Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations, 31655-31676 [2012-12687]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 103 (Tuesday, May 29, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31655-31676]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-12687]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2012-0116]


Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility 
Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant 
Hazards Considerations

Background

    Pursuant to Section 189a.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the 
Commission or NRC) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. The Act 
requires the Commission publish notice of any amendments issued, or 
proposed to be issued and grants the Commission the authority to issue 
and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license or 
combined license, as applicable, upon a determination by the Commission 
that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, 
notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a 
hearing from any person.
    This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or 
proposed to be issued from May 16 to May 29, 2012. The last biweekly 
notice was published on May 15, 2012 (77 FR 28626).

ADDRESSES: You may access information and comment submissions related 
to this document, which the NRC possesses and are publicly available, 
by searching on https://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2012-
0116. You may submit comments by the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0116. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-492-
3668; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.
     Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Chief, Rules, 
Announcements, and Directives Branch (RADB), Office of Administration, 
Mail Stop: TWB-05-B01M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555-0001.
     Fax comments to: RADB at 301-492-3446.
    For additional direction on accessing information and submitting 
comments, see ``Accessing Information and Submitting Comments'' in the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments

A. Accessing Information

    Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2012-0116 when contacting the NRC 
about the availability of information regarding this document. You may 
access information related to this document, which the NRC possesses 
and is publicly available, by the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0116.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC 
Library at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the 
search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-
based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's 
Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. Documents may be viewed in 
ADAMS by performing a search on the document date and docket number.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

B. Submitting Comments

    Please include Docket ID NRC-2012-0116 in the subject line of your 
comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make 
your comment submission available to the public in this docket.
    The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact 
information in comment submissions that you do not want to be publicly 
disclosed. The NRC posts all comment submissions at https://www.regulations.gov as well as entering the comment submissions into 
ADAMS, and the NRC does not edit comment submissions to remove 
identifying or contact information.
    If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons 
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to 
include identifying or contact information in

[[Page 31656]]

their comment submissions that they do not want to be publicly 
disclosed. Your request should state that the NRC will not edit comment 
submissions to remove such information before making the comment 
submissions available to the public or entering the comment submissions 
into ADAMS.

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating 
Licenses and Combined Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards 
Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following 
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under 
the Commission's regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR) 50.92, this means that operation of the facility 
in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) Involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis 
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown 
below.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The 
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment 
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the 
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day 
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, 
for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the 
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment 
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a 
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination; any hearing will take place after 
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will 
occur very infrequently.
    Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, any 
person(s) whose interest may be affected by this action may file a 
request for a hearing and a petition to intervene with respect to 
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license or 
combined license. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of 
Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. 
Interested person(s) should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, 
which is available at the NRC's PDR, located at One White Flint North, 
Room O1-F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland 
20852. The NRC regulations are accessible electronically from the NRC 
Library on the NRC's Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to 
intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or a presiding 
officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative 
Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the 
request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative 
Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone 
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the 
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the 
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's 
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the 
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the 
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must 
also identify the specific contentions which the requestor/petitioner 
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
    Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue 
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the 
requestor/petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for 
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert 
opinion which support the contention and on which the requestor/
petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. 
The requestor/petitioner must also provide references to those specific 
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the 
requestor/petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert 
opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that 
a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law 
or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of 
the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if 
proven, would entitle the requestor/petitioner to relief. A requestor/
petitioner who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at 
least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If 
the final determination is that the amendment request involves no 
significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment 
request involves a significant hazards consideration, then any hearing 
held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.
    All documents filed in the NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including 
a request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or 
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a 
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by 
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c), 
must be filed in accordance with the NRC's E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139, 
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit 
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some 
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not 
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in 
accordance with the procedures described below.
    To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10

[[Page 31657]]

days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the 
Office of the Secretary by email at hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by 
telephone at 301-415-1677, to request (1) a digital identification (ID) 
certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or 
representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal 
server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise 
the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a request or 
petition for hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or 
its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID 
certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish 
an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the 
Secretary has not already established an electronic docket.
    Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is 
available on the NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing 
the E-Submittal server are detailed in the NRC's ``Guidance for 
Electronic Submission,'' which is available on the agency's public Web 
site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants 
may attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but 
should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted 
software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer 
assistance in using unlisted software.
    If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC 
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the 
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to 
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System, 
users will be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC's 
Web site. Further information on the Web-based submission form, 
including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on 
the NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
    Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a 
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for 
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in 
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with the NRC guidance 
available on the NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the 
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be 
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system 
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of 
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends 
the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The 
E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access 
to the document to the NRC's Office of the General Counsel and any 
others who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to 
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the 
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and 
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for 
and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition 
to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document 
via the E-Filing system.
    A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System 
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site 
at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email at 
MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a toll-free call at 1-866-672-7640. The 
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., 
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
    Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not 
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in 
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing 
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper 
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail 
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: 
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or 
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth 
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. 
Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for 
serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered 
complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or 
by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing 
the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, 
having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a 
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer 
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from 
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
    Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the 
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at 
https://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the 
Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to 
include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers, 
home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC 
regulation or other law requires submission of such information. With 
respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve 
the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use 
application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted 
materials in their submission.
    Petitions for leave to intervene must be filed no later than 60 
days from the date of publication of this notice. Non-timely filings 
will not be entertained absent a determination by the presiding officer 
that the petition or request should be granted or the contentions 
should be admitted, based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10 
CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii).
    For further details with respect to this license amendment 
application, see the application for amendment which is available for 
public inspection at the NRC's PDR, located at One White Flint North, 
Room O1-F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland 
20852. Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are 
accessible electronically through ADAMS in the NRC Library at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have access to 
ADAMS or who encounter problems in accessing the documents located in 
ADAMS, should contact the NRC's PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 
301-415-4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov.

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Docket No. 50-423, Millstone Power 
Station, Unit 3, New London County, Connecticut

    Date of amendment request: April 2, 2012.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise the Millstone Power Station, Unit 3 (MPS3) Technical 
Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirements (SRs) for snubbers to 
conform to the MPS3

[[Page 31658]]

Snubber Examination, Testing, and Service Life Monitoring Program Plan.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR) 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis 
of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is 
presented below:

Criterion 1

    Will operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed 
change involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes revise TS SR 4.7.10 to conform the TSs to 
the revised snubber program. Snubber examination, testing and 
service life monitoring will continue to meet the requirements of 10 
CFR 50.55a(g) except where the NRC has granted specific written 
relief, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i), or authorized 
alternatives pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3).
    Snubber examination, testing and service life monitoring is not 
an initiator of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the 
probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly 
increased.
    Snubbers will continue to be demonstrated operable by 
performance of a program for examination, testing and service life 
monitoring in compliance with 10 CFR 50.55a or authorized 
alternatives. The proposed change to TS ACTION 3.7.10 for inoperable 
snubbers is administrative in nature and is required for consistency 
with the proposed change to TS SR 4.7.10. Therefore, the proposed 
changes do not adversely affect plant operations, design functions 
or analyses that verify the capability of systems, structures, and 
components to perform their design functions. The consequences of 
accidents previously evaluated are not significantly increased.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.

Criterion 2

    Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed 
change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes do not involve any physical alteration of 
plant equipment. The proposed changes do not change the method by 
which any safety-related system performs its function. As such, no 
new or different types of equipment will be installed, and the basic 
operation of installed equipment is unchanged. The methods governing 
plant operation and testing remain consistent with current safety 
analysis assumptions.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3

    Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed 
change involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes ensure snubber examination, testing and 
service life monitoring will continue to meet the requirements of 10 
CFR 50.55a(g) except where the NRC has granted specific written 
relief, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i), or authorized 
alternatives pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3). Snubbers will continue 
to be demonstrated operable by performance of a program for 
examination, testing and service life monitoring in compliance with 
10 CFR 50.55a or authorized alternatives. The proposed change to TS 
ACTION 3.7.10 for inoperable snubbers is administrative in nature 
and is required for consistency with the proposed change to TS SR 
4.7.10.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Senior Counsel, Dominion 
Resources Services, Inc., 120 Tredegar Street, RS-2, Richmond, VA 
23219.
    NRC Branch Chief: George A. Wilson.

Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Docket No. 50-423, Millstone Power 
Station, Unit 3, New London County, Connecticut

    Date of amendment request: April 12, 2012.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
permanently revise Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.4.g, ``Steam 
Generator (SG) Program,'' to exclude a portion of the steam generator 
tubes below the top of the steam generator tubesheet from periodic 
inspections. Inclusion of the permanent alternate repair criteria 
(PARC) in TS 6.8.4.g permits deletion of the previous temporary 
alternate repair criteria (TARC) for Cycle 15. In addition, this 
amendment request also proposes to revise the reporting criteria in TS 
6.9.1.7, ``Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report,'' to remove 
reference to the previous Cycle 15 TARC, and add reporting requirements 
specific to the PARC.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The previously analyzed accidents are initiated by the failure 
of plant structures, systems, or components. The proposed change 
that alters the steam generator inspection criteria and the steam 
generator inspection reporting criteria does not have a detrimental 
impact on the integrity of any plant structure, system, or component 
that initiates an analyzed event. The proposed change will not alter 
the operation of, or otherwise increase the failure probability of 
any plant equipment that initiates an analyzed accident.
    Of the applicable accidents previously evaluated, the limiting 
transients with consideration to the proposed change to the steam 
generator tube inspection and repair criteria are the steam 
generator tube rupture (SGTR) event and the feedline break (FLB) 
postulated accidents.
    During the SGTR event, the required structural integrity margins 
of the steam generator tubes and the tube-to-tubesheet joint over 
the H* distance will be maintained. Tube rupture in tubes with 
cracks within the tubesheet is precluded by the constraint provided 
by the tube-to-tubesheet joint. This constraint results from the 
hydraulic expansion process, thermal expansion mismatch between the 
tube and tubesheet, and from the differential pressure between the 
primary and secondary side. Based on this design, the structural 
margins against burst, as discussed in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.121, 
``Bases for Plugging Degraded PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor] Steam 
Generator Tubes,'' (Reference 25) are maintained for both normal and 
postulated accident conditions.
    The proposed change has no impact on the structural or leakage 
integrity of the portion of the tube outside of the tubesheet. The 
proposed change maintains structural integrity of the steam 
generator tubes and does not affect other systems, structures, 
components, or operational features. Therefore, the proposed change 
results in no significant increase in the probability of the 
occurrence of a[n] SGTR accident.
    At normal operating pressures, leakage from primary water stress 
corrosion cracking below the proposed limited inspection depth is 
limited by both the tube-to-tubesheet crevice and the limited crack 
opening permitted by the tubesheet constraint. Consequently, 
negligible normal operating leakage is expected from cracks within 
the tubesheet region. The consequences of an SGTR event are affected 
by the primary-to-secondary leakage flow during the event. However, 
primary-to-secondary leakage flow through a postulated broken tube 
is not affected by the proposed changes since the tubesheet enhances 
the tube integrity in the region of the hydraulic expansion by 
precluding tube deformation beyond its initial hydraulically 
expanded outside diameter. Therefore, the proposed changes do not 
result in a significant increase in the consequences of a[n] SGTR.
    The consequences of a steam line break (SLB) are also not 
significantly affected by

[[Page 31659]]

the proposed changes. During a[n] SLB accident, the reduction in 
pressure above the tubesheet on the shell side of the steam 
generator creates an axially uniformly distributed load on the 
tubesheet due to the reactor coolant system pressure on the 
underside of the tubesheet. The resulting bending action constrains 
the tubes in the tubesheet thereby restricting primary-to-secondary 
leakage below the mid-plane.
    Primary-to-secondary leakage from tube degradation in the 
tubesheet area during the limiting accident (i.e., a[n] SLB) is 
limited by flow restrictions. These restrictions result from the 
crack and tube-to-tubesheet contact pressures that provide a 
restricted leakage path above the indications and also limit the 
degree of potential crack face opening as compared to free span 
indications.
    The leakage factor of 2.49 for Millstone Power Station Unit 3 
(MPS3), for a postulated SLB/FLB, has been calculated as shown in 
Table RA124-2 (Revised Table 9-7) of Reference 19. Specifically, for 
the condition monitoring (CM) assessment, the component of leakage 
from the prior cycle from below the H* distance will be multiplied 
by a factor of 2.49 and added to the total leakage from any other 
source and compared to the allowable accident induced leakage limit. 
For the operational assessment (OA), the difference in the leakage 
between the allowable leakage and the accident induced leakage from 
sources other than the tubesheet expansion region will be divided by 
2.49 and compared to the observed operational leakage.
    The probability of a[n] SLB is unaffected by the potential 
failure of a steam generator tube as the failure of the tube is not 
an initiator for a[n] SLB event. SLB leakage is limited by leakage 
flow restrictions resulting from the leakage path above potential 
cracks through the tube-to-tubesheet crevice. The leak rate during 
postulated accident conditions (including locked rotor) has been 
shown to remain within the accident analysis assumptions for all 
axial and or circumferentially orientated cracks occurring 15.2 
inches below the top of the tubesheet. The accident induced leak 
rate limit is 1.0 gpm. The TS operational leak rate is 150 gpd (0.1 
gpm) through any one steam generator. Consequently, there is 
significant margin between accident leakage and allowable 
operational leakage. The SLB/FLB leak rate ratio is only 2.49 
resulting in significant margin between the conservatively estimated 
accident leakage and the allowable accident leakage (1.0 gpm).
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change that alters the steam generator inspection 
criteria and the steam generator inspection reporting criteria does 
not introduce any new equipment, create new failure modes for 
existing equipment, or create any new limiting single failures. 
Plant operation will not be altered, and all safety functions will 
continue to perform as previously assumed in accident analyses.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin 
of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change that alters the steam generator inspection 
criteria and the steam generator inspection reporting criteria 
maintains the required structural margins of the steam generator 
tubes for both normal and accident conditions. NEI [Nuclear Energy 
Institute] 97-06, Revision 3, ``Steam Generator Program Guidelines'' 
(Reference 1) and RG 1.121, ``Bases for Plugging Degraded PWR Steam 
Generator Tubes'' (Reference 25), are used as the bases in the 
development of the limited tubesheet inspection depth methodology 
for determining that steam generator tube integrity considerations 
are maintained within acceptable limits. RG 1.121 describes a method 
acceptable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for meeting GDC 14, 
``Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary,'' GDC 15, ``Reactor Coolant 
System Design,'' GDC 31, ``Fracture Prevention of Reactor Coolant 
Pressure Boundary,'' and GDC 32, ``Inspection of Reactor Coolant 
Pressure Boundary,'' by reducing the probability and consequences of 
a[n] SGTR. RG 1.121 concludes that by determining the limiting safe 
conditions for tube wall degradation the probability and 
consequences of a[n] SGTR are reduced. This RG uses safety factors 
on loads for tube burst that are consistent with the requirements of 
Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 
Code.
    For axially oriented cracking located within the tubesheet, tube 
burst is precluded due to the presence of the tubesheet. For 
circumferentially oriented cracking, the H* analysis, documented in 
Section 4.0 of this enclosure, defines a length of degradation free 
expanded tubing that provides the necessary resistance to tube 
pullout due to the pressure induced forces, with applicable safety 
factors applied. Application of the limited hot and cold leg 
tubesheet inspection criteria will preclude unacceptable primary-to-
secondary leakage during all plant conditions. The methodology for 
determining leakage provides for large margins between calculated 
and actual leakage values in the proposed limited tubesheet 
inspection depth criteria.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in any margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Senior Counsel, Dominion 
Resources Services, Inc., 120 Tredegar Street, RS-2, Richmond, VA 
23219.
    NRC Branch Chief: George A. Wilson.

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, McGuire 
Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina

    Date of amendment request: September 26, 2011.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would 
change the Technical Specifications (TSs) to adopt NUREG-1431, 
``Standard Technical Specifications [STSs]--Westinghouse [Electric 
Company] Plants,'' STS 3.8.3, ``Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting 
Air,'' Condition E, regarding Diesel Generator [DG] starting air 
receiver pressure limits.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    A. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    Implementation of the proposed amendment does not significantly 
increase the probability or the consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated. The DGs and their associated emergency buses 
function as accident mitigators. The proposed changes do not involve 
a change in the operational limits or the design of the electrical 
power systems (particularly the emergency power systems) or change 
the function or operation of plant equipment or affect the response 
of that equipment when called upon to operate.
    The proposed changes to TS 3.8.3 Condition D are consistent with 
STS 3.8.3 Condition E, and they still ensure the DGs' ability to 
fulfill their safety-related function.
    Thus, based on the above, the proposed changes do not involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated.
    B. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes do not involve a change in the operational 
limits or the design capabilities of the emergency electrical power 
systems. The proposed changes do not change the function or 
operation of plant equipment or introduce any new failure 
mechanisms. The technical evaluation that supports this License 
Amendment Request included a review of the DG starting air system 
capability to which these changes are bounded. The proposed changes 
do not introduce any new or different types of failure mechanisms; 
plant equipment will continue to respond as designed and analyzed.
    C. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in the margin of safety?
    Response: No.

[[Page 31660]]

    Margin of safety is related to the confidence in the ability of 
the fission product barriers to perform their design functions 
during and following an accident situation. These barriers include 
the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system, and the containment 
system. The performance of the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant 
system and the containment system will not be adversely impacted by 
the proposed changes since the ability of the DGs to mitigate an 
analyzed accident has not been adversely impacted by the proposed 
changes.
    Thus, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a 
significant reduction in the margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Lara S. Nichols, Associate General Counsel, 
Duke Energy Corporation, 526 South Church Street--EC07H, Charlotte, NC 
28202.
    NRC Branch Chief: Nancy L. Salgado.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457, 
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois; Docket Nos. 
STN 50-454 and STN 50-455, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Ogle County, 
Illinois

    Date of amendment request: January 31, 2012.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed change would revise 
the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to describe the use of 
an Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) cross-tie. Specifically, this change adds 
information to the UFSAR describing the design and shared operation of 
cross-tie piping between the discharges of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Train 
A motor-driven AF pumps.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The AF system is normally in standby and a failure of the AF 
system during normal operations or emergency operations cannot 
initiate any of the accidents previously evaluated. The use of the 
AF Train A unit cross-tie does not interface with the reactor 
coolant system, containment, or engineered safeguards features in 
such a way as to be a precursor or initiator for an accident 
previously evaluated. The AF system is capable of performing the 
safety-related functions required to mitigate the effects of design 
basis accidents. Conditions which impose safety-related performance 
requirements on the design of the AF system include the following: 
loss of main feedwater transient, secondary system pipe breaks, loss 
of all a-c power, loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), and cooldown 
(after expected transients, accidents, and other scenarios). For the 
non-accident unit, controls ensure compliance with existing TS 
conditions that ensure one train remains operable and the condition 
exists for a limited time. The AF system will continue to be used in 
compliance with the existing conditions in the TS. Since the AF 
system is assured of performing its intended design function in 
mitigating the effects of design basis accidents, the consequences 
of accidents previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be 
increased.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    Failures of the AF system cannot initiate an accident. The 
proposed use of an AF Train A unit cross-tie will not interface with 
the reactor coolant system, containment, or engineered safeguards 
features. Failure modes and effects described in the UFSAR are not 
impacted. The electrical power supplies and AF system pumps will be 
maintained in design basis train alignments. Use of an AF Train A 
unit cross-tie will have no impact on the range of initiating events 
previously assessed. Thus, the accident analysis presented in the 
UFSAR is not impacted. The change is consistent with the safety 
analysis assumptions.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The margin of safety is not reduced. Results of the existing 
UFSAR accident analysis are not impacted, and therefore the safety 
margins are not impacted. The proposed change will not reduce a 
margin of safety because the non-accident unit will be operated 
within existing TS conditions. For the non-accident unit, controls 
ensure compliance with existing TS conditions that ensure one train 
remains operable and the condition exists for a limited time. The AF 
Train A unit cross-tie is not a credited flow path in design basis 
or needed to meet a safety function. The AF Train A unit cross-tie 
is an additional strategy made available if a total loss of 
secondary heat sink should occur. The AF Train A unit cross-tie 
would be initiated if the feed flow to at least one SG cannot be 
verified during the event, and an appropriate SG level cannot be 
maintained to regain secondary heat sink. As such, the AF Train A 
unit cross-tie is an improvement in emergency procedures for a total 
loss of heat sink, and this improves probabilistic risk assessment. 
The proposed change, therefore, does not involve a reduction in a 
margin of safety.
    Based on the above, EGC concludes that the proposed change 
presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards 
set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of ``no 
significant hazards consideration'' is justified.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mr. Bradley J. Fewell, Associate General 
Counsel, Exelon Nuclear, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555.
    NRC Branch Chief: Jacob I. Zimmerman.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457, 
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois; Docket Nos. 
STN 50-454 and STN 50-455, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Ogle County, 
Illinois

    Date of amendment request: March 22, 2012.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
modify technical specification requirements regarding steam generator 
tube inspections and reporting as described in TSTF-510, Revision 2, 
``Revision to Steam Generator Program Inspection Frequencies and Tube 
Sample Selection;'' however, Exelon Generating Company (EGC) is 
proposing certain variations and deviations from TSTF-510.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    Response: No.
    The proposed change revises the Steam Generator (SG) Program to 
modify the frequency of verification of SG tube integrity and SG 
tube sample selection. A steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event 
is one of the design basis accidents that are analyzed as part of a 
plant's licensing basis. The proposed SG tube inspection frequency 
and sample selection criteria will continue to ensure that the SG 
tubes are inspected such that the probability of a SGTR is not 
increased. The consequences of a SGTR are bounded by the 
conservative assumptions in the design basis accident analysis. The

[[Page 31661]]

proposed change will not cause the consequences of a SGTR to exceed 
those assumptions.
    Therefore, it is concluded that this change does not involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes to the Steam Generator Program will not 
introduce any adverse changes to the plant design basis or 
postulated accidents resulting from potential tube degradation. The 
proposed change does not affect the design of the SGs or their 
method of operation. In addition, the proposed change does not 
impact any other plant system or component.
    Therefore, it is concluded that this change does not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The SG tubes in pressurized water reactors are an integral part 
of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and, as such, are relied 
upon to maintain the primary system's pressure and inventory. As 
part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the SG tubes are 
unique in that they are also relied upon as a heat transfer surface 
between the primary and secondary systems such that residual heat 
can be removed from the primary system. In addition, the SG tubes 
also isolate the radioactive fission products in the primary coolant 
from the secondary system. In summary, the safety function of a SG 
is maintained by ensuring the integrity of its tubes.
    Steam generator tube integrity is a function of the design, 
environment, and the physical condition of the tube. The proposed 
change does not affect tube design or operating environment. The 
proposed change will continue to require monitoring of the physical 
condition of the SG tubes such that there will not be a reduction in 
the margin of safety compared to the current requirements.
    The proposed amendment deletes the current TS 5.5.9.c.2 and TS 
5.5.9.f.2 allowance to use ABB Combustion Engineering Inc. TIG 
welded sleeves as a steam generator tube repair method. There are no 
ABB Combustion Engineering Inc. (Westinghouse) TIG-welded sleeves 
currently installed in the Braidwood Station, Unit 2, and Byron 
Station, Unit 2, SGs. EGC has been informed by the sleeve vendor 
that TIG welded sleeves are no longer commercially available. As a 
result of this change, there are no available SG tube repair methods 
for Braidwood Station or Byron Station. The proposed amendment 
deletes TS 5.5.9.f, TS 5.5.9.c.2, TS 5.5.9.c.3, and references to 
tube repair and sleeves in various TS. Removing the ability for tube 
repair methods is conservative; therefore, the proposed change does 
not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed change does not 
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    Based on the above, EGC concludes that the proposed change 
presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards 
set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of ``no 
significant hazards consideration'' is justified.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mr. Bradley J. Fewell, Associate General 
Counsel, Exelon Nuclear, 4300 Winfield Road, Warrenville, IL 60555.
    NRC Branch Chief: Jacob I. Zimmerman.

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC Docket No. 50-443, Seabrook Station, Unit 
1, Rockingham County, New Hampshire

    Date of amendment request: April 30, 2012.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed changes to the 
Seabrook Emergency Plan are associated with the initiating conditions 
involving a loss of safety system annunciation or indication in the 
control room. The proposed changes revise the emergency action levels 
(EALs) to include radiation monitoring indications within the aggregate 
of safety system indications that are considered when evaluating a loss 
of safety system indications rather than separate EALs.
    Basis for proposed NSHC determination: As required by 10 CFR 
50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of NSHC, 
which is presented below:

    1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    The proposed changes to the Seabrook Station emergency plan do 
not impact the physical function of plant structures, systems, or 
components (SSCs) or the manner in which SSCs perform their design 
function. The proposed changes neither adversely affect accident 
initiators or precursors, nor alter design assumptions. The proposed 
changes do not alter or prevent the ability of operable SSCs to 
perform their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an 
initiating event within assumed acceptance limits. No operating 
procedures or administrative controls that function to prevent or 
mitigate accidents are affected by the proposed changes.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
    The proposed changes will not impact the accident analysis. The 
changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no 
new or different type of equipment will be installed), a change in 
the method of plant operation, or new operator actions. The proposed 
changes will not introduce failure modes that could result in a new 
accident, and the change does not alter assumptions made in the 
safety analysis. The proposed changes revise emergency action levels 
(EAL), which establish the thresholds for placing the plant in an 
emergency classification. EALs are not initiators of any accidents.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction 
in the margin of safety.
    Margin of safety is associated with confidence in the ability of 
the fission product barriers (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor coolant 
system pressure boundary, and containment structure) to limit the 
level of radiation dose to the public. The proposed changes are 
associated with the EALs and do not impact operation of the plant or 
its response to transients or accidents. The changes do not affect 
the Technical Specifications or the operating license. The proposed 
changes do not involve a change in the method of plant operation, 
and no accident analyses will be affected by the proposed changes. 
Additionally, the proposed changes will not relax any criteria used 
to establish safety limits and will not relax any safety system 
settings. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not affected 
by these changes. The proposed changes will not result in plant 
operation in a configuration outside the design basis. The proposed 
changes do not adversely affect systems that respond to safely 
shutdown the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown 
condition.
    The revised EALs provide more appropriate and accurate criteria 
for determining protective measures that should be considered within 
and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety. The 
emergency plan will continue to activate an emergency response 
commensurate with the extent of degradation of plant safety.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves NSHC.
    Attorney for licensee: M.S. Ross, Florida Power & Light Company, 
P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420.
    NRC Branch Chief: Meena Khanna.

[[Page 31662]]

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Docket Nos. 52-025 and 52-
026, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4, Burke 
County, Georgia

    Date of amendment request: February 24, 2012.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed changes would amend 
Combined License Nos. NPF-91 and NPF-92, for VEGP Units 3 and 4, 
respectively, in regard to the Technical Specifications (TS). The 
proposed amendment updates the TS for operator usability that more 
closely aligns with the form and content of other improved Standard 
Technical Specifications NUREGs. Specifically, the changes would result 
in closer alignment with the guidance of the Technical Specifications 
Task Force (TSTF) Writer's Guide for Plant-Specific Improved Technical 
Specifications, TSTF-GG-05-01, Revision 1, and with NUREG-1431, 
Standard Technical Specifications-Westinghouse Plants as updated by the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved generic changes.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:
    In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, Southern Nuclear 
Operating Company (SNC) proposes to amend the VEGP TS. Evaluations 
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92 showing that the proposed changes do not 
involve significant hazards considerations are provided for each 
change.

    However, due to the significant number of changes associated 
with the upgrade effort, SNC has grouped similar changes into 
categories to facilitate the significant hazards evaluations 
required by 10 CFR 50.92. Generic significant hazards evaluations 
are provided for the Administrative, More Restrictive, Relocation, 
and Detail Removed categories. Each individual Less Restrictive 
change is addressed by a specific significant hazards evaluation. 
Due to the large volume of changes, obvious editorial or 
administrative changes (e.g., formatting, page rolls, punctuation, 
etc.) have not always received an explicit discussion, but are 
considered to be addressed by the applicable generic significant 
hazards evaluation for Administrative changes.
    Each significant change to the TS is marked-up on the 
appropriate page in Enclosure 2 of its submittal and assigned a 
reference number reflective of the significant hazards evaluation 
type. The reference number assigned to a change is used in the 
Discussion of Change (DOC) in Enclosure 1 of its submittal which 
provides a detailed description (basis) for each change supporting 
the applicable significant hazards evaluation in Enclosure 6 of its 
submittal.

10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation for Administrative Changes

    SNC proposes to amend the VEGP Units 3 and 4, Technical 
Specifications. SNC has evaluated each of the proposed TS changes 
identified as Administrative in accordance with the criteria set 
forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of amendment,'' and has determined 
that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards 
consideration. This significant hazards consideration is applicable 
to each Administrative change identified in Enclosure 1 and 
Enclosure 2 of its submittal.
    The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not 
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of 
these changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The 
criteria and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes involve reformatting, renumbering, and 
rewording the TS. The reformatting, renumbering, and rewording 
process involves no technical changes to the TS. As such, these 
changes are administrative in nature and do not affect initiators of 
analyzed events or assumed mitigation of accident or transient 
events.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or 
changes in methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed 
changes will not impose any new or different requirements, or 
eliminate any existing requirements.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes will not reduce a margin of safety because 
the changes have no effect on any safety analyses assumptions. These 
changes are administrative in nature. Therefore, the proposed 
changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.

10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation for More Restrictive Changes

    This generic category include changes that impose additional 
requirements, decrease allowed outage times, increase the Frequency 
of Surveillances, impose additional Surveillances, increase the 
scope of Specifications to include additional plant equipment, 
broaden the Applicability of Specifications, or provide additional 
actions. These changes have been evaluated to not be detrimental to 
plant safety.
    Changes to the TS requirements categorized as More Restrictive 
are annotated with an ``M'' in the Enclosure 1 DOC and Enclosure 2 
markup of its submittal.
    SNC proposes to amend the VEGP Units 3 and 4 TS. SNC has 
evaluated each of the proposed TS changes identified as More 
Restrictive in accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 
50.92, ``Issuance of amendment,'' and has determined that the 
proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration. 
This significant hazards consideration is applicable to each More 
Restrictive change identified in Enclosure 1 and Enclosure 2 of its 
submittal.
    The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not 
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of 
these changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The 
criteria and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes provide more stringent TS requirements. 
These more stringent requirements do not result in operations that 
significantly increase the probability of initiating an analyzed 
event, and do not alter assumptions relative to mitigation of an 
accident or transient event. The more restrictive requirements 
continue to ensure process variables, structures, systems, and 
components are maintained consistent with the safety analyses and 
licensing basis.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or 
changes in methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed 
changes do impose different Technical Specification requirements. 
However, these changes are consistent with the assumptions in the 
safety analyses and licensing basis.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The imposition of more restrictive requirements either has no 
effect on or increases a margin of plant safety. As provided in the 
discussion of change, each change in this category is, by 
definition, providing additional restrictions to enhance plant 
safety. The changes maintain

[[Page 31663]]

requirements within the safety analyses and licensing basis.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation for Relocated Specifications

    This generic category applies to changes that relocate entire TS 
Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs). A specific DOC for each 
TS identified for relocation is provided in Enclosure 1. This 
evaluation will be applicable to each of the changes identified with 
an ``R'' in the Enclosure 1 DOC and the associated Enclosure 2 
markup of its submittal.
    SNC has evaluated each of the proposed TS changes identified as 
Relocated Specifications in accordance with the criteria set forth 
in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of Amendment,'' and has determined that 
the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards 
consideration. This significant hazards consideration is applicable 
to each Relocated Specification identified in Enclosure 1 and 
Enclosure 2 of its submittal.
    The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not 
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of 
these changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The 
criteria and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes relocate LCOs for structures, systems, 
components, or variables that do not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 
50.36(c)(2)(ii) for inclusion in TS. The affected structures, 
systems, components, or variables are not assumed to be initiators 
of analyzed events and are not assumed to mitigate accident or 
transient events. The requirements and Surveillances for these 
affected structures, systems, components, or variables are proposed 
to be relocated from the TS to a licensee controlled document that 
is controlled by the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. The proposed 
changes only reduce the level of regulatory control on these 
requirements. The level of regulatory control has no impact on the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or 
change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed 
changes will not impose or eliminate any requirements, and adequate 
control of existing requirements will be maintained.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes will not reduce a margin of safety because 
they have no significant effect on any safety analyses assumptions, 
as indicated by the fact that the requirements do not meet the 10 
CFR 50.36 criteria for retention. In addition, the relocated 
requirements are moved without change, and any future changes to 
these requirements will be evaluated per 10 CFR 50.59.
    NRC prior review and approval of changes to these relocated 
requirements, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92, will no longer be 
required. There is no margin of safety attributed to NRC prior 
review and approval. However, the proposed changes are consistent 
with 10 CFR 50.36, which allows revising the TS to relocate these 
requirements and Surveillances to a licensee controlled document.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation for Detail Removed Changes

    This generic category applies to changes that involve removing 
details out of the TS. These details are either supported by 
existing content in the TS Bases or the Final Safety Analysis Report 
(FSAR) or a commitment is made to add them to the TS Bases or FSAR. 
The removal of this information is considered to be less restrictive 
because it is no longer controlled by the TS change process. 
Typically, the information removed is descriptive in nature and its 
removal conforms to NUREG-1431 for format and content.
    A specific DOC for each detail identified for removal is 
provided in Enclosure 1 of its submittal. This evaluation will be 
applicable to each of the changes identified with a ``D'' in the 
Enclosure 1 DOC and the associated Enclosure 2 markup of its 
submittal.
    SNC proposes to amend the VEGP Units 3 and 4, Technical 
Specifications. SNC has evaluated each of the proposed TS changes 
identified as Detail Removed in accordance with the criteria set 
forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of amendment,'' and has determined 
that the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards 
consideration. This significant hazards consideration is applicable 
to each Detail Removed change identified in Enclosure 1 and 
Enclosure 2 of its submittal.
    The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not 
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of 
these changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The 
criteria and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes relocate certain details from the TS to 
other documents under regulatory control. The FSAR will be 
maintained in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR part 52, 
Appendix D, Section VIII. The TS Bases are subject to the change 
control provisions in the Administrative Controls Chapter of the TS. 
Since any changes to these documents will be evaluated, no 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated will be allowed.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes do not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a 
change in the methods governing normal plant operations. The 
proposed changes will not impose or eliminate any requirements, and 
adequate control of the information will be maintained.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of 
a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes will not reduce a margin of safety because 
they have no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. In 
addition, the details to be moved from the TS to other documents are 
not being changed. Since any future changes to these details will be 
evaluated under the applicable regulatory change control mechanism, 
no significant reduction in a margin of safety will be allowed. A 
significant reduction in a margin of safety is not associated with 
the elimination of the 10 CFR 50.90 requirement for NRC review and 
approval of future changes to the relocated details. Not including 
these details in the TS is consistent with NUREG-1431, issued by the 
NRC, which allows revising the TS to relocate these requirements to 
a licensee controlled document controlled by 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 
part 52, Appendix D, Section VIII, or other TS controlled or 
regulation controlled documents.
    Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation for Less Restrictive Changes

    This category consists of technical changes which revise 
existing requirements such that more restoration time is provided, 
fewer compensatory measures are needed, surveillance requirements 
are deleted, or less restrictive surveillance requirements are 
required. This would also include requirements which are deleted 
from the TS (not relocated to other documents) and other technical 
changes that do not fit a generic category. These changes are 
evaluated individually.

[[Page 31664]]

    Technical changes to the TS requirements categorized as ``Less 
Restrictive'' are identified with an ``L'' and an individual number 
in the Enclosure 1 DOC and Enclosure 2 markup of its submittal.
    SNC proposes to amend the VEGP Units 3 and 4, Technical 
Specifications. SNC has evaluated each of the proposed technical 
changes identified as ``Less Restrictive'' individually in 
accordance with the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 and has 
determined that the proposed changes do not involve a significant 
hazards consideration.
    The basis for the determination that the proposed changes do not 
involve a significant hazards consideration is an evaluation of 
these changes against each of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92(c). The 
criteria and conclusions of the evaluation are presented below.
    L01 SNC proposes to amend TS 1.0, ``Definitions,'' by deleting 
the definition for Actuation Device Test. Reference to ``overlap 
with the ACTUATION DEVICE TEST'' that is cited in the definition of 
Actuation Logic Test is replaced with ``overlap with the actuated 
device.''
    Current Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.3.2.7 (``Perform 
ACTUATION DEVICE TEST'') and SR 3.3.2.8 (``Perform ACTUATION DEVICE 
TEST for squib valves'') are deleted from current TS 3.3.2 and Table 
3.3.2-1, Function 26, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Actuation. The 
equivalent requirement (using phrasing generally consistent with 
NUREG-1431) is included in individual Specifications for the 
actuated devices with the same 24 month Frequency as the deleted 
SRs. The impact of this reformatting is such that more appropriate, 
albeit less restrictive, actions would be applied when the 
associated device fails to meet the surveillance requirement. Also, 
current SR 3.3.2.9 is revised to eliminate the use of the Actuation 
Device Test defined term and replaced it with verification of 
actuation on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The change involves reformatting and revising the 
presentation of existing surveillance requirements (with no change 
in required system or device function), such that more appropriate, 
albeit less restrictive, actions would be applied when the device 
fails to meet the surveillance requirement. Revised surveillance 
requirement presentation and compliance with TS actions are not an 
initiator to any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the 
probability of an accident previously evaluated is not affected.
    The consequences of an accident as a result of the revised 
surveillance requirements and actions are no different than the 
consequences of the same accident during the existing ones. As a 
result, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not 
affected by this change.
    The proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of 
structures, systems, and components from performing their intended 
function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within 
the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect 
the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release 
assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change reformats TS requirements such that more 
appropriate, albeit less restrictive, actions would be applied when 
the device fails to meet the surveillance requirement. However, the 
proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant 
as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being introduced, and 
equipment is not being operated in a new or different manner. There 
are no setpoints, at which protective or mitigative actions are 
initiated, affected by this change. This change will not alter the 
manner in which equipment operation is initiated, nor will the 
function demands on credited equipment be changed. No change is 
being made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal 
event as described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, 
no new failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter 
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While 
certain actions for inoperability of actuated devices are made less 
restrictive by eliminating entry into Engineered Safety Feature 
Actuation System (ESFAS) Actuation and Instrumentation inoperability 
actions, no action is made less restrictive than currently approved 
for any associated actuated device inoperability. As such, there is 
no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    L02 SNC proposes to amend current TS 5.6, ``Reporting 
Requirements,'' to delete TS 5.6.1, ``Occupational Radiation 
Exposure Report,'' and TS 5.6.4, ``Monthly Operating Reports.'' This 
change results in the renumbering of TS 5.6 sections, but does not 
revise technical or administrative requirements. SNC stated that the 
change is consistent with NRC approved Industry/TSTF Standard 
Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-369, ``Removal of 
Monthly Operating Report and Occupational Radiation Exposure 
Report,'' Revision 1.
    SNC has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination published on June 23, 2004 (69 FR 35067) 
as part of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP) 
for TSTF-369, Revision 1. SNC has concluded that the proposed 
determination presented in the notice is applicable to VEGP Units 3 
and 4 and the determination is hereby incorporated by reference to 
satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a).
    L03 SNC proposes to amend TS to eliminate the use of the defined 
term ``CORE ALTERATIONS'' and incorporate changes reflected in TSTF-
471-A.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change eliminates the use of the term ``CORE 
ALTERATIONS,'' all Required Actions requiring suspension of core 
alterations, and reference to core alterations in a surveillance 
requirement. With the exception of a fuel handling accident, core 
alterations are not an initiator of any accident previously 
evaluated. Those revised Specifications which protect the initial 
conditions of a fuel handling accident also require the suspension 
of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. This Required Action 
protects the initial conditions of a fuel handling accident and, 
therefore, suspension of all other core alterations is not required. 
Suspension of core alterations, except fuel handling, does not 
provide mitigation of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, 
eliminating the TS presentation of core alterations does not affect 
the initiators of the accidents previously evaluated and suspension 
of core alterations does not affect the mitigation of the accidents 
previously evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described

[[Page 31665]]

in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new failure 
modes are being introduced. The change does not alter assumptions 
made in the safety analysis and licensing basis. Therefore, this 
change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Two events are postulated to occur in the plant conditions in 
which core alterations may be made: a fuel handling accident and a 
boron dilution incident. Suspending movement of irradiated fuel 
assemblies to prevent a fuel handling accident is retained as 
appropriate. As such, requiring the suspension of core alterations 
is an overly broad, redundant requirement that does not increase a 
margin of safety. Core alterations have no effect on a boron 
dilution incident. Core components are not involved in the creation 
or mitigation of a boron dilution incident and the shutdown margin 
(Mode 5) and boron concentration (Mode 6) limits are based on 
assuming the worst-case configuration of the core components.
    Therefore, core alterations have no effect on a margin of safety 
related to a boron dilution incident. Therefore, there is no 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    L04 SNC proposes to amend TS, Section 1.3, ``Completion Times,'' 
Example 1.3-3 to eliminate the Required Action A.1 and Required 
Action B.1 second Completion Times, and to replace the discussion 
regarding second Completion Times with a new discussion. SNC also 
proposes to delete the second Completion Times associated with 
current TS 3.8.5, ``Distribution Systems--Operating,'' Required 
Actions A.1, B.1, C.1, and D.1.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change eliminates certain Completion Times from the 
Technical Specifications. Completion Times are not an initiator to 
any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of 
an accident previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences 
of an accident during the revised Completion Time are no different 
than the consequences of the same accident during the existing 
Completion Times. As a result, the consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated are not affected by this change. The proposed 
change does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, 
and components (SSCs) from performing their intended function to 
mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed 
acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect the source 
term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions 
used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated. Further, the proposed change does not increase 
the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released 
offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative 
occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed change is 
consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and resultant 
consequences.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change to delete the second Completion Time does 
not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system 
settings or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The 
safety analysis acceptance criteria are not affected by this change. 
The proposed change will not result in plant operation in a 
configuration outside of the design basis.
    Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.
    L05 SNC proposes to amend TS to eliminate LCO 3.0.8.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    Technical Specification actions to restore equipment to Operable 
and to monitor plant parameters are not initiators to any analyzed 
accident sequence. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS 
continues to ensure that plant equipment is capable of performing 
mitigative functions assumed by the accident analysis.
    The proposed TS change does not involve any changes to SSCs and 
does not alter the method of operation or control of SSCs as 
described in the FSAR. The current assumptions in the safety 
analysis regarding accident initiators and mitigation of accidents 
are unaffected by this change. No additional failure modes or 
mechanisms are being introduced and the likelihood of previously 
analyzed failures remains unchanged.
    The integrity of fission product barriers, plant configuration, 
and operating procedures as described in the FSAR will not be 
affected by this change. Therefore, the consequences of previously 
analyzed accidents will not increase because of this change.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that 
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being 
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event 
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being 
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety 
analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change does not alter the requirement to 
restore compliance with TS and to monitor plant parameter status for 
appropriate manual actions. Operation in accordance with the 
proposed TS ensures that the plant response to analyzed events will 
continue to provide the margins of safety assumed by the analysis. 
Appropriate monitoring and maintenance, consistent with industry 
standards, will continue to be performed.
    As such, there is no functional change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    L06 SNC proposes to amend TS 3.2.5 to eliminate the increased 
frequency of verifying core power distribution parameters when the 
On-line Power Distribution Monitoring System (OPDMS) alarms are 
inoperable. This change retains the normal 24-hour Frequency and 
eliminates the 12-

[[Page 31666]]

hour Frequency when OPDMS alarms are inoperable.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    A TS frequency for monitoring plant parameters is not an 
initiator to any accident sequence analyzed in the FSAR. Operation 
in accordance with the proposed TS continues to ensure that initial 
conditions assumed in the accident analysis are maintained.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR and does not alter the method of 
operation or control of equipment as described in the FSAR. The 
current assumptions in the safety analysis regarding accident 
initiators and mitigation of accidents are unaffected by this 
change. Plant equipment remains capable of performing mitigative 
functions assumed by the accident analysis. No additional failure 
modes or mechanisms are being introduced and the likelihood of 
previously analyzed failures remains unchanged. The integrity of 
fission product barriers, plant configuration, and operating 
procedures as described in the FSAR will not be affected by this 
change. Therefore, the consequences of previously analyzed accidents 
will not increase because of this change.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that 
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being 
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event 
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being 
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety 
analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change is acceptable because the OPDMS 
alarms do not impact a margin of safety. Operation in accordance 
with the proposed TS ensures that the plant response to analyzed 
events will continue to provide the margins of safety assumed by the 
analysis. Appropriate monitoring and maintenance, consistent with 
industry standards, will continue to be performed.
    As such, there is no functional change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    L07 SNC proposes to amend the TS 3.3.1, 3.3.4, and 3.4.5 by 
replacing the TS Required Actions requiring the reactor trip 
breakers (RTBs) to be opened with two Required Actions: one Required 
Action states ``Initiate action to fully insert all rods,'' and the 
other Required Action states ``Place the Plant Control System in a 
condition incapable of rod withdrawal.'' For consistency, TS 
Applicabilities associated with RTB position are also being revised. 
Applicabilities including ``RTBs closed'' are revised to state 
``Plant Control System capable of rod withdrawal or one or more rods 
not fully inserted.'' Conversely, Applicabilities including ``RTBs 
open'' are revised to state ``With Plant Control System incapable of 
rod withdrawal and all rods fully inserted.''
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR and does not alter the method of 
operation or control of equipment as described in the FSAR. The 
current assumptions in the safety analysis regarding accident 
initiators and mitigation of accidents are unaffected by this 
change. Plant equipment remains capable of performing mitigative 
functions assumed by the accident analysis. However, the change 
involves allowing methods of compliance other than establishing or 
verifying RTB open or closed status to determine the condition of 
the capability of the Plant Control System to allow or inhibit rod 
withdrawal and the status of all rods inserted or not. The method of 
establishing this status is not an accident initiator nor involved 
with mitigation of the consequences of an accident.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does allow methods of compliance other than 
establishing or verifying RTB open or closed status; however, RTB 
open or closed status will continue to be one appropriate and viable 
method of establishing and verifying applicable plant conditions. 
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While 
certain interlocks depend on RTB open or close status, these 
interlocks and the association with RTB is not revised. When those 
interlocks are required, the position of RTBs will continue to 
dictate the appropriate protection system response. Allowing 
alternate methods of establishing or verifying the condition of the 
capability of the Plant Control System to allow or inhibit rod 
withdrawal and the status of all rods inserted or not, does not 
impact any safety analysis assumption or plant response to an 
analyzed event.
    As such, there is no functional change to the required plant 
conditions, and therefore, there is no significant reduction in a 
margin of safety.
    L08 SNC proposes to amend the TS by deleting current TS 3.3.1, 
Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation, Required Actions D.1.1, 
D.2.1, and D.2.2 applicable to inoperable Power Range Neutron Flux 
channels.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. Overly restrictive and inappropriate Required Actions 
are being deleted since adequate compensatory measures already 
address the potential impact on radial power monitoring and the 
appropriate compensatory and mitigative actions in the event the RTS 
function is degraded for the Power Range Neutron Flux function. 
Additionally, the Surveillances for TS 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt 
Ratio (QPTR),

[[Page 31667]]

address the requirements unique to loss of Power Range Neutron Flux 
monitoring for QPTR. Eliminating overly restrictive and 
inappropriate Required Actions does not impact an accident initiator 
or impact mitigation of the consequences of any accident.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change eliminates overly restrictive and 
inappropriate Required Actions. However, the proposed change does 
not involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the 
FSAR. No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not 
being operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints, 
at which protective or mitigative actions are initiated, affected by 
this change. This change will not alter the manner in which 
equipment operation is initiated, nor will the function demands on 
credited equipment be changed. No change is being made to the 
procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event as 
described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new 
failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter 
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change will not reduce a margin of 
safety because it has no such effect on any assumption of the safety 
analyses. While certain actions for inoperability of actuated 
devices are made less restrictive by eliminating a potentially 
unnecessary power reduction, and actions that could not be 
performed, no action is made less restrictive than currently 
approved for similar channel inoperability.
    Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.
    L09 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip 
System (RTS) Instrumentation,'' Source Range Neutron Flux Actions in 
Mode 2 for one and two inoperable channels. The change allows for 
placing inoperable channels in bypass and/or trip thereby allowing 
continued operation.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. However, the change involves providing actions allowing 
bypassing and/or tripping one or two inoperable Source Range Neutron 
Flux channels. Required Actions are not an accident initiator nor 
credited with mitigation of the consequences of an accident. The 
actions continue to assure operation consistent with the design 
provisions and within the assumptions of the safety analysis.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change involves certain less restrictive actions; 
however, these actions are consistent with the design provisions and 
with currently approved actions for other inoperable automatic RTS 
actuation functions. The proposed change does not involve a physical 
alteration of the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment 
is being introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change will not reduce a margin of 
safety because it has no such effect on any assumption of the safety 
analyses. While the change involves less restrictive actions, these 
actions are consistent with the design provisions and with currently 
approved actions for other inoperable automatic RTS actuation 
Functions. These actions do not result in any conflict with the 
assumptions in the safety analyses and licensing basis.
    As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.
    L10 SNC proposes to amend the TS, as follows:
     TS 3.1.8 ``PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions--MODE 2,'' is 
revised to delete the listing of current Function 16.b for TS 3.3.1, 
``Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation'';
     Current TS 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System (RTS) 
Instrumentation,'' Table 3.3.1-1, Function 16, Reactor Trip System 
Interlocks requirements are removed;
     Current TS 3.3.1 Action M is deleted;
     Current TS 3.3.2, ``Engineered Safety Feature Actuation 
System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,'' Table 3.3.2-1, Function 18, ESFAS 
Interlocks (with the exception of Table 3.3.2-1, Function 18.b, 
Reactor Trip, P-4) requirements are removed; and
     Current TS 3.3.2 Action J is deleted.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The TS RTS and ESFAS actuation functions explicitly 
retained in TS are those assumed to actuate in the safety analysis. 
The associated interlocks are necessary support functions for 
Operability of these TS required RTS and ESFAS functions. The 
removal of explicit interlock functions does not impact the design-
required actuation function. Plant equipment remains capable of 
performing preventative and mitigative functions assumed by the 
accident analysis. However, the change involves removing explicit 
requirements, including actions that lead to reestablishing 
operability of the assumed actuation functions; implicitly these 
requirements are maintained and the actions remain viable for 
reestablishing operability. Since the requirements for the safety 
function Operability remains unchanged, removing the explicit 
presentation of detail is not an accident initiator nor involved 
with mitigation of the consequences of an accident.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of

[[Page 31668]]

accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While the 
presentation of TS RTS and ESFAS actuation functions moves the 
associated interlocks from explicit treatment to becoming an 
implicit support system feature, the function continues to be 
required as necessary to support associated TS actuation functions. 
In doing so, certain actions for inoperability of interlocks are 
made more restrictive by now entering actions specific to the 
supported function's inoperability which have shorter Completion 
Times. However those actions are consistent with those currently 
approved for inoperability of that function.
    As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.
    L11 SNC proposes to amend TS 3.3.1, ``Reactor Trip System (RTS) 
Instrumentation,'' to delete:
     Current Table 3.3.1-1, Function 5, Source Range Neutron 
Flux High Setpoint, third row for that function including 
Applicability set ``3\(e)\,4\(e)\,5\(e)\'' and associated references 
to Required Channel, Condition, and Surveillance Requirements;
     Current Table 3.3.1-1, Footnote (e); and
     Current Action R.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The change involves removing certain actions that apply 
during inoperability of all four source range channels to provide 
indication. However, requirements and associated Required Actions 
continue to apply to source range channels in separate TS. The 
Required Actions removed are not accident initiators nor involved 
with mitigation of the consequences of an accident. The remaining 
requirements and actions continue to assure operation within the 
assumptions of the safety analysis.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change involves removing certain actions for 
inoperability of all four source range channels; however, this 
change does not result in any conflict with the assumptions in the 
safety analyses and licensing basis. The proposed change does not 
involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the FSAR. 
No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not being 
operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints, at 
which protective or mitigative actions are initiated, affected by 
this change. This change will not alter the manner in which 
equipment operation is initiated, nor will the function demands on 
credited equipment be changed. No change is being made to the 
procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event as 
described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new 
failure modes are being introduced.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change will not reduce a margin of 
safety because it has no such effect on any assumption of the safety 
analyses. While certain actions for inoperability of all four source 
range channels to indicate are removed, requirements and associated 
Required Actions continue to apply to source range channels in a 
separate TS. When all source range monitoring channels are 
inoperable, the remaining actions continue to assure operation 
within safety analysis assumptions. These actions are consistent 
with the actions presented in the NUREG-1431.
    As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.
    L12 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.3.2, ``Engineered Safety 
Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation,'' Actions related 
to functions that result in valve isolation actuations. Current TS 
3.3.2 Actions P, Q, R, S, T, and Z, are revised to ``Declare 
affected isolation valve(s) inoperable.'' Additionally, the 
following current Table 3.3.2-1 Applicability Footnotes are deleted:
     (e) Not applicable for valve isolation functions whose 
associated flow path is isolated;
     (h) Not applicable if all main steam isolation valves 
(MSIVs) are closed; and
     (i) Not applicable when the startup feedwater flow 
paths are isolated.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The less restrictive Required Actions are acceptable 
based on the fact that the new actions are the appropriate actions 
for the actuated equipment. Required Actions are not an accident 
initiator nor credited with mitigation of the consequences of an 
accident. The actions continue to assure operation within the 
assumptions of the safety analysis and are consistent with approved 
actions for the actuated equipment.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change involves certain less restrictive actions; 
however, the actions continue to assure operation within the 
assumptions of the safety analysis and are consistent with approved 
actions for the actuated equipment. The proposed change does not 
involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the FSAR. 
No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not being 
operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints, at 
which protective or mitigative actions are initiated, affected by 
this change. This change will not alter the manner in which 
equipment operation is initiated, nor will the function demands on 
credited equipment be changed. No change is being made to the 
procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event as 
described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, no new 
failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter 
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While the 
change involves less restrictive actions, the actions are consistent 
with approved actions for the actuated equipment. These actions do 
not result in any conflict with the assumptions in the safety 
analyses and licensing basis.
    As such, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.
    L13 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.3.3, ``Post Accident 
Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation,'' as follows:
     Function 12 is revised from ``Passive Residual Heat 
Removal (PRHR) Flow and PRHR Outlet Temperature,'' to ``Passive 
Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Heat Removal.'' In addition, the 
Required Channels/Divisions column is revised from ``2 flow & 1 
temperature,'' to ``2.''
     Function 17 is revised from ``Passive Containment 
Cooling System (PCS) Storage Tank Level and PCS Flow,'' to ``Passive 
Containment Cooling System (PCS) Heat Removal.'' In addition, the 
Required Channels/Divisions column is revised from ``2 level & 1 
flow,'' to ``2.''
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing

[[Page 31669]]

on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change reduces the number of required Function 12 
and Function 17 channels from three to two. Requiring the minimum of 
two redundant channels is consistent with NUREG-1431 requirements 
for meeting Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97 PAM redundancy requirements. 
The change also relocates the details of the specific channels 
designed to satisfy the PAM requirements to the associated Bases. 
The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the 
plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant operations. 
PAM functions are not initiators of analyzed events and therefore 
the revised requirements do not result in operations that 
significantly increase the probability of initiating an analyzed 
event. The PAM function affected by this change is designed to 
accommodate single failure to support post-accident monitoring. The 
change reduces TS requirements on excess required channels; however, 
single failure redundancy continues to be required. Thus, the 
proposed change does not alter assumptions relative to mitigation of 
an accident or transient event. The less restrictive requirements 
continue to ensure process variables, structures, systems, and 
components are maintained consistent with the safety analyses and 
licensing basis.
    The TS Bases will be maintained in accordance with the change 
control provisions of the TS Bases Control Program described in TS 
5.5.6. Because any change to the TS Bases will be evaluated, no 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated will be allowed.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. In 
addition, the details being moved from the current TS to the TS 
Bases are not being changed. NRC prior review and approval of 
changes to these relocated requirements, in accordance with 10 CFR 
50.92, will no longer be required. Future change to these details 
will be evaluated under the applicable regulatory change control 
mechanism. There is no margin of safety attributed to NRC prior 
review and approval; therefore, there is no significant reduction in 
a margin of safety.
    L14 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.3.5, ``Diverse Actuation 
System (DAS) Manual Controls,'' Table 3.3.5-1, ``DAS Manual 
Controls,'' footnote b; current TS 3.6.7, ``Passive Containment 
Cooling System (PCS)--Shutdown,'' Applicability; and current TS 
3.7.9, ``Fuel Storage Pool Makeup Water Sources,'' LCO Notes 1, 2, 
and 3; Applicability, Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.9.1 Note, SR 
3.7.9.2 Note, SR 3.7.9.3 Note, and SR 3.7.9.4 Note by deleting 
``calculated'' with respect to decay heat.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The proposed change provides less stringent TS 
requirements for the facility by not expressly specifying the method 
of determining the decay heat value. These less stringent 
requirements do not result in operations that significantly increase 
the probability of initiating an analyzed event, and do not alter 
assumptions relative to mitigation of an accident or transient 
event. The less restrictive requirements continue to ensure process 
variables, structures, systems, and components are maintained 
consistent with the safety analyses and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. 
Eliminating the imposition of single method of determining the decay 
heat value has no effect on or a margin of plant safety. 
``Calculating'' the decay heat value remains a viable option. The 
change maintains requirements within the safety analyses and 
licensing basis. As such, there is no technical change to the 
requirements and therefore, there is no significant reduction in a 
margin of safety.
    L15 SNC proposes to amend TS 3.4.8, ``Minimum [Reactor Coolant 
System] RCS Flow,'' SR 3.4.8.1 from ``Verify that at least one 
[Reactor Coolant Pump] RCP is in operation at >= 10% rated speed or 
equivalent,'' to ``Verify that at least one RCP is in operation with 
total flow through the core >= 3,000 gpm.''
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The change involves revising the acceptance criteria of 
an existing surveillance requirement with no change in required 
system or device function. Surveillance acceptance criteria are not 
accident initiators nor involved with mitigation of the consequences 
of any accident. The proposed acceptance criteria ensure that the 
applicable analysis input assumptions are preserved. Therefore, this 
change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change revises the acceptance criteria of an 
existing surveillance requirement. However, the proposed change does 
not involve a physical alteration of the plant as described in the 
FSAR. No new equipment is being introduced, and equipment is not 
being operated in a new or different manner. There are no setpoints, 
at which protective or mitigative actions are

[[Page 31670]]

initiated, affected by this change. This change will not alter the 
manner in which equipment operation is initiated, nor will the 
function demands on credited equipment be changed. No change is 
being made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal 
event as described in the FSAR as a result of this change. As such, 
no new failure modes are being introduced. The change does not alter 
assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. While the 
surveillance requirement acceptance criteria is made less 
restrictive by removal of design margin that accounts for minimizing 
stress and wear, and increasing equipment life, and the expected 
operating limit on minimum RCP speed, this margin is more 
appropriately maintained in the design and in operating and 
surveillance procedures.
    Therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.
    L16 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.4.10, ``RCS Specific 
Activity,'' Actions by deleting Required Action B.1, which requires 
``Perform SR 3.4.10.2,'' within 4 hours.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The proposed change provides less stringent TS actions 
for the facility. However, the less restrictive requirements 
continue to ensure process variables, structures, systems, and 
components are maintained consistent with the safety analyses and 
licensing basis. The performance of SR 3.4.10.2 is not related to an 
accident initiator nor credited with mitigation of the consequences 
of an accident.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. The 
change maintains requirements within the safety analyses and 
licensing basis. The result of performing the additional 
surveillance does not provide any additional margin of safety; as 
such, eliminating the Required Action for performing the additional 
surveillance does not result in a significant reduction in a margin 
of safety.
    L17 SNC proposes to amend TS as follows:
    1. Current TS 3.5.2, ``Core Makeup Tanks (CMTs)--Operating,'' 
Condition D is revised from ``One CMT inoperable due to presence of 
noncondensible gases in one high point vent,'' to ``One CMT inlet 
line with noncondensible gas volume not within limit.''
    2. Current TS 3.5.2, Required Action D.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore CMT inlet line noncondensible 
gas volume to within limit.''
    3. Current TS 3.5.2, SR 3.5.2.4 is revised from ``Verify the 
volume of noncondensible gases in each CMT inlet line has not caused 
the high point water level to drop below the sensor,'' to ``Verify 
the volume of noncondensible gases in each CMT inlet line is within 
limit.''
    4. Current TS 3.5.4, ``Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat 
Exchanger (PRHR HX)--Operating,'' Condition C is revised from 
``Presence of noncondensible gases in the high point vent,'' to 
``PRHR HX inlet line noncondensible gas volume not within limit.''
    5. Current TS 3.5.4, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore PRHR HX inlet line 
noncondensible gas volume to within limit.''
    6. Current TS 3.5.4, SR 3.5.4.3 is revised from ``Verify the 
volume of noncondensible gases in the PRHR HX inlet line has not 
caused the high point water level to drop below the sensor,'' to 
``Verify the volume of noncondensible gases in the PRHR HX inlet 
line is within limit.''
    7. Current TS 3.5.5, ``Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat 
Exchanger (PRHR HX)--Shutdown, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) 
Intact,'' Condition C is revised from ``Presence of noncondensible 
gases in the high point vent,'' to ``PRHR HX inlet line 
noncondensible gas volume not within limit.''
    8. Current TS 3.5.5, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore PRHR HX inlet line 
noncondensible gas volume to within limit.''
    9. Current TS 3.5.6, ``In-containment Refueling Water Storage 
Tank (IRWST)--Operating,'' Condition B is revised from ``One IRWST 
injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases in 
one high point vent,'' to ``One IRWST injection flow path with 
noncondensible gas volume in one squib valve outlet line pipe stub 
not within limit.''
    10. Current TS 3.5.6, Required Action B.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore noncondensible gas volume in 
squib valve outlet line pipe stub to within limit.''
    11. Current TS 3.5.6, Condition C is revised from ``One IRWST 
injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible gases in 
both high point vents,'' to ``One IRWST injection flow path with 
noncondensible gas volume in both squib valve outlet line pipe stubs 
not within limit.''
    12. Current TS 3.5.6, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases from one high point vent,'' to ``Restore one 
squib valve outlet line pipe stub noncondensible gas volume to 
within limit.''
    13. Current TS 3.5.6, SR 3.5.6.3 is revised from ``Verify the 
volume of noncondensible gases in each of the four IRWST injection 
squib valve outlet line pipe stubs has not caused the high-point 
water level to drop below the sensor,'' to ``Verify the volume of 
noncondensible gases in each of the four IRWST injection squib valve 
outlet line pipe stubs is within limit.''
    14. Current TS 3.5.7, ``In-containment Refueling Water Storage 
Tank (IRWST)--Shutdown, MODE 5,'' Condition B is revised from 
``Required IRWST injection line inoperable due to presence of 
noncondensible gases in one high point vent,'' to ``Required IRWST 
injection flow path with noncondensible gas volume in one squib 
valve outlet line pipe stub not within limit.''
    15. Current TS 3.5.7, Required Action B.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases,'' to ``Restore noncondensible gas volume in 
squib valve outlet line pipe stub to within limit.''
    16. Current TS 3.5.7, Condition C is revised from ``Required 
IRWST injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible 
gases in both high point vents,'' to ``Required IRWST injection flow 
path with noncondensible gas volume in both squib valve outlet line 
pipe stubs not within limit.''
    17. Current TS 3.5.7, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases from one high point vent,'' to ``Restore one 
squib valve outlet line pipe stub noncondensible gas volume to 
within limit.''
    18. TS 3.5.8, ``In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank 
(IRWST)--Shutdown, MODE 6,'' Condition B is revised from ``Required 
IRWST injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible 
gases in one high point vent,'' to ``Required IRWST injection flow 
path with noncondensible gas volume in one squib valve outlet line 
pipe stub not within limit.''
    19. Current TS 3.5.8, Required Action B.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases,''

[[Page 31671]]

to ``Restore noncondensible gas volume in squib valve outlet line 
pipe stub to within limit.''
    20. Current TS 3.5.8, Condition C is revised from ``Required 
IRWST injection line inoperable due to presence of noncondensible 
gases in both high point vents,'' to ``Required IRWST injection flow 
path with noncondensible gas volume in both squib valve outlet line 
pipe stubs not within limit.''
    21. Current TS 3.5.8, Required Action C.1 is revised from ``Vent 
noncondensible gases from one high point vent,'' to ``Restore one 
squib valve outlet line pipe stub noncondensible gas volume to 
within limit.''
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operations. The proposed change provides less stringent TS 
requirements by not expressly specifying the method of determining 
or restoring the noncondensible gas volume that can adversely affect 
the associated flow path; however, the requirement that 
noncondensible gas volume be within limit is not changed. These less 
stringent requirements do not result in operations that 
significantly increase the probability of initiating an analyzed 
event, and do not alter assumptions relative to mitigation of an 
accident or transient event. The less restrictive requirements 
continue to ensure process variables, structures, systems, and 
components are maintained consistent with the safety analyses and 
licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will not reduce a margin of safety because 
it has no effect on any assumption of the safety analyses. The 
amended actions and surveillances continue to assure that 
noncondensible gas volumes are maintained and restored to within 
acceptable limits. The change maintains requirements within the 
safety analyses and licensing basis.
    As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    L18 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.6.8, ``Containment 
Penetrations,'' LCO 3.6.8.d.2 to allow the penetration flow path to 
be open provided it can be closed prior to steaming into the 
containment. In conjunction, current SR 3.6.8.3 as well as the 
corresponding containment Isolation function required in current TS 
3.3.2, ``Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) 
Instrumentation,'' Table 3.3.2-1 Function 3.a for Modes 5 and 6, are 
removed. This removes requirements for Operable containment 
isolation signals in Modes 5 and 6, allowing manual operator actions 
to affect any required isolation prior to steaming into the 
containment.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change would remove requirements for Operable 
containment isolation signals in Modes 5 and 6, allowing manual 
operator action to effect any required isolation. The design 
provisions for instrumented closure signals are unaffected. The 
isolation status of the penetration flow path is not an initiator to 
any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of 
an accident previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences 
of an accident with the valves open and capable of being closed 
prior to steaming into the containment are no different than the 
consequences of the same accident with the current requirements. The 
valves are currently allowed to be open, provided they can be 
isolated. The accident analysis assumes cooling water inventory is 
not lost in the event of an accident. Thus, closing the valves prior 
to steaming into the containment will ensure this assumption is met. 
As a result, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated 
are not affected by this change. The proposed change does not alter 
or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) 
from performing their intended function to mitigate the consequences 
of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The 
proposed change does not affect the source term, containment 
isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating 
the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 
Further, the proposed change does not increase the types or amounts 
of radioactive effluent that may be released offsite, nor 
significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational/public 
radiation exposures.
    The proposed change is consistent with the safety analysis 
assumptions and resultant consequences.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change to remove requirements for Operable 
containment isolation signals in Modes 5 and 6, and allowing manual 
operator action to isolate the purge valve penetration flow path 
prior to steaming into the containment, does not alter the manner in 
which safety limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting 
conditions for operation are determined. The safety analysis 
acceptance criteria are not affected by this change. The proposed 
change will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside 
of the design basis.
    As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    L19 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.9.6 ``pH Adjustment,'' 
LCO and current SR 3.9.6.1 trisodium phosphate (TSP) requirement 
from the volume requirement of 560 ft\3\ to a weight requirement of 
26,460 lbs. In addition, due to this change, Condition A and 
Required Action A.1 is changed to refer to ``weight'' in lieu of 
``volume.''
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or

[[Page 31672]]

consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change allows for a lesser volume over time 
consistent with expected compaction and agglomeration. While the 
total weight will remain constant and sufficient to assure safety 
analysis assumptions are met, the unintended requirement to maintain 
volume > 560 ft\3\, even after compaction and agglomeration is made 
less restrictive. The TSP is not an initiator to any accident 
previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of an accident 
previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences of an 
accident with the changed TSP weight limit are no different than the 
consequences of the same accident with the current TSP limit. The 
accident analysis assumes a minimum of 26,460 lbs of TSP, and this 
value is being maintained in the TS. The assumed pH of 7.0 will be 
maintained using the proposed weight of TSP. This pH will continue 
to augment the retention of elemental iodine in the containment 
water, and thus reduce the iodine available to leak to the 
environment. As a result, the consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated are not affected by this change. The proposed change does 
not alter or prevent the ability of SSCs from performing their 
intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating 
event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change does 
not affect the source term, containment isolation, or radiological 
release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences 
of an accident previously evaluated. Further, the proposed change 
does not increase the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that 
may be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or 
cumulative occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed 
change is consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and 
resultant consequences.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change to allow for a lesser volume over time 
consistent with expected compaction and agglomeration, while 
maintaining the total weight to assure safety analysis assumptions 
are met, does not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting 
safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation are 
determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not affected 
by this change. The proposed change will not result in plant 
operation in a configuration outside of the design basis.
    As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    L20 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.7.2, ``Main Steam 
Isolation Valves (MSIVs),'' Condition D Note to allow separate 
Condition entry due to any inoperable valve covered by the LCO, not 
just the MSIVs.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change allows a separate Condition entry for each 
affected flow path. The failure of the main steam line flow path 
covered by the LCO to close is not an initiator to any accident 
previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of an accident 
previously evaluated is not affected. The consequences of an 
accident are not affected since the inoperability in the flow path 
is addressed to assure affected flow paths are isolated as assumed 
in the accident analysis. As a result, the consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated are not affected by this change. The 
proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, 
systems, and components from performing their intended function to 
mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed 
acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect the source 
term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions 
used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated. Further, the proposed change does not increase 
the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released 
offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative 
occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed change is 
consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and resultant 
consequences.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. No change is being made to the procedures relied upon to 
respond to an off-normal event as described in the FSAR as a result 
of this change. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. 
The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis 
and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change to allow a separate Condition entry for each 
affected flow path does not alter the manner in which safety limits, 
limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation 
are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not 
affected by this change. The proposed change will not result in 
plant operation in a configuration outside of the design basis.
    As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    L21 SNC proposes to amend TS 3.8.1, ``[Direct Current] DC 
Sources--Operating,'' by deleting SR 3.8.1.3 Note 2.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The Class 1E DC electrical power system, including associated 
battery chargers, is not an initiator to any accident sequence 
analyzed in the FSAR. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS 
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of 
performing its function as described in the FSAR, therefore the 
mitigative functions supported by the Class 1E DC electrical power 
system will continue to provide the protection assumed by the 
accident analysis.
    The proposed TS change does not involve any changes to SSCs and 
does not alter the method of operation or control of SSCs as 
described in the FSAR. The current assumptions in the safety 
analysis regarding accident initiators and mitigation of accidents 
are unaffected by this change. No additional failure modes or 
mechanisms are being introduced and the likelihood of previously 
analyzed failures remains unchanged. The integrity of fission 
product

[[Page 31673]]

barriers, plant configuration, and operating procedures as described 
in the FSAR will not be affected by this change. Therefore, the 
consequences of previously analyzed accidents will not increase 
because of this change.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that 
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being 
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event 
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being 
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety 
analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change is acceptable because the 
operability of the Class 1E DC electrical power system is 
unaffected, there is no detrimental impact on any equipment design 
parameter, and the plant will still be required to operate within 
assumed conditions. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS 
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of 
performing its function as described in the FSAR; therefore, the 
support of the Class 1E DC electrical power system to the plant 
response to analyzed events will continue to provide the margins of 
safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate monitoring and 
maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will continue to be 
performed.
    As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    L22 SNC proposes to amend current TS 3.8.2, ``DC Sources--
Shutdown,'' by adding a new Condition A to address inoperable 
battery chargers.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The Class 1E DC electrical power system, including associated 
battery chargers, is not an initiator to any accident sequence 
analyzed in the FSAR. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS 
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of 
performing its function as described in the FSAR, therefore the 
mitigative functions supported by the Class 1E DC electrical power 
system will continue to provide the protection assumed by the 
accident analysis.
    The proposed change does not involve any changes to SSCs and 
does not alter the method of operation or control of SSCs as 
described in the FSAR. The current assumptions in the safety 
analysis regarding accident initiators and mitigation of accidents 
are unaffected by this change. No additional failure modes or 
mechanisms are being introduced and the likelihood of previously 
analyzed failures remains unchanged.
    The integrity of fission product barriers, plant configuration, 
and operating procedures as described in the FSAR will not be 
affected by this change. Therefore, the consequences of previously 
analyzed accidents will not increase because of this change.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that 
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being 
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event 
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being 
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety 
analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change is acceptable because the 
Operability of the Class 1E DC electrical power system is 
unaffected, there is no detrimental impact on any equipment design 
parameter, and the plant will still be required to operate within 
assumed conditions. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS 
ensures that the Class 1E DC electrical power system is capable of 
performing its function as described in the FSAR; therefore, the 
support of the Class 1E DC electrical power system to the plant 
response to analyzed events will continue to provide the margins of 
safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate monitoring and 
maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will continue to be 
performed.
    As such, there is no technical change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    L23 SNC proposes to amend current TS 5.5.2, ``Radioactive 
Effluent Control Program,'' to state that the provisions of SR 3.0.2 
and SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Radioactive Effluents Control 
Program surveillance frequency.
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    A TS frequency for the determination of cumulative and projected 
dose contributions from radioactive effluents is not an initiator to 
any accident sequence analyzed in the FSAR. Operation in accordance 
with the proposed TS continues to ensure that initial conditions 
assumed in the accident analysis are maintained. The proposed change 
does not involve a modification to the physical configuration of the 
plant or change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The 
proposed change will not impose any new or different requirements or 
introduce a new accident initiator, accident precursor, or 
malfunction mechanism.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that 
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being 
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event 
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being 
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety 
analysis and licensing basis.

[[Page 31674]]

    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. The proposed change, applying the 25% extension to 
the frequency of performing the monthly cumulative dose and 
projected dose calculations, will have no effect on the plant 
response to analyzed events and with therefore not impact a margin 
of safety. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS ensures that 
the plant response to analyzed events will continue to provide the 
margins of safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate monitoring 
and maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will continue 
to be performed.
    As such, there is no functional change to the requirements and 
therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    L24 SNC proposes to amend current TS 5.5.3, ``Inservice Testing 
Program,'' paragraph b from ``The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are 
applicable to the above required Frequencies for performing 
inservice testing activities,'' to ``The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are 
applicable to the above required Frequencies and other normal and 
accelerated Frequencies specified as 2 years or less in the 
Inservice Testing Program for performing inservice testing 
activities.''
    SNC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards 
consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on 
the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
amendment,'' as discussed below:
    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The frequency for inservice testing is not an initiator to any 
accident sequence analyzed in the FSAR, nor is it associated with 
any mitigative actions to reduce consequences. Operation in 
accordance with the proposed TS continues to ensure that initial 
conditions accident mitigative features assumed in the accident 
analysis are maintained. The proposed change does not involve a 
modification to the physical configuration of the plant or change in 
the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed change 
will not impose any new or different requirements or introduce a new 
accident initiator, accident precursor, or malfunction mechanism.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant as described in the FSAR. No new equipment is being 
introduced, and equipment is not being operated in a new or 
different manner. There are no setpoints, at which protective or 
mitigative actions are initiated, affected by this change. This 
change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is 
initiated, nor will the function demands on credited equipment be 
changed. Any alteration in procedures will continue to ensure that 
the plant remains within analyzed limits, and no change is being 
made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event 
as described in the FSAR. As such, no new failure modes are being 
introduced. The change does not alter assumptions made in the safety 
analysis and licensing basis.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change, applying the 25% extension to certain 
frequencies for performing inservice testing, does not significantly 
degrade the reliability that results from performing the 
Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the 
recognition that the most probable result of any particular 
surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with 
the SRs. As such, there is no technical change to the requirements 
and therefore, there is no significant reduction in a margin of 
safety. Margin of safety is established through equipment design, 
operating parameters, and the setpoints at which automatic actions 
are initiated. Operation in accordance with the proposed TS ensures 
that the plant response to analyzed events will continue to provide 
the margins of safety assumed by the analysis. Appropriate 
monitoring and maintenance, consistent with industry standards, will 
continue to be performed. As such, there is no functional change to 
the requirements and therefore, there is no significant reduction in 
a margin of safety.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) 
are satisfied.
    Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

    Attorney for licensee: Mr. M. Stanford Blanton, Balch & Bingham 
LLP, 1710 Sixth Avenue North, Birmingham, AL 35203-2015.
    NRC Branch Chief: Mark E. Tonacci.

Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and 
Combined Licenses

    During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, 
the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has 
determined for each of these amendments that the application complies 
with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The 
Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the 
Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set 
forth in the license amendment.
    A notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to facility 
operating license or combined license, as applicable, proposed no 
significant hazards consideration determination, and opportunity for a 
hearing in connection with these actions, was published in the Federal 
Register as indicated.
    Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that 
these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in 
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), 
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an 
environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 
10 CFR 51.22(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, 
it is so indicated.
    For further details with respect to the action see (1) The 
applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's 
related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as 
indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at 
the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint 
North, Room O1-F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland 20852. Publicly available documents created or received at the 
NRC are accessible electronically through the Agencywide Documents 
Access and Management System (ADAMS) in the NRC Library at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS 
or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, 
contact the PDR's Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 or by 
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov.

Entergy Operations, Inc., System Energy Resources, Inc., South 
Mississippi Electric Power Association, and Entergy Mississippi, Inc., 
Docket No. 50-416, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Claiborne 
County, Mississippi

    Date of application for amendment: January 23, 2012, as 
supplemented by letter dated March 21, 2012.
    Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised Technical 
Specification (TS) 3.1.7, ``Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System.'' The 
license amendment request (LAR)

[[Page 31675]]

reflects the enrichment of the Boron-10 (B-10) isotope in the sodium 
pentaborate (SPB) solution, which is the credited neutron absorber. 
Increasing the enrichment of the B-10 isotope in the SPB solution 
effectively increases the available negative reactivity inserted by the 
SLC system without having to increase the system's storage capacity. In 
addition, changes to the SLC system increase the operating temperature 
range and decrease the solution volume. TS 3.1.7 has been reformatted 
so that Figures 3.1.7-1 and 3.1.7-2 can be deleted and replaced with 
various new action conditions and surveillance requirements. These 
changes to TS 3.1.7 were originally included as part of the GGNS 
Extended Power Uprate (EPU) LAR dated September 8, 2010. Due to delays 
in obtaining approval of the EPU LAR and the need for the SLC system 
changes to support operation with the Cycle 19 core design, Entergy 
Operations, Inc. (the licensee), submitted this request separately. The 
change is needed to ensure appropriate shutdown margin can be 
maintained during reload design for future cycles beginning with Cycle 
19.
    Date of issuance: May 11, 2012.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented 
prior to startup from the spring 2012 refueling outage.
    Amendment No: 190.
    Facility Operating License No. NPF-29: The amendment revised the 
Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: February 7, 2012 (77 FR 
6148). The supplemental letter dated March 21, 2012, provided 
additional information that clarified the application, did not expand 
the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change 
the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination as published in the Federal Register.
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated May 11, 2012.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457, 
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois; Docket Nos. 
STN 50-454 and STN 50-455, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Ogle County, 
Illinois

    Date of application for amendment: March 14, 2011, as supplemented 
by letters dated September 2, 2011, and November 18, 2011.
    Brief description of amendment: The license amendment request 
changes the facility operating licenses and the Technical 
Specifications (TSs) 3.4.12-1, for the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 
and Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The proposed change will reflect 
standard wording incorporated in NUREG-1431, Revision 3, ``Standard 
Technical Specifications-Westinghouse Plants,'' for plants with 
installed bypass test capability. The proposed change is needed to 
support utilization of bypass test capability that is planned to be 
installed, which will reduce the potential for unnecessary reactor 
trips or safeguards actuation due to a failure or transient in a 
redundant channel.
    Date of issuance: March 30, 2012.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented 
within 60 days.
    Amendment Nos.: Braidwood Unit 1--169; Braidwood Unit 2--169; Byron 
Unit 1--176 and Byron Unit 2-176.
    Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72. NPF-77, NPF-37, and NPF-66: 
The amendments revised the Technical Specifications and License.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: August 16, 2011 (76 FR 
50759). The September 2, 2011, and November 18, 2011, supplements 
contained clarifying information and did not change the staff's initial 
proposed finding of no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 30, 2012.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-461, Clinton Power 
Station, Unit 1, DeWitt County, Illinois

    Date of application for amendment: June 13, 2011.
    Brief description of amendment: The amendment modifies Clinton 
Power Station, Unit 1 (CPS), Technical Specification (TS) Limiting 
Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.1.2, ``Reactivity Anomalies,'' through 
a revision to the method for calculating core reactivity for the 
purpose of performing an anomaly check. The reactivity anomaly 
verification is currently determined by comparison of predicted vs. 
monitored control rod density. The proposed method would compare 
predicted vs. monitored keffective (keff).
    Date of issuance: March 1, 2012.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented 
within 60 days.
    Amendment No.: 198.
    Facility Operating License No. NPF-62: The amendment revised the 
Technical Specifications and License.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: October 4, 2011.
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated March 1, 2012.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-289, Three Mile Island 
Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1), Dauphin County, Pennsylvania

    Date of application for amendment: October 18, 2011, supplemented 
by letters dated January 20, 2012, and April 11, 2012.
    Brief description of amendment: The amendment involves 
administrative changes. The changes include correcting typographical 
errors, making format changes, clarifying symbols and pages, 
reformatting of previously deleted pages, incorporating a consistent 
abbreviation of average reactor coolant temperature, deleting notes 
that are no longer applicable, and replacing certain drawing figures 
with versions that have a corrected title block.
    Date of issuance: May 7, 2012.
    Effective date: Immediately, and shall be implemented within 60 
days.
    Amendment No.: 278.
    Facility Operating License No. DPR-50: Amendment revised the 
license and the technical specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: December 13, 2011 (76 
FR 77567).
    The supplements dated January 20, 2012, and April 11, 2012, 
provided additional information that clarified the application, did not 
expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not 
change the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards 
determination.
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated May 7, 2012.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket No. 50-388, Susquehanna Steam Electric 
Station, Unit 2, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania

    Date of application for amendment: March 8, 2012, as supplemented 
by letters dated March 23, March 29, and April 2, 2012.
    Brief description of amendment: On April 19, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission issued Amendment No. 258 to Renewed Facility 
Operating License No. NPF-22 for the Susquehanna Steam Electric 
Station, Unit 2 (SSES Unit 2). Due to a typographical error, the 
amendment was incorrectly numbered. The correct

[[Page 31676]]

Amendment No. is 238. This amendment was originally noticed in the 
Federal Register on May 15, 2012 (77 FR 28636). All references to 
Amendment No. 258 in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's letter 
dated April 19, 2012, have been corrected by letter dated April 27, 
2012. The amendment allows an extension of 24 hours to the Completion 
Time for Condition C in the SSES Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) 
3.8.7, ``Distribution Systems-Operating,'' to allow a Unit 1 4160 V 
subsystem to be de-energized and removed from service for 96 hours to 
perform modifications on the bus. It also allows an extension of 24 
hours to the Completion Time for Condition A in SSES Unit 2 TS 3.7.1, 
``Plant Systems-RHRSW [residual heat removal service water system] and 
UHS [ultimate heat sink],'' to allow the UHS spray array and spray 
array bypass valves associated with applicable division RHRSW, and in 
Condition B, the applicable division Unit 2 RHRSW subsystem, to be 
inoperable for 96 hours during the Unit 1 4160 V bus breaker control 
logic modifications.
    Date of issuance: April 19, 2012.
    Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented 
within 30 days from the date of issuance.
    Corrected Amendment No.: 238.
    Facility Operating License No. NPF-22: This amendment revised the 
License and Technical Specifications.
    Date of initial notice in Federal Register: March 16, 2012 (77 FR 
15814).
    The supplements dated March 23, March 29, and April 2, 2012, 
provided additional information that clarified the application, did not 
expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not 
change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination as published in the Federal Register.
    The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained 
in a Safety Evaluation dated April 19, 2012, which also contains its 
final no significant hazards consideration determination.
    No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of May 2012.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michele G. Evans,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2012-12687 Filed 5-25-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P