South Carolina Electric And Gas Company (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Units 2 and 3); Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Effective Immediately), 21815-21819 [2012-8669]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 70 (Wednesday, April 11, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 21815-21819]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-8669]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2012-0089; Docket Nos. 52-027 and 52-028; License Nos. NPF-93 and 
NPF-94; EA-12-063]


South Carolina Electric And Gas Company (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear 
Station Units 2 and 3); Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to 
Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Effective Immediately)

I

    The Licensee identified in this Order holds licenses issued by the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) authorizing 
operation and construction of nuclear power plants in accordance with 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52, ``Licenses, Certifications, and 
Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.''

II

    On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the coast 
of the Japanese island of Honshu. The earthquake resulted in a large 
tsunami, estimated to have exceeded 14 meters (45 feet) in height, that 
inundated the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant site. The 
earthquake and tsunami produced widespread devastation across 
northeastern Japan and significantly affected the infrastructure and 
industry in the northeastern coastal areas of Japan.
    When the earthquake occurred, Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, and 3 
were in operation and Units 4, 5, and 6 were shut down for routine 
refueling and maintenance activities. The Unit 4 reactor fuel was 
offloaded to the Unit 4 spent fuel pool. Following the earthquake, the 
three operating units automatically shut down and offsite power was 
lost to the entire facility. The emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 
started at all six units providing alternating current (ac) electrical 
power to critical systems at each unit. The facility response to the 
earthquake appears to have been normal.
    Approximately 40 minutes following the earthquake and shutdown of 
the operating units, the first large tsunami wave inundated the site, 
followed by additional waves. The tsunami caused extensive damage to 
site facilities and resulted in a complete loss of all ac electrical 
power at Units 1 through 5, a condition known as station blackout. In 
addition, all direct current electrical power was lost early in the 
event on Units 1 and 2 and after some period of time at the other 
units. Unit 6 retained the function of one air-cooled EDG. Despite 
their actions, the operators lost the ability to cool the fuel in the 
Unit 1 reactor after several hours, in the Unit 2 reactor after about 
70 hours, and in the Unit 3 reactor after about 36 hours, resulting in 
damage to the nuclear fuel shortly after the loss of cooling 
capabilities.
    The Unit 4 spent fuel pool contained the highest heat load of the 
six units with the full core present in the spent fuel pool and the 
refueling gates installed. However, because Unit 4 had been shut down 
for more than 3 months, the heat load was low relative to that present 
in spent fuel pools immediately following shutdown for reactor 
refueling. Following the earthquake and tsunami, the operators in the 
Units 3 and 4 control room focused their efforts on stabilizing the 
Unit 3 reactor. During the event, concern grew that the spent fuel was 
overheating, causing a high-temperature reaction of steam and zirconium 
fuel cladding generating hydrogen gas. This concern persisted primarily 
due to a lack of readily available and reliable information on water 
levels in the spent fuel pools. Helicopter water drops, water cannons, 
and cement delivery vehicles with articulating booms were used to 
refill the pools, which diverted resources and attention from other 
efforts. Subsequent analysis determined that the water level in the 
Unit 4 spent fuel pool did not drop below the top of the stored fuel 
and no significant fuel damage occurred. The lack of information on the 
condition of the spent fuel pools contributed to a poor understanding 
of possible radiation releases and adversely impacted effective 
prioritization of emergency response actions by decision makers.
    Following the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, 
the NRC established a senior-level agency task force referred to as the 
Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF was tasked with conducting a 
systematic and methodical review of the NRC regulations and processes 
and determining if the agency should make additional improvements to 
these programs in light of the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi. As a 
result of this review, the NTTF developed a comprehensive set of 
recommendations, documented in SECY-11-0093, ``Near-Term Report and 
Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan,'' 
dated July 12, 2011. These recommendations were modified by the NRC 
staff following interactions with stakeholders. Documentation of the 
NRC staff's efforts is contained in SECY-11-0124, ``Recommended Actions 
To Be Taken Without Delay From the Near-Term Task Force Report,'' dated 
September 9, 2011, and SECY-11-0137, ``Prioritization of Recommended 
Actions To Be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,'' dated 
October 3, 2011.
    As directed by the Commission's Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) 
for SECY-11-0093, the NRC staff reviewed the NTTF recommendations 
within the context of the NRC's existing regulatory framework and 
considered the various regulatory vehicles available to the NRC to 
implement the recommendations. SECY-11-0124 and SECY-11-0137 
established the NRC staff's prioritization of the recommendations based 
upon the potential safety enhancements.
    Current regulatory requirements and existing plant capabilities 
allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the United States. 
Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do 
not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety. However, the 
NRC's assessment of new insights from the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi 
leads the NRC staff to conclude that additional requirements must be 
imposed on Licensees and CP holders to increase the capability of 
nuclear power plants to mitigate beyond-design-basis external events. 
These additional requirements represent a substantial increase in the 
protection of public health and safety. The Commission has decided to 
administratively exempt this Order from applicable provisions of the 
Backfit Rule, 10 CFR 50.109, and the issue finality requirements in 10 
CFR 52.63 and 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Paragraph VIII.
    Additional details on an acceptable approach for complying with 
this Order will be contained in final interim staff guidance (ISG) 
scheduled to be issued by the NRC in August 2012. This guidance will 
include a template to be used for the plan that will be submitted in 
accordance with Section IV, Condition C.1 below.

III

    Reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and 
safety

[[Page 21816]]

and assurance of the common defense and security are the fundamental 
NRC regulatory objectives. Compliance with NRC requirements plays a 
critical role in giving the NRC confidence that Licensees and CP 
holders are maintaining an adequate level of public health and safety 
and common defense and security. While compliance with NRC requirements 
presumptively ensures adequate protection, new information may reveal 
that additional requirements are warranted. In such situations, the 
Commission may act in accordance with its statutory authority under 
Section 161 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to require 
Licensees and CP holders to take action in order to protect health and 
safety and common defense and security.
    To protect public health and safety from the inadvertent release of 
radioactive materials, the NRC's defense-in-depth strategy includes 
multiple layers of protection: (1) Prevention of accidents by virtue of 
the design, construction, and operation of the plant; (2) mitigation 
features to prevent radioactive releases should an accident occur; and 
(3) emergency preparedness programs that include measures such as 
sheltering and evacuation. The defense-in-depth strategy also provides 
for multiple physical barriers to contain the radioactive materials in 
the event of an accident. The barriers are the fuel cladding, the 
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment. These defense-
in-depth features are embodied in the existing regulatory requirements 
and thereby provide adequate protection of public health and safety.
    In the case of spent fuel pools, compliance with existing 
regulations and guidance presumptively provides reasonable assurance of 
the safe storage of spent fuel. In particular, Appendix A, ``General 
Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,'' to 10 CFR Part 50 
establishes the general design criteria (GDC) for nuclear power plants. 
All currently operating reactors were licensed to the GDC or meet the 
intent of the GDC. The GDC provide the design features of the spent 
fuel storage and handling systems and the protection of these systems 
from natural phenomena and operational events. The accidents considered 
during licensing of U.S. nuclear power plants typically include failure 
of the forced cooling system and loss of spent fuel pool inventory at a 
specified rate within the capacity of the makeup water system. Further, 
spent fuel pools at U.S. nuclear power plants rely on maintenance of an 
adequate inventory of water under accident conditions to provide 
containment, as well as the cooling and shielding safety functions.
    During the events in Fukushima, responders were without reliable 
instrumentation to determine water level in the spent fuel pool. This 
caused concerns that the pool may have boiled dry, resulting in fuel 
damage.\1\ Fukushima demonstrated the confusion and misapplication of 
resources that can result from beyond-design-basis external events when 
adequate instrumentation is not available.
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    \1\ See Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) 11-005, 
``Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Station,'' Revision 0, issued November 2011, p. 36.
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    The spent fuel pool level instrumentation at U.S. nuclear power 
plants is typically narrow range and, therefore, only capable of 
monitoring normal and slightly off-normal conditions. Although the 
likelihood of a catastrophic event affecting nuclear power plants and 
the associated spent fuel pools in the United States remains very low, 
beyond-design-basis external events could challenge the ability of 
existing instrumentation to provide emergency responders with reliable 
information on the condition of spent fuel pools. Reliable and 
available indication is essential to ensure plant personnel can 
effectively prioritize emergency actions.
    The Commission has determined that the spent fuel pool 
instrumentation required by this Order represents a significant 
enhancement to the protection of public health and safety and is an 
appropriate response to the insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident. While this consideration is qualitative in nature, the 
Commission has long taken the position that the determination as to 
whether proposed backfits represent a substantial safety improvement 
may be qualitative in nature. Staff Requirements Memorandum, SECY-93-
086, ``Backfit Considerations'' (June 30, 1993), pp. 1-2. However the 
Commission does not, at this time, have sufficient information to 
complete a full backfit analysis of the spent fuel pool instrumentation 
that would be required by this Order. The NRC is analyzing the insights 
gained from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident on an accelerated timeline. 
Additionally, the NRC has considered the Congressional intent that the 
agency act expeditiously on Tier 1 recommendations.
    The Commission has recognized, in exceptional circumstances, that 
some proposed rules may not meet the requirements specified in the 
Backfit Rule but nevertheless should be adopted by the NRC. Hence, the 
Commission advised the NRC staff that it would consider, on a case-by-
case basis, whether a proposed regulatory action should be adopted as 
an ``exception'' to the Backfit Rule. This Order represents such a 
case. Therefore, the Commission has decided to administratively exempt 
this Order from the Backfit Rule and the issue finality requirements in 
10 CFR 52.63 and 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, paragraph VIII for several 
reasons.
    The Fukushima Dai-ichi accident was unprecedented in terms of 
initiating cause and the particular failure sequence. In addition, our 
review of this event has highlighted the benefits that can be derived 
from the availability of more diverse instrumentation. Consistent with 
the final Aircraft Impact Assessment Rule, 10 CFR 50.150, 74 FR 28112 
(June 12, 2009), the Commission's decision to administratively exempt 
this Order from compliance with the Backfit Rule is a highly 
exceptional action limited to the insights associated with the 
extraordinary underlying circumstances of the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident and the NRC's lessons learned. Furthermore, the extensive 
stakeholder engagement and broad endorsement for timely action support 
the Commission's judgment that immediate action to commence 
implementation of the spent fuel monitoring requirements is warranted 
at this time. In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, the NRC finds that 
the public health, safety, and interest require that this Order be made 
immediately effective.
    Based upon the considerations set forth above, the Commission has 
determined that the Licensee must have a reliable means of remotely 
monitoring wide-range spent fuel pool levels to support effective 
prioritization of event mitigation and recovery actions in the event of 
a beyond-design-basis external event. These new requirements provide a 
greater capability, consistent with the overall defense-in-depth 
philosophy, and therefore greater assurance of protection of public 
health and safety from the challenges posed by beyond-design-basis 
external events to power reactors. Accordingly, the Commission 
concludes that combined licenses (COLs) NPF-93 and NPF-94 shall be 
modified to include the requirements identified in Attachment 1 to this 
Order.

IV

    Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 161b, 161i, 161o, and 182 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations 
in 10 CFR 2.202, and 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52, It is hereby ordered, 
effective immediately,

[[Page 21817]]

That COLS NPF-93 AND NPF-94 are modified as follows:
    A. 1. The Licensee shall, notwithstanding the provisions of any 
Commission regulation or license to the contrary, comply with the 
requirements described in Attachment 1 to this Order except to the 
extent that a more stringent requirement is set forth in the license. 
The Licensee shall promptly start implementation of the requirements in 
Attachment 1 to the Order and shall complete full implementation prior 
to initial fuel load.
    B. 1. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of 
this Order, notify the Commission (1) if it is unable to comply with 
any of the requirements described in Attachment 1, (2) if compliance 
with any of the requirements is unnecessary in its specific 
circumstances, or (3) if implementation of any of the requirements 
would cause the Licensee to be in violation of the provisions of any 
Commission regulation or the facility license. The notification shall 
provide the Licensee's justification for seeking relief from or 
variation of any specific requirement.
    2. If the Licensee considers that implementation of any of the 
requirements described in Attachment 1 to this Order would adversely 
impact safe and secure operation of the facility, it must notify the 
Commission, within twenty (20) days of this Order, of the adverse 
impact, the basis for its determination that the requirement has an 
adverse impact, and either a proposal for achieving the same objectives 
specified in the Attachment 1 requirement in question, or a schedule 
for modifying the facility to address the adverse condition. If neither 
approach is appropriate, the Licensee must supplement its response to 
Condition B.1 of this Order to identify the condition as a requirement 
with which it cannot comply, with attendant justifications as required 
in Condition B.1.
    C. 1. The Licensee shall, within one (1) year after issuance of the 
final ISG, submit to the Commission for review an overall integrated 
plan, including a description of how compliance with the requirements 
described in Attachment 1 will be achieved.
    2. The Licensee shall provide an initial status report sixty (60) 
days after the issuance of the final ISG, and at six (6)-month 
intervals following submittal of the overall integrated plan, as 
required in Condition C.1, which delineates progress made in 
implementing the requirements of this Order.
    3. The Licensee shall report to the Commission when full compliance 
with the requirements described in Attachment 1 is achieved.
    The Licensee's responses to Conditions B.1, B.2, C.1, C.2, and C.3, 
above, shall be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4 and 10 CFR 
52.3, as applicable.
    The Director, Office of New Reactors may, in writing, relax or 
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee 
of good cause.

V

    In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other 
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this 
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within twenty (20) days 
of the date of this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration 
will be given to extending the time to answer or to request a hearing. 
A request for extension of time in which to submit an answer or request 
a hearing must be made in writing to the Director, Office of New 
Reactors, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and 
include a statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may 
consent to this Order.
    If a hearing is requested by the Licensee, or a person whose 
interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order 
designating the time and place of any hearings. If a hearing is held, 
the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order 
should be sustained. Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee, 
or any other person adversely affected by this Order, may, in addition 
to demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move 
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the 
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate 
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, 
unfounded allegations, or error.
    All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a 
request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or 
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a 
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by 
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c), 
must be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139, 
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit 
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some 
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not 
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in 
accordance with the procedures described below.
    To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the 
Office of the Secretary by email at hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by 
telephone at (301) 415-1677, to request (1) a digital identification 
(ID) certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or 
representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal 
server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise 
the Secretary that the participant will be submitting a request or 
petition for hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or 
its counsel or representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID 
certificate). Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish 
an electronic docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the 
Secretary has not already established an electronic docket.
    Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is 
available on the NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing 
the E-Submittal server are detailed in the NRC's ``Guidance for 
Electronic Submission,'' which is available on the agency's public Web 
site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants 
may attempt to use other software not listed on the web site, but 
should note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted 
software, and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer 
assistance in using unlisted software.
    If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC 
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the 
document using the NRC's online, web-based submission form. In order to 
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange System, 
users will be required to install a web browser plug-in from the NRC's 
Web site. Further information on the web-based submission form, 
including the installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on 
the NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
    Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a 
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for 
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions

[[Page 21818]]

should be in Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with the NRC 
guidance available on the NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the 
time the documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To 
be timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing 
system no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon 
receipt of a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document 
and sends the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the 
document. The E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that 
provides access to the document to the NRC's Office of the General 
Counsel and any others who have advised the Office of the Secretary 
that they wish to participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need 
not serve the documents on those participants separately. Therefore, 
applicants and other participants (or their counsel or representative) 
must apply for and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing 
request/petition to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access 
to the document via the E-Filing system.
    A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System 
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site 
at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email at 
MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a toll-free call at 1-(866) 672-7640. The 
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., 
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
    Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not 
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in 
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing 
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper 
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail 
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: 
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or 
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth 
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants 
filing a document in this manner are responsible for serving the 
document on all other participants. Filing is considered complete by 
first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier, 
express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing the 
document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer, having 
granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a 
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer 
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from 
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
    Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in the 
NRC's electronic hearing docket, which is available to the public at 
https://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the 
Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to 
include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers, 
home addresses, or home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC 
regulation or other law requires submission of such information. With 
respect to copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve 
the purpose of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use 
application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted 
materials in their submission.
    If a person other than the Licensee requests a hearing, that person 
shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is 
adversely affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set 
forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d).
    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions 
specified in Section IV above shall be final twenty (20) days from the 
date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an 
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the 
provisions specified in Section IV shall be final when the extension 
expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a 
request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this 
order.

    Dated this 30th day of March 2012.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michael R. Johnson,
Director, Office of New Reactors.

Attachment 1--Requirements for Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Level 
Instrumentation at Combined License Holder Reactor Sites

    Attachment 2 to the March 12, 2012, Order Modifying Licenses with 
Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (available at the 
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) under 
ADAMS accession number ML12054A679) for Part 50 Licensees, requires 
reliable indication of the water level in associated spent fuel storage 
pools capable of supporting identification of the following pool water 
level conditions by trained personnel: (1) Level that is adequate to 
support operation of the normal fuel pool cooling system, (2) level 
that is adequate to provide substantial radiation shielding for a 
person standing on the spent fuel pool operating deck, and (3) level 
where fuel remains covered and actions to implement make-up water 
addition should no longer be deferred.
    The design bases of V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 address many of these 
attributes of spent fuel pool level instrumentation. The NRC staff 
reviewed these design features prior to issuance of the combined 
licenses for these facilities and certification of the AP1000 design 
referenced therein. The AP1000 certified design largely addresses the 
requirements in Attachment 2 of the March 12, 2012 Order by providing 
two safety-related spent fuel pool level instrument channels. The 
instruments measure the level from the top of the spent fuel pool to 
the top of the fuel racks to address the range requirements listed 
above. The safety-related classification provides for the following 
additional design features:
     Seismic and environmental qualification of the 
instruments.
     Independent power supplies.
     Electrical isolation and physical separation between 
instrument channels.
     Display in the control room as part of the post-accident 
monitoring instrumentation.
     Routine calibration and testing.
    As such, this Order requires V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 to address 
the following requirements that were not specified in the certified 
design.
    1. The spent fuel pool level instrumentation shall include the 
following design features:
    1.1 Arrangement: The spent fuel pool level instrument channels 
shall be arranged in a manner that provides reasonable protection of 
the level indication function against missiles that may result from 
damage to the structure over the spent fuel pool. This protection may 
be provided by locating the safety-related instruments to maintain 
instrument channel separation within the spent fuel pool area, and to 
utilize inherent shielding from missiles provided by existing recesses 
and corners in the spent fuel pool structure.
    1.2 Qualification: The level instrument channels shall be reliable 
at

[[Page 21819]]

temperature, humidity, and radiation levels consistent with the spent 
fuel pool water at saturation conditions for an extended period.
    1.3 Power supplies: Instrumentation channels shall provide for 
power connections from sources independent of the plant alternating 
current (ac) and direct current (dc) power distribution systems, such 
as portable generators or replaceable batteries. Power supply designs 
should provide for quick and accessible connection of sources 
independent of the plant ac and dc power distribution systems. Onsite 
generators used as an alternate power source and replaceable batteries 
used for instrument channel power shall have sufficient capacity to 
maintain the level indication function until offsite resource 
availability is reasonably assured.
    1.4 Accuracy: The instrument shall maintain its designed accuracy 
following a power interruption or change in power source without 
recalibration.
    1.5 Display: The display shall provide on-demand or continuous 
indication of spent fuel pool water level.
    2. The spent fuel pool instrumentation shall be maintained 
available and reliable through appropriate development and 
implementation of a training program. Personnel shall be trained in the 
use and the provision of alternate power to the safety-related level 
instrument channels.
[FR Doc. 2012-8669 Filed 4-10-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P