Zhiwei Lin, M.D.; Decision and Order, 18862-18865 [2012-7421]
Download as PDF
18862
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 60 / Wednesday, March 28, 2012 / Notices
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
assistance in gaining access to the
Commission should contact the Office
of the Secretary at 202–205–2000.
General information concerning the
Commission may also be obtained by
accessing its Internet server (https://
www.usitc.gov). The public record for
these reviews may be viewed on the
Commission’s electronic docket (EDIS)
at https://edis.usitc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background.—On March 5, 2012, the
Commission determined that the
domestic interested party group
response to its notice of institution (76
FR 74807, December 1, 2011) of the
subject five-year reviews was adequate
and that the respondent interested party
group response was inadequate. The
Commission did not find any other
circumstances that would warrant
conducting full reviews.1 Accordingly,
the Commission determined that it
would conduct expedited reviews
pursuant to section 751(c)(3) of the Act.
Staff report.—A staff report
containing information concerning the
subject matter of the reviews will be
placed in the nonpublic record on May
8, 2012, and made available to persons
on the Administrative Protective Order
service list for these reviews. A public
version will be issued thereafter,
pursuant to section 207.62(d)(4) of the
Commission’s rules.
Written submissions.—As provided in
section 207.62(d) of the Commission’s
rules, interested parties that are parties
to the reviews and that have provided
individually adequate responses to the
notice of institution,2 and any party
other than an interested party to the
reviews may file written comments with
the Secretary on what determinations
the Commission should reach in the
reviews. Comments are due on or before
May 11, 2012 and may not contain new
factual information. Any person that is
neither a party to the five-year reviews
nor an interested party may submit a
brief written statement (which shall not
contain any new factual information)
pertinent to the reviews by May 11,
2012. However, should the Department
of Commerce extend the time limit for
its completion of the final results of its
reviews, the deadline for comments
1 A record of the Commissioners’ votes, the
Commission’s statement on adequacy, and any
individual Commissioner’s statements will be
available from the Office of the Secretary and at the
Commission’s Web site.
2 The Commission has found the responses
submitted by domestic producers Carpenter
Technology Corporation, Crucible Industries, LLC,
Electralloy a G.O. Carlson Inc. Co., Universal
Stainless & Alloy Products, Inc., and Valbruna
Slater Stainless, Inc. to be individually adequate.
Comments from other interested parties will not be
accepted (see 19 CFR 207.62(d)(2)).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:29 Mar 27, 2012
Jkt 226001
(which may not contain new factual
information) on Commerce’s final
results is three business days after the
issuance of Commerce’s results. If
comments contain business proprietary
information (BPI), they must conform
with the requirements of sections 201.6,
207.3, and 207.7 of the Commission’s
rules. Please be aware that the
Commission’s rules with respect to
electronic filing have been amended.
The amendments took effect on
November 7, 2011. See 76 FR 61937
(Oct. 6, 2011) and the newly revised
Commission’s Handbook on E-Filing,
available on the Commission’s Web site
at https://edis.usitc.gov.
In accordance with sections 201.16(c)
and 207.3 of the rules, each document
filed by a party to the reviews must be
served on all other parties to the reviews
(as identified by either the public or BPI
service list), and a certificate of service
must be timely filed. The Secretary will
not accept a document for filing without
a certificate of service.
Determination.—The Commission has
determined to exercise its authority to
extend the reviews period by up to 90
days pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
1675(c)(5)(B).
Authority: These reviews are being
conducted under authority of title VII of the
Tariff Act of 1930; this notice is published
pursuant to section 207.62 of the
Commission’s rules.
By order of the Commission.
Issued: March 22, 2012.
James R. Holbein,
Secretary to the Commission.
The Commission published notice of
institution of the investigation in the
Federal Register on May 24, 2011 (76
FR 30195). In its original notice of
investigation, the Commission indicated
that it would transmit its report to the
Committee on March 26, 2012. The
notice is also available on the
Commission Web site at https://
www.usitc.gov. All other information
about the investigation, including a
description of the subject matter to be
addressed, contact information, and
Commission addresses, remains the
same as in the original notice. The
public record for this investigation may
be viewed on the Commission’s
electronic docket (EDIS) at https://
www.usitc.gov/secretary/edis.htm.
By order of the Commission.
Issued: March 23, 2012.
James R. Holbein,
Secretary to the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2012–7472 Filed 3–27–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7020–02–P
[Docket No. 10–54]
Zhiwei Lin, M.D.; Decision and Order
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION
[Investigation No. 332–524]
Brazil: Competitive Factors Affecting
U.S. and Brazilian Agricultural Sales in
Selected Third Country Markets
United States International
Trade Commission.
ACTION: Extension of date for
transmitting report.
AGENCY:
Following the receipt of a
letter on March 22, 2012, from the
Committee on Finance of the United
States Senate (Committee), the
Commission has extended to April 26,
2012, the date for transmitting its report
to the Committee in investigation No.
332–524, Brazil: Competitive Factors In
Brazil Affecting U.S. and Brazilian
Agricultural Sales in Selected Third
Country Markets.
SUMMARY:
Fmt 4703
Backround
Drug Enforcement Administration
BILLING CODE 7020–02–P
Frm 00077
March 22, 2012: Receipt of the letter
from the Committee.
April 26, 2012: New date for
transmitting the Commission’s report to
the Committee.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
[FR Doc. 2012–7345 Filed 3–27–12; 8:45 am]
PO 00000
DATES:
Sfmt 4703
On September 19, 2011,
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
Timothy D. Wing issued the attached
recommended decision (also ALJ).
Therein, the ALJ found that Respondent
is currently without authority to
dispense controlled substances in
California, the State in which he
practices medicine and holds his DEA
Registration and therefore
recommended that his registration be
revoked. Thereafter, Respondent filed
two motions 1 and the Government filed
a response to the motions. Having
reviewed the record in its entirety
including the ALJ’s recommended
decision and the various pleadings, I
have decided to adopt the ALJ’s rulings,
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
1 The motions were titled ‘‘Motion for
Reconsideration—Opposition for Summary
Disposition’’ and ‘‘Amended Motion for
Reconsideration—Exceptions to Order of Summary
Disposition.’’
E:\FR\FM\28MRN1.SGM
28MRN1
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 60 / Wednesday, March 28, 2012 / Notices
recommended order, except as noted
below.
Following the receipt of Respondent’s
request for a hearing, the ALJ
commenced pre-hearing procedures and
issued an Order for Prehearing
Statements. The Order clearly stated
‘‘that in the case of a motion, the nonmoving party shall have until 4 p.m.
EDT three business days after the date
of service of any motion to file a
responsive pleading’’ and that ‘‘[i]n the
absence of good cause failure to file a
written response * * * will be deemed
a waiver of objection.’’ ALJ at 2–3 2
(citing Order for Prehearing Statements,
at 3).
On September 12, 2011, the
Government filed a Motion for
Summary Disposition, asserting that on
July 28, 2011, the Medical Board of
California (MBC) had issued an Interim
Suspension Order against Respondent’s
medical license, and that consequently,
Respondent no longer has authority to
handle controlled substances in
California, the jurisdiction in which he
maintains his DEA registration. Mot. for
Summ. Disp., at 1. The Government
served the motion by both first class
mail and facsimile. See id. at 3. When,
by September 19, 2011, Respondent had
not filed a response to the Government’s
motion, the ALJ issued his
recommended decision finding that
because Respondent was currently
without authority under California law,
he was not entitled to hold his DEA
registration. ALJ at 4. The ALJ thus
recommended that I revoke
Respondent’s registration. Id. at 5.
On September 20, 2011 Respondent
filed a pleading titled Motion for
Reconsider[sic]—Opposition for Motion
for Summary Disposition (hereinafter,
Motion for Reconsideration). On the
same day, he also filed a document
entitled Amended Motion for
Reconsideration—Exceptions to Order
of Summary Disposition—Opposition to
Motion for Summary Disposition
(Amended Motion).
In both motions, Respondent asserted
that he had good cause for having failed
to timely file a response to the
Government’s Motion for Summary
Disposition within the time for filing a
response. More specifically,
Respondent’s attorney stated that he did
not see the faxed copy sent by the
Government to his office on September
12, 2011 because he was in trial at the
time and was receiving voluminous
items of evidence by fax during that
time. Motion for Reconsideration, at
1–2. See also Amended Motion at 1–2.
2 All citations to the ALJ’s decision are to the slip
opinion.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:29 Mar 27, 2012
Jkt 226001
Respondent’s attorney further stated
that the mailed copy of the
Government’s Motion for Summary
Disposition was not received in his
office until September 16, 2011, and
that because of his trial obligations he
did not actually see the Government’s
Motion until September 19, 2011, by
which date the time for filing his
opposition to the motion had expired.
Id. at 1–2.
Respondent’s Amended Motion also
asserted good cause to set aside the
Order for Summary Disposition, stating
that the finality of the MBC’s
Suspension Order should be questioned.
Id. at 3–4. In the motion, Respondent
argued that the Order to Show Cause
and the MBC’s Interim Suspension
Order ‘‘are based largely on an assertion
that Respondent began prescribing
Vicodin to [a] DEA Special Agent [who
acted in an undercover capacity (UC)]
without an adequate examination.’’ Id.
at 2. Respondent asserted that the audio
recording evidence of the initial
appointment between the UC and
Respondent was incomplete and
contained a number of serious
abnormalities that preclude
authentication. Id. at 3. Respondent
contended that the audio evidence may
have been ‘‘intentionally erased, which
would in turn impune (sic) Agent[’s]
credibility both for the purposes of the
Medical Board hearing and the DEA
OSC hearing.’’ Id. at 3.
Respondent further argued that the
instant case is factually distinguishable
from the DEA decisions cited in
Government’s Motion for Summary
Disposition because ‘‘in none of those
cases was there credible evidence
suggesting that the Department’s agents
had destroyed crucial evidence leading
to the State Medical Board License
Revocation Proceeding as well as the
DEA Order to Show Cause.’’ Id.
Respondent contended that ‘‘[t]he DEA
Administrative process has unique
powers to compel the production of the
[original recording and recording
device] evidence that Respondent’s
counsel needs to inspect.’’ Id. Finally,
Respondent argued that ‘‘it is in the
interest of justice for the [Agency]
proceeding to determine whether * * *
agents submitted falsified evidence to
the [MBC], which * * *would lead to a
ruling that would give cause for the
Medical Board to set aside its
suspension as well as for the
Department to keep Respondent’s DEA
certificate in force.’’ Id.
On September 21, the Government
filed a Response to Respondent’s
Amended Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that Respondent’s assertion of
good cause for his late submission of his
PO 00000
Frm 00078
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
18863
opposition to its summary disposition
motion was unpersuasive. Government
Response to Motion for Reconsideration,
at 1. The Government also argued that
the evidentiary issues raised by
Respondent are inapposite to the
assertion that Respondent currently
lacks authority to handle controlled
substances in California, a fact which
Respondent does not deny, and that
therefore, he is not authorized to
possess a DEA registration in that State.
Government Response at 2 (citations
omitted).
On September 22, 2011, the ALJ
denied Respondent’s motions. Ruling on
Respondent’s Amended Motion for
Reconsideration-Exceptions to Order of
Summary Disposition-Opposition To
Motion For Summary Disposition, at 4.
While the ALJ found that Respondent
had demonstrated good cause for the
late filing of his motions (due to ‘‘an
inadvertent office management error’’ by
his counsel), the ALJ found that his
‘‘request to set aside [the] previous
ruling is without legal authority.’’ Id. at
3. The ALJ further explained that
‘‘[a]lthough Respondent’s arguments
regarding the audio recording may be
relevant at hearing, Respondent is not
entitled to a hearing because he has
failed to demonstrate that he has state
authority to handle controlled
substances.’’ Id.
I need not decide whether
Respondent established good cause 3 for
his failure to timely file an opposition
to the Government’s summary
disposition motion because under the
Administrative Procedure Act and DEA
regulations, Respondent is entitled to
file exceptions to the Administrative
Law Judge’s decision, which is only a
recommendation. 5 U.S.C. 557(c); 21
CFR 1316.66. Under the Agency’s rule,
exceptions must be filed within twenty
days after the date on which the
recommended decision is served and
there is no dispute that Respondent’s
pleading, which he also titled as
exceptions, was timely filed. 21 CFR
1316.66(a). Thus, I will consider
Respondent’s post-ruling motions as
timely filed exceptions to the ALJ’s
recommended decision.
As noted above, in his Exceptions,
Respondent argues that the MBC’s
3 But see Kamir Garces Mejias, 72 FR 54931,
54932 (2007) (quoting De la Torre v. Continental
Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1994)
(‘‘Respondent’s claim ‘that [her] attorney was
preoccupied with other matters * * * has been
tried before and regularly has been found wanting.’
* * * ‘Most attorneys are busy most of the time and
they must organize their work so as to be able to
meet the time requirements of matters they are
handling or suffer the consequences.’’’) (quoting
Pinero Schroeder v. FNMA, 5874 F.2d 1117, 1118
(1st Cir. 1978) (other citation omitted))).
E:\FR\FM\28MRN1.SGM
28MRN1
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
18864
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 60 / Wednesday, March 28, 2012 / Notices
Interim Suspension Order (Suspension
Order) and this Agency’s subsequent
Order to Show Cause is based on the
allegation that he prescribed Vicodin to
a DEA Special Agent ‘‘without an
adequate examination.’’ Exceptions at 2.
Respondent maintains that ‘‘the crucial
events of [the Agent’s] conversations
with Respondent are somehow ‘missing’
from the audio recording’’ of the Agent’s
visit and that a copy of an audio
recording of the visit ‘‘contains a
number of serious abnormalities that
preclude [its] authentication.’’ Id. at 3.
Respondent thus raises the specter of
Government misconduct arguing that
there is ‘‘credible evidence suggesting
that the Department’s agents ha[ve]
destroyed crucial evidence leading to
the State Medical Board License
Revocation Proceeding.’’ Id. Respondent
then contends that ‘‘[i]f indeed
government Agents were actively
involved in the destruction of evidence
* * * leading to the license revocation
action which forms the basis for the
Motion for Summary Disposition, it is in
the interest of justice for [the DEA]
proceeding to determine whether the
Department’s agents submitted falsified
evidence to the [MBC] which, if further
explored through the discovery process,
would lead to a ruling that would give
cause for the [MBC] to set aside its
suspension as well as for the [Agency]
to keep Respondent’s DEA certificate in
force.’’ Id.
This fishing expedition cannot leave
the dock, however, for two reasons.
First, Respondent’s license remains
subject to the interim order of the MBC
which suspended his California
Physician and Surgeon’s Certificate. As
explained in the ALJ’s decision, this
action, which is undisputed, rendered
Respondent without authority to
dispense controlled substances in the
State in which he practices medicine
and holds his DEA registration, and thus
he no longer meets an essential
condition for holding a registration. See
21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) (authorizing
revocation of registration based ‘‘upon a
finding that the registrant * * * has had
his State license * * * suspended [or]
revoked * * * by competent State
authority and is no longer authorized by
State law to engage in the * * *
dispensing of controlled substances’’);
see also id. § 802(21) (defining ‘‘the term
‘practitioner’ [to] mean[] a * * *
physician * * * or other person
licensed, registered or otherwise
permitted, by * * * the jurisdiction in
which he practices * * * to distribute,
dispense, [or] administer * * * a
controlled substance in the course of
professional practice’’); id. § 823(f)
(‘‘The Attorney General shall register
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:29 Mar 27, 2012
Jkt 226001
practitioners * * * if the applicant is
authorized to dispense * * * controlled
substances under the laws of the State
in which he practices.’’).
Second, Respondent’s contention is a
collateral attack on the validity of the
MBC’s Suspension Order. However,
DEA has held repeatedly that a
registrant cannot collaterally attack the
result of a state criminal or
administrative proceeding in a
proceeding under section 304, 21 U.S.C.
824, of the CSA. Calvin Ramsey, 76 FR
20034, 20036 (2011) (other citations
omitted); Brenton D. Glisson, 72 FR
54296, 54297 n.2 (2007); Shahid Musud
Siddiqui, 61 FR 14818, 14818–19 (1996).
Rather, Respondent’s various challenges
to the validity of the MBC’s Suspension
Order must be litigated in the forums
provided by the State of California.
Thus, Respondent’s contentions
regarding the validity of the MBC’s
Suspension Order are therefore not
material to this Agency’s resolution of
whether he is entitled to maintain his
DEA registration in California.
Because it is undisputed that
Respondent currently lacks authority to
dispense controlled substances in
California, the State in which he holds
his DEA registration, Respondent is not
entitled to maintain his registration.
Accordingly, I adopt the ALJ’s
recommended decision and will order
that Respondent’s registration be
revoked and that any pending
application be denied.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a), as well
as 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA
Certificate of Registration BL7325079,
issued to Zhiwei Lin, M.D., be, and it
hereby is, revoked. I further order that
any pending application of Zhiwei Lin,
M.D., to renew or modify his
registration, be, and it hereby is, denied.
This Order is effective immediately.4
Dated: March 20, 2012.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Administrator.
Christine Menendez, Esq., for the
Government
Alan I. Kaplan, Esq., for the Respondent
Recommended Ruling, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decision of the
Administrative Law Judge
Timothy D. Wing, Administrative Law
Judge. This proceeding is an
adjudication governed by the
4 For the same reasons that the State imposed its
emergency suspension of Respondent’s medical
license, I conclude that the public interest requires
that this Order be effective immediately. 21 CFR
1316.67.
PO 00000
Frm 00079
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 551 et seq., to determine whether a
practitioner’s Certificate of Registration
(COR) with the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA, Government or
Agency) should be revoked and any
pending applications for renewal or
modification of that registration denied.
Without this registration, Zhiwei Lin,
M.D. (Respondent), would be unable to
lawfully possess, prescribe, dispense or
otherwise handle controlled substances.
I. Procedural Posture
On August 8, 2011, the Deputy
Assistant Administrator, DEA, issued an
Order to Show Cause (OSC) of DEA COR
BL7325079. The OCS provided notice to
Respondent of an opportunity to show
cause as to why the DEA should not
revoke Respondent’s DEA COR
BL7325079, pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 824(a)(4), and deny any pending
applications for renewal or
modification, on the grounds that
Respondent’s continued registration
would be inconsistent with the public
interest under 21 U.S.C. § 823(f). On
September 2, 2011, Respondent, through
counsel, in a letter dated August 31,
2011, timely requested a hearing with
the DEA Office of Administrative Law
Judges.
I issued an Order for Prehearing
Statements on September 6, 2011.
On September 12, 2011, the
Government filed a Motion for
Summary Disposition, with a copy
served on Respondent via U.S. mail.
(Mot. at 3.) Pursuant to the September
6, 2011 Order for Prehearing Statements,
Respondent had ‘‘until 4 p.m. EDT three
business days after the date of service of
any motion to file a responsive
pleading* * * . In the absence of good
cause, failure to file a written response
to the moving party’s motion after three
business days will be deemed a waiver
of objection.’’ (Order for Prehearing
Statements at 3.)
As of September 19, 2011, five
business days after service of the
Government’s Motion for Summary
Disposition, Respondent had not yet
filed a response. While not dispositive,
Respondent is deemed to have waived
any objection to the Government’s
motion.
II. The Parties’ Contentions
A. The Government
In support of its Motion for Summary
Disposition, the Government asserts that
on July 28, 2011, the Medical Board of
California issued an Interim Suspension
Order suspending Respondent’s medical
license, and that Respondent
consequently lacks authority to handle
E:\FR\FM\28MRN1.SGM
28MRN1
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 60 / Wednesday, March 28, 2012 / Notices
controlled substances in California, the
jurisdiction in which he maintains his
DEA registration. (Mot. at 1.) The
Government contends that such state
authority is a necessary condition for
maintaining a DEA COR and therefore
asks that I summarily recommend to the
Administrator that Respondent’s COR
be revoked and any pending
applications for renewal or modification
be denied. (Mot. at 1–2.) In support of
its motion, the Government cites
Agency precedent and attaches the
Interim Suspension Order issued by the
Medical Board of California, marked for
identification as Exhibit B.
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
B. Respondent
As noted above, Respondent did not
respond to the Government’s Motion for
Summary Disposition, or seek an
extension within the deadline for
response, and is therefore deemed to
waive objection.
III. Discussion
At issue is whether Respondent may
maintain his DEA COR given that
California has suspended Respondent
from the practice of medicine or
surgery.
Under 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(3), a
practitioner’s loss of state authority to
engage in the practice of medicine and
to handle controlled substances is
grounds to revoke a practitioner’s
registration. Accordingly, this Agency
has consistently held that a person may
not hold a DEA registration if he is
without appropriate authority under the
laws of the state in which he does
business. See Scott Sandarg, D.M.D., 74
Fed. Reg. 17,528 (DEA 2009); David W.
Wang, M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 54,297 (DEA
2007); Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D., 71
Fed. Reg. 39,130 (DEA 2006); Dominick
A. Ricci, M.D., 58 Fed. Reg. 51,104 (DEA
1993); Bobby Watts M.D., 53 Fed. Reg.
11,919 (DEA 1988).
Summary disposition in a DEA
suspension case is warranted even if the
period of suspension of a respondent’s
state medical license is temporary, or
even if there is the potential for
reinstatement of state authority because
‘‘revocation is also appropriate when a
state license had been suspended, but
with the possibility of future
reinstatement.’’ Stuart A. Bergman,
M.D., 70 Fed. Reg. 33,193 (DEA 2005);
Roger A. Rodriguez, M.D., 70 Fed. Reg.
33,206 (DEA 2005).
It is well-settled that when no
question of fact is involved, or when the
material facts are agreed upon, a
plenary, adversarial administrative
proceeding is not required, under the
rationale that Congress does not intend
administrative agencies to perform
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:29 Mar 27, 2012
Jkt 226001
meaningless tasks. See Layfe Robert
Anthony, M.D., 67 Fed. Reg. 35,582
(DEA 2002); Michael G. Dolin, M.D., 65
Fed. Reg. 5661 (DEA 2000); see also
Philip E. Kirk, M.D., 48 Fed. Reg. 32,887
(DEA 1983), aff’d sub nom. Kirk v.
Mullen, 749 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1984).
Accord Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer
Auth. v. EPA, 35 F.3d 600, 605 (1st Cir.
1994).
In the instant case, the Government
asserts, and Respondent does not
contest, that Respondent’s California
license to practice medicine and surgery
is presently suspended. This allegation
is confirmed by Government Exhibit B.
I therefore find there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact, and that
substantial evidence shows that
Respondent is presently without state
authority to handle controlled
substances in California. Because ‘‘DEA
does not have statutory authority under
the Controlled Substances Act to
maintain a registration if the registrant
is without state authority to handle
controlled substances in the state in
which he practices,’’ Sheran Arden
Yeates, M.D., 71 Fed. Reg. 39,130,
39,131 (DEA 2006), I conclude that
summary disposition is appropriate. It is
therefore
ORDERED that the hearing in this
case, scheduled to commence on
November 15, 2011, is hereby
CANCELLED; and it is further
ORDERED that all proceedings before
the undersigned are STAYED pending
the Agency’s issuance of a final order.
Recommended Decision
I grant the Government’s Motion for
Summary Disposition and recommend
that Respondent’s DEA COR BL7325079
be revoked and any pending
applications denied.
September 19, 2011.
s/Timothy D. Wing,
Administrative Law Judge.
[FR Doc. 2012–7421 Filed 3–27–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Employment and Training
Administration
Workforce Investment Act of 1998
(WIA); Lower Living Standard Income
Level (LLSIL)
Employment and Training
Administration (ETA), Labor.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
Title I of WIA (Pub. L. 105–
220) requires the U.S. Secretary of Labor
(Secretary) to update and publish the
SUMMARY:
PO 00000
Frm 00080
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
18865
LLSIL tables annually, for uses
described in the law (including
determining eligibility for youth). WIA
defines the term ‘‘low income
individual’’ as one who qualifies under
various criteria, including an individual
who received income for a six-month
period that does not exceed the higher
level of the poverty line or 70 percent
of the LLSIL. This issuance provides the
Secretary’s annual LLSIL for 2012 and
references the current 2012 Health and
Human Services ‘‘Poverty Guidelines.’’
DATES: This notice is effective March 28,
2012.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION OR QUESTIONS
ON LLSIL: Please contact Samuel Wright,
Department of Labor, Employment and
Training Administration, 200
Constitution Avenue NW., Room S–
4231, Washington, DC 20210;
Telephone: 202–693–2870; Fax: 202–
693–33015 (these are not toll-free
numbers); Email address:
wright.samuel.e@dol.gov. Individuals
with hearing or speech impairments
may access the telephone number above
via Text Telephone (TTY/TDD) by
calling the toll-free Federal Information
Relay Service at 1–877–889–5627 (TTY/
TDD).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION OR QUESTIONS
ON FEDERAL YOUTH EMPLOYMENT
PROGRAMS: Please contact Evan
Rosenberg, Department of Labor,
Employment and Training
Administration, 200 Constitution
Avenue NW., Room N–4464,
Washington, DC 20210; Telephone:
202–693–3593; Fax: 202–693–3110
(these are not toll-free numbers); Email:
Rosenberg.Evan@dol.gov. Individuals
with hearing or speech impairments
may access the telephone number above
via TTY by calling the toll-free Federal
Information Relay Service at 1–877–
889–5627 (TTY/TDD).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
purpose of WIA is to provide workforce
investment activities through statewide
and local workforce investment systems
that increase the employment, retention,
and earnings of participants. WIA
programs are intended to increase the
occupational skill attainment by
participants and the quality of the
workforce, thereby reducing welfare
dependency and enhancing the
productivity and competitiveness of the
Nation.
LLSIL is used for several purposes
under the WIA. Specifically, WIA
Section 101(25) defines the term ‘‘low
income individual’’ for eligibility
purposes, and Sections 127(b)(2)(C) and
132(b)(1)(B)(v)(IV) define the terms
‘‘disadvantaged youth’’ and
‘‘disadvantaged adult’’ in terms of the
E:\FR\FM\28MRN1.SGM
28MRN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 60 (Wednesday, March 28, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18862-18865]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-7421]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 10-54]
Zhiwei Lin, M.D.; Decision and Order
On September 19, 2011, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Timothy D.
Wing issued the attached recommended decision (also ALJ). Therein, the
ALJ found that Respondent is currently without authority to dispense
controlled substances in California, the State in which he practices
medicine and holds his DEA Registration and therefore recommended that
his registration be revoked. Thereafter, Respondent filed two motions
\1\ and the Government filed a response to the motions. Having reviewed
the record in its entirety including the ALJ's recommended decision and
the various pleadings, I have decided to adopt the ALJ's rulings,
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
[[Page 18863]]
recommended order, except as noted below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The motions were titled ``Motion for Reconsideration--
Opposition for Summary Disposition'' and ``Amended Motion for
Reconsideration--Exceptions to Order of Summary Disposition.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following the receipt of Respondent's request for a hearing, the
ALJ commenced pre-hearing procedures and issued an Order for Prehearing
Statements. The Order clearly stated ``that in the case of a motion,
the non-moving party shall have until 4 p.m. EDT three business days
after the date of service of any motion to file a responsive pleading''
and that ``[i]n the absence of good cause failure to file a written
response * * * will be deemed a waiver of objection.'' ALJ at 2-3 \2\
(citing Order for Prehearing Statements, at 3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ All citations to the ALJ's decision are to the slip opinion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 12, 2011, the Government filed a Motion for Summary
Disposition, asserting that on July 28, 2011, the Medical Board of
California (MBC) had issued an Interim Suspension Order against
Respondent's medical license, and that consequently, Respondent no
longer has authority to handle controlled substances in California, the
jurisdiction in which he maintains his DEA registration. Mot. for Summ.
Disp., at 1. The Government served the motion by both first class mail
and facsimile. See id. at 3. When, by September 19, 2011, Respondent
had not filed a response to the Government's motion, the ALJ issued his
recommended decision finding that because Respondent was currently
without authority under California law, he was not entitled to hold his
DEA registration. ALJ at 4. The ALJ thus recommended that I revoke
Respondent's registration. Id. at 5.
On September 20, 2011 Respondent filed a pleading titled Motion for
Reconsider[sic]--Opposition for Motion for Summary Disposition
(hereinafter, Motion for Reconsideration). On the same day, he also
filed a document entitled Amended Motion for Reconsideration--
Exceptions to Order of Summary Disposition--Opposition to Motion for
Summary Disposition (Amended Motion).
In both motions, Respondent asserted that he had good cause for
having failed to timely file a response to the Government's Motion for
Summary Disposition within the time for filing a response. More
specifically, Respondent's attorney stated that he did not see the
faxed copy sent by the Government to his office on September 12, 2011
because he was in trial at the time and was receiving voluminous items
of evidence by fax during that time. Motion for Reconsideration, at 1-
2. See also Amended Motion at 1-2. Respondent's attorney further stated
that the mailed copy of the Government's Motion for Summary Disposition
was not received in his office until September 16, 2011, and that
because of his trial obligations he did not actually see the
Government's Motion until September 19, 2011, by which date the time
for filing his opposition to the motion had expired. Id. at 1-2.
Respondent's Amended Motion also asserted good cause to set aside
the Order for Summary Disposition, stating that the finality of the
MBC's Suspension Order should be questioned. Id. at 3-4. In the motion,
Respondent argued that the Order to Show Cause and the MBC's Interim
Suspension Order ``are based largely on an assertion that Respondent
began prescribing Vicodin to [a] DEA Special Agent [who acted in an
undercover capacity (UC)] without an adequate examination.'' Id. at 2.
Respondent asserted that the audio recording evidence of the initial
appointment between the UC and Respondent was incomplete and contained
a number of serious abnormalities that preclude authentication. Id. at
3. Respondent contended that the audio evidence may have been
``intentionally erased, which would in turn impune (sic) Agent['s]
credibility both for the purposes of the Medical Board hearing and the
DEA OSC hearing.'' Id. at 3.
Respondent further argued that the instant case is factually
distinguishable from the DEA decisions cited in Government's Motion for
Summary Disposition because ``in none of those cases was there credible
evidence suggesting that the Department's agents had destroyed crucial
evidence leading to the State Medical Board License Revocation
Proceeding as well as the DEA Order to Show Cause.'' Id. Respondent
contended that ``[t]he DEA Administrative process has unique powers to
compel the production of the [original recording and recording device]
evidence that Respondent's counsel needs to inspect.'' Id. Finally,
Respondent argued that ``it is in the interest of justice for the
[Agency] proceeding to determine whether * * * agents submitted
falsified evidence to the [MBC], which * * *would lead to a ruling that
would give cause for the Medical Board to set aside its suspension as
well as for the Department to keep Respondent's DEA certificate in
force.'' Id.
On September 21, the Government filed a Response to Respondent's
Amended Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that Respondent's assertion
of good cause for his late submission of his opposition to its summary
disposition motion was unpersuasive. Government Response to Motion for
Reconsideration, at 1. The Government also argued that the evidentiary
issues raised by Respondent are inapposite to the assertion that
Respondent currently lacks authority to handle controlled substances in
California, a fact which Respondent does not deny, and that therefore,
he is not authorized to possess a DEA registration in that State.
Government Response at 2 (citations omitted).
On September 22, 2011, the ALJ denied Respondent's motions. Ruling
on Respondent's Amended Motion for Reconsideration-Exceptions to Order
of Summary Disposition-Opposition To Motion For Summary Disposition, at
4. While the ALJ found that Respondent had demonstrated good cause for
the late filing of his motions (due to ``an inadvertent office
management error'' by his counsel), the ALJ found that his ``request to
set aside [the] previous ruling is without legal authority.'' Id. at 3.
The ALJ further explained that ``[a]lthough Respondent's arguments
regarding the audio recording may be relevant at hearing, Respondent is
not entitled to a hearing because he has failed to demonstrate that he
has state authority to handle controlled substances.'' Id.
I need not decide whether Respondent established good cause \3\ for
his failure to timely file an opposition to the Government's summary
disposition motion because under the Administrative Procedure Act and
DEA regulations, Respondent is entitled to file exceptions to the
Administrative Law Judge's decision, which is only a recommendation. 5
U.S.C. 557(c); 21 CFR 1316.66. Under the Agency's rule, exceptions must
be filed within twenty days after the date on which the recommended
decision is served and there is no dispute that Respondent's pleading,
which he also titled as exceptions, was timely filed. 21 CFR
1316.66(a). Thus, I will consider Respondent's post-ruling motions as
timely filed exceptions to the ALJ's recommended decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ But see Kamir Garces Mejias, 72 FR 54931, 54932 (2007)
(quoting De la Torre v. Continental Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 12, 15 (1st
Cir. 1994) (``Respondent's claim `that [her] attorney was
preoccupied with other matters * * * has been tried before and
regularly has been found wanting.' * * * `Most attorneys are busy
most of the time and they must organize their work so as to be able
to meet the time requirements of matters they are handling or suffer
the consequences.''') (quoting Pinero Schroeder v. FNMA, 5874 F.2d
1117, 1118 (1st Cir. 1978) (other citation omitted))).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, in his Exceptions, Respondent argues that the MBC's
[[Page 18864]]
Interim Suspension Order (Suspension Order) and this Agency's
subsequent Order to Show Cause is based on the allegation that he
prescribed Vicodin to a DEA Special Agent ``without an adequate
examination.'' Exceptions at 2. Respondent maintains that ``the crucial
events of [the Agent's] conversations with Respondent are somehow
`missing' from the audio recording'' of the Agent's visit and that a
copy of an audio recording of the visit ``contains a number of serious
abnormalities that preclude [its] authentication.'' Id. at 3.
Respondent thus raises the specter of Government misconduct arguing
that there is ``credible evidence suggesting that the Department's
agents ha[ve] destroyed crucial evidence leading to the State Medical
Board License Revocation Proceeding.'' Id. Respondent then contends
that ``[i]f indeed government Agents were actively involved in the
destruction of evidence * * * leading to the license revocation action
which forms the basis for the Motion for Summary Disposition, it is in
the interest of justice for [the DEA] proceeding to determine whether
the Department's agents submitted falsified evidence to the [MBC]
which, if further explored through the discovery process, would lead to
a ruling that would give cause for the [MBC] to set aside its
suspension as well as for the [Agency] to keep Respondent's DEA
certificate in force.'' Id.
This fishing expedition cannot leave the dock, however, for two
reasons. First, Respondent's license remains subject to the interim
order of the MBC which suspended his California Physician and Surgeon's
Certificate. As explained in the ALJ's decision, this action, which is
undisputed, rendered Respondent without authority to dispense
controlled substances in the State in which he practices medicine and
holds his DEA registration, and thus he no longer meets an essential
condition for holding a registration. See 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)
(authorizing revocation of registration based ``upon a finding that the
registrant * * * has had his State license * * * suspended [or] revoked
* * * by competent State authority and is no longer authorized by State
law to engage in the * * * dispensing of controlled substances''); see
also id. Sec. 802(21) (defining ``the term `practitioner' [to] mean[]
a * * * physician * * * or other person licensed, registered or
otherwise permitted, by * * * the jurisdiction in which he practices *
* * to distribute, dispense, [or] administer * * * a controlled
substance in the course of professional practice''); id. Sec. 823(f)
(``The Attorney General shall register practitioners * * * if the
applicant is authorized to dispense * * * controlled substances under
the laws of the State in which he practices.'').
Second, Respondent's contention is a collateral attack on the
validity of the MBC's Suspension Order. However, DEA has held
repeatedly that a registrant cannot collaterally attack the result of a
state criminal or administrative proceeding in a proceeding under
section 304, 21 U.S.C. 824, of the CSA. Calvin Ramsey, 76 FR 20034,
20036 (2011) (other citations omitted); Brenton D. Glisson, 72 FR
54296, 54297 n.2 (2007); Shahid Musud Siddiqui, 61 FR 14818, 14818-19
(1996). Rather, Respondent's various challenges to the validity of the
MBC's Suspension Order must be litigated in the forums provided by the
State of California. Thus, Respondent's contentions regarding the
validity of the MBC's Suspension Order are therefore not material to
this Agency's resolution of whether he is entitled to maintain his DEA
registration in California.
Because it is undisputed that Respondent currently lacks authority
to dispense controlled substances in California, the State in which he
holds his DEA registration, Respondent is not entitled to maintain his
registration. Accordingly, I adopt the ALJ's recommended decision and
will order that Respondent's registration be revoked and that any
pending application be denied.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and
824(a), as well as 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificate of
Registration BL7325079, issued to Zhiwei Lin, M.D., be, and it hereby
is, revoked. I further order that any pending application of Zhiwei
Lin, M.D., to renew or modify his registration, be, and it hereby is,
denied. This Order is effective immediately.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ For the same reasons that the State imposed its emergency
suspension of Respondent's medical license, I conclude that the
public interest requires that this Order be effective immediately.
21 CFR 1316.67.
Dated: March 20, 2012.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Administrator.
Christine Menendez, Esq., for the Government
Alan I. Kaplan, Esq., for the Respondent
Recommended Ruling, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision
of the Administrative Law Judge
Timothy D. Wing, Administrative Law Judge. This proceeding is an
adjudication governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
Sec. 551 et seq., to determine whether a practitioner's Certificate of
Registration (COR) with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA,
Government or Agency) should be revoked and any pending applications
for renewal or modification of that registration denied. Without this
registration, Zhiwei Lin, M.D. (Respondent), would be unable to
lawfully possess, prescribe, dispense or otherwise handle controlled
substances.
I. Procedural Posture
On August 8, 2011, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, DEA, issued
an Order to Show Cause (OSC) of DEA COR BL7325079. The OCS provided
notice to Respondent of an opportunity to show cause as to why the DEA
should not revoke Respondent's DEA COR BL7325079, pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
Sec. 824(a)(4), and deny any pending applications for renewal or
modification, on the grounds that Respondent's continued registration
would be inconsistent with the public interest under 21 U.S.C. Sec.
823(f). On September 2, 2011, Respondent, through counsel, in a letter
dated August 31, 2011, timely requested a hearing with the DEA Office
of Administrative Law Judges.
I issued an Order for Prehearing Statements on September 6, 2011.
On September 12, 2011, the Government filed a Motion for Summary
Disposition, with a copy served on Respondent via U.S. mail. (Mot. at
3.) Pursuant to the September 6, 2011 Order for Prehearing Statements,
Respondent had ``until 4 p.m. EDT three business days after the date of
service of any motion to file a responsive pleading* * * . In the
absence of good cause, failure to file a written response to the moving
party's motion after three business days will be deemed a waiver of
objection.'' (Order for Prehearing Statements at 3.)
As of September 19, 2011, five business days after service of the
Government's Motion for Summary Disposition, Respondent had not yet
filed a response. While not dispositive, Respondent is deemed to have
waived any objection to the Government's motion.
II. The Parties' Contentions
A. The Government
In support of its Motion for Summary Disposition, the Government
asserts that on July 28, 2011, the Medical Board of California issued
an Interim Suspension Order suspending Respondent's medical license,
and that Respondent consequently lacks authority to handle
[[Page 18865]]
controlled substances in California, the jurisdiction in which he
maintains his DEA registration. (Mot. at 1.) The Government contends
that such state authority is a necessary condition for maintaining a
DEA COR and therefore asks that I summarily recommend to the
Administrator that Respondent's COR be revoked and any pending
applications for renewal or modification be denied. (Mot. at 1-2.) In
support of its motion, the Government cites Agency precedent and
attaches the Interim Suspension Order issued by the Medical Board of
California, marked for identification as Exhibit B.
B. Respondent
As noted above, Respondent did not respond to the Government's
Motion for Summary Disposition, or seek an extension within the
deadline for response, and is therefore deemed to waive objection.
III. Discussion
At issue is whether Respondent may maintain his DEA COR given that
California has suspended Respondent from the practice of medicine or
surgery.
Under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 824(a)(3), a practitioner's loss of state
authority to engage in the practice of medicine and to handle
controlled substances is grounds to revoke a practitioner's
registration. Accordingly, this Agency has consistently held that a
person may not hold a DEA registration if he is without appropriate
authority under the laws of the state in which he does business. See
Scott Sandarg, D.M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 17,528 (DEA 2009); David W. Wang,
M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 54,297 (DEA 2007); Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D., 71
Fed. Reg. 39,130 (DEA 2006); Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 Fed. Reg.
51,104 (DEA 1993); Bobby Watts M.D., 53 Fed. Reg. 11,919 (DEA 1988).
Summary disposition in a DEA suspension case is warranted even if
the period of suspension of a respondent's state medical license is
temporary, or even if there is the potential for reinstatement of state
authority because ``revocation is also appropriate when a state license
had been suspended, but with the possibility of future reinstatement.''
Stuart A. Bergman, M.D., 70 Fed. Reg. 33,193 (DEA 2005); Roger A.
Rodriguez, M.D., 70 Fed. Reg. 33,206 (DEA 2005).
It is well-settled that when no question of fact is involved, or
when the material facts are agreed upon, a plenary, adversarial
administrative proceeding is not required, under the rationale that
Congress does not intend administrative agencies to perform meaningless
tasks. See Layfe Robert Anthony, M.D., 67 Fed. Reg. 35,582 (DEA 2002);
Michael G. Dolin, M.D., 65 Fed. Reg. 5661 (DEA 2000); see also Philip
E. Kirk, M.D., 48 Fed. Reg. 32,887 (DEA 1983), aff'd sub nom. Kirk v.
Mullen, 749 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1984). Accord Puerto Rico Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth. v. EPA, 35 F.3d 600, 605 (1st Cir. 1994).
In the instant case, the Government asserts, and Respondent does
not contest, that Respondent's California license to practice medicine
and surgery is presently suspended. This allegation is confirmed by
Government Exhibit B. I therefore find there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact, and that substantial evidence shows that
Respondent is presently without state authority to handle controlled
substances in California. Because ``DEA does not have statutory
authority under the Controlled Substances Act to maintain a
registration if the registrant is without state authority to handle
controlled substances in the state in which he practices,'' Sheran
Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 Fed. Reg. 39,130, 39,131 (DEA 2006), I conclude
that summary disposition is appropriate. It is therefore
ORDERED that the hearing in this case, scheduled to commence on
November 15, 2011, is hereby CANCELLED; and it is further
ORDERED that all proceedings before the undersigned are STAYED
pending the Agency's issuance of a final order.
Recommended Decision
I grant the Government's Motion for Summary Disposition and
recommend that Respondent's DEA COR BL7325079 be revoked and any
pending applications denied.
September 19, 2011.
s/Timothy D. Wing,
Administrative Law Judge.
[FR Doc. 2012-7421 Filed 3-27-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P