Decision and Order; Perry T. Dobyns, M.D., 45656-45663 [2012-18750]
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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 148 / Wednesday, August 1, 2012 / Notices
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Authority: These reviews are being
conducted under authority of Title VII of the
Tariff Act of 1930; this notice is published
pursuant to section 207.61 of the
Commission’s rules.
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
By order of the Commission.
Issued: July 24, 2012.
Lisa R. Barton,
Acting Secretary to the Commission.
Decision and Order; Perry T. Dobyns,
M.D.
[FR Doc. 2012–18441 Filed 7–31–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7020–02–P
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Antitrust Division
Notice Pursuant to the National
Cooperative Research and Production
Act of 1993—Pistoia Alliance, Inc.
Notice is hereby given that, on June
29, 2012, pursuant to Section 6(a) of the
National Cooperative Research and
Production Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301
et seq. (‘‘the Act’’), Pistoia Alliance, Inc.
has filed written notifications
simultaneously with the Attorney
General and the Federal Trade
Commission disclosing changes in its
membership. The notifications were
filed for the purpose of extending the
Act’s provisions limiting the recovery of
antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages
under specified circumstances.
Specifically, Certara L.P. Portugal,
Funchal, Madeira, PORTUGAL; Deloitte
Consulting LLP, New York, NY; Mary
Chitty (individual member), Needham,
MA; and Hewlett-Packard Company,
Palo Alto, CA, have been added as
parties to this venture.
No other changes have been made in
either the membership or planned
activity of the group research project.
Membership in this group research
project remains open, and Pistoia
Alliance, Inc. intends to file additional
written notifications disclosing all
changes in membership.
On May 28, 2009, Pistoia Alliance,
Inc. filed its original notification
pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act. The
Department of Justice published a notice
in the Federal Register pursuant to
Section 6(b) of the Act on July 15, 2009
(74 FR 34364).
The last notification was filed with
the Department on April 17, 2012. A
notice was published in the Federal
Register pursuant to Section 6(b) of the
Act on May 14, 2012 (77 FR 28404).
Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil Enforcement, Antitrust
Division.
denying Respondent’s application, ALJ
at 22, Respondent has been sober since
December 2008, that he has been in
compliance with his Indiana Physicians’
Assistance Program Continuing Care
Contract since November 2009, id. at 20,
and that he ‘‘has consistently taken
responsibility for his misconduct.’’ 1 Id.
at 21. The ALJ thus recommended that
Respondent be granted a restricted
registration subject to multiple
conditions. The Government did not file
exceptions to the ALJ’s decision.2
Having reviewed the record, I have
decided to adopt the ALJ’s findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and
recommended Order. Accordingly, I
will order that Respondent be granted a
registration subject to the following
conditions:
(1) Respondent shall be limited to
prescribing controlled substances and
may not administer or dispense directly
any controlled substances. In addition,
Respondent may not order any
controlled substances or accept any
samples of controlled substances. If
Respondent is employed at a practice in
which controlled substances are stored
on the premises, Respondent shall not
have access to the cabinet in which the
controlled substances are stored.
Respondent shall inform any medical
practice at which he becomes employed
of this restriction on his registration.
(2) Respondent is prohibited from
prescribing controlled substances to
himself or any family member.
(3) Respondent shall maintain a log of
all controlled substance prescriptions he
authorizes and shall file a report listing
in chronological order all such
prescriptions by date, and including the
following information: the name and
address of the patient, name and dosage
of the drug, quantity of the drug, and
number of refills authorized. Each
report shall be filed with the local DEA
field office no later than ten (10)
calendar days after the end of the
previous quarter, e.g., April 10 (for the
quarter ending on March 31), July 10
[FR Doc. 2012–18769 Filed 7–31–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 11–45]
On November 2, 2011, Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) Gail A. Randall issued
the attached recommended decision.
Therein, the ALJ found that while the
Government had established grounds for
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1 No evidence was put forward showing that
Respondent diverted controlled substances to
others.
2 In its post-hearing brief, the Government cites a
prior decision of this Agency, which after having
already ordered that the practitioner’s application
be granted, then noted ‘‘evidence of the
community’s need for a physician of his specialty
with prescribing capabilities.’’ Gov. Br. 11 (quoting
David M. Headley, 61 FR 39469, 39471 (1996)).
However, the Agency has since held in multiple
cases that community impact evidence is not
relevant in the public interest determination and
provided an extensive explanation as to why. See
Linda Sue Cheek, 76 FR 66972, 66973 (2011); Mark
De La Lama, 76 FR 20011, 20020 n.20 (2011);
Bienvenido Tan, 76 FR 17673, 17694 n.58 (2011);
Gregory D. Owens, 74 FR 36571, 36757 & n.22
(2009).
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(for the quarter ending on June 30),
October 10 (for the quarter ending on
September 30), and January 10 (for the
quarter ending on December 31). If
Respondent issues no controlled
substance prescriptions during a
quarter, a report indicating that no
prescriptions were issued shall also be
filed no later than ten (10) calendar days
following the end of the quarter.
(4) If Respondent opens his own
practice, he shall consent to
unannounced inspections by DEA
personnel of any medical office he
maintains and shall waive his right to
require DEA personnel to obtain an
Administrative Inspection Warrant prior
to conducting an inspection.
(5) Respondent shall enter into an
agreement with the Indiana Physicians’
Assistance Program pursuant to which
he agrees that it shall disclose any
violation of the conditions of his
contract (including any failed drug
screens) to the local DEA field office. In
the event Respondent tests positive for
a drug for which he does not hold a
valid prescription, or fails to report for
drug screening upon being ordered to do
so, such acts shall constitute grounds for
the immediate suspension of his
registration.
(6) Respondent shall report to the
local DEA field office any relapse within
forty-eight hours of such occurrence.
(7) These conditions shall remain in
effect for a period of three years, except
that in the event Respondent
successfully completes his contract with
the Indiana Physicians’ Assistance
Program, condition number five shall
terminate upon completion of said
contract. However, if said contract is
renewed, condition number five shall
continue in effect until three years from
the date of issuance of this registration.
Order
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Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 28 CFR 0.100(b),
I order that the application of Perry T.
Dobyns, M.D., for a DEA Certificate of
Registration as a practitioner, be, and it
hereby is, granted, subject to the
conditions set forth above. This Order is
effective immediately.
Dated: July 24, 2012.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Administrator.
D. Linden Barber, Esq., and
Jonathan P. Novak, Esq., for the
Government
Robert E. Saint, Esq., for the
Respondent
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RECOMMENDED RULINGS, FINDINGS
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND DECISION OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Gail A. Randall, Administrative Law
Judge. The Deputy Assistant
Administrator, Office of Diversion
Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration (‘‘DEA’’ or
‘‘Government’’), issued an Order to
Show Cause (‘‘Order’’) dated March 7,
2011, proposing to deny the DEA
Certificate of Registration application of
Perry T. Dobyns, M.D., (‘‘Respondent’’),
as a practitioner, pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 823(f) (2006), because to grant the
Respondent’s registration would be
inconsistent with the public interest, as
that term is used in 21 U.S.C. 823(f).
[Administrative Law Judge Exhibit
(‘‘ALJ Exh.’’) 1 at 1].
The Order alleged that on June 25,
2010, the Respondent submitted an
application for a DEA registration as a
practitioner with authority to handle
controlled substances in Schedules II–V.
[Id.].
The Order further alleged that the
Respondent had entered into an
agreement with the North Carolina
Medical Board in 2007, because of his
misuse of drugs, including controlled
substances. The Respondent also agreed
not to use mood-altering drugs that had
not been prescribed to him by a
physician. However, a urine screen
submitted on October 31, 2008, tested
positive for tetrahydrocannabinol,
indicating that he had unlawfully
possessed and used a Schedule I
controlled substance. Further, the
Respondent’s urine screen submitted on
November 22, 2008, tested positive for
oxycodone and oxymorphone,
indicating that he had unlawfully
possessed and consumed two Schedule
II controlled substances. [Id.].
Next, the Order asserted that, on
December 2, 2008, the Respondent
forged a prescription for oxycodone in
order to illegally obtain this Schedule II
controlled substance. He filled this
prescription. [ALJ Exh. 1 at 2].
The Order noted that, on August 3,
2010, the Respondent was interviewed
by DEA personnel, and he admitted
that: (a) in 2002 the Respondent was
admitted to a hospital due to abuse of
alcohol and narcotics, and he
subsequently entered into an agreement
with the Indiana State Medical
Association’s Physicians Assistance
Program; (b) in 2008, the Respondent
had used narcotics that had been
prescribed to one of his family
members; (c) in September of 2008, he
smoked marijuana; and (d) in late 2008,
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45657
he issued a forged prescription for
oxycodone to himself. [Id.].
Lastly, the Order asserts that the
Respondent returned to Indiana in June
of 2010, and began practicing medicine.
Although he did not possess a DEA
registration, on November 15, 2010, the
Respondent or his medical office staff
issued two prescriptions for controlled
substances using an electronic
prescribing program. [Id.].
The Deputy Assistant Administrator
then gave the Respondent the
opportunity to show cause as to why his
application should not be denied on the
basis of those allegations. [Id. at 2].
On April 25, 2011, the Respondent 1
filed a request for a hearing in the
above-captioned matter. [ALJ Exh. 2].
On May 31, 2011, the Government
filed Government’s Motion to Terminate
Proceeding Due to Untimely Request for
Hearing, [Motion]. [ALJ Exh. 3]. On June
17, 2011, I denied the Government’s
Motion. [ALJ Exh. 5].
On July 20, 2011, Jonathan P. Novak
entered his appearance on behalf of the
Government in the above captioned
matter. [ALJ Exh. 6].
The hearing was conducted on August
23, 2011, in Lafayette, Indiana. [ALJ
Exh. 7]. At the hearing, counsel for the
DEA called one witness to testify and
introduced documentary evidence. The
Respondent testified and introduced
documentary evidence. [Transcript
(‘‘Tr.’’) Volume I].
After the hearing, the Government
submitted Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Argument
(‘‘Govt. Brief’’). The Respondent also
submitted Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Argument
(‘‘Resp. Brief’’).
II. ISSUE
The issue in this proceeding is
whether or not the record as a whole
establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Drug Enforcement
Administration (‘‘DEA’’ or
‘‘Government’’) should deny the
application for a DEA Certificate of
Registration, of Perry T. Dobyns, M.D.,
(‘‘Respondent’’), as a practitioner,
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2006),
because to grant his application would
be inconsistent with the public interest,
as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C.
§ 823(f). [ALJ Exh. 4; Transcript (‘‘Tr.’’)
at 8].
1 On May 26, 2011, the Respondent filed his PreHearing Statement. Mr. Saint entered his
appearance by filing this document.
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III. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Stipulated Facts
The parties have stipulated to the
following facts:
1. Respondent applied for a DEA
registration on June 25, 2010.
[Government Exhibit (‘‘Govt. Exh.’’) 1].
2. Respondent previously held a DEA
registration but allowed it to expire
without renewal in 2009.
3. Respondent was hospitalized for
alcohol and drug abuse in 2002, and
entered into the Physicians Assistance
Program in Indiana because of his abuse
of alcohol and narcotic controlled
substances.
4. In 2007, Respondent entered an
agreement with the North Carolina
Physicians Health Program that required
him to submit to drug testing.
5. In the fall of 2008, Respondent
unlawfully possessed marijuana,
oxymorphone and oxycodone, and used
these drugs.
6. On October 31, 2008, Respondent
tested positive for marijuana in a drug
test performed under his agreement
with the North Carolina Physicians
Health Program.
7. On November 22, 2008, Respondent
tested positive for oxymorphone and
oxycodone in a drug test performed
under his agreement with the North
Carolina Physicians Health Program.
8. On December 2, 2008, Respondent
filled a prescription for oxycodone
which he had forged using the name
and DEA number of another physician.
[ALJ Exh. 4].
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B. Respondent’s Addiction History
In late 2001, the Respondent’s
medical practice in Oklahoma was
failing. The Respondent’s alcohol intake
increased at home, and he began taking
a controlled substance, hydrocodone,
‘‘to help (him) during the day.’’ [Tr. 44].
The Respondent used hydrocodone
samples given to the clinic by drug
representatives. [Tr. 45]. He failed to
maintain distribution records for these
controlled substances. [Tr. 88].
In 2002, the Respondent moved to
Indiana. He continued to drink during
the night and use narcotic prescription
medications during the day. [Tr. 44–45].
The narcotics were taken from the
practice’s sample cabinet. [Tr. 46]. In
November of 2002, the Respondent’s
‘‘depression, exacerbated by the alcohol
and drug dependence, came to an
extreme, and (he) attempted suicide.’’
[Tr. 46]. His employers at the Harrison
Family Practice referred him to the
Indiana Physician Assistance Program,
(PAP), who recommended that he seek
inpatient treatment. [Tr. 46–47].
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In late 2002, the Respondent was
admitted to the Rush Memorial
Behavioral Health program in Chicago,
Illinois, which was a specific program
for impaired physicians. [Tr. 47]. The
Respondent attended this in-patient
program for 10 weeks. [Tr. 20, 47, 87].
He was initially diagnosed as
chemically dependent on opiates and
alcohol along with a diagnosis of
depression. [Respondent’s Exhibit
(‘‘Resp. Exh.’’) D].
The Respondent enrolled in the
Indiana PAP and signed a Continuing
Care Contract (‘‘Contract’’). [Tr. 48;
Resp. Exh. D]. He was required to have
regular contact with the PAP through inperson meetings in Indianapolis. [Tr.
48]. He was also required to attend
regular meetings of Alcoholics
Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous
three times per week. [Id.]. He was also
to attend weekly meetings of the
Caduceus Group, a treatment group for
doctors with substance abuse issues, in
Indianapolis. [Id.]. The Contract also
required the Respondent to participate
in random urine drug screens. [Tr. 48–
50]. While in Indiana, the Respondent
remained in compliance with the
Contract. [Tr. 49].
In 2007, the Respondent moved to
North Carolina, enrolled in the North
Carolina PAP, and signed a new fiveyear contract. [Tr. 51; Resp. Exh. D].
Similar to the Indiana PAP, this
program is intended to ‘‘help[]
physicians overcome an addiction
issue.’’ [Tr. 19]. As a requirement of this
program, the Respondent was to refrain
from consuming any controlled
substances that were not legitimately
prescribed to him or given to him for
medical purposes. [Tr. 20]. He was also
to submit to urine drug screens as
dictated to by the program. [Id.].
While in North Carolina, the
Respondent worked in Chapel Hill
during the week and spent his
weekends in Fayetteville with his
family. [Tr. 52–53]. He was also caring
for his dying brother. [Tr. 53]. The stress
of caring for his brother contributed to
his relapse. [Tr. 21–22]. This was his
first relapse since beginning the
recovery process in 2002. [Tr. 22, 93].
The Respondent’s brother used medical
marijuana, and the Respondent used it
in October of 2008. [Tr. 53–54]. The
Respondent also consumed oxycodone
from his brother’s prescription, and
subsequently he issued a prescription to
himself using another doctor’s DEA
number. [Tr. 22]. This doctor did not
know of the Respondent’s conduct until
the DEA informed him. [Tr. 22]. The
Respondent also wrote a prescription for
his sister using his DEA registration and
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consumed the controlled substances
himself. [Tr. 94].
The Respondent then had a positive
drug screen for marijuana in October of
2008, and another positive drug screen
for oxycodone and oxymorphone in
November of 2008. [Tr. 55–56, 88–89].
The North Carolina PAP reported these
positive test results to the North
Carolina Medical Board. [Tr. 56].
Ultimately, the Respondent’s North
Carolina medical license was
indefinitely suspended. [Tr. 22].
The DEA did not know about the
Respondent’s sobriety between
November of 2008 until November of
2009, when he reentered the Indiana
Physician Assistance Program. [Tr. 31,
58]. He then applied to renew his
Indiana medical license. On the
application for such renewal, the
Respondent disclosed the action that
had been taken against his North
Carolina medical license. [Tr. 58–59].
The Indiana Medical Board renewed the
Respondent’s medical license with
probationary conditions. [Tr. 23]. In
August and December of 2009, those
terms and conditions were altered
slightly. [Resp. Exh. A]. The Respondent
is to remain compliant with the
Indiana’s Physician Assistance Program
(PAP), and he is to notify the Indiana
Medical Board within twenty-four hours
of any relapse. [Tr. 23]. The Respondent
is only allowed to work a forty hour
work week, and, prior to the Board’s
removal of this condition, there had to
be another physician on-site when the
Respondent was working. The
Respondent has remained compliant
with the terms of his probation. [Tr. 23,
28].
On November 23, 2009, the
Respondent signed a second Continuing
Care Contract with the Indiana PAP.
[Resp. Exh. D]. This is a five-year
agreement. [Id.]. The Respondent
agreed, among other provisions, to
participate in supervised urine/hair/
blood drug screens, and agreed to
abstain from mood-changing chemicals
except those prescribed by a treating
physician. [Id.]. In the event of a
relapse, the Respondent is to notify the
PAP. [Id.]. The Respondent also agreed
to attend Caduceus meetings and to
attend ‘‘mutual self-help meetings’’such
as AA or NA at a frequency of three
times per week. [Tr. 68; Resp. Exh. D].
The Respondent also agreed to attend
individual therapy bi-weekly for a
period of time and to see a psychiatrist
for medication management. [Resp. Exh.
D; Tr. 69–70].
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In August of 2010, Diversion
Investigator (DI) Gary L. Whisenand 2
interviewed the Respondent. [Tr. 19]. I
find DI Whisenand’s testimony
consistent with the documentary
exhibits and credible. DI Whisenand
credibly testified that Indiana’s
Physician Assistance Program was a
reliable program that cooperated with
the DEA. [Tr. 30]. During the interview
with DI Whisenand, the Respondent
admitted to smoking marijuana and
consuming oxycodone. [Tr. 21, 84]. The
Respondent had explained that he had
moved to North Carolina to care for an
ailing brother, who had Stage IV lung
cancer, and the stress of tending to his
brother had caused the Respondent to
relapse. [Tr. 21–22]. This was his first
relapse since beginning the recovery
process in 2002. [Tr. 22, 93].
Dr. Fred W. Frick submitted an
affidavit in this proceeding. [Resp. Exh.
D]. Dr. Frick is board certified in
internal medicine with an extensive
record as an addictionologist. [Id.].
Since 2004, he has been the contract
Medical Consultant and Director of the
Indiana State Medical Association’s
Physicians Assistance Program. [Id.]. He
explained that the PAP ‘‘is currently
recognized as an acceptable monitoring
and advocacy program by the Indiana
Medical Licensing Board.’’ [Id.]. Dr.
Frick oversees the program, ‘‘which
directs the monitoring and advocacy for
chemically dependent physicians in the
State of Indiana.’’ [Id.]. Dr. Frick was
familiar with the Respondent’s history
of drug use and addiction. [Id.].
Dr. Frick wrote that each of the
Respondent’s drug screens have been
negative since November 23, 2009,
except for the presence of Ultram,
‘‘which was prescribed for Dr. Dobyns
by a treating physician.’’ [Id.]. Lastly,
Dr. Frick wrote that to the best of his
knowledge, the Respondent ‘‘has been
compliant with all other aspects of his
Continuing Care Contract since
November 23, 2009.’’ [Id.].
C. Respondent’s DEA Application
In his DEA application, the
Respondent disclosed that his North
Carolina medical license had been
placed on indefinite suspension. [Tr. 18;
Govt. Exh. 1]. No charges are pending
before the North Carolina medical
board. [Govt. Exh. 1]. The Respondent
also disclosed that he had had a positive
drug test in 2008. [Id.].
The Respondent also disclosed that he
had applied to renew his medical
license in Indiana, and that the Indiana
Medical Board agreed to do so on a
2 DI Whisenand has been a DEA diversion
investigator for just over six years. [Tr. 15].
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probationary basis. [Id.]. The
Respondent agreed to participate in the
Indiana State Medical Association’s
Physician Assistance Program (PAP).
[Id.]. The Respondent also wrote that his
participation in Indiana has continued
to the date of his application without
incident. [Id.].
D. Electronic Prescriptions
In June of 2010, the Respondent
accepted a position at the Madison
County Health Center (‘‘Center’’) as a
staff physician. [Tr. 75]. He made a full
disclosure to that employer about his
drug use history. [Tr. 62]. There, if a
patient needed controlled substances,
the Respondent would take a medical
history, perform a physical examination,
and determine whether the prescription
was appropriate for the patient. [Tr. 64].
At that point, the Respondent would
refer the patient to the Center’s medical
director for issuance of the controlled
substance prescription. [Id.].
The DEA received two electronic
prescriptions for controlled substances
written under the Respondent’s name
and dated in November of 2010. [Tr. 26–
28; Govt. Exh. 2]. These prescriptions
contained the Respondent’s electronic
signature. [Tr. 31]. These two
prescriptions were for a patient who had
seen the Respondent’s supervisory
physician previously, and she was
issued these two prescriptions for
ongoing treatment of chronic pain and
anxiety. [Tr. 78].
At the time of these prescriptions, the
Respondent was working at the Center.
[Tr. 75]. The Center had an electronic
medical records system. [Tr. 31, 65].
The default for the Respondent was for
the system to send prescriptions to the
printer for the Respondent to then take
to the medical director to issue. [Tr. 65].
The two electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances were
inadvertently sent by the system to the
facsimile machine rather than to the
printer. As soon as the Respondent
became aware of the computer error, he
took corrective action. He credibly
testified that ‘‘the measure that we took
was to disconnect the fax function from
the computer entirely so that the
computer could no longer physically
access the fax line.’’ [Tr. 67]. It was DI
Whisenand’s assumption that the
Respondent’s electronic signature was
affixed by that system. [Tr. 32]. The
prescriptions were then faxed to a
pharmacy by the electronic medical
records system without the
Respondent’s knowledge. [Tr. 33]. DI
Whisenand credibly testified that he did
not have any evidence that the
Respondent knowingly transmitted
controlled substance prescriptions via
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45659
facisimile to a pharmacy. [Tr. 35]. After
this time, DI Whisenand never received
any complaints from a pharmacy or a
pharmacy worker regarding the
Respondent. [Tr. 34].
E. Respondent’s Current Situation
The Respondent received his medical
degree with honors in 1995 from the
University of Tennessee at Memphis,
Tennessee. [Tr. 42]. The Respondent
completed a residency in family
medicine in 1997, and he became board
certified by the American Board of
Family Practice the same year. [Tr. 43].
In 2005, the Respondent recertified for
a ten-year period. [Id.]. However, due to
the North Carolina action against his
medical license, his certification was
invalidated. [Id.].
The Respondent has been clean and
sober since December 20, 2008. [Tr. 98].
The Respondent is unemployed, and he
does not have a DEA registration
number. [Tr. 24–25]. The Respondent is
currently active in AA and has a
sponsor. [Tr. 70–71]. He attends at least
two meetings a week with his sponsor
and engages in one or two phone calls
during the week. [Tr. 71].
The Respondent currently has an
active, in all substances, controlled
substances registration with Indiana.
[Tr. 40, 61–62]. He also has an active
Indiana medical license which is on
probation. [Tr. 40–41; Resp. Exh. A]. In
July of 2011, the Indiana Medical Board
modified the Respondent’s probationary
conditions of December 2009. [Resp.
Exh. C]. Currently the Respondent’s
probationary conditions include: (a) the
Respondent must maintain and remain
in compliance with a contract from the
Indiana PAP; (b) the Respondent shall
report any relapse regarding chemical
dependency to the Board within twentyfour hours; (c) the Respondent shall not
work more than forty hours a week and
for the next year shall submit quarterly
written reports to the Board from his
employer concerning his employment,
and from the Respondent concerning his
DEA status; and (d) the Respondent
shall comply with the statutes and rules
governing the practice of medicine.
[Resp. Exh. B; Resp. Exh. C].
In April of 2011, the Respondent was
discharged from the Center. The
primary reason for that action was the
difficulties experienced by the Center in
handling the Respondent’s lack of a
DEA registration. [Tr. 67].
The Respondent credibly testified that
he has never had a medical malpractice
judgment entered against him, he has
never settled a medical malpractice
claim, and that the disclosed adverse
actions taken against his medical license
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were the only such actions taken. [Tr.
67–68].
Today, the Respondent’s North
Carolina medical license is indefinitely
suspended. [Tr. 56]. The Respondent
does not plan to return to North
Carolina. [Tr. 56]. The Respondent
intends to become gainfully employed
as a physician in Indiana. [Tr. 71].
Without a DEA registration, the
Respondent is not able to have a
meaningful medical practice. [Tr. 72].
The Respondent is not seeking any
employment where he would have
access to mood altering substances on
the worksite. [Tr. 96].
IV. STATEMENT OF LAW AND
DISCUSSION
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A. Position of the Parties
1. Government’s Position
The Government asserts that the
appropriate remedy in this matter is
denial of the Respondent’s application.
[Govt. Brief at 12]. Looking to the factors
defining the public interest, the
Government first proposes that factor
one is applicable, for the North Carolina
licensing board has indefinitely
suspended the Respondent’s medical
license. [Govt. Brief at 6]. Further, the
State of Indiana only granted the
Respondent a medical license with
restrictions and monitoring
requirements. [Id.]. The Government
argues that such conditions reflect ‘‘a
systematic concern for Respondent’s
professional and personal well-being.
As such, this factor weighs in favor of
denying Respondent’s application for a
DEA Certificate of Registration.’’ [Id.].
As to factor two, the Government
asserts that the Respondent admitted to
a lengthy history of using illicit drugs
for recreational purposes, and to
obtaining controlled substances for
personal use through illicit means.
[Govt. Brief at 7]. Under this factor, the
Government concludes that the
‘‘Respondent has shown a callous and
cavalier attitude towards both using and
prescribing controlled substances.’’
[Govt. Brief at 8].
Under factor four, the Government
asserts that the Respondent violated
federal law when he fraudulently used
a prescription pad belonging to another
doctor to write a prescription for a
controlled substance for himself. [Id.].
Also, the Respondent admitted to
possessing and using marijuana that he
obtained illicitly. [Id.]. Because of this
conduct, the Government argues that
factor four weighs heavily in favor of
denying the Respondent’s application.
[Govt. Brief at 8–9].
Lastly, under factor five, the
Government argues that the Respondent
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has only been in monitored recovery for
two years. [Govt. Brief at 10]. The
Government notes that prior DEA
precedent takes into account the length
of time the Respondent has been in
recovery. [Govt. Brief at 9]. Here, the
Respondent had been clean and sober
for six years before his relapse. In the
context of this behavior, the
Government argues that the
Respondent’s ‘‘risk of relapse should be
considered high until such time (as)
Respondent has shown a longer period
of compliance with the restrictions of
his substance abuse treatment by
remaining sober, as well as a better
understanding of the seriousness of his
addiction and the danger it presents to
himself and to others.’’ [Govt. Brief at
10].
The Government also finds it
significant that the Respondent failed to
show any remorse or ‘‘even [an]
understanding for the danger he
presented to his patients by practicing
under the influence of Schedule II
narcotics.’’ [Id.]. Therefore, the
Government concludes, the
Respondent’s application should be
denied. [Govt. Brief at 11–12].
In the alternative, the Government
asserts, if the Respondent should be
granted a restricted registration, the
Government requests that (a) the
Respondent’s registration be limited to
Schedule IV and V controlled
substances only; (b) the Respondent be
limited to prescribing controlled
substances only, and not be authorized
to prescribe to himself or any family
members; (c) the Respondent shall only
be authorized to obtain controlled
substances from a treating practitioner
who prescribes controlled substances to
the Respondent for a legitimate medical
purpose; (d) the Respondent maintain a
prescription log which he would submit
quarterly to the DEA; (e) Respondent
shall consent to unannounced
inspections without the need of an
Administrative Inspection Warrant; and
(f) the Respondent continue in his
agreement with the Indiana PAP. [Govt.
Brief at 12–13].
2. Respondent’s Position
The Respondent asserts that granting
his application would be in the public
interest. [Resp. Brief at 11]. The
Respondent argues that he has been in
substantial compliance with his
treatment for eight years except for a
relapse during two months in 2008.
[Resp. Brief at 10]. He notes that he has
maintained an active probationary
medical license in Indiana, and he has
complied with the terms of that
probation. [Id.]. The Respondent also
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has an active Indiana Controlled
Substance Registration. [Id.].
The Respondent next asserts that no
evidence exists that the Respondent’s
medical care endangered patients or that
his care deviated from any standard of
care. [Resp. Brief at 11]. Instead,
Respondent argues that his violations
stemmed from his chemical
dependency, which was exacerbated by
unusual family circumstances, namely
the terminal illness of his brother. [Id.].
Therefore, the Respondent proffers that
the ‘‘issuance of a restricted
registration’’ would resolve ‘‘[a]ny
concern for the public health and
safety’’ posed by the Respondent’s
violations. Lastly, the Respondent
concludes that he should be granted a
registration restricted as follows: (1) the
Respondent must remain in compliance
with the Indiana Continuing Care
Contract; (2) and also with his
probationary medical license; (3) and
that the Respondent be required to
immediately disclose any noncompliance with either of these two
monitoring agreements. [Id.].
B. Statement of Law and Analysis
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2006),3
the Deputy Administrator may deny an
application for a DEA Certificate of
Registration if she determines that such
registration would be inconsistent with
the public interest. In determining the
public interest, the following factors are
considered:
(1) The recommendation of the
appropriate State licensing board or
professional disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant’s experience in
dispensing, or conducting research with
respect to controlled substances.
(3) The applicant’s conviction record
under Federal or State laws relating to
the manufacture, distribution, or
dispensing of controlled substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State,
Federal, or local laws relating to
controlled substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may
threaten the public health and safety.
These factors are to be considered in
the disjunctive; the Deputy
Administrator may rely on any one or a
combination of factors and may give
each factor the weight she deems
appropriate in determining whether a
registration should be revoked or an
application for registration be denied.
See Robert A. Leslie, M.D., 68 Fed. Reg.
15,227, 15,230 (DEA 2003); Henry J.
Schwarz, Jr., M.D., 54 Fed. Reg. 16,422
(DEA 1989). Moreover, the Deputy
3 The Deputy Administrator has the authority to
make such a determination pursuant to 28 C.F.R.
§§ 0.100(b) and 0.104 (2011).
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Administrator is ‘‘not required to make
findings as to all of the factors.’’ Hoxie
v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir.
2005); see also Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d
165, 173–74 (DC Cir. 2005).
The Government bears the burden of
proving that the requirements for
registration are not satisfied. 21 C.F.R.
§ 1301.44(d) (2011). The burden of proof
shifts to the Respondent once the
Government has made its prima facie
case. See Medicine Shoppe—
Jonesborough, 73 Fed. Reg. 364, 380
(DEA 2008); see also Thomas E.
Johnston, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,311 (DEA
1980).
DEA precedent has also held that
‘‘past performance is the best predictor
of future performance.’’ Alra Labs., Inc.
v. DEA, 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995).
Further, DEA has repeatedly held that
‘‘where a registrant has committed acts
inconsistent with the public interest, the
registrant must accept responsibility for
[his] actions and demonstrate that [he]
will not engage in future misconduct.’’
Medicine Shoppe—Jonesborough, 73
Fed. Reg. at 387; see also Samuel S.
Jackson, D.D.S., 72 Fed. Reg. 23,848,
23,853 (DEA 2007). In short, after the
Government makes its prima facie case,
the Respondent must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he
can be entrusted with the authority that
a registration provides by demonstrating
that he accepts responsibility for his
misconduct and that the misconduct
will not re-occur.
1. Recommendation of Appropriate
State Licensing Board.
The DEA has long held that a
practitioner’s reinstatement by a State
board ‘‘is not dispositive,’’ because
‘‘DEA maintains a separate oversight
responsibility with respect to the
handling of controlled substances and
has a statutory obligation to make its
independent determination as to
whether the granting of [a registration]
would be in the public interest.’’
Mortimer B. Levin, D.O., 55 Fed. Reg.
8,209, 8,210 (DEA 1990); see also Jayam
Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 459,
461 (DEA 2009). The ultimate
responsibility to determine whether a
registration is consistent with the public
interest has been delegated exclusively
to the DEA, not to entities within state
government. Edmund Chein, M.D., 72
Fed. Reg. 6,580, 6,590 (DEA 2007), aff’d,
Chein v. DEA, 533 F.3d 828 (DC Cir.
2008). Although not dispositive, state
board decisions are relevant on the issue
of granting or denying a DEA
application. See Gregory D. Owens,
D.D.S., 74 Fed. Reg. 36,751, 36,755
(DEA 2009); Martha Hernandez, M.D.,
62 Fed. Reg. 61,145, 61,147 (DEA 1997).
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Here, the Indiana State Medical Board
has not made a recommendation
concerning the Respondent’s DEA
application. The Respondent currently
has an active, in all substances,
controlled substances registration with
Indiana. He also has an active Indiana
medical license which is on probation.
Nevertheless, the DEA has consistently
held that a practitioner’s possession of
State authority, while a prerequisite to
registration, is not dispositive of the
public interest determination. Mark De
La Lama, P.A., 76 Fed. Reg. 20,011,
20,018 (DEA 2011).
2. Applicant’s Conviction Record
Relating to Controlled Substances,
Experience With Controlled Substances
And Compliance With Applicable State,
Federal, Or Local Laws Relating To
Controlled Substances.
The critical consideration in this
proceeding is whether the
circumstances that existed in 2008, have
changed sufficiently to support a
conclusion that Respondent’s
registration would be in the public
interest. See Ellis Turk, M.D., 62 Fed.
Reg. 19,603, 19,604 (DEA 1997). As this
Agency has repeatedly held, a
proceeding under the Controlled
Substances Act ‘‘‘is a remedial measure,
based upon the public interest and the
necessity to protect the public from
those individuals who have misused
* * * their DEA Certificate of
Registration, and who have not
presented sufficient mitigating evidence
to assure the Administrator that they
can be entrusted with the responsibility
carried by such a registration.’’’ Jon Karl
Dively, D.D.S., 72 Fed. Reg. 74,332,
74,334 (DEA 2007) (quoting Samuel S.
Jackson, D.D.S., 72 Fed. Reg. 23,848,
23,853 (DEA 2007)).
As for Factor 3, the parties do not
dispute that the Respondent has not
been convicted of any offense relating to
controlled substances. The Respondent
also previously held a DEA registration
but allowed it to expire without renewal
in 2009.
In late 2001, the Respondent illegally
used hydrocodone samples given to the
clinic by drug representatives. He failed
to maintain distribution records for
these controlled substances. The
Respondent continued this behavior of
unlawful consumption of controlled
substances through 2002.
In late 2002, the Respondent was
hospitalized for alcohol and drug abuse.
He was diagnosed as chemically
dependent on opiates and alcohol. In
March of 2003, when he completed the
inpatient treatment, he entered the
Physicians Assistance Program in
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Sfmt 4703
45661
Indiana. He remained in compliance
with his Contract during this time.
Under the Controlled Substances Act,
it is ‘‘unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally * * * to
acquire or obtain possession of a
controlled substance by
misrepresentation, fraud, forgery,
deception, or subterfuge.’’ 21 U.S.C.
§ 843(a)(3) (2006). In 2008, the
Respondent began smoking marijuana
and consuming other controlled
substances unlawfully. The Respondent
wrote a prescription for his sister, filled
it, and consumed the controlled
substances himself. He also wrote a
prescription for controlled substances
on another physician’s prescription pad,
filled that prescription, and consumed
those controlled substances.
Subsequently the Respondent tested
positive for marijuana use in October of
2008, and for oxycodone and
oxymorphone in November of 2008.
Such unlawful consumption of
controlled substances weighs against the
Respondent’s being granted a DEA
registration.
Further, the Respondent’s use of
another’s DEA registration to prescribe
himself controlled substances is, itself,
a violation of the Controlled Substances
Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(2) (2006) (‘‘It
shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally to use in the
course of the * * * dispensing of a
controlled substance * * * a
registration number which is * * *
issued to another person.’’); see also
Patrick W. Stodola, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg.
20,727, 20,735–36 (DEA 2009); Harrell
E. Robinson, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 61,370,
61,376 (DEA 2009). This violation also
weighs against the granting of the
Respondent’s application for a DEA
registration.
In June of 2010, a pharmacy received
two electronic prescriptions for
controlled substances electronically
signed by the Respondent. The
Respondent did not have a DEA
registration. Such conduct also violates
the Controlled Substances Act and its
implementing regulations. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (2006) (‘‘Except as authorized
by this title, it shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally to
* * * dispense * * * a controlled
substance.’’); see also 21 C.F.R.
§ 1301.11 (2011) (requiring any person
who dispenses a controlled substance to
be registered unless exempted by law).
However, I also note the nature of the
offense, for the computer-generated
prescriptions were sent to the facsimile
machine in error. I also note that the
Respondent took remedial actions to
ensure such an error does not happen
again. Further, although not an excuse
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for this incident, I also note that the
recipient of this prescription was being
treated by the Respondent, who credibly
testified that the prescriptions were
issued for a legitimate medical purpose.
3. Other Factors Affecting the Public
Interest
Another factor in this case is the fact
that the Respondent unlawfully
consumed controlled substances while
caring for patients. Although this record
contains no evidence of any harm
coming to his patients, the fact that he
was willing to risk such harm is
inconsistent with the requirements of a
DEA registrant.
Further, the DEA has long held that a
practitioner’s self-abuse of controlled
substances constitutes ‘‘conduct which
may threaten public health and safety.’’
21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(5) (2006); see also
Tony T. Bui, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 49,979,
49,990 (DEA 2010); Kenneth Wayne
Green, Jr., M.D., 59 Fed. Reg. 51,453
(DEA 1994); David E. Trawick, D.D.S.,
53 Fed. Reg. 5,326 (DEA 1988). Here, the
Respondent self-abused hydrocodone
products in 2001 and oxycodone
products in 2008. Such unlawful
ingestion of controlled substances,
especially when a physician is caring
for patients while under the influence of
these drugs, places the public health
and safety in jeopardy.
Yet, I found the Respondent credible
when he testified that he has been drug
free since December of 2008. He has
remained active in his recovery, and his
drug screens have been negative. As the
Deputy Administrator has previously
determined, ‘‘[t]he paramount issue is
not how much time has elapsed since
[the Respondent’s] unlawful conduct,
but rather, whether during that time
[the] Respondent has learned from past
mistakes and has demonstrated that he
would handle controlled substances
properly if entrusted with a DEA
registration.’’ Leonardo V. Lopez, M.D.,
54 Fed. Reg. 36,915 (DEA 1989). Even
though it has been previously found that
time, alone, is not dispositive in such
situations, it is certainly an appropriate
factor to be considered. See Robert G.
Hallermeier, M.D., 62 Fed. Reg. 26,818
(DEA 1997) (four years); John Porter
Richards, D.O., 61 Fed. Reg. 13,878
(DEA 1996) (ten years); Norman Alpert,
M.D., 58 Fed. Reg. 67,420, 67,421 (DEA
1993) (seven years).
Here, the Respondent’s Indiana
medical license requires him to remain
compliant with the Indiana’s Physician
Assistance Programs’ Continuing Care
Contract. The Respondent signed that
five-year contract in November of 2009.
The contract provides for supervised
drug screens, and in the event of a
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relapse, the Respondent is to notify the
Indiana PAP. The Respondent agreed to
attend Caduceus meetings, AA or NA
meetings, to receive counseling, to
abstain from consuming nonprescribed
mood-changing chemicals, and to see a
psychiatrist for medication
management. The Medical Director, Dr.
Frick, affirmed that the Respondent has
been compliant with these
requirements, and that his drug screens
have been negative since November 23,
2009. The Respondent credibly testified
that he has been clean and sober since
December 20, 2008. This past conduct
demonstrates the Respondent’s ability to
comply with his PAP contract and to
continue to perform his daily functions
drug-free.
After the Government ‘‘has proved
that a registrant has committed acts
inconsistent with the public interest, a
registrant must ‘present sufficient
mitigating evidence to assure the
Administrator that [he] can be entrusted
with the responsibility carried by such
a registration.’ ’’ Medicine Shoppe—
Jonesborough, 73 Fed. Reg. 364, 387
(DEA 2008) (quoting Samuel S. Jackson,
D.D.S., 72 Fed. Reg. 23,848, 23,853
(DEA 2007). ‘‘Moreover, because ‘past
performance is the best predictor of
future performance,’ Alra Labs., Inc. v.
DEA, 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995),
[DEA] has repeatedly held that where a
registrant has committed acts
inconsistent with the public interest, the
registrant must accept responsibility for
[his] actions and demonstrate that [he]
will not engage in future misconduct.’’
Medicine Shoppe—Jonesborough, 73
Fed. Reg. at 387; see also Samuel S.
Jackson, D.D.S., 72 Fed. Reg. 23, 848,
23,853 (DEA 2007); John H. Kennedy,
M.D., 71 Fed. Reg. 35,705, 35,709 (DEA
2006); Prince George Daniels, D.D.S., 60
Fed. Reg. 62,884, 62,887 (DEA 1995).
See also Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477,
483 (6th Cir. 2005) (‘‘admitting fault’’ is
‘‘properly consider[ed]’’ by DEA to be
an ‘‘important factor[]’’ in the public
interest determination).
Here, the Respondent has consistently
taken responsibility for his misconduct.
He disclosed his misconduct to the
Indiana medical board and to the DEA
in his applications and in his testimony
at this proceeding. Further,
requirements are in place to ensure the
public interest is protected from the
possibility of relapse by the Respondent.
First, early detection will take place
because of the urine screens and the
requirement for the Respondent to
disclose any violations of his
Continuing Care Contract. Second, the
DEA can restrict his registration to the
prescribing of controlled substances
only, and to prohibit his prescribing to
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Sfmt 4703
himself or to any other family member.
Lastly, the situation that led to his
relapse in 2008 no longer exists. The
Respondent is no longer caring for his
brother. These factors are also
appropriate to consider when
determining the appropriate use of the
Deputy Administrator’s discretion in
this matter. See Martha Hernandez,
M.D., 62 Fed. Reg. 61,145 (DEA 1997)
(holding that, in exercising his
discretion in determining the
appropriate remedy, the Deputy
Administrator should consider all of the
facts and circumstances of a particular
case).
V. CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATION
Therefore, I conclude that the DEA
has met its burden of proof and has
established that grounds exist for
denying the Respondent’s DEA
application for registration.
I do not condone nor minimize the
seriousness of the Respondent’s prior
misconduct in 2001–2002, and again in
2008. However, based on this record, I
recommend that the Respondent be
afforded an opportunity to demonstrate
that he can responsibly handle
controlled substance prescriptions by
the granting of a restricted registration.
See Cecil E. Oakes, Jr., M.D., 63 Fed.
Reg. 11,907, 11,910 (DEA 1998) (‘‘Such
a resolution will provide Respondent
with the opportunity to demonstrate
that he can responsibly handle
controlled substances, while at the same
time protect the public health and
safety, by providing a mechanism for
rapid detection of any improper
activity.’’).
Based on this record and the
Respondent’s actions since December of
2008, I recommend to the Deputy
Administrator 4 that the Respondent be
granted a conditional DEA registration.
I suggest that the conditions include:
that the registration restricts his
handling of controlled substances to
merely prescribing and not storing or
dispensing such drugs and that he be
prohibited from prescribing controlled
substances to himself or any family
member. Further, I recommend the
Respondent be subject to quarterly
reporting of his prescribing of controlled
substances to his local DEA office. I also
recommend that the Respondent be
ordered to consent to unannounced
inspections by DEA personnel without
requiring an administrative inspection
warrant. Lastly, I recommend that the
Respondent be ordered to continue with
4 The Deputy Administrator has the authority to
make such a determination pursuant to 28 C.F.R.
§§ 0.100(b) and 0.104 (2011).
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his agreement with the Indiana PAP and
to notify the DEA should a relapse
occur. I recommend these restrictions
apply for three years from the date of
the final order so directing this result.
In this way, the Respondent may return
to the full practice of medicine, and the
DEA can assure itself of the
Respondent’s compliance with DEA
regulations and of the protection of the
public interest.
Date: November 2, 2011
/s/Gail A. Randall
Administrative Law Judge
[FR Doc. 2012–18750 Filed 7–31–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 12–27]
James William Eisenberg, M.D.;
Decision and Order
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On April 5, 2012, Administrative Law
Judge Timothy D. Wing issued the
attached recommended decision.1
Neither party filed exceptions to the
ALJ’s decision.
Having reviewed the entire record, I
have decided to adopt the ALJ’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law except as
noted below.2 Based on a recent action
of the Arizona Medical Board, which is
discussed more fully below, I reject the
ALJ’s conclusion that the Arizona
Medical Board’s ‘‘action reflects a
determination that Respondent,
notwithstanding findings of
unprofessional conduct in the recent
past, can be entrusted with a medical
license’’ and that ‘‘this action * * *
weigh[s] against a finding that
Respondent’s continued registration
1 All citations to the ALJ’s decision are to the slip
opinion as originally issued.
2 I do not adopt the ALJ’s footnote 25. See Kwan
Bo Jin, 77 FR 35021, 35021 n.2 (2012).
Moreover, regarding the ALJ’s discussion of
whether the Arizona Board’s 2011 order, see GX 11,
which provided that Respondent’s admissions were
‘‘not intended or made for any other use, such as
in the context of another State or Federal
government regulatory proceeding,’’ is binding on
this Agency, see ALJ at 20 n. 29, I further note that
DEA has previously held that ‘‘[s]tate officials
* * * lack authority to resolve a matter pending
before the [Agency] and [a] stipulated settlement
[between state officials and a Registrant] cannot
bind this Agency.’’ Edmund Chein, 72 FR 6580,
6590 (2007), pet. for rev. denied, 533 F.3d 828 (DC
Cir. 2008)). See also Fourth Street Pharmacy v.
DEA, 836 F.2d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 1988) (absent
proof of an agency relationship between a state
Attorney General and the Agency regarding an
agreement between the State and a registrant, a state
Attorney General ‘‘could not and did not have
authority to bind the DEA to a promise to refrain
from instituting lawful regulatory action to revoke’’
a registration).
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would be inconsistent with the public
interest under Factor One.’’ ALJ at 21.
However, I do adopt the ALJ’s
findings and legal conclusions that
Respondent lacked a legitimate medical
purpose and acted outside of the usual
course of professional practice when, on
August 12, 2011, he prescribed both
oxycodone and Xanax to an undercover
officer, as well as on September 1, 2011,
when he prescribed oxycodone to a
second undercover officer. ALJ at 30–31.
As the ALJ found, substantial evidence
supports the conclusion that these were
negotiated drug deals in which for an
additional fee, Respondent, upon the
requests of the undercover officers for
the drugs, agreed to prescribe controlled
substances and negotiated with the
undercover officers over the quantity of
the oxycodone and/or the strength of the
drug.3 See id. 23–27. Indeed, with
respect to the second undercover officer,
Respondent agreed to write a
prescription for oxycodone before he
had even performed a physical
examination. See id. at 25–26. The
findings with respect to the two
undercover officers alone establish a
prima facie case that Respondent has
committed acts which render his
3 While I adopt the ALJ’s findings and legal
conclusions that Respondent unlawfully distributed
controlled substances to the undercover officers, I
rely solely on the evidence regarding the
circumstances of their visits with Respondent. To
make clear, I reject the ALJ’s legal conclusion that
the hearsay statement of a former employee of AZ
Go Green to the effect ‘‘that Respondent was
illegally prescribing oxycodone’’ constitutes
substantial evidence that Respondent was engaged
in drug deals. ALJ at 27 n.35. Contrary to the ALJ’s
assertion, this information was initially provided by
the informant to the Phoenix Police Department,
which relayed it to the Arizona Attorney General’s
Office, which then passed it on to the DEA Special
Agent, and was thus hearsay within hearsay within
hearsay. Tr. 23.
While the Special Agent testified that he knew
the informant had been a former employee, he
offered no further evidence to support that the
declarant was reliable. See id. Most significantly,
the Government offered the testimony for the
limited purpose of showing what prompted the
investigation, id. at 69, and when on crossexamination, Respondent’s counsel attempted to
explore the issue of the informant’s potential bias,
the Government objected that the inquiry was not
relevant to the issue of whether Respondent issued
prescriptions for a legitimate medical purpose in
the usual course of professional practice. Id. at 70–
71. Indeed, the Government itself later objected to
a further question on cross-examination contending
that the informant’s statements were hearsay,
explaining that it had offered the statements ‘‘just
to show why the agents were at AZ Go Green.’’ Id.
at 74.
I agree with the Government and conclude that
the statement does not constitute substantial
evidence that Respondent was engaged in drug
deals. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (Substantial evidence * * *
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’’). Instead, I rely on the evidence
pertaining to the specific undercover visits.
PO 00000
Frm 00089
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
45663
registration inconsistent with the public
interest. See 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4); see also
MacKay v. DEA, 664 F.3d 808, 821 (10th
Cir. 2011); Jayam Krishna-Iyer, 74 FR
459, 463 (2009) (citing Alan H. Olefsky,
57 FR 928, 928–29 (1992)).
While I do not rely on the hearsay
evidence cited by the ALJ as support for
his conclusion that Respondent was
engaged in drug deals, there is other
evidence to support the conclusion that
Respondent is a drug dealer. I take
official notice 4 that on April 4, 2012,
the Arizona Medical Board issued to
Respondent an Order For Decree Of
Censure And Practice Restriction And
Consent To The Same. See In re James
W. Eisenberg, M.D. No. MD–11–1351A
(Az. Med. Bd. Apr. 4, 2012). Therein,
the Board found, with respect to four
patients (including the owner of the
clinic where he worked), that
Respondent:
Failed to document any attempt to verify
the diagnoses or to obtain medical records,
imaging, diagnostic work up or specialty
consultation. Respondent failed to consider
any non-opioid management other than
cannabis, and failed to review the Controlled
Substance Prescription Monitoring Program
(CSPMP); perform urine drug testing; counsel
the patients regarding precaution, risks and
safe opioid use; or obtain a standard opioid
treating agreement.
Id. at 2. The Board further found with
respect to these patients, that
Respondent:
Deviated from the standard of care by
performing an extremely limited pain history
and physical exam, by failing to perform a
medical record review or risk assessment for
opioid use, by failing to perform a diagnostic
evaluation or consider a multidisciplinary
approach outside of cannabis and daily
opioid, by failing to verify a medical
diagnosis appropriately treated with daily
high dose opioid, and by failing to monitor
for compliance by urine drug testing or
review of the CSPMP.
Id. at 3. The Board thus concluded that
Respondent had committed
‘‘unprofessional conduct,’’ by engaging
in conduct ‘‘that is or might be harmful
or dangerous to the health of the patient
or the public’’ and by ‘‘failing or
refusing to maintain adequate records
4 Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
an agency ‘‘may take official notice of facts at any
stage in a proceeding—even in the final decision.’’
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on
the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979). In accordance
with the APA and DEA’s regulations, Respondent
is ‘‘entitled on timely request to an opportunity to
show to the contrary.’’ 5 U.S.C. 556(e); see also 21
CFR 1316.59(e). To allow Respondent the
opportunity to refute the facts of which I take
official notice, Respondent may file a motion for
reconsideration within fifteen days of service of this
order which shall commence with the mailing of
the order.
E:\FR\FM\01AUN1.SGM
01AUN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 148 (Wednesday, August 1, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 45656-45663]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-18750]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 11-45]
Decision and Order; Perry T. Dobyns, M.D.
On November 2, 2011, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Gail A. Randall
issued the attached recommended decision. Therein, the ALJ found that
while the Government had established grounds for denying Respondent's
application, ALJ at 22, Respondent has been sober since December 2008,
that he has been in compliance with his Indiana Physicians' Assistance
Program Continuing Care Contract since November 2009, id. at 20, and
that he ``has consistently taken responsibility for his misconduct.''
\1\ Id. at 21. The ALJ thus recommended that Respondent be granted a
restricted registration subject to multiple conditions. The Government
did not file exceptions to the ALJ's decision.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ No evidence was put forward showing that Respondent diverted
controlled substances to others.
\2\ In its post-hearing brief, the Government cites a prior
decision of this Agency, which after having already ordered that the
practitioner's application be granted, then noted ``evidence of the
community's need for a physician of his specialty with prescribing
capabilities.'' Gov. Br. 11 (quoting David M. Headley, 61 FR 39469,
39471 (1996)). However, the Agency has since held in multiple cases
that community impact evidence is not relevant in the public
interest determination and provided an extensive explanation as to
why. See Linda Sue Cheek, 76 FR 66972, 66973 (2011); Mark De La
Lama, 76 FR 20011, 20020 n.20 (2011); Bienvenido Tan, 76 FR 17673,
17694 n.58 (2011); Gregory D. Owens, 74 FR 36571, 36757 & n.22
(2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Having reviewed the record, I have decided to adopt the ALJ's
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended Order.
Accordingly, I will order that Respondent be granted a registration
subject to the following conditions:
(1) Respondent shall be limited to prescribing controlled
substances and may not administer or dispense directly any controlled
substances. In addition, Respondent may not order any controlled
substances or accept any samples of controlled substances. If
Respondent is employed at a practice in which controlled substances are
stored on the premises, Respondent shall not have access to the cabinet
in which the controlled substances are stored. Respondent shall inform
any medical practice at which he becomes employed of this restriction
on his registration.
(2) Respondent is prohibited from prescribing controlled substances
to himself or any family member.
(3) Respondent shall maintain a log of all controlled substance
prescriptions he authorizes and shall file a report listing in
chronological order all such prescriptions by date, and including the
following information: the name and address of the patient, name and
dosage of the drug, quantity of the drug, and number of refills
authorized. Each report shall be filed with the local DEA field office
no later than ten (10) calendar days after the end of the previous
quarter, e.g., April 10 (for the quarter ending on March 31), July 10
[[Page 45657]]
(for the quarter ending on June 30), October 10 (for the quarter ending
on September 30), and January 10 (for the quarter ending on December
31). If Respondent issues no controlled substance prescriptions during
a quarter, a report indicating that no prescriptions were issued shall
also be filed no later than ten (10) calendar days following the end of
the quarter.
(4) If Respondent opens his own practice, he shall consent to
unannounced inspections by DEA personnel of any medical office he
maintains and shall waive his right to require DEA personnel to obtain
an Administrative Inspection Warrant prior to conducting an inspection.
(5) Respondent shall enter into an agreement with the Indiana
Physicians' Assistance Program pursuant to which he agrees that it
shall disclose any violation of the conditions of his contract
(including any failed drug screens) to the local DEA field office. In
the event Respondent tests positive for a drug for which he does not
hold a valid prescription, or fails to report for drug screening upon
being ordered to do so, such acts shall constitute grounds for the
immediate suspension of his registration.
(6) Respondent shall report to the local DEA field office any
relapse within forty-eight hours of such occurrence.
(7) These conditions shall remain in effect for a period of three
years, except that in the event Respondent successfully completes his
contract with the Indiana Physicians' Assistance Program, condition
number five shall terminate upon completion of said contract. However,
if said contract is renewed, condition number five shall continue in
effect until three years from the date of issuance of this
registration.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 28
CFR 0.100(b), I order that the application of Perry T. Dobyns, M.D.,
for a DEA Certificate of Registration as a practitioner, be, and it
hereby is, granted, subject to the conditions set forth above. This
Order is effective immediately.
Dated: July 24, 2012.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Administrator.
D. Linden Barber, Esq., and
Jonathan P. Novak, Esq., for the Government
Robert E. Saint, Esq., for the Respondent
RECOMMENDED RULINGS, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DECISION
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Gail A. Randall, Administrative Law Judge. The Deputy Assistant
Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration (``DEA'' or ``Government''), issued an Order to Show
Cause (``Order'') dated March 7, 2011, proposing to deny the DEA
Certificate of Registration application of Perry T. Dobyns, M.D.,
(``Respondent''), as a practitioner, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec. 823(f)
(2006), because to grant the Respondent's registration would be
inconsistent with the public interest, as that term is used in 21
U.S.C. 823(f). [Administrative Law Judge Exhibit (``ALJ Exh.'') 1 at
1].
The Order alleged that on June 25, 2010, the Respondent submitted
an application for a DEA registration as a practitioner with authority
to handle controlled substances in Schedules II-V. [Id.].
The Order further alleged that the Respondent had entered into an
agreement with the North Carolina Medical Board in 2007, because of his
misuse of drugs, including controlled substances. The Respondent also
agreed not to use mood-altering drugs that had not been prescribed to
him by a physician. However, a urine screen submitted on October 31,
2008, tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol, indicating that he had
unlawfully possessed and used a Schedule I controlled substance.
Further, the Respondent's urine screen submitted on November 22, 2008,
tested positive for oxycodone and oxymorphone, indicating that he had
unlawfully possessed and consumed two Schedule II controlled
substances. [Id.].
Next, the Order asserted that, on December 2, 2008, the Respondent
forged a prescription for oxycodone in order to illegally obtain this
Schedule II controlled substance. He filled this prescription. [ALJ
Exh. 1 at 2].
The Order noted that, on August 3, 2010, the Respondent was
interviewed by DEA personnel, and he admitted that: (a) in 2002 the
Respondent was admitted to a hospital due to abuse of alcohol and
narcotics, and he subsequently entered into an agreement with the
Indiana State Medical Association's Physicians Assistance Program; (b)
in 2008, the Respondent had used narcotics that had been prescribed to
one of his family members; (c) in September of 2008, he smoked
marijuana; and (d) in late 2008, he issued a forged prescription for
oxycodone to himself. [Id.].
Lastly, the Order asserts that the Respondent returned to Indiana
in June of 2010, and began practicing medicine. Although he did not
possess a DEA registration, on November 15, 2010, the Respondent or his
medical office staff issued two prescriptions for controlled substances
using an electronic prescribing program. [Id.].
The Deputy Assistant Administrator then gave the Respondent the
opportunity to show cause as to why his application should not be
denied on the basis of those allegations. [Id. at 2].
On April 25, 2011, the Respondent \1\ filed a request for a hearing
in the above-captioned matter. [ALJ Exh. 2].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ On May 26, 2011, the Respondent filed his Pre-Hearing
Statement. Mr. Saint entered his appearance by filing this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 31, 2011, the Government filed Government's Motion to
Terminate Proceeding Due to Untimely Request for Hearing, [Motion].
[ALJ Exh. 3]. On June 17, 2011, I denied the Government's Motion. [ALJ
Exh. 5].
On July 20, 2011, Jonathan P. Novak entered his appearance on
behalf of the Government in the above captioned matter. [ALJ Exh. 6].
The hearing was conducted on August 23, 2011, in Lafayette,
Indiana. [ALJ Exh. 7]. At the hearing, counsel for the DEA called one
witness to testify and introduced documentary evidence. The Respondent
testified and introduced documentary evidence. [Transcript (``Tr.'')
Volume I].
After the hearing, the Government submitted Proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Argument (``Govt. Brief''). The Respondent
also submitted Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Argument (``Resp. Brief'').
II. ISSUE
The issue in this proceeding is whether or not the record as a
whole establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the Drug
Enforcement Administration (``DEA'' or ``Government'') should deny the
application for a DEA Certificate of Registration, of Perry T. Dobyns,
M.D., (``Respondent''), as a practitioner, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec.
823(f) (2006), because to grant his application would be inconsistent
with the public interest, as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. Sec.
823(f). [ALJ Exh. 4; Transcript (``Tr.'') at 8].
[[Page 45658]]
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Stipulated Facts
The parties have stipulated to the following facts:
1. Respondent applied for a DEA registration on June 25, 2010.
[Government Exhibit (``Govt. Exh.'') 1].
2. Respondent previously held a DEA registration but allowed it to
expire without renewal in 2009.
3. Respondent was hospitalized for alcohol and drug abuse in 2002,
and entered into the Physicians Assistance Program in Indiana because
of his abuse of alcohol and narcotic controlled substances.
4. In 2007, Respondent entered an agreement with the North Carolina
Physicians Health Program that required him to submit to drug testing.
5. In the fall of 2008, Respondent unlawfully possessed marijuana,
oxymorphone and oxycodone, and used these drugs.
6. On October 31, 2008, Respondent tested positive for marijuana in
a drug test performed under his agreement with the North Carolina
Physicians Health Program.
7. On November 22, 2008, Respondent tested positive for oxymorphone
and oxycodone in a drug test performed under his agreement with the
North Carolina Physicians Health Program.
8. On December 2, 2008, Respondent filled a prescription for
oxycodone which he had forged using the name and DEA number of another
physician.
[ALJ Exh. 4].
B. Respondent's Addiction History
In late 2001, the Respondent's medical practice in Oklahoma was
failing. The Respondent's alcohol intake increased at home, and he
began taking a controlled substance, hydrocodone, ``to help (him)
during the day.'' [Tr. 44]. The Respondent used hydrocodone samples
given to the clinic by drug representatives. [Tr. 45]. He failed to
maintain distribution records for these controlled substances. [Tr.
88].
In 2002, the Respondent moved to Indiana. He continued to drink
during the night and use narcotic prescription medications during the
day. [Tr. 44-45]. The narcotics were taken from the practice's sample
cabinet. [Tr. 46]. In November of 2002, the Respondent's ``depression,
exacerbated by the alcohol and drug dependence, came to an extreme, and
(he) attempted suicide.'' [Tr. 46]. His employers at the Harrison
Family Practice referred him to the Indiana Physician Assistance
Program, (PAP), who recommended that he seek inpatient treatment. [Tr.
46-47].
In late 2002, the Respondent was admitted to the Rush Memorial
Behavioral Health program in Chicago, Illinois, which was a specific
program for impaired physicians. [Tr. 47]. The Respondent attended this
in-patient program for 10 weeks. [Tr. 20, 47, 87]. He was initially
diagnosed as chemically dependent on opiates and alcohol along with a
diagnosis of depression. [Respondent's Exhibit (``Resp. Exh.'') D].
The Respondent enrolled in the Indiana PAP and signed a Continuing
Care Contract (``Contract''). [Tr. 48; Resp. Exh. D]. He was required
to have regular contact with the PAP through in-person meetings in
Indianapolis. [Tr. 48]. He was also required to attend regular meetings
of Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous three times per week.
[Id.]. He was also to attend weekly meetings of the Caduceus Group, a
treatment group for doctors with substance abuse issues, in
Indianapolis. [Id.]. The Contract also required the Respondent to
participate in random urine drug screens. [Tr. 48-50]. While in
Indiana, the Respondent remained in compliance with the Contract. [Tr.
49].
In 2007, the Respondent moved to North Carolina, enrolled in the
North Carolina PAP, and signed a new five-year contract. [Tr. 51; Resp.
Exh. D]. Similar to the Indiana PAP, this program is intended to
``help[] physicians overcome an addiction issue.'' [Tr. 19]. As a
requirement of this program, the Respondent was to refrain from
consuming any controlled substances that were not legitimately
prescribed to him or given to him for medical purposes. [Tr. 20]. He
was also to submit to urine drug screens as dictated to by the program.
[Id.].
While in North Carolina, the Respondent worked in Chapel Hill
during the week and spent his weekends in Fayetteville with his family.
[Tr. 52-53]. He was also caring for his dying brother. [Tr. 53]. The
stress of caring for his brother contributed to his relapse. [Tr. 21-
22]. This was his first relapse since beginning the recovery process in
2002. [Tr. 22, 93]. The Respondent's brother used medical marijuana,
and the Respondent used it in October of 2008. [Tr. 53-54]. The
Respondent also consumed oxycodone from his brother's prescription, and
subsequently he issued a prescription to himself using another doctor's
DEA number. [Tr. 22]. This doctor did not know of the Respondent's
conduct until the DEA informed him. [Tr. 22]. The Respondent also wrote
a prescription for his sister using his DEA registration and consumed
the controlled substances himself. [Tr. 94].
The Respondent then had a positive drug screen for marijuana in
October of 2008, and another positive drug screen for oxycodone and
oxymorphone in November of 2008. [Tr. 55-56, 88-89]. The North Carolina
PAP reported these positive test results to the North Carolina Medical
Board. [Tr. 56]. Ultimately, the Respondent's North Carolina medical
license was indefinitely suspended. [Tr. 22].
The DEA did not know about the Respondent's sobriety between
November of 2008 until November of 2009, when he reentered the Indiana
Physician Assistance Program. [Tr. 31, 58]. He then applied to renew
his Indiana medical license. On the application for such renewal, the
Respondent disclosed the action that had been taken against his North
Carolina medical license. [Tr. 58-59]. The Indiana Medical Board
renewed the Respondent's medical license with probationary conditions.
[Tr. 23]. In August and December of 2009, those terms and conditions
were altered slightly. [Resp. Exh. A]. The Respondent is to remain
compliant with the Indiana's Physician Assistance Program (PAP), and he
is to notify the Indiana Medical Board within twenty-four hours of any
relapse. [Tr. 23]. The Respondent is only allowed to work a forty hour
work week, and, prior to the Board's removal of this condition, there
had to be another physician on-site when the Respondent was working.
The Respondent has remained compliant with the terms of his probation.
[Tr. 23, 28].
On November 23, 2009, the Respondent signed a second Continuing
Care Contract with the Indiana PAP. [Resp. Exh. D]. This is a five-year
agreement. [Id.]. The Respondent agreed, among other provisions, to
participate in supervised urine/hair/blood drug screens, and agreed to
abstain from mood-changing chemicals except those prescribed by a
treating physician. [Id.]. In the event of a relapse, the Respondent is
to notify the PAP. [Id.]. The Respondent also agreed to attend Caduceus
meetings and to attend ``mutual self-help meetings''such as AA or NA at
a frequency of three times per week. [Tr. 68; Resp. Exh. D]. The
Respondent also agreed to attend individual therapy bi-weekly for a
period of time and to see a psychiatrist for medication management.
[Resp. Exh. D; Tr. 69-70].
[[Page 45659]]
In August of 2010, Diversion Investigator (DI) Gary L. Whisenand
\2\ interviewed the Respondent. [Tr. 19]. I find DI Whisenand's
testimony consistent with the documentary exhibits and credible. DI
Whisenand credibly testified that Indiana's Physician Assistance
Program was a reliable program that cooperated with the DEA. [Tr. 30].
During the interview with DI Whisenand, the Respondent admitted to
smoking marijuana and consuming oxycodone. [Tr. 21, 84]. The Respondent
had explained that he had moved to North Carolina to care for an ailing
brother, who had Stage IV lung cancer, and the stress of tending to his
brother had caused the Respondent to relapse. [Tr. 21-22]. This was his
first relapse since beginning the recovery process in 2002. [Tr. 22,
93].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ DI Whisenand has been a DEA diversion investigator for just
over six years. [Tr. 15].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Fred W. Frick submitted an affidavit in this proceeding. [Resp.
Exh. D]. Dr. Frick is board certified in internal medicine with an
extensive record as an addictionologist. [Id.]. Since 2004, he has been
the contract Medical Consultant and Director of the Indiana State
Medical Association's Physicians Assistance Program. [Id.]. He
explained that the PAP ``is currently recognized as an acceptable
monitoring and advocacy program by the Indiana Medical Licensing
Board.'' [Id.]. Dr. Frick oversees the program, ``which directs the
monitoring and advocacy for chemically dependent physicians in the
State of Indiana.'' [Id.]. Dr. Frick was familiar with the Respondent's
history of drug use and addiction. [Id.].
Dr. Frick wrote that each of the Respondent's drug screens have
been negative since November 23, 2009, except for the presence of
Ultram, ``which was prescribed for Dr. Dobyns by a treating
physician.'' [Id.]. Lastly, Dr. Frick wrote that to the best of his
knowledge, the Respondent ``has been compliant with all other aspects
of his Continuing Care Contract since November 23, 2009.'' [Id.].
C. Respondent's DEA Application
In his DEA application, the Respondent disclosed that his North
Carolina medical license had been placed on indefinite suspension. [Tr.
18; Govt. Exh. 1]. No charges are pending before the North Carolina
medical board. [Govt. Exh. 1]. The Respondent also disclosed that he
had had a positive drug test in 2008. [Id.].
The Respondent also disclosed that he had applied to renew his
medical license in Indiana, and that the Indiana Medical Board agreed
to do so on a probationary basis. [Id.]. The Respondent agreed to
participate in the Indiana State Medical Association's Physician
Assistance Program (PAP). [Id.]. The Respondent also wrote that his
participation in Indiana has continued to the date of his application
without incident. [Id.].
D. Electronic Prescriptions
In June of 2010, the Respondent accepted a position at the Madison
County Health Center (``Center'') as a staff physician. [Tr. 75]. He
made a full disclosure to that employer about his drug use history.
[Tr. 62]. There, if a patient needed controlled substances, the
Respondent would take a medical history, perform a physical
examination, and determine whether the prescription was appropriate for
the patient. [Tr. 64]. At that point, the Respondent would refer the
patient to the Center's medical director for issuance of the controlled
substance prescription. [Id.].
The DEA received two electronic prescriptions for controlled
substances written under the Respondent's name and dated in November of
2010. [Tr. 26-28; Govt. Exh. 2]. These prescriptions contained the
Respondent's electronic signature. [Tr. 31]. These two prescriptions
were for a patient who had seen the Respondent's supervisory physician
previously, and she was issued these two prescriptions for ongoing
treatment of chronic pain and anxiety. [Tr. 78].
At the time of these prescriptions, the Respondent was working at
the Center. [Tr. 75]. The Center had an electronic medical records
system. [Tr. 31, 65]. The default for the Respondent was for the system
to send prescriptions to the printer for the Respondent to then take to
the medical director to issue. [Tr. 65].
The two electronic prescriptions for controlled substances were
inadvertently sent by the system to the facsimile machine rather than
to the printer. As soon as the Respondent became aware of the computer
error, he took corrective action. He credibly testified that ``the
measure that we took was to disconnect the fax function from the
computer entirely so that the computer could no longer physically
access the fax line.'' [Tr. 67]. It was DI Whisenand's assumption that
the Respondent's electronic signature was affixed by that system. [Tr.
32]. The prescriptions were then faxed to a pharmacy by the electronic
medical records system without the Respondent's knowledge. [Tr. 33]. DI
Whisenand credibly testified that he did not have any evidence that the
Respondent knowingly transmitted controlled substance prescriptions via
facisimile to a pharmacy. [Tr. 35]. After this time, DI Whisenand never
received any complaints from a pharmacy or a pharmacy worker regarding
the Respondent. [Tr. 34].
E. Respondent's Current Situation
The Respondent received his medical degree with honors in 1995 from
the University of Tennessee at Memphis, Tennessee. [Tr. 42]. The
Respondent completed a residency in family medicine in 1997, and he
became board certified by the American Board of Family Practice the
same year. [Tr. 43]. In 2005, the Respondent recertified for a ten-year
period. [Id.]. However, due to the North Carolina action against his
medical license, his certification was invalidated. [Id.].
The Respondent has been clean and sober since December 20, 2008.
[Tr. 98]. The Respondent is unemployed, and he does not have a DEA
registration number. [Tr. 24-25]. The Respondent is currently active in
AA and has a sponsor. [Tr. 70-71]. He attends at least two meetings a
week with his sponsor and engages in one or two phone calls during the
week. [Tr. 71].
The Respondent currently has an active, in all substances,
controlled substances registration with Indiana. [Tr. 40, 61-62]. He
also has an active Indiana medical license which is on probation. [Tr.
40-41; Resp. Exh. A]. In July of 2011, the Indiana Medical Board
modified the Respondent's probationary conditions of December 2009.
[Resp. Exh. C]. Currently the Respondent's probationary conditions
include: (a) the Respondent must maintain and remain in compliance with
a contract from the Indiana PAP; (b) the Respondent shall report any
relapse regarding chemical dependency to the Board within twenty-four
hours; (c) the Respondent shall not work more than forty hours a week
and for the next year shall submit quarterly written reports to the
Board from his employer concerning his employment, and from the
Respondent concerning his DEA status; and (d) the Respondent shall
comply with the statutes and rules governing the practice of medicine.
[Resp. Exh. B; Resp. Exh. C].
In April of 2011, the Respondent was discharged from the Center.
The primary reason for that action was the difficulties experienced by
the Center in handling the Respondent's lack of a DEA registration.
[Tr. 67].
The Respondent credibly testified that he has never had a medical
malpractice judgment entered against him, he has never settled a
medical malpractice claim, and that the disclosed adverse actions taken
against his medical license
[[Page 45660]]
were the only such actions taken. [Tr. 67-68].
Today, the Respondent's North Carolina medical license is
indefinitely suspended. [Tr. 56]. The Respondent does not plan to
return to North Carolina. [Tr. 56]. The Respondent intends to become
gainfully employed as a physician in Indiana. [Tr. 71]. Without a DEA
registration, the Respondent is not able to have a meaningful medical
practice. [Tr. 72]. The Respondent is not seeking any employment where
he would have access to mood altering substances on the worksite. [Tr.
96].
IV. STATEMENT OF LAW AND DISCUSSION
A. Position of the Parties
1. Government's Position
The Government asserts that the appropriate remedy in this matter
is denial of the Respondent's application. [Govt. Brief at 12]. Looking
to the factors defining the public interest, the Government first
proposes that factor one is applicable, for the North Carolina
licensing board has indefinitely suspended the Respondent's medical
license. [Govt. Brief at 6]. Further, the State of Indiana only granted
the Respondent a medical license with restrictions and monitoring
requirements. [Id.]. The Government argues that such conditions reflect
``a systematic concern for Respondent's professional and personal well-
being. As such, this factor weighs in favor of denying Respondent's
application for a DEA Certificate of Registration.'' [Id.].
As to factor two, the Government asserts that the Respondent
admitted to a lengthy history of using illicit drugs for recreational
purposes, and to obtaining controlled substances for personal use
through illicit means. [Govt. Brief at 7]. Under this factor, the
Government concludes that the ``Respondent has shown a callous and
cavalier attitude towards both using and prescribing controlled
substances.'' [Govt. Brief at 8].
Under factor four, the Government asserts that the Respondent
violated federal law when he fraudulently used a prescription pad
belonging to another doctor to write a prescription for a controlled
substance for himself. [Id.]. Also, the Respondent admitted to
possessing and using marijuana that he obtained illicitly. [Id.].
Because of this conduct, the Government argues that factor four weighs
heavily in favor of denying the Respondent's application. [Govt. Brief
at 8-9].
Lastly, under factor five, the Government argues that the
Respondent has only been in monitored recovery for two years. [Govt.
Brief at 10]. The Government notes that prior DEA precedent takes into
account the length of time the Respondent has been in recovery. [Govt.
Brief at 9]. Here, the Respondent had been clean and sober for six
years before his relapse. In the context of this behavior, the
Government argues that the Respondent's ``risk of relapse should be
considered high until such time (as) Respondent has shown a longer
period of compliance with the restrictions of his substance abuse
treatment by remaining sober, as well as a better understanding of the
seriousness of his addiction and the danger it presents to himself and
to others.'' [Govt. Brief at 10].
The Government also finds it significant that the Respondent failed
to show any remorse or ``even [an] understanding for the danger he
presented to his patients by practicing under the influence of Schedule
II narcotics.'' [Id.]. Therefore, the Government concludes, the
Respondent's application should be denied. [Govt. Brief at 11-12].
In the alternative, the Government asserts, if the Respondent
should be granted a restricted registration, the Government requests
that (a) the Respondent's registration be limited to Schedule IV and V
controlled substances only; (b) the Respondent be limited to
prescribing controlled substances only, and not be authorized to
prescribe to himself or any family members; (c) the Respondent shall
only be authorized to obtain controlled substances from a treating
practitioner who prescribes controlled substances to the Respondent for
a legitimate medical purpose; (d) the Respondent maintain a
prescription log which he would submit quarterly to the DEA; (e)
Respondent shall consent to unannounced inspections without the need of
an Administrative Inspection Warrant; and (f) the Respondent continue
in his agreement with the Indiana PAP. [Govt. Brief at 12-13].
2. Respondent's Position
The Respondent asserts that granting his application would be in
the public interest. [Resp. Brief at 11]. The Respondent argues that he
has been in substantial compliance with his treatment for eight years
except for a relapse during two months in 2008. [Resp. Brief at 10]. He
notes that he has maintained an active probationary medical license in
Indiana, and he has complied with the terms of that probation. [Id.].
The Respondent also has an active Indiana Controlled Substance
Registration. [Id.].
The Respondent next asserts that no evidence exists that the
Respondent's medical care endangered patients or that his care deviated
from any standard of care. [Resp. Brief at 11]. Instead, Respondent
argues that his violations stemmed from his chemical dependency, which
was exacerbated by unusual family circumstances, namely the terminal
illness of his brother. [Id.]. Therefore, the Respondent proffers that
the ``issuance of a restricted registration'' would resolve ``[a]ny
concern for the public health and safety'' posed by the Respondent's
violations. Lastly, the Respondent concludes that he should be granted
a registration restricted as follows: (1) the Respondent must remain in
compliance with the Indiana Continuing Care Contract; (2) and also with
his probationary medical license; (3) and that the Respondent be
required to immediately disclose any non-compliance with either of
these two monitoring agreements. [Id.].
B. Statement of Law and Analysis
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec. 823(f) (2006),\3\ the Deputy
Administrator may deny an application for a DEA Certificate of
Registration if she determines that such registration would be
inconsistent with the public interest. In determining the public
interest, the following factors are considered:
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\3\ The Deputy Administrator has the authority to make such a
determination pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 0.100(b) and 0.104
(2011).
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(1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board or
professional disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant's experience in dispensing, or conducting
research with respect to controlled substances.
(3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State laws
relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled
substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws
relating to controlled substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and
safety.
These factors are to be considered in the disjunctive; the Deputy
Administrator may rely on any one or a combination of factors and may
give each factor the weight she deems appropriate in determining
whether a registration should be revoked or an application for
registration be denied. See Robert A. Leslie, M.D., 68 Fed. Reg.
15,227, 15,230 (DEA 2003); Henry J. Schwarz, Jr., M.D., 54 Fed. Reg.
16,422 (DEA 1989). Moreover, the Deputy
[[Page 45661]]
Administrator is ``not required to make findings as to all of the
factors.'' Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005); see also
Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 173-74 (DC Cir. 2005).
The Government bears the burden of proving that the requirements
for registration are not satisfied. 21 C.F.R. Sec. 1301.44(d) (2011).
The burden of proof shifts to the Respondent once the Government has
made its prima facie case. See Medicine Shoppe--Jonesborough, 73 Fed.
Reg. 364, 380 (DEA 2008); see also Thomas E. Johnston, 45 Fed. Reg.
72,311 (DEA 1980).
DEA precedent has also held that ``past performance is the best
predictor of future performance.'' Alra Labs., Inc. v. DEA, 54 F.3d
450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995). Further, DEA has repeatedly held that ``where
a registrant has committed acts inconsistent with the public interest,
the registrant must accept responsibility for [his] actions and
demonstrate that [he] will not engage in future misconduct.'' Medicine
Shoppe--Jonesborough, 73 Fed. Reg. at 387; see also Samuel S. Jackson,
D.D.S., 72 Fed. Reg. 23,848, 23,853 (DEA 2007). In short, after the
Government makes its prima facie case, the Respondent must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he can be entrusted with the
authority that a registration provides by demonstrating that he accepts
responsibility for his misconduct and that the misconduct will not re-
occur.
1. Recommendation of Appropriate State Licensing Board.
The DEA has long held that a practitioner's reinstatement by a
State board ``is not dispositive,'' because ``DEA maintains a separate
oversight responsibility with respect to the handling of controlled
substances and has a statutory obligation to make its independent
determination as to whether the granting of [a registration] would be
in the public interest.'' Mortimer B. Levin, D.O., 55 Fed. Reg. 8,209,
8,210 (DEA 1990); see also Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 459,
461 (DEA 2009). The ultimate responsibility to determine whether a
registration is consistent with the public interest has been delegated
exclusively to the DEA, not to entities within state government. Edmund
Chein, M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 6,580, 6,590 (DEA 2007), aff'd, Chein v. DEA,
533 F.3d 828 (DC Cir. 2008). Although not dispositive, state board
decisions are relevant on the issue of granting or denying a DEA
application. See Gregory D. Owens, D.D.S., 74 Fed. Reg. 36,751, 36,755
(DEA 2009); Martha Hernandez, M.D., 62 Fed. Reg. 61,145, 61,147 (DEA
1997).
Here, the Indiana State Medical Board has not made a recommendation
concerning the Respondent's DEA application. The Respondent currently
has an active, in all substances, controlled substances registration
with Indiana. He also has an active Indiana medical license which is on
probation. Nevertheless, the DEA has consistently held that a
practitioner's possession of State authority, while a prerequisite to
registration, is not dispositive of the public interest determination.
Mark De La Lama, P.A., 76 Fed. Reg. 20,011, 20,018 (DEA 2011).
2. Applicant's Conviction Record Relating to Controlled Substances,
Experience With Controlled Substances And Compliance With Applicable
State, Federal, Or Local Laws Relating To Controlled Substances.
The critical consideration in this proceeding is whether the
circumstances that existed in 2008, have changed sufficiently to
support a conclusion that Respondent's registration would be in the
public interest. See Ellis Turk, M.D., 62 Fed. Reg. 19,603, 19,604 (DEA
1997). As this Agency has repeatedly held, a proceeding under the
Controlled Substances Act ```is a remedial measure, based upon the
public interest and the necessity to protect the public from those
individuals who have misused * * * their DEA Certificate of
Registration, and who have not presented sufficient mitigating evidence
to assure the Administrator that they can be entrusted with the
responsibility carried by such a registration.''' Jon Karl Dively,
D.D.S., 72 Fed. Reg. 74,332, 74,334 (DEA 2007) (quoting Samuel S.
Jackson, D.D.S., 72 Fed. Reg. 23,848, 23,853 (DEA 2007)).
As for Factor 3, the parties do not dispute that the Respondent has
not been convicted of any offense relating to controlled substances.
The Respondent also previously held a DEA registration but allowed it
to expire without renewal in 2009.
In late 2001, the Respondent illegally used hydrocodone samples
given to the clinic by drug representatives. He failed to maintain
distribution records for these controlled substances. The Respondent
continued this behavior of unlawful consumption of controlled
substances through 2002.
In late 2002, the Respondent was hospitalized for alcohol and drug
abuse. He was diagnosed as chemically dependent on opiates and alcohol.
In March of 2003, when he completed the inpatient treatment, he entered
the Physicians Assistance Program in Indiana. He remained in compliance
with his Contract during this time.
Under the Controlled Substances Act, it is ``unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally * * * to acquire or obtain possession
of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery,
deception, or subterfuge.'' 21 U.S.C. Sec. 843(a)(3) (2006). In 2008,
the Respondent began smoking marijuana and consuming other controlled
substances unlawfully. The Respondent wrote a prescription for his
sister, filled it, and consumed the controlled substances himself. He
also wrote a prescription for controlled substances on another
physician's prescription pad, filled that prescription, and consumed
those controlled substances. Subsequently the Respondent tested
positive for marijuana use in October of 2008, and for oxycodone and
oxymorphone in November of 2008. Such unlawful consumption of
controlled substances weighs against the Respondent's being granted a
DEA registration.
Further, the Respondent's use of another's DEA registration to
prescribe himself controlled substances is, itself, a violation of the
Controlled Substances Act. See 21 U.S.C. Sec. 843(a)(2) (2006) (``It
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to use in
the course of the * * * dispensing of a controlled substance * * * a
registration number which is * * * issued to another person.''); see
also Patrick W. Stodola, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 20,727, 20,735-36 (DEA
2009); Harrell E. Robinson, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 61,370, 61,376 (DEA
2009). This violation also weighs against the granting of the
Respondent's application for a DEA registration.
In June of 2010, a pharmacy received two electronic prescriptions
for controlled substances electronically signed by the Respondent. The
Respondent did not have a DEA registration. Such conduct also violates
the Controlled Substances Act and its implementing regulations. See 21
U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) (2006) (``Except as authorized by this title, it
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to * * *
dispense * * * a controlled substance.''); see also 21 C.F.R. Sec.
1301.11 (2011) (requiring any person who dispenses a controlled
substance to be registered unless exempted by law). However, I also
note the nature of the offense, for the computer-generated
prescriptions were sent to the facsimile machine in error. I also note
that the Respondent took remedial actions to ensure such an error does
not happen again. Further, although not an excuse
[[Page 45662]]
for this incident, I also note that the recipient of this prescription
was being treated by the Respondent, who credibly testified that the
prescriptions were issued for a legitimate medical purpose.
3. Other Factors Affecting the Public Interest
Another factor in this case is the fact that the Respondent
unlawfully consumed controlled substances while caring for patients.
Although this record contains no evidence of any harm coming to his
patients, the fact that he was willing to risk such harm is
inconsistent with the requirements of a DEA registrant.
Further, the DEA has long held that a practitioner's self-abuse of
controlled substances constitutes ``conduct which may threaten public
health and safety.'' 21 U.S.C. Sec. 823(f)(5) (2006); see also Tony T.
Bui, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 49,979, 49,990 (DEA 2010); Kenneth Wayne Green,
Jr., M.D., 59 Fed. Reg. 51,453 (DEA 1994); David E. Trawick, D.D.S., 53
Fed. Reg. 5,326 (DEA 1988). Here, the Respondent self-abused
hydrocodone products in 2001 and oxycodone products in 2008. Such
unlawful ingestion of controlled substances, especially when a
physician is caring for patients while under the influence of these
drugs, places the public health and safety in jeopardy.
Yet, I found the Respondent credible when he testified that he has
been drug free since December of 2008. He has remained active in his
recovery, and his drug screens have been negative. As the Deputy
Administrator has previously determined, ``[t]he paramount issue is not
how much time has elapsed since [the Respondent's] unlawful conduct,
but rather, whether during that time [the] Respondent has learned from
past mistakes and has demonstrated that he would handle controlled
substances properly if entrusted with a DEA registration.'' Leonardo V.
Lopez, M.D., 54 Fed. Reg. 36,915 (DEA 1989). Even though it has been
previously found that time, alone, is not dispositive in such
situations, it is certainly an appropriate factor to be considered. See
Robert G. Hallermeier, M.D., 62 Fed. Reg. 26,818 (DEA 1997) (four
years); John Porter Richards, D.O., 61 Fed. Reg. 13,878 (DEA 1996) (ten
years); Norman Alpert, M.D., 58 Fed. Reg. 67,420, 67,421 (DEA 1993)
(seven years).
Here, the Respondent's Indiana medical license requires him to
remain compliant with the Indiana's Physician Assistance Programs'
Continuing Care Contract. The Respondent signed that five-year contract
in November of 2009. The contract provides for supervised drug screens,
and in the event of a relapse, the Respondent is to notify the Indiana
PAP. The Respondent agreed to attend Caduceus meetings, AA or NA
meetings, to receive counseling, to abstain from consuming
nonprescribed mood-changing chemicals, and to see a psychiatrist for
medication management. The Medical Director, Dr. Frick, affirmed that
the Respondent has been compliant with these requirements, and that his
drug screens have been negative since November 23, 2009. The Respondent
credibly testified that he has been clean and sober since December 20,
2008. This past conduct demonstrates the Respondent's ability to comply
with his PAP contract and to continue to perform his daily functions
drug-free.
After the Government ``has proved that a registrant has committed
acts inconsistent with the public interest, a registrant must `present
sufficient mitigating evidence to assure the Administrator that [he]
can be entrusted with the responsibility carried by such a
registration.' '' Medicine Shoppe--Jonesborough, 73 Fed. Reg. 364, 387
(DEA 2008) (quoting Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S., 72 Fed. Reg. 23,848,
23,853 (DEA 2007). ``Moreover, because `past performance is the best
predictor of future performance,' Alra Labs., Inc. v. DEA, 54 F.3d 450,
452 (7th Cir. 1995), [DEA] has repeatedly held that where a registrant
has committed acts inconsistent with the public interest, the
registrant must accept responsibility for [his] actions and demonstrate
that [he] will not engage in future misconduct.'' Medicine Shoppe--
Jonesborough, 73 Fed. Reg. at 387; see also Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S.,
72 Fed. Reg. 23, 848, 23,853 (DEA 2007); John H. Kennedy, M.D., 71 Fed.
Reg. 35,705, 35,709 (DEA 2006); Prince George Daniels, D.D.S., 60 Fed.
Reg. 62,884, 62,887 (DEA 1995). See also Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477,
483 (6th Cir. 2005) (``admitting fault'' is ``properly consider[ed]''
by DEA to be an ``important factor[]'' in the public interest
determination).
Here, the Respondent has consistently taken responsibility for his
misconduct. He disclosed his misconduct to the Indiana medical board
and to the DEA in his applications and in his testimony at this
proceeding. Further, requirements are in place to ensure the public
interest is protected from the possibility of relapse by the
Respondent. First, early detection will take place because of the urine
screens and the requirement for the Respondent to disclose any
violations of his Continuing Care Contract. Second, the DEA can
restrict his registration to the prescribing of controlled substances
only, and to prohibit his prescribing to himself or to any other family
member. Lastly, the situation that led to his relapse in 2008 no longer
exists. The Respondent is no longer caring for his brother. These
factors are also appropriate to consider when determining the
appropriate use of the Deputy Administrator's discretion in this
matter. See Martha Hernandez, M.D., 62 Fed. Reg. 61,145 (DEA 1997)
(holding that, in exercising his discretion in determining the
appropriate remedy, the Deputy Administrator should consider all of the
facts and circumstances of a particular case).
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Therefore, I conclude that the DEA has met its burden of proof and
has established that grounds exist for denying the Respondent's DEA
application for registration.
I do not condone nor minimize the seriousness of the Respondent's
prior misconduct in 2001-2002, and again in 2008. However, based on
this record, I recommend that the Respondent be afforded an opportunity
to demonstrate that he can responsibly handle controlled substance
prescriptions by the granting of a restricted registration. See Cecil
E. Oakes, Jr., M.D., 63 Fed. Reg. 11,907, 11,910 (DEA 1998) (``Such a
resolution will provide Respondent with the opportunity to demonstrate
that he can responsibly handle controlled substances, while at the same
time protect the public health and safety, by providing a mechanism for
rapid detection of any improper activity.'').
Based on this record and the Respondent's actions since December of
2008, I recommend to the Deputy Administrator \4\ that the Respondent
be granted a conditional DEA registration. I suggest that the
conditions include: that the registration restricts his handling of
controlled substances to merely prescribing and not storing or
dispensing such drugs and that he be prohibited from prescribing
controlled substances to himself or any family member. Further, I
recommend the Respondent be subject to quarterly reporting of his
prescribing of controlled substances to his local DEA office. I also
recommend that the Respondent be ordered to consent to unannounced
inspections by DEA personnel without requiring an administrative
inspection warrant. Lastly, I recommend that the Respondent be ordered
to continue with
[[Page 45663]]
his agreement with the Indiana PAP and to notify the DEA should a
relapse occur. I recommend these restrictions apply for three years
from the date of the final order so directing this result. In this way,
the Respondent may return to the full practice of medicine, and the DEA
can assure itself of the Respondent's compliance with DEA regulations
and of the protection of the public interest.
\4\ The Deputy Administrator has the authority to make such a
determination pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 0.100(b) and 0.104
(2011).
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Date: November 2, 2011
/s/Gail A. Randall
Administrative Law Judge
[FR Doc. 2012-18750 Filed 7-31-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P