36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification, 42704-42707 [2012-17719]
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42704
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 140 / Friday, July 20, 2012 / Notices
The Agreement does not constitute an
admission by Battat or a determination
by the Commission that Battat violated
the CPSA’s reporting requirements. This
agreement completely and finally
resolves the staff allegations set forth in
paragraphs 2–18 with respect to Battat
Incorporated, and its officers, directors,
and related companies.
32. Upon provisional acceptance of
the Agreement by the Commission, the
Agreement shall be placed on the public
record and published in the Federal
Register, in accordance with the
procedures set forth in 16 CFR
1118.20(e). If the Commission does not
receive any written request not to accept
the Agreement within fifteen (15)
calendar days, the Agreement shall be
deemed finally accepted on the 16th
calendar day after the date it is
published in the Federal Register, in
accordance with 16 CFR 1118.20(f).
33. Upon the Commission’s final
acceptance of the Agreement and
issuance of the Order, Battat knowingly,
voluntarily, and completely waives any
rights it may have in this matter to the
following: (a) An administrative or
judicial hearing; (b) judicial review or
other challenge or contest of the
Commission’s actions; (c) a
determination by the Commission of
whether Battat failed to comply with the
CPSA and the underlying regulations;
(d) a statement of findings of fact and
conclusions of law; and (e) any claims
under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
34. The Commission may publicize
the terms of the Agreement and the final
Order.
35. The Agreement and the final
Order shall apply to, and be binding
upon, Battat, and each of its successors
and/or assigns, until the obligations
described in paragraph 29 has been
fulfilled to the satisfaction of the
Commission.
36. The Commission issues the final
Order under the provisions of the CPSA,
and a violation of the final Order may
subject Battat, and each of its successors
and/or assigns, to appropriate legal
action.
37. The Agreement may be used in
interpreting the final Order.
Understandings, agreements,
representations, or interpretations apart
from those contained in the Agreement
and the Order may not be used to vary
or contradict the terms or the Agreement
and the final Order. The Agreement
shall not be waived, amended,
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modified, or otherwise altered without
written agreement thereto, executed by
the party against whom such waiver,
amendment, modification, or alteration
is sought to be enforced.
38. If any provision of the Agreement
or the final Order is held to be illegal,
invalid, or unenforceable under present
or future laws effective during the terms
of the Agreement and the final Order,
such provision shall be fully severable.
The balance of the Agreement and the
final Order shall remain in full force
and effect, unless the Commission and
Battat agree that severing the provision
materially affects the purpose of the
Agreement and final Order.
39. This Agreement may be executed
in counterparts.
Battat Incorporated
Dated: June 27, 2012.
By:
llllllllllllllllll
l
Joseph Battat.
Dated June 27, 2012
By:
llllllllllllllllll
l
Anthony T. Pavel, Jr.,
Counsel to Battat Incorporated, K&L
Gates LLP, 1601 K Street NW.,
Washington, DC 20006–1600.
12 months of service of the
Commission’s Order upon counsel for
Battat, identified in the Settlement
Agreement. The payments shall be made
electronically to the CPSC via
www.pay.gov in equal quarterly
installments of $100,000.00
commencing within 20 days of service
upon Battat of this final order. Upon the
failure of Battat to make the foregoing
payments when due, interest on the
unpaid amount shall accrue and be paid
by Battat at the federal legal rate of
interest set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a)
and (b). If Battat fails to make such
payments, as set forth in the Settlement
Agreement, such conduct will be
considered a violation of this Agreement
and Order.
Provisionally accepted and
provisional Order issued on the 13th
day of July, 2012.
By Order of the Commission.
Todd A. Stevenson,
Secretary, U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission.
[FR Doc. 2012–17704 Filed 7–19–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6355–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
COMMISSION STAFF
Office of the Secretary
Cheryl A. Falvey,
General Counsel.
Mary B. Murphy,
Assistant General Counsel
Dated: July 12, 2012.
By:
llllllllllllllllll
l
Sarah C. Wang,
Trial Attorney, Division of Compliance,
Office of the General Counsel.
[Transmittal Nos. 12–10]
Order
Upon consideration of the Settlement
Agreement entered into between Battat,
Incorporated (‘‘Battat’’), and U.S.
Consumer Product Safety Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) staff, and the
Commission having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and over Battat, and
it appearing that the Settlement
Agreement and the Order are in the
public interest, it is ordered that the
Settlement Agreement be, and is,
hereby, accepted; and it is further
ordered, that Battat shall pay a civil
penalty in the amount of four hundred
thousand dollars ($400,000.00) within
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36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification
Defense Security Cooperation
Agency, Department of Defense.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
The Department of Defense is
publishing the unclassified text of a
section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification.
This is published to fulfill the
requirements of section 155 of Public
Law 104–164 dated July 21, 1996.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Ms. B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, (703)
601–3740.
The following is a copy of a letter to
the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Transmittals 12–10
with attached transmittal, policy
justification, and Sensitivity of
Technology.
SUMMARY:
Dated: July 17, 2012.
Aaron Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison
Officer, Department of Defense.
BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
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Transmittal No. 12–10
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of
Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the
Arms Export Control Act, as amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Qatar
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment*
Other .....................................
$1.70 billion
$1.30 billion
TOTAL .................................
$3.00 billion
(iii) Description and Quantity or
Quantities of Articles or Services under
Consideration for Purchase: 24 AH–64D
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APACHE Block III LONGBOW Attack
Helicopters, 56 T700–GE–701D Engines,
27 AN/ASQ–170 Modernized Target
Acquisition and Designation Sight, 27
AN/AAR–11 Modernized Pilot Night
Vision Sensors, 12 AN/APG–78 Fire
Control Radars (FCR) with Radar
Electronics Unit (LONGBOW
component), 12 AN/APR–48A Radar
Frequency Interferometers, 28 AN/
AAR–57(V)7 Common Missile Warning
Systems, 30 AN/AVR–2B Laser
Detecting Sets, 28 AN/APR–39A(V)4
Radar Signal Detecting Sets, 28 AN/
ALQ–136(V)5 Radar Jammers or
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Equivalent, 160 Integrated Helmet and
Display Sight Systems-21, 58 Embedded
Global Positioning Systems with Inertial
Navigation, 30 30mm Automatic Chain
Guns, 8 Aircraft Ground Power Units,
52 AN/AVS–6 Night Vision Goggles, 60
M299A1 HELLFIRE Missile Launchers,
576 AGM–114R HELLFIRE II Missiles,
295 FIM–92H STINGER
Reprogrammable Micro Processor (RMP)
Block I Missiles, 50 STINGER Air-to-Air
Launchers, 4092 2.75 in Hydra Rockets,
and 90 APACHE Aviator Integrated
Helmets. Also included are M206
infrared countermeasure flares, M211
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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 140 / Friday, July 20, 2012 / Notices
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and M212 Advanced Infrared
Countermeasure Munitions (AIRCM)
flares, training devices, helmets,
simulators, generators, transportation,
wheeled vehicles and organization
equipment, spare and repair parts,
support equipment, tools and test
equipment, technical data and
publications, personnel training and
training equipment, U.S. government
and contractor engineering, technical,
and logistics support services, and other
related elements of logistics support.
(iv) Military Department: Army
(WYX)
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid,
Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology
Contained in the Defense Article or
Defense Services Proposed to be Sold:
See Annex attached
(viii) Date Report Delivered to
Congress: July 10, 2012
* As defined in Section 47(6) of the
Arms Export Control Act.
POLICY JUSTIFICATION
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Qatar—AH–64D APACHE Block III
LONGBOW Attack Helicopters
The Government of Qatar has
requested a possible sale of 24 AH–64D
APACHE Block III LONGBOW Attack
Helicopters, 56 T700–GE–701D Engines,
27 AN/ASQ–170 Modernized Target
Acquisition and Designation Sight, 27
AN/AAR–11 Modernized Pilot Night
Vision Sensors, 12 AN/APG–78 Fire
Control Radars (FCR) with Radar
Electronics Unit (LONGBOW
component), 12 AN/APR–48A Radar
Frequency Interferometers, 28 AN/
AAR–57(V)7 Common Missile Warning
Systems, 30 AN/AVR–2B Laser
Detecting Sets, 28 AN/APR–39A(V)4
Radar Signal Detecting Sets, 28 AN/
ALQ–136(V)5 Radar Jammers or
Equivalent, 160 Integrated Helmet and
Display Sight Systems-21, 58 Embedded
Global Positioning Systems with Inertial
Navigation, 30 30mm Automatic Chain
Guns, 8 Aircraft Ground Power Units,
52 AN/AVS–6 Night Vision Goggles, 60
M299A1 HELLFIRE Missile Launchers,
576 AGM–114R HELLFIRE II Missiles,
295 FIM–92H STINGER
Reprogrammable Micro Processor (RMP)
Block I Missiles, 50 STINGER Air-to-Air
Launchers, 4092 2.75 in Hydra Rockets,
and 90 APACHE Aviator Integrated
Helmets. Also included are M206
infrared countermeasure flares, M211
and M212 Advanced Infrared
Countermeasure Munitions (AIRCM)
flares, training devices, helmets,
simulators, generators, transportation,
wheeled vehicles and organization
equipment, spare and repair parts,
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support equipment, tools and test
equipment, technical data and
publications, personnel training and
training equipment, U.S. government
and contractor engineering, technical,
and logistics support services, and other
related elements of logistics support.
The estimated cost is $3.00 billion.
This proposed sale will contribute to
the foreign policy and national security
of the United States by helping to
improve the security of a friendly
country that has been, and continues to
be, an important force for political and
economic progress in the Middle East.
Qatar is host to the U.S. Central
Command forces and serves as a critical
forward-deployed location in the region.
The acquisition of these helicopters will
allow for integration with U.S. forces for
training exercises, which contributes to
regional security and interoperability.
The proposed sale of the AH–64D
APACHE helicopters will allow the
Qatari Armed Forces (QAF) to replace
its aging airframes with multi-mission
attack helicopters, capable of meeting its
requirements for close air support,
armed reconnaissance and anti-tank
warfare missions. The helicopters will
provide a long-term defensive and
offensive capability to the Qatari
peninsula as well as enhance the
protection of key oil and gas
infrastructure and platforms which are
vital to U.S. and western economic
interests. Qatar will have no difficulty
absorbing these helicopters into its
armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment
and support will not alter the basic
military balance in the region.
The prime contractors will be The
Boeing Company in Mesa, Arizona,
Lockheed Martin Corporation in
Orlando, Florida, General Electric in
Cincinnati, Ohio, Lockheed Martin
Mission Systems and Sensors in Owego,
New York, Longbow Limited Liability
Corporation in Orlando, Florida, and
Raytheon Corporation in Tucson,
Arizona. There are no known offset
agreements proposed in connection
with this potential sale.
Implementation of this proposed sale
will require the assignment of three U.S.
Government and five contractor
representatives to Qatar to support
delivery of the APACHE helicopters and
provide support and equipment
familiarization. In addition, Qatar has
expressed an interest in a Technical
Assistance Fielding Team for in-country
pilot and maintenance training. To
support the requirement a team of 12
personnel (one military team leader and
11 contractors) would be deployed to
Qatar for approximately three years.
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There will be no adverse impact on
U.S. defense readiness as a result of this
proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 12–10
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of
Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the
Arms Export Control Act
Annex
Item No. vii
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
1. The AH–64D APACHE Attack
Helicopter weapon system contains
communications and target
identification equipment, navigation
equipment, aircraft survivability
equipment, displays, and sensors. The
airframe itself does not contain sensitive
technology; however, the pertinent
equipment listed below will be either
installed on the aircraft or included in
the sale:
a. The AN/APG–78 Fire Control Radar
(FCR) is an active, low-probability of
intercept, millimeter-wave radar,
combined with a passive AN/APR–48A
Radar Frequency Interferometer (RFI)
mounted on top of the helicopter mast.
The FCR Ground Targeting Mode
detects, locates, classifies and prioritizes
stationary or moving armored vehicles,
tanks and mobile air defense systems as
well as hovering helicopters and
helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft in
normal flight. The RFI detects threat
radar emissions and determines the type
of radar and mode of operation. The
FCR data and RFI data are fused for
maximum synergism. If desired, the
radar data can be used to refer targets to
the regular electro-optical Modernized
Target Acquisition and Designation
Sight (MTADS), permitting additional
visual/infrared imagery and control of
weapons, including the semi active laser
version of the HELLFIRE II missile.
Critical system information is stored in
the FCR in the form of mission
executable code, target detection,
classification algorithms and coded
threat parametrics. This information is
provided in a form that cannot be
extracted by the foreign user via antitamper provisions built into the system.
The content of these items is classified
Secret. The RFI is a passive radar
detection and direction finding system,
which utilizes a detachable User Data
Module (UDM) on the RFI processor,
which contains the Radio Frequency
threat library. The UDM, which is a
hardware assemblage, is classified
Secret when programmed with threat
parameters, threat priorities and/or
techniques derived from U.S.
intelligence information.
b. The AN/ASQ–170 Modernized
Target Acquisition and Designation
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Sight/AN/AAQ–11 Modernized Pilot
Night Vision Sensor (MTADS/MPNVS)
provides day, night, limited adverse
weather target information, as well as
night navigation capabilities. The
MPNVS provides thermal imaging that
permits nap-of-the-earth flight to, from,
and within the battle area, while
MTADS provides the co-pilot gunner
with search, detection, recognition, and
designation by means of Direct View
Optics (DVO), television, and Forward
Looking Infrared (FLIR) sighting systems
that may be used singularly or in
combinations. Hardware is Unclassified.
Technical manuals for authorized
maintenance levels are Unclassified.
Reverse engineering is not a major
concern.
c. The AAR–57(V)7 Common Missile
Warning System (CMWS) detects energy
emitted by threat missile in-flight,
evaluates potential false alarm emitters
in the environment, declares validity of
threat and selects appropriate countermeasures. The CMWS consists of an
Electronic Control Unit (ECU), ElectroOptic Missile Sensors (EOMSs), and
Sequencer and Improved
Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD).
The ECU hardware is classified
Confidential; releasable technical
manuals for operation and maintenance
are classified Secret.
d. The AN/APR–39A(V)4 Radar
Signal Detecting Set is a system, that
provides warning of a radar directed air
defense threat and allow appropriate
countermeasures. This is the 1553
databus compatible configuration. The
hardware is classified Confidential
when programmed with U.S. threat
data; releasable technical manuals for
operation and maintenance are
classified Confidential; releasable
technical data (technical performance)
is classified Secret.
e. The AN/AVR–2B Laser Detecting
Set is a passive laser warning system
that receives, processes and displays
threat information resulting from
aircraft illumination by lasers on the
multi-functional display. The hardware
is classified Confidential; releasable
technical manuals for operation and
maintenance are classified Secret.
f. The AN/ALQ–136(V)5 Radar
Jammer, or equivalent, is an automatic
radar jammer that analyzes various
incoming radar signals. When threat
signals are identified and verified,
jamming automatically begins and
continues until the threat radar breaks
lock. The hardware is classified
Confidential; releasable technical
manuals for operation and maintenance
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are classified Secret; releasable
technical data (technical performance)
is classified Secret.
g. The Integrated Helmet Display
Sight System (IHDSS–21) is an
enhanced version of its predecessor. It
will provide improved operational
performance primarily in resolution
allowing greater utilization of the
MTADS/MPNVS performance
enhancements. The hardware is
Unclassified.
h. The highest level for release of the
AGM–114R HELLFIRE II missile is
Secret, based upon the software. The
highest level of classified information
that could be disclosed by a proposed
sale or by testing of the end item is
Secret; the highest level that must be
disclosed for production, maintenance,
or training is Confidential. Reverse
engineering could reveal Confidential
information. Vulnerability data,
countermeasures, vulnerability/
susceptibility analyses, and threat
definitions are classified Secret or
Confidential.
i. The FIM–92H STINGER Block 1
Reprogrammable Micro Processor (RMP)
(less module) missile is an advanced,
‘‘fire and forget,’’ short-range, air
defense weapon system. It provides lowaltitude defense for ground forces
against attack or aerial observation by
low-flying Unmanned Aerial System,
Cruise Missile, Rotary Wing, and FixedWing threats. The STINGER employs an
infrared heat seeking/ultraviolet seeker
to guide to the target. The STINGER
Block I missile has an extensive infrared
counter-countermeasure capability and
can engage targets from any aspect to
include head-on. The missile utilizes a
high-explosive, hit-to-kill warhead. The
FIM–92 STINGER RMP Block I missile
can be fired from a variety of platforms
to include vehicles and helicopters. The
hardware is classified Confidential. The
highest classification of data and
information is Secret; and the Captive
Flight Trainer has a classification of
Confidential.
j. The M211-flare is a countermeasure
decoy in a 1″x1″x8″ form factor in an
aluminum case cartridge. It consists of
case, piston, special material payload
foils, and end cap. The special material
is a pyrophoric metal (iron) foil that
reacts with oxygen to generate infrared
energy. The M211 decoys are dispersed
from an aircraft to be used as a decoy
in combination with the currently
fielded M206 and M212 countermeasure
flares to protect against advanced air-toair and surface-to-air missile threats.
The hardware is Unclassified and
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42707
releasable technical manuals for
operation and maintenance are
classified Secret.
k. The M212 flare is a multi-spectral
countermeasure flare in a 1″x1″x8″ form
factor in an aluminum case cartridge. It
consists of a case, impulse cartridge,
Safe and Ignition (S&I), a propellant
grain and a forward brass closure which
acts as a weight to improve
aerodynamics of the decoy. The M212
flares are dispersed from an aircraft and
used in combination with the currently
fielded M206 and M211 countermeasure
flares and decoys to protect against
advanced air-to-air and surface-to-air
missile threats. The hardware is
Unclassified and releasable technical
manuals for operation and maintenance
are classified Secret.
2. If a technologically advanced
adversary were to obtain knowledge of
the specific hardware and software
elements, the information could be used
to develop countermeasures which
might reduce weapon system
effectiveness or be used in the
development of a system with similar or
advanced capabilities.
[FR Doc. 2012–17719 Filed 7–19–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
[Transmittal Nos. 12–35]
36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification
Defense Security Cooperation
Agency, Department of Defense.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
The Department of Defense is
publishing the unclassified text of a
section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification.
This is published to fulfill the
requirements of section 155 of Public
Law 104–164 dated July 21, 1996.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms.
B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, (703) 601–
3740.
The following is a copy of a letter to
the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Transmittals 12–35
with attached transmittal and policy
justification.
SUMMARY:
Dated: July 17, 2012.
Aaron Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison
Officer, Department of Defense.
BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 140 (Friday, July 20, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 42704-42707]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-17719]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
[Transmittal Nos. 12-10]
36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification
AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense.
ACTION: Notice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text
of a section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. This is published to
fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-164 dated
July 21, 1996.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, (703)
601-3740.
The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Transmittals 12-10 with attached transmittal, policy
justification, and Sensitivity of Technology.
Dated: July 17, 2012.
Aaron Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
[[Page 42705]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN20JY12.001
BILLING CODE 5001-06-C
Transmittal No. 12-10
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section
36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Qatar
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment*................. $1.70 billion
Other.................................... $1.30 billion
------------------------------
TOTAL.................................... $3.00 billion
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase: 24 AH-64D APACHE Block III
LONGBOW Attack Helicopters, 56 T700-GE-701D Engines, 27 AN/ASQ-170
Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight, 27 AN/AAR-11
Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors, 12 AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars
(FCR) with Radar Electronics Unit (LONGBOW component), 12 AN/APR-48A
Radar Frequency Interferometers, 28 AN/AAR-57(V)7 Common Missile
Warning Systems, 30 AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Sets, 28 AN/APR-39A(V)4
Radar Signal Detecting Sets, 28 AN/ALQ-136(V)5 Radar Jammers or
Equivalent, 160 Integrated Helmet and Display Sight Systems-21, 58
Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation, 30 30mm
Automatic Chain Guns, 8 Aircraft Ground Power Units, 52 AN/AVS-6 Night
Vision Goggles, 60 M299A1 HELLFIRE Missile Launchers, 576 AGM-114R
HELLFIRE II Missiles, 295 FIM-92H STINGER Reprogrammable Micro
Processor (RMP) Block I Missiles, 50 STINGER Air-to-Air Launchers, 4092
2.75 in Hydra Rockets, and 90 APACHE Aviator Integrated Helmets. Also
included are M206 infrared countermeasure flares, M211
[[Page 42706]]
and M212 Advanced Infrared Countermeasure Munitions (AIRCM) flares,
training devices, helmets, simulators, generators, transportation,
wheeled vehicles and organization equipment, spare and repair parts,
support equipment, tools and test equipment, technical data and
publications, personnel training and training equipment, U.S.
government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support
services, and other related elements of logistics support.
(iv) Military Department: Army (WYX)
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be
Paid: None
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or
Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Annex attached
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: July 10, 2012
* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.
POLICY JUSTIFICATION
Qatar--AH-64D APACHE Block III LONGBOW Attack Helicopters
The Government of Qatar has requested a possible sale of 24 AH-64D
APACHE Block III LONGBOW Attack Helicopters, 56 T700-GE-701D Engines,
27 AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight, 27
AN/AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors, 12 AN/APG-78 Fire
Control Radars (FCR) with Radar Electronics Unit (LONGBOW component),
12 AN/APR-48A Radar Frequency Interferometers, 28 AN/AAR-57(V)7 Common
Missile Warning Systems, 30 AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Sets, 28 AN/APR-
39A(V)4 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, 28 AN/ALQ-136(V)5 Radar Jammers or
Equivalent, 160 Integrated Helmet and Display Sight Systems-21, 58
Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation, 30 30mm
Automatic Chain Guns, 8 Aircraft Ground Power Units, 52 AN/AVS-6 Night
Vision Goggles, 60 M299A1 HELLFIRE Missile Launchers, 576 AGM-114R
HELLFIRE II Missiles, 295 FIM-92H STINGER Reprogrammable Micro
Processor (RMP) Block I Missiles, 50 STINGER Air-to-Air Launchers, 4092
2.75 in Hydra Rockets, and 90 APACHE Aviator Integrated Helmets. Also
included are M206 infrared countermeasure flares, M211 and M212
Advanced Infrared Countermeasure Munitions (AIRCM) flares, training
devices, helmets, simulators, generators, transportation, wheeled
vehicles and organization equipment, spare and repair parts, support
equipment, tools and test equipment, technical data and publications,
personnel training and training equipment, U.S. government and
contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and
other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is
$3.00 billion.
This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and
national security of the United States by helping to improve the
security of a friendly country that has been, and continues to be, an
important force for political and economic progress in the Middle East.
Qatar is host to the U.S. Central Command forces and serves as a
critical forward-deployed location in the region. The acquisition of
these helicopters will allow for integration with U.S. forces for
training exercises, which contributes to regional security and
interoperability.
The proposed sale of the AH-64D APACHE helicopters will allow the
Qatari Armed Forces (QAF) to replace its aging airframes with multi-
mission attack helicopters, capable of meeting its requirements for
close air support, armed reconnaissance and anti-tank warfare missions.
The helicopters will provide a long-term defensive and offensive
capability to the Qatari peninsula as well as enhance the protection of
key oil and gas infrastructure and platforms which are vital to U.S.
and western economic interests. Qatar will have no difficulty absorbing
these helicopters into its armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the
basic military balance in the region.
The prime contractors will be The Boeing Company in Mesa, Arizona,
Lockheed Martin Corporation in Orlando, Florida, General Electric in
Cincinnati, Ohio, Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Sensors in Owego,
New York, Longbow Limited Liability Corporation in Orlando, Florida,
and Raytheon Corporation in Tucson, Arizona. There are no known offset
agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of
three U.S. Government and five contractor representatives to Qatar to
support delivery of the APACHE helicopters and provide support and
equipment familiarization. In addition, Qatar has expressed an interest
in a Technical Assistance Fielding Team for in-country pilot and
maintenance training. To support the requirement a team of 12 personnel
(one military team leader and 11 contractors) would be deployed to
Qatar for approximately three years.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a
result of this proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 12-10
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section
36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
Annex
Item No. vii
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
1. The AH-64D APACHE Attack Helicopter weapon system contains
communications and target identification equipment, navigation
equipment, aircraft survivability equipment, displays, and sensors. The
airframe itself does not contain sensitive technology; however, the
pertinent equipment listed below will be either installed on the
aircraft or included in the sale:
a. The AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radar (FCR) is an active, low-
probability of intercept, millimeter-wave radar, combined with a
passive AN/APR-48A Radar Frequency Interferometer (RFI) mounted on top
of the helicopter mast. The FCR Ground Targeting Mode detects, locates,
classifies and prioritizes stationary or moving armored vehicles, tanks
and mobile air defense systems as well as hovering helicopters and
helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft in normal flight. The RFI detects
threat radar emissions and determines the type of radar and mode of
operation. The FCR data and RFI data are fused for maximum synergism.
If desired, the radar data can be used to refer targets to the regular
electro-optical Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight
(MTADS), permitting additional visual/infrared imagery and control of
weapons, including the semi active laser version of the HELLFIRE II
missile. Critical system information is stored in the FCR in the form
of mission executable code, target detection, classification algorithms
and coded threat parametrics. This information is provided in a form
that cannot be extracted by the foreign user via anti-tamper provisions
built into the system. The content of these items is classified Secret.
The RFI is a passive radar detection and direction finding system,
which utilizes a detachable User Data Module (UDM) on the RFI
processor, which contains the Radio Frequency threat library. The UDM,
which is a hardware assemblage, is classified Secret when programmed
with threat parameters, threat priorities and/or techniques derived
from U.S. intelligence information.
b. The AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation
[[Page 42707]]
Sight/AN/AAQ-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensor (MTADS/MPNVS)
provides day, night, limited adverse weather target information, as
well as night navigation capabilities. The MPNVS provides thermal
imaging that permits nap-of-the-earth flight to, from, and within the
battle area, while MTADS provides the co-pilot gunner with search,
detection, recognition, and designation by means of Direct View Optics
(DVO), television, and Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sighting systems
that may be used singularly or in combinations. Hardware is
Unclassified. Technical manuals for authorized maintenance levels are
Unclassified. Reverse engineering is not a major concern.
c. The AAR-57(V)7 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) detects
energy emitted by threat missile in-flight, evaluates potential false
alarm emitters in the environment, declares validity of threat and
selects appropriate counter-measures. The CMWS consists of an
Electronic Control Unit (ECU), Electro-Optic Missile Sensors (EOMSs),
and Sequencer and Improved Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD). The ECU
hardware is classified Confidential; releasable technical manuals for
operation and maintenance are classified Secret.
d. The AN/APR-39A(V)4 Radar Signal Detecting Set is a system, that
provides warning of a radar directed air defense threat and allow
appropriate countermeasures. This is the 1553 databus compatible
configuration. The hardware is classified Confidential when programmed
with U.S. threat data; releasable technical manuals for operation and
maintenance are classified Confidential; releasable technical data
(technical performance) is classified Secret.
e. The AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Set is a passive laser warning
system that receives, processes and displays threat information
resulting from aircraft illumination by lasers on the multi-functional
display. The hardware is classified Confidential; releasable technical
manuals for operation and maintenance are classified Secret.
f. The AN/ALQ-136(V)5 Radar Jammer, or equivalent, is an automatic
radar jammer that analyzes various incoming radar signals. When threat
signals are identified and verified, jamming automatically begins and
continues until the threat radar breaks lock. The hardware is
classified Confidential; releasable technical manuals for operation and
maintenance are classified Secret; releasable technical data (technical
performance) is classified Secret.
g. The Integrated Helmet Display Sight System (IHDSS-21) is an
enhanced version of its predecessor. It will provide improved
operational performance primarily in resolution allowing greater
utilization of the MTADS/MPNVS performance enhancements. The hardware
is Unclassified.
h. The highest level for release of the AGM-114R HELLFIRE II
missile is Secret, based upon the software. The highest level of
classified information that could be disclosed by a proposed sale or by
testing of the end item is Secret; the highest level that must be
disclosed for production, maintenance, or training is Confidential.
Reverse engineering could reveal Confidential information.
Vulnerability data, countermeasures, vulnerability/susceptibility
analyses, and threat definitions are classified Secret or Confidential.
i. The FIM-92H STINGER Block 1 Reprogrammable Micro Processor (RMP)
(less module) missile is an advanced, ``fire and forget,'' short-range,
air defense weapon system. It provides low-altitude defense for ground
forces against attack or aerial observation by low-flying Unmanned
Aerial System, Cruise Missile, Rotary Wing, and Fixed-Wing threats. The
STINGER employs an infrared heat seeking/ultraviolet seeker to guide to
the target. The STINGER Block I missile has an extensive infrared
counter-countermeasure capability and can engage targets from any
aspect to include head-on. The missile utilizes a high-explosive, hit-
to-kill warhead. The FIM-92 STINGER RMP Block I missile can be fired
from a variety of platforms to include vehicles and helicopters. The
hardware is classified Confidential. The highest classification of data
and information is Secret; and the Captive Flight Trainer has a
classification of Confidential.
j. The M211-flare is a countermeasure decoy in a 1''x1''x8'' form
factor in an aluminum case cartridge. It consists of case, piston,
special material payload foils, and end cap. The special material is a
pyrophoric metal (iron) foil that reacts with oxygen to generate
infrared energy. The M211 decoys are dispersed from an aircraft to be
used as a decoy in combination with the currently fielded M206 and M212
countermeasure flares to protect against advanced air-to-air and
surface-to-air missile threats. The hardware is Unclassified and
releasable technical manuals for operation and maintenance are
classified Secret.
k. The M212 flare is a multi-spectral countermeasure flare in a
1''x1''x8'' form factor in an aluminum case cartridge. It consists of a
case, impulse cartridge, Safe and Ignition (S&I), a propellant grain
and a forward brass closure which acts as a weight to improve
aerodynamics of the decoy. The M212 flares are dispersed from an
aircraft and used in combination with the currently fielded M206 and
M211 countermeasure flares and decoys to protect against advanced air-
to-air and surface-to-air missile threats. The hardware is Unclassified
and releasable technical manuals for operation and maintenance are
classified Secret.
2. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge
of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could
be used to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapon system
effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or
advanced capabilities.
[FR Doc. 2012-17719 Filed 7-19-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
