36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification, 695-699 [2012-31724]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
• Office of the Secretary

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 3 (Friday, January 4, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 695-699]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-31724]


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

[Transmittal Nos. 12-59]


36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification

AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text 
of a section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. This is published to 
fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-164 dated 
July 21, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, (703) 
601-3740.
    The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, Transmittals 12-59 with attached transmittal and 
policy justification, and Sensitivity of Technology.

    Dated: December 31, 2012.
Aaron Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
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Transmittal No. 12-59
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 
36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended
    (i) Prospective Purchaser: Qatar
    (ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment*.................  $276 Million
Other....................................  $130 Million
                                          ------------------------------
  Total..................................  $406 Million
 

    (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or 
Services under Consideration for Purchase: 7 M142 High Mobility 
Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) Launchers with the Universal Fire 
Control System (UFCS); 60 M57 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) 
Block IA T2K Unitary Rockets (60 pods, 1 rocket per pod); 360 M31A1 
Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Unitary Rockets (60 pods, 
6 rockets per pod); 180 M28A2 Reduced Range Practice Rockets (30 pods, 
6 rockets per pod); 7 M68A2 Trainers, 1 Advanced Field Artillery 
Tactical Data System (AFATDS); 2 M1151A1 High Mobility Multipurpose 
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV); and 2 M1152A2 HMMWVs. Also included are 
simulators, generators, transportation, wheeled vehicles, 
communications equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, 
tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel 
training and training equipment, U.S. government

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and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, 
and other related elements of logistics support.
    (iv) Military Department: Army (UAQ)
    (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None
    (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be 
Paid: None
    (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or 
Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Annex attached.
    (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: 21 December 2012

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Qatar--HIMARS, ATACMS, and GMLRS

    The Government of Qatar has requested a possible sale of 7 M142 
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) Launchers with the 
Universal Fire Control System (UFCS); 60 M57 Army Tactical Missile 
System (ATACMS) Block 1A T2K Unitary Rockets (60 pods, 1 rocket per 
pod); 360 M31A1 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Unitary 
Rockets (60 pods, 6 rockets per pod); 180 M28A2 Reduced Range Practice 
Rockets (30 pods, 6 rockets per pod); 7 M68A2 Trainers, 1 Advanced 
Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS); 2 M1151A1 High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV); and 2 M1152A2 HMMWVs. Also 
included are simulators, generators, transportation, wheeled vehicles, 
communications equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, 
tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel 
training and training equipment, U.S. government and contractor 
engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other 
related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $406 
million.
    This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and 
national security of the United States by helping to improve the 
security of an important partner which has been, and continues to be an 
important force for political stability and economic progress in the 
Middle East.
    The proposed sale will improve Qatar's capability to meet current 
and future threats and provide greater security for its critical 
infrastructure. It will also enhance Qatar's interoperability with the 
U.S. and its allies, making it a more valuable partner in an 
increasingly important area of the world. Qatar will have no difficulty 
absorbing these launchers into its armed forces.
    The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the 
basic military balance in the region.
    The prime contractor will be Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire 
Control in Dallas, Texas. There are no known offset agreements proposed 
in connection with this potential sale.
    Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of 
two contractor representatives to Qatar for a minimum of one year to 
support delivery of the HIMARS and to provide support and equipment 
familiarization.
    There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a 
result of this proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 12-59
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 
36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended
Annex
Item No. vii
    (vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
    1. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) with the 
Universal Fire Control System (UFCS) is a C-130 transportable, wheeled 
version of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launcher. 
Integrated on a 5-ton Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) truck 
chassis, it carries one launch pod containing six MLRS rockets or one 
ATACMS missile and is capable of firing all MLRS Family of Munitions 
(MFOM) rockets and missiles, to include Guided MLRS, ATACMS Unitary, 
and future variants. HIMARS operates with the same MLRS command, 
control, and communications, as well as the same size crew, as the 
M270A1 launcher. The HIMARS launcher has a Global Positioning System 
(GPS), but can operate without it. The launcher has a maximum speed of 
55 mph and a minimum cruising range of 300 miles. The UFCS provides the 
command and control interface, man-machine interface, weapon interface, 
launcher interface and embedded training. The UFCS enables the launcher 
to interoperate with compatible national fire direction systems to 
navigate to specific fire and reload points, compute the technical 
firing solution, and orient the Launcher Module (LM) on the target to 
deliver the weapon accurately and effectively. The HIMARS launcher is 
moderately susceptible to reverse engineering. However, the cost to 
develop and establish a production capability would be prohibitive for 
many countries. It includes Built-in-Test and capability to store 
critical mission parameters, as well as system configuration and 
maintenance information. The UFCS also provided position navigation and 
processing necessary to direct and maintain control of the launcher 
system to allow for accurate firing and loading of weapons. The UFCS is 
militarily critical because it has the latest software and hardware. 
Reverse engineering would allow countermeasures to be developed, 
degrading the total weapon system. It would also impact the commercial 
business base by allowing cheap replication without the expenditure of 
Research and Development funds. The UFCS software is classified as 
Secret. The HIMARS hardware is Unclassified.
    2. The M57 ATACMS Block 1A T2K Unitary Rocket provides Corps and 
Joint Task Force Commanders the capability to attack high-value, time 
sensitive targets when and where collateral damage, unexploded 
ordnance, or piloted aircraft risk may be of concern. It can be 
employed, even during inclement weather, against a variety of 
infrastructure, tactical, and, operational targets. These targets 
include both single and multi-story buildings, radio and television 
communications centers, telephone-relay sites, and other targets 
located in urban or foliage restricted terrain. The M57 ATACMS Block 1A 
(Unitary) rocket is a conventional, semi-ballistic missile which 
utilizes a 500-lb HE unitary warhead. The Block IA configuration has 
increased range and accuracy as compared to the Block I (70-300km for 
Block 1A vs. 25-165km for Block I) and maintains lethality due to a 
Global Positioning System (GPS) aided guidance system. The M57 ATACMS 
Block 1A (Unitary) is the Full Material Release variant of ATACMS 
Unitary (formerly the M48 Quick Reaction Unitary), and has been 
upgraded to TACMS 2K (T2K) specifications (T2K includes redesigned 
components to compensate for obsolescence issues and bring down per-
unit costs). Components of the M57 ATACMS Block IA Unitary missile are 
considered highly resistant to reverse engineering, and the impact of 
loss or diversion of the end item hardware would have minimum adverse 
impact. However, technical data for production of the Ring Laser 
Gyroscope (RLG), or for production, procession, fabrication, and 
loading of the solid propellant rocket motor are potentially applicable 
to development and production of accurate, long-range missile delivery 
systems. In addition, the RLG and accelerometers would have 
applicability to aircraft, space, and submarine programs. Lithium 
battery technology has applicability in a number of areas such as smart 
munitions communication, etc. Technologies used in the missile guidance 
and control subsystems and propulsion system are on the Militarily 
Critical Technologies List with details provided below:

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    a. The Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) is militarily critical due 
to the components used and the manufacturing process involved in the 
development of the ring laser gyroscope (RLG), accelerometers, 
microprocessors, and integration of the GPS receiver into the missile.
    b. The propulsion system technology is militarily critical. 
Critical factors include low-burn rate/high performance propellant, 
case bonding, and design for long shelf-life stability.
    c. The lithium thermal batteries used in the tactical missile 
guidance and control are militarily critical. Within the U.S., only a 
small number of companies can produce batteries having the required 
combination of energy density and shelf life.
    d. The system software could be used by adversaries to evaluate 
missions and capabilities of the missile and is therefore militarily 
critical.
    The data table and mission critical data generator special 
applications software is classified Confidential. The Security 
Classification Guide's (SCG's) classification of performance data and 
information ranges from Unclassified to Secret. System accuracy, 
lethality, and effectiveness data are classified Secret. System 
response time and most trajectory data are classified Confidential. 
Range, reliability, and maintainability data are Unclassified. 
Countermeasures and counter-countermeasures are classified Secret.
    3. The M31 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Unitary 
uses a Unitary High Explosive (HE) Warhead along with GPS-aided IMU 
based guidance and control for ground-to-ground precision point 
targeting. GPS is not required for GMLRS to meet its effectiveness 
threshold. Additionally, GMLRS Unitary uses an Electronic Safe and Arm 
Fuse (ESAF) along with a nose mounted proximity sensor to give enhanced 
effectiveness to the GMLRS Unitary rocket by providing tri-mode warhead 
functionality with point detonate, point detonate with programmable 
delay, or Height of Burst proximity function. Control of the rocket in 
flight is accomplished by fins (canards) located in the nose section. 
The GMLRS Unitary M31A1 is comprised of a Launch Pod Container (LPC) 
and six GMLRS Unitary Rockets. The LPC can be loaded in the M270A1, 
M142 HIMARS, or in the European M270 launcher. The LPC provides a 
protective environment for the GMLRS Unitary during shipment and 
storage, and serves as an expendable launch rail when the GMLRS Unitary 
Rocket is fired. The height, width, length, and other features of the 
LPC are exactly the same as for the MLRS rocket LPC. The LPC is a 
controlled breathing type container equipped with desiccant for 
humidity control. The forward and aft LPC covers are designed to 
fracture as the rocket egresses from the container. The GMLRS rocket 
utilizes technologies in the guidance and control subsystem and the 
rocket motor that appear on the Military Critical Technologies List. 
The most serious consequences of unauthorized disclosure of information 
concerning the guidance and control subsystem are the accelerated 
development of countermeasures and manufacturing capability by other 
nations. Components of the GMLRS system are considered highly resistant 
to reverse engineering and the impact of loss or diversion of the end 
item hardware would have minimum adverse impact. However, technical 
data for production of the RLG, or for production, processing, 
fabrication, and loading of the solid propellant rocket motor are 
directly applicable to the development and production of accurate, 
long-range rocket and missile systems. In addition, the RLG and 
accelerometers would have applicability to aircraft, space and 
submarine programs. Lithium battery technology has applicability in a 
number of areas such as smart munitions, communications, etc. 
Production technology for the GMLRS motor exceeds limits established in 
the Missile Technology Control Regime.
    a. The proximity sensor does not include special anti-tamper 
features nor is there any attempt to hide original component markings. 
Reverse engineering and then reproducing the fuse system, while not 
impossible, would require a considerable amount of resources, technical 
ability, testing and time; both for the ESAF and the Proximity Sensor. 
The details of the Directional Doppler Ratio (DDR) signal processing 
technique used in the GMLRS Unitary proximity sensor and in other U.S. 
Army proximity fuses remains classified Secret.
    b. The GMLRS guidance and control subsystem is composed of a three-
axis laser gyro inertial sensor assembly and an electronics chassis 
assembly. The basic design and packaging of the guidance and control 
subsystem is unique and critical to GMLRS and includes several embedded 
Non-Developmental Items (NDIs). The assembly must fit into the space 
available in the forward section of the rocket. The technology involved 
with the guidance and control subsystem is militarily critical due to 
the components used, and the manufacturing processes involved in 
development of the RLGs, accelerometers, microprocessors and GPS. The 
rocket is guided by an inertial navigation system with GPS updates. The 
rockets are Selective Adaptive Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) compliant 
and will have specific country code and coalition codes loaded in the 
key deployment package by the GPS Joint Program Office.
    c. RLG technology is militarily critical. The RLGs have been 
produced and used in military and commercial systems since the mid-
1970s. Widespread use of RLGs has enabled refinement of production 
techniques and processes resulting in high-rate, low cost production, 
while improving weapon system accuracy. RLG critical technology factors 
include the processes, procedures, and equipment used in the 
manufacture, inspection and test of RLG hardware.
    d. Like the RLGs, the accelerometer critical technology factors 
include the processes, procedures and equipment used in the 
manufacture, inspection, and test of accelerometer hardware.
    e. The GMLRS uses microprocessors to control data collection from 
the inertial sensors, and to perform guidance, autopilot, navigation, 
and hardware interface communications functions. The latest technology 
in microprocessor development is used in GMLRS, and is militarily 
critical.
    f. The technology involved with the integration of the GPS receiver 
and the SAASM into the GMLRS guidance and control subsystem is 
militarily critical.
    g. The GMLRS rocket propulsion subsystem technology is militarily 
critical. This propellant formulation has been incorporated in a 
limited motor volume to provide the boost and sustain thrust profile 
that meets the unique range and payload requirements of the GMLRS 
system. Critical factors include low-burn rate/high-performance 
propellant, limited toxicity, and design for extended shelf-life 
stability.
    h. A lithium thermal battery powers the GMLRS rocket electronics. 
The battery is critical and unique to GMLRS. The knowledge required for 
the design and production of thermal batteries is not widely held. 
Within the U.S., only a limited number of companies can produce 
batteries having the required combination of energy density, and shelf 
life. However, Aerospatiale Batteries in Bourges, France also has the 
capability to produce batteries of this type.
    i. The GMLRS system software is militarily critical. The software 
is uploaded to the rocket from the launcher during pre-launch 
operations. The system software would be useful to adversaries 
concerning GMLRS

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missions and tactical capabilities, and could possibly be reverse 
engineered to duplicate the algorithms.
    j. The U.S. proximity sensor for height of burst fusing is listed 
as militarily critical technology. The GMLRS proximity sensor and ESAF 
fall within that definition. The proximity sensor design utilizes DDR 
as a basic signal processing technique and commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) parts for the transmitter and electronic signal processing 
components. The GMLRS proximity sensor uses a unique frequency and 
signal processing algorithm. The proximity sensor is only turned on 
over the target, and it cannot be functioned or turned on during pre-
flight built-in-test. Operating frequency parameters and the 
proprietary signal processing algorithm are unique to the GMLRS 
proximity sensor and are classified Secret. The assembled GMLRS and 
components are Unclassified. Performance of GMLRS is classified 
Confidential.
    4. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) is an 
automated C3 (Command, Control, and Communications) system for the 
fires battlefield functional area. It provides the commander with 
integrated, responsive, and reliable fire support. AFATDS is a fully 
automated fire support system, which minimizes the sensor-to-shooter 
timeline and increases the hit ratio. It provides fully automated 
support for planning, coordinating and controlling mortars, field 
artillery cannons, rockets, close air support, attack helicopter and 
naval gunfire, for close support, counter-fire, interdiction, and deep 
operations.
    5. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge 
of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could 
be used to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapons systems 
effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or 
advanced capabilities.

[FR Doc. 2012-31724 Filed 1-3-13; 8:45 am]
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