must supplement its response to Condition C.1 of this Order to identify the condition as a requirement with which it cannot comply, with attendant justifications as required in Condition C.1. 3. All licensees shall, within twenty (20) days of the issuance date of the final ISG for Phase 2, notify the Commission (1) if they are unable to comply with any of the Phase 2 requirements described in Attachment 2, (2) if compliance with any of the Phase 2 requirements is unnecessary in their specific circumstances, or (3) if E:\FR\FM\14JNN1.SGM 14JNN1 mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 115 / Friday, June 14, 2013 / Notices implementation of any of the Phase 2 requirements would cause the Licensee to be in violation of the provisions of any Commission regulation or the facility license. The notification shall provide the Licensee’s justification for seeking relief from or variation of any specific requirement. 4. Any Licensee that considers that implementation of any of the Phase 2 requirements described in Attachment 2 would adversely affect the safe and secure operation of the facility must notify the Commission, within twenty (20) days of the issuance date of the final ISG for Phase 2, of the adverse safety impact, the basis for the Licensee’s determination that the requirement has an adverse safety impact, and either a proposal for achieving the same objectives specified in the requirement in question, or a schedule for modifying the facility to address the adverse safety condition. If neither approach is appropriate, the Licensee must supplement its response to Condition C.3 of this Order to identify the condition as a requirement with which it cannot comply, with attendant justifications as required in Condition C.3. D. 1. All Licensees shall, by June 30, 2014, submit to the Commission for review an overall integrated plan including a description of how compliance with the Phase 1 requirements described in Attachment 2 will be achieved. 2. All Licensees shall, by December 31, 2015, submit to the Commission for review an overall integrated plan including a description of their approach to the Phase 2 requirements described in Attachment 2 and how compliance will be achieved within the required schedule. 3. All Licensees shall provide status reports at six (6)-month intervals following submittal of the Phase 1 integrated plan, as required in Condition D.1, which delineates progress made in implementing the requirements of this Order. 4. All Licensees shall report to the Commission when full compliance with the requirements for Phase 1 and Phase 2, as described in Attachment 2, are achieved. Licensee responses to Conditions C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, D.1, D.2, D.3 and D.4 above shall be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4, ‘‘Written Communications.’’ The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee of good cause. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:03 Jun 13, 2013 Jkt 229001 V. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time to answer or to request a hearing. A request for extension of time in which to submit an answer or request a hearing must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order. Licensees that consent to this Order and waive their right to a hearing pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(d) may submit their answers in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4 instead of following the requirements of the NRC E-filing Rule described below. If a hearing is requested by a Licensee or a person whose interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of any hearings. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be sustained. Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the licensee or any other person adversely affected by this Order, may, in addition to demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded allegations, or error. All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c), must be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139; August 28, 2007). The EFiling process requires participants to submit and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in accordance with the procedures described below. To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 days prior to the filing deadline, the PO 00000 Frm 00146 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 35993 participant must contact the Office of the Secretary by email at hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by telephone at 301–415–1677, to (1) request a digital identification (ID) certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal server for any NRC proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a request or petition for hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or its counsel or representative, already holds an NRCissued digital ID certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the Secretary has not already established an electronic docket. Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is available on NRC’s public Web site at https:// www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/ apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing the ESubmittal server are detailed in NRC’s ‘‘Guidance for Electronic Submissions,’’ which is available on the NRC’s public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/sitehelp/electronic-sub-ref-mat.html. Participants may attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but should note that the NRC’s E-Filing system does not support unlisted software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer assistance in using unlisted software. If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the document using the NRC’s online, Web-based submission form. In order to serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System, users will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC’s Web site. Further information on the Webbased submission form, including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on the NRC’s public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html. Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance available on the NRC’s public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the documents are submitted through the NRC’s E-Filing system. To be timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing E:\FR\FM\14JNN1.SGM 14JNN1 35994 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 115 / Friday, June 14, 2013 / Notices system no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access to the document to the NRC’s Office of the General Counsel and any others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/ petition to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document via the E-Filing system. A person filing electronically using the NRC’s adjudicatory E-Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System Help Desk through the ‘‘Contact Us’’ link located on the NRC’s Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/ site-help/e-submittals.html, by email at MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a tollfree call to1–866–672–7640. The NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays. Participants who believe that they have good cause for not submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered complete by firstclass mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from use of E-Filing no longer exists. Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the NRC’s electronic hearing docket, which is available to the public at https:// ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the Commission or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers, home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC regulation or other law requires submission of such information. With respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted materials in their submission. In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions specified in Section IV above shall be final twenty (20) days from the date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions specified in Section IV shall be final when the extension expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this order. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Dated this 6th day of June, 2013. Eric J. Leeds, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. ATTACHMENT 1: OPERATING BOILING-WATER REACTOR LICENSES WITH MARK I AND MARK II CONTAINMENTS mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 ....................................................................................................................... Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 ....................................................................................................................... Columbia Generating Station .................................................................................................................................................. Cooper Nuclear Station ........................................................................................................................................................... Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 ...................................................................................................................... Duane Arnold Energy Center .................................................................................................................................................. Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 .......................................................................................................................... Fermi ........................................................................................................................................................................................ Hope Creek Generating Station .............................................................................................................................................. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant ............................................................................................................................. LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 .................................................................................................................................... Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 ............................................................................................................................ Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ....................................................................................................................................... Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 ...................................................................................................................... Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station ............................................................................................................................... Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 .............................................................................................................. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ................................................................................................................................................. Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 ................................................................................................................. Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 .............................................................................................................. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ................................................................................................................................. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:03 Jun 13, 2013 Jkt 229001 PO 00000 Frm 00147 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\14JNN1.SGM 14JNN1 BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark BWR-Mark I. I. II. I. I. I. I. I. I. I. II. II. I. I & II. I. I. I. I. II. I. Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 115 / Friday, June 14, 2013 / Notices mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES Attachment 2: Requirements for Reliable Hardened Vent Systems Capable of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions at Boiling-Water Reactor Facilities With Mark I and Mark II Containments Boiling-Water Reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and Mark II containments shall have a reliable, severe accident capable hardened containment venting system (HCVS) 2. This requirement shall be implemented in two phases. In Phase 1, licensees of BWRs with Mark I and Mark II containments shall design and install a venting system that provides venting capability from the wetwell during severe accident conditions. Severe accident conditions include the elevated temperatures, pressures, radiation levels, and combustible gas concentrations, such as hydrogen and carbon monoxide, associated with accidents involving extensive core damage, including accidents involving a breach of the reactor vessel by molten core debris. In Phase 2, licensees of BWRs with Mark I and Mark II containments shall design and install a venting system that provides venting capability from the drywell under severe accident conditions, or, alternatively, those licensees shall develop and implement a reliable containment venting strategy that makes it unlikely that a licensee would need to vent from the containment drywell during severe accident conditions. A. PHASE 1 (Reliable, Severe Accident Capable Wetwell Venting System) The BWRs with Mark I and Mark II containments shall design and install a HCVS, using a vent path from the containment wetwell to remove decay heat, vent the containment atmosphere (including steam, hydrogen, carbon monoxide, non-condensable gases, aerosols, and fission products), and control containment pressure within acceptable limits. The HCVS shall be designed for those accident conditions (before and after core damage) for which containment venting is relied upon to reduce the probability of containment failure, including accident sequences that result in the loss of active containment heat removal capability or extended loss of alternating current (AC) power. The HCVS shall meet the requirements in Sections 1, 2, and 3, below. 2 Unless otherwise specified in this attachment, HCVS refers to a reliable, severe accident capable hardened containment venting system. The HCVS includes a severe accident capable containment wetwell venting system and may also, depending on the approach taken for Phase 2, include a severe accident capable containment drywell venting system. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:03 Jun 13, 2013 Jkt 229001 1. HCVS Functional Requirements 1.1 The design of the HCVS shall consider the following performance objectives: 1.1.1 The HCVS shall be designed to minimize the reliance on operator actions. 1.1.2 The HCVS shall be designed to minimize plant operators’ exposure to occupational hazards, such as extreme heat stress, while operating the HCVS system. 1.1.3 The HCVS shall also be designed to account for radiological conditions that would impede personnel actions needed for event response. 1.1.4 The HCVS controls and indications shall be accessible and functional under a range of plant conditions, including severe accident conditions, extended loss of AC power, and inadequate containment cooling. 1.2 The HCVS shall include the following design features: 1.2.1 The HCVS shall have the capacity to vent the steam/energy equivalent of one (1) percent of licensed/rated thermal power (unless a lower value is justified by analyses), and be able to restore and then maintain containment pressure below the primary containment design pressure and the primary containment pressure limit. 1.2.2 The HCVS shall discharge the effluent to a release point above main plant structures. 1.2.3 The HCVS shall include design features to minimize unintended cross flow of vented fluids within a unit and between units on the site. 1.2.4 The HCVS shall be designed to be manually operated during sustained operations from a control panel located in the main control room or a remote but readily accessible location.3 1.2.5 The HCVS shall, in addition to meeting the requirements of 1.2.4, be capable of manual operation (e.g., reachrod with hand wheel or manual operation of pneumatic supply valves from a shielded location), which is accessible to plant operators during sustained operations. 1.2.6 The HCVS shall be capable of operating with dedicated and permanently installed equipment for at least 24 hours following the loss of normal power or loss of normal pneumatic supplies to air operated components during an extended loss of AC power. 3 For the purposes of these technical requirements, ‘‘sustained operations’’ means until such time that alternate reliable containment heat removal and pressure control is reestablished, independent of the HCVS, (e.g., suppression pool, torus, or shutdown cooling) using installed or portable equipment. PO 00000 Frm 00148 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 35995 1.2.7 The HCVS shall include means to prevent inadvertent actuation. 1.2.8 The HCVS shall include means to monitor the status of the vent system (e.g., valve position indication) from the control panel required by 1.2.4. The monitoring system shall be designed for sustained operation during an extended loss of AC power. 1.2.9 The HCVS shall include a means to monitor the effluent discharge for radioactivity that may be released from operation of the HCVS. The monitoring system shall provide indication from the control panel required by 1.2.4 and shall be designed for sustained operation during an extended loss of AC power. 1.2.10 The HCVS shall be designed to withstand and remain functional during severe accident conditions, including containment pressure, temperature, and radiation while venting steam, hydrogen, and other noncondensable gases and aerosols. The design is not required to exceed the current capability of the limiting containment components. 1.2.11 The HCVS shall be designed and operated to ensure the flammability limits of gases passing through the system are not reached; otherwise, the system shall be designed to withstand dynamic loading resulting from hydrogen deflagration and detonation. 1.2.12 The HCVS shall be designed to minimize the potential for hydrogen gas migration and ingress into the reactor building or other buildings. 1.2.13 The HCVS shall include features and provisions for the operation, testing, inspection and maintenance adequate to ensure that reliable function and capability are maintained. 2. HCVS Quality Standards The HCVS shall meet the following quality standards: 2.1 The HCVS vent path up to and including the second containment isolation barrier shall be designed consistent with the design basis of the plant. Items in this path include piping, piping supports, containment isolation valves, containment isolation valve actuators and containment isolation valve position indication components. 2.2 All other HCVS components shall be designed for reliable and rugged performance that is capable of ensuring HCVS functionality following a seismic event. These items include electrical power supply, valve actuator pneumatic supply and instrumentation (local and remote) components. E:\FR\FM\14JNN1.SGM 14JNN1 35996 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 115 / Friday, June 14, 2013 / Notices 3. HCVS Programmatic Requirements 3.1 The Licensee shall develop, implement, and maintain procedures necessary for the safe operation of the HCVS. Procedures shall be established for system operations when normal and backup power is available, and during an extended loss of AC power. 3.2 The Licensee shall train appropriate personnel in the use of the HCVS. The training curricula shall include system operations when normal and backup power is available, and during an extended loss of AC power. B. PHASE 2 (Reliable, Severe Accident Capable Drywell Venting System) Licensees with BWRs with Mark I and Mark II containments shall either: (1) Design and install a HCVS, using a vent path from the containment drywell, that meets the requirements in Section B.1 below, or (2) develop and implement a reliable containment venting strategy that makes it unlikely that a licensee would need to vent from the containment drywell before alternate reliable containment heat removal and pressure control is reestablished and meets the requirements in Section B.2 below. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 1. HCVS Drywell Vent Functional Requirements 1.1 The drywell venting system shall be designed to vent the containment atmosphere (including steam, hydrogen, non-condensable gases, aerosols, and fission products), and control containment pressure within acceptable limits during severe accident conditions. 1.2 The same functional requirements (reflecting accident conditions in the drywell), quality requirements, and programmatic requirements defined in Section A of this Attachment for the wetwell venting system shall also apply to the drywell venting system. 2. Containment Venting Strategy Requirements Licensees choosing to develop and implement a reliable containment venting strategy that does not require a reliable, severe accident capable drywell venting system shall meet the following requirements: 2.1 The strategy making it unlikely that a licensee would need to vent from the containment drywell during severe accident conditions shall be part of the overall accident management plan for Mark I and Mark II containments. 2.2 The licensee shall provide supporting documentation demonstrating that containment failure as a result of overpressure can be VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:03 Jun 13, 2013 Jkt 229001 prevented without a drywell vent during severe accident conditions. 2.3 Implementation of the strategy shall include licensees preparing the necessary procedures, defining and fulfilling functional requirements for installed or portable equipment (e.g., pumps and valves), and installing the needed instrumentation. [FR Doc. 2013–14072 Filed 6–13–13; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION [Release No. 34–69725; File No. SR–EDGX– 2013–19] Self-Regulatory Organizations; EDGX Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Amendments to the EDGX Exchange, Inc. Fee Schedule June 10, 2013. Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2 notice is hereby given that on June 3, 2013, EDGX Exchange, Inc. (the ‘‘Exchange’’ or ‘‘EDGX’’) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II and III below, which items have been prepared by the self-regulatory organization. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons. I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Proposed Rule Change The Exchange proposes to amend its fees and rebates applicable to Members 3 of the Exchange pursuant to EDGX Rule 15.1(a) and (c). All of the changes described herein are applicable to EDGX Members. The text of the proposed rule change is available on the Exchange’s Internet Web site at www.directedge.com, at the Exchange’s principal office, and at the Public Reference Room of the Commission. II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received 1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). CFR 240.19b–4. 3 As defined in Exchange Rule 1.5(n). 2 17 PO 00000 Frm 00149 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 on the proposed rule change. The text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV below. The self-regulatory organization has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A, B and C below, of the most significant aspects of such statements. A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Purpose of, and the Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change 1. Purpose The Exchange proposes to amend its fees and rebates applicable to Members of the Exchange pursuant to EDGX Rule 15.1(a) and (c) to: (1) Lower the default 4 rebate at the top of its fee schedule for adding liquidity in securities at or above $1.00 on EDGX from a rebate of $0.0021 per share to a rebate of $0.0020 per share and make conforming changes to add flags B, V, Y, 3, and 4; (2) make conforming changes to the internalization flags 5, EA, and ER; (3) increase the fee charged from $0.0018 per share to $0.0020 per share for orders that yield Flag RB, which routes to NASDAQ OMX BX (‘‘BX’’) and adds liquidity; (4) decrease the rebate from $0.0026 per share to $0.0020 per share for orders that yield Flag RS, which routes to NASDAQ OMX PSX (‘‘PSX’’) and adds liquidity; (5) add the Midpoint Match Volume Tier (‘‘MPM Volume Tier’’) to Footnote 3 of the Exchange’s fee schedule; 5 and (6) amend the criteria to meet the $0.0035 per share Mega Tier in Footnote 1 as well as lower the associated removal and routing rate from $0.0020 per share to $0.0015 per share on the Exchange’s fee schedule. Lower Default Rebate The Exchange proposes to lower the default rebate at the top of its fee schedule for adding liquidity in securities at or above $1.00 on EDGX from a rebate of $0.0021 per share to a rebate of $0.0020 per share. This change will also be reflected in the following added liquidity flags: B, V, Y, 3, and 4. The Exchange notes that Members will still qualify for all tiered rebates on the Exchange’s fee schedule. Amendments to Customer Internalization Fees For customer internalization, which occurs when two orders presented to the Exchange from the same Member (i.e., MPID) are presented separately and not 4 ‘‘Default’’ refers to the standard rebate provided to Members for orders that add liquidity to the Exchange absent Members qualifying for additional volume tiered pricing. 5 References herein to ‘‘Footnotes’’ refer only to footnotes on the Exchange’s fee schedule and not to footnotes within the current filing. E:\FR\FM\14JNN1.SGM 14JNN1

Agencies

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 115 (Friday, June 14, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 35990-35996]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-14072]

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2013-0128]

All Operating Boiling-Water Reactor Licensees With Mark I And
Mark II Containments; Docket Nos. (As Shown In Attachment 1), License
Nos. (As Shown In Attachment 1), EA-13-109; Order Modifying Licenses
With Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation
Under Severe Accident Conditions (Effective Immediately)

The Licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order hold
licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
authorizing operation of nuclear power plants in accordance with the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Part 50 of Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), ``Domestic Licensing of
Production and Utilization Facilities.'' Specifically, these Licensees
operate boiling-water reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and Mark II
containment designs.

II.

The events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant following
the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami highlight the possibility that
events such as rare natural phenomena could challenge the traditional
defense-in-depth protections related to preventing accidents,
mitigating accidents to prevent the release of radioactive materials,
and taking actions to protect the public should a release occur. At
Fukushima Dai-ichi, limitations in time and unpredictable conditions
associated with the accident significantly hindered attempts by the
operators to prevent core damage and containment failure. In
particular, the operators were unable to successfully operate the
containment venting system. These problems, with venting the
containments under the challenging conditions following the tsunami,
contributed to the progression of the accident from inadequate cooling
of the core leading to core damage, to compromising containment
functions from overpressure and over-temperature conditions, and to the
hydrogen explosions that destroyed the reactor buildings (secondary
containments) of three of the Fukushima Dai-ichi units. The loss of the
various barriers led to the release of radioactive materials, which
further hampered operator efforts to arrest the accidents and
ultimately led to the contamination of large areas surrounding the
plant. Fortunately, the evacuation of local populations minimized the
immediate danger to public health and safety from the loss of control
of the large amount of radioactive materials within the reactor cores.
The events at Fukushima reinforced the importance of reliable
operation of hardened containment vents during emergency conditions,
particularly, for small containments such as the Mark I and Mark II
designs. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued Order EA-12-050 \1\
requiring the Licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order to
implement requirements for a reliable hardened containment venting
system (HCVS) for Mark I and Mark II containments. Order EA-12-050
required licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II
containments to install a reliable HCVS to support strategies for
controlling containment pressure and preventing core damage following
an event that causes a loss of heat removal systems (e.g., an extended
loss of electrical power). The NRC determined that the issuance of EA-
12-050 and implementation of the requirements of that Order were
necessary to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the
public health and safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ ``Order Modifying Licenses With Regard To Reliable Hardened
Containment Vents (Effective Immediately),'' EA-12-050 (March 12,
2012) (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A043).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While developing the requirements for a reliable HCVS in EA-12-050,
the NRC acknowledged that questions remained about maintaining
containment integrity and limiting the release of radioactive materials
if the venting systems were used during severe accident conditions. The
NRC staff presented options to address these issues, including the
possible use of engineered filters to control releases, for Commission
consideration in SECY-12-0157, ``Consideration of Additional
Requirements for Containment Venting Systems for Boiling Water Reactors
with Mark I and Mark II Containments'' (November 26, 2012). Option 2 in
SECY-12-0157 was to modify EA-12-050 to require severe accident capable
vents (i.e., a reliable HCVS capable of operating under severe accident
conditions). Other options discussed in SECY-12-0157 included the
installation of engineered filtered containment venting systems (Option
3) and the development of a severe accident confinement strategy
(Option 4). In the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) for SECY-12-
0157, dated March 19, 2013, the Commission approved Option 2 and
directed the staff to issue a modification to EA-12-050 requiring
licensees subject to that Order to ``upgrade or replace the reliable
hardened vents required by Order EA-12-050 with a containment venting
system designed and installed to remain functional during severe
accident conditions.''
The requirements in this Order, in addition to providing a reliable
HCVS to assist in preventing core damage when heat removal capability
is lost (the purpose of EA-12-050), will ensure that venting functions
are also available during severe accident conditions. Severe accident
conditions include the elevated temperatures, pressures, radiation
levels, and combustible gas concentrations, such as hydrogen and carbon
monoxide, associated with accidents involving extensive core damage,
including accidents involving a breach of the reactor vessel by molten
core debris.
Ensuring that the venting functions are available under severe
accident conditions will support the strategies in the Mark I and Mark
II severe accident management guidelines for the protection or recovery
of the containment, which serves as a barrier to the release of
radioactive materials. This Order will ensure that this additional
severe accident venting capability is provided while also achieving,
with minimal delays, the purpose of EA-12-050--to provide a reliable
HCVS to control containment pressure and prevent core damage following
the loss of heat removal functions.
This Order rescinds the requirements imposed in Section IV and
Attachment 2 of EA-12-050 and replaces them with the requirements in
Section IV and Attachment 2 of this Order. Because the requirements in
EA-12-050 are now reflected in this Order, licensees are no longer
expected to comply with the

[[Page 35991]]

requirements in EA-12-050, including applicable schedule deadlines for
submittals or implementation.
This Order defines requirements related to containment venting
before and during severe accident conditions, which is a subset of the
issues related to containment performance during severe accidents
outlined in SECY-12-0157. Other issues include improving licensees'
severe accident management capabilities and filtering strategies to
limit the release of radioactive materials when venting is necessary.
For example, the importance of drywell flooding to prevent core debris
that has breached the reactor vessel from causing containment failure
by drywell liner melt-through in Mark I containments was discussed in
SECY-12-0157 and during the related Commission meeting held on January
9, 2013. The remaining issues related to filtering strategies and
severe accident management of BWR Mark I and II containments will be
addressed through the rulemaking process, as directed by the Commission
in its SRM for SECY-12-0157. The rulemaking process will commence in
June 2013 when the NRC staff begins a series of public meetings to
support developing the regulatory basis for the proposed rulemaking.

III.

The purpose of requiring reliable hardened vents in EA-12-050 was
to prevent core damage when heat removal capability is lost due to
conditions such as an extended loss of electrical power. In EA-12-050,
the Commission determined that, in light of the events at Fukushima
Dai-ichi and consistent with the NRC's defense-in-depth strategy,
installation of reliable hardened containment vents to help prevent
core damage in BWRs with Mark I and Mark II containments was necessary
to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health
and safety.
This Order requires installation of reliable hardened vents that
will not only assist in preventing core damage when heat removal
capability is lost, but will also function in severe accident
conditions (i.e., when core damage has occurred). The safety
improvements to Mark I and Mark II containment venting systems required
by this Order are intended to increase confidence in maintaining the
containment function following core damage events. Although venting the
containment during severe accident conditions could result in the
release of radioactive materials, venting could also prevent
containment structural and gross penetration leakage failures due to
overpressurization that would hamper accident management (e.g.,
continuing efforts to cool core debris) and ultimately result in
larger, uncontrolled releases of radioactive material.
Under the backfit provisions of 10 CFR 50.109, ``Backfitting,'' the
NRC may require plant improvements beyond those needed to provide
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety
when engineering approaches are available to provide a cost-justified
substantial safety improvement. The staff performed a detailed
regulatory analysis of possible improvements to Mark I and Mark II
reliable hardened containment vents, including the option of installing
severe accident capable vents. That analysis is available in the NRC's
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at Accession
No. ML12312A456. A summary of the staff's cost-benefit evaluation was
provided in SECY-12-0157.
As discussed in SECY-12-0157, the NRC's determination that a
venting system should be available during severe accident conditions
considered both quantitative assessments of costs and benefits, as well
as, various qualitative factors. Among the qualitative factors, one of
the more important is enhancing the defense-in-depth characteristics of
Mark I and Mark II containments by addressing the relatively high
probabilities that those containments would fail should an accident
progress to melting the core. Other qualitative factors supporting
installation of severe accident capable vents include addressing
uncertainties in the understanding of severe accident events,
supporting severe accident management and response, improving the
control of hydrogen generated during severe accidents, improving
readiness for external and multi-unit events, and reducing
uncertainties about radiological releases and thereby improving
emergency planning and response. The installation of a reliable, severe
accident capable containment venting system, in combination with other
actions such as ensuring drywell flooding capabilities, reduces the
likelihood of containment failures and thereby enhances the defense-in-
depth protections for plants with Mark I and Mark II containments.
The Commission has determined that requiring BWR facilities with
Mark I and Mark II containments to make the necessary plant
modifications and procedure changes to provide a reliable hardened
venting system that is capable of performing under severe accident
conditions is a cost-justified substantial safety improvement. These
modifications are needed to protect health and to minimize danger to
life or property because they will give licensees greater capabilities
to respond to severe accidents and limit the uncontrolled release of
radioactive materials. In such situations, the Commission may act in
accordance with its statutory authority under Section 161 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to require Licensees to take
appropriate action to reduce the risks posed to the public from the
operation of nuclear power plants.
For Mark I containments, the preferred venting path is from the
wetwell portion of containment because the water in the suppression
pool provides a degree of decontamination before release to the
environment. The benefits of the suppression pool in the scrubbing of
possible releases when using the wetwell vents for pressure control
were described in Generic Letter 89-16, ``Installation of a Hardened
Wetwell Vent.'' In addition, the wetwell venting path has been
incorporated into other parts of the mitigating strategies to address
lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. During severe
accidents involving molten core debris breaching the reactor vessel,
mitigating strategies include injecting water into the containment to
help prevent drywell liner melt-through, which would result in a
release pathway directly into the reactor building. However, water
injection can eventually increase the water level in the suppression
pool to a point where venting from the wetwell would no longer be
possible. Without venting, containment pressure would continue to
increase, threatening containment failure. For this reason, current
severe accident management guidelines for Mark I containments include
provisions for venting from the drywell for containment pressure
control if the capability of venting from the wetwell is not available.
Because water injection in Mark II containments could similarly impede
the ability to vent from the wetwell, the Mark II severe accident
management guidelines also currently include provisions for use of both
wetwell and drywell containment vents.
In general, wetwell venting for Mark II containments provides
similar benefits to Mark I containments in terms of scrubbing of
possible releases. However, for Mark II containments, in the unlikely
event of core debris melting through the reactor vessel, there is a
potential for the core debris to cause a failure of drain line or
downcomer pipe penetration in the floor, resulting in direct
communication between the

[[Page 35992]]

drywell and the wetwell volume above the water in the suppression pool.
This condition, which is referred to as suppression pool bypass, is
described in more detail in SECY-12-0157. In a suppression pool bypass
scenario, the primary concern is the loss of the suppression pool as a
means of filtering the release from the vents. This loss of filtering
capability is an issue that will be resolved as part of the NRC
rulemaking addressing broader severe accident management and filtering
strategies, previously described.
For the reasons discussed above, this Order requires Mark I and
Mark II containments to have a wetwell venting system that remains
functional during severe accident conditions. This Order also requires
licensees with Mark I and Mark II containments to either install a
severe accident capable drywell venting system or develop and implement
a reliable containment venting strategy that makes it unlikely that a
licensee would need to vent from the containment drywell during severe
accident conditions. Although not required by this Order, licensees
with Mark II containments may propose to provide the necessary
containment venting capability and resolve concerns about suppression
pool bypass scenarios by developing alternate approaches such as the
installation of a containment drywell vent with an installed engineered
filter. Licensees wishing to propose this or other alternatives may do
so by requesting relaxation in accordance with Section IV of this
Order.
In recognition of the relative importance of venting capabilities
from the wetwell and drywell, a phased approach to implementation is
being used to minimize delays in implementing the requirements
originally imposed by EA-12-050. Phase 1 involves upgrading the venting
capabilities from the containment wetwell to provide reliable, severe
accident capable hardened vents to assist in preventing core damage
and, if necessary, to provide venting capability during severe accident
conditions. Phase 2 involves providing additional protections for
severe accident conditions through installation of a reliable, severe
accident capable drywell vent system or the development of a reliable
containment venting strategy that makes it unlikely that a licensee
would need to vent from the containment drywell during severe accident
conditions.
Following the issuance of this Order, the NRC staff will work with
stakeholders to develop detailed guidance on specific capabilities and
other aspects of implementing the requirements defined in Attachment 2
to this Order within the schedules defined in Section IV of this Order.
This guidance will more fully define functional requirements (e.g.,
equipment specifications) as well as acceptable approaches to technical
requirements such as designing the containment venting system to
minimize the reliance on operator actions. The NRC anticipates issuing
the final interim staff guidance (ISG) for Phase 1 of this Order by
October 31, 2013, to support licensees preparing and submitting
integrated plans in accordance with the schedule defined in Section IV.
The NRC staff plans to subsequently review the integrated plans and
document those reviews in safety evaluations. The NRC anticipates
issuing the final ISG for Phase 2 of this Order by April 30, 2015, to
support licensees preparing and submitting integrated plans related to
the installation of severe accident containment drywell vents or
implementing a reliable containment venting strategy that makes it
unlikely that a licensee would need to vent from the containment
drywell during severe accident conditions.
The NRC has concluded that (1) the requirement to provide a
reliable HCVS to prevent or limit core damage upon loss of heat removal
capability is necessary to ensure reasonable assurance of adequate
protection of public health and safety, and (2) the requirement that
the reliable HCVS remain functional during severe accident conditions
is a cost-justified substantial safety improvement under 10 CFR
50.109(a)(3). The NRC is therefore requiring Licensee actions. In
addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, the NRC finds that the public
health, safety and interest require that this Order be made immediately
effective.

IV.

Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 161b, 161i, 161o, and 182 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations
in 10 CFR 2.202, ``Orders,'' and 10 CFR Part 50, it is hereby ordered,
effective immediately, that all licenses identified in attachment 1 to
this order are modified as follows:
A. The requirements in Section IV and Attachment 2 of EA-12-050 are
hereby rescinded. Licensees are no longer required to comply with those
requirements.
B. All Licensees shall, notwithstanding the provisions of any
Commission regulation or license to the contrary, comply with the
requirements described in Attachment 2 to this Order except to the
extent that a more stringent requirement is set forth in the license.
These Licensees shall promptly start implementation of the requirements
in Attachment 2 to this Order upon issuance of the associated final
interim staff guidance (ISG) for each phase, and shall complete the two
phases of implementation by the following dates:
Phase 1 (severe accident capable wetwell venting system):
No later than startup from the second refueling outage that begins
after June 30, 2014, or June 30, 2018, whichever comes first.
Phase 2, (severe accident capable drywell venting system):
No later than startup from the first refueling outage that begins after
June 30, 2017, or June 30, 2019, whichever comes first.
C. 1. All Licensees shall, within twenty (20) days of the issuance
date of the final ISG for Phase 1, notify the Commission (1) if they
are unable to comply with any of the Phase 1 requirements described in
Attachment 2, (2) if compliance with any of the Phase 1 requirements is
unnecessary in their specific circumstances, or (3) if implementation
of any of the Phase 1 requirements would cause the Licensee to be in
violation of the provisions of any Commission regulation or the
facility license. The notification shall provide the Licensee's
justification for seeking relief from or variation of any specific
requirement.
2. Any Licensee that considers that implementation of any of the
Phase 1 requirements described in Attachment 2 would adversely affect
the safe and secure operation of the facility must notify the
Commission, within twenty (20) days of the issuance date of the final
ISG for Phase 1, of the adverse safety impact, the basis for the
Licensee's determination that the requirement has an adverse safety
impact, and either a proposal for achieving the same objectives
specified in the requirement in question, or a schedule for modifying
the facility to address the adverse safety condition. If neither
approach is appropriate, the Licensee must supplement its response to
Condition C.1 of this Order to identify the condition as a requirement
with which it cannot comply, with attendant justifications as required
in Condition C.1.
3. All licensees shall, within twenty (20) days of the issuance
date of the final ISG for Phase 2, notify the Commission (1) if they
are unable to comply with any of the Phase 2 requirements described in
Attachment 2, (2) if compliance with any of the Phase 2 requirements is
unnecessary in their specific circumstances, or (3) if

[[Page 35993]]

implementation of any of the Phase 2 requirements would cause the
Licensee to be in violation of the provisions of any Commission
regulation or the facility license. The notification shall provide the
Licensee's justification for seeking relief from or variation of any
specific requirement.
4. Any Licensee that considers that implementation of any of the
Phase 2 requirements described in Attachment 2 would adversely affect
the safe and secure operation of the facility must notify the
Commission, within twenty (20) days of the issuance date of the final
ISG for Phase 2, of the adverse safety impact, the basis for the
Licensee's determination that the requirement has an adverse safety
impact, and either a proposal for achieving the same objectives
specified in the requirement in question, or a schedule for modifying
the facility to address the adverse safety condition. If neither
approach is appropriate, the Licensee must supplement its response to
Condition C.3 of this Order to identify the condition as a requirement
with which it cannot comply, with attendant justifications as required
in Condition C.3.
D. 1. All Licensees shall, by June 30, 2014, submit to the
Commission for review an overall integrated plan including a
description of how compliance with the Phase 1 requirements described
in Attachment 2 will be achieved.
2. All Licensees shall, by December 31, 2015, submit to the
Commission for review an overall integrated plan including a
description of their approach to the Phase 2 requirements described in
Attachment 2 and how compliance will be achieved within the required
schedule.
3. All Licensees shall provide status reports at six (6)-month
intervals following submittal of the Phase 1 integrated plan, as
required in Condition D.1, which delineates progress made in
implementing the requirements of this Order.
4. All Licensees shall report to the Commission when full
compliance with the requirements for Phase 1 and Phase 2, as described
in Attachment 2, are achieved.
Licensee responses to Conditions C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, D.1, D.2, D.3
and D.4 above shall be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4,
``Written Communications.'' The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above
conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee of good cause.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within twenty (20) days
of the date of this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration
will be given to extending the time to answer or to request a hearing.
A request for extension of time in which to submit an answer or request
a hearing must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555, and include a statement of good cause for the extension. The
answer may consent to this Order. Licensees that consent to this Order
and waive their right to a hearing pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(d) may
submit their answers in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4 instead of
following the requirements of the NRC E-filing Rule described below.
If a hearing is requested by a Licensee or a person whose interest
is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating
the time and place of any hearings. If a hearing is held, the issue to
be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be
sustained. Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the licensee or any other
person adversely affected by this Order, may, in addition to demanding
a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move the
presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the Order
on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion,
unfounded allegations, or error.
All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a
request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c),
must be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139;
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in
accordance with the procedures described below.
To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant must contact the
Office of the Secretary by email at hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by
telephone at 301-415-1677, to (1) request a digital identification (ID)
certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or
representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal
server for any NRC proceeding in which it is participating; and (2)
advise the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a request
or petition for hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or
its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID
certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish
an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the
Secretary has not already established an electronic docket.
Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is
available on NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing
the E-Submittal server are detailed in NRC's ``Guidance for Electronic
Submissions,'' which is available on the NRC's public Web site at
https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/electronic-sub-ref-mat.html. Participants
may attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but
should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted
software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer
assistance in using unlisted software.
If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System,
users will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC's
Web site. Further information on the Web-based submission form,
including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on
the NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance
available on the NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing

[[Page 35994]]

system no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon
receipt of a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document
and sends the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the
document. The E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that
provides access to the document to the NRC's Office of the General
Counsel and any others who have advised the Office of the Secretary
that they wish to participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need
not serve the documents on those participants separately. Therefore,
applicants and other participants (or their counsel or representative)
must apply for and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing
request/petition to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access
to the document via the E-Filing system.
A person filing electronically using the NRC's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC's Web site
at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email at
MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a toll-free call to1-866-672-7640. The NRC
Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern
Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
Participants who believe that they have good cause for not
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff.
Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for
serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered
complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or
by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing
the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer,
having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the
NRC's electronic hearing docket, which is available to the public at
https://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the
Commission or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to
include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers,
home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC
regulation or other law requires submission of such information. With
respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve
the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use
application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted
materials in their submission.
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in Section IV above shall be final twenty (20) days from the
date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the
provisions specified in Section IV shall be final when the extension
expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a
request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this
order.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Dated this 6th day of June, 2013.
Eric J. Leeds,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Attachment 1: Operating Boiling-Water Reactor Licenses With Mark I and
Mark II Containments
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, BWR-Mark I.
and 3.
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 BWR-Mark I.
and 2.
Columbia Generating Station............... BWR-Mark II.
Cooper Nuclear Station.................... BWR-Mark I.
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and BWR-Mark I.
3.
Duane Arnold Energy Center................ BWR-Mark I.
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and BWR-Mark I.
2.
Fermi..................................... BWR-Mark I.
Hope Creek Generating Station............. BWR-Mark I.
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.. BWR-Mark I.
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2..... BWR-Mark II.
Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 BWR-Mark II.
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant....... BWR-Mark I.
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 BWR-Mark I & II.
and 2.
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station... BWR-Mark I.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 BWR-Mark I.
and 3.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station............. BWR-Mark I.
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 BWR-Mark I.
and 2.
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units BWR-Mark II.
1 and 2.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station...... BWR-Mark I.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 35995]]

Attachment 2: Requirements for Reliable Hardened Vent Systems Capable
of Operation Under Severe Accident Conditions at Boiling-Water Reactor
Facilities With Mark I and Mark II Containments

Boiling-Water Reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and Mark II containments
shall have a reliable, severe accident capable hardened containment
venting system (HCVS) \2\. This requirement shall be implemented in two
phases. In Phase 1, licensees of BWRs with Mark I and Mark II
containments shall design and install a venting system that provides
venting capability from the wetwell during severe accident conditions.
Severe accident conditions include the elevated temperatures,
pressures, radiation levels, and combustible gas concentrations, such
as hydrogen and carbon monoxide, associated with accidents involving
extensive core damage, including accidents involving a breach of the
reactor vessel by molten core debris. In Phase 2, licensees of BWRs
with Mark I and Mark II containments shall design and install a venting
system that provides venting capability from the drywell under severe
accident conditions, or, alternatively, those licensees shall develop
and implement a reliable containment venting strategy that makes it
unlikely that a licensee would need to vent from the containment
drywell during severe accident conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\ Unless otherwise specified in this attachment, HCVS refers
to a reliable, severe accident capable hardened containment venting
system. The HCVS includes a severe accident capable containment
wetwell venting system and may also, depending on the approach taken
for Phase 2, include a severe accident capable containment drywell
venting system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. PHASE 1 (Reliable, Severe Accident Capable Wetwell Venting System)

The BWRs with Mark I and Mark II containments shall design and
install a HCVS, using a vent path from the containment wetwell to
remove decay heat, vent the containment atmosphere (including steam,
hydrogen, carbon monoxide, non-condensable gases, aerosols, and fission
products), and control containment pressure within acceptable limits.
The HCVS shall be designed for those accident conditions (before and
after core damage) for which containment venting is relied upon to
reduce the probability of containment failure, including accident
sequences that result in the loss of active containment heat removal
capability or extended loss of alternating current (AC) power. The HCVS
shall meet the requirements in Sections 1, 2, and 3, below.
1. HCVS Functional Requirements
1.1 The design of the HCVS shall consider the following performance
objectives:
1.1.1 The HCVS shall be designed to minimize the reliance on
operator actions.
1.1.2 The HCVS shall be designed to minimize plant operators'
exposure to occupational hazards, such as extreme heat stress, while
operating the HCVS system.
1.1.3 The HCVS shall also be designed to account for radiological
conditions that would impede personnel actions needed for event
response.
1.1.4 The HCVS controls and indications shall be accessible and
functional under a range of plant conditions, including severe accident
conditions, extended loss of AC power, and inadequate containment
cooling.
1.2 The HCVS shall include the following design features:
1.2.1 The HCVS shall have the capacity to vent the steam/energy
equivalent of one (1) percent of licensed/rated thermal power (unless a
lower value is justified by analyses), and be able to restore and then
maintain containment pressure below the primary containment design
pressure and the primary containment pressure limit.
1.2.2 The HCVS shall discharge the effluent to a release point
above main plant structures.
1.2.3 The HCVS shall include design features to minimize unintended
cross flow of vented fluids within a unit and between units on the
site.
1.2.4 The HCVS shall be designed to be manually operated during
sustained operations from a control panel located in the main control
room or a remote but readily accessible location.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\3\ For the purposes of these technical requirements,
``sustained operations'' means until such time that alternate
reliable containment heat removal and pressure control is
reestablished, independent of the HCVS, (e.g., suppression pool,
torus, or shutdown cooling) using installed or portable equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1.2.5 The HCVS shall, in addition to meeting the requirements of
1.2.4, be capable of manual operation (e.g., reach-rod with hand wheel
or manual operation of pneumatic supply valves from a shielded
location), which is accessible to plant operators during sustained
operations.
1.2.6 The HCVS shall be capable of operating with dedicated and
permanently installed equipment for at least 24 hours following the
loss of normal power or loss of normal pneumatic supplies to air
operated components during an extended loss of AC power.
1.2.7 The HCVS shall include means to prevent inadvertent
actuation.
1.2.8 The HCVS shall include means to monitor the status of the
vent system (e.g., valve position indication) from the control panel
required by 1.2.4. The monitoring system shall be designed for
sustained operation during an extended loss of AC power.
1.2.9 The HCVS shall include a means to monitor the effluent
discharge for radioactivity that may be released from operation of the
HCVS. The monitoring system shall provide indication from the control
panel required by 1.2.4 and shall be designed for sustained operation
during an extended loss of AC power.
1.2.10 The HCVS shall be designed to withstand and remain
functional during severe accident conditions, including containment
pressure, temperature, and radiation while venting steam, hydrogen, and
other non-condensable gases and aerosols. The design is not required to
exceed the current capability of the limiting containment components.
1.2.11 The HCVS shall be designed and operated to ensure the
flammability limits of gases passing through the system are not
reached; otherwise, the system shall be designed to withstand dynamic
loading resulting from hydrogen deflagration and detonation.
1.2.12 The HCVS shall be designed to minimize the potential for
hydrogen gas migration and ingress into the reactor building or other
buildings.
1.2.13 The HCVS shall include features and provisions for the
operation, testing, inspection and maintenance adequate to ensure that
reliable function and capability are maintained.
2. HCVS Quality Standards
The HCVS shall meet the following quality standards:
2.1 The HCVS vent path up to and including the second containment
isolation barrier shall be designed consistent with the design basis of
the plant. Items in this path include piping, piping supports,
containment isolation valves, containment isolation valve actuators and
containment isolation valve position indication components.
2.2 All other HCVS components shall be designed for reliable and
rugged performance that is capable of ensuring HCVS functionality
following a seismic event. These items include electrical power supply,
valve actuator pneumatic supply and instrumentation (local and remote)
components.

[[Page 35996]]

3. HCVS Programmatic Requirements
3.1 The Licensee shall develop, implement, and maintain procedures
necessary for the safe operation of the HCVS. Procedures shall be
established for system operations when normal and backup power is
available, and during an extended loss of AC power.
3.2 The Licensee shall train appropriate personnel in the use of
the HCVS. The training curricula shall include system operations when
normal and backup power is available, and during an extended loss of AC
power.

B. PHASE 2 (Reliable, Severe Accident Capable Drywell Venting System)

Licensees with BWRs with Mark I and Mark II containments shall
either:
(1) Design and install a HCVS, using a vent path from the
containment drywell, that meets the requirements in Section B.1 below,
or
(2) develop and implement a reliable containment venting strategy
that makes it unlikely that a licensee would need to vent from the
containment drywell before alternate reliable containment heat removal
and pressure control is reestablished and meets the requirements in
Section B.2 below.
1. HCVS Drywell Vent Functional Requirements
1.1 The drywell venting system shall be designed to vent the
containment atmosphere (including steam, hydrogen, non-condensable
gases, aerosols, and fission products), and control containment
pressure within acceptable limits during severe accident conditions.
1.2 The same functional requirements (reflecting accident
conditions in the drywell), quality requirements, and programmatic
requirements defined in Section A of this Attachment for the wetwell
venting system shall also apply to the drywell venting system.
2. Containment Venting Strategy Requirements
Licensees choosing to develop and implement a reliable containment
venting strategy that does not require a reliable, severe accident
capable drywell venting system shall meet the following requirements:
2.1 The strategy making it unlikely that a licensee would need to
vent from the containment drywell during severe accident conditions
shall be part of the overall accident management plan for Mark I and
Mark II containments.
2.2 The licensee shall provide supporting documentation
demonstrating that containment failure as a result of overpressure can
be prevented without a drywell vent during severe accident conditions.
2.3 Implementation of the strategy shall include licensees
preparing the necessary procedures, defining and fulfilling functional
requirements for installed or portable equipment (e.g., pumps and
valves), and installing the needed instrumentation.

[FR Doc. 2013-14072 Filed 6-13-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

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