Safety Advisory 2013-01; Passing Stop Signals Protecting Movable Bridges, 13747-13748 [2013-04713]
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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 40 / Thursday, February 28, 2013 / Notices
This notice applies to all Federal
agency decisions as of the issuance date
of this notice and all laws under which
such actions were taken, including but
not limited to:
1. National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)
2. Safe, Accountable, Flexible and
Efficient, Transportation Equity Act,
A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU)
3. MAP 21—Moving Ahead for Progress
in the 21st Century
4. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964
5. National Historic Preservation Act of
1966
6. Executive Order 12898, Federal
Actions to Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and
Low-Income Populations
7. Section 4(f) of the Transportation Act
of 1966
(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance
Program Number 20.205, Highway Planning
and Construction. The regulations
implementing Executive Order 12372
regarding intergovernmental consultation on
Federal programs and activities apply to this
program.)
Authority: 23 U.S.C. 139(l)(1).
Dated: February 20, 2013.
Matthew Schmitz,
Director, State Programs, Federal Highway
Administration, Sacramento, California.
[FR Doc. 2013–04643 Filed 2–27–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–RY–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Railroad Safety: Advisory Notice
Related to Railroad Accidents in
Vicinity of Underground Pipelines
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Advisory Notice.
AGENCY:
In response to Safety
Recommendation R–12–04 issued by the
National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), FRA is issuing this Advisory
Notice to inform railroads of the
circumstances surrounding the June 19,
2009, derailment of eastbound Canadian
National Railway (CN) Freight Train
U70691–18 in Cherry Valley, IL, and to
remind railroads of the need to
immediately notify pipeline operators of
rail accidents occurring in railroad
rights-of-way where pipelines are
present and the need to ensure that
pipeline inspections are accomplished
prior to resumption of service.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl
Alexy, Staff Director, Hazardous
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
SUMMARY:
VerDate Mar<15>2010
19:12 Feb 27, 2013
Jkt 229001
Materials Division, Office of Railroad
Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., Washington, DC 20590; telephone:
(202) 493–6245; or Karl.Alexy@dot.gov;
or Elisabeth Galotto, Trial Attorney,
Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC
20590; telephone: (202) 493–0270; or
Elisabeth.Galotto@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June
19, 2009, at approximately 8:36 p.m.
(CST), CN Freight Train U70691–18,
traveling eastbound at 36 mph, derailed
at a highway-rail grade crossing in
Cherry Valley, IL. The train consisted of
two locomotives and 114 cars, 19 of
which derailed. All of the derailed cars
were tank cars carrying denatured fuel
ethanol, a flammable liquid. Thirteen of
the derailed tank cars were breached or
lost product and caught fire. At the time
of the derailment, several motor
vehicles were stopped on either side of
the grade crossing waiting for the train
to pass. As a result of the fire that
erupted after the derailment, a
passenger in one of the stopped cars was
fatally injured, two passengers in the
same car received serious injuries, and
five occupants of other cars waiting at
the highway-rail grade crossing were
injured. Two responding firefighters
also sustained minor injuries. The
release of ethanol and the resulting fire
prompted a mandatory evacuation of
about 600 residences within a half-mile
radius of the accident site.
The NTSB determined that the
probable cause of the accident was the
washout of the track structure that was
discovered about 1 hour before the
train’s arrival, and CN’s failure to notify
the train crew of the known washout in
time to stop the train because of the
inadequacy of CN’s emergency
communication procedures.
At the derailment site was a 12-inch
diameter underground natural gas
transmission pipeline operated by Nicor
Gas. The pipeline well exceeded Federal
standards for protective ground cover.
Yet, as the wreckage was removed from
above the pipeline, Nicor’s crews
discovered that a railcar wheel and axle
assembly had impacted the pipeline.
Although the pipeline was buried about
11 feet deep and protected within a 16inch diameter casing, the railcar wheels
severely dented the pipeline. The
impact caused a severe flattening of the
pipe casing with sharp angular bends at
two locations where the railcar wheel
assembly contacted it. This degree of
deformation to the 16-inch pipe casing
likely caused similar damage to the 12inch carrier pipe. The NTSB concluded
that had the gas pipeline been installed
at the railroad crossing with only the
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
13747
minimum level of ground cover
permitted by the current Federal and
industry pipeline construction
standards, it likely would have failed as
a result of being struck by derailed
equipment in this accident.
Accordingly, NTSB issued Safety
Recommendation R–12–04
recommending that FRA ‘‘[i]nform
railroads about the circumstances of the
accident and advise them of the need to
immediately notify pipeline operators of
accidents occurring in railroad rights-ofway and ensure that pipeline
inspections are accomplished prior to
resumption of service.’’
On July 31, 2012, the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) issued an
advisory bulletin in the Federal Register
(77 FR 45417–45418), encouraging
pipeline owners and operators, as a part
of their public awareness programs, to
inform rail operators and emergency
response officials of the benefits of
using the 811 ‘‘Call Before You Dig’’
program to identify and notify
underground utilities that an incident
has occurred in the vicinity of their
buried facilities.
Like PHMSA, FRA encourages
railroads to use the 811 ‘‘Call Before
You Dig’’ program to notify pipeline
operators of rail accidents occurring in
railroad rights-of-way where pipelines
are present and to ensure that pipeline
inspections are accomplished prior to
resumption of service. By calling 811,
pipeline owners and operators will be
notified of potential problems the
accident may have caused to the
pipeline, and enable the pipeline
owners and operators to work with the
involved railroads to prevent further
injury to individuals cleaning up the
accident site.
Issued in Washington, DC, on February 25,
2013.
Robert C. Lauby,
Deputy Associate Administrator for
Regulatory and Legislative Operations.
[FR Doc. 2013–04684 Filed 2–27–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Safety Advisory 2013–01; Passing Stop
Signals Protecting Movable Bridges
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
AGENCY:
FRA is issuing Safety
Advisory 2013–01 to remind track
SUMMARY:
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13748
Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 40 / Thursday, February 28, 2013 / Notices
owners, railroads, and their employees
of the importance of ensuring that rails
are properly aligned and movable spans
are secured before permitting a train to
pass a signal that is displaying a stop
indication and protecting a movable
bridge. FRA is issuing this notice in
response to a recent train accident
involving a derailment in which there
was an unsecured swing span that
moved laterally during the passage of a
train. This notice recommends that track
owners and railroads: (1) Evaluate the
design and construction of existing
movable bridges to determine if
effective span locking is being provided;
(2) review current operating rules and
procedures to ensure that these
instructions adequately protect movable
bridges during the operation of trains;
and (3) ensure that employees
authorized to determine whether
movable bridges are correctly aligned
and secured are adequately trained to
perform these duties.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Carlo M. Patrick, Staff Director, Rail and
Infrastructure Integrity Division, Office
of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC
20590, telephone (202) 493–6399; David
R. Killingbeck, Chief Engineer—
Structures, Rail and Infrastructure
Integrity Division, Office of Railroad
Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone
(202) 493–6251; or Anna Nassif Winkle,
Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel,
FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202)
493–6166.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Background
On November 30, 2012, a
Consolidated Rail Corporation mixed
freight train with two locomotives and
82 freight cars, including 51 hazardous
materials tank cars, derailed seven cars
while crossing a single-leaf movable
swing bridge. The derailed cars
included loaded tank cars of vinyl
chloride and ethanol. One vinyl
chloride tank car was breached,
resulting in the release of its contents
into a waterway and the atmosphere, as
well as in the subsequent evacuation of
approximately 600 nearby residents.
Due to the typically limited train
traffic over the bridge, it was normally
left in an open position when not
needed in order to allow pleasure craft
to pass. Upon arriving at the bridge, a
train crew would normally encounter a
stop signal and the bridge in the fullyopen position, oriented approximately
perpendicular to the track. As such,
once stopped at the signal, the train
VerDate Mar<15>2010
19:12 Feb 27, 2013
Jkt 229001
crew normally would request the bridge
to close using the key pad on the
locomotive radio. Through the use of a
programmable logic controller, an
automated sequence would commence
closing and seating the bridge and then
moving the slide lock rails into the
locked position. Once the slide lock
rails were fully engaged, a signal to
proceed would be displayed.
Following the derailment, the
swinging end of the movable span was
found to be laterally displaced
approximately three feet. Although
FRA’s investigation of this accident is
ongoing, and the probable causes and
contributing factors have not yet been
established, preliminary indications are
that the movable span was not locked in
place and moved or rotated laterally
during the passage of the train. Unlike
most swing bridges that possess end
wedges that when driven, prevent
rotation of the span, the subject bridge
was a rare, shear-pole swing span that
had neither end wedges nor span locks.
The slide rails that were part of the
movable bridge rail joints provided the
only means of securing the span from
rotating.
Recommended Action: In light of the
above discussion, FRA recommends that
track owners and railroads:
1. Evaluate the design of existing
movable bridges, especially swing
bridges, to determine if effective span
locking, independent of rail locking, is
being provided as recommended in
Chapter 15 (Steel Structures) of the
current American Railway Engineering
and Maintenance-of-Way Association
Manual for Railway Engineering.
2. Evaluate operating rules and
procedures that permit the operation of
trains past a stop signal protecting a
movable bridge to ensure their adequacy
to prevent operation of trains should the
bridge not be properly aligned and
secured.
3. Review the adequacy of all training
given to employees authorized to
determine that a movable bridge is
properly aligned and locked to ensure
that employees are capable of correctly
determining that the movable bridge is
safe for train movements.
FRA encourages track owners and
railroads to take actions that are
consistent with the preceding
recommendations and to take other
actions to help ensure the safety of the
Nation’s railroads, their employees, and
the general public. FRA may modify this
Safety Advisory 2013–01, issue
additional safety advisories, or take
other appropriate actions it deems
necessary to ensure the highest level of
safety on the Nation’s railroads,
PO 00000
Frm 00131
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
including pursuing other corrective
measures under its rail safety authority.
Issued in Washington, DC, on February 22,
2013.
Jo Strang,
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety/
Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2013–04713 Filed 2–27–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Transit Administration
Environmental Impact Statement for
the East San Fernando Valley Transit
Corridor Project, Los Angeles,
California
AGENCY:
Federal Transit Administration,
DOT.
Notice of Intent to Prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
ACTION:
The Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) and the Los
Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (LACMTA) are
issuing this Notice of Intent (NOI) to
advise other agencies and the public
that they will jointly prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
for proposed transit improvements in
the East San Fernando Valley Transit
Project Corridor in Los Angeles County,
California. The proposed project would
provide new transit service and related
infrastructure in the eastern San
Fernando Valley. The EIS will evaluate
new light rail and bus rapid transit
services alternatives, generally running
north-south along portions of Van Nuys
and Sepulveda Boulevards.
The EIS will be prepared in
accordance with the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and its implementing
regulations. The EIS process will
evaluate alternatives recommended for
further study as a result of the planning
Alternatives Analysis approved by the
LACMTA Board on January 24, 2013,
and available on the LACMTA Web site
(https://www.metro.net/east-sfv).
Pursuant to 23 CFR 771.123(j), at the
conclusion of the Draft Environmental
Impact Statement (DEIS) circulation
period, LACMTA will prepare a report
identifying the locally preferred
alternative (LPA). Prior to
commencement of a Final EIS, the LPA
will be adopted by the LACMTA Board
and included in the Metropolitan
Transportation Plan identifying
sufficient federal and other funding for
the project, in order to be evaluated
under the NEPA process.
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\28FEN1.SGM
28FEN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 40 (Thursday, February 28, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13747-13748]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-04713]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Safety Advisory 2013-01; Passing Stop Signals Protecting Movable
Bridges
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2013-01 to remind track
[[Page 13748]]
owners, railroads, and their employees of the importance of ensuring
that rails are properly aligned and movable spans are secured before
permitting a train to pass a signal that is displaying a stop
indication and protecting a movable bridge. FRA is issuing this notice
in response to a recent train accident involving a derailment in which
there was an unsecured swing span that moved laterally during the
passage of a train. This notice recommends that track owners and
railroads: (1) Evaluate the design and construction of existing movable
bridges to determine if effective span locking is being provided; (2)
review current operating rules and procedures to ensure that these
instructions adequately protect movable bridges during the operation of
trains; and (3) ensure that employees authorized to determine whether
movable bridges are correctly aligned and secured are adequately
trained to perform these duties.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Carlo M. Patrick, Staff Director, Rail
and Infrastructure Integrity Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-
6399; David R. Killingbeck, Chief Engineer--Structures, Rail and
Infrastructure Integrity Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-6251;
or Anna Nassif Winkle, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-
6166.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On November 30, 2012, a Consolidated Rail Corporation mixed freight
train with two locomotives and 82 freight cars, including 51 hazardous
materials tank cars, derailed seven cars while crossing a single-leaf
movable swing bridge. The derailed cars included loaded tank cars of
vinyl chloride and ethanol. One vinyl chloride tank car was breached,
resulting in the release of its contents into a waterway and the
atmosphere, as well as in the subsequent evacuation of approximately
600 nearby residents.
Due to the typically limited train traffic over the bridge, it was
normally left in an open position when not needed in order to allow
pleasure craft to pass. Upon arriving at the bridge, a train crew would
normally encounter a stop signal and the bridge in the fully-open
position, oriented approximately perpendicular to the track. As such,
once stopped at the signal, the train crew normally would request the
bridge to close using the key pad on the locomotive radio. Through the
use of a programmable logic controller, an automated sequence would
commence closing and seating the bridge and then moving the slide lock
rails into the locked position. Once the slide lock rails were fully
engaged, a signal to proceed would be displayed.
Following the derailment, the swinging end of the movable span was
found to be laterally displaced approximately three feet. Although
FRA's investigation of this accident is ongoing, and the probable
causes and contributing factors have not yet been established,
preliminary indications are that the movable span was not locked in
place and moved or rotated laterally during the passage of the train.
Unlike most swing bridges that possess end wedges that when driven,
prevent rotation of the span, the subject bridge was a rare, shear-pole
swing span that had neither end wedges nor span locks. The slide rails
that were part of the movable bridge rail joints provided the only
means of securing the span from rotating.
Recommended Action: In light of the above discussion, FRA
recommends that track owners and railroads:
1. Evaluate the design of existing movable bridges, especially
swing bridges, to determine if effective span locking, independent of
rail locking, is being provided as recommended in Chapter 15 (Steel
Structures) of the current American Railway Engineering and
Maintenance-of-Way Association Manual for Railway Engineering.
2. Evaluate operating rules and procedures that permit the
operation of trains past a stop signal protecting a movable bridge to
ensure their adequacy to prevent operation of trains should the bridge
not be properly aligned and secured.
3. Review the adequacy of all training given to employees
authorized to determine that a movable bridge is properly aligned and
locked to ensure that employees are capable of correctly determining
that the movable bridge is safe for train movements.
FRA encourages track owners and railroads to take actions that are
consistent with the preceding recommendations and to take other actions
to help ensure the safety of the Nation's railroads, their employees,
and the general public. FRA may modify this Safety Advisory 2013-01,
issue additional safety advisories, or take other appropriate actions
it deems necessary to ensure the highest level of safety on the
Nation's railroads, including pursuing other corrective measures under
its rail safety authority.
Issued in Washington, DC, on February 22, 2013.
Jo Strang,
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2013-04713 Filed 2-27-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
