Improving 9-1-1 Reliability; Reliability and Continuity of Communications Networks, Including Broadband Technologies, 21879-21891 [2013-08525]
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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 71 / Friday, April 12, 2013 / Proposed Rules
population, including any minority or
low-income population.
VI. References
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The documents below are referenced
in the preamble. All documents are
located in the Air Docket at the address
listed in section titled ADDRESSES at the
beginning of this document. Unless
specified otherwise, all documents are
available in Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–
OAR–2012–0580 at https://
www.regulations.gov.
A.D. Little, 1991. Risk Assessment of
Flammable Refrigerants for Use in Home
Appliances (draft report). Arthur D. Little,
Inc., for EPA, Division of Global Change.
September 10, 1991. Docket item EPA–
HQ–OAR–2009–0286–0023.
ASHRAE, 2010. American National
Standards Institute (ANSI)/American
Society of Heating, Refrigerating and AirConditioning Engineers (ASHRAE).
Standard 34–2010: Designation and Safety
Classification of Refrigerants. 2010.
(Supersedes ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 34–
2007.)
EPA, 1994. Significant New Alternatives
Policy Technical Background Document:
Risk Screen on the Use of Substitutes for
Class I Ozone-Depleting Substances:
Refrigeration and Air Conditioning.
Stratospheric Protection Division. March,
1994.
ICF, 2009. ICF Consulting. ‘‘Significant New
Alternatives Policy Program Refrigeration
and Air Conditioning Sector—Risk Screen
on Substitutes for CFC–12 in Household
Refrigerators and Household Freezers—
Substitute: Isobutane’’, May 22, 2009.
ICF, 2009. ICF Consulting. ‘‘Significant New
Alternatives Policy Program Refrigeration
and Air Conditioning Sector—Risk Screen
on Substitutes for CFC–12, HCFC–22 and
R502 in Retail Food Refrigeration—
Substitute: Propane’’, May 26, 2009.
ICF, 2009. ICF Consulting. ‘‘Significant New
Alternatives Policy Program in the
Household Refrigeration Sector—Risk
Screen on Substitutes for CFC–12 and
HCFC–22 in Household Refrigerators,
Household Freezers and Window AC
Units—Substitute: HCR–188C’’, July 17,
2009.
ICF, 2009. ICF Consulting. ‘‘Significant New
Alternatives Policy Program in the
Household Refrigeration Sector—Risk
Screen on Substitutes for CFC–12 and
HCFC–22 in Household Refrigerators and
Freezers– Substitute: HCR–188C1’’,
November 6, 2009.
ICF, 2011a. ICF Consulting. ‘‘Significant New
Alternatives Policy Program Refrigeration
and Air Conditioning Sector—Risk Screen
on Substitutes for CFC–12 and HCFC–22 in
Household Refrigerators and Household
Freezers— Substitute: Isobutane.’’ June
2011.
ICF, 2011b. ICF Consulting. ‘‘Significant New
Alternatives Policy Program Refrigeration
and Air Conditioning Sector—Risk Screen
on Substitutes for CFC–12, HCFC–22 and
R502 in Retail Food Refrigeration—
Substitute: Propane.’’ June 2011.
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ICF, 2011c. ICF Consulting. ‘‘Significant New
Alternatives Policy Program in the
Household Refrigeration Sector—Risk
Screen on Substitutes for CFC–12 and
HCFC–22 in Household Refrigerators and
Freezers—Substitute: R–441.’’ June 2011.
ICF, 2011d. ICF Consulting. ‘‘Additional enduses modeling for household refrigerators
and freezers.’’ July 2011.
AR4, 2007, the Fourth Assessment Report
(AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change
2007.
TEAP, 2010. United Nations Environment
Programme. Report of the Technology and
Economic Assessment Panel. Available
online at https://ozone.unep.org/teap/
Reports/TEAP_Reports/teap-2010progressreport-volume2-May2010.pdf.
UL, 2000. UL 250: Household Refrigerators
and Freezers. 10th edition. Supplement
SA: Requirements for Refrigerators and
Freezers Employing a Flammable
Refrigerant in the Refrigerating System.
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. August 25,
2000.
UL, 2010. UL 471. Commercial Refrigerators
and Freezers. 10th edition. Supplement SB:
Requirements for Refrigerators and
Freezers Employing a Flammable
Refrigerant in the Refrigerating System.
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. November
24, 2010.
UL, 2011. Revisiting Flammable Refrigerants.
White Paper. Underwriters Laboratories,
Inc. February, 2011.
World Meteorological Organization (WMO),
2011. WMO Scientific Assessment of at
https://ozone.unep.org/Assessment_Panels/
SAP/Scientific_Assessment_2010/
index.shtml. Ozone Depletion: 2010.
Available online.
List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 82
Environmental protection,
Administrative practice and procedure,
Air pollution control, Recycling,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Stratospheric ozone layer.
Dated: March 28, 2013.
Bob Perciasepe,
Acting Administrator.
For the reasons set out in the
preamble, 40 CFR part 82 is proposed to
be amended as follows:
PART 82—PROTECTION OF
STRATOSPHERIC OZONE
1. The authority citation for part 82
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7414, 7601, 7671–
7671g.
2. Section 82.154 is amended by
adding section vii to paragraph (a)(1) to
read as follows:
■
§ 82.154
Prohibitions.
(a)(1) * * *
(vii) Effective [DATE 60 days after
publication of final rule in the Federal
Register], isobutane (R–600a) and R–
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21879
441A as substitutes in household
refrigerators, freezers, and combination
refrigerators and freezers; and propane
(R–290) as a substitute in retail food
refrigerators and freezers (standalone
units only).
[FR Doc. 2013–08667 Filed 4–11–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560–50–P
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
47 CFR Chapter I
[PS Docket No. 13–75; PS Docket No. 11–
60; FCC 13–33]
Improving 9–1–1 Reliability; Reliability
and Continuity of Communications
Networks, Including Broadband
Technologies
Federal Communications
Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
The Federal Communications
Commission proposes a range of
approaches to ensure that providers of
9–1–1 communications services
implement best practices and other
sound engineering principles to
improve the reliability and resiliency of
the Nation’s 9–1–1 networks. The
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking also
proposes amendments to the
Commission’s current rules to clarify
and add specificity to service providers’
obligations to notify 9–1–1 call centers
of communications outages. This action
follows an inquiry by the Public Safety
and Homeland Security Bureau into
widespread 9–1–1 service outages
during the ‘‘derecho’’ windstorm that
affected large portions of the United
States in June 2012, revealing significant
vulnerabilities in current 9–1–1 network
configuration and service provider
maintenance practices. The Commission
requests comment on these proposals to
improve the reliability and resiliency of
9–1–1 networks and ensure that 9–1–1
call centers receive timely and
actionable notification of service
outages.
SUMMARY:
Submit comments on or before
May 13, 2013 and reply comments by
May 28, 2013. Written comments on the
Paperwork Reduction Act proposed
information collection requirements
must be submitted by the public, Office
of Management and Budget (OMB), and
other interested parties on or before
June 11, 2013.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments to the
Federal Communications Commission,
445 12th Street SW., Washington, DC
20554. Comments may be submitted
DATES:
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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 71 / Friday, April 12, 2013 / Proposed Rules
electronically through the Federal
Communications Commission’s Web
site: https://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/. In
addition to filing comments with the
Secretary, a copy of any comments on
the Paperwork Reduction Act
information collection requirements
contained herein should be submitted to
the Federal Communications
Commission via email to PRA@fcc.gov
and to Nicholas A. Fraser, Office of
Management and Budget, via email to
Nicholas_A._Fraser@omb.eop.gov or via
fax at 202–395–5167. For detailed
instructions for submitting comments
and additional information on the
rulemaking process, see the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of
this document. Parties wishing to file
materials with a claim of confidentiality
should follow the procedures set forth
in § 0.459 of the Commission’s rules.
Confidential submissions may not be
filed via ECFS but rather should be filed
with the Secretary’s Office following the
procedures set forth in 47 CFR 0.459.
Redacted versions of confidential
submissions may be filed via ECFS.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric
P. Schmidt, Attorney Advisor, Public
Safety and Homeland Security Bureau,
(202) 418–1214 or eric.schmidt@fcc.gov.
For additional information concerning
the Paperwork Reduction Act
information collection requirements
contained in this document, contact
Judith Boley-Herman, (202) 418–0214,
or send an email to PRA@fcc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a
summary of the Commission’s Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking in PS Docket No.
13–75 and PS Docket No. 11–60,
released on March 20, 2013. The full
text of this document is available for
public inspection during regular
business hours in the FCC Reference
Center, Room CY–A257, 445 12th Street
SW., Washington, DC 20554, or online
at https://www.fcc.gov/document/
improving-9-1-1-reliability.
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I. Introduction
1. In this Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM), we seek comment
on approaches to ensure the reliability
and resiliency of the communications
infrastructure necessary to ensure
continued availability of the Nation’s 9–
1–1 system, particularly during times of
major disaster. We take this action in
response to the findings and
recommendations presented in the
Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau’s (PSHSB or Bureau) January 10,
2013, report titled Impact of the June
2012 Derecho on Communications
Networks and Services: Report and
Recommendations (Derecho Report),
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which is available at https://
www.fcc.gov/document/derecho-reportand-recommendations. In that report,
following an extensive inquiry and
review of comments, the Bureau found
that the June 2012 derecho affecting the
Midwest and Mid-Atlantic United States
severely disrupted 9–1–1-related
communications and that these
disruptions were due in large part to
avoidable planning and systems failures
within 9–1–1 service providers’
networks. The Bureau concluded that
these failures could, and would, have
been avoided if providers had followed
industry best practices and other sound
engineering principles. Accordingly, the
Bureau recommended that the
Commission consider action in the
following areas: (1) 9–1–1 circuit
auditing; (2) 9–1–1 service provider
central office backup power; (3)
physical diversity of monitor and
control links; and (4) improved outage
notification to Public Safety Answering
Points (PSAPs). This NPRM seeks
comment on approaches to implement
these recommendations, taking into
account the evolving nature of network
technologies, as well as the continuing
migration of circuit-switched services to
Internet Protocol (IP)-based platforms.
Thus, any rules or other policies
designed to improve 9–1–1 service
reliability will be developed with the
ongoing transition to Next Generation
9–1–1 (NG9–1–1) in mind.
II. Discussion
A. Need for Commission Action
2. The Commission previously has
addressed communications reliability
issues by working with service
providers to develop voluntary best
practices, and by measuring the
effectiveness of those best practices
through outage reporting. The outage
reporting process has often been
effective in improving the reliability,
resiliency, and security of many
communications services. The June
2012 derecho, however, revealed the
limits of that approach and highlighted
the potential benefits and importance of
supplementing a voluntary approach
with respect to critical 9–1–1
communications.
3. The Commission seeks comment on
the extent to which 9–1–1 failures
during the derecho reflect the reliability
of 9–1–1 networks nationwide. Why
would PSAPs located in other parts of
the Nation be more or less vulnerable to
the effects of a storm like the derecho?
To what extent have service providers
affected by the derecho addressed
vulnerabilities revealed by the storm,
both in the affected region and across
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their entire service areas? What specific
remedial actions have these service
providers taken, particularly with
respect to critical circuit auditing,
functional central office backup power,
and diversity of monitoring links, and
when were those actions completed?
Has the experience of the derecho
caused other 9–1–1 service providers to
reexamine their network architecture
and maintenance practices, and what
have those efforts revealed about the
reliability and resiliency of the Nation’s
9–1–1 infrastructure as a whole? What
changes have been made to improve 9–
1–1 reliability and resiliency? What
assurance does the Commission have
that these changes will persist?
4. Although we intend the approaches
in this NPRM to complement and
strengthen—not to replace—the
Commission’s current approach to
network reliability, we seek comment
on the appropriate balance between
voluntary best practices and
Commission mandates as they relate to
9–1–1 communications. In light of the
many existing best practices addressing
these issues and service providers’
failure to implement them fully,
however, we seek comment on whether
there is any assurance that additional
voluntary best practices would
necessarily lead to effective and
consistent compliance without
additional Commission action,
especially after such dangerous failures
potentially affected millions of people.
The Derecho Report noted that multiple
9–1–1 service providers implemented
best practices to varying degrees, or
adopted key best practices in theory,
with substantial exceptions in day-today operation. To what extent are
network reliability best practices,
particularly those regarding physical
auditing of critical circuits, functional
and well-maintained central office
backup power, and diversity of network
monitoring links, followed today? What
evidence exists that they are followed?
What circumstances might lead to these
best practices not being followed? What
measures can be taken to compensate
for the failure to implement a best
practice so that 9–1–1 reliability is not
impaired? What evidence exists to
substantiate that these measures are
taken routinely when best practices are
not followed? What incentives do
service providers have to implement
best practices, and are those incentives
sufficient? Beyond general agreement
with best practices, what assurances can
9–1–1 service providers make to ensure
rigorous implementation on a
nationwide basis?
5. Which advisory bodies do service
providers look to for guidance regarding
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best practices, e.g., Communications
Security, Reliability, and
Interoperability Council (CSRIC),
Alliance for Telecommunications
Industry Solutions (ATIS) Network
Reliability Steering Committee (NRSC),
Association of Public-Safety
Communications Officials (APCO),
National Emergency Number
Association (NENA), or other
organizations? What best practices are
followed today other than those adopted
by CSRIC? What relevant industry
standards are followed routinely? If so,
are they preferred over the best practices
adopted by CSRIC? What evidence
exists that these standards are routinely
followed? How do they differ from the
best practices issued by CSRIC? For
example, are there specific regional
circumstances that would make it more
difficult or expensive to perform critical
circuit auditing? Do service providers
take measures to compensate for failing
to implement the best practice in these
instances? What evidence exists to
substantiate that these measures are
actually taken? Should certain best
practices be considered critical for some
parts of the country and not others? If
existing best practices have proven
difficult for service providers to
implement or inadequate to prevent
communications outages, what can be
done to update or revise those practices
to reflect lessons learned in the
derecho? Which best practices,
specifically, should be added or
expanded, and would such changes
make service providers more likely to
comply in the future?
B. Entities Subject to Proposals
6. We seek comment on the class of
entities to which the proposals put
forward for consideration in this NPRM
would apply. Throughout this NPRM we
use the term ‘‘9–1–1 service provider,’’
defined in the Derecho Report as a
communications provider ‘‘responsible
for routing and delivering 9–1–1 calls to
PSAPs.’’ These providers are typically
ILECs, though as the Bureau explained,
the transition to NG9–1–1 may broaden
the class of entities that perform this
function. Accordingly, we seek
comment on defining the term ‘‘9–1–1
service provider.’’ We anticipate that the
proposals in this NPRM would apply to
all 9–1–1 service providers, and
tentatively define that term to include
all entities, including ILECs that provide
9–1–1 call routing, automatic location
information (ALI), emergency services
Internet protocol networks (ESInets),
and similar services directly to a PSAP.
Is that definition sufficient to capture all
the entities that both now and in the
future could provide functions
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necessary to the provision of such
services to a PSAP? If not, how should
this term be defined? For example,
should any of the proposals apply to
other types of wireline service
providers, wireless service providers,
interconnected VoIP service providers,
or other potential means of reaching a
PSAP as NG9–1–1 broadens the range of
entities capable of delivering 9–1–1
service? Should reliability standards or
certification requirements extend to data
centers and other facilities that may in
the future be used to host NG9–1–1
components? Are there certain
proposals from which non-ILEC service
providers should expressly be exempt?
To the extent that any of the
implementation approaches would
impose obligations on entities regulated
as common carriers under Title II of the
Communications Act, should there be a
mechanism for cost recovery beyond the
9–1–1 related tariff mechanisms already
in place?
C. Implementation Approaches
7. We seek comment on four possible
approaches to implement the
recommendations for Commission
action in the Derecho Report. We seek
input on whether each of these
approaches can stand alone, or whether
the Commission should adopt two or
more options as part of an integrated
approach (e.g., reporting, certification,
performance reliability requirements).
As noted above, these proposals are
intended to complement, rather than to
replace, the Commission’s current
support for implementation of best
practices developed through
cooperation with industry and advisory
bodies. We also seek comment on the
suitability of each of the approaches
described below, as well as any other
approaches the Commission should
consider. However the Commission
decides to proceed, a meaningful level
of specificity is essential for any
approach to be effective. We therefore
seek comment on the suitability of
existing best practices as a basis for any
rules we may adopt. Although each
proposal is intended to be flexible,
commenters should describe in detail
how they propose to implement their
preferred approach and how those
choices would advance the goals of this
NPRM.
8. We specifically seek comments
from state commissions and PSAPs on
the approaches they use to oversee 9–1–
1 connectivity. Many states, for
example, regulate 9–1–1 service
provided by ILECs. Do those states use
a reporting approach? Onsite audits? Do
PSAPs that contract for 9–1–1 services
impose certification or similar
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requirements upon their 9–1–1 service
providers? Do they specify levels of
reliability through service level
agreements (SLAs) or require adherence
to best practices? Are such SLAs
negotiated at the PSAP, state, or serviceprovider level, and what level of 9–1–
1 service do they provide? What have
state commissions and PSAPs found to
work in their oversight of 9–1–1 service
providers, and what needs to be
improved?
9. Reporting. Under this approach, the
Commission would require service
providers to periodically report on the
extent to which they are voluntarily
implementing critical best practices, or
complying with applicable standards
established by the Commission. Would
adoption of this reporting approach
alone or as part of an integrated
approach meet the goal of ensuring 9–
1–1 reliability? What costs and benefits
would such a reporting obligation
create? Which best practices or other
standards should be subject to reporting
requirements, and are these standards
sufficiently detailed to objectively
evaluate compliance? To what extent
would such a reporting obligation be
effective in the absence of a companion
requirement to correct deficiencies
revealed in the reports? What
performance level should the
Commission use to prompt remedial
actions based on these reports?
Commenters offering support for this
approach should specify the scope,
granularity, and frequency of reporting
they support.
10. We note that the Commission has
used reporting in the past as a means of
ensuring a certain level of reliability in
9–1–1 services. In 2007, in response to
Hurricane Katrina, the Commission
adopted rules requiring local exchange
carriers, wireless service providers
subject to 9–1–1 requirements, and
interconnected VoIP service providers
‘‘to conduct an analysis of the resiliency
and reliability of their 911 networks or
systems and to submit a report to the
Commission.’’ The reports proved of
limited use, however, because they
lacked the specificity necessary to
determine network reliability in
individual cases. In light of this
experience, we invite commenters to
address how to craft a reporting
requirement that would more effectively
promote reliability of 9–1–1 services
and networks and create incentives for
service providers to maintain
consistently high standards of 9–1–1
reliability.
11. Certification. Under this approach,
the Commission would require
providers to certify periodically that
their 9–1–1 network service and
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facilities comply with voluntary
industry best practices, reliability
requirements specified by the
Commission or other standards. This
approach could help ensure that senior
management is aware of significant
vulnerabilities in the 9–1–1 network
and accountable for its decisions
regarding design, maintenance, and
disaster preparedness. Are existing best
practices sufficiently detailed to serve as
standards for certification? What
performance level should the
Commission use to prompt remedial
actions based on these certifications?
With respect to this approach, we seek
comment on existing certification
schemes—whether or not directly
related to the work of the Commission—
that might serve as models for
certification in this context.
12. Do existing Commission
certification schemes, such as those
used for Consumer Proprietary Network
Information or Equal Employment
Opportunity; provide an appropriate
model for addressing 9–1–1 reliability?
Why or why not? What are the tradeoffs
among the various models? What costs
and benefits would be associated with
each? Is there sufficient justification for
the Commission to adopt a new
certification model? If so, why? Would
one possible model be found in Section
302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which
requires Chief Executive Officers (CEOs)
and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) to
certify the integrity of financial reports
their companies submit to the Securities
and Exchange Commission? If so, which
portions of certification under SarbanesOxley are suitable for certifications in
this context, and are there others that
are not suitable? For example, as under
Sarbanes-Oxley, should corporate
officers be personally liable for the
accuracy of their certifications, and how
would the Commission enforce such a
requirement? What costs and benefits
would be associated with this model?
13. Reliability Requirements. Under a
third approach the Commission would
specify minimum standards for 9–1–1
communications reliability, based on
recognized industry best practices. How
can the Commission ensure that any
such requirements account for sound
engineering practices not specifically
codified as CSRIC best practices,
particularly as technologies evolve? Are
there differences in the design and
operation of particular 9–1–1 networks
that the Commission should consider in
connection with sound engineering and
network reliability standards, and
which may not be reflected fully in
existing best practices?
14. Compliance Reviews and
Inspections. Under this approach, the
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Commission would conduct periodic
compliance reviews or site inspections
of service provider facilities to verify
that 9–1–1 service providers are
adhering to certain standards. This
approach may be best suited as part of
an integrated approach, in conjunction
with rules setting minimum standards
for compliance. We seek comment on
this option, as well as any benefits or
costs of this approach. Which service
providers should be subject to
inspections or compliance reviews, and
how often should those inspections
occur? Should reviews be limited to
records and documentation of
compliance with Commission
requirements, or should they include
physical site inspections of network
routes? Would this approach require
additional staff, both at the Commission
and employed by service providers, to
conduct inspections and document
compliance? If so, what experience and
training would these personnel require,
and would they be likely to detect
network design and maintenance issues
such as those that led to 9–1–1 failures
during the derecho?
D. Bureau Recommendations for
Improving 9–1–1 Network Reliability
15. As explained above, for each
recommendation we seek comment on a
range of possible implementation
approaches. We also seek comment on
the relative costs and benefits of the
various proposals. We also seek
comment on any alternative proposals
that may be more effective or efficient
in improving 9–1–1 network reliability
or resiliency. In evaluating specific
proposals for Commission action, we
also seek comment on how we can best
work in cooperation with state, tribal,
and local governments, which we have
recognized are the primary
administrators of the legacy 9–1–1
system. For each of the proposals, we
specifically seek comments from state
commissions and PSAPs on the
approaches they use to oversee 9–1–1
connectivity.
1. Routine 9–1–1 Circuit Auditing
16. Many of the vulnerabilities
revealed by the derecho hinge on the
concept of physical diversity. Under
generally accepted definitions, physical
diversity means that two circuits follow
different paths separated by some
physical distance so that a single failure
such as a power outage, equipment
failure, or cable cut will not result in
both circuits failing. For example, two
circuits that ride over the same fiber
optic cable are not physically diverse,
even though they utilize different fibers
in that cable and may be logically
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diverse for purposes of transmitting
data. We seek comment on this
definition and any other concept of
network diversity we should consider.
17. As the Derecho Report noted, for
example, a physical diversity audit
might have revealed vulnerabilities that
led to 9–1–1 and ALI service failures to
multiple PSAPs in Northern Virginia.
To what extent does this experience
reflect vulnerabilities in 9–1–1 networks
nationwide? Do 9–1–1 service providers
perform regular, physical audits—not
just logical analyses—of critical circuits
to ensure that their networks remain
physically diverse? If so, what
specifically do they do and how often?
What steps are taken to ensure that
physical diversity is sustained despite
the circuit rearrangements that
frequently take place in
communications networks?
18. As a result of service providers’
inconsistent auditing of 9–1–1 circuits
and avoidable single points of failure in
their networks, the Derecho Report
recommended regularly-scheduled
auditing of these circuits, noting that it
‘‘should lead to fewer 9–1–1 outages
and enhance the reliability of 9–1–1
communications. If providers do not
regularly audit the physical routes of 9–
1–1 circuits and ALI links, they will be
ill-equipped to verify diversity and
understand, avoid, or address instances
where a single failure causes loss of all
E9–1–1 circuits or all ALI links for a
PSAP.’’ Are there instances where single
points of failure are unavoidable, and
how should that term be defined? The
Derecho Report concluded that the
benefits of implementing this
recommendation will likely outweigh
any additional costs, given the large
numbers of customers that can be served
successfully in emergencies by circuits
that are diverse, and the harms that
could result from avoidable failures.
The Bureau added that any burden
likely would be modest because this
obligation would apply only to a limited
number of high-priority circuits that
provide 9–1–1 service.
19. In light of providers’ apparent
failure to audit circuit diversity
adequately, notwithstanding preexisting best practices bolstered by
Bureau reminders, we seek comment in
general on the extent to which providers
are auditing these circuits and whether
those audits follow established best
practices. Do existing best practices
provide sufficient guidance on this
topic? If not, what, specifically, should
new or revised best practices address?
What remedial actions have 9–1–1
service providers taken based on lessons
learned in the derecho, whether or not
they were directly affected by the storm?
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20. How, when, and to what degree of
specificity should network diversity
audits be conducted? Under current
technologies, critical 9–1–1 circuits
include, at a minimum, 9–1–1 trunks to
PSAPs and ALI/ANI links, but we seek
comment on other transport routes or
technologies that may also be vital for
emergency response, now or in the
future. Although some network
characteristics may vary by service
provider and location, any auditing
obligation must be specifically defined
to be effective. Should the Commission
therefore adopt rules prescribing in
some fashion how audits should be
conducted, and should it conduct
inspections or compliance reviews to
enforce any such rules? How frequently
should audits be conducted, and are
there existing published industry
standards that could serve as a model?
Should the Commission require not
only that service providers perform
audits, but also that they take action to
eliminate reasonably avoidable single
points of failure? If so, should any single
point of failure be considered
unavoidable? Should the Commission
require that audits be performed by
independent experts or conduct
periodic compliance reviews or formal
inspections as a means of ensuring
compliance? Are there complicating
factors in performing diversity audits
that the Commission should take note
of? To what extent do leased circuits
affect the ability to perform accurate
audits? How would diversity be
sustained despite normal circuit
rearrangements and grooming?
21. How can the Commission ensure
that its guidance regarding transport
network diversity remains current as
technology changes? For example, in a
NG9–1–1 environment, it is likely that
at least some crucial servers will be
hosted outside of central offices, in
either commercial or government data
centers. In those cases, should the
Commission ask or require such data
centers to meet physical diversity
standards or certify that they conduct
diversity audits? Would it be sufficient
if all such servers are backed up by a
redundant hot standby server in another
data center? Would conformance with
the higher tiers of the ANSI/TIA–942
standard be suitable for qualifying data
centers to host critical NG9–1–1
components? How does the transition to
broadband, IP-based networks affect the
ability to conduct accurate audits? Is a
reporting requirement the best approach
for ensuring that providers perform 9–
1–1 audits?
22. We also seek comment on whether
reports should be made publicly
available. Should they be treated as
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confidential, absent a persuasive
contrary showing, as with outage
reports? Do commenters believe any
such reports should be shared within
the PSAP community, or made
accessible to 9–1–1 industry
associations (e.g., APCO, NENA)?
Should the reports be shared with state
regulators such as state public utilities
commissions?
23. We also seek comment on whether
providers should certify that they are
performing 9–1–1 circuit audits in
conformance with best practices, and if
so, how often they should so certify. If
the Commission were to pursue the
certification approach, to which
standards should providers be required
to certify? Do existing standards or
guidance serve as a usable template?
Beyond certifying that they have
conducted an audit, what other
information should service providers
need to certify? For example, should
they conduct audits under generallyaccepted procedures reflected in best
practices? Should providers certify that
the circuits audited satisfied specified
criteria for physical diversity and
identify and describe exceptions in
some fashion? How often should
providers be required to file any such
certifications, and how granular should
they be? Should any certification
requirement be accompanied by an
obligation to correct deficiencies
revealed by diversity audits?
24. We also seek input regarding
additional costs, if any, that would
accrue to providers in implementing
requirements associated with this
recommendation through any of the
approaches noted above (i.e., reporting,
certification, performance
requirements). The NPRM provides
preliminary cost and benefit estimates
and seeks comment on all aspects of and
assumptions underlying the cost/benefit
analysis.
2. Sufficient Backup Power at Central
Offices
25. The derecho raised many
questions regarding backup power,
including whether all central offices
must have some form of backup power,
and what constitutes adequate backup
power. During the derecho,
approximately 7 percent of one affected
service provider’s central-office
generators failed to operate properly
when needed. To what extent is this
failure rate representative of centraloffice backup power nationwide among
all 9–1–1 service providers? What rate
of generator or other backup power
failures have service providers
experienced during other recent power
failures?
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26. In light of these concerns, we seek
comment on whether the Commission
should institute requirements with
respect to backup power, including
testing and maintenance of backup
power equipment. How closely do
providers adhere to existing industry
best practices and other published
guidelines on backup power? Would
new or expanded best practices provide
additional guidance necessary to help
maintain reliable backup power? If so,
would additional best practices provide
as much assurance of rigorous
compliance as any of the approaches
proposed here? What additional best
practices are needed in this area? How
closely do providers follow generator
and battery manufacturers’
recommended maintenance schedules?
We also are interested in comment
regarding backup power test records,
e.g., what types of records are actually
maintained, and the general content of
those records. How long are records
retained, and are they shared effectively
within the service provider’s
organization? As records could not
always be readily located, does this
suggest that FCC monitoring would be
helpful? If a battery or generator fails a
routine test, is that information
communicated to management and
reliably acted upon in a timely manner?
27. If we conclude that the
Commission should establish backup
power requirements, what, more
precisely, should be required?
Acknowledging that what constitutes a
‘‘central office’’ can vary to some extent
by service provider and location, we ask
commenters to give views on whether
and how an adequate level of backup
power may differ based on the type of
facility. Should the required level of
backup power depend on the
relationship of each central office to
reliable 9–1–1 service? Furthermore, the
forecast transition to NG9–1–1 will
likely allow some capabilities to be
hosted outside of central offices in
consolidated data centers. We seek
comment on the level of backup power
currently available at such facilities and
the degree to which they should be
required to comply with backup power
standards for 9–1–1 networks.
28. Should the Commission require
service providers to file reports
describing their central office backup
power schemes, including maintenance
and testing? If so, how often should
providers have to file such reports?
Should reports be based on
conformance with specific best
practices, or other standards adopted by
the Commission? How many reports
would there be? We also ask what
specific information should be included
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in these reports, e.g., should the report
be limited to factual discussion of
existing practices, or should providers
also report on any planned
improvements? Should the report
explicitly note departures from industry
best practices? Should the reports
include an inventory of backup power
deployment in service provider central
offices? Should providers report on the
results of recent tests and their protocol
for addressing needed repairs? Should
the reports be made publicly available?
Would a requirement help foster the
sustained focus needed to make a
difference?
29. We also seek comment on the
approach of having 9–1–1 service
providers periodically certify that their
central offices have sufficient backup
power or conform with specific best
practices. With this approach, to what
standard(s) should providers certify?
What existing industry backup power
standards or guidance might serve as a
usable template? Beyond certifying that
their backup power meets minimum
standards, what other factors might
service providers be required to certify
to? How often should providers be
required to file any such certifications,
and how granular should they be? Who,
by title, should attest to the validity of
the certification?
30. We seek comment on whether we
should adopt a minimum standard for
central office backup power. Should the
Commission require on-site backup
power for a specific number of hours,
whether through appropriately rated
batteries or a backup generator with a
sufficient fuel supply? Should we
require that service providers maintain
sufficient backup power to ensure
continuity of critical communications
and, if so, how should ‘‘critical
communications’’ be defined? Should
the Commission require service
providers to have in place and
implement plans for regular
maintenance and testing of backup
power equipment? If so, should the
Commission specify a level of detail and
granularity for those plans? Would
periodic site inspections or compliance
reviews be useful to ensure compliance?
Do service providers currently test
backup generators under actual office
load, and is that method preferable to or
more effective than others? How often
do service providers employ tandem
generator arrangements where the
failure of one generator would result in
a central office being switched
immediately to battery backup? Should
these generators be replaced or
redesigned to shed nonessential loads?
We seek comments on the benefits and
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drawbacks of each implementation
approach, and compared to each other.
31. We also seek input regarding
additional costs, if any, that would
accrue to providers who are not already
rigorously implementing best practices,
and to all providers to either report or
certify. The cost associated with
reporting and certification appears to be
a fraction of the cost required to
remediate deficiencies that these
approaches reveal. However, the very
preliminary information obtained by the
Bureau so far suggests that remediation
may not be necessary for a substantial
majority of central offices that already
have permanent generators and readily
accessible portable generators; do not
use tandem generator arrangements,
where the failure of one generator
results in neither generator functioning;
and already have implemented
appropriate battery and generator
testing. We seek more specific
information about the prevalence of
each of these situations below, and on
the estimated time and cost associated
with remediation where necessary. Is
the range of potential remediation costs
wide enough to raise questions about
whether the costs of remediation may
exceed the benefits?
32. We have identified a number of
questions involving potential costs that
appear relevant to this inquiry. How
many central offices have a generator
onsite? A portable generator that can be
deployed promptly (e.g., within four
hours)? What is the fully loaded cost of
such a portable generator? How many
central offices have batteries that are not
tested to the manufacturer’s
specifications? How long does it take on
average to test such batteries over the
course of a year? What is the cost of
doing so? Similarly, how many onsite
generators are not tested monthly or
yearly, and what would the associated
incremental costs of such testing be?
What is the likelihood of a generator’s
failing a monthly or annual
maintenance test, and the associated
cost of repairing it? How many tandem
generator arrangements are there, in
which the failure of one results in
neither functioning? How much is
already budgeted to address problems
associated with the potential need to
address these issues? The NPRM
provides a preliminary analysis of and
seeks comment on all aspects of and
assumptions underlying the costs and
benefits of: (1) Having generators
available in all central offices; (2) more
regular battery testing; (3) more regular
generator testing; (4) repairing a
generator soon after it fails a test; (5)
eliminating a tandem generator
arrangement where the failure of one
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generator results in neither generator
functioning; (6). The NPRM seeks
comment on all aspects of and
assumptions underlying the cost/benefit
analysis
3. Robust Network Monitoring
Capabilities
33. A 9–1–1 service provider typically
operates one or more Network
Operations Centers (NOCs) from which
it performs, among other tasks, remote
monitoring of its network. This
monitoring enables a provider to detect
critical facilities outages and other
problems as soon as they occur and to
deploy resources as appropriate to
rectify problems. These NOCs typically
communicate with the network
elements that they monitor by first
connecting with one or more regional
aggregation points, which then connect
to the array of network elements to be
monitored. The diversity of these
regional aggregation points, including
the diversity of the facilities that
connect them to NOCs, is vital to
communications reliability. During the
derecho, the network monitoring
capabilities of the two primary ILECs
involved were disabled within the area
of the storm, depriving them of visibility
into the status of their network
operations and complicating their
recovery efforts. In both instances, the
loss of monitoring capability throughout
the segment of the network affected by
the storm could be attributed to a single
point of failure. To what extent do these
failures reflect vulnerabilities in
network monitoring systems
nationwide? How often do other 9–1–1
service providers rely on a single
physical path to monitor large portions
of their networks, and why have
redundant links not been installed?
34. Based on network monitoring
failures during the derecho, the Bureau
recommended that the Commission take
action to ensure that 9–1–1 service
providers put in place ‘‘diverse monitor
and control links and capabilities
throughout their network[s].’’ We seek
comment on whether and how to
implement this recommendation. What
have 9–1–1 service providers affected by
the derecho done to ensure they will not
lose visibility into their networks during
future emergencies? To what extent
have other 9–1–1 service providers
implemented diverse monitoring
capabilities within their networks, and
do they plan specific, additional
improvements in response to the
derecho? How can the Commission be
confident that these measures will be
sustained?
35. Should the Commission pursue
the Derecho Report’s recommendations
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with respect to network monitoring,
how should it specify the level or degree
of ‘‘diversity’’ expected of network
monitoring and control capabilities? For
example, should the Commission define
this ‘‘diversity’’ such that the failure of
one element of a service provider’s
monitoring system, for example the
failure of a control link, cannot result in
the loss of network monitoring
capabilities? If this definition is not
suitable, what would a suitable
alternative be and why is it superior?
We observe that, unlike other policy
objectives the Bureau recommends,
diversity in network monitoring is not
the subject of a specific CSRIC best
practice, although other best practices
address circuit diversity and network
monitoring in general. Are new or more
specific best practices needed to provide
guidance in this area? If so, what new
or revised best practices are needed?
Would additional best practices provide
as much assurance of rigorous
compliance as any of the approaches
proposed here? Who should be charged
with developing these best practices? At
a minimum, the derecho revealed that it
is a sound engineering practice to
design network monitoring centers with
visibility into the network through
physically diverse links that help to
avoid single points of failure. Where are
these concepts addressed in industry
best practices or other published
guidelines? How will the transition to
NG9–1–1 affect network monitoring
technologies and the need for diverse
monitoring links?
36. Should the Commission require
service providers to file reports
describing the diversity of their network
monitoring capabilities? If so, how often
should such reports be filed, and how
granular should they be? What specific
information should be included in these
reports? For example, should the reports
include detailed descriptions of service
provider monitoring and control
architectures, including maps? What are
the public safety and homeland security
implications of public disclosure of key
network routes? Should such reporting
be limited to factual discussion of
existing practices, or should providers
also report on any planned or ongoing
efforts to improve the diversity of their
network monitoring capabilities?
37. We also seek comment on the
approach of having providers certify
that their monitoring and control links
are sufficiently diverse. With this
approach, to what diversity standard
should providers certify? For example,
should service providers certify that no
single points of failure exist in the
network monitoring facilities that run
between their NOCs and regional
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aggregation points? Beyond certifying
that their monitoring links are
sufficiently diverse, what other
information should providers be
required to certify? For example, should
service providers be asked to certify that
they have more than one regional
aggregation point in major metropolitan
areas? How often should providers be
required to file any such certifications,
and how granular should they be? How
could existing certification schemes,
such as section 302 of SOX, serve as
models for such certification?
38. Should the Commission require
service providers to implement a certain
level of diversity in their network
monitoring and control capabilities? If
so, how precisely should the
Commission specify the level or degree
of ‘‘diversity’’ required of network
monitoring and control links? Should
the Commission avail itself of
compliance reviews or formal
inspections as a further means of
ensuring compliance with any such rule
it adopts?
39. The NPRM includes an analysis of
the costs and benefits associated with
ensuring more diversity in monitoring
capabilities and seek comment on all
aspects of and assumptions underlying
that analysis.
E. Improved PSAP Notification Under
Section 4.9 of the Commission’s Rules
40. The derecho also demonstrated
that timely, clear, and appropriately
targeted communication between 9–1–1
service providers and PSAPs is key
during any disruption of 9–1–1 service,
particularly in a disaster when the
public requires additional emergency
assistance. The Commission’s current
rules recognize that PSAPs must be
notified when communications outages
affect 9–1–1 service, but the derecho
revealed that many PSAPs’ efforts to
restore service and respond to
emergencies during the derecho were
hindered by inadequate information and
otherwise ineffective communication by
service providers. Although we
recognize that conditions often change
rapidly in disaster situations, PSAPs—
and ultimately the public—depend on
communications providers for accurate
situational awareness when outages
affect public safety. We therefore
propose amendments to § 4.9 of the
Commission’s rules to clarify how
service providers can more effectively
and uniformly notify PSAPs of outages
affecting 9–1–1 service and cooperate to
restore service as quickly as possible.
41. Section 4.9 requires certain
communications providers to notify the
Commission within 120 minutes of
discovering a reportable outage. The
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rule also requires specified providers to
notify ‘‘9–1–1 special facilities’’—i.e.,
PSAPs—affected by an outage with ‘‘all
available information that may be
useful’’ to mitigate the outage ‘‘as soon
as possible by telephone or other
electronic means.’’ After the derecho,
however, many PSAPs reported that
they were not notified of outages or
received inadequate information about
the scope of impacts to 9–1–1 service.
The lack of specificity in this rule has
led to questions regarding how to
determine whether or how providers are
complying with the Commission’s PSAP
notification requirements.
42. During the Bureau’s derecho
inquiry, multiple PSAPs stated that they
contacted their 9–1–1 service provider
to report a loss of service before being
contacted by the provider. Other PSAPs
received notification in the form of
‘‘cryptic’’ emails that referenced
problems in one central office but did
not specify all of the jurisdictions
affected. Furthermore, inadequate
information from service providers
during the derecho led some PSAPs to
activate ineffective reroutes, or to
attempt to reroute even though service
could have been restored via the
original route.
43. We therefore propose revisions to
§ 4.9 intended to clarify 9–1–1 service
providers’ outage reporting obligations
and better ensure that PSAPs receive
timely and actionable notification when
a communications outage affects 9–1–1
service. Under the proposed rules,
service providers subject to PSAP
notification requirements would be
required to notify PSAPs of outages
immediately, by telephone and in
writing via electronic means. These
notifications would include, at a
minimum, the nature of the outage, the
estimated number of users affected or
potentially affected, the location of
those users, the actions being taken by
provider to address the outage, the
estimated time at which service will be
restored, recommended actions the
impacted facility should take to
minimize disruption of service, and the
sender’s name, telephone number and
email address at which the sender can
be reached.
44. We seek comment on this
proposed language and any alternative
revisions to § 4.9 that would accomplish
the goal of clarifying reporting
obligations and ensuring that PSAPs
receive more detailed outage
notifications. To what extent do
providers currently inform PSAPs of 9–
1–1 outages, and what is included in
those communications? What additional
information would PSAPs find useful?
How much information that would be
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helpful to PSAPs is practically available
to service providers during natural
disasters and other emergencies? Under
the proposed rule, service providers
would be required to provide PSAP
notification immediately. Should the
Commission adopt a more specific
timeframe by when service providers
must notify PSAPs? If so, what would be
an appropriate timeframe? Should the
Commission specify a list of acceptable
‘‘electronic means’’ for written
notifications, or do PSAPs and service
providers prefer flexibility to choose
their own methods of communication?
Should service providers be required to
keep and retain records of their
communications with PSAPs to
demonstrate compliance with
notification requirements? To what
extent do state tariffs and other state and
local regulations impose requirements
regarding outage reporting and
communication in general between
service providers and PSAPs?
45. We note that the current outage
reporting rules apply to a range of
service providers beyond the ILECs that
typically route 9–1–1 calls to PSAPs
under current network configurations.
Should any new or revised PSAP
notification requirements apply to all
entities covered by § 4.9, or only those
considered ‘‘9–1–1 service providers’’
for purposes of this NPRM? Should
amended notification requirements
apply to additional service providers
who are not already covered by § 4.9?
Because our intent is to clarify the
current rule and promote efficient
communication between service
providers and PSAPs, we begin with the
assumption that revisions would be
most effective if applied consistently to
all providers covered by the current
rule. We invite comment on that view,
however, and seek input on the range of
entities that should be subject to revised
PSAP notification requirements.
46. In light of the anticipated
evolution toward NG9–1–1, we also
seek comment on whether entities such
as data centers and centralized call
centers that do not fit the traditional
definition of PSAPs should also be
notified of communications outages. For
example, how would the outagereporting rules apply to consolidated
call centers that may not be physically
located in the affected area but still
serve many of the functions of a
traditional local PSAP? As technologies
evolve, is there a better way to approach
PSAP notification than the current
rubric of direct communication from
service provider staff to PSAP staff? For
example, are there automated
technologies such as machine-readable
data feeds that could transmit outage
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information to PSAPs in a standardized
format?
47. Because service providers must
already notify PSAPs of outages under
current rules, we do not expect any
incremental costs resulting from a
clarification of that obligation. We do,
however, seek comment on the costs
and benefits of particular notification
requirements, as well as the burden
each approach would place on
providers and PSAPs.
III. Other Matters
A. Legal Authority
48. The NPRM includes a discussion
of the Commission’s legal authority for
the prospective actions discussed above
to promote the reliability and resiliency
of communications infrastructure that is
essential for 9–1–1 service and seeks
comment on that analysis.
B. Small Entities
49. The Commission seeks comment
on the degree to which the rules
proposed in this NPRM would affect
small businesses.
often should such reviews occur, and
how should the ongoing utility of each
proposal be measured? Alternatively,
we seek comment on whether the
Commission should establish a sunset
date on which any of the proposals
would cease to apply. How should that
date be determined, and should it be
tied to a specific triggering event, e.g.,
demonstrated improvements in network
reliability or the widespread adoption of
NG9–1–1? Should any of these
proposals sunset for individual service
providers once they deploy NG9–1–1?
Because certain approaches may entail
upfront costs that decrease over time,
what effect should the cost of
compliance have on a potential sunset
date? Should sunset occur automatically
without additional Commission action,
or should the Commission consider a
possible sunset after further review?
How else might the Commission ensure
that any action it takes remains current
and technologically appropriate over
time?
E. Procedural Matters
C. Circumstances Beyond Providers’
Control
50. The Commission seeks comment
on the extent to which any action it
takes in this area should account for
circumstances beyond the control of the
provider. What are the specific laws,
regulations, and other challenges that
would interfere with compliance with
these requirements, and how prevalent
are these challenges in specific
localities? If cost should be considered,
what are the appropriate criteria for
deciding when a cost is truly prohibitive
rather than merely inconvenient? Is the
Commission’s authority to suspend,
revoke, amend, or waive its rules for
good cause sufficient to ensure
consideration of these factors, or should
there be explicit exemptions in the rules
themselves? If we determine that a
particular state, local, or tribal law,
regulation, or practice affirmatively
impedes the deployment of effective 9–
1–1 services to PSAPs or the
deployment of NG9–1–1 services, would
the Commission have authority to
preempt that law, regulation, or
practice? If so, under what
circumstances should we exercise that
authority?
1. Regulatory Flexibility Act
D. Review and Sunset
51. We also seek comment on whether
the Commission should conduct a
periodic review of any rules or other
requirements that it adopts to ensure
that those actions provide flexibility and
take into account the continuing
advancement of technology. If so, how
54. The proceeding of which this
Notice is a part is a ‘‘permit-butdisclose’’ proceeding in accordance
with the Commission’s ex parte rules.
Persons making ex parte presentations
must file a copy of any written
presentation or a memorandum
summarizing any oral presentation
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52. An Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (IRFA) for this NPRM is
located under section titled Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. Written
public comments are requested on this
IRFA. Comments must be identified as
responses to the IRFA and must be filed
by the deadlines for comments on the
NPRM indicated above.
2. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
53. This document contains proposed
new information collection
requirements. The Commission, as part
of its continuing effort to reduce
paperwork burdens, invites the general
public and the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) to comment on the
information collection requirements
contained in this document, as required
by the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995, Public Law 104–13. In addition,
pursuant to the Small Business
Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public
Law 107–198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4),
we seek specific comment on how we
might further reduce the information
collection burden for small business
concerns with fewer than 25 employees.
3. Ex Parte Rules
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within two business days after the
presentation (unless a different deadline
applicable to the Sunshine period
applies). Persons making oral ex parte
presentations are reminded that
memoranda summarizing the
presentation must (1) list all persons
attending or otherwise participating in
the meeting at which the ex parte
presentation was made, and (2)
summarize all data presented and
arguments made during the
presentation. If the presentation
consisted in whole or in part of the
presentation of data or arguments
already reflected in the presenter’s
written comments, memoranda or other
filings in the proceeding, the presenter
may provide citations to such data or
arguments in his or her prior comments,
memoranda, or other filings (specifying
the relevant page and/or paragraph
numbers where such data or arguments
can be found) in lieu of summarizing
them in the memorandum. Documents
shown or given to Commission staff
during ex parte meetings are deemed to
be written ex parte presentations and
must be filed consistent with rule
§ 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by
rule § 1.49(f) or for which the
Commission has made available a
method of electronic filing, written ex
parte presentations and memoranda
summarizing oral ex parte
presentations, and all attachments
thereto, must be filed through the
electronic comment filing system
available for that proceeding, and must
be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc,
.xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants
in this proceeding should familiarize
themselves with the Commission’s ex
parte rules.
4. Comment Filing Procedures
55. Pursuant to §§ 1.415 and 1.419 of
the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 1.415,
1.419, interested parties may file
comments and reply comments on or
before the dates indicated on the first
page of this document. Comments
should be filed in PS Docket No. 13–75.
Comments may be filed using the
Commission’s Electronic Comment
Filing System (ECFS). See Electronic
Filing of Documents in Rulemaking
Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).
D Electronic Filers: Comments may be
filed electronically using the Internet by
accessing the ECFS: https://
fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/.
D Paper Filers: Parties who choose to
file by paper must file an original and
one copy of each filing.
Filings can be sent by hand or
messenger delivery, by commercial
overnight courier, or by first-class or
overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All
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filings must be addressed to the
Commission’s Secretary, Office of the
Secretary, Federal Communications
Commission.
1. All hand-delivered or messengerdelivered paper filings for the
Commission’s Secretary must be
delivered to FCC Headquarters at 445
12th St. SW., Room TW–A325,
Washington, DC 20554. The filing hours
are 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. All hand
deliveries must be held together with
rubber bands or fasteners. Any
envelopes and boxes must be disposed
of before entering the building.
2. Commercial overnight mail (other
than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail
and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300
East Hampton Drive, Capitol Heights,
MD 20743.
3. U.S. Postal Service first-class,
Express, and Priority mail must be
addressed to 445 12th Street SW.,
Washington DC 20554.
People with Disabilities: To request
materials in accessible formats for
people with disabilities (braille, large
print, electronic files, audio format),
send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call
the Consumer & Governmental Affairs
Bureau at 202–418–0530 (voice), 202–
418–0432 (TTY).
Confidential Materials: Parties
wishing to file materials with a claim of
confidentiality should follow the
procedures set forth in § 0.459 of the
Commission’s rules. Confidential
submissions may not be filed via ECFS
but rather should be filed with the
Secretary’s Office following the
procedures set forth in 47 CFR 0.459.
Redacted versions of confidential
submissions may be filed via ECFS.
Initial Paperwork Reduction Act
Analysis
This document contains proposed
information collection requirements.
The Commission, as part of its
continuing effort to reduce paperwork
burdens, invites the general public and
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) to comment on the information
collection requirements contained in
this document, as required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
Public Law 104–13. Public and agency
comments are due June 11, 2013.
Comments should address: (a)
Whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the
Commission, including whether the
information shall have practical utility;
(b) the accuracy of the Commission’s
burden estimates; (c) ways to enhance
the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information collected; (d) ways to
minimize the burden of the collection of
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information on the respondents,
including the use of automated
collection techniques or other forms of
information technology; and (e) way to
further reduce the information
collection burden on small business
concerns with fewer than 25 employees.
In addition, pursuant to the Small
Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002,
Public Law 107–198, see 44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment on
how we might further reduce the
information collection burden for small
business concerns with fewer than 25
employees.
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
1. As required by the Regulatory
Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended
(RFA), the Commission has prepared
this IRFA of the possible significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities by the
recommendations in this NPRM.
Written public comments are requested
on this IRFA. Comments must be
identified as responses to the IRFA and
must be filed by the deadlines for
comments provided in ‘‘Comment
Period and Procedures’’ of this NPRM.
The Commission will send a copy of
this NPRM, including this IRFA, to the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration (SBA). In
addition, the NPRM and IRFA (or
summaries thereof) will be published in
the Federal Register.
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the
Proposed Rules
2. The June 2012 Derecho storm
revealed serious vulnerabilities in the
Nation’s 9–1–1 communications
infrastructure that could have been
prevented or mitigated through the
implementation of best practices
developed by industry and advisory
bodies. Yet, the Bureau’s inquiry into
communications failures during and
after the storm found that multiple 9–1–
1 service providers failed to implement
best practices related to physical circuit
diversity, central office backup power,
and network monitoring, leading to
emergency communications outages
affecting millions of Americans. In some
cases, PSAPs did not receive timely or
adequate notification of these outages,
compounding the difficulty of providing
emergency assistance until service was
restored. A broad range of comments
from state and local governments, as
well as public safety entities
themselves, support the Bureau’s
finding that such failures are
unacceptable. As part of its statutory
obligation to ensure that
communications networks of all types
‘‘promot[e] safety of life and property,’’
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the Commission has a particular
responsibility to promote reliable
emergency communications and prevent
avoidable failures.
3. With the objective of ensuring
reliability and resiliency of 9–1–1
networks and services, the NPRM
proposes to:
• Ensure that 9–1–1 service providers
conduct routine circuit audits to verify
physical diversity and identify
avoidable single points of failure. The
NPRM seeks comment of the details of
this obligation and the extent to which
providers would be required to fortify
non-diverse circuits.
• Ensure that 9–1–1 service providers
maintain adequate backup power in
central offices, supported by appropriate
testing, maintenance, and records
retention. The NPRM seeks comment on
what level of backup power should be
considered adequate and whether
current maintenance and recordkeeping
practices are sufficient to ensure
reliability.
• Ensure that 9–1–1 service providers
maintain robust and resilient network
monitoring capabilities, supported by
diverse network monitoring and control
links. The NPRM seeks comment on the
degree of diversity and specific
engineering practices necessary to
protect network monitoring capabilities
against single points of failure.
4. The NPRM proposes a range of
approaches by which the above
objectives could be accomplished. For
instance, 9–1–1 service providers could
be required to report whether they have
implemented relevant best practices, or
a company representative could be
required to certify compliance with best
practices on a regular basis. The
Commission could also codify key best
practices in its rules, such as a
minimum level of physical diversity for
9–1–1 circuits. Under the latter
approach, the Commission could also
ensure compliance though periodic site
inspections and compliance reviews. As
the NPRM notes, these alternatives need
not be mutually exclusive and are
intended as a starting point for
discussion of which approach(es) will
yield the greatest benefit in
communications reliability at the lowest
cost to service providers.
5. The NPRM also proposes revisions
to § 4.9 of the Commission’s rules to
state with greater specificity how and
when 9–1–1 service providers must
notify PSAPs affected by
communications outages. As noted in
the Derecho Report, the current rule has
led to questions regarding whether
providers are complying fully with the
Commission’s PSAP notification
requirements, and whether the current
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requirements provide PSAPs with
actionable information. Clarification of
these standards could increase
compliance by service providers and
improve situational awareness for
PSAPs affected by outages.
6. The Commission traditionally has
addressed communications reliability
issues by working with service
providers to develop voluntary best
practices that address vulnerabilities in
the communications network, and by
measuring the effectiveness of those best
practices through outage reporting.
Under the Commission’s current rules,
the outage reporting process has often
been effective in improving the
reliability, resiliency, and security of
many communications services. The
June 2012 derecho, however, revealed
the need to supplement this approach
with regard to critical 9–1–1
communications. While the NPRM
supports the development of additional
best practices, it recognizes that
additional Commission action may be
appropriate. Thus, the proposed
approach would complement, rather
than replace, the existing regime of best
practices and outage reporting.
B. Legal Basis
7. The legal basis for the rules and
rule changes proposed in this NPRM are
contained in Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o),
201(b), 214(d), 218, 251(e)(3), 301,
303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j),
316, 332, 403, 615a–1, and 615c of the
Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j),
154(o), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 251(e)(3),
301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a),
309(j), 316, 332, 403, 615a–1, and 615c.
The Commission also believes it has
ancillary authority under Title I of the
Communications Act to impose the
requirements discussed in the NPRM on
any 9–1–1 service providers not subject
to express regulatory authority under
Title II. Any such regulations would be
‘‘reasonably ancillary’’ to the goal of
ensuring a common baseline for the
reliability of 9–1–1 service on a
nationwide basis, regardless of the
regulatory status of the entity providing
the service.
C. Description and Estimate of the
Number of Small Entities to Which
Rules Will Apply
8. The RFA directs agencies to
provide a description of, and, where
feasible, an estimate of, the number of
small entities that may be affected by
the proposed rules adopted herein. The
RFA generally defines the term ‘‘small
entity’’ as having the same meaning as
the terms ‘‘small business,’’ ‘‘small
organization,’’ and ‘‘small governmental
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jurisdiction.’’ In addition, the term
‘‘small business’’ has the same meaning
as the term ‘‘small business concern’’
under the Small Business Act. A small
business concern is one which: (1) Is
independently owned and operated; (2)
is not dominant in its field of operation;
and (3) satisfies any additional criteria
established by the Small Business
Administration (SBA).
1. Total Small Entities
9. Our action may, over time, affect
small entities that are not easily
categorized at present. We therefore
describe here, at the outset, three
comprehensive, statutory small entity
size standards. First, nationwide, there
are a total of approximately 27.9 million
small businesses, according to the SBA.
In addition, a ‘‘small organization’’ is
generally ‘‘any not-for-profit enterprise
which is independently owned and
operated and is not dominant in its
field.’’ Nationwide, as of 2007, there
were approximately 1,621,315 small
organizations. Finally, the term ‘‘small
governmental jurisdiction’’ is defined
generally as ‘‘governments of cities,
towns, townships, villages, school
districts, or special districts, with a
population of less than fifty thousand.’’
Census Bureau data for 2011 indicate
that there were 89,476 local
governmental jurisdictions in the
United States. We estimate that, of this
total, as many as 88,506 entities may
qualify as ‘‘small governmental
jurisdictions.’’ Thus, we estimate that
most governmental jurisdictions are
small.
2. Entities Subject to NPRM
10. As noted in the NPRM, we seek
comment on the class of entities to
which the proposals would apply.
Generally, we expect Commission
action to focus narrowly on entities that
provide key facilities for 9–1–1 service
rather than the broader class of all
communications services capable of
placing 9–1–1 calls. Like the Derecho
Report, the NPRM defines ‘‘9–1–1
service provider’’ as a communications
provider ‘‘responsible for routing and
delivering 9–1–1 calls to PSAPs.’’ Under
current technologies, these providers are
typically ILECs, although the transition
to NG9–1–1 may broaden the class of
entities that provide 9–1–1 service in
the future. The NPRM therefore asks
whether the Commission should codify
a definition of the term ‘‘9–1–1 service
provider’’ that clarifies the extent, if
any, to which the proposals would
apply to non-ILEC providers of 9–1–1
service.
11. We anticipate that the proposals
in this Notice would apply to all 9–1–
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1 service providers, and tentatively
define that term to include all entities,
including ILECs, that provide 9–1–1 call
routing, ALI, emergency services
Internet protocol networks (ESInets),
and similar services directly to a PSAP.
The transition to NG9–1–1 may allow
other service providers to perform
similar functions, and we seek comment
on the degree to which the proposals
should apply to other types of wireline
service providers, wireless service
providers, interconnected VoIP service
providers, or other potential means of
reaching a PSAP as NG9–1–1 broadens
the range of entities capable of
delivering 9–1–1 service. We also seek
comment on whether there should be a
cost-recovery mechanism for entities
regulated as common carriers under
Title II of the Communications Act to
the extent not already provided under
state tariffs.
12. Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers (ILECs). Neither the
Commission nor the SBA has developed
a small business size standard
specifically for incumbent local
exchange services. The appropriate size
standard under SBA rules is for the
category Wired Telecommunications
Carriers. Under that size standard, such
a business is small if it has 1,500 or
fewer employees. Census Bureau data
for 2007 show that there were 3,188
firms in this category that operated for
the entire year. Of this total, 3,144 had
employment of 999 or fewer, and 44
firms had had employment of 1,000
employees or more. Thus under this
category and the associated small
business size standard, the majority of
these incumbent local exchange service
providers can be considered small.
13. The Commission has included
small incumbent LECs in this present
RFA analysis. As noted above, a ‘‘small
business’’ under the RFA is one that,
inter alia, meets the pertinent small
business size standard (e.g., a telephone
communications business having 1,500
or fewer employees), and ‘‘is not
dominant in its field of operation.’’ The
SBA’s Office of Advocacy contends that,
for RFA purposes, small incumbent
LECs are not dominant in their field of
operation because any such dominance
is not ‘‘national’’ in scope. The
Commission has therefore included
small incumbent LECs in this RFA
analysis, although the Commission
emphasizes that this RFA action has no
effect on Commission analyses and
determinations in other, non-RFA
contexts.
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D. Description of Projected Reporting,
Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements
14. The actions proposed in the
NPRM could require 9–1–1 service
providers to take a range of actions to
strengthen the Nation’s 9–1–1
infrastructure in the areas of circuit
diversity, central office backup power,
and network monitoring and control.
Specific regulatory obligations would
depend upon the approach chosen to
implement each of these objectives.
Requirements for compliance could
range from periodic reporting on
whether 9–1–1 service providers are
voluntarily implementing best practices,
to mandatory standards for 9–1–1
network reliability codified in the
Commission’s rules and subject to its
enforcement powers. Service providers
also could be required to periodically
certify that they have adequate internal
controls to ensure network reliability
and inform senior management of any
significant vulnerabilities. Because
many 9–1–1 service providers already
implement some or all of the relevant
best practices on a voluntary basis, the
additional burden of compliance with
these requirements may be minimal.
15. Generally, the reporting and
certification approaches would likely
require more recordkeeping and
information collection than the
codification-and-enforcement approach,
which would focus on the actual
implementation of best practices.
However, reporting and certification
may give service providers more
flexibility in designing and maintaining
their networks while ensuring that they
remain accountable for the results of
their decisions. At a minimum, 9–1–1
service providers would be required to
keep records of, and disclose to the
Commission, the extent to which they
have implemented the best practices
discussed in the NPRM. At a maximum,
they would be required to comply with
reliability standards enforced by the
Commission, potentially requiring
changes to networks that do not
currently meet these standards.
16. The NPRM also proposes revisions
to § 4.9 of the Commission’s rules to
clarify service providers’ obligations to
notify PSAPs of 9–1–1 outages. The
NPRM seeks comment on this objective,
as well as on the substantive terms of
the reporting obligation.
E. Steps Taken To Minimize Significant
Economic Impact on Small Entities, and
Significant Alternatives Considered
17. The RFA requires an agency to
describe any significant alternatives that
it has considered in reaching its
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proposed approach, which may include
(among others) the following four
alternatives: (1) The establishment of
differing compliance or reporting
requirements or timetables that take into
account the resources available to small
entities; (2) the clarification,
consolidation, or simplification of
compliance or reporting requirements
under the rule for small entities; (3) the
use of performance, rather than design,
standards; and (4) an exemption from
coverage of the rule, or any part thereof,
for small entities.
18. The approaches proposed in the
NPRM are intended to complement and
strengthen, not to replace, the
Commission’s current approach of
encouraging service providers to
voluntarily implement best practices
and measuring compliance through
outage reporting. Thus, small entities
with limited resources would continue
to enjoy many of the benefits of the
current regime, including a general
focus on network performance and
reliability rather than specific design
requirements. The Commission has
traditionally considered this approach a
more flexible and less costly alternative
to more comprehensive regulation, and
the NPRM would preserve those
advantages in large part.
19. To the extent that the NPRM
would impose new obligations on small
entities, we seek comment on
alternatives including (1) the
establishment of differing compliance or
reporting requirements or timetables
that take into account the resources
available to small entities; (2) the
clarification, consolidation, or
simplification of compliance or
reporting requirements under the rule
for small entities; (3) the use of
performance, rather than design,
standards; and (4) an exemption from
coverage of the rule, or any part thereof,
for small entities. Which of the
proposed approaches do small entities
find particularly difficult or costly to
comply with, and how could those
difficulties be addressed through
modifications or exemptions? What
would be the effect on public safety of
exemptions from 9–1–1 service
requirements, regardless of cost?
F. Federal Rules That May Duplicate,
Overlap, or Conflict With the Proposed
Rule
None.
IV. Ordering Clauses
20. It is further ordered that the
Commission’s Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference
Information Center, shall send a copy of
this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
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including the Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration.
21. Accordingly, it is ordered
pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o),
201(b), 214(d), 218, 251(e)(3), 301,
303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j),
316, 332, 403, 615a–1, and 615c of the
Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i)–(j) & (o),
201(b), 214(d), 218, 251(e)(3), 301,
303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j),
316, 332, 403, 615a–1, and 615c, that
this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
PS Docket No. 13–75 and PS Docket No.
11–60 is adopted.
List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 4
Telecommunications.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.
Proposed rules
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, the Federal Communications
Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR
part 4 as follows:
PART 4—DISRUPTIONS TO
COMMUNICATIONS
1. The authority citation for part 4
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: Sec. 5, 48 Stat. 1068, as
amended; 47 U.S.C. 154, 155, 201, 251, 307,
316, 615a–1, 1302(a), and 1302(b).
2. Section 4.9 is amended by revising
paragraphs (a)(4), (c)(2)(iv), (e)(5), (f)(4),
and (g)(1)(i) to read as follows:
■
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§ 4.9 Outage reporting requirements—
threshold criteria.
(a) * * *
(4) Potentially affects a 911 special
facility (as defined in paragraph (e) of
§ 4.5), in which case they also shall
notify immediately by telephone and in
writing via electronic means, any
official who has been designated by the
management of the affected 911 facility
as the provider’s contact person(s) for
communications outages at that facility,
and they shall convey all available
information that may be useful to the
management of the affected facility in
mitigating the effects of the outage on
callers to that facility. This information
shall include, at a minimum, the nature
of the outage, the estimated number of
users affected or potentially affected, the
location of those users, the actions being
taken by provider to address the outage,
the estimated time at which service will
be restored, recommended actions the
impacted 911 special facility should
take to minimize disruption of service,
and the sender’s name, telephone
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number and email address at which the
sender can be reached. Not later than 72
hours after discovering the outage, the
provider shall submit electronically an
Initial Communications Outage Report
to the Commission. Not later than thirty
days after discovering the outage, the
provider shall submit electronically a
Final Communications Outage Report to
the Commission. The Notification and
the Initial and Final reports shall
comply with all of the requirements of
§ 4.11.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(2) * * *
(iv) Potentially affecting a 911 special
facility (as defined in paragraph (e) of
§ 4.5), in which case they also shall
notify immediately by telephone and in
writing via electronic means, any
official who has been designated by the
management of the affected 911 facility
as the provider’s contact person(s) for
communications outages at that facility,
and they shall convey all available
information that may be useful to the
management of the affected facility in
mitigating the effects of the outage on
callers to that facility. This information
shall include, at a minimum, the nature
of the outage, the estimated number of
users affected or potentially affected, the
location of those users, the actions being
taken by provider to address the outage,
the estimated time at which service will
be restored, recommended actions the
impacted 911 special facility should
take to minimize disruption of service,
and the sender’s name, telephone
number and email address at which the
sender can be reached.
*
*
*
*
*
(e) * * *
(5) That potentially affects a 911
special facility (as defined in paragraph
(e) of § 4.5), in which case they also
shall notify immediately by telephone
and in writing via electronic means, any
official who has been designated by the
management of the affected 911 facility
as the provider’s contact person(s) for
communications outages at that facility,
and they shall convey all available
information that may be useful to the
management of the affected facility in
mitigating the effects of the outage on
callers to that facility. This information
shall include, at a minimum, the nature
of the outage, the estimated number of
users affected or potentially affected, the
location of those users, the actions being
taken by provider to address the outage,
the estimated time at which service will
be restored, recommended actions the
impacted 911 special facility should
take to minimize disruption of service,
and the sender’s name, telephone
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number and email address at which the
sender can be reached. In determining
the number of users potentially affected
by a failure of a switch, a concentration
ratio of 8 shall be applied. For providers
of paging service solely, however, the
following outage criteria shall apply
instead of those in paragraphs (b)(1)
through (b)(3) of this section.
Notification must be submitted if the
failure of a switch for at least 30
minutes duration potentially affects at
least 900,000 user-minutes. Not later
than 72 hours after discovering the
outage, the provider shall submit
electronically an Initial
Communications Outage Report to the
Commission. Not later than thirty days
after discovering the outage, the
provider shall submit electronically a
Final Communications Outage Report to
the Commission. The Notification and
the Initial and Final reports shall
comply with all of the requirements of
§ 4.11.
*
*
*
*
*
(f) * * *
(4) Potentially affects a 911 special
facility (as defined in paragraph (e) of
§ 4.5), in which case they also shall
notify immediately by telephone and in
writing via electronic means, any
official who has been designated by the
management of the affected 911 facility
as the provider’s contact person(s) for
communications outages at that facility,
and they shall convey all available
information that may be useful to the
management of the affected facility in
mitigating the effects of the outage on
callers to that facility. This information
shall include, at a minimum, the nature
of the outage, the estimated number of
users affected or potentially affected, the
location of those users, the actions being
taken by provider to address the outage,
the estimated time at which service will
be restored, recommended actions the
impacted 911 special facility should
take to minimize disruption of service,
and the sender’s name, telephone
number and email address at which the
sender can be reached. Not later than 72
hours after discovering the outage, the
provider shall submit electronically an
Initial Communications Outage Report
to the Commission. Not later than thirty
days after discovering the outage, the
provider shall submit electronically a
Final Communications Outage Report to
the Commission. The Notification and
the Initial and Final reports shall
comply with all of the requirements of
§ 4.11.
*
*
*
*
*
(g) * * *
(1) * * *
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(i) Within 240 minutes of discovering
that they have experienced on any
facilities that they own, operate, lease,
or otherwise utilize, an outage of at least
30 minutes duration that potentially
affects a 911 special facility (as defined
in paragraph (e) of § 4.5), in which case
they also shall notify immediately by
telephone and in writing via electronic
means, any official who has been
designated by the management of the
affected 911 facility as the provider’s
contact person(s) for communications
outages at that facility, and the provider
shall convey all available information
that may be useful to the management
of the affected facility in mitigating the
effects of the outage on efforts to
communicate with that facility. This
information shall include, at a
minimum, the nature of the outage, the
estimated number of users affected or
potentially affected, the location of
those users, the actions being taken by
provider to address the outage, the
estimated time at which service will be
restored, recommended actions the
impacted 911 special facility should
take to minimize the disruption of
service, and the sender’s name,
telephone number and email address at
which the sender can be reached; or
*
*
*
*
*
[FR Doc. 2013–08525 Filed 4–11–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 64
[WC Docket No. 13–39; FCC 13–18]
Rural Call Completion
Federal Communications
Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
The Federal Communications
Commission proposes to adopt rules
requiring facilities-based originating
long distance providers to record and
retain data on call completion rates to
rural areas, and to report this data to the
Commission on a quarterly basis. We
propose to reduce or eliminate a
provider’s retention and reporting
obligations if that provider certifies that
it qualifies for one of two proposed safe
harbor provisions. We also propose to
prohibit both originating and
intermediate providers from causing
audible ringing to be sent to the caller
before the terminating provider has
signaled that the called party is being
alerted. These changes will allow the
Commission to more effectively
determine the causes of call completion
mstockstill on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
SUMMARY:
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:20 Apr 11, 2013
Jkt 229001
problems to rural areas and take action
to cure them, and will also prevent
consumer confusion caused by the
injection of false ringtones before the
called party has been alerted.
DATES: Submit comments on or before
May 13, 2013.
Submit reply comments on or before
May 28, 2013.
Written comments on the Paperwork
Reduction Act proposed information
collection requirements must be
submitted by the public, Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), and
other interested parties on or before
June 11, 2013.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by WC Docket No. 13–39, by
any of the following methods:
D Federal Communications
Commission’s Web site: https://
fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
D People with Disabilities: Contact the
FCC to request reasonable
accommodations (accessible format
documents, sign language interpreters,
CART, etc.) by email: FCC504@fcc.gov
or phone: 202–418–0530 or TTY: 202–
418–0432.
In addition to filing comments with the
Secretary, a copy of any comments on
the Paperwork Reduction Act
information collection requirements
contained herein should be submitted to
the Federal Communications
Commission via email to PRA@fcc.gov
and to Nicholas A. Fraser, Office of
Management and Budget, via email to
Nicholas_A._Fraser@omb.eop.gov or via
fax at 202–395–5167.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Steven Rowings, Competition Policy
Division, Wireline Competition Bureau,
at (202) 418–1033 or by email at
steven.rowings@fcc.gov. To submit
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
comments, send an email to
PRA@fcc.gov. For further information
concerning the Paperwork Reduction
Act information collection requirements
contained in this document, contact
Judith B. Herman, 202–418–0214.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant
to §§ 1.415 and 1.419 of the
Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 1.415,
1.419, interested parties may file
comments and reply comments on or
before the dates indicated on the first
page of this document. Comments may
be filed using the Commission’s
Electronic Comment Filing System
(ECFS). See Electronic Filing of
Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings,
63 FR 24121 (1998).
D Electronic Filers: Comments may be
filed electronically using the Internet by
PO 00000
Frm 00038
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
21891
accessing the ECFS: https://
fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/.
D Paper Filers: Parties who choose to
file by paper must file an original and
one copy of each filing. If more than one
docket or rulemaking number appears in
the caption of this proceeding, filers
must submit two additional copies for
each additional docket or rulemaking
number.
Filings can be sent by hand or
messenger delivery, by commercial
overnight courier, or by first-class or
overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All
filings must be addressed to the
Commission’s Secretary, Office of the
Secretary, Federal Communications
Commission.
• All hand-delivered or messengerdelivered paper filings for the
Commission’s Secretary must be
delivered to FCC Headquarters at 445
12th St. SW., Room TW–A325,
Washington, DC 20554. The filing hours
are 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. All hand
deliveries must be held together with
rubber bands or fasteners. Any
envelopes and boxes must be disposed
of before entering the building.
• Commercial overnight mail (other
than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail
and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300
East Hampton Drive, Capitol Heights,
MD 20743.
• U.S. Postal Service first-class,
Express, and Priority mail must be
addressed to 445 12th Street SW.,
Washington DC 20554.
• People with Disabilities: To request
materials in accessible formats for
people with disabilities (braille, large
print, electronic files, audio format),
send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call
the Consumer & Governmental Affairs
Bureau at 202–418–0530 (voice), 202–
418–0432 (TTY).
This document contains proposed
information collection requirements.
The Commission, as part of its
continuing effort to reduce paperwork
burdens, invites the general public and
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) to comment on the information
collection requirements contained in
this document, as required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
Public Law 104–13. Public and agency
comments are due June 11, 2013.
PRA comments should address
whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the
Commission, including whether the
information shall have practical utility;
the accuracy of the Commission’s
burden estimates; ways to enhance the
quality, utility, and clarity of the
information collected; and ways to
minimize the burden of the collection of
E:\FR\FM\12APP1.SGM
12APP1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 71 (Friday, April 12, 2013)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 21879-21891]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-08525]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Chapter I
[PS Docket No. 13-75; PS Docket No. 11-60; FCC 13-33]
Improving 9-1-1 Reliability; Reliability and Continuity of
Communications Networks, Including Broadband Technologies
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Federal Communications Commission proposes a range of
approaches to ensure that providers of 9-1-1 communications services
implement best practices and other sound engineering principles to
improve the reliability and resiliency of the Nation's 9-1-1 networks.
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking also proposes amendments to the
Commission's current rules to clarify and add specificity to service
providers' obligations to notify 9-1-1 call centers of communications
outages. This action follows an inquiry by the Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau into widespread 9-1-1 service outages during
the ``derecho'' windstorm that affected large portions of the United
States in June 2012, revealing significant vulnerabilities in current
9-1-1 network configuration and service provider maintenance practices.
The Commission requests comment on these proposals to improve the
reliability and resiliency of 9-1-1 networks and ensure that 9-1-1 call
centers receive timely and actionable notification of service outages.
DATES: Submit comments on or before May 13, 2013 and reply comments by
May 28, 2013. Written comments on the Paperwork Reduction Act proposed
information collection requirements must be submitted by the public,
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and other interested parties on
or before June 11, 2013.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments to the Federal Communications Commission,
445 12th Street SW., Washington, DC 20554. Comments may be submitted
[[Page 21880]]
electronically through the Federal Communications Commission's Web
site: https://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/. In addition to filing comments
with the Secretary, a copy of any comments on the Paperwork Reduction
Act information collection requirements contained herein should be
submitted to the Federal Communications Commission via email to
PRA@fcc.gov and to Nicholas A. Fraser, Office of Management and Budget,
via email to Nicholas_A._Fraser@omb.eop.gov or via fax at 202-395-
5167. For detailed instructions for submitting comments and additional
information on the rulemaking process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document. Parties wishing to file materials
with a claim of confidentiality should follow the procedures set forth
in Sec. 0.459 of the Commission's rules. Confidential submissions may
not be filed via ECFS but rather should be filed with the Secretary's
Office following the procedures set forth in 47 CFR 0.459. Redacted
versions of confidential submissions may be filed via ECFS.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric P. Schmidt, Attorney Advisor,
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418-1214 or
eric.schmidt@fcc.gov. For additional information concerning the
Paperwork Reduction Act information collection requirements contained
in this document, contact Judith Boley-Herman, (202) 418-0214, or send
an email to PRA@fcc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking in PS Docket No. 13-75 and PS Docket No. 11-60,
released on March 20, 2013. The full text of this document is available
for public inspection during regular business hours in the FCC
Reference Center, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street SW., Washington, DC
20554, or online at https://www.fcc.gov/document/improving-9-1-1-reliability.
I. Introduction
1. In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), we seek comment on
approaches to ensure the reliability and resiliency of the
communications infrastructure necessary to ensure continued
availability of the Nation's 9-1-1 system, particularly during times of
major disaster. We take this action in response to the findings and
recommendations presented in the Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau's (PSHSB or Bureau) January 10, 2013, report titled Impact of
the June 2012 Derecho on Communications Networks and Services: Report
and Recommendations (Derecho Report), which is available at https://www.fcc.gov/document/derecho-report-and-recommendations. In that
report, following an extensive inquiry and review of comments, the
Bureau found that the June 2012 derecho affecting the Midwest and Mid-
Atlantic United States severely disrupted 9-1-1-related communications
and that these disruptions were due in large part to avoidable planning
and systems failures within 9-1-1 service providers' networks. The
Bureau concluded that these failures could, and would, have been
avoided if providers had followed industry best practices and other
sound engineering principles. Accordingly, the Bureau recommended that
the Commission consider action in the following areas: (1) 9-1-1
circuit auditing; (2) 9-1-1 service provider central office backup
power; (3) physical diversity of monitor and control links; and (4)
improved outage notification to Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs).
This NPRM seeks comment on approaches to implement these
recommendations, taking into account the evolving nature of network
technologies, as well as the continuing migration of circuit-switched
services to Internet Protocol (IP)-based platforms. Thus, any rules or
other policies designed to improve 9-1-1 service reliability will be
developed with the ongoing transition to Next Generation 9-1-1 (NG9-1-
1) in mind.
II. Discussion
A. Need for Commission Action
2. The Commission previously has addressed communications
reliability issues by working with service providers to develop
voluntary best practices, and by measuring the effectiveness of those
best practices through outage reporting. The outage reporting process
has often been effective in improving the reliability, resiliency, and
security of many communications services. The June 2012 derecho,
however, revealed the limits of that approach and highlighted the
potential benefits and importance of supplementing a voluntary approach
with respect to critical 9-1-1 communications.
3. The Commission seeks comment on the extent to which 9-1-1
failures during the derecho reflect the reliability of 9-1-1 networks
nationwide. Why would PSAPs located in other parts of the Nation be
more or less vulnerable to the effects of a storm like the derecho? To
what extent have service providers affected by the derecho addressed
vulnerabilities revealed by the storm, both in the affected region and
across their entire service areas? What specific remedial actions have
these service providers taken, particularly with respect to critical
circuit auditing, functional central office backup power, and diversity
of monitoring links, and when were those actions completed? Has the
experience of the derecho caused other 9-1-1 service providers to
reexamine their network architecture and maintenance practices, and
what have those efforts revealed about the reliability and resiliency
of the Nation's 9-1-1 infrastructure as a whole? What changes have been
made to improve 9-1-1 reliability and resiliency? What assurance does
the Commission have that these changes will persist?
4. Although we intend the approaches in this NPRM to complement and
strengthen--not to replace--the Commission's current approach to
network reliability, we seek comment on the appropriate balance between
voluntary best practices and Commission mandates as they relate to 9-1-
1 communications. In light of the many existing best practices
addressing these issues and service providers' failure to implement
them fully, however, we seek comment on whether there is any assurance
that additional voluntary best practices would necessarily lead to
effective and consistent compliance without additional Commission
action, especially after such dangerous failures potentially affected
millions of people. The Derecho Report noted that multiple 9-1-1
service providers implemented best practices to varying degrees, or
adopted key best practices in theory, with substantial exceptions in
day-to-day operation. To what extent are network reliability best
practices, particularly those regarding physical auditing of critical
circuits, functional and well-maintained central office backup power,
and diversity of network monitoring links, followed today? What
evidence exists that they are followed? What circumstances might lead
to these best practices not being followed? What measures can be taken
to compensate for the failure to implement a best practice so that 9-1-
1 reliability is not impaired? What evidence exists to substantiate
that these measures are taken routinely when best practices are not
followed? What incentives do service providers have to implement best
practices, and are those incentives sufficient? Beyond general
agreement with best practices, what assurances can 9-1-1 service
providers make to ensure rigorous implementation on a nationwide basis?
5. Which advisory bodies do service providers look to for guidance
regarding
[[Page 21881]]
best practices, e.g., Communications Security, Reliability, and
Interoperability Council (CSRIC), Alliance for Telecommunications
Industry Solutions (ATIS) Network Reliability Steering Committee
(NRSC), Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO),
National Emergency Number Association (NENA), or other organizations?
What best practices are followed today other than those adopted by
CSRIC? What relevant industry standards are followed routinely? If so,
are they preferred over the best practices adopted by CSRIC? What
evidence exists that these standards are routinely followed? How do
they differ from the best practices issued by CSRIC? For example, are
there specific regional circumstances that would make it more difficult
or expensive to perform critical circuit auditing? Do service providers
take measures to compensate for failing to implement the best practice
in these instances? What evidence exists to substantiate that these
measures are actually taken? Should certain best practices be
considered critical for some parts of the country and not others? If
existing best practices have proven difficult for service providers to
implement or inadequate to prevent communications outages, what can be
done to update or revise those practices to reflect lessons learned in
the derecho? Which best practices, specifically, should be added or
expanded, and would such changes make service providers more likely to
comply in the future?
B. Entities Subject to Proposals
6. We seek comment on the class of entities to which the proposals
put forward for consideration in this NPRM would apply. Throughout this
NPRM we use the term ``9-1-1 service provider,'' defined in the Derecho
Report as a communications provider ``responsible for routing and
delivering 9-1-1 calls to PSAPs.'' These providers are typically ILECs,
though as the Bureau explained, the transition to NG9-1-1 may broaden
the class of entities that perform this function. Accordingly, we seek
comment on defining the term ``9-1-1 service provider.'' We anticipate
that the proposals in this NPRM would apply to all 9-1-1 service
providers, and tentatively define that term to include all entities,
including ILECs that provide 9-1-1 call routing, automatic location
information (ALI), emergency services Internet protocol networks
(ESInets), and similar services directly to a PSAP. Is that definition
sufficient to capture all the entities that both now and in the future
could provide functions necessary to the provision of such services to
a PSAP? If not, how should this term be defined? For example, should
any of the proposals apply to other types of wireline service
providers, wireless service providers, interconnected VoIP service
providers, or other potential means of reaching a PSAP as NG9-1-1
broadens the range of entities capable of delivering 9-1-1 service?
Should reliability standards or certification requirements extend to
data centers and other facilities that may in the future be used to
host NG9-1-1 components? Are there certain proposals from which non-
ILEC service providers should expressly be exempt? To the extent that
any of the implementation approaches would impose obligations on
entities regulated as common carriers under Title II of the
Communications Act, should there be a mechanism for cost recovery
beyond the 9-1-1 related tariff mechanisms already in place?
C. Implementation Approaches
7. We seek comment on four possible approaches to implement the
recommendations for Commission action in the Derecho Report. We seek
input on whether each of these approaches can stand alone, or whether
the Commission should adopt two or more options as part of an
integrated approach (e.g., reporting, certification, performance
reliability requirements). As noted above, these proposals are intended
to complement, rather than to replace, the Commission's current support
for implementation of best practices developed through cooperation with
industry and advisory bodies. We also seek comment on the suitability
of each of the approaches described below, as well as any other
approaches the Commission should consider. However the Commission
decides to proceed, a meaningful level of specificity is essential for
any approach to be effective. We therefore seek comment on the
suitability of existing best practices as a basis for any rules we may
adopt. Although each proposal is intended to be flexible, commenters
should describe in detail how they propose to implement their preferred
approach and how those choices would advance the goals of this NPRM.
8. We specifically seek comments from state commissions and PSAPs
on the approaches they use to oversee 9-1-1 connectivity. Many states,
for example, regulate 9-1-1 service provided by ILECs. Do those states
use a reporting approach? Onsite audits? Do PSAPs that contract for 9-
1-1 services impose certification or similar requirements upon their 9-
1-1 service providers? Do they specify levels of reliability through
service level agreements (SLAs) or require adherence to best practices?
Are such SLAs negotiated at the PSAP, state, or service-provider level,
and what level of 9-1-1 service do they provide? What have state
commissions and PSAPs found to work in their oversight of 9-1-1 service
providers, and what needs to be improved?
9. Reporting. Under this approach, the Commission would require
service providers to periodically report on the extent to which they
are voluntarily implementing critical best practices, or complying with
applicable standards established by the Commission. Would adoption of
this reporting approach alone or as part of an integrated approach meet
the goal of ensuring 9-1-1 reliability? What costs and benefits would
such a reporting obligation create? Which best practices or other
standards should be subject to reporting requirements, and are these
standards sufficiently detailed to objectively evaluate compliance? To
what extent would such a reporting obligation be effective in the
absence of a companion requirement to correct deficiencies revealed in
the reports? What performance level should the Commission use to prompt
remedial actions based on these reports? Commenters offering support
for this approach should specify the scope, granularity, and frequency
of reporting they support.
10. We note that the Commission has used reporting in the past as a
means of ensuring a certain level of reliability in 9-1-1 services. In
2007, in response to Hurricane Katrina, the Commission adopted rules
requiring local exchange carriers, wireless service providers subject
to 9-1-1 requirements, and interconnected VoIP service providers ``to
conduct an analysis of the resiliency and reliability of their 911
networks or systems and to submit a report to the Commission.'' The
reports proved of limited use, however, because they lacked the
specificity necessary to determine network reliability in individual
cases. In light of this experience, we invite commenters to address how
to craft a reporting requirement that would more effectively promote
reliability of 9-1-1 services and networks and create incentives for
service providers to maintain consistently high standards of 9-1-1
reliability.
11. Certification. Under this approach, the Commission would
require providers to certify periodically that their 9-1-1 network
service and
[[Page 21882]]
facilities comply with voluntary industry best practices, reliability
requirements specified by the Commission or other standards. This
approach could help ensure that senior management is aware of
significant vulnerabilities in the 9-1-1 network and accountable for
its decisions regarding design, maintenance, and disaster preparedness.
Are existing best practices sufficiently detailed to serve as standards
for certification? What performance level should the Commission use to
prompt remedial actions based on these certifications? With respect to
this approach, we seek comment on existing certification schemes--
whether or not directly related to the work of the Commission--that
might serve as models for certification in this context.
12. Do existing Commission certification schemes, such as those
used for Consumer Proprietary Network Information or Equal Employment
Opportunity; provide an appropriate model for addressing 9-1-1
reliability? Why or why not? What are the tradeoffs among the various
models? What costs and benefits would be associated with each? Is there
sufficient justification for the Commission to adopt a new
certification model? If so, why? Would one possible model be found in
Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires Chief Executive
Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) to certify the
integrity of financial reports their companies submit to the Securities
and Exchange Commission? If so, which portions of certification under
Sarbanes-Oxley are suitable for certifications in this context, and are
there others that are not suitable? For example, as under Sarbanes-
Oxley, should corporate officers be personally liable for the accuracy
of their certifications, and how would the Commission enforce such a
requirement? What costs and benefits would be associated with this
model?
13. Reliability Requirements. Under a third approach the Commission
would specify minimum standards for 9-1-1 communications reliability,
based on recognized industry best practices. How can the Commission
ensure that any such requirements account for sound engineering
practices not specifically codified as CSRIC best practices,
particularly as technologies evolve? Are there differences in the
design and operation of particular 9-1-1 networks that the Commission
should consider in connection with sound engineering and network
reliability standards, and which may not be reflected fully in existing
best practices?
14. Compliance Reviews and Inspections. Under this approach, the
Commission would conduct periodic compliance reviews or site
inspections of service provider facilities to verify that 9-1-1 service
providers are adhering to certain standards. This approach may be best
suited as part of an integrated approach, in conjunction with rules
setting minimum standards for compliance. We seek comment on this
option, as well as any benefits or costs of this approach. Which
service providers should be subject to inspections or compliance
reviews, and how often should those inspections occur? Should reviews
be limited to records and documentation of compliance with Commission
requirements, or should they include physical site inspections of
network routes? Would this approach require additional staff, both at
the Commission and employed by service providers, to conduct
inspections and document compliance? If so, what experience and
training would these personnel require, and would they be likely to
detect network design and maintenance issues such as those that led to
9-1-1 failures during the derecho?
D. Bureau Recommendations for Improving 9-1-1 Network Reliability
15. As explained above, for each recommendation we seek comment on
a range of possible implementation approaches. We also seek comment on
the relative costs and benefits of the various proposals. We also seek
comment on any alternative proposals that may be more effective or
efficient in improving 9-1-1 network reliability or resiliency. In
evaluating specific proposals for Commission action, we also seek
comment on how we can best work in cooperation with state, tribal, and
local governments, which we have recognized are the primary
administrators of the legacy 9-1-1 system. For each of the proposals,
we specifically seek comments from state commissions and PSAPs on the
approaches they use to oversee 9-1-1 connectivity.
1. Routine 9-1-1 Circuit Auditing
16. Many of the vulnerabilities revealed by the derecho hinge on
the concept of physical diversity. Under generally accepted
definitions, physical diversity means that two circuits follow
different paths separated by some physical distance so that a single
failure such as a power outage, equipment failure, or cable cut will
not result in both circuits failing. For example, two circuits that
ride over the same fiber optic cable are not physically diverse, even
though they utilize different fibers in that cable and may be logically
diverse for purposes of transmitting data. We seek comment on this
definition and any other concept of network diversity we should
consider.
17. As the Derecho Report noted, for example, a physical diversity
audit might have revealed vulnerabilities that led to 9-1-1 and ALI
service failures to multiple PSAPs in Northern Virginia. To what extent
does this experience reflect vulnerabilities in 9-1-1 networks
nationwide? Do 9-1-1 service providers perform regular, physical
audits--not just logical analyses--of critical circuits to ensure that
their networks remain physically diverse? If so, what specifically do
they do and how often? What steps are taken to ensure that physical
diversity is sustained despite the circuit rearrangements that
frequently take place in communications networks?
18. As a result of service providers' inconsistent auditing of 9-1-
1 circuits and avoidable single points of failure in their networks,
the Derecho Report recommended regularly-scheduled auditing of these
circuits, noting that it ``should lead to fewer 9-1-1 outages and
enhance the reliability of 9-1-1 communications. If providers do not
regularly audit the physical routes of 9-1-1 circuits and ALI links,
they will be ill-equipped to verify diversity and understand, avoid, or
address instances where a single failure causes loss of all E9-1-1
circuits or all ALI links for a PSAP.'' Are there instances where
single points of failure are unavoidable, and how should that term be
defined? The Derecho Report concluded that the benefits of implementing
this recommendation will likely outweigh any additional costs, given
the large numbers of customers that can be served successfully in
emergencies by circuits that are diverse, and the harms that could
result from avoidable failures. The Bureau added that any burden likely
would be modest because this obligation would apply only to a limited
number of high-priority circuits that provide 9-1-1 service.
19. In light of providers' apparent failure to audit circuit
diversity adequately, notwithstanding pre-existing best practices
bolstered by Bureau reminders, we seek comment in general on the extent
to which providers are auditing these circuits and whether those audits
follow established best practices. Do existing best practices provide
sufficient guidance on this topic? If not, what, specifically, should
new or revised best practices address? What remedial actions have 9-1-1
service providers taken based on lessons learned in the derecho,
whether or not they were directly affected by the storm?
[[Page 21883]]
20. How, when, and to what degree of specificity should network
diversity audits be conducted? Under current technologies, critical 9-
1-1 circuits include, at a minimum, 9-1-1 trunks to PSAPs and ALI/ANI
links, but we seek comment on other transport routes or technologies
that may also be vital for emergency response, now or in the future.
Although some network characteristics may vary by service provider and
location, any auditing obligation must be specifically defined to be
effective. Should the Commission therefore adopt rules prescribing in
some fashion how audits should be conducted, and should it conduct
inspections or compliance reviews to enforce any such rules? How
frequently should audits be conducted, and are there existing published
industry standards that could serve as a model? Should the Commission
require not only that service providers perform audits, but also that
they take action to eliminate reasonably avoidable single points of
failure? If so, should any single point of failure be considered
unavoidable? Should the Commission require that audits be performed by
independent experts or conduct periodic compliance reviews or formal
inspections as a means of ensuring compliance? Are there complicating
factors in performing diversity audits that the Commission should take
note of? To what extent do leased circuits affect the ability to
perform accurate audits? How would diversity be sustained despite
normal circuit rearrangements and grooming?
21. How can the Commission ensure that its guidance regarding
transport network diversity remains current as technology changes? For
example, in a NG9-1-1 environment, it is likely that at least some
crucial servers will be hosted outside of central offices, in either
commercial or government data centers. In those cases, should the
Commission ask or require such data centers to meet physical diversity
standards or certify that they conduct diversity audits? Would it be
sufficient if all such servers are backed up by a redundant hot standby
server in another data center? Would conformance with the higher tiers
of the ANSI/TIA-942 standard be suitable for qualifying data centers to
host critical NG9-1-1 components? How does the transition to broadband,
IP-based networks affect the ability to conduct accurate audits? Is a
reporting requirement the best approach for ensuring that providers
perform 9-1-1 audits?
22. We also seek comment on whether reports should be made publicly
available. Should they be treated as confidential, absent a persuasive
contrary showing, as with outage reports? Do commenters believe any
such reports should be shared within the PSAP community, or made
accessible to 9-1-1 industry associations (e.g., APCO, NENA)? Should
the reports be shared with state regulators such as state public
utilities commissions?
23. We also seek comment on whether providers should certify that
they are performing 9-1-1 circuit audits in conformance with best
practices, and if so, how often they should so certify. If the
Commission were to pursue the certification approach, to which
standards should providers be required to certify? Do existing
standards or guidance serve as a usable template? Beyond certifying
that they have conducted an audit, what other information should
service providers need to certify? For example, should they conduct
audits under generally-accepted procedures reflected in best practices?
Should providers certify that the circuits audited satisfied specified
criteria for physical diversity and identify and describe exceptions in
some fashion? How often should providers be required to file any such
certifications, and how granular should they be? Should any
certification requirement be accompanied by an obligation to correct
deficiencies revealed by diversity audits?
24. We also seek input regarding additional costs, if any, that
would accrue to providers in implementing requirements associated with
this recommendation through any of the approaches noted above (i.e.,
reporting, certification, performance requirements). The NPRM provides
preliminary cost and benefit estimates and seeks comment on all aspects
of and assumptions underlying the cost/benefit analysis.
2. Sufficient Backup Power at Central Offices
25. The derecho raised many questions regarding backup power,
including whether all central offices must have some form of backup
power, and what constitutes adequate backup power. During the derecho,
approximately 7 percent of one affected service provider's central-
office generators failed to operate properly when needed. To what
extent is this failure rate representative of central-office backup
power nationwide among all 9-1-1 service providers? What rate of
generator or other backup power failures have service providers
experienced during other recent power failures?
26. In light of these concerns, we seek comment on whether the
Commission should institute requirements with respect to backup power,
including testing and maintenance of backup power equipment. How
closely do providers adhere to existing industry best practices and
other published guidelines on backup power? Would new or expanded best
practices provide additional guidance necessary to help maintain
reliable backup power? If so, would additional best practices provide
as much assurance of rigorous compliance as any of the approaches
proposed here? What additional best practices are needed in this area?
How closely do providers follow generator and battery manufacturers'
recommended maintenance schedules? We also are interested in comment
regarding backup power test records, e.g., what types of records are
actually maintained, and the general content of those records. How long
are records retained, and are they shared effectively within the
service provider's organization? As records could not always be readily
located, does this suggest that FCC monitoring would be helpful? If a
battery or generator fails a routine test, is that information
communicated to management and reliably acted upon in a timely manner?
27. If we conclude that the Commission should establish backup
power requirements, what, more precisely, should be required?
Acknowledging that what constitutes a ``central office'' can vary to
some extent by service provider and location, we ask commenters to give
views on whether and how an adequate level of backup power may differ
based on the type of facility. Should the required level of backup
power depend on the relationship of each central office to reliable 9-
1-1 service? Furthermore, the forecast transition to NG9-1-1 will
likely allow some capabilities to be hosted outside of central offices
in consolidated data centers. We seek comment on the level of backup
power currently available at such facilities and the degree to which
they should be required to comply with backup power standards for 9-1-1
networks.
28. Should the Commission require service providers to file reports
describing their central office backup power schemes, including
maintenance and testing? If so, how often should providers have to file
such reports? Should reports be based on conformance with specific best
practices, or other standards adopted by the Commission? How many
reports would there be? We also ask what specific information should be
included
[[Page 21884]]
in these reports, e.g., should the report be limited to factual
discussion of existing practices, or should providers also report on
any planned improvements? Should the report explicitly note departures
from industry best practices? Should the reports include an inventory
of backup power deployment in service provider central offices? Should
providers report on the results of recent tests and their protocol for
addressing needed repairs? Should the reports be made publicly
available? Would a requirement help foster the sustained focus needed
to make a difference?
29. We also seek comment on the approach of having 9-1-1 service
providers periodically certify that their central offices have
sufficient backup power or conform with specific best practices. With
this approach, to what standard(s) should providers certify? What
existing industry backup power standards or guidance might serve as a
usable template? Beyond certifying that their backup power meets
minimum standards, what other factors might service providers be
required to certify to? How often should providers be required to file
any such certifications, and how granular should they be? Who, by
title, should attest to the validity of the certification?
30. We seek comment on whether we should adopt a minimum standard
for central office backup power. Should the Commission require on-site
backup power for a specific number of hours, whether through
appropriately rated batteries or a backup generator with a sufficient
fuel supply? Should we require that service providers maintain
sufficient backup power to ensure continuity of critical communications
and, if so, how should ``critical communications'' be defined? Should
the Commission require service providers to have in place and implement
plans for regular maintenance and testing of backup power equipment? If
so, should the Commission specify a level of detail and granularity for
those plans? Would periodic site inspections or compliance reviews be
useful to ensure compliance? Do service providers currently test backup
generators under actual office load, and is that method preferable to
or more effective than others? How often do service providers employ
tandem generator arrangements where the failure of one generator would
result in a central office being switched immediately to battery
backup? Should these generators be replaced or redesigned to shed
nonessential loads? We seek comments on the benefits and drawbacks of
each implementation approach, and compared to each other.
31. We also seek input regarding additional costs, if any, that
would accrue to providers who are not already rigorously implementing
best practices, and to all providers to either report or certify. The
cost associated with reporting and certification appears to be a
fraction of the cost required to remediate deficiencies that these
approaches reveal. However, the very preliminary information obtained
by the Bureau so far suggests that remediation may not be necessary for
a substantial majority of central offices that already have permanent
generators and readily accessible portable generators; do not use
tandem generator arrangements, where the failure of one generator
results in neither generator functioning; and already have implemented
appropriate battery and generator testing. We seek more specific
information about the prevalence of each of these situations below, and
on the estimated time and cost associated with remediation where
necessary. Is the range of potential remediation costs wide enough to
raise questions about whether the costs of remediation may exceed the
benefits?
32. We have identified a number of questions involving potential
costs that appear relevant to this inquiry. How many central offices
have a generator onsite? A portable generator that can be deployed
promptly (e.g., within four hours)? What is the fully loaded cost of
such a portable generator? How many central offices have batteries that
are not tested to the manufacturer's specifications? How long does it
take on average to test such batteries over the course of a year? What
is the cost of doing so? Similarly, how many onsite generators are not
tested monthly or yearly, and what would the associated incremental
costs of such testing be? What is the likelihood of a generator's
failing a monthly or annual maintenance test, and the associated cost
of repairing it? How many tandem generator arrangements are there, in
which the failure of one results in neither functioning? How much is
already budgeted to address problems associated with the potential need
to address these issues? The NPRM provides a preliminary analysis of
and seeks comment on all aspects of and assumptions underlying the
costs and benefits of: (1) Having generators available in all central
offices; (2) more regular battery testing; (3) more regular generator
testing; (4) repairing a generator soon after it fails a test; (5)
eliminating a tandem generator arrangement where the failure of one
generator results in neither generator functioning; (6). The NPRM seeks
comment on all aspects of and assumptions underlying the cost/benefit
analysis
3. Robust Network Monitoring Capabilities
33. A 9-1-1 service provider typically operates one or more Network
Operations Centers (NOCs) from which it performs, among other tasks,
remote monitoring of its network. This monitoring enables a provider to
detect critical facilities outages and other problems as soon as they
occur and to deploy resources as appropriate to rectify problems. These
NOCs typically communicate with the network elements that they monitor
by first connecting with one or more regional aggregation points, which
then connect to the array of network elements to be monitored. The
diversity of these regional aggregation points, including the diversity
of the facilities that connect them to NOCs, is vital to communications
reliability. During the derecho, the network monitoring capabilities of
the two primary ILECs involved were disabled within the area of the
storm, depriving them of visibility into the status of their network
operations and complicating their recovery efforts. In both instances,
the loss of monitoring capability throughout the segment of the network
affected by the storm could be attributed to a single point of failure.
To what extent do these failures reflect vulnerabilities in network
monitoring systems nationwide? How often do other 9-1-1 service
providers rely on a single physical path to monitor large portions of
their networks, and why have redundant links not been installed?
34. Based on network monitoring failures during the derecho, the
Bureau recommended that the Commission take action to ensure that 9-1-1
service providers put in place ``diverse monitor and control links and
capabilities throughout their network[s].'' We seek comment on whether
and how to implement this recommendation. What have 9-1-1 service
providers affected by the derecho done to ensure they will not lose
visibility into their networks during future emergencies? To what
extent have other 9-1-1 service providers implemented diverse
monitoring capabilities within their networks, and do they plan
specific, additional improvements in response to the derecho? How can
the Commission be confident that these measures will be sustained?
35. Should the Commission pursue the Derecho Report's
recommendations
[[Page 21885]]
with respect to network monitoring, how should it specify the level or
degree of ``diversity'' expected of network monitoring and control
capabilities? For example, should the Commission define this
``diversity'' such that the failure of one element of a service
provider's monitoring system, for example the failure of a control
link, cannot result in the loss of network monitoring capabilities? If
this definition is not suitable, what would a suitable alternative be
and why is it superior? We observe that, unlike other policy objectives
the Bureau recommends, diversity in network monitoring is not the
subject of a specific CSRIC best practice, although other best
practices address circuit diversity and network monitoring in general.
Are new or more specific best practices needed to provide guidance in
this area? If so, what new or revised best practices are needed? Would
additional best practices provide as much assurance of rigorous
compliance as any of the approaches proposed here? Who should be
charged with developing these best practices? At a minimum, the derecho
revealed that it is a sound engineering practice to design network
monitoring centers with visibility into the network through physically
diverse links that help to avoid single points of failure. Where are
these concepts addressed in industry best practices or other published
guidelines? How will the transition to NG9-1-1 affect network
monitoring technologies and the need for diverse monitoring links?
36. Should the Commission require service providers to file reports
describing the diversity of their network monitoring capabilities? If
so, how often should such reports be filed, and how granular should
they be? What specific information should be included in these reports?
For example, should the reports include detailed descriptions of
service provider monitoring and control architectures, including maps?
What are the public safety and homeland security implications of public
disclosure of key network routes? Should such reporting be limited to
factual discussion of existing practices, or should providers also
report on any planned or ongoing efforts to improve the diversity of
their network monitoring capabilities?
37. We also seek comment on the approach of having providers
certify that their monitoring and control links are sufficiently
diverse. With this approach, to what diversity standard should
providers certify? For example, should service providers certify that
no single points of failure exist in the network monitoring facilities
that run between their NOCs and regional aggregation points? Beyond
certifying that their monitoring links are sufficiently diverse, what
other information should providers be required to certify? For example,
should service providers be asked to certify that they have more than
one regional aggregation point in major metropolitan areas? How often
should providers be required to file any such certifications, and how
granular should they be? How could existing certification schemes, such
as section 302 of SOX, serve as models for such certification?
38. Should the Commission require service providers to implement a
certain level of diversity in their network monitoring and control
capabilities? If so, how precisely should the Commission specify the
level or degree of ``diversity'' required of network monitoring and
control links? Should the Commission avail itself of compliance reviews
or formal inspections as a further means of ensuring compliance with
any such rule it adopts?
39. The NPRM includes an analysis of the costs and benefits
associated with ensuring more diversity in monitoring capabilities and
seek comment on all aspects of and assumptions underlying that
analysis.
E. Improved PSAP Notification Under Section 4.9 of the Commission's
Rules
40. The derecho also demonstrated that timely, clear, and
appropriately targeted communication between 9-1-1 service providers
and PSAPs is key during any disruption of 9-1-1 service, particularly
in a disaster when the public requires additional emergency assistance.
The Commission's current rules recognize that PSAPs must be notified
when communications outages affect 9-1-1 service, but the derecho
revealed that many PSAPs' efforts to restore service and respond to
emergencies during the derecho were hindered by inadequate information
and otherwise ineffective communication by service providers. Although
we recognize that conditions often change rapidly in disaster
situations, PSAPs--and ultimately the public--depend on communications
providers for accurate situational awareness when outages affect public
safety. We therefore propose amendments to Sec. 4.9 of the
Commission's rules to clarify how service providers can more
effectively and uniformly notify PSAPs of outages affecting 9-1-1
service and cooperate to restore service as quickly as possible.
41. Section 4.9 requires certain communications providers to notify
the Commission within 120 minutes of discovering a reportable outage.
The rule also requires specified providers to notify ``9-1-1 special
facilities''--i.e., PSAPs--affected by an outage with ``all available
information that may be useful'' to mitigate the outage ``as soon as
possible by telephone or other electronic means.'' After the derecho,
however, many PSAPs reported that they were not notified of outages or
received inadequate information about the scope of impacts to 9-1-1
service. The lack of specificity in this rule has led to questions
regarding how to determine whether or how providers are complying with
the Commission's PSAP notification requirements.
42. During the Bureau's derecho inquiry, multiple PSAPs stated that
they contacted their 9-1-1 service provider to report a loss of service
before being contacted by the provider. Other PSAPs received
notification in the form of ``cryptic'' emails that referenced problems
in one central office but did not specify all of the jurisdictions
affected. Furthermore, inadequate information from service providers
during the derecho led some PSAPs to activate ineffective reroutes, or
to attempt to reroute even though service could have been restored via
the original route.
43. We therefore propose revisions to Sec. 4.9 intended to clarify
9-1-1 service providers' outage reporting obligations and better ensure
that PSAPs receive timely and actionable notification when a
communications outage affects 9-1-1 service. Under the proposed rules,
service providers subject to PSAP notification requirements would be
required to notify PSAPs of outages immediately, by telephone and in
writing via electronic means. These notifications would include, at a
minimum, the nature of the outage, the estimated number of users
affected or potentially affected, the location of those users, the
actions being taken by provider to address the outage, the estimated
time at which service will be restored, recommended actions the
impacted facility should take to minimize disruption of service, and
the sender's name, telephone number and email address at which the
sender can be reached.
44. We seek comment on this proposed language and any alternative
revisions to Sec. 4.9 that would accomplish the goal of clarifying
reporting obligations and ensuring that PSAPs receive more detailed
outage notifications. To what extent do providers currently inform
PSAPs of 9-1-1 outages, and what is included in those communications?
What additional information would PSAPs find useful? How much
information that would be
[[Page 21886]]
helpful to PSAPs is practically available to service providers during
natural disasters and other emergencies? Under the proposed rule,
service providers would be required to provide PSAP notification
immediately. Should the Commission adopt a more specific timeframe by
when service providers must notify PSAPs? If so, what would be an
appropriate timeframe? Should the Commission specify a list of
acceptable ``electronic means'' for written notifications, or do PSAPs
and service providers prefer flexibility to choose their own methods of
communication? Should service providers be required to keep and retain
records of their communications with PSAPs to demonstrate compliance
with notification requirements? To what extent do state tariffs and
other state and local regulations impose requirements regarding outage
reporting and communication in general between service providers and
PSAPs?
45. We note that the current outage reporting rules apply to a
range of service providers beyond the ILECs that typically route 9-1-1
calls to PSAPs under current network configurations. Should any new or
revised PSAP notification requirements apply to all entities covered by
Sec. 4.9, or only those considered ``9-1-1 service providers'' for
purposes of this NPRM? Should amended notification requirements apply
to additional service providers who are not already covered by Sec.
4.9? Because our intent is to clarify the current rule and promote
efficient communication between service providers and PSAPs, we begin
with the assumption that revisions would be most effective if applied
consistently to all providers covered by the current rule. We invite
comment on that view, however, and seek input on the range of entities
that should be subject to revised PSAP notification requirements.
46. In light of the anticipated evolution toward NG9-1-1, we also
seek comment on whether entities such as data centers and centralized
call centers that do not fit the traditional definition of PSAPs should
also be notified of communications outages. For example, how would the
outage-reporting rules apply to consolidated call centers that may not
be physically located in the affected area but still serve many of the
functions of a traditional local PSAP? As technologies evolve, is there
a better way to approach PSAP notification than the current rubric of
direct communication from service provider staff to PSAP staff? For
example, are there automated technologies such as machine-readable data
feeds that could transmit outage information to PSAPs in a standardized
format?
47. Because service providers must already notify PSAPs of outages
under current rules, we do not expect any incremental costs resulting
from a clarification of that obligation. We do, however, seek comment
on the costs and benefits of particular notification requirements, as
well as the burden each approach would place on providers and PSAPs.
III. Other Matters
A. Legal Authority
48. The NPRM includes a discussion of the Commission's legal
authority for the prospective actions discussed above to promote the
reliability and resiliency of communications infrastructure that is
essential for 9-1-1 service and seeks comment on that analysis.
B. Small Entities
49. The Commission seeks comment on the degree to which the rules
proposed in this NPRM would affect small businesses.
C. Circumstances Beyond Providers' Control
50. The Commission seeks comment on the extent to which any action
it takes in this area should account for circumstances beyond the
control of the provider. What are the specific laws, regulations, and
other challenges that would interfere with compliance with these
requirements, and how prevalent are these challenges in specific
localities? If cost should be considered, what are the appropriate
criteria for deciding when a cost is truly prohibitive rather than
merely inconvenient? Is the Commission's authority to suspend, revoke,
amend, or waive its rules for good cause sufficient to ensure
consideration of these factors, or should there be explicit exemptions
in the rules themselves? If we determine that a particular state,
local, or tribal law, regulation, or practice affirmatively impedes the
deployment of effective 9-1-1 services to PSAPs or the deployment of
NG9-1-1 services, would the Commission have authority to preempt that
law, regulation, or practice? If so, under what circumstances should we
exercise that authority?
D. Review and Sunset
51. We also seek comment on whether the Commission should conduct a
periodic review of any rules or other requirements that it adopts to
ensure that those actions provide flexibility and take into account the
continuing advancement of technology. If so, how often should such
reviews occur, and how should the ongoing utility of each proposal be
measured? Alternatively, we seek comment on whether the Commission
should establish a sunset date on which any of the proposals would
cease to apply. How should that date be determined, and should it be
tied to a specific triggering event, e.g., demonstrated improvements in
network reliability or the widespread adoption of NG9-1-1? Should any
of these proposals sunset for individual service providers once they
deploy NG9-1-1? Because certain approaches may entail upfront costs
that decrease over time, what effect should the cost of compliance have
on a potential sunset date? Should sunset occur automatically without
additional Commission action, or should the Commission consider a
possible sunset after further review? How else might the Commission
ensure that any action it takes remains current and technologically
appropriate over time?
E. Procedural Matters
1. Regulatory Flexibility Act
52. An Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) for this NPRM
is located under section titled Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis. Written public comments are requested on this IRFA. Comments
must be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the
deadlines for comments on the NPRM indicated above.
2. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
53. This document contains proposed new information collection
requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to
reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) to comment on the information collection
requirements contained in this document, as required by the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. In addition, pursuant to the
Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44
U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment on how we might further
reduce the information collection burden for small business concerns
with fewer than 25 employees.
3. Ex Parte Rules
54. The proceeding of which this Notice is a part is a ``permit-
but-disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte
rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any
written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation
[[Page 21887]]
within two business days after the presentation (unless a different
deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making
oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the
presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise
participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was
made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during
the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of
the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the
presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the
proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or
arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings
(specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data
or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the
memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex
parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must
be filed consistent with rule Sec. 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed
by rule Sec. 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a
method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and
memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments
thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system
available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format
(e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this
proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte
rules.
4. Comment Filing Procedures
55. Pursuant to Sec. Sec. 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's
rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and
reply comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of
this document. Comments should be filed in PS Docket No. 13-75.
Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing
System (ECFS). See Electronic Filing of Documents in Rulemaking
Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).
[ssquf] Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically
using the Internet by accessing the ECFS: https://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/.
[ssquf] Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file
an original and one copy of each filing.
Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial
overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service
mail. All filings must be addressed to the Commission's Secretary,
Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
1. All hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the
Commission's Secretary must be delivered to FCC Headquarters at 445
12th St. SW., Room TW-A325, Washington, DC 20554. The filing hours are
8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. All hand deliveries must be held together with
rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of
before entering the building.
2. Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 East Hampton
Drive, Capitol Heights, MD 20743.
3. U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail must
be addressed to 445 12th Street SW., Washington DC 20554.
People with Disabilities: To request materials in accessible
formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic
files, audio format), send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the
Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-
418-0432 (TTY).
Confidential Materials: Parties wishing to file materials with a
claim of confidentiality should follow the procedures set forth in
Sec. 0.459 of the Commission's rules. Confidential submissions may not
be filed via ECFS but rather should be filed with the Secretary's
Office following the procedures set forth in 47 CFR 0.459. Redacted
versions of confidential submissions may be filed via ECFS.
Initial Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis
This document contains proposed information collection
requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to
reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) to comment on the information collection
requirements contained in this document, as required by the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. Public and agency comments
are due June 11, 2013.
Comments should address: (a) Whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of
the Commission, including whether the information shall have practical
utility; (b) the accuracy of the Commission's burden estimates; (c)
ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information
collected; (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of
information on the respondents, including the use of automated
collection techniques or other forms of information technology; and (e)
way to further reduce the information collection burden on small
business concerns with fewer than 25 employees. In addition, pursuant
to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198,
see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment on how we might
further reduce the information collection burden for small business
concerns with fewer than 25 employees.
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
1. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as
amended (RFA), the Commission has prepared this IRFA of the possible
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities
by the recommendations in this NPRM. Written public comments are
requested on this IRFA. Comments must be identified as responses to the
IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments provided in
``Comment Period and Procedures'' of this NPRM. The Commission will
send a copy of this NPRM, including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA). In addition, the
NPRM and IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal
Register.
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules
2. The June 2012 Derecho storm revealed serious vulnerabilities in
the Nation's 9-1-1 communications infrastructure that could have been
prevented or mitigated through the implementation of best practices
developed by industry and advisory bodies. Yet, the Bureau's inquiry
into communications failures during and after the storm found that
multiple 9-1-1 service providers failed to implement best practices
related to physical circuit diversity, central office backup power, and
network monitoring, leading to emergency communications outages
affecting millions of Americans. In some cases, PSAPs did not receive
timely or adequate notification of these outages, compounding the
difficulty of providing emergency assistance until service was
restored. A broad range of comments from state and local governments,
as well as public safety entities themselves, support the Bureau's
finding that such failures are unacceptable. As part of its statutory
obligation to ensure that communications networks of all types
``promot[e] safety of life and property,''
[[Page 21888]]
the Commission has a particular responsibility to promote reliable
emergency communications and prevent avoidable failures.
3. With the objective of ensuring reliability and resiliency of 9-
1-1 networks and services, the NPRM proposes to:
Ensure that 9-1-1 service providers conduct routine
circuit audits to verify physical diversity and identify avoidable
single points of failure. The NPRM seeks comment of the details of this
obligation and the extent to which providers would be required to
fortify non-diverse circuits.
Ensure that 9-1-1 service providers maintain adequate
backup power in central offices, supported by appropriate testing,
maintenance, and records retention. The NPRM seeks comment on what
level of backup power should be considered adequate and whether current
maintenance and recordkeeping practices are sufficient to ensure
reliability.
Ensure that 9-1-1 service providers maintain robust and
resilient network monitoring capabilities, supported by diverse network
monitoring and control links. The NPRM seeks comment on the degree of
diversity and specific engineering practices necessary to protect
network monitoring capabilities against single points of failure.
4. The NPRM proposes a range of approaches by which the above
objectives could be accomplished. For instance, 9-1-1 service providers
could be required to report whether they have implemented relevant best
practices, or a company representative could be required to certify
compliance with best practices on a regular basis. The Commission could
also codify key best practices in its rules, such as a minimum level of
physical diversity for 9-1-1 circuits. Under the latter approach, the
Commission could also ensure compliance though periodic site
inspections and compliance reviews. As the NPRM notes, these
alternatives need not be mutually exclusive and are intended as a
starting point for discussion of which approach(es) will yield the
greatest benefit in communications reliability at the lowest cost to
service providers.
5. The NPRM also proposes revisions to Sec. 4.9 of the
Commission's rules to state with greater specificity how and when 9-1-1
service providers must notify PSAPs affected by communications outages.
As noted in the Derecho Report, the current rule has led to questions
regarding whether providers are complying fully with the Commission's
PSAP notification requirements, and whether the current requirements
provide PSAPs with actionable information. Clarification of these
standards could increase compliance by service providers and improve
situational awareness for PSAPs affected by outages.
6. The Commission traditionally has addressed communications
reliability issues by working with service providers to develop
voluntary best practices that address vulnerabilities in the
communications network, and by measuring the effectiveness of those
best practices through outage reporting. Under the Commission's current
rules, the outage reporting process has often been effective in
improving the reliability, resiliency, and security of many
communications services. The June 2012 derecho, however, revealed the
need to supplement this approach with regard to critical 9-1-1
communications. While the NPRM supports the development of additional
best practices, it recognizes that additional Commission action may be
appropriate. Thus, the proposed approach would complement, rather than
replace, the existing regime of best practices and outage reporting.
B. Legal Basis
7. The legal basis for the rules and rule changes proposed in this
NPRM are contained in Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o), 201(b), 214(d),
218, 251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j), 316,
332, 403, 615a-1, and 615c of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 154(o), 201(b), 214(d), 218,
251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 332,
403, 615a-1, and 615c. The Commission also believes it has ancillary
authority under Title I of the Communications Act to impose the
requirements discussed in the NPRM on any 9-1-1 service providers not
subject to express regulatory authority under Title II. Any such
regulations would be ``reasonably ancillary'' to the goal of ensuring a
common baseline for the reliability of 9-1-1 service on a nationwide
basis, regardless of the regulatory status of the entity providing the
service.
C. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which
Rules Will Apply
8. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and, where
feasible, an estimate of, the number of small entities that may be
affected by the proposed rules adopted herein. The RFA generally
defines the term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the
terms ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small
governmental jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business''
has the same meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the
Small Business Act. A small business concern is one which: (1) Is
independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of
operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the
Small Business Administration (SBA).
1. Total Small Entities
9. Our action may, over time, affect small entities that are not
easily categorized at present. We therefore describe here, at the
outset, three comprehensive, statutory small entity size standards.
First, nationwide, there are a total of approximately 27.9 million
small businesses, according to the SBA. In addition, a ``small
organization'' is generally ``any not-for-profit enterprise which is
independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.''
Nationwide, as of 2007, there were approximately 1,621,315 small
organizations. Finally, the term ``small governmental jurisdiction'' is
defined generally as ``governments of cities, towns, townships,
villages, school districts, or special districts, with a population of
less than fifty thousand.'' Census Bureau data for 2011 indicate that
there were 89,476 local governmental jurisdictions in the United
States. We estimate that, of this total, as many as 88,506 entities may
qualify as ``small governmental jurisdictions.'' Thus, we estimate that
most governmental jurisdictions are small.
2. Entities Subject to NPRM
10. As noted in the NPRM, we seek comment on the class of entities
to which the proposals would apply. Generally, we expect Commission
action to focus narrowly on entities that provide key facilities for 9-
1-1 service rather than the broader class of all communications
services capable of placing 9-1-1 calls. Like the Derecho Report, the
NPRM defines ``9-1-1 service provider'' as a communications provider
``responsible for routing and delivering 9-1-1 calls to PSAPs.'' Under
current technologies, these providers are typically ILECs, although the
transition to NG9-1-1 may broaden the class of entities that provide 9-
1-1 service in the future. The NPRM therefore asks whether the
Commission should codify a definition of the term ``9-1-1 service
provider'' that clarifies the extent, if any, to which the proposals
would apply to non-ILEC providers of 9-1-1 service.
11. We anticipate that the proposals in this Notice would apply to
all 9-1-
[[Page 21889]]
1 service providers, and tentatively define that term to include all
entities, including ILECs, that provide 9-1-1 call routing, ALI,
emergency services Internet protocol networks (ESInets), and similar
services directly to a PSAP. The transition to NG9-1-1 may allow other
service providers to perform similar functions, and we seek comment on
the degree to which the proposals should apply to other types of
wireline service providers, wireless service providers, interconnected
VoIP service providers, or other potential means of reaching a PSAP as
NG9-1-1 broadens the range of entities capable of delivering 9-1-1
service. We also seek comment on whether there should be a cost-
recovery mechanism for entities regulated as common carriers under
Title II of the Communications Act to the extent not already provided
under state tariffs.
12. Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs). Neither the
Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard
specifically for incumbent local exchange services. The appropriate
size standard under SBA rules is for the category Wired
Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size standard, such a business
is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. Census Bureau data for
2007 show that there were 3,188 firms in this category that operated
for the entire year. Of this total, 3,144 had employment of 999 or
fewer, and 44 firms had had employment of 1,000 employees or more. Thus
under this category and the associated small business size standard,
the majority of these incumbent local exchange service providers can be
considered small.
13. The Commission has included small incumbent LECs in this
present RFA analysis. As noted above, a ``small business'' under the
RFA is one that, inter alia, meets the pertinent small business size
standard (e.g., a telephone communications business having 1,500 or
fewer employees), and ``is not dominant in its field of operation.''
The SBA's Office of Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small
incumbent LECs are not dominant in their field of operation because any
such dominance is not ``national'' in scope. The Commission has
therefore included small incumbent LECs in this RFA analysis, although
the Commission emphasizes that this RFA action has no effect on
Commission analyses and determinations in other, non-RFA contexts.
D. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other
Compliance Requirements
14. The actions proposed in the NPRM could require 9-1-1 service
providers to take a range of actions to strengthen the Nation's 9-1-1
infrastructure in the areas of circuit diversity, central office backup
power, and network monitoring and control. Specific regulatory
obligations would depend upon the approach chosen to implement each of
these objectives. Requirements for compliance could range from periodic
reporting on whether 9-1-1 service providers are voluntarily
implementing best practices, to mandatory standards for 9-1-1 network
reliability codified in the Commission's rules and subject to its
enforcement powers. Service providers also could be required to
periodically certify that they have adequate internal controls to
ensure network reliability and inform senior management of any
significant vulnerabilities. Because many 9-1-1 service providers
already implement some or all of the relevant best practices on a
voluntary basis, the additional burden of compliance with these
requirements may be minimal.
15. Generally, the reporting and certification approaches would
likely require more recordkeeping and information collection than the
codification-and-enforcement approach, which would focus on the actual
implementation of best practices. However, reporting and certification
may give service providers more flexibility in designing and
maintaining their networks while ensuring that they remain accountable
for the results of their decisions. At a minimum, 9-1-1 service
providers would be required to keep records of, and disclose to the
Commission, the extent to which they have implemented the best
practices discussed in the NPRM. At a maximum, they would be required
to comply with reliability standards enforced by the Commission,
potentially requiring changes to networks that do not currently meet
these standards.
16. The NPRM also proposes revisions to Sec. 4.9 of the
Commission's rules to clarify service providers' obligations to notify
PSAPs of 9-1-1 outages. The NPRM seeks comment on this objective, as
well as on the substantive terms of the reporting obligation.
E. Steps Taken To Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered
17. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant
alternatives that it has considered in reaching its proposed approach,
which may include (among others) the following four alternatives: (1)
The establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or
timetables that take into account the resources available to small
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of
compliance or reporting requirements under the rule for small entities;
(3) the use of performance, rather than design, standards; and (4) an
exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small
entities.
18. The approaches proposed in the NPRM are intended to complement
and strengthen, not to replace, the Commission's current approach of
encouraging service providers to voluntarily implement best practices
and measuring compliance through outage reporting. Thus, small entities
with limited resources would continue to enjoy many of the benefits of
the current regime, including a general focus on network performance
and reliability rather than specific design requirements. The
Commission has traditionally considered this approach a more flexible
and less costly alternative to more comprehensive regulation, and the
NPRM would preserve those advantages in large part.
19. To the extent that the NPRM would impose new obligations on
small entities, we seek comment on alternatives including (1) the
establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or
timetables that take into account the resources available to small
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of
compliance or reporting requirements under the rule for small entities;
(3) the use of performance, rather than design, standards; and (4) an
exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small
entities. Which of the proposed approaches do small entities find
particularly difficult or costly to comply with, and how could those
difficulties be addressed through modifications or exemptions? What
would be the effect on public safety of exemptions from 9-1-1 service
requirements, regardless of cost?
F. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Proposed Rule
None.
IV. Ordering Clauses
20. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a
copy of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
[[Page 21890]]
including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.
21. Accordingly, it is ordered pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j),
4(o), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307,
309(a), 309(j), 316, 332, 403, 615a-1, and 615c of the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i)-(j) & (o), 201(b),
214(d), 218, 251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a),
309(j), 316, 332, 403, 615a-1, and 615c, that this Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in PS Docket No. 13-75 and PS Docket No. 11-60 is adopted.
List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 4
Telecommunications.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.
Proposed rules
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Federal
Communications Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR part 4 as follows:
PART 4--DISRUPTIONS TO COMMUNICATIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 4 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Sec. 5, 48 Stat. 1068, as amended; 47 U.S.C. 154,
155, 201, 251, 307, 316, 615a-1, 1302(a), and 1302(b).
0
2. Section 4.9 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(4), (c)(2)(iv),
(e)(5), (f)(4), and (g)(1)(i) to read as follows:
Sec. 4.9 Outage reporting requirements--threshold criteria.
(a) * * *
(4) Potentially affects a 911 special facility (as defined in
paragraph (e) of Sec. 4.5), in which case they also shall notify
immediately by telephone and in writing via electronic means, any
official who has been designated by the management of the affected 911
facility as the provider's contact person(s) for communications outages
at that facility, and they shall convey all available information that
may be useful to the management of the affected facility in mitigating
the effects of the outage on callers to that facility. This information
shall include, at a minimum, the nature of the outage, the estimated
number of users affected or potentially affected, the location of those
users, the actions being taken by provider to address the outage, the
estimated time at which service will be restored, recommended actions
the impacted 911 special facility should take to minimize disruption of
service, and the sender's name, telephone number and email address at
which the sender can be reached. Not later than 72 hours after
discovering the outage, the provider shall submit electronically an
Initial Communications Outage Report to the Commission. Not later than
thirty days after discovering the outage, the provider shall submit
electronically a Final Communications Outage Report to the Commission.
The Notification and the Initial and Final reports shall comply with
all of the requirements of Sec. 4.11.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(2) * * *
(iv) Potentially affecting a 911 special facility (as defined in
paragraph (e) of Sec. 4.5), in which case they also shall notify
immediately by telephone and in writing via electronic means, any
official who has been designated by the management of the affected 911
facility as the provider's contact person(s) for communications outages
at that facility, and they shall convey all available information that
may be useful to the management of the affected facility in mitigating
the effects of the outage on callers to that facility. This information
shall include, at a minimum, the nature of the outage, the estimated
number of users affected or potentially affected, the location of those
users, the actions being taken by provider to address the outage, the
estimated time at which service will be restored, recommended actions
the impacted 911 special facility should take to minimize disruption of
service, and the sender's name, telephone number and email address at
which the sender can be reached.
* * * * *
(e) * * *
(5) That potentially affects a 911 special facility (as defined in
paragraph (e) of Sec. 4.5), in which case they also shall notify
immediately by telephone and in writing via electronic means, any
official who has been designated by the management of the affected 911
facility as the provider's contact person(s) for communications outages
at that facility, and they shall convey all available information that
may be useful to the management of the affected facility in mitigating
the effects of the outage on callers to that facility. This information
shall include, at a minimum, the nature of the outage, the estimated
number of users affected or potentially affected, the location of those
users, the actions being taken by provider to address the outage, the
estimated time at which service will be restored, recommended actions
the impacted 911 special facility should take to minimize disruption of
service, and the sender's name, telephone number and email address at
which the sender can be reached. In determining the number of users
potentially affected by a failure of a switch, a concentration ratio of
8 shall be applied. For providers of paging service solely, however,
the following outage criteria shall apply instead of those in
paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) of this section. Notification must be
submitted if the failure of a switch for at least 30 minutes duration
potentially affects at least 900,000 user-minutes. Not later than 72
hours after discovering the outage, the provider shall submit
electronically an Initial Communications Outage Report to the
Commission. Not later than thirty days after discovering the outage,
the provider shall submit electronically a Final Communications Outage
Report to the Commission. The Notification and the Initial and Final
reports shall comply with all of the requirements of Sec. 4.11.
* * * * *
(f) * * *
(4) Potentially affects a 911 special facility (as defined in
paragraph (e) of Sec. 4.5), in which case they also shall notify
immediately by telephone and in writing via electronic means, any
official who has been designated by the management of the affected 911
facility as the provider's contact person(s) for communications outages
at that facility, and they shall convey all available information that
may be useful to the management of the affected facility in mitigating
the effects of the outage on callers to that facility. This information
shall include, at a minimum, the nature of the outage, the estimated
number of users affected or potentially affected, the location of those
users, the actions being taken by provider to address the outage, the
estimated time at which service will be restored, recommended actions
the impacted 911 special facility should take to minimize disruption of
service, and the sender's name, telephone number and email address at
which the sender can be reached. Not later than 72 hours after
discovering the outage, the provider shall submit electronically an
Initial Communications Outage Report to the Commission. Not later than
thirty days after discovering the outage, the provider shall submit
electronically a Final Communications Outage Report to the Commission.
The Notification and the Initial and Final reports shall comply with
all of the requirements of Sec. 4.11.
* * * * *
(g) * * *
(1) * * *
[[Page 21891]]
(i) Within 240 minutes of discovering that they have experienced on
any facilities that they own, operate, lease, or otherwise utilize, an
outage of at least 30 minutes duration that potentially affects a 911
special facility (as defined in paragraph (e) of Sec. 4.5), in which
case they also shall notify immediately by telephone and in writing via
electronic means, any official who has been designated by the
management of the affected 911 facility as the provider's contact
person(s) for communications outages at that facility, and the provider
shall convey all available information that may be useful to the
management of the affected facility in mitigating the effects of the
outage on efforts to communicate with that facility. This information
shall include, at a minimum, the nature of the outage, the estimated
number of users affected or potentially affected, the location of those
users, the actions being taken by provider to address the outage, the
estimated time at which service will be restored, recommended actions
the impacted 911 special facility should take to minimize the
disruption of service, and the sender's name, telephone number and
email address at which the sender can be reached; or
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2013-08525 Filed 4-11-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P