Pipeline Safety: Cast Iron Pipe (Supplementary Advisory Bulletin), 17119-17121 [2012-7080]
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srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 57 / Friday, March 23, 2012 / Notices
consecutive years of data, comparing the
experiences of drivers in the first 2 years
with their experiences in the final year.
Applying principles from these
studies to the past 3-year record of the
twelve applicants, two of the drivers
were involved in crashes and none were
convicted of moving violations in a
CMV. All the applicants achieved a
record of safety while driving with their
vision impairment, demonstrating the
likelihood that they have adapted their
driving skills to accommodate their
condition. As the applicants’ ample
driving histories with their vision
deficiencies are good predictors of
future performance, FMCSA concludes
their ability to drive safely can be
projected into the future.
We believe that the applicants’
intrastate driving experience and history
provide an adequate basis for predicting
their ability to drive safely in interstate
commerce. Intrastate driving, like
interstate operations, involves
substantial driving on highways on the
interstate system and on other roads
built to interstate standards. Moreover,
driving in congested urban areas
exposes the driver to more pedestrian
and vehicular traffic than exists on
interstate highways. Faster reaction to
traffic and traffic signals is generally
required because distances between
them are more compact. These
conditions tax visual capacity and
driver response just as intensely as
interstate driving conditions. The
veteran drivers in this proceeding have
operated CMVs safely under those
conditions for at least 3 years, most for
much longer. Their experience and
driving records lead us to believe that
each applicant is capable of operating in
interstate commerce as safely as he/she
has been performing in intrastate
commerce. Consequently, FMCSA finds
that exempting these applicants from
the vision requirement in 49 CFR
391.41(b)(10) is likely to achieve a level
of safety equal to that existing without
the exemption. For this reason, the
Agency is granting the exemptions for
the 2-year period allowed by 49 U.S.C.
31136(e) and 31315 to the twelve
applicants listed in the notice of
February 6, 2012 (77 FR 5874).
We recognize that the vision of an
applicant may change and affect his/her
ability to operate a CMV as safely as in
the past. As a condition of the
exemption, therefore, FMCSA will
impose requirements on the twelve
individuals consistent with the
grandfathering provisions applied to
drivers who participated in the
Agency’s vision waiver program.
Those requirements are found at 49
CFR 391.64(b) and include the
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17:14 Mar 22, 2012
Jkt 226001
following: (1) That each individual be
physically examined every year (a) by
an ophthalmologist or optometrist who
attests that the vision in the better eye
continues to meet the requirement in 49
CFR 391.41(b)(10) and (b) by a medical
examiner who attests that the individual
is otherwise physically qualified under
49 CFR 391.41; (2) that each individual
provide a copy of the ophthalmologist’s
or optometrist’s report to the medical
examiner at the time of the annual
medical examination; and (3) that each
individual provide a copy of the annual
medical certification to the employer for
retention in the driver’s qualification
file, or keep a copy in his/her driver’s
qualification file if he/she is selfemployed. The driver must have a copy
of the certification when driving, for
presentation to a duly authorized
Federal, State, or local enforcement
official.
Discussion of Comments
FMCSA received no comments in this
proceeding.
Conclusion
Based upon its evaluation of the
twelve exemption applications, FMCSA
exempts Eugenio V. Bermudez (MA),
John A. Carroll, Jr. (AL), Mark W.
Crocker (TN), Johnny Dillard (SC), Keith
J. Haaf (VA), Edward M. Jurek (NY),
Allen J. Kunze (ND), Jack W. Murphy,
Jr. (OH), Mark A. Smalls (GA), Glenn R.
Theis (MN), Peter A. Troyan (MI) and
Gary Vines (AL) from the vision
requirement in 49 CFR 391.41(b)(10),
subject to the requirements cited above
(49 CFR 391.64(b)).
In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 31136(e)
and 31315, each exemption will be valid
for 2 years unless revoked earlier by
FMCSA. The exemption will be revoked
if: (1) The person fails to comply with
the terms and conditions of the
exemption; (2) the exemption has
resulted in a lower level of safety than
was maintained before it was granted; or
(3) continuation of the exemption would
not be consistent with the goals and
objectives of 49 U.S.C. 31136 and 31315.
If the exemption is still effective at the
end of the 2-year period, the person may
apply to FMCSA for a renewal under
procedures in effect at that time.
Issued on: March 9, 2012.
Larry W. Minor,
Associate Administration for Policy.
[FR Doc. 2012–7084 Filed 3–22–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–EX–P
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17119
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA–2012–0039]
Pipeline Safety: Cast Iron Pipe
(Supplementary Advisory Bulletin)
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice; Issuance of Advisory
Bulletin.
AGENCY:
PHMSA is issuing an advisory
bulletin to owners and operators of
natural gas cast iron distribution
pipelines and state pipeline safety
representatives. Recent deadly
explosions in Philadelphia and
Allentown, Pennsylvania involving cast
iron pipelines installed in 1942 and
1928, respectively, gained national
attention and highlight the need for
continued safety improvements to aging
gas pipeline systems. This bulletin is an
update of two prior Alert Notices (ALN–
91–02; October 11, 1991 and ALN–92–
02; June 26, 1992) covering the
continued use of cast iron pipe in
natural gas distribution pipeline
systems. This advisory bulletin
reiterates two prior Alert Notices which
remain relevant, urges owners and
operators to conduct a comprehensive
review of their cast iron distribution
pipelines and replacement programs
and accelerate pipeline repair,
rehabilitation and replacement of highrisk pipelines, requests state agencies to
consider enhancements to cast iron
replacement plans and programs, and
alerts owners and operators of the
pipeline safety requirements for the
investigation of failures. In addition, the
latest survey and reporting requirements
of cast iron pipelines required by the
Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty,
and Job Creation Act of 2011 are
included for information.
ADDRESSES: This document can be
viewed on the Office of Pipeline Safety
home page at: https://ops.dot.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff
Gilliam, Director, Engineering and
Research, 202–366–0568 or by email at
Jeffery.Gilliam@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
I. Background
On January 18, 2011, an explosion
and fire caused the death of one gas
utility employee and injuries to several
other people while gas utility crews
were responding to a natural gas leak in
Philadelphia, PA. A preliminary
investigation found a circumferential
E:\FR\FM\23MRN1.SGM
23MRN1
17120
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 57 / Friday, March 23, 2012 / Notices
break on a 12-inch cast iron distribution
main that was installed in 1942, and
was operating at 17 pounds per square
inch gauge (psig) pressure at the time of
incident. An investigation continues
toward finding the cause.
On February 9, 2011, five people lost
their lives and a number of homes were
destroyed and other properties impacted
by an explosion and subsequent fire in
Allentown, PA. A preliminary
investigation found a crack in a 12-inch
cast iron natural gas distribution main
that was installed in 1928, and was
operating at less than 1 psig at the time
of incident. The crack was located
below grade near the destroyed homes.
An investigation continues toward
finding the cause.
Alert Notice (ALN–91–02)
On October 11, 1991, PHMSA’s
predecessor agency, the Research and
Special Programs Administration
(RSPA), issued Pipeline Safety Alert
Notice (ALN–91–02) alerting pipeline
operators of National Transportation
Safety Board recommendation P–91–12
in response to the August 1990
explosion and fire in Allentown, PA,
caused by a crack in a 4-inch cast iron
gas main. The recommendation stated:
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
‘‘Require each gas operator to implement a
program, based on factors such as age, pipe
diameter, operating pressure, soil
corrosiveness, existing graphitic damage, leak
history, burial depth, and external loading, to
identify and replace in a planned, timely
manner cast iron piping systems that may
threaten public safety.’’
The Alert Notice informed
distribution pipeline operators with cast
iron pipe of the following:
—The Gas Piping Technology
Committee developed guide material
to assist them in developing
procedures for determining the
serviceability of the cast iron pipe and
to identify the cast iron pipe segments
that may need replacement.
—Computer programs are commercially
available that can be used to develop
a systematic replacement program for
cast iron pipe.
—Pipeline safety regulations require
that cast iron pipe on which general
graphitization is found to a degree
where a fracture might result must be
replaced. In addition, the regulations
require that cast iron pipe that is
excavated must be protected against
damage. An operator’s compliance
with the above guidelines and code
requirements can be enhanced by
incorporating all of the operator’s cast
iron responsibilities in an effective
cast iron management program that is
designed to identify and replace or
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:14 Mar 22, 2012
Jkt 226001
remove from service cast iron pipe
that may threaten the public.
Alert Notice (ALN–92–02)
On June 26, 1992, RSPA issued a
Pipeline Safety Alert Notice (ALN–92–
02) as a Supplementary Alert Notice to
the 1991 Alert Notice. The
Supplementary Alert Notice reminded
pipeline operators of the requirement at
49 CFR 192.613 that each operator have
a procedure for continuing surveillance
of its pipeline facilities to identify
problems and take appropriate action
concerning failures, leakage, history,
corrosion, and other unusual operating
and maintenance conditions. This
procedure should also include
surveillance of cast iron to identify
problems and to take appropriate action
concerning graphitization.
II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2012–05)
To: Each Owner and Operator of a Natural
Gas Cast Iron Distribution Pipeline Facility
and State Pipeline Safety Representatives.
Subject: Cast Iron Pipe (Supplementary
Advisory Bulletin).
Purpose: To Address Continued Concerns
Rising Out of Recent Cast Iron Incidents.
Advisory:
On October 11, 1991, Alert Notice (ALN–
91–02) was issued reminding all operators of
natural gas distribution systems to have a
program to identify and replace cast iron
piping systems that may threaten public
safety. RSPA also informed operators of
guidelines and computer programs that were
available to help operators determine the
serviceability of cast iron pipe and schedule
its replacement or retirement. On June 26,
1992, Alert Notice (ALN–92–02) was issued
informing pipeline operators that § 192.613
required each operator to have a procedure
for continuing surveillance of its pipeline
facilities to identify problems and take
appropriate action concerning failures,
leakage, history, corrosion, and other unusual
operating and maintenance conditions. This
procedure should also include surveillance
of cast iron to identify problems and to take
appropriate action concerning graphitization.
The two Alert Notices remain relevant, and
reaffirm the need for operators of gas cast
iron distribution systems to maintain an
effective cast iron management program.
PHMSA urges owners and operators to
conduct a comprehensive review of their cast
iron distribution pipeline systems and
replacement programs and to accelerate
pipeline repair, rehabilitation, and
replacement of aging and high-risk pipe.
Recent incidents, such as the deadly
explosions in Philadelphia and Allentown,
Pennsylvania involving cast iron pipe
failures, have focused attention on our
Nation’s aging pipeline infrastructure and
underline the importance of having valid
methods for evaluating the integrity of
pipelines to better ensure public safety.
PHMSA recommends owners and operators
of natural gas cast iron pipelines assure their
replacement program models are based on
relevant risk factors.
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Frm 00120
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
In addition, PHMSA reminds owners and
operators of cast iron distribution pipelines
of their responsibility for the investigation of
all failures and that each operator must
establish procedures for analyzing incidents
and failures, including laboratory
examination of failed pipe segments and
equipment, where appropriate, for the
purpose of determining the causes of the
failure and minimizing the possibility of a
recurrence [192.617]. Owners and operators
are required to review pipeline records,
validate safe pipeline operating pressure
levels and accelerate repairs and replacement
where improvements in safety are necessary.
The Distribution Integrity Management
Program (DIMP) requires natural gas
distribution companies to develop and
implement DIMP for the pipelines they own,
operate or maintain.
PHMSA is asking owners and operators of
cast iron distribution pipelines and state
pipeline safety representatives to consider
the following where improvements in safety
are necessary:
—Request, review and monitor operator cast
iron replacement plans and programs,
actively encourage operators to develop
and continually update and follow their
plans, and consider establishment of
mandated replacement programs.
—Establish accelerated leakage survey
frequencies or leak testing considering
results from failure investigations and
environmental risk factors.
—Focus pipeline safety efforts on identifying
the highest risk pipe.
—Use rate adjustments and flexible rate
recovery mechanisms to incentivize
pipeline rehabilitation, repair and
replacement programs.
—Strengthen pipeline safety inspections,
accident investigations and enforcement
actions.
—Install interior/home methane gas alarms.
The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty,
and Job Creation Act of 2011, was signed into
law (Pub. L. 112–90) on January 3, 2012.
Section 7 of the new law requires the U.S.
Department of Transportation to measure
every two years the progress that owners and
operators of pipeline facilities have made in
adopting and implementing their plans for
the safe management and replacement of cast
iron gas pipelines. Additionally, not later
than December 31, 2013, the Secretary of
Transportation must submit to Congress a
report that — (1) Identifies the total mileage
of cast iron gas pipelines in the United
States; and (2) evaluates the progress that
owners and operators of pipeline facilities
have made in implementing their plans for
the safe management and replacement of cast
iron gas pipelines.
PHMSA is committed to working with
owners and operators of natural gas cast iron
distribution pipelines and state pipeline
safety representatives to ensure our Nation’s
pipeline infrastructure is safe and wellmaintained.
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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 57 / Friday, March 23, 2012 / Notices
Issued in Washington, DC, on March 20,
2012.
Jeffrey D. Wiese,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2012–7080 Filed 3–22–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–60–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Surface Transportation Board
[Docket No. FD 35605]
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
RailAmerica, Inc., Palm Beach Rail
Holding, Inc., RailAmerica
Transportation Corp., RailTex, Inc.,
Fortress Investment Group, LLC, and
RR Acquisition Holding, LLC—Control
Exemption—Wellsboro & Corning
Railroad, LLC
RailAmerica, Inc. (RailAmerica), Palm
Beach Rail Holding, Inc. (Palm Beach),
RailAmerica Transportation Corp.
(RTC), RailTex, Inc. (RailTex), Fortress
Investment Group, LLC (Fortress), and
RR Acquisition Holding, LLC (RR
Acquisition) (collectively, RailAmerica
et al.), have filed a verified notice of
exemption to acquire indirect control of
the Wellsboro & Corning Railroad, LLC
(W&C), a Class III rail carrier, through
the acquisition of control of TransRail
Holdings, LLC (TransRail), the parent of
W&C, by RailTex.
The proposed transaction is
scheduled to be consummated on or
after April 7, 2012 (30 days after the
notice of exemption was filed).
W&C acquired the assets of the
Wellsboro & Corning Railroad Co.1 W&C
owns and operates 35.5 miles of track
between Wellsboro, PA., milepost
109.90, and Erwin, N.Y., milepost 74.70,
in Tioga County, PA., and Steuben
County, N.Y. W&C interchanges traffic
with the Norfolk Southern Railway
Company and the Canadian Pacific
Railway Company.
According to the verified notice of
exemption, RailTex entered a Unit
Purchase Agreement dated January 31,
2012 (the Agreement), with (1)
TransRail, (2) Industrial Waste Group,
LLC (IWG), (3) Wellsboro & Corning
Railroad Co., and (4) A. Thomas Myles
III, A. Thomas Myles IV, and William
Myles (the MG Principals). The MG
Principals own TransRail, and TransRail
owns W&C and the successor to IWG.
Under the Agreement, RailTex will
acquire 100% of the Class A Common
Units of TransRail, giving RailTex a
70% ownership interest in TransRail
and control of W&C through TransRail.
1 Wellsboro & Corning R.R.—Acquis. & Operation
Exemption—Wellsboro & Corning R.R., FD 35595
(STB served Feb. 22, 2012).
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17:14 Mar 22, 2012
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The MG Principals will retain the Class
B Common Units of TransRail, thereby
retaining a 30% interest in TransRail,
though they will not retain control or
the power to control W&C.
Fortress’ noncarrier affiliate, RR
Acquisition, currently owns about 60%
of the publicly traded shares and
controls the noncarrier RailAmerica,
which directly controls the noncarrier
Palm Beach, which directly controls the
noncarrier RTC.
RailAmerica states that it controls the
following Class III rail carriers: (1)
Alabama & Gulf Coast Railway LLC; (2)
Arizona & California Railroad Company;
(3) Bauxite & Northern Railway
Company; (4) California Northern
Railroad Company; (5) Cascade and
Columbia River Railroad Company; (6)
Central Oregon & Pacific Railroad, Inc.;
(7) The Central Railroad Company of
Indiana; (8) Central Railroad Company
of Indianapolis; (9) Connecticut
Southern Railroad, Inc.; (10) Conecuh
Valley Railway, LLC; (11) Dallas,
Garland & Northeastern Railroad, Inc.;
(12) Delphos Terminal Railroad
Company, Inc.; (13) Eastern Alabama
Railway, LLC; (14) Huron & Eastern
Railway Company, Inc.; (15) Indiana &
Ohio Railway Company; (16) Indiana
Southern Railroad, LLC; (17) Kiamichi
Railroad Company, LLC; (18) Kyle
Railroad Company; (19) The Massena
Terminal Railroad Company; (20) MidMichigan Railroad, Inc.; (21) Missouri &
Northern Arkansas Railroad Company,
Inc.; (22) New England Central Railroad,
Inc.; (23) North Carolina & Virginia
Railroad Company, LLC; (24) Otter Tail
Valley Railroad Company, Inc.; (25)
Point Comfort & Northern Railway
Company; (26) Puget Sound & Pacific
Railroad; (27) Rockdale, Sandow &
Southern Railroad Company; (28) San
Diego & Imperial Valley Railroad
Company, Inc.; (29) San Joaquin Valley
Railroad Company; (30) South Carolina
Central Railroad Company, LLC; (31)
Three Notch Railway, LLC; (32) Toledo,
Peoria & Western Railway Corporation;
(33) Ventura County Railroad Corp.; and
(34) Wiregrass Central Railway, LLC.2
Further, Fortress, on behalf of other
equity funds managed by it and its
affiliates, directly controls the
noncarrier FECR Rail LLC, which
directly controls FEC Rail Corp., which
directly controls Florida East Coast
Railway, LLC, a Class II rail carrier.
2 On February 3, 2012, in Docket No. FD 35592,
RailAmerica et al. filed a petition for exemption
from the prior approval requirements of 49 U.S.C.
11323–25 to acquire control of Marquette Rail, LLC,
a Class III rail carrier. The Board issued a notice on
February 28, 2012, instituting an exemption
proceeding pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 10502(b).
PO 00000
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17121
RailAmerica et al. states that: (1) W&C
does not connect with any of
RailAmerica’s subsidiary railroads; (2)
the proposed transaction is not part of
a series of anticipated transactions to
connect W&C and any of RailAmerica’s
subsidiary railroads; and (3) the
proposed transaction does not involve a
Class I rail carrier. The proposed
transaction is therefore exempt from the
prior approval requirements of 49 U.S.C.
11323 pursuant to 49 CFR 1180.2(d)(2).
Under 49 U.S.C. 10502(g), the Board
may not use its exemption authority to
relieve a rail carrier of its statutory
obligation to protect the interests of its
employees. Because the transaction
involves the control of one or more
Class III rail carriers and one Class II rail
carrier, the transaction is subject to the
labor protective requirements of 49
U.S.C. 11326(b) and Wisconsin Central
Ltd.—Acquisition Exemption—Lines of
Union Pacific Railroad, 2 S.T.B. 218
(1997).
If the verified notice contains false or
misleading information, the exemption
is void ab initio. Petitions to revoke the
exemption under 49 U.S.C. 10502(d)
may be filed at any time. The filing of
a petition to revoke will not
automatically stay the effectiveness of
the exemption. Petitions to stay must be
filed by March 30, 2012 (at least seven
days before the exemption becomes
effective).
An original and ten copies of all
pleadings, referring to Docket No. FD
35605 must be filed with the Surface
Transportation Board, 395 E Street SW.,
Washington, DC 20423–0001. In
addition, a copy of each pleading must
be served on: Louis E. Gitomer, 600
Baltimore Avenue, Suite 301, Towson,
MD 21204.
Board decisions and notices are
available on our Web site at
www.stb.dot.gov.
Decided: March 20, 2012.
By the Board, Rachel D. Campbell,
Director, Office of Proceedings.
Raina S. White,
Clearance Clerk.
[FR Doc. 2012–7054 Filed 3–22–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4915–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Surface Transportation Board
[Docket No. EP 290 (Sub-No. 5) (2012–2)]
Quarterly Rail Cost Adjustment Factor
Surface Transportation Board,
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Approval of rail cost adjustment
factor.
AGENCY:
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 57 (Friday, March 23, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 17119-17121]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-7080]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0039]
Pipeline Safety: Cast Iron Pipe (Supplementary Advisory Bulletin)
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
DOT.
ACTION: Notice; Issuance of Advisory Bulletin.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing an advisory bulletin to owners and operators
of natural gas cast iron distribution pipelines and state pipeline
safety representatives. Recent deadly explosions in Philadelphia and
Allentown, Pennsylvania involving cast iron pipelines installed in 1942
and 1928, respectively, gained national attention and highlight the
need for continued safety improvements to aging gas pipeline systems.
This bulletin is an update of two prior Alert Notices (ALN-91-02;
October 11, 1991 and ALN-92-02; June 26, 1992) covering the continued
use of cast iron pipe in natural gas distribution pipeline systems.
This advisory bulletin reiterates two prior Alert Notices which remain
relevant, urges owners and operators to conduct a comprehensive review
of their cast iron distribution pipelines and replacement programs and
accelerate pipeline repair, rehabilitation and replacement of high-risk
pipelines, requests state agencies to consider enhancements to cast
iron replacement plans and programs, and alerts owners and operators of
the pipeline safety requirements for the investigation of failures. In
addition, the latest survey and reporting requirements of cast iron
pipelines required by the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and
Job Creation Act of 2011 are included for information.
ADDRESSES: This document can be viewed on the Office of Pipeline Safety
home page at: https://ops.dot.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeff Gilliam, Director, Engineering
and Research, 202-366-0568 or by email at Jeffery.Gilliam@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
On January 18, 2011, an explosion and fire caused the death of one
gas utility employee and injuries to several other people while gas
utility crews were responding to a natural gas leak in Philadelphia,
PA. A preliminary investigation found a circumferential
[[Page 17120]]
break on a 12-inch cast iron distribution main that was installed in
1942, and was operating at 17 pounds per square inch gauge (psig)
pressure at the time of incident. An investigation continues toward
finding the cause.
On February 9, 2011, five people lost their lives and a number of
homes were destroyed and other properties impacted by an explosion and
subsequent fire in Allentown, PA. A preliminary investigation found a
crack in a 12-inch cast iron natural gas distribution main that was
installed in 1928, and was operating at less than 1 psig at the time of
incident. The crack was located below grade near the destroyed homes.
An investigation continues toward finding the cause.
Alert Notice (ALN-91-02)
On October 11, 1991, PHMSA's predecessor agency, the Research and
Special Programs Administration (RSPA), issued Pipeline Safety Alert
Notice (ALN-91-02) alerting pipeline operators of National
Transportation Safety Board recommendation P-91-12 in response to the
August 1990 explosion and fire in Allentown, PA, caused by a crack in a
4-inch cast iron gas main. The recommendation stated:
``Require each gas operator to implement a program, based on
factors such as age, pipe diameter, operating pressure, soil
corrosiveness, existing graphitic damage, leak history, burial
depth, and external loading, to identify and replace in a planned,
timely manner cast iron piping systems that may threaten public
safety.''
The Alert Notice informed distribution pipeline operators with cast
iron pipe of the following:
--The Gas Piping Technology Committee developed guide material to
assist them in developing procedures for determining the serviceability
of the cast iron pipe and to identify the cast iron pipe segments that
may need replacement.
--Computer programs are commercially available that can be used to
develop a systematic replacement program for cast iron pipe.
--Pipeline safety regulations require that cast iron pipe on which
general graphitization is found to a degree where a fracture might
result must be replaced. In addition, the regulations require that cast
iron pipe that is excavated must be protected against damage. An
operator's compliance with the above guidelines and code requirements
can be enhanced by incorporating all of the operator's cast iron
responsibilities in an effective cast iron management program that is
designed to identify and replace or remove from service cast iron pipe
that may threaten the public.
Alert Notice (ALN-92-02)
On June 26, 1992, RSPA issued a Pipeline Safety Alert Notice (ALN-
92-02) as a Supplementary Alert Notice to the 1991 Alert Notice. The
Supplementary Alert Notice reminded pipeline operators of the
requirement at 49 CFR 192.613 that each operator have a procedure for
continuing surveillance of its pipeline facilities to identify problems
and take appropriate action concerning failures, leakage, history,
corrosion, and other unusual operating and maintenance conditions. This
procedure should also include surveillance of cast iron to identify
problems and to take appropriate action concerning graphitization.
II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB-2012-05)
To: Each Owner and Operator of a Natural Gas Cast Iron
Distribution Pipeline Facility and State Pipeline Safety
Representatives.
Subject: Cast Iron Pipe (Supplementary Advisory Bulletin).
Purpose: To Address Continued Concerns Rising Out of Recent Cast
Iron Incidents.
Advisory:
On October 11, 1991, Alert Notice (ALN-91-02) was issued
reminding all operators of natural gas distribution systems to have
a program to identify and replace cast iron piping systems that may
threaten public safety. RSPA also informed operators of guidelines
and computer programs that were available to help operators
determine the serviceability of cast iron pipe and schedule its
replacement or retirement. On June 26, 1992, Alert Notice (ALN-92-
02) was issued informing pipeline operators that Sec. 192.613
required each operator to have a procedure for continuing
surveillance of its pipeline facilities to identify problems and
take appropriate action concerning failures, leakage, history,
corrosion, and other unusual operating and maintenance conditions.
This procedure should also include surveillance of cast iron to
identify problems and to take appropriate action concerning
graphitization. The two Alert Notices remain relevant, and reaffirm
the need for operators of gas cast iron distribution systems to
maintain an effective cast iron management program.
PHMSA urges owners and operators to conduct a comprehensive
review of their cast iron distribution pipeline systems and
replacement programs and to accelerate pipeline repair,
rehabilitation, and replacement of aging and high-risk pipe. Recent
incidents, such as the deadly explosions in Philadelphia and
Allentown, Pennsylvania involving cast iron pipe failures, have
focused attention on our Nation's aging pipeline infrastructure and
underline the importance of having valid methods for evaluating the
integrity of pipelines to better ensure public safety. PHMSA
recommends owners and operators of natural gas cast iron pipelines
assure their replacement program models are based on relevant risk
factors.
In addition, PHMSA reminds owners and operators of cast iron
distribution pipelines of their responsibility for the investigation
of all failures and that each operator must establish procedures for
analyzing incidents and failures, including laboratory examination
of failed pipe segments and equipment, where appropriate, for the
purpose of determining the causes of the failure and minimizing the
possibility of a recurrence [192.617]. Owners and operators are
required to review pipeline records, validate safe pipeline
operating pressure levels and accelerate repairs and replacement
where improvements in safety are necessary. The Distribution
Integrity Management Program (DIMP) requires natural gas
distribution companies to develop and implement DIMP for the
pipelines they own, operate or maintain.
PHMSA is asking owners and operators of cast iron distribution
pipelines and state pipeline safety representatives to consider the
following where improvements in safety are necessary:
--Request, review and monitor operator cast iron replacement plans
and programs, actively encourage operators to develop and
continually update and follow their plans, and consider
establishment of mandated replacement programs.
--Establish accelerated leakage survey frequencies or leak testing
considering results from failure investigations and environmental
risk factors.
--Focus pipeline safety efforts on identifying the highest risk
pipe.
--Use rate adjustments and flexible rate recovery mechanisms to
incentivize pipeline rehabilitation, repair and replacement
programs.
--Strengthen pipeline safety inspections, accident investigations
and enforcement actions.
--Install interior/home methane gas alarms.
The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act
of 2011, was signed into law (Pub. L. 112-90) on January 3, 2012.
Section 7 of the new law requires the U.S. Department of
Transportation to measure every two years the progress that owners
and operators of pipeline facilities have made in adopting and
implementing their plans for the safe management and replacement of
cast iron gas pipelines. Additionally, not later than December 31,
2013, the Secretary of Transportation must submit to Congress a
report that -- (1) Identifies the total mileage of cast iron gas
pipelines in the United States; and (2) evaluates the progress that
owners and operators of pipeline facilities have made in
implementing their plans for the safe management and replacement of
cast iron gas pipelines.
PHMSA is committed to working with owners and operators of
natural gas cast iron distribution pipelines and state pipeline
safety representatives to ensure our Nation's pipeline
infrastructure is safe and well-maintained.
[[Page 17121]]
Issued in Washington, DC, on March 20, 2012.
Jeffrey D. Wiese,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2012-7080 Filed 3-22-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P