Railroad Safety: Advisory Notice Related to Railroad Accidents in Vicinity of Underground Pipelines, 13747 [2013-04684]
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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 40 / Thursday, February 28, 2013 / Notices
This notice applies to all Federal
agency decisions as of the issuance date
of this notice and all laws under which
such actions were taken, including but
not limited to:
1. National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)
2. Safe, Accountable, Flexible and
Efficient, Transportation Equity Act,
A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA–LU)
3. MAP 21—Moving Ahead for Progress
in the 21st Century
4. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964
5. National Historic Preservation Act of
1966
6. Executive Order 12898, Federal
Actions to Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and
Low-Income Populations
7. Section 4(f) of the Transportation Act
of 1966
(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance
Program Number 20.205, Highway Planning
and Construction. The regulations
implementing Executive Order 12372
regarding intergovernmental consultation on
Federal programs and activities apply to this
program.)
Authority: 23 U.S.C. 139(l)(1).
Dated: February 20, 2013.
Matthew Schmitz,
Director, State Programs, Federal Highway
Administration, Sacramento, California.
[FR Doc. 2013–04643 Filed 2–27–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–RY–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Railroad Safety: Advisory Notice
Related to Railroad Accidents in
Vicinity of Underground Pipelines
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Advisory Notice.
AGENCY:
In response to Safety
Recommendation R–12–04 issued by the
National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), FRA is issuing this Advisory
Notice to inform railroads of the
circumstances surrounding the June 19,
2009, derailment of eastbound Canadian
National Railway (CN) Freight Train
U70691–18 in Cherry Valley, IL, and to
remind railroads of the need to
immediately notify pipeline operators of
rail accidents occurring in railroad
rights-of-way where pipelines are
present and the need to ensure that
pipeline inspections are accomplished
prior to resumption of service.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl
Alexy, Staff Director, Hazardous
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SUMMARY:
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19:12 Feb 27, 2013
Jkt 229001
Materials Division, Office of Railroad
Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., Washington, DC 20590; telephone:
(202) 493–6245; or Karl.Alexy@dot.gov;
or Elisabeth Galotto, Trial Attorney,
Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC
20590; telephone: (202) 493–0270; or
Elisabeth.Galotto@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June
19, 2009, at approximately 8:36 p.m.
(CST), CN Freight Train U70691–18,
traveling eastbound at 36 mph, derailed
at a highway-rail grade crossing in
Cherry Valley, IL. The train consisted of
two locomotives and 114 cars, 19 of
which derailed. All of the derailed cars
were tank cars carrying denatured fuel
ethanol, a flammable liquid. Thirteen of
the derailed tank cars were breached or
lost product and caught fire. At the time
of the derailment, several motor
vehicles were stopped on either side of
the grade crossing waiting for the train
to pass. As a result of the fire that
erupted after the derailment, a
passenger in one of the stopped cars was
fatally injured, two passengers in the
same car received serious injuries, and
five occupants of other cars waiting at
the highway-rail grade crossing were
injured. Two responding firefighters
also sustained minor injuries. The
release of ethanol and the resulting fire
prompted a mandatory evacuation of
about 600 residences within a half-mile
radius of the accident site.
The NTSB determined that the
probable cause of the accident was the
washout of the track structure that was
discovered about 1 hour before the
train’s arrival, and CN’s failure to notify
the train crew of the known washout in
time to stop the train because of the
inadequacy of CN’s emergency
communication procedures.
At the derailment site was a 12-inch
diameter underground natural gas
transmission pipeline operated by Nicor
Gas. The pipeline well exceeded Federal
standards for protective ground cover.
Yet, as the wreckage was removed from
above the pipeline, Nicor’s crews
discovered that a railcar wheel and axle
assembly had impacted the pipeline.
Although the pipeline was buried about
11 feet deep and protected within a 16inch diameter casing, the railcar wheels
severely dented the pipeline. The
impact caused a severe flattening of the
pipe casing with sharp angular bends at
two locations where the railcar wheel
assembly contacted it. This degree of
deformation to the 16-inch pipe casing
likely caused similar damage to the 12inch carrier pipe. The NTSB concluded
that had the gas pipeline been installed
at the railroad crossing with only the
PO 00000
Frm 00130
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
13747
minimum level of ground cover
permitted by the current Federal and
industry pipeline construction
standards, it likely would have failed as
a result of being struck by derailed
equipment in this accident.
Accordingly, NTSB issued Safety
Recommendation R–12–04
recommending that FRA ‘‘[i]nform
railroads about the circumstances of the
accident and advise them of the need to
immediately notify pipeline operators of
accidents occurring in railroad rights-ofway and ensure that pipeline
inspections are accomplished prior to
resumption of service.’’
On July 31, 2012, the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) issued an
advisory bulletin in the Federal Register
(77 FR 45417–45418), encouraging
pipeline owners and operators, as a part
of their public awareness programs, to
inform rail operators and emergency
response officials of the benefits of
using the 811 ‘‘Call Before You Dig’’
program to identify and notify
underground utilities that an incident
has occurred in the vicinity of their
buried facilities.
Like PHMSA, FRA encourages
railroads to use the 811 ‘‘Call Before
You Dig’’ program to notify pipeline
operators of rail accidents occurring in
railroad rights-of-way where pipelines
are present and to ensure that pipeline
inspections are accomplished prior to
resumption of service. By calling 811,
pipeline owners and operators will be
notified of potential problems the
accident may have caused to the
pipeline, and enable the pipeline
owners and operators to work with the
involved railroads to prevent further
injury to individuals cleaning up the
accident site.
Issued in Washington, DC, on February 25,
2013.
Robert C. Lauby,
Deputy Associate Administrator for
Regulatory and Legislative Operations.
[FR Doc. 2013–04684 Filed 2–27–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Safety Advisory 2013–01; Passing Stop
Signals Protecting Movable Bridges
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
AGENCY:
FRA is issuing Safety
Advisory 2013–01 to remind track
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\28FEN1.SGM
28FEN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 40 (Thursday, February 28, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Page 13747]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-04684]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Railroad Safety: Advisory Notice Related to Railroad Accidents in
Vicinity of Underground Pipelines
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Advisory Notice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: In response to Safety Recommendation R-12-04 issued by the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), FRA is issuing this
Advisory Notice to inform railroads of the circumstances surrounding
the June 19, 2009, derailment of eastbound Canadian National Railway
(CN) Freight Train U70691-18 in Cherry Valley, IL, and to remind
railroads of the need to immediately notify pipeline operators of rail
accidents occurring in railroad rights-of-way where pipelines are
present and the need to ensure that pipeline inspections are
accomplished prior to resumption of service.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Alexy, Staff Director, Hazardous
Materials Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590; telephone: (202) 493-6245; or
Karl.Alexy@dot.gov; or Elisabeth Galotto, Trial Attorney, Office of
Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590;
telephone: (202) 493-0270; or Elisabeth.Galotto@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June 19, 2009, at approximately 8:36 p.m.
(CST), CN Freight Train U70691-18, traveling eastbound at 36 mph,
derailed at a highway-rail grade crossing in Cherry Valley, IL. The
train consisted of two locomotives and 114 cars, 19 of which derailed.
All of the derailed cars were tank cars carrying denatured fuel
ethanol, a flammable liquid. Thirteen of the derailed tank cars were
breached or lost product and caught fire. At the time of the
derailment, several motor vehicles were stopped on either side of the
grade crossing waiting for the train to pass. As a result of the fire
that erupted after the derailment, a passenger in one of the stopped
cars was fatally injured, two passengers in the same car received
serious injuries, and five occupants of other cars waiting at the
highway-rail grade crossing were injured. Two responding firefighters
also sustained minor injuries. The release of ethanol and the resulting
fire prompted a mandatory evacuation of about 600 residences within a
half-mile radius of the accident site.
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the
washout of the track structure that was discovered about 1 hour before
the train's arrival, and CN's failure to notify the train crew of the
known washout in time to stop the train because of the inadequacy of
CN's emergency communication procedures.
At the derailment site was a 12-inch diameter underground natural
gas transmission pipeline operated by Nicor Gas. The pipeline well
exceeded Federal standards for protective ground cover. Yet, as the
wreckage was removed from above the pipeline, Nicor's crews discovered
that a railcar wheel and axle assembly had impacted the pipeline.
Although the pipeline was buried about 11 feet deep and protected
within a 16-inch diameter casing, the railcar wheels severely dented
the pipeline. The impact caused a severe flattening of the pipe casing
with sharp angular bends at two locations where the railcar wheel
assembly contacted it. This degree of deformation to the 16-inch pipe
casing likely caused similar damage to the 12-inch carrier pipe. The
NTSB concluded that had the gas pipeline been installed at the railroad
crossing with only the minimum level of ground cover permitted by the
current Federal and industry pipeline construction standards, it likely
would have failed as a result of being struck by derailed equipment in
this accident. Accordingly, NTSB issued Safety Recommendation R-12-04
recommending that FRA ``[i]nform railroads about the circumstances of
the accident and advise them of the need to immediately notify pipeline
operators of accidents occurring in railroad rights-of-way and ensure
that pipeline inspections are accomplished prior to resumption of
service.''
On July 31, 2012, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) issued an advisory bulletin in the Federal
Register (77 FR 45417-45418), encouraging pipeline owners and
operators, as a part of their public awareness programs, to inform rail
operators and emergency response officials of the benefits of using the
811 ``Call Before You Dig'' program to identify and notify underground
utilities that an incident has occurred in the vicinity of their buried
facilities.
Like PHMSA, FRA encourages railroads to use the 811 ``Call Before
You Dig'' program to notify pipeline operators of rail accidents
occurring in railroad rights-of-way where pipelines are present and to
ensure that pipeline inspections are accomplished prior to resumption
of service. By calling 811, pipeline owners and operators will be
notified of potential problems the accident may have caused to the
pipeline, and enable the pipeline owners and operators to work with the
involved railroads to prevent further injury to individuals cleaning up
the accident site.
Issued in Washington, DC, on February 25, 2013.
Robert C. Lauby,
Deputy Associate Administrator for Regulatory and Legislative
Operations.
[FR Doc. 2013-04684 Filed 2-27-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P