Brian Earl Cressman, M.D.; Decision and Order, 12091-12092 [2013-03878]

Download as PDF Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 35 / Thursday, February 21, 2013 / Notices 28 U.S.C. Dollar amount to be adjusted 11 U.S.C. (6)—in paragraph (5)(B) ............................................ (7)—in paragraph 6(C) .............................................. (8)—in paragraph 7(A)(iii) .......................................... 1322(d)—contents of chapter 13 plan, monthly income .. 1325(b)—chapter 13 confirmation of plan, disposable income. 1326(b)(3)—payments to former chapter 7 trustee .......... [FR Doc. 2013–03998 Filed 2–20–13; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 2210–55–P DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Drug Enforcement Administration [Docket No. 13–4] Brian Earl Cressman, M.D.; Decision and Order On December 5, 2012, Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) John J. Mulrooney, II, issued the attached Amended Order Granting the Government’s Motion for Summary Disposition and Recommended Decision (hereinafter, Recommended Decision). Therein, the ALJ found that Respondent is no longer authorized under Alabama law to dispense controlled substances and therefore recommended that his DEA Certificate of Registration, BC4785614, be revoked. See Recommended Decision at 3–5. Neither party filed exceptions to the Recommended Decision. Having reviewed the entire record, I have decided to adopt the ALJ’s Recommended Decision in its entirety including his recommended order. See Hooper v. Holder, 2012 WL 2020079,*2 (4th Cir. 2012). Order erowe on DSK2VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a), as well as 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificate of Registration BC4785614, issued to Brian Earl Cressman, M.D., be, and it hereby is, revoked. I further order that any pending application of Brian Earl Cressman, M.D., to renew or modify this registration, be, and it hereby is, denied. This Order is effective March 25, 2013. Dated: February 12, 2013. Michele M. Leonhart, Administrator. Theresa Krause, Esq., for the Government. Brian Earl Cressman, M.D., pro se, for the Respondent. VerDate Mar<15>2010 14:47 Feb 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 New (adjusted) dollar amount $1,175 ....................................................... $625 .......................................................... $625 .......................................................... $1,250. $675. $675. $625 (each time it appears) ..................... $625 (each time it appears) ..................... $675 (each time it appears). $675 (each time it appears). $25 ............................................................ $25. Amended Order Granting the Government’s Motion for Summary Disposition and Recommended Decision Chief Administrative Law Judge John J. Mulrooney, II. On October 25, 2012, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or Government) issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of Registration (OSC/ISO) immediately suspending, and proposing to revoke the DEA Certificate of Registration (COR), Number BC4785614, of Brian Earl Cressman, M.D. (Respondent), pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) and (4) (2006), because the Respondent’s continued registration is inconsistent with the public interest as that term is used in 21 U.S.C. 823(f) (2006 & Supp. III 2010). In the OSC/ISO, the Government alleges as grounds for revocation, inter alia, that the Respondent is ‘‘without authority to handle controlled substances in the [s]tate of Alabama.’’ OSC/ISO at 1. On November 14, 2012, the DEA Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) received from the Respondent, representing himself, pro se, a timely filed request for hearing (Hearing Request). Therein, the Respondent conceded that his Alabama Controlled Substance Certificate (ACSC) was revoked in February of 2012. Resp’t Hrng. Req., at 1. The same day, this tribunal issued an order (Briefing Schedule): (1) Directing the Government to ‘‘provide evidence to support the allegation that the Respondent lacks state authority to handle controlled substances’’ on or before Wednesday, November 21, 2012; (2) setting a deadline of November 21, 2012 for the Government to file a motion for summary disposition; and (3) setting a deadline of November 30, 2012 for the Respondent to respond to any motion for summary disposition. Briefing Schedule, at 1–2. On November 20, 2012, the Government filed a Motion for Summary Disposition (‘‘MSD’’), seeking: (1) Summary disposition; and (2) a recommendation that ‘‘the Respondent’s DEA COR as a practitioner be revoked PO 00000 12091 Frm 00061 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 based on the Respondent’s lack of a state license.’’ MSD, at 5. A copy of a June 21, 2010 Order issued by the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners revoking the Respondent’s ACSC was attached to the MSD. MSD App. A. Additionally, the Government included a printout from the Alabama State Board of Medical Examiners Web site dated November 15, 2012, which lists the status of the Respondent’s ACSC as revoked, and also a verification of controlled substances registration, dated November 15, 2012, from the Alabama State Board of Medical Examiners, confirming the revocation. MSD Apps. B, C. The Respondent did not file a response to the Government’s motion within the time allowed. On December 3, 2012, this tribunal issued an ‘‘Order Granting the Government’s Unopposed Motion for Summary Disposition and Recommended Decision,’’ (Summary Disposition Order/Recommended Decision). On the same day the Summary Disposition Order/ Recommended Decision was issued, the Respondent filed with the tribunal an untitled letter (Post Order Letter). This amended order has been issued to incorporate the consideration of the matters set for in the Respondent’s Post Order Letter, and supersedes the previously-issued Summary Disposition Order/Recommended Decision in all respects. In his Post Order Letter, the Respondent represents ‘‘that the Alabama revocation decision, was dismissed in a Montgomery circuit court by the Honorable Judge Hardwick.’’ Post Order Letter, at 1. In support of this assertion, the Respondent provided a copy of an August 25, 2010 Order from the Circuit Court of Montgomery County (Hardwick, J.). Id. at 2–3. Contrary to the Respondent’s assertion, this Order did not dismiss the Alabama Board Order revoking the Respondent’s state controlled substance privileges, but stayed the Order ‘‘pending judicial review by the Court of Civil Appeals.’’ Id. at 3. In a subsequent, published decision, the Alabama Court of Civil E:\FR\FM\21FEN1.SGM 21FEN1 erowe on DSK2VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 12092 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 35 / Thursday, February 21, 2013 / Notices Appeals dismissed the Respondent’s appeal of the Alabama Board Order on procedural grounds. Cressman v. Ala. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 72 So. 3d 679 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). Moreover, as discussed, supra, in his Request for Hearing, the Respondent has already conceded that his Alabama controlled substance privileges were ‘‘revoked in Feb[ruary] 2012.’’ Resp’t Req. for Hrng at 1. Therefore, the Respondent’s letter notwithstanding, it is beyond argument that the Respondent does not currently possess authority to handle controlled substances in the State of Alabama, the state of his DEA COR. In order to revoke a registrant’s DEA registration, the DEA has the burden of proving that the requirements for revocation are satisfied. 21 CFR 1301.44(e). Once DEA has made its prima facie case for revocation of the registrant’s DEA COR, the burden of production then shifts to the Respondent to show that, given the totality of the facts and circumstances in the record, revoking the registrant’s registration would not be appropriate. Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 174 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Humphreys v. DEA, 96 F.3d 658, 661 (3d Cir. 1996); Shatz v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 873 F.2d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 1989); Thomas E. Johnston, 45 FR 72311 (1980). The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) requires that, in order to maintain a DEA registration, a practitioner must be authorized to handle controlled substances in ‘‘the jurisdiction in which he practices.’’ See 21 U.S.C. 802(21) (‘‘[t]he term ‘practitioner’ means a physician * * * licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by * * * the jurisdiction in which he practices * * * to distribute, dispense, [or] administer * * * a controlled substance in the course of professional practice’’); see also id. § 823(f) (‘‘The Attorney General shall register practitioners * * * if the applicant is authorized to dispense * * * controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.’’). DEA has long held that possession of authority under state law to dispense controlled substances is an essential condition for obtaining and maintaining a DEA registration. Serenity ´ Cafe, 77 FR 35027, 35028 (2012); David W. Wang, 72 FR 54297, 54298 (2007); Sheran Arden Yeates, 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51104 (1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11919 (1988). Because ‘‘possessing authority under state law to handle controlled substances is an essential condition for holding a DEA registration,’’ this Agency has consistently held that ‘‘the CSA requires the revocation of a registration issued to VerDate Mar<15>2010 14:47 Feb 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 a practitioner who lacks [such authority].’’ Roy Chi Lung, 74 FR 20346, 20347 (2009); see also Scott Sandarg, D.M.D., 74 FR 17528, 174529 (2009); John B. Freitas, D.O., 74 ed. Reg. 17524, 17525 (2009); Roger A. Rodriguez, M.D., 70 FR 33206, 33207 (2005); Stephen J. Graham, M.D., 69 FR 11661 (2004); Abraham A. Chaplan, M.D., 57 FR 55280 (1992); see also Harrell E. Robinson, 74 FR 61370, 61375 (2009).1 ‘‘[R]evocation is warranted even where a practitioner’s state authority has been summarily suspended and the State has yet to provide the practitioner with a hearing to challenge the State’s action at which he may ultimately prevail.’’ Kamal Tiwari, M.D., 76 FR 71604, 71606, (2011); see also Bourne Pharmacy, Inc., 72 Fed Reg. 18273, 18274 (2007); Anne Lazar Thorn, 62 FR 12847 (1997). Congress does not intend for administrative agencies to perform meaningless tasks. See Philip E. Kirk, M.D., 48 FR 32887 (1983), aff’d sub nom. Kirk v. Mullen, 749 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. EPA, 35 F.3d 600, 605 (1st Cir. 1994); NLRB v. Int’l Assoc. of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, AFL–CIO, 549 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Consol. Mines & Smelting Co., 455 F.2d 432, 453 (9th Cir. 1971). Thus, it is well-settled that, where no genuine question of fact is involved, or when the material facts are agreed upon, a plenary, adversarial administrative proceeding is not required. See Jesus R. Juarez, M.D., 62 FR 14945 (1997); Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51104 (1993). Here, both parties agree, and the supplied Alabama Board Order and other documentation establish, that the Respondent is without authorization to handle controlled substances in Alabama,2 the jurisdiction where the Respondent holds the DEA COR that is the subject of this litigation. Summary disposition of an administrative case is warranted where, as here, ‘‘there is no factual dispute of substance.’’ See Veg-Mix, Inc., 832 F.2d 601, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (‘‘an agency may ordinarily dispense with a hearing 1 But see 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) (‘‘A registration pursuant to section 823 of this title to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance may be suspended or revoked by the Attorney General upon a finding that the registrant * * * has had his State license or registration suspended, revoked, or denied by competent State authority. * * *’’) (emphasis added). 2 The Respondent’s representation that he has secured employment in Texas is of no moment here. See Shahid Musud Siddiqui, M.D., 61 FR 14818 (1996) (a registrant’s controlled substance privileges in a state outside the state of his DEA registration is irrelevant). PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 when no genuine dispute exists’’).3 At this juncture, no genuine dispute exists over the fact that the Respondent lacks state authority to handle controlled substances in the State of Alabama. Because the Respondent lacks such state authority, both the plain language of applicable federal statutory provisions and Agency interpretive precedent dictate that the Respondent is not entitled to maintain his DEA registration. Simply put, there is no contested factual matter adducible at a hearing that would provide DEA with the authority to allow the Respondent to continue to hold his COR. In view of this determination, it is unnecessary to address the remaining allegations contained in the OSC/ISO. Accordingly, I hereby Grant the Government’s Motion for Summary Disposition; and recommend that the Respondent’s DEA registration be revoked forthwith and any pending applications for renewal be denied. Dated: December 5, 2012. John J. Mulrooney, II, Chief Administrative Law Judge. [FR Doc. 2013–03878 Filed 2–20–13; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4410–09–P DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Drug Enforcement Administration [Docket No. 11–10] John V. Scalera; Decision and Order On November 17, 2010, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, issued an Order to Show Cause to John V. Scalera, M.D. (hereinafter, Respondent), of Northfield, New Jersey. The Show Cause Order proposed the denial of Respondent’s application for a DEA Certificate of Registration as a practitioner, on the ground that his ‘‘registration would be inconsistent with the public interest.’’ ALJ Ex. 1, at 1. The Show Cause Order specifically alleged that Respondent had previously held a DEA registration, which, on February 23, 2009, he voluntarily surrendered for cause. Id. The Order alleged that Respondent had written 3 Even assuming arguendo the possibility that the Respondent’s state controlled substances privileges could be reinstated, summary disposition would still be warranted because ‘‘revocation is also appropriate when a state license has been suspended, but with the possibility of future reinstatement,’’ Rodriguez, 70 FR at 33207 (citations omitted), and even where there is a judicial challenge to the state medical board action actively pending in the state courts. Michael G. Dolin, M.D., 65 FR 5661, 5662 (2000). E:\FR\FM\21FEN1.SGM 21FEN1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 35 (Thursday, February 21, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 12091-12092]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-03878]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket No. 13-4]


Brian Earl Cressman, M.D.; Decision and Order

    On December 5, 2012, Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) John J. 
Mulrooney, II, issued the attached Amended Order Granting the 
Government's Motion for Summary Disposition and Recommended Decision 
(hereinafter, Recommended Decision). Therein, the ALJ found that 
Respondent is no longer authorized under Alabama law to dispense 
controlled substances and therefore recommended that his DEA 
Certificate of Registration, BC4785614, be revoked. See Recommended 
Decision at 3-5. Neither party filed exceptions to the Recommended 
Decision. Having reviewed the entire record, I have decided to adopt 
the ALJ's Recommended Decision in its entirety including his 
recommended order. See Hooper v. Holder, 2012 WL 2020079,*2 (4th Cir. 
2012).

Order

    Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 
824(a), as well as 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificate of 
Registration BC4785614, issued to Brian Earl Cressman, M.D., be, and it 
hereby is, revoked. I further order that any pending application of 
Brian Earl Cressman, M.D., to renew or modify this registration, be, 
and it hereby is, denied. This Order is effective March 25, 2013.

    Dated: February 12, 2013.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Administrator.

Theresa Krause, Esq., for the Government.
Brian Earl Cressman, M.D., pro se, for the Respondent.

Amended Order Granting the Government's Motion for Summary Disposition 
and Recommended Decision

    Chief Administrative Law Judge John J. Mulrooney, II. On October 
25, 2012, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA 
or Government) issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension 
of Registration (OSC/ISO) immediately suspending, and proposing to 
revoke the DEA Certificate of Registration (COR), Number BC4785614, of 
Brian Earl Cressman, M.D. (Respondent), pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) 
and (4) (2006), because the Respondent's continued registration is 
inconsistent with the public interest as that term is used in 21 U.S.C. 
823(f) (2006 & Supp. III 2010). In the OSC/ISO, the Government alleges 
as grounds for revocation, inter alia, that the Respondent is ``without 
authority to handle controlled substances in the [s]tate of Alabama.'' 
OSC/ISO at 1.
    On November 14, 2012, the DEA Office of Administrative Law Judges 
(OALJ) received from the Respondent, representing himself, pro se, a 
timely filed request for hearing (Hearing Request). Therein, the 
Respondent conceded that his Alabama Controlled Substance Certificate 
(ACSC) was revoked in February of 2012. Resp't Hrng. Req., at 1. The 
same day, this tribunal issued an order (Briefing Schedule): (1) 
Directing the Government to ``provide evidence to support the 
allegation that the Respondent lacks state authority to handle 
controlled substances'' on or before Wednesday, November 21, 2012; (2) 
setting a deadline of November 21, 2012 for the Government to file a 
motion for summary disposition; and (3) setting a deadline of November 
30, 2012 for the Respondent to respond to any motion for summary 
disposition. Briefing Schedule, at 1-2.
    On November 20, 2012, the Government filed a Motion for Summary 
Disposition (``MSD''), seeking: (1) Summary disposition; and (2) a 
recommendation that ``the Respondent's DEA COR as a practitioner be 
revoked based on the Respondent's lack of a state license.'' MSD, at 5. 
A copy of a June 21, 2010 Order issued by the Alabama Board of Medical 
Examiners revoking the Respondent's ACSC was attached to the MSD. MSD 
App. A. Additionally, the Government included a printout from the 
Alabama State Board of Medical Examiners Web site dated November 15, 
2012, which lists the status of the Respondent's ACSC as revoked, and 
also a verification of controlled substances registration, dated 
November 15, 2012, from the Alabama State Board of Medical Examiners, 
confirming the revocation. MSD Apps. B, C. The Respondent did not file 
a response to the Government's motion within the time allowed.
    On December 3, 2012, this tribunal issued an ``Order Granting the 
Government's Unopposed Motion for Summary Disposition and Recommended 
Decision,'' (Summary Disposition Order/Recommended Decision). On the 
same day the Summary Disposition Order/Recommended Decision was issued, 
the Respondent filed with the tribunal an untitled letter (Post Order 
Letter). This amended order has been issued to incorporate the 
consideration of the matters set for in the Respondent's Post Order 
Letter, and supersedes the previously-issued Summary Disposition Order/
Recommended Decision in all respects.
    In his Post Order Letter, the Respondent represents ``that the 
Alabama revocation decision, was dismissed in a Montgomery circuit 
court by the Honorable Judge Hardwick.'' Post Order Letter, at 1. In 
support of this assertion, the Respondent provided a copy of an August 
25, 2010 Order from the Circuit Court of Montgomery County (Hardwick, 
J.). Id. at 2-3. Contrary to the Respondent's assertion, this Order did 
not dismiss the Alabama Board Order revoking the Respondent's state 
controlled substance privileges, but stayed the Order ``pending 
judicial review by the Court of Civil Appeals.'' Id. at 3. In a 
subsequent, published decision, the Alabama Court of Civil

[[Page 12092]]

Appeals dismissed the Respondent's appeal of the Alabama Board Order on 
procedural grounds. Cressman v. Ala. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 72 So. 3d 679 
(Ala. Civ. App. 2011). Moreover, as discussed, supra, in his Request 
for Hearing, the Respondent has already conceded that his Alabama 
controlled substance privileges were ``revoked in Feb[ruary] 2012.'' 
Resp't Req. for Hrng at 1. Therefore, the Respondent's letter 
notwithstanding, it is beyond argument that the Respondent does not 
currently possess authority to handle controlled substances in the 
State of Alabama, the state of his DEA COR.
    In order to revoke a registrant's DEA registration, the DEA has the 
burden of proving that the requirements for revocation are satisfied. 
21 CFR 1301.44(e). Once DEA has made its prima facie case for 
revocation of the registrant's DEA COR, the burden of production then 
shifts to the Respondent to show that, given the totality of the facts 
and circumstances in the record, revoking the registrant's registration 
would not be appropriate. Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 174 (D.C. Cir. 
2005); Humphreys v. DEA, 96 F.3d 658, 661 (3d Cir. 1996); Shatz v. U.S. 
Dept. of Justice, 873 F.2d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 1989); Thomas E. 
Johnston, 45 FR 72311 (1980).
    The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) requires that, in order to 
maintain a DEA registration, a practitioner must be authorized to 
handle controlled substances in ``the jurisdiction in which he 
practices.'' See 21 U.S.C. 802(21) (``[t]he term `practitioner' means a 
physician * * * licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by * * * 
the jurisdiction in which he practices * * * to distribute, dispense, 
[or] administer * * * a controlled substance in the course of 
professional practice''); see also id. Sec.  823(f) (``The Attorney 
General shall register practitioners * * * if the applicant is 
authorized to dispense * * * controlled substances under the laws of 
the State in which he practices.''). DEA has long held that possession 
of authority under state law to dispense controlled substances is an 
essential condition for obtaining and maintaining a DEA registration. 
Serenity Caf[eacute], 77 FR 35027, 35028 (2012); David W. Wang, 72 FR 
54297, 54298 (2007); Sheran Arden Yeates, 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); 
Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51104 (1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 
11919 (1988). Because ``possessing authority under state law to handle 
controlled substances is an essential condition for holding a DEA 
registration,'' this Agency has consistently held that ``the CSA 
requires the revocation of a registration issued to a practitioner who 
lacks [such authority].'' Roy Chi Lung, 74 FR 20346, 20347 (2009); see 
also Scott Sandarg, D.M.D., 74 FR 17528, 174529 (2009); John B. 
Freitas, D.O., 74 ed. Reg. 17524, 17525 (2009); Roger A. Rodriguez, 
M.D., 70 FR 33206, 33207 (2005); Stephen J. Graham, M.D., 69 FR 11661 
(2004); Abraham A. Chaplan, M.D., 57 FR 55280 (1992); see also Harrell 
E. Robinson, 74 FR 61370, 61375 (2009).\1\ ``[R]evocation is warranted 
even where a practitioner's state authority has been summarily 
suspended and the State has yet to provide the practitioner with a 
hearing to challenge the State's action at which he may ultimately 
prevail.'' Kamal Tiwari, M.D., 76 FR 71604, 71606, (2011); see also 
Bourne Pharmacy, Inc., 72 Fed Reg. 18273, 18274 (2007); Anne Lazar 
Thorn, 62 FR 12847 (1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ But see 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) (``A registration pursuant to 
section 823 of this title to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a 
controlled substance may be suspended or revoked by the Attorney 
General upon a finding that the registrant * * * has had his State 
license or registration suspended, revoked, or denied by competent 
State authority. * * *'') (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Congress does not intend for administrative agencies to perform 
meaningless tasks. See Philip E. Kirk, M.D., 48 FR 32887 (1983), aff'd 
sub nom. Kirk v. Mullen, 749 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Puerto 
Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. EPA, 35 F.3d 600, 605 (1st Cir. 1994); 
NLRB v. Int'l Assoc. of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, 
AFL-CIO, 549 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Consol. Mines & 
Smelting Co., 455 F.2d 432, 453 (9th Cir. 1971). Thus, it is well-
settled that, where no genuine question of fact is involved, or when 
the material facts are agreed upon, a plenary, adversarial 
administrative proceeding is not required. See Jesus R. Juarez, M.D., 
62 FR 14945 (1997); Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51104 (1993). Here, 
both parties agree, and the supplied Alabama Board Order and other 
documentation establish, that the Respondent is without authorization 
to handle controlled substances in Alabama,\2\ the jurisdiction where 
the Respondent holds the DEA COR that is the subject of this 
litigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ The Respondent's representation that he has secured 
employment in Texas is of no moment here. See Shahid Musud Siddiqui, 
M.D., 61 FR 14818 (1996) (a registrant's controlled substance 
privileges in a state outside the state of his DEA registration is 
irrelevant).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Summary disposition of an administrative case is warranted where, 
as here, ``there is no factual dispute of substance.'' See Veg-Mix, 
Inc., 832 F.2d 601, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (``an agency may ordinarily 
dispense with a hearing when no genuine dispute exists'').\3\ At this 
juncture, no genuine dispute exists over the fact that the Respondent 
lacks state authority to handle controlled substances in the State of 
Alabama. Because the Respondent lacks such state authority, both the 
plain language of applicable federal statutory provisions and Agency 
interpretive precedent dictate that the Respondent is not entitled to 
maintain his DEA registration. Simply put, there is no contested 
factual matter adducible at a hearing that would provide DEA with the 
authority to allow the Respondent to continue to hold his COR. In view 
of this determination, it is unnecessary to address the remaining 
allegations contained in the OSC/ISO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Even assuming arguendo the possibility that the Respondent's 
state controlled substances privileges could be reinstated, summary 
disposition would still be warranted because ``revocation is also 
appropriate when a state license has been suspended, but with the 
possibility of future reinstatement,'' Rodriguez, 70 FR at 33207 
(citations omitted), and even where there is a judicial challenge to 
the state medical board action actively pending in the state courts. 
Michael G. Dolin, M.D., 65 FR 5661, 5662 (2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, I hereby
    Grant the Government's Motion for Summary Disposition; and 
recommend that the Respondent's DEA registration be revoked forthwith 
and any pending applications for renewal be denied.

    Dated: December 5, 2012.
John J. Mulrooney, II,
Chief Administrative Law Judge.
[FR Doc. 2013-03878 Filed 2-20-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P