Matthew J. Kachinas, M.D.; Decision and Order, 29691-29692 [2012-12096]
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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 97 / Friday, May 18, 2012 / Notices
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If you have comments, especially on
the estimated public burden or
associated response time, suggestions,
or need a copy of the proposed
information collection instrument with
instructions or additional information,
please contact Danielle Ouellette,
Department of Justice Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services,
145 N Street NE., Washington, DC
20530.
Written comments and suggestions
from the public and affected agencies
concerning the proposed collection of
information are encouraged. Your
comments should address one or more
of the following four points:
—Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
—Evaluate the accuracy of the agency’s
estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
—Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
—Minimize the burden of the collection
of information on those who are to
respond, including through the use of
appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological
collection techniques or other forms
of information technology, e.g.,
permitting electronic submission of
responses.
Overview of This Information
Collection
(1) Type of Information Collection:
Proposed collection; comments
requested.
(2) Title of the Form/Collection: Status
of COPS Grant Implementation
Facsimile.
(3) Agency form number, if any, and
the applicable component of the
Department sponsoring the collection:
None. U.S. Department of Justice Office
of Community Oriented Policing
Services.
(4) Affected public who will be asked
or required to respond, as well as a brief
abstract: Under the Violent Crime and
Control Act of 1994, the U.S.
Department of Justice COPS Office
would require the completion of the
Status of COPS Grant Implementation
Facsimile from law enforcement
agencies if they have yet to send in their
current Federal Financial Report (SF–
425). This is to ensure that these
agencies are planning on implementing
their COPS grant program and/or project
that they had previously been awarded.
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(5) An estimate of the total number of
respondents and the amount of time
estimate for an average respondent to
respond/reply: It is estimated that 200
respondents annually will complete the
form within .1 hours.
(6) An estimate of the total public
burden (in hours) associated with the
collection: There are an estimated 20
total annual burden hours associated
with this collection.
If additional information is required
contact: Jerri Murray, Department
Clearance Officer, United States
Department of Justice, Justice
Management Division, Policy and
Planning Staff, Two Constitution
Square, 145 N Street NE., Room 2E–508,
Washington, DC 20530.
Jerri Murray,
Department Clearance Officer, PRA, U.S.
Department of Justice.
[FR Doc. 2012–12091 Filed 5–17–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–AT–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Matthew J. Kachinas, M.D.; Decision
and Order
On September 27, 2011, the Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to Matthew J. Kachinas,
M.D. (hereinafter, Registrant), of Ft.
Myers and Venice, Florida. The Show
Cause Order proposed the revocation of
Respondent’s DEA Certificates of
Registration, #s FK1795624 and
FK1794305, and the denial of any
applications to renew or modify the
registrations, on two grounds. Show
Cause Order at 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 823(f),
824(a)(3) & (4)).
First, the Order alleged that as a result
of an action taken by the Florida Board
of Medicine, Registrant no longer holds
authority to dispense controlled
substances in Florida, the State in
which he holds his registrations. Show
Cause Order at 2. Second, the Order
alleged that ‘‘DEA’s investigation
revealed that [Registrant] stored and
later abandoned controlled substances
at an unregistered location, in violation
of 21 CFR 1301.12(a).’’ Id. The Order
also notified Registrant of his right to
request a hearing on the allegations or
to submit a written statement in lieu of
a hearing, the procedures for doing
either, and the consequences for failing
to do either. See id. (citing 21 CFR
1301.43(a), (c), (d), & (e)).
As evidenced by the signed return
receipt card, on December 5, 2011,
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29691
service was accomplished on Registrant
by certified mail addressed to him at his
residence. GX 7. Since the date of
service, more than thirty days have now
passed and neither Registrant, nor
anyone purporting to represent him, has
requested a hearing or submitted a
written statement in lieu of a hearing.
Accordingly, I find that Registrant has
waived both his right to a hearing and
his right to submit a written statement
in lieu of a hearing. 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
Accordingly, I issue this Decision and
Order based on relevant evidence
contained in the Investigative Record
submitted by the Government. I make
the following findings.
Findings
Registrant is the holder of two DEA
Certificates of Registration, which
authorize him to dispense controlled
substances in schedules II through V as
a practitioner: (1) #FK1795624, with the
registered address of 13100 Westlinks
Terrace, Suite 12, Ft. Myers, Florida;
and (2) #FK1794305, with the registered
address of 401 Commercial Ct., Suite D,
Venice, Florida. Both of these
registrations do not expire until
December 31, 2012.1
Registrant formerly held a license to
practice medicine which was issued by
the Florida Board of Medicine.
However, on April 16, 2010, the Board
of Medicine issued a Final Order which
adopted the recommended order of a
state Administrative Law Judge and
revoked Registrant’s medical license.
GX 5, at 10–11. Accordingly, I find that
Registrant is without authority under
the laws of Florida to practice medicine
and dispense controlled substances.
The Government also submitted
various Incident Reports it obtained
from the Longboat Key, Florida Police
Department. According to these reports,
on July 6, 2011, a police officer was
summoned to a home located at 1590
Harbor Cay Lane based on ‘‘a complaint
of some type of hazardous materials
located in a repossessed home.’’ GX 6,
at 1. According to the report, the
responding officer spoke with one Ms.
O. of Field Asset Services, an Austin,
Texas based firm, who stated that the
home had been recently repossessed
from a former physician and that she
was hired to clean up the property. Id.
at 3. Ms. O. showed the officer items
that she believed to be narcotics, a large
amount of needles, and a lab specimen
medium. Id. The officer took possession
of the items suspected of being
1 Registrant also held a third registration, which
expired on December 31, 2011. However, the
Government states that Registrant did not file a
renewal application for this registration. Request for
Final Agency Action at 7.
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29692
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 97 / Friday, May 18, 2012 / Notices
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
controlled substances and advised Ms.
O. that the needles and other medical
supplies should be declared bio-hazards
and removed by a professional disposal
firm. Id. Another portion of the report
lists the confiscated items and includes
five vials of injectable Diazepam 5mg/
ml (a schedule IV controlled substance),
11 vials of injectable midazolam 50mg/
10ml (also a schedule IV controlled
substance), 1 vial of ketamine 500gm/
10ml (a schedule III controlled
substance), as well as one partially used
vial of each of these drugs, and one vial
of brevital sodium (a schedule IV
controlled substance). Id. at 2. The
police report, however, contains no
further information explaining how the
determination was made that the vials
contained the above listed drugs. See
generally id. Nor does any other
evidence in the record establish how
this determination was made.
In addition, the record includes a
document which provides Master
Information for Registrant’s expired
registration and lists the same 1590
Harbor Cay Lane address as his mailing
address. GX 3. While this document
creates a reasonable suspicion that
Registrant brought the above items to
this address, the record contains no
further evidence sufficient to move
beyond suspicion and into the realm of
substantial evidence necessary to
establish this as a fact. See NLRB v.
Columbian E. & S. Co., 306 U.S. 292,
300 (1939) (‘‘Substantial evidence is
more than a scintilla, and must do more
than create a suspicion of the existence
of the fact to be established.’’). More
specifically, while the police report
notes that the home had ‘‘recently been
repossessed from’’ Registrant, no other
evidence establishes the declarant’s
basis of knowledge, let alone such facts
as the respective dates on which
Registrant vacated the premises and the
home was repossessed, whether the
home was secured after Registrant
vacated the premises and was in that
state when Ms. O. entered it and found
the items, and whether Registrant was
the only person who stayed in the home
and who had access to controlled
substances.
Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the
Attorney General is authorized to
suspend or revoke a registration issued
under section 823 ‘‘upon a finding that
the registrant * * * has had his State
license * * * suspended [or] revoked
* * * by competent State authority and
is no longer authorized by State law to
engage in the * * * dispensing of
controlled substances.’’ Moreover, DEA
has repeatedly held that the possession
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18:21 May 17, 2012
Jkt 226001
of authority to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the State
in which a practitioner engages in
professional practice is a fundamental
condition for obtaining and maintaining
a practitioner’s registration.
This rule derives from the text of two
provisions of the CSA. First, Congress
defined ‘‘the term ‘practitioner’ [to]
mean[] a * * * physician * * * or
other person licensed, registered or
otherwise permitted, by * * * the
jurisdiction in which he practices * * *
to distribute, dispense, [or] administer
* * * a controlled substance in the
course of professional practice.’’ 21
U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a
practitioner’s registration, Congress
directed that ‘‘[t]he Attorney General
shall register practitioners * * * if the
applicant is authorized to dispense
* * * controlled substances under the
laws of the State in which he practices.’’
21 U.S.C. 823(f). Because Congress has
clearly mandated that a practitioner
possess state authority in order to be
deemed a practitioner under the Act,
DEA has held repeatedly that revocation
of a practitioner’s registration is the
appropriate sanction whenever he is no
longer authorized to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the State
in which he practices medicine. See,
e.g., Calvin Ramsey, 76 FR 20034, 20036
(2011); Dominick A. Ricci, 58 FR 51104,
51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, 53 FR
11919, 11920 (1988).
As found above, on April 16, 2010,
the Florida Board of Medicine revoked
Registrant’s medical license and
accordingly, he is no longer authorized
under Florida law to dispense
controlled substances. Because
Registrant no longer satisfies the CSA’s
requirement for maintaining his
registrations, I will order that his
registrations be revoked and that any
pending applications be denied.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(3), as
well as 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that
DEA Certificates of Registration
FK1795624 and FK1794305, issued to
Matthew J. Kachinas, M.D., be, and they
hereby are, revoked. I further order that
any pending application of Matthew J.
Kachinas, M.D., to renew or modify
either registration, be, and it hereby is,
denied. This Order is effective June 18,
2012.
Dated: May 4, 2012.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2012–12096 Filed 5–17–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 12–28]
Segun M. Rasaki, M.D.; Decision and
Order
On January 27, 2012, Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) Timothy D. Wing
issued the attached recommended
decision. Neither party filed exceptions
to the decision. Having reviewed the
entire record, I have decided to adopt
the ALJ’s rulings, findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommended
Order.
To make clear, DEA’s longstanding
rule that a practitioner may not hold a
registration if he lacks authority under
state law to dispense controlled
substances and that the loss of such
authority subjects a practitioner’s
registration to revocation is not based
solely on 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), which is
a grant of authority to either suspend or
revoke a registration ‘‘upon a finding’’
that a registrant ‘‘has had his State
license or registration suspended,
revoked, or denied by competent State
authority and is no longer authorized by
State law to engage in the * * *
dispensing of controlled substances.’’
As explained in numerous cases, DEA’s
rule derives primarily from two other
provisions of the CSA, 21 U.S.C.
802(21), which defines the term
‘‘practitioner,’’ and 21 U.S.C. 823(f),
which sets forth the requirements for
obtaining a registration as a practitioner.
More specifically, the CSA defines
‘‘the term ‘practitioner’ [to] mean[ ] a
* * * physician * * * or other person
licensed, registered or otherwise
permitted, by * * * the jurisdiction in
which he practices * * * to distribute,
dispense, [or] administer * * * a
controlled substance in the course of
professional practice.’’ 21 U.S.C.
802(21). Consistent with this definition,
Congress, in setting the requirements for
obtaining a practitioner’s registration,
provided that ‘‘[t]he Attorney General
shall register practitioners * * * if the
applicant is authorized to dispense
* * * controlled substances under the
laws of the State in which he practices.’’
21 U.S.C. 823(f). Accordingly, because
one cannot obtain a practitioner’s
registration unless one holds authority
under state law to dispense controlled
substances, and because where a
registered practitioner’s state authority
has been revoked or suspended, the
practitioner no longer meets the
statutory definition of a practitioner,
DEA has repeatedly held that the
possession of authority to dispense
controlled substances under the laws of
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 97 (Friday, May 18, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 29691-29692]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-12096]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Matthew J. Kachinas, M.D.; Decision and Order
On September 27, 2011, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office
of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, issued an Order
to Show Cause to Matthew J. Kachinas, M.D. (hereinafter, Registrant),
of Ft. Myers and Venice, Florida. The Show Cause Order proposed the
revocation of Respondent's DEA Certificates of Registration, s
FK1795624 and FK1794305, and the denial of any applications to renew or
modify the registrations, on two grounds. Show Cause Order at 1 (citing
21 U.S.C. 823(f), 824(a)(3) & (4)).
First, the Order alleged that as a result of an action taken by the
Florida Board of Medicine, Registrant no longer holds authority to
dispense controlled substances in Florida, the State in which he holds
his registrations. Show Cause Order at 2. Second, the Order alleged
that ``DEA's investigation revealed that [Registrant] stored and later
abandoned controlled substances at an unregistered location, in
violation of 21 CFR 1301.12(a).'' Id. The Order also notified
Registrant of his right to request a hearing on the allegations or to
submit a written statement in lieu of a hearing, the procedures for
doing either, and the consequences for failing to do either. See id.
(citing 21 CFR 1301.43(a), (c), (d), & (e)).
As evidenced by the signed return receipt card, on December 5,
2011, service was accomplished on Registrant by certified mail
addressed to him at his residence. GX 7. Since the date of service,
more than thirty days have now passed and neither Registrant, nor
anyone purporting to represent him, has requested a hearing or
submitted a written statement in lieu of a hearing. Accordingly, I find
that Registrant has waived both his right to a hearing and his right to
submit a written statement in lieu of a hearing. 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
Accordingly, I issue this Decision and Order based on relevant evidence
contained in the Investigative Record submitted by the Government. I
make the following findings.
Findings
Registrant is the holder of two DEA Certificates of Registration,
which authorize him to dispense controlled substances in schedules II
through V as a practitioner: (1) FK1795624, with the
registered address of 13100 Westlinks Terrace, Suite 12, Ft. Myers,
Florida; and (2) FK1794305, with the registered address of 401
Commercial Ct., Suite D, Venice, Florida. Both of these registrations
do not expire until December 31, 2012.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Registrant also held a third registration, which expired on
December 31, 2011. However, the Government states that Registrant
did not file a renewal application for this registration. Request
for Final Agency Action at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Registrant formerly held a license to practice medicine which was
issued by the Florida Board of Medicine. However, on April 16, 2010,
the Board of Medicine issued a Final Order which adopted the
recommended order of a state Administrative Law Judge and revoked
Registrant's medical license. GX 5, at 10-11. Accordingly, I find that
Registrant is without authority under the laws of Florida to practice
medicine and dispense controlled substances.
The Government also submitted various Incident Reports it obtained
from the Longboat Key, Florida Police Department. According to these
reports, on July 6, 2011, a police officer was summoned to a home
located at 1590 Harbor Cay Lane based on ``a complaint of some type of
hazardous materials located in a repossessed home.'' GX 6, at 1.
According to the report, the responding officer spoke with one Ms. O.
of Field Asset Services, an Austin, Texas based firm, who stated that
the home had been recently repossessed from a former physician and that
she was hired to clean up the property. Id. at 3. Ms. O. showed the
officer items that she believed to be narcotics, a large amount of
needles, and a lab specimen medium. Id. The officer took possession of
the items suspected of being
[[Page 29692]]
controlled substances and advised Ms. O. that the needles and other
medical supplies should be declared bio-hazards and removed by a
professional disposal firm. Id. Another portion of the report lists the
confiscated items and includes five vials of injectable Diazepam 5mg/ml
(a schedule IV controlled substance), 11 vials of injectable midazolam
50mg/10ml (also a schedule IV controlled substance), 1 vial of ketamine
500gm/10ml (a schedule III controlled substance), as well as one
partially used vial of each of these drugs, and one vial of brevital
sodium (a schedule IV controlled substance). Id. at 2. The police
report, however, contains no further information explaining how the
determination was made that the vials contained the above listed drugs.
See generally id. Nor does any other evidence in the record establish
how this determination was made.
In addition, the record includes a document which provides Master
Information for Registrant's expired registration and lists the same
1590 Harbor Cay Lane address as his mailing address. GX 3. While this
document creates a reasonable suspicion that Registrant brought the
above items to this address, the record contains no further evidence
sufficient to move beyond suspicion and into the realm of substantial
evidence necessary to establish this as a fact. See NLRB v. Columbian
E. & S. Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (``Substantial evidence is more
than a scintilla, and must do more than create a suspicion of the
existence of the fact to be established.''). More specifically, while
the police report notes that the home had ``recently been repossessed
from'' Registrant, no other evidence establishes the declarant's basis
of knowledge, let alone such facts as the respective dates on which
Registrant vacated the premises and the home was repossessed, whether
the home was secured after Registrant vacated the premises and was in
that state when Ms. O. entered it and found the items, and whether
Registrant was the only person who stayed in the home and who had
access to controlled substances.
Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized
to suspend or revoke a registration issued under section 823 ``upon a
finding that the registrant * * * has had his State license * * *
suspended [or] revoked * * * by competent State authority and is no
longer authorized by State law to engage in the * * * dispensing of
controlled substances.'' Moreover, DEA has repeatedly held that the
possession of authority to dispense controlled substances under the
laws of the State in which a practitioner engages in professional
practice is a fundamental condition for obtaining and maintaining a
practitioner's registration.
This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the CSA.
First, Congress defined ``the term `practitioner' [to] mean[] a * * *
physician * * * or other person licensed, registered or otherwise
permitted, by * * * the jurisdiction in which he practices * * * to
distribute, dispense, [or] administer * * * a controlled substance in
the course of professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in
setting the requirements for obtaining a practitioner's registration,
Congress directed that ``[t]he Attorney General shall register
practitioners * * * if the applicant is authorized to dispense * * *
controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he
practices.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(f). Because Congress has clearly mandated
that a practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a
practitioner under the Act, DEA has held repeatedly that revocation of
a practitioner's registration is the appropriate sanction whenever he
is no longer authorized to dispense controlled substances under the
laws of the State in which he practices medicine. See, e.g., Calvin
Ramsey, 76 FR 20034, 20036 (2011); Dominick A. Ricci, 58 FR 51104,
51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, 53 FR 11919, 11920 (1988).
As found above, on April 16, 2010, the Florida Board of Medicine
revoked Registrant's medical license and accordingly, he is no longer
authorized under Florida law to dispense controlled substances. Because
Registrant no longer satisfies the CSA's requirement for maintaining
his registrations, I will order that his registrations be revoked and
that any pending applications be denied.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and
824(a)(3), as well as 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificates of
Registration FK1795624 and FK1794305, issued to Matthew J. Kachinas,
M.D., be, and they hereby are, revoked. I further order that any
pending application of Matthew J. Kachinas, M.D., to renew or modify
either registration, be, and it hereby is, denied. This Order is
effective June 18, 2012.
Dated: May 4, 2012.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2012-12096 Filed 5-17-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P