Office of Privacy, Records, and Disclosure; Privacy Act of 1974; Proposed Implementation, 38218-38224 [2012-15429]
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38218
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
Vol. 77, No. 124
Wednesday, June 27, 2012
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices is to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
5 CFR Part 9301
RIN 3460–AA03
Office of Privacy, Records, and
Disclosure; Privacy Act of 1974;
Proposed Implementation
Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
AGENCY:
In accordance with the
requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974,
5 U.S.C. 552a, the Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
(SIGAR) gives notice of a proposed
amendment to this part to exempt
several systems of records maintained
within the agency from certain
provisions of the Privacy Act.
DATES: Comments must be received no
later than July 27, 2012.
ADDRESSES: Comments should be sent to
Hugo Teufel, Acting General Counsel,
Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2530
Crystal Drive, Arlington, VA 22202–
3934. Comments will be made available
for inspection upon written request.
SIGAR will make such comments
available for public inspection in the
Office of Privacy, Records, and
Disclosure, 9th Floor, 1550 Crystal
Drive, Arlington, VA 22202, on official
business days between the hours of
9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern time. You can
make an appointment to inspect
comments by telephoning (703) 545–
6000. All comments, including
attachments and other supporting
materials, received are part of the public
record and subject to public disclosure.
You should submit only information
that you wish to make available
publicly.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kate
Gastner, Public Information Manager,
Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2530
Crystal Drive, Arlington, VA 22202–
3934, (703) 545–5993.
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SUMMARY:
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On
January 28, 2008, the President signed
into law the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
(Pub. L. 110–181), which created the
Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).
SIGAR is responsible for coordinating
and conducting audits and
investigations to promote efficiency and
effectiveness of reconstruction
programs, and to detect and prevent
waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayers’
dollars. Under 5 U.S.C. 301, heads of
Executive or military departments may
prescribe regulations governing the
conduct of its employees and the
custody, use, and preservation of the
agency’s records, papers, and property.
SIGAR is publishing separately the
notices of the new systems of records to
be maintained by SIGAR.
The provisions of the Privacy Act
upon which SIGAR is relying for the
exemptions are 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2),
(k)(1), and (k)(2). Under 5 U.S.C.
552a(j)(2), the head of a Federal agency
may promulgate rules to exempt a
system of records from certain
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a if the system
of records is ‘‘maintained by an agency
or component thereof which performs as
its principal function any activity
pertaining to the enforcement of
criminal laws’’, and includes
information compiled for the purpose of
a criminal investigation, including
reports of informants and investigators,
and associated with an identifiable
individual; and reports identifiable to
an individual compiled at any stage of
the process of enforcement of the
criminal laws.
To the extent that these systems of
records contain investigative material
within the provisions of 5 U.S.C.
552a(j)(2), SIGAR proposes to exempt
the following systems of records from
various provisions of the Privacy Act
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2):
SIGAR–04 Freedom of Information
Act and Privacy Act Records;
SIGAR–05 Audit Records;
SIGAR–06 Correspondence Records;
SIGAR–07 Hotline Records;
SIGAR–08 Investigation Records;
SIGAR–09 Legal Records;
SIGAR–10 Legislative Inquiries and
Correspondence.
The proposed exemption under 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) for the abovereferenced systems of records is from
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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provisions 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4),
(d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(4), (e)(1), (e)(2),
(e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5),
(e)(8), (f), and (g).
5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G) and (f)(l) enable
individuals to inquire whether a system
of records contains records pertaining to
themselves. 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1),
(e)(4)(H), and (f)(2), (3), and (5) grant
individuals access, or concern
procedures by which an individual may
gain access, to records pertaining to
themselves. 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(2), (3), and
(4), (e)(4)(H), and (f)(4) permit an
individual to request amendment of a
record pertaining to the individual or
concern related procedures, and require
the agency either to amend the record or
to note the disputed portion of the
record, and to provide a copy of the
individual’s statement of disagreement
with the agency’s refusal to amend a
record to persons or other agencies to
whom the record is thereafter disclosed.
5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) requires an agency
to make accountings of disclosures of a
record available to the individual
named in the record upon his or her
request. 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(4) requires an
agency to inform any person or other
agency about any correction or notation
of dispute that the agency made in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(d) to any
record that the agency disclosed to the
person or agency if an accounting of the
disclosure was made. 5 U.S.C.
552a(e)(4)(I) requires an agency to
publish a general notice listing the
categories of sources for information
contained in a system of records.
5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) requires an agency
to maintain in its records only such
information about an individual as is
relevant and necessary to accomplish a
purpose of the agency required to be
accomplished by statute or Executive
Order. 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(2) requires an
agency to collect information to the
greatest extent practicable directly from
the subject individual when the
information may result in adverse
determinations about an individual’s
rights, benefits, and privileges under
Federal programs. 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3)
requires an agency to inform each
individual, whom it asks to supply
information, of the agency’s authority
for soliciting the information, whether
disclosure of information is voluntary or
mandatory, the principal purpose(s) for
which the agency will use the
information, the routine uses that may
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be made of the information, and the
effects on the individual of not
providing all or part of the information.
5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) requires an agency
to maintain all records it uses in making
any determination about any individual
with such accuracy, relevance,
timeliness, and completeness as is
reasonably necessary to assure fairness
to the individual in the determination.
5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(8) requires an agency to
make reasonable efforts to serve notice
on an individual when the agency
makes any record on the individual
available to any person under
compulsory legal process, when such
process becomes a matter of public
record. 5 U.S.C. 552a(g) provides for
civil remedies to an individual when an
agency wrongfully refuses to amend a
record or to review a request for
amendment, when an agency
wrongfully refuses to grant access to a
record, when an agency fails to maintain
accurate, relevant, timely, and complete
records which are used to make a
determination adverse to the individual,
and when an agency fails to comply
with any other provision of 5 U.S.C.
552a so as to adversely affect the
individual.
Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), the head of
any agency may promulgate rules to
exempt any system of records within the
agency from certain provisions of the
Privacy Act to the extent that the system
contains information subject to the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1), to
protect material authorized to be kept
secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy pursuant to Executive
Order.
To the extent that these systems of
records contain national defense or
foreign policy information within the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 55a(k)(1), SIGAR
proposes to exempt the following
systems of records from various
provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1):
SIGAR–07 Hotline Records;
SIGAR–08 Investigation Records;
SIGAR–09 Legal Records.
The proposed exemption under 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) for the abovereferenced systems of records is from
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), 5
U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (2), (3), and (4), 5
U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G),
(H), and (I), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(f).
5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) requires an agency
to make accountings of disclosures of a
record available to the individual
named in the record upon his or her
request. 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H),
and (f)(2), (3), and (5) grant individuals
access, or concern procedures by which
an individual may gain access, to
records pertaining to them. 5 U.S.C.
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552a(d)(2), (3), and (4), (e)(4)(H), and
(f)(4) permit an individual to request
amendment of a record pertaining to the
individual or concern related
procedures, and require the agency
either to amend the record or to note the
disputed portion of the record, and to
provide a copy of the individual’s
statement of disagreement with the
agency’s refusal to amend a record to
persons or other agencies to whom the
record is thereafter disclosed.
5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) requires an agency
to maintain in its records only such
information about an individual as is
relevant and necessary to accomplish a
purpose of the agency required to be
accomplished by statute or Executive
Order. 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G) and (f)(1)
enable individuals to inquire whether a
system of records contains records
pertaining to them. Application of these
provisions to the above-referenced
systems of records could allow
individuals to learn whether they have
been identified as subjects of
investigation. 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(I)
requires an agency to publish a general
notice listing the categories of sources
for information contained in a system of
records.
Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), the head of
a Federal agency may promulgate rules
to exempt a system of records from
certain provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a if the
system of records is ‘‘investigatory
material compiled for law enforcement
purposes, other than material within the
scope of subsection (j)(2).’’ To the extent
that these systems of records contain
investigative material within the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), SIGAR
proposes to exempt the following
systems of records from various
provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2):
SIGAR–04 Freedom of Information
Act and Privacy Act Records;
SIGAR–05 Audit Records;
SIGAR–06 Correspondence Records;
SIGAR–07 Hotline Records;
SIGAR–08 Investigation Records;
SIGAR–09 Legal Records;
SIGAR–10 Legislative Inquiries and
Correspondence.
The proposed exemption under 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) for the abovereferenced systems of records is from
provisions 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1),
(d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(4), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), and (f).
5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) requires an agency
to make accountings of disclosures of a
record available to the individual
named in the record upon his or her
request. 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H),
and (f)(2), (3), and (5) grant individuals
access, or concern procedures by which
an individual may gain access, to
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records pertaining to them. 5 U.S.C.
552a(d)(2), (3), and (4), (e)(4)(H), and
(f)(4) permit an individual to request
amendment of a record pertaining to the
individual or concern-related
procedures, and require the agency
either to amend the record or to note the
disputed portion of the record, and to
provide a copy of the individual’s
statement of disagreement with the
agency’s refusal to amend a record to
persons or other agencies to whom the
record is thereafter disclosed.
5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) requires an agency
to maintain in its records only such
information about an individual as is
relevant and necessary to accomplish a
purpose of the agency required to be
accomplished by statute or Executive
Order. 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G) and (f)(1)
enable individuals to inquire whether a
system of records contains records
pertaining to them. Application of these
provisions to the above-referenced
systems of records could allow
individuals to learn whether they have
been identified as subjects of
investigation. 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(I)
requires an agency to publish a general
notice listing the categories of sources
for information contained in a system of
records.
Any information from a system of
records for which an exemption is
claimed under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) or (k)
which is also included in another
system of records retains the same
exempt status such information has in
the system for which such exemption is
claimed.
This proposed rule is not a
‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under
Executive Order 12866.
Pursuant to the requirements of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5
U.S.C. 601–612, it is hereby certified
that this rule will not have significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. The term
‘‘small entity’’ is defined to have the
same meaning as the terms ‘‘small
business,’’ ‘‘small organization’’ and
‘‘small governmental jurisdiction’’ as
defined in the RFA.
The proposed regulation, issued
under section 522a(j)(2) and (k) of the
Privacy Act, is to exempt certain
information maintained by SIGAR in the
above systems of records from
notification, access and amendment of a
record by individuals who are citizens
of the United States or aliens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence. In as
much as the Privacy Act rights are
personal and apply only to U.S. citizens
or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, small entities, as
defined in the RFA, are not provided
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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 124 / Wednesday, June 27, 2012 / Proposed Rules
rights under the Privacy Act and are
outside the scope of this regulation.
Dated: June 19, 2012.
Steven J. Trent,
Acting Inspector General.
List of Subjects in 5 CFR Part 9301
Administrative practice and
procedure, Freedom of information,
Privacy.
For the reasons set forth above, SIGAR
proposes to amend 5 CFR part 9301 as
follows:
PART 9301—DISCLOSURE OF
RECORDS AND INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for part 9301
continues to read as follows:
Authority: Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93–579, 88 Stat. 1896, codified at 5 U.S.C.
552a(f) (agency rules).
2. Add § 9301.20 to subpart B to read
as follows:
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§ 9301.20 Systems exempt in whole or in
part from provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a and
this part.
(a) In General. In accordance with 5
U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k), SIGAR hereby
exempts the systems of records
identified below from the following
provisions of the Privacy Act for the
reasons indicated.
(b) Authority. These rules are
promulgated pursuant to the authority
vested in the Special Inspector General
by 5 U.S.C. 552a (j) and (k).
(c) General exemptions under 5 U.S.C.
552a(j)(2). (1) Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2),
the head of any agency may promulgate
rules to exempt any system of records
within the agency from certain
provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 if
the agency or component thereof that
maintains the system performs as its
principal function any activities
pertaining to the enforcement of
criminal laws. Certain components of
SIGAR have as their principal function
activities pertaining to the enforcement
of criminal laws and protective service
activities which are necessary to assure
the safety of individuals protected by
SIGAR pursuant to the provisions of 18
U.S.C. 3056. This paragraph applies to
the following systems of records
maintained by SIGAR:
SIGAR–04 Freedom of Information
Act and Privacy Act Records;
SIGAR–05 Audit Records;
SIGAR–06 Correspondence Records;
SIGAR–07 Hotline Records;
SIGAR–08 Investigation Records;
SIGAR–09 Legal Records;
SIGAR–10 Legislative Inquiries and
Correspondence.
(2) SIGAR hereby exempts the
systems of records listed in paragraphs
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(c)(1)(i) of this section from the
following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a,
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2): 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3) and (4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1),
(2), (3), (4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), (2) and
(3), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I),
5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) and (8), 5 U.S.C.
552a(f), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(g).
(d) Reasons for exemptions under 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). (1) 5 U.S.C.
552a(e)(4)(G) and (f)(l) enable
individuals to inquire whether a system
of records contains records pertaining to
them. Application of these provisions to
the systems of records would give
individuals an opportunity to learn
whether they have been identified as
suspects or subjects of investigation. As
further described in (d)(2) of this
section, access to such knowledge
would impair SIGAR’s ability to carry
out its mission, since individuals could:
(i) Take steps to avoid detection;
(ii) Inform associates that an
investigation is in progress;
(iii) Learn the nature of the
investigation;
(iv) Learn whether they are only
suspects or identified as law violators;
(v) Begin, continue, or resume illegal
conduct upon learning that they are not
identified in the system of records; or
(vi) Destroy evidence needed to prove
the violation.
(2) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H) and
(f)(2), (3) and (5) grant individuals
access to records pertaining to them.
The application of these provisions to
the systems of records would
compromise SIGAR’s ability to provide
useful tactical and strategic information
to law enforcement agencies.
(i) Permitting access to records
contained in the systems of records
would provide individuals with
information concerning the nature of
any current investigations and would
enable them to avoid detection or
apprehension by:
(A) Discovering the facts that would
form the basis for their arrest;
(B) Enabling them to destroy or alter
evidence of criminal conduct that
would form the basis for their arrest;
and
(C) Using knowledge that criminal
investigators had reason to believe that
a crime was about to be committed, to
delay the commission of the crime or
commit it at a location that might not be
under surveillance.
(ii) Permitting access to either ongoing or closed investigative files would
also reveal investigative techniques and
procedures, the knowledge of which
could enable individuals planning
crimes to structure their operations so as
to avoid detection or apprehension.
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(iii) Permitting access to investigative
files and records could, moreover,
disclose the identity of confidential
sources and informers and the nature of
the information supplied and thereby
endanger the physical safety of those
sources by exposing them to possible
reprisals for having provided the
information. Confidential sources and
informers might refuse to provide
criminal investigators with valuable
information unless they believed that
their identities would not be revealed
through disclosure of their names or the
nature of the information they supplied.
Loss of access to such sources would
seriously impair SIGAR’s ability to carry
out its mandate.
(iv) Furthermore, providing access to
records contained in the systems of
records could reveal the identities of
undercover law enforcement officers
who compiled information regarding the
individual’s criminal activities and
thereby endanger the physical safety of
those undercover officers or their
families by exposing them to possible
reprisals.
(v) By compromising the law
enforcement value of the systems of
records for the reasons outlined in
paragraphs (d)(2)(i) through (iv) of this
section, permitting access in keeping
with these provisions would discourage
other law enforcement and regulatory
agencies, foreign and domestic, from
freely sharing information with SIGAR
and thus would restrict SIGAR’s access
to information necessary to accomplish
its mission most effectively.
(vi) Limitation on access to the
material contained in the protective
intelligence files is considered
necessary to the preservation of the
utility of intelligence files and in
safeguarding those persons SIGAR is
authorized to protect. Access to the
protective intelligence files could
adversely affect the quality of
information available to SIGAR;
compromise confidential sources,
hinder the ability of SIGAR to keep
track of persons of protective interest;
and interfere with SIGAR’s protective
intelligence activities by individuals
gaining access to protective intelligence
files.
(vii) Many of the persons on whom
records are maintained in the protective
intelligence suffer from mental
aberrations. Knowledge of their
condition and progress comes from
authorities, family members and
witnesses. Many times this information
comes to SIGAR as a result of two party
conversations where it would be
impossible to hide the identity of
informants. Sources of information must
be developed, questions asked and
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answers recorded. Trust must be
extended and guarantees of
confidentiality and anonymity must be
maintained. Allowing access to
information of this kind to individuals
who are the subjects of protective
interest may well lead to violence
directed against an informant by a
mentally disturbed individual.
(viii) Finally, the dissemination of
certain information that SIGAR may
maintain in the systems of records is
restricted by law.
(3) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(2), (3) and (4),
(e)(4)(H), and (f)(4) permit an individual
to request amendment of a record
pertaining to him or her and require the
agency either to amend the record, or to
note the disputed portion of the record
and to provide a copy of the
individual’s statement of disagreement
with the agency’s refusal to amend a
record to persons or other agencies to
whom the record is thereafter disclosed.
Since these provisions depend on the
individual’s having access to his or her
records, and since these rules exempt
the systems of records from the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a relating to
access to records, for the reasons set out
in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, these
provisions should not apply to the
systems of records.
(4) 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) requires an
agency to make accountings of
disclosures of a record available to the
individual named in the record upon
his or her request. The accountings must
state the date, nature, and purpose of
each disclosure of the record and the
name and address of the recipient.
(i) The application of this provision
would impair the ability of law
enforcement agencies outside SIGAR to
make effective use of information
provided by SIGAR. Making
accountings of disclosures available to
the subjects of an investigation would
alert them to the fact that another
agency is conducting an investigation
into their criminal activities and could
reveal the geographic location of the
other agency’s investigation, the nature
and purpose of that investigation, and
the dates on which that investigation
was active. Violators possessing such
knowledge would be able to take
measures to avoid detection or
apprehension by altering their
operations, by transferring their
criminal activities to other geographical
areas, or by destroying or concealing
evidence that would form the basis for
arrest. In the case of a delinquent
account, such release might enable the
subject of the investigation to dissipate
assets before levy.
(ii) Moreover, providing accountings
to the subjects of investigations would
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alert them to the fact that SIGAR has
information regarding their criminal
activities and could inform them of the
general nature of that information.
Access to such information could reveal
the operation of SIGAR’s informationgathering and analysis systems and
permit violators to take steps to avoid
detection or apprehension.
(iii) The release of such information to
the subject of a protective intelligence
file would provide significant
information concerning the nature of an
investigation, and could result in
impeding or compromising the efforts of
Department personnel to detect persons
suspected of criminal activities or to
collect information necessary for the
proper evaluation of persons considered
to be of protective interest.
(5) 5 U.S.C. 552(c)(4) requires an
agency to inform any person or other
agency about any correction or notation
of dispute that the agency made in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(d) to any
record that the agency disclosed to the
person or agency if an accounting of the
disclosure was made. Since this
provision depends on an individual’s
having access to and an opportunity to
request amendment of records
pertaining to him or her, and since these
rules exempt the systems of records
from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a
relating to access to and amendment of
records, for the reasons set out in
paragraph (f)(3) of this section, this
provision should not apply to the
systems of records.
(6) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(I) requires an
agency to publish a general notice
listing the categories of sources for
information contained in a system of
records. The application of this
provision to the systems of records
could compromise SIGAR’s ability to
provide useful information to law
enforcement agencies, since revealing
sources for the information could:
(i) Disclose investigative techniques
and procedures;
(ii) Result in threats or reprisals
against informers by the subjects of
investigations; and
(iii) Cause informers to refuse to give
full information to criminal
investigators for fear of having their
identities as sources disclosed.
(7) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) requires an
agency to maintain in its records only
such information about an individual as
is relevant and necessary to accomplish
a purpose of the agency required to be
accomplished by statute or executive
order. The term ‘‘maintain,’’ as defined
in 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(3), includes
‘‘collect’’ and ‘‘disseminate.’’ The
application of this provision to the
systems of records could impair
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SIGAR’s ability to collect and
disseminate valuable law enforcement
information.
(i) At the time that SIGAR collects
information, it often lacks sufficient
time to determine whether the
information is relevant and necessary to
accomplish a SIGAR purpose.
(ii) In many cases, especially in the
early stages of investigation, it may be
impossible to immediately determine
whether information collected is
relevant and necessary, and information
that initially appears irrelevant and
unnecessary often may, upon further
evaluation or upon collation with
information developed subsequently,
prove particularly relevant to a law
enforcement program.
(iii) Compliance with the records
maintenance criteria listed in the
foregoing provision would require the
periodic up-dating of SIGAR’s
protective intelligence files to insure
that the records maintained in the
system remain timely and complete.
(iv) Not all violations of law
discovered by SIGAR fall within the
investigative jurisdiction of SIGAR. To
promote effective law enforcement,
SIGAR will have to disclose such
violations to other law enforcement
agencies, including State, local and
foreign agencies, that have jurisdiction
over the offenses to which the
information relates. Otherwise, SIGAR
might be placed in the position of
having to ignore information relating to
violations of law not within the
jurisdiction of SIGAR when that
information comes to SIGAR’s attention
during the collation and analysis of
information in its records.
(8) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(2) requires an
agency to collect information to the
greatest extent practicable directly from
the subject individual when the
information may result in adverse
determinations about an individual’s
rights, benefits, and privileges under
Federal programs. The application of
this provision to the systems of records
would impair SIGAR’s ability to collate,
analyze, and disseminate investigative,
intelligence, and enforcement
information.
(i) Most information collected about
an individual under criminal
investigation is obtained from third
parties, such as witnesses and
informants. It is usually not feasible to
rely upon the subject of the
investigation as a source for information
regarding his criminal activities.
(ii) An attempt to obtain information
from the subject of a criminal
investigation will often alert that
individual to the existence of an
investigation, thereby affording the
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individual an opportunity to attempt to
conceal his criminal activities so as to
avoid apprehension.
(iii) In certain instances, the subject of
a criminal investigation is not required
to supply information to criminal
investigators as a matter of legal duty.
(iv) During criminal investigations it
is often a matter of sound investigative
procedure to obtain information from a
variety of sources to verify information
already obtained.
(9) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3) requires an
agency to inform each individual whom
it asks to supply information, on the
form that it uses to collect the
information or on a separate form that
the individual can retain, of the
agency’s authority for soliciting the
information; whether disclosure of
information is voluntary or mandatory;
the principal purposes for which the
agency will use the information; the
routine uses that may be made of the
information; and the effects on the
individual of not providing all or part of
the information. The systems of records
should be exempted from this provision
to avoid impairing SIGAR’s ability to
collect and collate investigative,
intelligence, and enforcement data.
(i) Confidential sources or undercover
law enforcement officers often obtain
information under circumstances in
which it is necessary to keep the true
purpose of their actions secret so as not
to let the subject of the investigation or
his or her associates know that a
criminal investigation is in progress.
(ii) If it became known that the
undercover officer was assisting in a
criminal investigation, that officer’s
physical safety could be endangered
through reprisal, and that officer may
not be able to continue working on the
investigation.
(iii) Individuals often feel inhibited in
talking to a person representing a
criminal law enforcement agency but
are willing to talk to a confidential
source or undercover officer whom they
believe not to be involved in law
enforcement activities.
(iv) Providing a confidential source of
information with written evidence that
he or she was a source, as required by
this provision, could increase the
likelihood that the source of information
would be subject to retaliation by the
subject of the investigation.
(v) Individuals may be contacted
during preliminary information
gathering, surveys, or compliance
projects concerning the administration
of the internal revenue laws before any
individual is identified as the subject of
an investigation. Informing the
individual of the matters required by
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this provision would impede or
compromise subsequent investigations.
(vi) Finally, application of this
provision could result in an
unwarranted invasion of the personal
privacy of the subject of the criminal
investigation, particularly where further
investigation reveals that the subject
was not involved in any criminal
activity.
(10) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) requires an
agency to maintain all records it uses in
making any determination about any
individual with such accuracy,
relevance, timeliness, and completeness
as is reasonably necessary to assure
fairness to the individual in the
determination.
(i) Since 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(3) defines
‘‘maintain’’ to include ‘‘collect’’ and
‘‘disseminate,’’ application of this
provision to the systems of records
would hinder the initial collection of
any information that could not, at the
moment of collection, be determined to
be accurate, relevant, timely, and
complete. Similarly, application of this
provision would seriously restrict
SIGAR’s ability to disseminate
information pertaining to a possible
violation of law to law enforcement and
regulatory agencies. In collecting
information during a criminal
investigation, it is often impossible or
unfeasible to determine accuracy,
relevance, timeliness, or completeness
prior to collection of the information. In
disseminating information to law
enforcement and regulatory agencies, it
is often impossible to determine
accuracy, relevance, timeliness, or
completeness prior to dissemination,
because SIGAR may not have the
expertise with which to make such
determinations.
(ii) Information that may initially
appear inaccurate, irrelevant, untimely,
or incomplete may, when collated and
analyzed with other available
information, become more pertinent as
an investigation progresses. In addition,
application of this provision could
seriously impede criminal investigators
and intelligence analysts in the exercise
of their judgment in reporting results
obtained during criminal investigations.
(iii) Compliance with the records
maintenance criteria listed in the
foregoing provision would require the
periodic up-dating of SIGAR’s
protective intelligence files to insure
that the records maintained in the
system remain timely and complete.
(11) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(8) requires an
agency to make reasonable efforts to
serve notice on an individual when the
agency makes any record on the
individual available to any person
under compulsory legal process, when
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such process becomes a matter of public
record. The systems of records should
be exempted from this provision to
avoid revealing investigative techniques
and procedures outlined in those
records and to prevent revelation of the
existence of an ongoing investigation
where there is need to keep the
existence of the investigation secret.
(12) 5 U.S.C. 552a(g) provides for civil
remedies to an individual when an
agency wrongfully refuses to amend a
record or to review a request for
amendment, when an agency
wrongfully refuses to grant access to a
record, when an agency fails to maintain
accurate, relevant, timely, and complete
records which are used to make a
determination adverse to the individual,
and when an agency fails to comply
with any other provision of 5 U.S.C.
552a so as to adversely affect the
individual. The systems of records
should be exempted from this provision
to the extent that the civil remedies may
relate to provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a
from which these rules exempt the
systems of records, since there should
be no civil remedies for failure to
comply with provisions from which
SIGAR is exempted. Exemption from
this provision will also protect SIGAR
from baseless civil court actions that
might hamper its ability to collate,
analyze, and disseminate investigative,
intelligence, and law enforcement data.
(e) Specific exemptions under 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(1). (1) Under 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(1), the head of any agency may
promulgate rules to exempt any system
of records within the agency from
certain provisions of the Privacy Act to
the extent that the system contains
information subject to the provisions of
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1). This paragraph
applies to the following systems of
records maintained by SIGAR:
SIGAR–07 Hotline Records;
SIGAR–08 Investigation Records;
SIGAR–09 Legal Records.
(2) SIGAR hereby exempts the
systems of records listed in paragraph
(e)(1) of this section from the following
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a, pursuant to
5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3),
5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (2), (3), and (4), 5
U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G),
(H), and (I), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(f).
(f) Reasons for exemptions under 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(1). The reason for
invoking the exemption is to protect
material authorized to be kept secret in
the interest of national defense or
foreign policy pursuant to Executive
Orders 12958, 13526, or successor or
prior Executive Orders.
(g) Specific exemptions under 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). (1) Under 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(2), the head of any agency may
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promulgate rules to exempt any system
of records within the agency from
certain provisions of the Privacy Act of
1974 if the system is investigatory
material compiled for law enforcement
purposes and for the purposes of
assuring the safety of individuals
protected by SIGAR pursuant to the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3056. This
paragraph applies to the following
systems of records maintained by
SIGAR:
SIGAR–04 Freedom of Information
Act and Privacy Act Records;
SIGAR–05 Audit Records;
SIGAR–06 Correspondence Records;
SIGAR–07 Hotline Records;
SIGAR–08 Investigation Records;
SIGAR–09 Legal Records;
SIGAR–10 Legislative Inquiries and
Correspondence.
(2) SIGAR hereby exempts the
systems of records listed in paragraphs
(g)(1)(i) of this section from the
following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a,
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2): 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3), 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (2), (3),
(4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), 5 U.S.C.
552a(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and 5 U.S.C.
552a(f).
(h) Reasons for exemptions under 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). (1) 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3)
requires an agency to make accountings
of disclosures of a record available to
the individual named in the record
upon his or her request. The
accountings must state the date, nature,
and purpose of each disclosure of the
record and the name and address of the
recipient.
(i) The application of this provision
would impair the ability of SIGAR and
of law enforcement agencies outside
SIGAR to make effective use of
information maintained by SIGAR.
Making accountings of disclosures
available to the subjects of an
investigation would alert them to the
fact that an agency is conducting an
investigation into their illegal activities
and could reveal the geographic location
of the investigation, the nature and
purpose of that investigation, and the
dates on which that investigation was
active. Violators possessing such
knowledge would be able to take
measures to avoid detection or
apprehension by altering their
operations, by transferring their illegal
activities to other geographical areas, or
by destroying or concealing evidence
that would form the basis for detection
or apprehension. In the case of a
delinquent account, such release might
enable the subject of the investigation to
dissipate assets before levy.
(ii) Providing accountings to the
subjects of investigations would alert
them to the fact that SIGAR has
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information regarding their illegal
activities and could inform them of the
general nature of that information.
(2) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H) and
(f)(2), (3) and (5) grant individuals
access to records pertaining to them.
The application of these provisions to
the systems of records would
compromise SIGAR’s ability to utilize
and provide useful tactical and strategic
information to law enforcement
agencies.
(i) Permitting access to records
contained in the systems of records
would provide individuals with
information concerning the nature of
any current investigations and would
enable them to avoid detection or
apprehension by:
(A) Discovering the facts that would
form the basis for their detection or
apprehension;
(B) Enabling them to destroy or alter
evidence of illegal conduct that would
form the basis for their detection or
apprehension, and
(C) Using knowledge that
investigators had reason to believe that
a violation of law was about to be
committed, to delay the commission of
the violation or commit it at a location
that might not be under surveillance.
(ii) Permitting access to either ongoing or closed investigative files would
also reveal investigative techniques and
procedures, the knowledge of which
could enable individuals planning noncriminal acts to structure their
operations so as to avoid detection or
apprehension.
(iii) Permitting access to investigative
files and records could, moreover,
disclose the identity of confidential
sources and informers and the nature of
the information supplied and thereby
endanger the physical safety of those
sources by exposing them to possible
reprisals for having provided the
information. Confidential sources and
informers might refuse to provide
investigators with valuable information
unless they believed that their identities
would not be revealed through
disclosure of their names or the nature
of the information they supplied. Loss
of access to such sources would
seriously impair SIGAR’s ability to carry
out its mandate.
(iv) Furthermore, providing access to
records contained in the systems of
records could reveal the identities of
undercover law enforcement officers or
other persons who compiled
information regarding the individual’s
illegal activities and thereby endanger
the physical safety of those undercover
officers, persons, or their families by
exposing them to possible reprisals.
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38223
(v) By compromising the law
enforcement value of the systems of
records for the reasons outlined in
paragraphs (h)(2)(i) through (iv) of this
section, permitting access in keeping
with these provisions would discourage
other law enforcement and regulatory
agencies, foreign and domestic, from
freely sharing information with SIGAR
and thus would restrict SIGAR’s access
to information necessary to accomplish
its mission most effectively.
(vi) Finally, the dissemination of
certain information that SIGAR may
maintain in the systems of records is
restricted by law.
(3) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(2), (3) and (4),
(e)(4)(H), and (f)(4) permit an individual
to request amendment of a record
pertaining to him or her and require the
agency either to amend the record, or to
note the disputed portion of the record
and to provide a copy of the
individual’s statement of disagreement
with the agency’s refusal to amend a
record to persons or other agencies to
whom the record is thereafter disclosed.
Since these provisions depend on the
individual’s having access to his or her
records, and since these rules exempt
the systems of records from the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a relating to
access to records, for the reasons set out
in paragraph (h)(2) of this section, these
provisions should not apply to the
systems of records.
(4) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) requires an
agency to maintain in its records only
such information about an individual as
is relevant and necessary to accomplish
a purpose of the agency required to be
accomplished by statute or executive
order. The term ‘‘maintain,’’ as defined
in 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(3), includes
‘‘collect’’ and ‘‘disseminate.’’ The
application of this provision to the
system of records could impair SIGAR’s
ability to collect, utilize and
disseminate valuable law enforcement
information.
(i) At the time that SIGAR collects
information, it often lacks sufficient
time to determine whether the
information is relevant and necessary to
accomplish a Department purpose.
(ii) In many cases, especially in the
early stages of investigation, it may be
impossible immediately to determine
whether information collected is
relevant and necessary, and information
that initially appears irrelevant and
unnecessary often may, upon further
evaluation or upon collation with
information developed subsequently,
prove particularly relevant to a law
enforcement program.
(iii) Not all violations of law
discovered by SIGAR analysts fall
within the investigative jurisdiction of
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SIGAR. To promote effective law
enforcement, SIGAR will have to
disclose such violations to other law
enforcement agencies, including State,
local and foreign agencies that have
jurisdiction over the offenses to which
the information relates. Otherwise,
SIGAR might be placed in the position
of having to ignore information relating
to violations of law not within the
jurisdiction of SIGAR when that
information comes to SIGAR’s attention
during the collation and analysis of
information in its records.
(5) 5 U.S.C. 552a (e)(4)(G) and (f)(1)
enable individuals to inquire whether a
system of records contains records
pertaining to them. Application of these
provisions to the systems of records
would allow individuals to learn
whether they have been identified as
suspects or subjects of investigation. As
further described in the following
paragraph, access to such knowledge
would impair SIGAR’s ability to carry
out its mission, since individuals could:
(i) Take steps to avoid detection;
(ii) Inform associates that an
investigation is in progress;
(iii) Learn the nature of the
investigation;
(iv) Learn whether they are only
suspects or identified as law violators;
(v) Begin, continue, or resume illegal
conduct upon learning that they are not
identified in the system of records; or
(vi) Destroy evidence needed to prove
the violation.
(6) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(I) requires an
agency to publish a general notice
listing the categories of sources for
information contained in a system of
records. The application of this
provision to the systems of records
could compromise SIGAR’s ability to
complete or continue investigations or
to provide useful information to law
enforcement agencies, since revealing
sources for the information could:
(i) Disclose investigative techniques
and procedures;
(ii) Result in threats or reprisals
against informers by the subjects of
investigations; and
(iii) Cause informers to refuse to give
full information to investigators for fear
of having their identities as sources
disclosed.
[FR Doc. 2012–15429 Filed 6–26–12; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Examining the AD Docket
Federal Aviation Administration
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the
Docket Operations office between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this proposed AD, the
regulatory evaluation, any comments
received, and other information. The
street address for the Docket Operations
office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in
the ADDRESSES section. Comments will
be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Shahram Daneshmandi, Aerospace
Engineer, International Branch, ANM–
116, Transport Airplane Directorate,
FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton,
Washington 98057–3356; telephone
(425) 227–1112; fax (425) 227–1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2012–0672; Directorate
Identifier 2011–NM–261–AD]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Saab AB,
Saab Aerosystems Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
We propose to adopt a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
Saab AB, Saab Aerosystems Model 340A
(SAAB/SF340A) and SAAB 340B
airplanes. This proposed AD was
prompted by reports of stall events
during icing conditions which were not
accompanied with a prior stall warning.
This proposed AD would require
replacing the stall warning computer
(SWC) with a new SWC, and modifying
the airplane for the replacement of the
SWC. We are proposing this AD to
prevent natural stall events when
operating in icing conditions, which if
not corrected may result in loss of
control of the airplane.
DATES: We must receive comments on
this proposed AD by August 13, 2012.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by
any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Mail: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations,
M–30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations,
M–30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in
this proposed AD, contact Saab AB,
Saab Aerosystems, SE–581 88,
¨
Linkoping, Sweden; telephone +46 13
18 5591; fax +46 13 18 4874; email
saab2000.techsupport@saabgroup.com;
Internet https://www.saabgroup.com.
You may review copies of the
referenced service information at the
FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton,
Washington. For information on the
availability of this material at the FAA,
call 425–227–1221.
SUMMARY:
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Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written
relevant data, views, or arguments about
this proposed AD. Send your comments
to an address listed under the
ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No.
FAA–2012–0672; Directorate Identifier
2011–NM–261–AD’’ at the beginning of
your comments. We specifically invite
comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy
aspects of this proposed AD. We will
consider all comments received by the
closing date and may amend this
proposed AD based on those comments.
We will post all comments we
receive, without change, to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each
substantive verbal contact we receive
about this proposed AD.
Discussion
The European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), which is the Technical Agent
for the Member States of the European
Community, has issued EASA
Airworthiness Directive 2011–0219,
dated November 11, 2011 (referred to
after this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an
unsafe condition for the specified
products. The MCAI states:
A few natural stall events, specifically
when operating in icing conditions, have
been experienced on SAAB 340 series
aeroplanes, without receiving a prior stall
warning. This condition, if not corrected,
could result in loss of control of the
aeroplane.
To address this potential unsafe condition,
a modified stall warning system,
incorporating improved stall warning logic,
has been developed.
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Agencies
- SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 124 (Wednesday, June 27, 2012)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 38218-38224]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-15429]
========================================================================
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 124 / Wednesday, June 27, 2012 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 38218]]
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
5 CFR Part 9301
RIN 3460-AA03
Office of Privacy, Records, and Disclosure; Privacy Act of 1974;
Proposed Implementation
AGENCY: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: In accordance with the requirements of the Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) gives notice of a proposed amendment to this
part to exempt several systems of records maintained within the agency
from certain provisions of the Privacy Act.
DATES: Comments must be received no later than July 27, 2012.
ADDRESSES: Comments should be sent to Hugo Teufel, Acting General
Counsel, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2530
Crystal Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-3934. Comments will be made
available for inspection upon written request. SIGAR will make such
comments available for public inspection in the Office of Privacy,
Records, and Disclosure, 9th Floor, 1550 Crystal Drive, Arlington, VA
22202, on official business days between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.
Eastern time. You can make an appointment to inspect comments by
telephoning (703) 545-6000. All comments, including attachments and
other supporting materials, received are part of the public record and
subject to public disclosure. You should submit only information that
you wish to make available publicly.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kate Gastner, Public Information
Manager, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2530
Crystal Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-3934, (703) 545-5993.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On January 28, 2008, the President signed
into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
(Pub. L. 110-181), which created the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). SIGAR is responsible for
coordinating and conducting audits and investigations to promote
efficiency and effectiveness of reconstruction programs, and to detect
and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayers' dollars. Under 5
U.S.C. 301, heads of Executive or military departments may prescribe
regulations governing the conduct of its employees and the custody,
use, and preservation of the agency's records, papers, and property.
SIGAR is publishing separately the notices of the new systems of
records to be maintained by SIGAR.
The provisions of the Privacy Act upon which SIGAR is relying for
the exemptions are 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2). Under 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), the head of a Federal agency may promulgate rules to
exempt a system of records from certain provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a if
the system of records is ``maintained by an agency or component thereof
which performs as its principal function any activity pertaining to the
enforcement of criminal laws'', and includes information compiled for
the purpose of a criminal investigation, including reports of
informants and investigators, and associated with an identifiable
individual; and reports identifiable to an individual compiled at any
stage of the process of enforcement of the criminal laws.
To the extent that these systems of records contain investigative
material within the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), SIGAR proposes
to exempt the following systems of records from various provisions of
the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2):
SIGAR-04 Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Records;
SIGAR-05 Audit Records;
SIGAR-06 Correspondence Records;
SIGAR-07 Hotline Records;
SIGAR-08 Investigation Records;
SIGAR-09 Legal Records;
SIGAR-10 Legislative Inquiries and Correspondence.
The proposed exemption under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) for the above-
referenced systems of records is from provisions 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3),
(c)(4), (d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(4), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3),
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g).
5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G) and (f)(l) enable individuals to inquire
whether a system of records contains records pertaining to themselves.
5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H), and (f)(2), (3), and (5) grant
individuals access, or concern procedures by which an individual may
gain access, to records pertaining to themselves. 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(2),
(3), and (4), (e)(4)(H), and (f)(4) permit an individual to request
amendment of a record pertaining to the individual or concern related
procedures, and require the agency either to amend the record or to
note the disputed portion of the record, and to provide a copy of the
individual's statement of disagreement with the agency's refusal to
amend a record to persons or other agencies to whom the record is
thereafter disclosed.
5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) requires an agency to make accountings of
disclosures of a record available to the individual named in the record
upon his or her request. 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(4) requires an agency to
inform any person or other agency about any correction or notation of
dispute that the agency made in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(d) to any
record that the agency disclosed to the person or agency if an
accounting of the disclosure was made. 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(I) requires
an agency to publish a general notice listing the categories of sources
for information contained in a system of records.
5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) requires an agency to maintain in its records
only such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary
to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by
statute or Executive Order. 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(2) requires an agency to
collect information to the greatest extent practicable directly from
the subject individual when the information may result in adverse
determinations about an individual's rights, benefits, and privileges
under Federal programs. 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3) requires an agency to
inform each individual, whom it asks to supply information, of the
agency's authority for soliciting the information, whether disclosure
of information is voluntary or mandatory, the principal purpose(s) for
which the agency will use the information, the routine uses that may
[[Page 38219]]
be made of the information, and the effects on the individual of not
providing all or part of the information.
5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) requires an agency to maintain all records it
uses in making any determination about any individual with such
accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably
necessary to assure fairness to the individual in the determination. 5
U.S.C. 552a(e)(8) requires an agency to make reasonable efforts to
serve notice on an individual when the agency makes any record on the
individual available to any person under compulsory legal process, when
such process becomes a matter of public record. 5 U.S.C. 552a(g)
provides for civil remedies to an individual when an agency wrongfully
refuses to amend a record or to review a request for amendment, when an
agency wrongfully refuses to grant access to a record, when an agency
fails to maintain accurate, relevant, timely, and complete records
which are used to make a determination adverse to the individual, and
when an agency fails to comply with any other provision of 5 U.S.C.
552a so as to adversely affect the individual.
Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), the head of any agency may promulgate
rules to exempt any system of records within the agency from certain
provisions of the Privacy Act to the extent that the system contains
information subject to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1), to protect
material authorized to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy pursuant to Executive Order.
To the extent that these systems of records contain national
defense or foreign policy information within the provisions of 5 U.S.C.
55a(k)(1), SIGAR proposes to exempt the following systems of records
from various provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(1):
SIGAR-07 Hotline Records;
SIGAR-08 Investigation Records;
SIGAR-09 Legal Records.
The proposed exemption under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) for the above-
referenced systems of records is from provisions of 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3), 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (2), (3), and (4), 5 U.S.C.
552a(e)(1), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(f).
5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) requires an agency to make accountings of
disclosures of a record available to the individual named in the record
upon his or her request. 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H), and (f)(2),
(3), and (5) grant individuals access, or concern procedures by which
an individual may gain access, to records pertaining to them. 5 U.S.C.
552a(d)(2), (3), and (4), (e)(4)(H), and (f)(4) permit an individual to
request amendment of a record pertaining to the individual or concern
related procedures, and require the agency either to amend the record
or to note the disputed portion of the record, and to provide a copy of
the individual's statement of disagreement with the agency's refusal to
amend a record to persons or other agencies to whom the record is
thereafter disclosed.
5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) requires an agency to maintain in its records
only such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary
to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by
statute or Executive Order. 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G) and (f)(1) enable
individuals to inquire whether a system of records contains records
pertaining to them. Application of these provisions to the above-
referenced systems of records could allow individuals to learn whether
they have been identified as subjects of investigation. 5 U.S.C.
552a(e)(4)(I) requires an agency to publish a general notice listing
the categories of sources for information contained in a system of
records.
Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), the head of a Federal agency may
promulgate rules to exempt a system of records from certain provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 552a if the system of records is ``investigatory material
compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than material within the
scope of subsection (j)(2).'' To the extent that these systems of
records contain investigative material within the provisions of 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), SIGAR proposes to exempt the following systems of
records from various provisions of the Privacy Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(2):
SIGAR-04 Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Records;
SIGAR-05 Audit Records;
SIGAR-06 Correspondence Records;
SIGAR-07 Hotline Records;
SIGAR-08 Investigation Records;
SIGAR-09 Legal Records;
SIGAR-10 Legislative Inquiries and Correspondence.
The proposed exemption under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) for the above-
referenced systems of records is from provisions 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3),
(d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(4), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H),
(e)(4)(I), and (f).
5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) requires an agency to make accountings of
disclosures of a record available to the individual named in the record
upon his or her request. 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H), and (f)(2),
(3), and (5) grant individuals access, or concern procedures by which
an individual may gain access, to records pertaining to them. 5 U.S.C.
552a(d)(2), (3), and (4), (e)(4)(H), and (f)(4) permit an individual to
request amendment of a record pertaining to the individual or concern-
related procedures, and require the agency either to amend the record
or to note the disputed portion of the record, and to provide a copy of
the individual's statement of disagreement with the agency's refusal to
amend a record to persons or other agencies to whom the record is
thereafter disclosed.
5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) requires an agency to maintain in its records
only such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary
to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by
statute or Executive Order. 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G) and (f)(1) enable
individuals to inquire whether a system of records contains records
pertaining to them. Application of these provisions to the above-
referenced systems of records could allow individuals to learn whether
they have been identified as subjects of investigation. 5 U.S.C.
552a(e)(4)(I) requires an agency to publish a general notice listing
the categories of sources for information contained in a system of
records.
Any information from a system of records for which an exemption is
claimed under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) or (k) which is also included in another
system of records retains the same exempt status such information has
in the system for which such exemption is claimed.
This proposed rule is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under
Executive Order 12866.
Pursuant to the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601-612, it is hereby certified that this rule will not
have significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The term ``small entity'' is defined to have the same meaning
as the terms ``small business,'' ``small organization'' and ``small
governmental jurisdiction'' as defined in the RFA.
The proposed regulation, issued under section 522a(j)(2) and (k) of
the Privacy Act, is to exempt certain information maintained by SIGAR
in the above systems of records from notification, access and amendment
of a record by individuals who are citizens of the United States or
aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. In as much as the
Privacy Act rights are personal and apply only to U.S. citizens or an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, small entities, as
defined in the RFA, are not provided
[[Page 38220]]
rights under the Privacy Act and are outside the scope of this
regulation.
Dated: June 19, 2012.
Steven J. Trent,
Acting Inspector General.
List of Subjects in 5 CFR Part 9301
Administrative practice and procedure, Freedom of information,
Privacy.
For the reasons set forth above, SIGAR proposes to amend 5 CFR part
9301 as follows:
PART 9301--DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS AND INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for part 9301 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat.
1896, codified at 5 U.S.C. 552a(f) (agency rules).
2. Add Sec. 9301.20 to subpart B to read as follows:
Sec. 9301.20 Systems exempt in whole or in part from provisions of 5
U.S.C. 552a and this part.
(a) In General. In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k), SIGAR
hereby exempts the systems of records identified below from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act for the reasons indicated.
(b) Authority. These rules are promulgated pursuant to the
authority vested in the Special Inspector General by 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)
and (k).
(c) General exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). (1) Under 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), the head of any agency may promulgate rules to
exempt any system of records within the agency from certain provisions
of the Privacy Act of 1974 if the agency or component thereof that
maintains the system performs as its principal function any activities
pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws. Certain components of
SIGAR have as their principal function activities pertaining to the
enforcement of criminal laws and protective service activities which
are necessary to assure the safety of individuals protected by SIGAR
pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3056. This paragraph applies to
the following systems of records maintained by SIGAR:
SIGAR-04 Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Records;
SIGAR-05 Audit Records;
SIGAR-06 Correspondence Records;
SIGAR-07 Hotline Records;
SIGAR-08 Investigation Records;
SIGAR-09 Legal Records;
SIGAR-10 Legislative Inquiries and Correspondence.
(2) SIGAR hereby exempts the systems of records listed in
paragraphs (c)(1)(i) of this section from the following provisions of 5
U.S.C. 552a, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and
(4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (2), (3), (4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), (2) and
(3), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) and (8),
5 U.S.C. 552a(f), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(g).
(d) Reasons for exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). (1) 5 U.S.C.
552a(e)(4)(G) and (f)(l) enable individuals to inquire whether a system
of records contains records pertaining to them. Application of these
provisions to the systems of records would give individuals an
opportunity to learn whether they have been identified as suspects or
subjects of investigation. As further described in (d)(2) of this
section, access to such knowledge would impair SIGAR's ability to carry
out its mission, since individuals could:
(i) Take steps to avoid detection;
(ii) Inform associates that an investigation is in progress;
(iii) Learn the nature of the investigation;
(iv) Learn whether they are only suspects or identified as law
violators;
(v) Begin, continue, or resume illegal conduct upon learning that
they are not identified in the system of records; or
(vi) Destroy evidence needed to prove the violation.
(2) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H) and (f)(2), (3) and (5) grant
individuals access to records pertaining to them. The application of
these provisions to the systems of records would compromise SIGAR's
ability to provide useful tactical and strategic information to law
enforcement agencies.
(i) Permitting access to records contained in the systems of
records would provide individuals with information concerning the
nature of any current investigations and would enable them to avoid
detection or apprehension by:
(A) Discovering the facts that would form the basis for their
arrest;
(B) Enabling them to destroy or alter evidence of criminal conduct
that would form the basis for their arrest; and
(C) Using knowledge that criminal investigators had reason to
believe that a crime was about to be committed, to delay the commission
of the crime or commit it at a location that might not be under
surveillance.
(ii) Permitting access to either on-going or closed investigative
files would also reveal investigative techniques and procedures, the
knowledge of which could enable individuals planning crimes to
structure their operations so as to avoid detection or apprehension.
(iii) Permitting access to investigative files and records could,
moreover, disclose the identity of confidential sources and informers
and the nature of the information supplied and thereby endanger the
physical safety of those sources by exposing them to possible reprisals
for having provided the information. Confidential sources and informers
might refuse to provide criminal investigators with valuable
information unless they believed that their identities would not be
revealed through disclosure of their names or the nature of the
information they supplied. Loss of access to such sources would
seriously impair SIGAR's ability to carry out its mandate.
(iv) Furthermore, providing access to records contained in the
systems of records could reveal the identities of undercover law
enforcement officers who compiled information regarding the
individual's criminal activities and thereby endanger the physical
safety of those undercover officers or their families by exposing them
to possible reprisals.
(v) By compromising the law enforcement value of the systems of
records for the reasons outlined in paragraphs (d)(2)(i) through (iv)
of this section, permitting access in keeping with these provisions
would discourage other law enforcement and regulatory agencies, foreign
and domestic, from freely sharing information with SIGAR and thus would
restrict SIGAR's access to information necessary to accomplish its
mission most effectively.
(vi) Limitation on access to the material contained in the
protective intelligence files is considered necessary to the
preservation of the utility of intelligence files and in safeguarding
those persons SIGAR is authorized to protect. Access to the protective
intelligence files could adversely affect the quality of information
available to SIGAR; compromise confidential sources, hinder the ability
of SIGAR to keep track of persons of protective interest; and interfere
with SIGAR's protective intelligence activities by individuals gaining
access to protective intelligence files.
(vii) Many of the persons on whom records are maintained in the
protective intelligence suffer from mental aberrations. Knowledge of
their condition and progress comes from authorities, family members and
witnesses. Many times this information comes to SIGAR as a result of
two party conversations where it would be impossible to hide the
identity of informants. Sources of information must be developed,
questions asked and
[[Page 38221]]
answers recorded. Trust must be extended and guarantees of
confidentiality and anonymity must be maintained. Allowing access to
information of this kind to individuals who are the subjects of
protective interest may well lead to violence directed against an
informant by a mentally disturbed individual.
(viii) Finally, the dissemination of certain information that SIGAR
may maintain in the systems of records is restricted by law.
(3) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(2), (3) and (4), (e)(4)(H), and (f)(4) permit
an individual to request amendment of a record pertaining to him or her
and require the agency either to amend the record, or to note the
disputed portion of the record and to provide a copy of the
individual's statement of disagreement with the agency's refusal to
amend a record to persons or other agencies to whom the record is
thereafter disclosed. Since these provisions depend on the individual's
having access to his or her records, and since these rules exempt the
systems of records from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a relating to
access to records, for the reasons set out in paragraph (d)(2) of this
section, these provisions should not apply to the systems of records.
(4) 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) requires an agency to make accountings of
disclosures of a record available to the individual named in the record
upon his or her request. The accountings must state the date, nature,
and purpose of each disclosure of the record and the name and address
of the recipient.
(i) The application of this provision would impair the ability of
law enforcement agencies outside SIGAR to make effective use of
information provided by SIGAR. Making accountings of disclosures
available to the subjects of an investigation would alert them to the
fact that another agency is conducting an investigation into their
criminal activities and could reveal the geographic location of the
other agency's investigation, the nature and purpose of that
investigation, and the dates on which that investigation was active.
Violators possessing such knowledge would be able to take measures to
avoid detection or apprehension by altering their operations, by
transferring their criminal activities to other geographical areas, or
by destroying or concealing evidence that would form the basis for
arrest. In the case of a delinquent account, such release might enable
the subject of the investigation to dissipate assets before levy.
(ii) Moreover, providing accountings to the subjects of
investigations would alert them to the fact that SIGAR has information
regarding their criminal activities and could inform them of the
general nature of that information. Access to such information could
reveal the operation of SIGAR's information-gathering and analysis
systems and permit violators to take steps to avoid detection or
apprehension.
(iii) The release of such information to the subject of a
protective intelligence file would provide significant information
concerning the nature of an investigation, and could result in impeding
or compromising the efforts of Department personnel to detect persons
suspected of criminal activities or to collect information necessary
for the proper evaluation of persons considered to be of protective
interest.
(5) 5 U.S.C. 552(c)(4) requires an agency to inform any person or
other agency about any correction or notation of dispute that the
agency made in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(d) to any record that the
agency disclosed to the person or agency if an accounting of the
disclosure was made. Since this provision depends on an individual's
having access to and an opportunity to request amendment of records
pertaining to him or her, and since these rules exempt the systems of
records from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a relating to access to and
amendment of records, for the reasons set out in paragraph (f)(3) of
this section, this provision should not apply to the systems of
records.
(6) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(I) requires an agency to publish a general
notice listing the categories of sources for information contained in a
system of records. The application of this provision to the systems of
records could compromise SIGAR's ability to provide useful information
to law enforcement agencies, since revealing sources for the
information could:
(i) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures;
(ii) Result in threats or reprisals against informers by the
subjects of investigations; and
(iii) Cause informers to refuse to give full information to
criminal investigators for fear of having their identities as sources
disclosed.
(7) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) requires an agency to maintain in its
records only such information about an individual as is relevant and
necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be
accomplished by statute or executive order. The term ``maintain,'' as
defined in 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(3), includes ``collect'' and
``disseminate.'' The application of this provision to the systems of
records could impair SIGAR's ability to collect and disseminate
valuable law enforcement information.
(i) At the time that SIGAR collects information, it often lacks
sufficient time to determine whether the information is relevant and
necessary to accomplish a SIGAR purpose.
(ii) In many cases, especially in the early stages of
investigation, it may be impossible to immediately determine whether
information collected is relevant and necessary, and information that
initially appears irrelevant and unnecessary often may, upon further
evaluation or upon collation with information developed subsequently,
prove particularly relevant to a law enforcement program.
(iii) Compliance with the records maintenance criteria listed in
the foregoing provision would require the periodic up-dating of SIGAR's
protective intelligence files to insure that the records maintained in
the system remain timely and complete.
(iv) Not all violations of law discovered by SIGAR fall within the
investigative jurisdiction of SIGAR. To promote effective law
enforcement, SIGAR will have to disclose such violations to other law
enforcement agencies, including State, local and foreign agencies, that
have jurisdiction over the offenses to which the information relates.
Otherwise, SIGAR might be placed in the position of having to ignore
information relating to violations of law not within the jurisdiction
of SIGAR when that information comes to SIGAR's attention during the
collation and analysis of information in its records.
(8) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(2) requires an agency to collect information
to the greatest extent practicable directly from the subject individual
when the information may result in adverse determinations about an
individual's rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs.
The application of this provision to the systems of records would
impair SIGAR's ability to collate, analyze, and disseminate
investigative, intelligence, and enforcement information.
(i) Most information collected about an individual under criminal
investigation is obtained from third parties, such as witnesses and
informants. It is usually not feasible to rely upon the subject of the
investigation as a source for information regarding his criminal
activities.
(ii) An attempt to obtain information from the subject of a
criminal investigation will often alert that individual to the
existence of an investigation, thereby affording the
[[Page 38222]]
individual an opportunity to attempt to conceal his criminal activities
so as to avoid apprehension.
(iii) In certain instances, the subject of a criminal investigation
is not required to supply information to criminal investigators as a
matter of legal duty.
(iv) During criminal investigations it is often a matter of sound
investigative procedure to obtain information from a variety of sources
to verify information already obtained.
(9) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3) requires an agency to inform each
individual whom it asks to supply information, on the form that it uses
to collect the information or on a separate form that the individual
can retain, of the agency's authority for soliciting the information;
whether disclosure of information is voluntary or mandatory; the
principal purposes for which the agency will use the information; the
routine uses that may be made of the information; and the effects on
the individual of not providing all or part of the information. The
systems of records should be exempted from this provision to avoid
impairing SIGAR's ability to collect and collate investigative,
intelligence, and enforcement data.
(i) Confidential sources or undercover law enforcement officers
often obtain information under circumstances in which it is necessary
to keep the true purpose of their actions secret so as not to let the
subject of the investigation or his or her associates know that a
criminal investigation is in progress.
(ii) If it became known that the undercover officer was assisting
in a criminal investigation, that officer's physical safety could be
endangered through reprisal, and that officer may not be able to
continue working on the investigation.
(iii) Individuals often feel inhibited in talking to a person
representing a criminal law enforcement agency but are willing to talk
to a confidential source or undercover officer whom they believe not to
be involved in law enforcement activities.
(iv) Providing a confidential source of information with written
evidence that he or she was a source, as required by this provision,
could increase the likelihood that the source of information would be
subject to retaliation by the subject of the investigation.
(v) Individuals may be contacted during preliminary information
gathering, surveys, or compliance projects concerning the
administration of the internal revenue laws before any individual is
identified as the subject of an investigation. Informing the individual
of the matters required by this provision would impede or compromise
subsequent investigations.
(vi) Finally, application of this provision could result in an
unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of the subject of the
criminal investigation, particularly where further investigation
reveals that the subject was not involved in any criminal activity.
(10) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) requires an agency to maintain all records
it uses in making any determination about any individual with such
accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably
necessary to assure fairness to the individual in the determination.
(i) Since 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(3) defines ``maintain'' to include
``collect'' and ``disseminate,'' application of this provision to the
systems of records would hinder the initial collection of any
information that could not, at the moment of collection, be determined
to be accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Similarly, application
of this provision would seriously restrict SIGAR's ability to
disseminate information pertaining to a possible violation of law to
law enforcement and regulatory agencies. In collecting information
during a criminal investigation, it is often impossible or unfeasible
to determine accuracy, relevance, timeliness, or completeness prior to
collection of the information. In disseminating information to law
enforcement and regulatory agencies, it is often impossible to
determine accuracy, relevance, timeliness, or completeness prior to
dissemination, because SIGAR may not have the expertise with which to
make such determinations.
(ii) Information that may initially appear inaccurate, irrelevant,
untimely, or incomplete may, when collated and analyzed with other
available information, become more pertinent as an investigation
progresses. In addition, application of this provision could seriously
impede criminal investigators and intelligence analysts in the exercise
of their judgment in reporting results obtained during criminal
investigations.
(iii) Compliance with the records maintenance criteria listed in
the foregoing provision would require the periodic up-dating of SIGAR's
protective intelligence files to insure that the records maintained in
the system remain timely and complete.
(11) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(8) requires an agency to make reasonable
efforts to serve notice on an individual when the agency makes any
record on the individual available to any person under compulsory legal
process, when such process becomes a matter of public record. The
systems of records should be exempted from this provision to avoid
revealing investigative techniques and procedures outlined in those
records and to prevent revelation of the existence of an ongoing
investigation where there is need to keep the existence of the
investigation secret.
(12) 5 U.S.C. 552a(g) provides for civil remedies to an individual
when an agency wrongfully refuses to amend a record or to review a
request for amendment, when an agency wrongfully refuses to grant
access to a record, when an agency fails to maintain accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete records which are used to make a
determination adverse to the individual, and when an agency fails to
comply with any other provision of 5 U.S.C. 552a so as to adversely
affect the individual. The systems of records should be exempted from
this provision to the extent that the civil remedies may relate to
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a from which these rules exempt the systems
of records, since there should be no civil remedies for failure to
comply with provisions from which SIGAR is exempted. Exemption from
this provision will also protect SIGAR from baseless civil court
actions that might hamper its ability to collate, analyze, and
disseminate investigative, intelligence, and law enforcement data.
(e) Specific exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1). (1) Under 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), the head of any agency may promulgate rules to
exempt any system of records within the agency from certain provisions
of the Privacy Act to the extent that the system contains information
subject to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1). This paragraph applies
to the following systems of records maintained by SIGAR:
SIGAR-07 Hotline Records;
SIGAR-08 Investigation Records;
SIGAR-09 Legal Records.
(2) SIGAR hereby exempts the systems of records listed in paragraph
(e)(1) of this section from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a,
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), 5 U.S.C.
552a(d)(1), (2), (3), and (4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), 5 U.S.C.
552a(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(f).
(f) Reasons for exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1). The reason
for invoking the exemption is to protect material authorized to be kept
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy pursuant
to Executive Orders 12958, 13526, or successor or prior Executive
Orders.
(g) Specific exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). (1) Under 5
U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), the head of any agency may
[[Page 38223]]
promulgate rules to exempt any system of records within the agency from
certain provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 if the system is
investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes and for
the purposes of assuring the safety of individuals protected by SIGAR
pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3056. This paragraph applies to
the following systems of records maintained by SIGAR:
SIGAR-04 Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Records;
SIGAR-05 Audit Records;
SIGAR-06 Correspondence Records;
SIGAR-07 Hotline Records;
SIGAR-08 Investigation Records;
SIGAR-09 Legal Records;
SIGAR-10 Legislative Inquiries and Correspondence.
(2) SIGAR hereby exempts the systems of records listed in
paragraphs (g)(1)(i) of this section from the following provisions of 5
U.S.C. 552a, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), 5
U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (2), (3), (4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), 5 U.S.C.
552a(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(f).
(h) Reasons for exemptions under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). (1) 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3) requires an agency to make accountings of disclosures of a
record available to the individual named in the record upon his or her
request. The accountings must state the date, nature, and purpose of
each disclosure of the record and the name and address of the
recipient.
(i) The application of this provision would impair the ability of
SIGAR and of law enforcement agencies outside SIGAR to make effective
use of information maintained by SIGAR. Making accountings of
disclosures available to the subjects of an investigation would alert
them to the fact that an agency is conducting an investigation into
their illegal activities and could reveal the geographic location of
the investigation, the nature and purpose of that investigation, and
the dates on which that investigation was active. Violators possessing
such knowledge would be able to take measures to avoid detection or
apprehension by altering their operations, by transferring their
illegal activities to other geographical areas, or by destroying or
concealing evidence that would form the basis for detection or
apprehension. In the case of a delinquent account, such release might
enable the subject of the investigation to dissipate assets before
levy.
(ii) Providing accountings to the subjects of investigations would
alert them to the fact that SIGAR has information regarding their
illegal activities and could inform them of the general nature of that
information.
(2) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H) and (f)(2), (3) and (5) grant
individuals access to records pertaining to them. The application of
these provisions to the systems of records would compromise SIGAR's
ability to utilize and provide useful tactical and strategic
information to law enforcement agencies.
(i) Permitting access to records contained in the systems of
records would provide individuals with information concerning the
nature of any current investigations and would enable them to avoid
detection or apprehension by:
(A) Discovering the facts that would form the basis for their
detection or apprehension;
(B) Enabling them to destroy or alter evidence of illegal conduct
that would form the basis for their detection or apprehension, and
(C) Using knowledge that investigators had reason to believe that a
violation of law was about to be committed, to delay the commission of
the violation or commit it at a location that might not be under
surveillance.
(ii) Permitting access to either on-going or closed investigative
files would also reveal investigative techniques and procedures, the
knowledge of which could enable individuals planning non-criminal acts
to structure their operations so as to avoid detection or apprehension.
(iii) Permitting access to investigative files and records could,
moreover, disclose the identity of confidential sources and informers
and the nature of the information supplied and thereby endanger the
physical safety of those sources by exposing them to possible reprisals
for having provided the information. Confidential sources and informers
might refuse to provide investigators with valuable information unless
they believed that their identities would not be revealed through
disclosure of their names or the nature of the information they
supplied. Loss of access to such sources would seriously impair SIGAR's
ability to carry out its mandate.
(iv) Furthermore, providing access to records contained in the
systems of records could reveal the identities of undercover law
enforcement officers or other persons who compiled information
regarding the individual's illegal activities and thereby endanger the
physical safety of those undercover officers, persons, or their
families by exposing them to possible reprisals.
(v) By compromising the law enforcement value of the systems of
records for the reasons outlined in paragraphs (h)(2)(i) through (iv)
of this section, permitting access in keeping with these provisions
would discourage other law enforcement and regulatory agencies, foreign
and domestic, from freely sharing information with SIGAR and thus would
restrict SIGAR's access to information necessary to accomplish its
mission most effectively.
(vi) Finally, the dissemination of certain information that SIGAR
may maintain in the systems of records is restricted by law.
(3) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(2), (3) and (4), (e)(4)(H), and (f)(4) permit
an individual to request amendment of a record pertaining to him or her
and require the agency either to amend the record, or to note the
disputed portion of the record and to provide a copy of the
individual's statement of disagreement with the agency's refusal to
amend a record to persons or other agencies to whom the record is
thereafter disclosed. Since these provisions depend on the individual's
having access to his or her records, and since these rules exempt the
systems of records from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a relating to
access to records, for the reasons set out in paragraph (h)(2) of this
section, these provisions should not apply to the systems of records.
(4) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) requires an agency to maintain in its
records only such information about an individual as is relevant and
necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be
accomplished by statute or executive order. The term ``maintain,'' as
defined in 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(3), includes ``collect'' and
``disseminate.'' The application of this provision to the system of
records could impair SIGAR's ability to collect, utilize and
disseminate valuable law enforcement information.
(i) At the time that SIGAR collects information, it often lacks
sufficient time to determine whether the information is relevant and
necessary to accomplish a Department purpose.
(ii) In many cases, especially in the early stages of
investigation, it may be impossible immediately to determine whether
information collected is relevant and necessary, and information that
initially appears irrelevant and unnecessary often may, upon further
evaluation or upon collation with information developed subsequently,
prove particularly relevant to a law enforcement program.
(iii) Not all violations of law discovered by SIGAR analysts fall
within the investigative jurisdiction of
[[Page 38224]]
SIGAR. To promote effective law enforcement, SIGAR will have to
disclose such violations to other law enforcement agencies, including
State, local and foreign agencies that have jurisdiction over the
offenses to which the information relates. Otherwise, SIGAR might be
placed in the position of having to ignore information relating to
violations of law not within the jurisdiction of SIGAR when that
information comes to SIGAR's attention during the collation and
analysis of information in its records.
(5) 5 U.S.C. 552a (e)(4)(G) and (f)(1) enable individuals to
inquire whether a system of records contains records pertaining to
them. Application of these provisions to the systems of records would
allow individuals to learn whether they have been identified as
suspects or subjects of investigation. As further described in the
following paragraph, access to such knowledge would impair SIGAR's
ability to carry out its mission, since individuals could:
(i) Take steps to avoid detection;
(ii) Inform associates that an investigation is in progress;
(iii) Learn the nature of the investigation;
(iv) Learn whether they are only suspects or identified as law
violators;
(v) Begin, continue, or resume illegal conduct upon learning that
they are not identified in the system of records; or (vi) Destroy
evidence needed to prove the violation.
(6) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(I) requires an agency to publish a general
notice listing the categories of sources for information contained in a
system of records. The application of this provision to the systems of
records could compromise SIGAR's ability to complete or continue
investigations or to provide useful information to law enforcement
agencies, since revealing sources for the information could:
(i) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures;
(ii) Result in threats or reprisals against informers by the
subjects of investigations; and
(iii) Cause informers to refuse to give full information to
investigators for fear of having their identities as sources disclosed.
[FR Doc. 2012-15429 Filed 6-26-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3710-L9-P