Pipeline Safety: Inspection and Protection of Pipeline Facilities After Railway Accidents, 45417-45418 [2012-18571]

Download as PDF Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 147 / Tuesday, July 31, 2012 / Notices Issued On: July 25, 2012. Edward Carranza, Jr., Deputy Regional Administrator, Region 9. [FR Doc. 2012–18636 Filed 7–30–12; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [Docket ID PHMSA–2012–0175] Notice of Availability of Draft Environmental Assessment for Public Comment for the Longhorn Pipeline Reversal Project Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT. ACTION: Notice of Availability of Draft Environmental Assessment for Public Comment for the Longhorn Pipeline Reversal Project. AGENCY: In accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321–4347, and the Council on Environmental Quality NEPA implementing regulations, 40 CFR Parts 1500–1508, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is announcing the availability of and requesting comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment (Draft EA) for the Longhorn Pipeline Reversal Project (Proposed Project). SUMMARY: Submit any comments regarding the Draft EA no later than September 14, 2012. ADDRESSES: Comments should reference the docket number PHMSA–2012–0175 at the beginning of the comment. Comments are posted without changes or edits to https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information provided. There is a privacy statement published on https:// www.regulations.gov. Comments may be submitted in the following ways: E-Gov Web Site: https:// www.regulations.gov. This site allows the public to enter comments on any Federal Register notice issued by any agency. Mail: Docket Management System: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. If you submit your comments by mail, please submit two copies. To receive confirmation that PHMSA has received your comments, please include a self-addressed stamped postcard. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES DATES: VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:48 Jul 30, 2012 Jkt 226001 Hand Delivery: Docket Management System: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590 between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Fax: Docket Management System: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, 202–493–2251. PHMSA has posted the Draft EA at https://www.regulations.gov in docket number PHMSA–2012–0175. The Draft EA is also available for inspection at the following public libraries: • Austin Public Library—Twin Oaks Branch, 1800 South 5th Street, Austin, TX 78704, 512–974–9980. • Collier Regional Library, 6200 Pinemont Drive, Houston, TX, 77092, 832–393–1740. • Abilene Public Library–South Branch, 1401 South Danville Drive, Abilene, TX 79605, 325–698–7565. • El Paso Main Library, 501 North Oregon Street, El Paso, TX, 79901, 915– 543–5433. • Ector County Public Library, 321 West 5th Street, Odessa, TX, 79761, 432–332–0633. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Amelia Samaras, Attorney, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Office of the Chief Counsel, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590; by phone at 202–366–4362; or email at amelia.samaras@dot.gov. The Longhorn Pipeline runs from El Paso, Texas to Houston, Texas and is owned and operated by Magellan Pipeline Company, L.P. (Magellan). The Longhorn Pipeline currently transports refined petroleum products from east to west (Houston to El Paso). The Proposed Project would convert the segment of the Longhorn Pipeline from Crane, Texas to East Houston, Texas to crude oil service and reverse the flow so that crude oil would flow from west to east (Crane to Houston). At Crane, refined products would enter the pipeline and move west to El Paso. The refined products would enter the Longhorn Pipeline via an existing pipeline segment that connects the Longhorn Pipeline to the existing Orion West Pipeline located to the north of the Longhorn Pipeline. The Orion West Pipeline runs from Frost, Texas to El Paso and is also owned and operated by Magellan. PHMSA is responsible for regulating the transportation of hazardous liquids via pipeline. PHMSA issues and SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 45417 enforces pipeline safety regulations that dictate requirements for construction, design, testing, operation, and maintenance of natural gas and hazardous liquid (including crude oil, petroleum products, and anhydrous ammonia) pipelines. PHMSA does not typically serve as lead agency for pipeline construction projects, as it has no authority over pipeline siting and does not issue any approval or authorization to commence a pipeline construction project. However, a settlement agreement specific to this action titled: ‘‘The Longhorn Mitigation Plan’’ (LMP) resulted from litigation associated with changes to the Longhorn Pipeline in 1999. The LMP provides PHMSA with broader responsibility and oversight of the Longhorn Pipeline. The Proposed Project would require upgrades to the pipeline and would include construction of a six-mile pipeline segment in El Paso and a 2.5-mile pipeline segment in Houston. Modifications and upgrades to existing infrastructure to facilitate reversal and increased capacity, such as new pump stations and terminals, would occur at various locations along the Longhorn and Orion Pipelines’ right-of-ways. Although not originally included in the LMP, activities along the Orion West Pipeline and the segment from Odessa to Crane that would take place as a result of the Proposed Project are analyzed in this Draft EA as connected actions. This Draft EA analyzes the changes that would take place as a result of the Proposed Project and how the changes could impact the human environment during construction, normal operations, and in the unlikely event of a release. PHMSA has also analyzed the condition of the Longhorn Pipeline and how the change in product and direction would affect the pipeline. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Policy and Programs. [FR Doc. 2012–18524 Filed 7–30–12; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–60–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [Docket No. PHMSA–2012–0176] Pipeline Safety: Inspection and Protection of Pipeline Facilities After Railway Accidents Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA); DOT. AGENCY: E:\FR\FM\31JYN1.SGM 31JYN1 45418 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 147 / Tuesday, July 31, 2012 / Notices Notice; Issuance of Advisory Bulletin. ACTION: PHMSA is issuing an advisory bulletin to alert all pipeline owners and operators of the circumstances of the Cherry Valley, Illinois derailment and remind them of the importance of assuring that pipeline facilities have not been damaged either during a railroad accident or other event occurring in the right-of-way. Further, the advisory bulletin reminds pipeline owners and operators of the importance of providing pertinent information to rail operators and emergency response officials during an incident. This information should include the presence, depth and location of the pipelines so that the movement of heavy equipment and debris on the right-of-way does not damage or rupture the pipeline or otherwise pose a hazard to people working in, and around, the accident location. The advisory also encourages pipeline owners and operators to inform rail operators and emergency response officials of the benefits of using the 811 ‘‘Call Before You Dig’’ program to identify and notify underground utilities that an incident has occurred in the vicinity of their buried facilities. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Appelbaum by phone at 202– 366–1419 or by email at david.appelbaum@dot.gov. Information about PHMSA may be found at https:// phmsa.dot.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: SUMMARY: mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES Background On Friday, June 19, 2009, at approximately 8:36 p.m., CST, a Canadian National Railway Company (CN) freight train U7069l-l8, traveling eastbound at 36 mph, derailed at a highway/rail grade crossing in Cherry Valley, Illinois. The train consisted of two locomotives and 114 cars, 19 of which derailed. All of the derailed cars were tank cars carrying denatured fuel ethanol, a flammable liquid. Thirteen of the derailed tank cars were breached or lost product and caught fire. At the time of the derailment, several motor vehicles were stopped on either side of the grade crossing waiting for the train to pass. As a result of the fire that erupted after the derailment, a passenger in one of the stopped cars was fatally injured, two passengers in the same car received serious injuries, and five occupants of other cars waiting at the highway-rail crossing were injured. Two responding firefighters also sustained minor injuries. The release of ethanol and the resulting fire prompted a mandatory evacuation of about 600 VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:55 Jul 30, 2012 Jkt 226001 residences within a l⁄2-mile radius of the accident site. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the probable cause of the accident was the washout of the track structure that was discovered about one hour before the train’s arrival, and CN’s failure to notify the train crew of the known washout in time to stop the train because of the inadequacy of CN’s emergency communication procedures. At the site of the derailment was a 12inch diameter underground natural gas transmission pipeline operated by Nicor Gas. The pipeline well exceeded Federal standards for protective ground cover. Yet, as the wreckage was removed from above the pipeline, Nicor’s crews discovered that a railcar wheel and axle assembly had impinged on the pipeline. Although the pipeline was buried about 11 feet deep and protected within a 16inch diameter casing, the rail car wheels impacted and severely dented the pipeline. The impact caused a severe flattening of the pipe casing with sharp angular bends at two locations where it was contacted by the rail car wheel assembly. This degree of deformation to the 16-inch casing pipe likely caused similar damage to the 12-inch carrier pipe. The NTSB concluded that had the gas pipeline been installed at the railroad crossing with the minimum level of ground cover permitted by the current Federal and industry pipeline construction standards, it likely would have failed as a result of being struck by derailed equipment in this accident. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2012–08) To: Owners and Operators of Hazardous Liquid and Gas Pipeline Systems. Subject: Inspection and Protection of Pipeline Facilities after Railway Accidents. Advisory: To further enhance the Department’s safety efforts, PHMSA is issuing this advisory bulletin as a reminder for pipeline owners and operators to appropriately inspect and protect pipeline facilities following railroad accidents that occur in pipeline right-of-ways. As illustrated in the June 19, 2009, Cherry Valley, Illinois train derailment, buried pipelines are susceptible to damage even when depth-of-cover protection exceeds minimum Federal requirements. Pipeline owners and operators should inspect their facilities following a railroad accident or other significant event occurring in right-ofways to ensure pipeline integrity. Also, during response operations, pipeline owners and operators need to inform rail operators and emergency response PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 officials of the presence, depth and location of the pipelines so that the movement of heavy equipment on the right-of-way does not damage or rupture the pipeline or otherwise pose a hazard to people working in, and around, the accident location. Additionally, PHMSA encourages pipeline owners and operators, as a part of their public awareness program, to inform rail operators and emergency response officials of the benefits of using the 811 ‘‘Call Before You Dig’’ program to identify and notify underground utilities that an incident has occurred in the vicinity of their buried facilities. Linda Daugherty, Deputy Associate Administrator for Policy and Programs. [FR Doc. 2012–18571 Filed 7–30–12; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–60–P DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Internal Revenue Service Proposed Collection; Comment Request for Form 14145 Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury. ACTION: Notice and request for comments. AGENCY: The Department of the Treasury, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork and respondent burden, invites the general public and other Federal agencies to take this opportunity to comment on proposed and/or continuing information collections, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104–13 (44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A)). Currently, the IRS is soliciting comments concerning Form 14145, IRS Applicant Contact Card. DATES: Written comments should be received on or before October 1, 2012 to be assured of consideration. ADDRESSES: Direct all written comments to Yvette Lawrence, Internal Revenue Service, room 6129, 1111 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20224. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Requests for additional information or copies of the form and instructions should be directed to R. Joseph Durbala, (202) 622–3634, at Internal Revenue Service, room 6129, 1111 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20224, or through the Internet at RJoseph.Durbala@irs.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Title: IRS Applicant Contact Card. OMB Number: 1545–XXXX. SUMMARY: E:\FR\FM\31JYN1.SGM 31JYN1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 147 (Tuesday, July 31, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 45417-45418]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-18571]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

[Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0176]


Pipeline Safety: Inspection and Protection of Pipeline Facilities 
After Railway Accidents

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA); 
DOT.

[[Page 45418]]


ACTION: Notice; Issuance of Advisory Bulletin.

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SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing an advisory bulletin to alert all pipeline 
owners and operators of the circumstances of the Cherry Valley, 
Illinois derailment and remind them of the importance of assuring that 
pipeline facilities have not been damaged either during a railroad 
accident or other event occurring in the right-of-way. Further, the 
advisory bulletin reminds pipeline owners and operators of the 
importance of providing pertinent information to rail operators and 
emergency response officials during an incident. This information 
should include the presence, depth and location of the pipelines so 
that the movement of heavy equipment and debris on the right-of-way 
does not damage or rupture the pipeline or otherwise pose a hazard to 
people working in, and around, the accident location. The advisory also 
encourages pipeline owners and operators to inform rail operators and 
emergency response officials of the benefits of using the 811 ``Call 
Before You Dig'' program to identify and notify underground utilities 
that an incident has occurred in the vicinity of their buried 
facilities.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Appelbaum by phone at 202-366-
1419 or by email at david.appelbaum@dot.gov. Information about PHMSA 
may be found at https://phmsa.dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On Friday, June 19, 2009, at approximately 8:36 p.m., CST, a 
Canadian National Railway Company (CN) freight train U7069l-l8, 
traveling eastbound at 36 mph, derailed at a highway/rail grade 
crossing in Cherry Valley, Illinois. The train consisted of two 
locomotives and 114 cars, 19 of which derailed. All of the derailed 
cars were tank cars carrying denatured fuel ethanol, a flammable 
liquid. Thirteen of the derailed tank cars were breached or lost 
product and caught fire. At the time of the derailment, several motor 
vehicles were stopped on either side of the grade crossing waiting for 
the train to pass. As a result of the fire that erupted after the 
derailment, a passenger in one of the stopped cars was fatally injured, 
two passengers in the same car received serious injuries, and five 
occupants of other cars waiting at the highway-rail crossing were 
injured. Two responding firefighters also sustained minor injuries. The 
release of ethanol and the resulting fire prompted a mandatory 
evacuation of about 600 residences within a \l/2\-mile radius of the 
accident site.
    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the 
probable cause of the accident was the washout of the track structure 
that was discovered about one hour before the train's arrival, and CN's 
failure to notify the train crew of the known washout in time to stop 
the train because of the inadequacy of CN's emergency communication 
procedures.
    At the site of the derailment was a 12-inch diameter underground 
natural gas transmission pipeline operated by Nicor Gas. The pipeline 
well exceeded Federal standards for protective ground cover. Yet, as 
the wreckage was removed from above the pipeline, Nicor's crews 
discovered that a railcar wheel and axle assembly had impinged on the 
pipeline. Although the pipeline was buried about 11 feet deep and 
protected within a 16-inch diameter casing, the rail car wheels 
impacted and severely dented the pipeline. The impact caused a severe 
flattening of the pipe casing with sharp angular bends at two locations 
where it was contacted by the rail car wheel assembly. This degree of 
deformation to the 16-inch casing pipe likely caused similar damage to 
the 12-inch carrier pipe. The NTSB concluded that had the gas pipeline 
been installed at the railroad crossing with the minimum level of 
ground cover permitted by the current Federal and industry pipeline 
construction standards, it likely would have failed as a result of 
being struck by derailed equipment in this accident.

Advisory Bulletin (ADB-2012-08)

    To: Owners and Operators of Hazardous Liquid and Gas Pipeline 
Systems.
    Subject: Inspection and Protection of Pipeline Facilities after 
Railway Accidents.
    Advisory: To further enhance the Department's safety efforts, PHMSA 
is issuing this advisory bulletin as a reminder for pipeline owners and 
operators to appropriately inspect and protect pipeline facilities 
following railroad accidents that occur in pipeline right-of-ways.
    As illustrated in the June 19, 2009, Cherry Valley, Illinois train 
derailment, buried pipelines are susceptible to damage even when depth-
of-cover protection exceeds minimum Federal requirements. Pipeline 
owners and operators should inspect their facilities following a 
railroad accident or other significant event occurring in right-of-ways 
to ensure pipeline integrity. Also, during response operations, 
pipeline owners and operators need to inform rail operators and 
emergency response officials of the presence, depth and location of the 
pipelines so that the movement of heavy equipment on the right-of-way 
does not damage or rupture the pipeline or otherwise pose a hazard to 
people working in, and around, the accident location.
    Additionally, PHMSA encourages pipeline owners and operators, as a 
part of their public awareness program, to inform rail operators and 
emergency response officials of the benefits of using the 811 ``Call 
Before You Dig'' program to identify and notify underground utilities 
that an incident has occurred in the vicinity of their buried 
facilities.

Linda Daugherty,
Deputy Associate Administrator for Policy and Programs.
[FR Doc. 2012-18571 Filed 7-30-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P