Pipeline Safety: Inspection and Protection of Pipeline Facilities After Railway Accidents, 45417-45418 [2012-18571]
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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 147 / Tuesday, July 31, 2012 / Notices
Issued On: July 25, 2012.
Edward Carranza, Jr.,
Deputy Regional Administrator, Region 9.
[FR Doc. 2012–18636 Filed 7–30–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
[Docket ID PHMSA–2012–0175]
Notice of Availability of Draft
Environmental Assessment for Public
Comment for the Longhorn Pipeline
Reversal Project
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of Availability of Draft
Environmental Assessment for Public
Comment for the Longhorn Pipeline
Reversal Project.
AGENCY:
In accordance with the
National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321–4347, and the
Council on Environmental Quality
NEPA implementing regulations,
40 CFR Parts 1500–1508, the Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) is announcing
the availability of and requesting
comments on the Draft Environmental
Assessment (Draft EA) for the Longhorn
Pipeline Reversal Project (Proposed
Project).
SUMMARY:
Submit any comments regarding
the Draft EA no later than September 14,
2012.
ADDRESSES: Comments should reference
the docket number PHMSA–2012–0175
at the beginning of the comment.
Comments are posted without changes
or edits to https://www.regulations.gov,
including any personal information
provided. There is a privacy statement
published on https://
www.regulations.gov. Comments may be
submitted in the following ways:
E-Gov Web Site: https://
www.regulations.gov. This site allows
the public to enter comments on any
Federal Register notice issued by any
agency.
Mail: Docket Management System:
U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M–30, West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590. If you submit
your comments by mail, please submit
two copies. To receive confirmation that
PHMSA has received your comments,
please include a self-addressed stamped
postcard.
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DATES:
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16:48 Jul 30, 2012
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Hand Delivery: Docket Management
System: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC 20590 between 9:00
a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
Fax: Docket Management System:
U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, 202–493–2251.
PHMSA has posted the Draft EA at
https://www.regulations.gov in docket
number PHMSA–2012–0175.
The Draft EA is also available for
inspection at the following public
libraries:
• Austin Public Library—Twin Oaks
Branch, 1800 South 5th Street, Austin,
TX 78704, 512–974–9980.
• Collier Regional Library, 6200
Pinemont Drive, Houston, TX, 77092,
832–393–1740.
• Abilene Public Library–South
Branch, 1401 South Danville Drive,
Abilene, TX 79605, 325–698–7565.
• El Paso Main Library, 501 North
Oregon Street, El Paso, TX, 79901, 915–
543–5433.
• Ector County Public Library, 321
West 5th Street, Odessa, TX, 79761,
432–332–0633.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Amelia Samaras, Attorney, Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, Office of the Chief
Counsel, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590; by phone at
202–366–4362; or email at
amelia.samaras@dot.gov.
The
Longhorn Pipeline runs from El Paso,
Texas to Houston, Texas and is owned
and operated by Magellan Pipeline
Company, L.P. (Magellan). The
Longhorn Pipeline currently transports
refined petroleum products from east to
west (Houston to El Paso). The Proposed
Project would convert the segment of
the Longhorn Pipeline from Crane,
Texas to East Houston, Texas to crude
oil service and reverse the flow so that
crude oil would flow from west to east
(Crane to Houston). At Crane, refined
products would enter the pipeline and
move west to El Paso. The refined
products would enter the Longhorn
Pipeline via an existing pipeline
segment that connects the Longhorn
Pipeline to the existing Orion West
Pipeline located to the north of the
Longhorn Pipeline. The Orion West
Pipeline runs from Frost, Texas to El
Paso and is also owned and operated by
Magellan.
PHMSA is responsible for regulating
the transportation of hazardous liquids
via pipeline. PHMSA issues and
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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Fmt 4703
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45417
enforces pipeline safety regulations that
dictate requirements for construction,
design, testing, operation, and
maintenance of natural gas and
hazardous liquid (including crude oil,
petroleum products, and anhydrous
ammonia) pipelines. PHMSA does not
typically serve as lead agency for
pipeline construction projects, as it has
no authority over pipeline siting and
does not issue any approval or
authorization to commence a pipeline
construction project. However, a
settlement agreement specific to this
action titled: ‘‘The Longhorn Mitigation
Plan’’ (LMP) resulted from litigation
associated with changes to the Longhorn
Pipeline in 1999. The LMP provides
PHMSA with broader responsibility and
oversight of the Longhorn Pipeline.
The Proposed Project would require
upgrades to the pipeline and would
include construction of a six-mile
pipeline segment in El Paso and a
2.5-mile pipeline segment in Houston.
Modifications and upgrades to existing
infrastructure to facilitate reversal and
increased capacity, such as new pump
stations and terminals, would occur at
various locations along the Longhorn
and Orion Pipelines’ right-of-ways.
Although not originally included in the
LMP, activities along the Orion West
Pipeline and the segment from Odessa
to Crane that would take place as a
result of the Proposed Project are
analyzed in this Draft EA as connected
actions.
This Draft EA analyzes the changes
that would take place as a result of the
Proposed Project and how the changes
could impact the human environment
during construction, normal operations,
and in the unlikely event of a release.
PHMSA has also analyzed the condition
of the Longhorn Pipeline and how the
change in product and direction would
affect the pipeline.
Linda Daugherty,
Deputy Associate Administrator for Policy
and Programs.
[FR Doc. 2012–18524 Filed 7–30–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–60–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA–2012–0176]
Pipeline Safety: Inspection and
Protection of Pipeline Facilities After
Railway Accidents
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA); DOT.
AGENCY:
E:\FR\FM\31JYN1.SGM
31JYN1
45418
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 147 / Tuesday, July 31, 2012 / Notices
Notice; Issuance of Advisory
Bulletin.
ACTION:
PHMSA is issuing an advisory
bulletin to alert all pipeline owners and
operators of the circumstances of the
Cherry Valley, Illinois derailment and
remind them of the importance of
assuring that pipeline facilities have not
been damaged either during a railroad
accident or other event occurring in the
right-of-way. Further, the advisory
bulletin reminds pipeline owners and
operators of the importance of providing
pertinent information to rail operators
and emergency response officials during
an incident. This information should
include the presence, depth and
location of the pipelines so that the
movement of heavy equipment and
debris on the right-of-way does not
damage or rupture the pipeline or
otherwise pose a hazard to people
working in, and around, the accident
location. The advisory also encourages
pipeline owners and operators to inform
rail operators and emergency response
officials of the benefits of using the 811
‘‘Call Before You Dig’’ program to
identify and notify underground
utilities that an incident has occurred in
the vicinity of their buried facilities.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
David Appelbaum by phone at 202–
366–1419 or by email at
david.appelbaum@dot.gov. Information
about PHMSA may be found at https://
phmsa.dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
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Background
On Friday, June 19, 2009, at
approximately 8:36 p.m., CST, a
Canadian National Railway Company
(CN) freight train U7069l-l8, traveling
eastbound at 36 mph, derailed at a
highway/rail grade crossing in Cherry
Valley, Illinois. The train consisted of
two locomotives and 114 cars, 19 of
which derailed. All of the derailed cars
were tank cars carrying denatured fuel
ethanol, a flammable liquid. Thirteen of
the derailed tank cars were breached or
lost product and caught fire. At the time
of the derailment, several motor
vehicles were stopped on either side of
the grade crossing waiting for the train
to pass. As a result of the fire that
erupted after the derailment, a
passenger in one of the stopped cars was
fatally injured, two passengers in the
same car received serious injuries, and
five occupants of other cars waiting at
the highway-rail crossing were injured.
Two responding firefighters also
sustained minor injuries. The release of
ethanol and the resulting fire prompted
a mandatory evacuation of about 600
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17:55 Jul 30, 2012
Jkt 226001
residences within a l⁄2-mile radius of the
accident site.
The National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) determined that the
probable cause of the accident was the
washout of the track structure that was
discovered about one hour before the
train’s arrival, and CN’s failure to notify
the train crew of the known washout in
time to stop the train because of the
inadequacy of CN’s emergency
communication procedures.
At the site of the derailment was a 12inch diameter underground natural gas
transmission pipeline operated by Nicor
Gas. The pipeline well exceeded Federal
standards for protective ground cover.
Yet, as the wreckage was removed from
above the pipeline, Nicor’s crews
discovered that a railcar wheel and axle
assembly had impinged on the pipeline.
Although the pipeline was buried about
11 feet deep and protected within a 16inch diameter casing, the rail car wheels
impacted and severely dented the
pipeline. The impact caused a severe
flattening of the pipe casing with sharp
angular bends at two locations where it
was contacted by the rail car wheel
assembly. This degree of deformation to
the 16-inch casing pipe likely caused
similar damage to the 12-inch carrier
pipe. The NTSB concluded that had the
gas pipeline been installed at the
railroad crossing with the minimum
level of ground cover permitted by the
current Federal and industry pipeline
construction standards, it likely would
have failed as a result of being struck by
derailed equipment in this accident.
Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2012–08)
To: Owners and Operators of
Hazardous Liquid and Gas Pipeline
Systems.
Subject: Inspection and Protection of
Pipeline Facilities after Railway
Accidents.
Advisory: To further enhance the
Department’s safety efforts, PHMSA is
issuing this advisory bulletin as a
reminder for pipeline owners and
operators to appropriately inspect and
protect pipeline facilities following
railroad accidents that occur in pipeline
right-of-ways.
As illustrated in the June 19, 2009,
Cherry Valley, Illinois train derailment,
buried pipelines are susceptible to
damage even when depth-of-cover
protection exceeds minimum Federal
requirements. Pipeline owners and
operators should inspect their facilities
following a railroad accident or other
significant event occurring in right-ofways to ensure pipeline integrity. Also,
during response operations, pipeline
owners and operators need to inform
rail operators and emergency response
PO 00000
Frm 00091
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
officials of the presence, depth and
location of the pipelines so that the
movement of heavy equipment on the
right-of-way does not damage or rupture
the pipeline or otherwise pose a hazard
to people working in, and around, the
accident location.
Additionally, PHMSA encourages
pipeline owners and operators, as a part
of their public awareness program, to
inform rail operators and emergency
response officials of the benefits of
using the 811 ‘‘Call Before You Dig’’
program to identify and notify
underground utilities that an incident
has occurred in the vicinity of their
buried facilities.
Linda Daugherty,
Deputy Associate Administrator for Policy
and Programs.
[FR Doc. 2012–18571 Filed 7–30–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–60–P
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Internal Revenue Service
Proposed Collection; Comment
Request for Form 14145
Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
Treasury.
ACTION: Notice and request for
comments.
AGENCY:
The Department of the
Treasury, as part of its continuing effort
to reduce paperwork and respondent
burden, invites the general public and
other Federal agencies to take this
opportunity to comment on proposed
and/or continuing information
collections, as required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
Public Law 104–13 (44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(2)(A)). Currently, the IRS is
soliciting comments concerning Form
14145, IRS Applicant Contact Card.
DATES: Written comments should be
received on or before October 1, 2012 to
be assured of consideration.
ADDRESSES: Direct all written comments
to Yvette Lawrence, Internal Revenue
Service, room 6129, 1111 Constitution
Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20224.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Requests for additional information or
copies of the form and instructions
should be directed to R. Joseph Durbala,
(202) 622–3634, at Internal Revenue
Service, room 6129, 1111 Constitution
Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20224, or
through the Internet at
RJoseph.Durbala@irs.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Title: IRS
Applicant Contact Card.
OMB Number: 1545–XXXX.
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\31JYN1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 147 (Tuesday, July 31, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 45417-45418]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-18571]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0176]
Pipeline Safety: Inspection and Protection of Pipeline Facilities
After Railway Accidents
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA);
DOT.
[[Page 45418]]
ACTION: Notice; Issuance of Advisory Bulletin.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing an advisory bulletin to alert all pipeline
owners and operators of the circumstances of the Cherry Valley,
Illinois derailment and remind them of the importance of assuring that
pipeline facilities have not been damaged either during a railroad
accident or other event occurring in the right-of-way. Further, the
advisory bulletin reminds pipeline owners and operators of the
importance of providing pertinent information to rail operators and
emergency response officials during an incident. This information
should include the presence, depth and location of the pipelines so
that the movement of heavy equipment and debris on the right-of-way
does not damage or rupture the pipeline or otherwise pose a hazard to
people working in, and around, the accident location. The advisory also
encourages pipeline owners and operators to inform rail operators and
emergency response officials of the benefits of using the 811 ``Call
Before You Dig'' program to identify and notify underground utilities
that an incident has occurred in the vicinity of their buried
facilities.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Appelbaum by phone at 202-366-
1419 or by email at david.appelbaum@dot.gov. Information about PHMSA
may be found at https://phmsa.dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On Friday, June 19, 2009, at approximately 8:36 p.m., CST, a
Canadian National Railway Company (CN) freight train U7069l-l8,
traveling eastbound at 36 mph, derailed at a highway/rail grade
crossing in Cherry Valley, Illinois. The train consisted of two
locomotives and 114 cars, 19 of which derailed. All of the derailed
cars were tank cars carrying denatured fuel ethanol, a flammable
liquid. Thirteen of the derailed tank cars were breached or lost
product and caught fire. At the time of the derailment, several motor
vehicles were stopped on either side of the grade crossing waiting for
the train to pass. As a result of the fire that erupted after the
derailment, a passenger in one of the stopped cars was fatally injured,
two passengers in the same car received serious injuries, and five
occupants of other cars waiting at the highway-rail crossing were
injured. Two responding firefighters also sustained minor injuries. The
release of ethanol and the resulting fire prompted a mandatory
evacuation of about 600 residences within a \l/2\-mile radius of the
accident site.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the
probable cause of the accident was the washout of the track structure
that was discovered about one hour before the train's arrival, and CN's
failure to notify the train crew of the known washout in time to stop
the train because of the inadequacy of CN's emergency communication
procedures.
At the site of the derailment was a 12-inch diameter underground
natural gas transmission pipeline operated by Nicor Gas. The pipeline
well exceeded Federal standards for protective ground cover. Yet, as
the wreckage was removed from above the pipeline, Nicor's crews
discovered that a railcar wheel and axle assembly had impinged on the
pipeline. Although the pipeline was buried about 11 feet deep and
protected within a 16-inch diameter casing, the rail car wheels
impacted and severely dented the pipeline. The impact caused a severe
flattening of the pipe casing with sharp angular bends at two locations
where it was contacted by the rail car wheel assembly. This degree of
deformation to the 16-inch casing pipe likely caused similar damage to
the 12-inch carrier pipe. The NTSB concluded that had the gas pipeline
been installed at the railroad crossing with the minimum level of
ground cover permitted by the current Federal and industry pipeline
construction standards, it likely would have failed as a result of
being struck by derailed equipment in this accident.
Advisory Bulletin (ADB-2012-08)
To: Owners and Operators of Hazardous Liquid and Gas Pipeline
Systems.
Subject: Inspection and Protection of Pipeline Facilities after
Railway Accidents.
Advisory: To further enhance the Department's safety efforts, PHMSA
is issuing this advisory bulletin as a reminder for pipeline owners and
operators to appropriately inspect and protect pipeline facilities
following railroad accidents that occur in pipeline right-of-ways.
As illustrated in the June 19, 2009, Cherry Valley, Illinois train
derailment, buried pipelines are susceptible to damage even when depth-
of-cover protection exceeds minimum Federal requirements. Pipeline
owners and operators should inspect their facilities following a
railroad accident or other significant event occurring in right-of-ways
to ensure pipeline integrity. Also, during response operations,
pipeline owners and operators need to inform rail operators and
emergency response officials of the presence, depth and location of the
pipelines so that the movement of heavy equipment on the right-of-way
does not damage or rupture the pipeline or otherwise pose a hazard to
people working in, and around, the accident location.
Additionally, PHMSA encourages pipeline owners and operators, as a
part of their public awareness program, to inform rail operators and
emergency response officials of the benefits of using the 811 ``Call
Before You Dig'' program to identify and notify underground utilities
that an incident has occurred in the vicinity of their buried
facilities.
Linda Daugherty,
Deputy Associate Administrator for Policy and Programs.
[FR Doc. 2012-18571 Filed 7-30-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P