Importance of Clear Safety Procedures for Temporary Removal From Service of Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Warning Systems and Wayside Signal Systems, 33146-33148 [2013-13047]
Download as PDF
<![CDATA[
33146
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 106 / Monday, June 3, 2013 / Notices
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
[Docket No. FAA–2013–0392; Notice No.]
RIN 2120–AJ61
Notice of Proposal Policy for
Distribution of FAA Data and
Information; Extension of Comment
Period
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice for Data and Information
Policy; Extension of comment period.
AGENCY:
This action extends the
comment period set out in the notice
concerning data and information policy
that was published on May 1, 2013. In
that document, the FAA proposed its
data and information distribution policy
and sought comment. This extension is
a result of formal requests from the
public to extend the comment period to
the proposal. This extension is
necessary to afford all interested parties
an opportunity to present their views on
the proposed policy.
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before July 28, 2013.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments
identified by Docket No. FAA–2013–
0392 using any of the following
methods:
• Mail: send comments by mail to
Docket Operations, U.S. Department of
Transportation, M–30, room W12–140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590–0001, Persons
wishing to receive confirmation of
receipt of their written submission
should include a self-addressed
stamped postcard.
• Hand Deliver: Deliver comments to
Docket Operations in Room W12–140
on the ground floor of the West Building
at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington DC, between 9:00 a.m. and
5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
• Facsimile: Fax comments to the
docket operations personnel at 202–
493–2251.
Privacy: We will post all comments
we receive, without change, to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information the commenter
provides. Using the search function of
the docket Web site, anyone can find
and read the electronic form of all
comments received into any FAA
docket, including the name of the
individual sending the comment (or
signing the comment for an association,
business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s
complete Privacy Act Statement can be
found in the Federal Register published
sroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
SUMMARY:
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:40 May 31, 2013
Jkt 229001
on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478),
as well as at https://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.
Docket: Background documents or
comments received may be read at
https://www.regulations.gov at any time.
Follow the online instructions for
accessing the docket or Docket
Operations in Room W12–140 of the
West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mojdeh Supola at (202) 385–8022 or by
electronic mail at
mojdeh.supola@faa.gov.
Background
On May 1, 2013, the FAA issued
Notice of Proposed Policy for
distribution of FAA data and
information (78 FR 25521). Comments
to that document were to be received on
or before May 31, 2013.
By emails dated on or about May 20,
2013, three associations and two
companies representing a large crosssection of the aviation industry
requested that the FAA extend the
comment period for 30 or 60 days (Saab
Sensis Corporation, Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association, Harris corporation,
Airline For America, and Regional
Airline Association). The petitioners
stated that good cause and need for an
extended comment period arises from
the scope and extent of the proposed
policy, coupled with the effects it could
have between and among individual
companies and individuals represented
by the petitioners.
The FAA agrees with the petitioners’
request for an extension of the comment
period. We recognize the policy
contents are significant and complex.
Further, we understand that it is the
intention of the petitioners to continue
to canvass their members and/or
business partners for comments, and to
coordinate and consolidate the
additional comments.
Absent unusual circumstances, the
FAA does not anticipate any further
extension of the comment period for
this rulemaking.
Extension of Comment Period
In accordance with § 11.47(c) of Title
14, Code of Federal Regulations, the
FAA has reviewed the joint petition
made by the three associations and the
two companies for extension of the
comment period for this notice. These
petitioners have shown a substantive
interest in the proposed policy and good
cause for the extension of the comment
period. The FAA has determined that
extension of the comment period is
consistent with the public interest, and
PO 00000
Frm 00102
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
that good cause exists for taking this
action.
Accordingly, the comment period for
this notice is extended to July 28, 2013.
Issued in Washington, DC, on May 28,
2013.
Harold Davis,
Director, Office of ATO Data Management.
[FR Doc. 2013–13086 Filed 5–31–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Safety Advisory 2013–04]
Importance of Clear Safety Procedures
for Temporary Removal From Service
of Highway-Rail Grade Crossing
Warning Systems and Wayside Signal
Systems
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
AGENCY:
FRA is issuing this Safety
Advisory 2013–04 to reemphasize the
importance of clear and precise railroad
safety procedures to ensure the safety of
the traveling public and railroad
employees when highway-rail grade
crossing warning systems and wayside
signal systems are temporarily removed
from service for purposes of testing,
inspection, maintenance, or repair. FRA
previously made related
recommendations to railroads regarding
the importance of clear safety
procedures to ensure the safety of
highway-rail grade crossing warning
systems and wayside signal systems in
Safety Advisory 2002–01.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
George Hartman, Staff Director, Signal
and Train Control Division, Office of
Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590 (phone: 202–
493–6225, email:
George.Hartman@dot.gov), or Kathryn
Shelton, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief
Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., Washington, DC 20590 (phone:
202–493–6063, email:
Kathryn.Shelton@dot.gov).
SUMMARY:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Highway-rail grade crossing warning
devices and wayside train signals are
among the most important safety
systems in the railroad industry for
preventing train collisions and highwayrail grade crossing accidents. Despite
the high degree of reliability of these
E:\FR\FM\03JNN1.SGM
03JNN1
sroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 106 / Monday, June 3, 2013 / Notices
systems, failures occasionally do occur.
FRA regulations (Title 49 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) parts 234 and
236) require that grade crossing warning
devices and wayside signals operate on
the ‘‘fail safe’’ or ‘‘closed circuit’’
principle, which causes a system to
revert to its safest state in the event of
a failure or malfunction of a vital
component of the system. In practical
terms, fail-safe operations mean the
grade crossing warning devices will
activate to stop traffic or a wayside
signal will stop train movement in the
event of a component failure. However,
under certain circumstances,
particularly where human error is
involved, the fail-safe features can be
deactivated or circumvented, creating
the potential for an accident. FRA has
found that serious highway-rail grade
crossing accidents and false proceed
signal failures have occurred due to
human error.
FRA acknowledges that the railroad
industry has long recognized the
importance of having well-defined
safety procedures in place to ensure
safety when highway-rail grade crossing
warning systems and wayside signal
systems have been temporarily removed
from service for purposes of testing,
inspection, maintenance, or repair. Most
railroads have had such safety
procedures in place for many years. In
2002, FRA published a safety advisory
about the importance of having clear
safety procedures for the temporary
removal of highway-rail grade crossing
systems and wayside signal systems
from service. Safety Advisory 2002–01 1
was issued in response to a series of
grade crossing accidents that also
involved the failure of railroad
personnel to follow appropriate safety
procedures for the temporary removal of
highway-rail grade crossing warning
systems from service. Nevertheless, FRA
remains concerned that grade crossing
accidents and false proceed signal
failures continue to occur. Thus, FRA
believes it is necessary to reemphasize
to the railroad industry the importance
of reviewing and re-evaluating their
existing safety procedures related to
these events.
Over the past year, two serious
incidents have resulted from the failure
of railroad personnel to follow
appropriate safety procedures when
removing grade crossing warning
devices and wayside signal systems
from service for repair. A brief review of
these incidents may help illustrate the
critical importance of railroads having
clear and precise safety procedures in
place when testing, inspecting,
1 67
FR 3258 (Jan. 23, 2002).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:40 May 31, 2013
Jkt 229001
maintaining, or repairing highway-rail
grade crossing warning systems and
wayside signal systems.2
One incident involved a fatal collision
between a southbound passenger train
and an automobile that was eastbound
at a highway-rail grade crossing. At the
time of the collision, two railroad signal
employees were working on the grade
crossing warning system. The warning
system had been removed from service
and did not activate as the train
approached the crossing. The train was
equipped with a forward-facing video
camera that recorded (1) that the gate
arms were in the upright position, and
(2) that the grade crossing warning
lights were deactivated as the train
traveled through the highway-rail grade
crossing and struck the automobile. The
automobile driver was fatally injured as
a result of the collision.
The second incident involved the
derailment of a passenger train that had
entered a yard track from the main
track. Locomotive video- and eventrecorder data show that the passenger
train was proceeding on a clear signal
through a power-operated switch that
had been aligned in the reverse position
toward the yard. After traveling at a
speed of 61 mph through a turnout that
was limited to 15 mph for movement
onto a 5 mph yard track, the passenger
train derailed about 254 feet beyond the
power-operated switch. Four cars and
two locomotives derailed upright and
emergency responders reported that 14
persons were injured, 8 of whom were
transported to area hospitals.
Preliminary information indicates that
a signal employee was performing
troubleshooting activities with jumper
wires inside the signal bungalow just
before the derailment. The signal
employee was applying a jumper wire to
energize the circuit that verified the
position of a power-operated switch.
This circumvented the signal system’s
ability to verify that the power-operated
switch was aligned and locked in the
correct position for the displayed signal
aspect.
Both of the occurrences discussed
above resulted from interference with
the normal functioning of the systems
without measures being taken to
provide for the safety of highway traffic
and train operations that depend on the
normal functioning of such systems.
FRA is very concerned about these
recent incidents and believes that
issuance of this safety advisory is
necessary in order to once again draw
2 Additional information pertaining to these
incidents can be obtained from National
Transportation Safety Board Safety
Recommendations R–13–3 and –4.
PO 00000
Frm 00103
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
33147
the attention of the railroad industry to
this issue with the intent to reduce the
likelihood of similar incidents occurring
in the future.
Failure to provide for the safety of
highway traffic and train operations
during all periods while the normal
functioning of a system is interfered
with is a violation of Federal rail safety
regulations (see 49 CFR 234.209 and
236.4). FRA believes these requirements
are vital to ensuring the safety of
railroad employees, highway users, and
the general public. Accordingly, when a
system is completely or partially
deactivated without adequate protective
measures being taken, FRA will take
firm enforcement action, which could
include civil penalties against the
companies or individuals responsible or
both. However, preventing such serious
failures in the first place is our primary
goal and the consistent application of
proper procedures is critical to
achieving that goal.
Railroads need to have clear and
precise procedures for temporarily
removing grade crossing warning
devices and wayside signal systems
from service when performing repairs,
tests, inspections, or maintenance.
These procedures need to address the
use of jumper wires, where applicable,
and should also help ensure that grade
crossing warning devices and wayside
signal systems are properly tested and
known to be in proper working order
before they are restored to service. Most
railroads already have such procedures
in place; however, in light of the
incidents noted above, FRA believes
that railroads should review existing
procedures to ensure that they are
adequate and should take steps to
ensure that these safety procedures are
followed.
Use of Jumper Wires
There are situations where it may be
necessary to temporarily circumvent the
normal functioning of a grade crossing
warning or wayside signal system.
These situations include testing,
inspection, maintenance, and repair of
grade crossing warning systems or
wayside signal systems, maintenance-ofway activity, and trains standing within
a warning system’s approach circuit for
extended periods. A common method of
circumventing the normal functioning
of a grade crossing warning or wayside
signal system is the application of
jumper wires, which is appropriate
when done in a safe manner.
In situations involving grade crossing
warning systems, it is critical that the
system’s credibility be maintained. For
example, if maintenance-of-way work is
being performed on trackage that is part
E:\FR\FM\03JNN1.SGM
03JNN1
sroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
33148
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 106 / Monday, June 3, 2013 / Notices
of a highway-rail grade crossing warning
system’s train detection circuit without
the application of jumper wires, it is
highly probable that the warning system
will activate. This indicates to motorists
that it is not safe to cross the railroad
tracks when, in fact, no train is
approaching the crossing. The integrity
of the warning system would be
compromised by the conveyance of false
information to motorists, such that in
the future, they would not necessarily
comply with the warning system
indications. Appropriate use of jumper
wires or other safe means of
circumventing the normal functioning
of the system thus prevents the incorrect
warning from being displayed to
motorists. Safety is also maintained as
long as measures are taken to provide
for the safety of motorists and train
operations.
Temporary removal from service of
grade crossing warning devices and
wayside signal systems—through the
application of jumpers or other means—
is a safe practice, when combined with
protective measures for highway traffic
and train operations. FRA has reviewed
some of the safety procedures for
disabling grade crossing warning
devices and wayside signal systems that
are in place on the major railroads to
determine ‘‘best practices’’ that have
been developed in the industry. We
found that the most effective safety
procedures include the following items:
(1) Requirements for signal employees
to obtain proper authority from the train
dispatcher or other appropriate
personnel responsible for the movement
of trains through the territory before
disabling a grade crossing warning or
wayside signal system; (2)
documentation of the authority to
disable the grade crossing warning or
wayside signal system; (3) a requirement
that all disabled grade crossing warning
and wayside signal systems must be
properly inspected and tested to ensure
proper operation before being restored
to service; and (4) a procedure for signal
employees to verify with the train
dispatcher or other appropriate
personnel responsible for the movement
of trains through the territory that the
grade crossing warning system or
wayside signal system has been
properly tested before being restored to
service.
To mitigate the risks inherent with
circumventing the normal functioning
of a system, FRA believes it is important
that individual railroads have standard
procedures in place before interfering
with the normal operation of a grade
crossing warning or wayside signal
system.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:40 May 31, 2013
Jkt 229001
Recommended Actions
In recognition of the need to ensure
safety, FRA strongly recommends that:
1. Each railroad responsible for the
proper operation of a highway-rail grade
crossing warning system or wayside
signal system review and evaluate its
specific railroadwide instructions for
the proper method for temporary
removal of these systems from service.
These instructions should address the
following items:
a. The manner in which the
deactivation is authorized.
b. The personnel designated to
authorize deactivation.
c. The protocols for notifying
appropriate persons, especially
personnel responsible for the movement
of trains, that a grade crossing warning
system or wayside signal system has
been temporarily removed from service.
d. The appropriate methods of
providing for the safety of train
movements while the grade crossing
warning system or wayside signal
system is temporarily removed from
service.
e. The requirements necessary to
perform an inspection and operational
test of the pertinent system components
before restoring the grade crossing
warning system or wayside signal
system to service.
f. The protocols for documenting and
notifying appropriate persons that the
grade crossing warning system or
wayside signal system has been
properly tested and restored to service.
2. Each railroad provide regular
periodic training to all affected
employees to ensure their
understanding of instructions for the
proper procedures for the temporary
removal from service of grade crossing
warning or wayside signal systems,
including the proper use of jumper
wires.
FRA encourages railroad industry
members to take actions that are
consistent with the preceding
recommendations, and to take other
complementary actions to help ensure
the safety of the Nation’s railroad
employees. FRA may modify this Safety
Advisory 2013–04, issue additional
safety advisories, or take other
appropriate actions necessary to ensure
the highest level of safety on the
Nation’s railroads, including pursuing
other corrective measures under its rail
safety authority.
PO 00000
Frm 00104
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Issued in Washington, DC, on May 28,
2013.
Robert C. Lauby,
Deputy Associate Administrator for
Regulatory and Legislative Operations.
[FR Doc. 2013–13047 Filed 5–31–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Maritime Administration
[Docket No. Marad 2013 0065]
Information Collection Available for
Public Comments and
Recommendations
Notice and request for
comments.
ACTION:
In accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, this
notice announces the Maritime
Administration’s (MARAD’s) intention
to request extension of approval for
three years of a currently approved
information collection.
DATES: Comments should be submitted
on or before August 2, 2013.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bill
Kurfehs, Maritime Administration, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590. Telephone: 202–366–2318 or
Email: bill.kurfehs.@dot.gov. Copies of
this collection also can be obtained from
that office.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
Maritime Administration (MARAD)
Title of Collection: Voluntary Tanker
Agreement.
Type of Request: Extension of
currently approved information
collection.
OMB Control Number: 2133–0505.
Form Numbers: None.
Expiration Date of Approval: Three
years from date of approval by the
Office of Management and Budget.
Summary of Collection of
Information: The collection consists of a
request from the Maritime
Administration (MARAD) that each
participant in the Voluntary Tanker
Agreement submit a list of the names of
ships owned, chartered or contracted for
by the participant, their size and flags of
registry and other pertinent information.
There is a recommended format for this
information included as part of the
application.
Need and Use of the Information: The
collection of information is necessary to
evaluate tanker capability and make
plans for use of this capability to meet
national emergency requirements. This
information will be used by both
E:\FR\FM\03JNN1.SGM
03JNN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 106 (Monday, June 3, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33146-33148]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-13047]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Safety Advisory 2013-04]
Importance of Clear Safety Procedures for Temporary Removal From
Service of Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Warning Systems and Wayside
Signal Systems
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing this Safety Advisory 2013-04 to reemphasize the
importance of clear and precise railroad safety procedures to ensure
the safety of the traveling public and railroad employees when highway-
rail grade crossing warning systems and wayside signal systems are
temporarily removed from service for purposes of testing, inspection,
maintenance, or repair. FRA previously made related recommendations to
railroads regarding the importance of clear safety procedures to ensure
the safety of highway-rail grade crossing warning systems and wayside
signal systems in Safety Advisory 2002-01.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: George Hartman, Staff Director, Signal
and Train Control Division, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance,
FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (phone: 202-493-
6225, email: George.Hartman@dot.gov), or Kathryn Shelton, Trial
Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590 (phone: 202-493-6063, email:
Kathryn.Shelton@dot.gov).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Highway-rail grade crossing warning devices and wayside train
signals are among the most important safety systems in the railroad
industry for preventing train collisions and highway-rail grade
crossing accidents. Despite the high degree of reliability of these
[[Page 33147]]
systems, failures occasionally do occur. FRA regulations (Title 49 Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR) parts 234 and 236) require that grade
crossing warning devices and wayside signals operate on the ``fail
safe'' or ``closed circuit'' principle, which causes a system to revert
to its safest state in the event of a failure or malfunction of a vital
component of the system. In practical terms, fail-safe operations mean
the grade crossing warning devices will activate to stop traffic or a
wayside signal will stop train movement in the event of a component
failure. However, under certain circumstances, particularly where human
error is involved, the fail-safe features can be deactivated or
circumvented, creating the potential for an accident. FRA has found
that serious highway-rail grade crossing accidents and false proceed
signal failures have occurred due to human error.
FRA acknowledges that the railroad industry has long recognized the
importance of having well-defined safety procedures in place to ensure
safety when highway-rail grade crossing warning systems and wayside
signal systems have been temporarily removed from service for purposes
of testing, inspection, maintenance, or repair. Most railroads have had
such safety procedures in place for many years. In 2002, FRA published
a safety advisory about the importance of having clear safety
procedures for the temporary removal of highway-rail grade crossing
systems and wayside signal systems from service. Safety Advisory 2002-
01 \1\ was issued in response to a series of grade crossing accidents
that also involved the failure of railroad personnel to follow
appropriate safety procedures for the temporary removal of highway-rail
grade crossing warning systems from service. Nevertheless, FRA remains
concerned that grade crossing accidents and false proceed signal
failures continue to occur. Thus, FRA believes it is necessary to
reemphasize to the railroad industry the importance of reviewing and
re-evaluating their existing safety procedures related to these events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 67 FR 3258 (Jan. 23, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the past year, two serious incidents have resulted from the
failure of railroad personnel to follow appropriate safety procedures
when removing grade crossing warning devices and wayside signal systems
from service for repair. A brief review of these incidents may help
illustrate the critical importance of railroads having clear and
precise safety procedures in place when testing, inspecting,
maintaining, or repairing highway-rail grade crossing warning systems
and wayside signal systems.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Additional information pertaining to these incidents can be
obtained from National Transportation Safety Board Safety
Recommendations R-13-3 and -4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One incident involved a fatal collision between a southbound
passenger train and an automobile that was eastbound at a highway-rail
grade crossing. At the time of the collision, two railroad signal
employees were working on the grade crossing warning system. The
warning system had been removed from service and did not activate as
the train approached the crossing. The train was equipped with a
forward-facing video camera that recorded (1) that the gate arms were
in the upright position, and (2) that the grade crossing warning lights
were deactivated as the train traveled through the highway-rail grade
crossing and struck the automobile. The automobile driver was fatally
injured as a result of the collision.
The second incident involved the derailment of a passenger train
that had entered a yard track from the main track. Locomotive video-
and event-recorder data show that the passenger train was proceeding on
a clear signal through a power-operated switch that had been aligned in
the reverse position toward the yard. After traveling at a speed of 61
mph through a turnout that was limited to 15 mph for movement onto a 5
mph yard track, the passenger train derailed about 254 feet beyond the
power-operated switch. Four cars and two locomotives derailed upright
and emergency responders reported that 14 persons were injured, 8 of
whom were transported to area hospitals.
Preliminary information indicates that a signal employee was
performing troubleshooting activities with jumper wires inside the
signal bungalow just before the derailment. The signal employee was
applying a jumper wire to energize the circuit that verified the
position of a power-operated switch. This circumvented the signal
system's ability to verify that the power-operated switch was aligned
and locked in the correct position for the displayed signal aspect.
Both of the occurrences discussed above resulted from interference
with the normal functioning of the systems without measures being taken
to provide for the safety of highway traffic and train operations that
depend on the normal functioning of such systems. FRA is very concerned
about these recent incidents and believes that issuance of this safety
advisory is necessary in order to once again draw the attention of the
railroad industry to this issue with the intent to reduce the
likelihood of similar incidents occurring in the future.
Failure to provide for the safety of highway traffic and train
operations during all periods while the normal functioning of a system
is interfered with is a violation of Federal rail safety regulations
(see 49 CFR 234.209 and 236.4). FRA believes these requirements are
vital to ensuring the safety of railroad employees, highway users, and
the general public. Accordingly, when a system is completely or
partially deactivated without adequate protective measures being taken,
FRA will take firm enforcement action, which could include civil
penalties against the companies or individuals responsible or both.
However, preventing such serious failures in the first place is our
primary goal and the consistent application of proper procedures is
critical to achieving that goal.
Railroads need to have clear and precise procedures for temporarily
removing grade crossing warning devices and wayside signal systems from
service when performing repairs, tests, inspections, or maintenance.
These procedures need to address the use of jumper wires, where
applicable, and should also help ensure that grade crossing warning
devices and wayside signal systems are properly tested and known to be
in proper working order before they are restored to service. Most
railroads already have such procedures in place; however, in light of
the incidents noted above, FRA believes that railroads should review
existing procedures to ensure that they are adequate and should take
steps to ensure that these safety procedures are followed.
Use of Jumper Wires
There are situations where it may be necessary to temporarily
circumvent the normal functioning of a grade crossing warning or
wayside signal system. These situations include testing, inspection,
maintenance, and repair of grade crossing warning systems or wayside
signal systems, maintenance-of-way activity, and trains standing within
a warning system's approach circuit for extended periods. A common
method of circumventing the normal functioning of a grade crossing
warning or wayside signal system is the application of jumper wires,
which is appropriate when done in a safe manner.
In situations involving grade crossing warning systems, it is
critical that the system's credibility be maintained. For example, if
maintenance-of-way work is being performed on trackage that is part
[[Page 33148]]
of a highway-rail grade crossing warning system's train detection
circuit without the application of jumper wires, it is highly probable
that the warning system will activate. This indicates to motorists that
it is not safe to cross the railroad tracks when, in fact, no train is
approaching the crossing. The integrity of the warning system would be
compromised by the conveyance of false information to motorists, such
that in the future, they would not necessarily comply with the warning
system indications. Appropriate use of jumper wires or other safe means
of circumventing the normal functioning of the system thus prevents the
incorrect warning from being displayed to motorists. Safety is also
maintained as long as measures are taken to provide for the safety of
motorists and train operations.
Temporary removal from service of grade crossing warning devices
and wayside signal systems--through the application of jumpers or other
means--is a safe practice, when combined with protective measures for
highway traffic and train operations. FRA has reviewed some of the
safety procedures for disabling grade crossing warning devices and
wayside signal systems that are in place on the major railroads to
determine ``best practices'' that have been developed in the industry.
We found that the most effective safety procedures include the
following items: (1) Requirements for signal employees to obtain proper
authority from the train dispatcher or other appropriate personnel
responsible for the movement of trains through the territory before
disabling a grade crossing warning or wayside signal system; (2)
documentation of the authority to disable the grade crossing warning or
wayside signal system; (3) a requirement that all disabled grade
crossing warning and wayside signal systems must be properly inspected
and tested to ensure proper operation before being restored to service;
and (4) a procedure for signal employees to verify with the train
dispatcher or other appropriate personnel responsible for the movement
of trains through the territory that the grade crossing warning system
or wayside signal system has been properly tested before being restored
to service.
To mitigate the risks inherent with circumventing the normal
functioning of a system, FRA believes it is important that individual
railroads have standard procedures in place before interfering with the
normal operation of a grade crossing warning or wayside signal system.
Recommended Actions
In recognition of the need to ensure safety, FRA strongly
recommends that:
1. Each railroad responsible for the proper operation of a highway-
rail grade crossing warning system or wayside signal system review and
evaluate its specific railroadwide instructions for the proper method
for temporary removal of these systems from service. These instructions
should address the following items:
a. The manner in which the deactivation is authorized.
b. The personnel designated to authorize deactivation.
c. The protocols for notifying appropriate persons, especially
personnel responsible for the movement of trains, that a grade crossing
warning system or wayside signal system has been temporarily removed
from service.
d. The appropriate methods of providing for the safety of train
movements while the grade crossing warning system or wayside signal
system is temporarily removed from service.
e. The requirements necessary to perform an inspection and
operational test of the pertinent system components before restoring
the grade crossing warning system or wayside signal system to service.
f. The protocols for documenting and notifying appropriate persons
that the grade crossing warning system or wayside signal system has
been properly tested and restored to service.
2. Each railroad provide regular periodic training to all affected
employees to ensure their understanding of instructions for the proper
procedures for the temporary removal from service of grade crossing
warning or wayside signal systems, including the proper use of jumper
wires.
FRA encourages railroad industry members to take actions that are
consistent with the preceding recommendations, and to take other
complementary actions to help ensure the safety of the Nation's
railroad employees. FRA may modify this Safety Advisory 2013-04, issue
additional safety advisories, or take other appropriate actions
necessary to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's
railroads, including pursuing other corrective measures under its rail
safety authority.
Issued in Washington, DC, on May 28, 2013.
Robert C. Lauby,
Deputy Associate Administrator for Regulatory and Legislative
Operations.
[FR Doc. 2013-13047 Filed 5-31-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
