In the Matter of All Operating Boiling Water Reactor Licensees With Mark I and Mark II Containments; Order Modifying Licenses With Regard To Reliable Hardened Containment Vents (Effective Immediately), 16098-16105 [2012-6545]
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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 53 / Monday, March 19, 2012 / Notices
Wolf Creek Generating Station
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.,
Docket No. 50–482, License No. NPF–
42
Mr. Matthew W. Sunseri, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Wolf Creek
Nuclear Operating Corporation, P.O.
Box 411, Burlington, KS 66839
emcdonald on DSK29S0YB1PROD with NOTICES
Requirements for Mitigation Strategies
for Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events at Operating Reactor Sites and
Construction Permit Holders
This Order requires a three-phase
approach for mitigating beyond-designbasis external events. The initial phase
requires the use of installed equipment
and resources to maintain or restore
core cooling, containment and spent
fuel pool (SFP) cooling capabilities. The
transition phase requires providing
sufficient, portable, onsite equipment
and consumables to maintain or restore
these functions until they can be
accomplished with resources brought
from off site. The final phase requires
obtaining sufficient offsite resources to
sustain those functions indefinitely.
(1) Licensees or construction permit
(CP) holders shall develop, implement,
and maintain guidance and strategies to
maintain or restore core cooling,
containment and SFP cooling
capabilities following a beyond-designbasis external event.
(2) These strategies must be capable of
mitigating a simultaneous loss of all
alternating current (ac) power and loss
of normal access to the ultimate heat
sink and have adequate capacity to
address challenges to core cooling,
containment, and SFP cooling
capabilities at all units on a site subject
to this Order.
(3) Licensees or CP holders must
provide reasonable protection for the
associated equipment from external
events. Such protection must
demonstrate that there is adequate
capacity to address challenges to core
cooling, containment, and SFP cooling
capabilities at all units on a site subject
to this Order.
(4) Licensees or CP holders must be
capable of implementing the strategies
in all modes.
(5) Full compliance shall include
procedures, guidance, training, and
acquisition, staging, or installing of
equipment needed for the strategies.
Requirements for Mitigation Strategies
for Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events at Col Holder Reactor Sites
(VOGTLE Units 3 and 4)
Attachment 2 to this order for Part 50
licensees requires a phased approach for
mitigating beyond-design-basis external
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events. The initial phase requires the
use of installed equipment and
resources to maintain or restore core
cooling, containment and spent fuel
pool (SFP) cooling capabilities. The
transition phase requires providing
sufficient, portable, onsite equipment
and consumables to maintain or restore
these functions until they can be
accomplished with resources brought
from off site. The final phase requires
obtaining sufficient offsite resources to
sustain those functions indefinitely.
The design bases of Vogtle Units 3
and 4 includes passive design features
that provide core, containment and SFP
cooling capability for 72 hours, without
reliance on alternating current (ac)
power. These features do not rely on
access to any external water sources
since the containment vessel and the
passive containment cooling system
serve as the safety-related ultimate heat
sink. The NRC staff reviewed these
design features prior to issuance of the
combined licenses for these facilities
and certification of the AP1000 design
referenced therein. The AP1000 design
also includes equipment to maintain
required safety functions in the long
term (beyond 72 hours to 7 days)
including capability to replenish water
supplies. Connections are provided for
generators and pumping equipment that
can be brought to the site to back up the
installed equipment. The staff
concluded in its final safety evaluation
report for the AP1000 design that the
installed equipment (and alternatively,
the use of transportable equipment) is
capable of supporting extended
operation of the passive safety systems
to maintain required safety functions in
the long term. As such, this Order
requires Vogtle Units 3 and 4 to address
the following requirements relative to
the final phase.
(1) Licensees shall develop,
implement, and maintain guidance and
strategies to maintain or restore core
cooling, containment and SFP cooling
capabilities following a beyond-designbasis external event.
(2) These strategies must be capable of
mitigating a simultaneous loss of all ac
power and loss of normal access to the
normal heat sink and have adequate
capacity to address challenges to core
cooling, containment, and SFP cooling
capabilities at all units on a site subject
to this Order.
(3) Licensees must provide reasonable
protection for the associated equipment
from external events. Such protection
must demonstrate that there is adequate
capacity to address challenges to core
cooling, containment, and SFP cooling
capabilities at all units on a site subject
to this Order.
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(4) Licensees must be capable of
implementing the strategies in all
modes.
(5) Full compliance shall include
procedures, guidance, training, and
acquisition, staging, or installing of
equipment needed for the strategies.
[FR Doc. 2012–6547 Filed 3–16–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. (as shown in Attachment 1);
License Nos. (as shown in Attachment 1);
EA–12–050; [NRC–2012–0069]
In the Matter of All Operating Boiling
Water Reactor Licensees With Mark I
and Mark II Containments; Order
Modifying Licenses With Regard To
Reliable Hardened Containment Vents
(Effective Immediately)
I
The Licensees identified in
Attachment 1 to this Order hold licenses
issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC or Commission)
authorizing operation of nuclear power
plants in accordance with the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and
Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) part 50, ‘‘Domestic
Licensing of Production and Utilization
Facilities.’’ Specifically, these Licensees
operate boiling-water reactors (BWRs)
with Mark I and Mark II containment
designs.
II
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0
earthquake struck off the coast of the
Japanese island of Honshu. The
earthquake resulted in a large tsunami,
estimated to have exceeded 14 meters
(45 feet) in height, which inundated the
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant
site. The earthquake and tsunami
produced widespread devastation across
northeastern Japan, and significantly
affected the infrastructure and industry
in the northeastern coastal areas of
Japan.
When the earthquake occurred,
Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, and 3
were in operation and Units 4, 5, and 6
were shut down for routine refueling
and maintenance activities. The Unit 4
reactor fuel was offloaded to the Unit 4
spent fuel pool. Following the
earthquake, the three operating units
automatically shut down and offsite
power was lost to the entire facility. The
emergency diesel generators (EDGs)
started at all six units providing
alternating current (ac) electrical power
to critical systems at each unit. The
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facility response to the earthquake
appears to have been normal.
Approximately 40 minutes following
the earthquake and shutdown of the
operating units, the first large tsunami
wave inundated the site, followed by
additional waves. The tsunami caused
extensive damage to site facilities and
resulted in a complete loss of all ac
electrical power at Units 1 through 5, a
condition known as station blackout
(SBO). In addition, all direct current
electrical power was lost early in the
event on Units 1 and 2, and after some
period of time at the other units. Unit
6 retained the function of one air-cooled
EDG. Despite their actions, the operators
lost the ability to cool the fuel in the
Unit 1 reactor after several hours, in the
Unit 2 reactor after about 70 hours, and
in the Unit 3 reactor after about 36
hours, resulting in damage to the
nuclear fuel shortly after the loss of
cooling capabilities.
Operators first considered using the
facility’s hardened vent to control
pressure in the containment within an
hour following the loss of all ac power
at Unit 1. The Emergency Response
Center began reviewing accident
management procedures and checking
containment venting procedures to
determine how to open the containment
vent valves without power.1 Ultimately,
without adequate core and containment
cooling, primary containment (drywell)
pressure and temperature in Units 1, 2,
and 3 substantially exceeded the design
values for the containments. When the
operators attempted to vent the
containments, they were significantly
challenged in opening the hardened
wetwell (suppression chamber) vents
because of complications from the
prolonged SBO, and high radiation
fields that impeded access.
At Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, 3,
and 4, venting the wetwell involved
opening motor- and air-operated valves.
Similar features are used in many
hardened vent systems that were
installed in U.S. BWR Mark I
containment plants following issuance
of Generic Letter (GL) 89–16,
‘‘Installation of a Hardened Wetwell
Vent.’’ In the prolonged SBO situation
that occurred at Fukushima, operator
actions were not possible from the
control room because of the loss of
power, and the loss of pneumatic
supply pressure to the air-operated
valves. The resultant delay in venting
the containment precluded early
injection of coolant into the reactor
1 See Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
(INPO) report ‘‘INPO 11–005, Special Report on the
Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station, Revision 0,’’ issued November 2011,
p. 72.
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vessel. The lack of coolant, in turn,
resulted in extensive core damage, high
radiation levels, hydrogen production
and containment failure. The leakage of
hydrogen gas into the reactor buildings
resulted in explosions in the secondary
containment buildings of Units 1, 3, and
4, and the ensuing damage to the facility
contributed to the uncontrolled release
of radioactive material to the
environment.
Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, 3, and
4 use the Mark I containment design;
however, because Mark II containment
designs are only slightly larger in
volume than Mark I containment
designs and use wetwell pressure
suppression, it can reasonably be
concluded that a Mark II under similar
circumstances would have suffered
similar consequences.
Following the events at the
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power
plant, the NRC established a senior-level
agency task force referred to as the NearTerm Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF
was tasked with conducting a
systematic and methodical review of the
NRC regulations and processes and
determining if the agency should make
additional improvements to these
programs in light of the events at
Fukushima Dai-ichi. As a result of this
review, the NTTF developed a
comprehensive set of recommendations,
documented in SECY–11–0093, ‘‘NearTerm Report and Recommendations for
Agency Actions Following the Events in
Japan,’’ dated July 12, 2011. These
recommendations were enhanced by the
NRC staff following interactions with
stakeholders. Documentation of the
staff’s efforts is contained in SECY–11–
0124, ‘‘Recommended Actions To Be
Taken Without Delay From the NearTerm Task Force Report,’’ dated
September 9, 2011, and SECY–11–0137,
‘‘Prioritization of Recommended
Actions To Be Taken in Response to
Fukushima Lessons Learned,’’ dated
October 3, 2011.
As directed by the Staff Requirements
Memorandum (SRM) for SECY–11–
0093, the NRC staff reviewed the NTTF
recommendations within the context of
the NRC’s existing regulatory framework
and considered the various regulatory
vehicles available to the NRC to
implement the recommendations.
SECY–11–0124 and SECY–11–0137
established the staff’s prioritization of
the recommendations based upon the
potential safety enhancements.
Current regulatory requirements and
existing plant capabilities allow the
NRC to conclude that a sequence of
events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi
accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S.
Therefore, continued operation and
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continued licensing activities do not
pose an imminent threat to public
health and safety. However, the
importance of reliable operation of
hardened vents during emergency
conditions was already well established
and this understanding has been
reinforced by the clear lessons of
Fukushima. While not required,
hardened vents have been in place in
U.S. plants with BWR Mark I
containments for many years but a wide
variance exists with regard to the
reliability of the vents. Additionally,
hardened vents are not required on
plants with BWR Mark II containments
although as discussed above, Mark II
containments are only slightly larger
than Mark I. Reliable hardened venting
systems in BWR facilities with Mark I
and Mark II containments are needed to
ensure that adequate protection of
public health and safety is maintained.
In SRM–SECY–11–0137, the
Commission directed the NRC staff to
take certain actions and provided
further guidance including directing the
staff to consider filtered vents. The staff
has determined that there are policy
issues that need to be resolved before
any regulatory action can be taken to
require Licensees to install filtered
vents. These policy issues include
consideration of severe accident
conditions in the design and operation
of the vent, addition of filters to
hardened reliable vent systems, and
consideration of vents in areas other
than primary containment. However,
the NRC has also determined that
Licensees should promptly begin the
implementation of short-term actions
relating to reliable hardened vents and
to focus these actions on improvements
that will assist in the prevention of core
damage. As such, this Order requires
Licensees to take the necessary actions
to install reliable hardened venting
systems in BWR facilities with Mark I
and Mark II containments to assist
strategies relating to the prevention of
core damage. With respect to the policy
issues discussed above, the NRC staff
plans to submit a Policy Paper to the
Commission in July 2012.
Additional details on an acceptable
approach for complying with this Order
will be contained in final Interim Staff
Guidance (ISG) scheduled to be issued
by the NRC in August 2012. This
guidance will also include a template to
be used for the plan that will be
submitted in accordance with Section
IV, C.1 below.
III
Reasonable assurance of adequate
protection of the public health and
safety and assurance of the common
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defense and security are the
fundamental NRC regulatory objectives.
Compliance with NRC requirements
plays a critical role in giving the NRC
confidence that Licensees are
maintaining an adequate level of public
health and safety and common defense
and security. While compliance with
NRC requirements presumptively
assures adequate protection, new
information may reveal that additional
requirements are warranted. In such
situations, the Commission may act in
accordance with its statutory authority
under Section 161 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended, to require
Licensees to take action in order to
protect health and safety and common
defense and security.
To protect public health and safety
from the inadvertent release of
radioactive materials, the NRC’s
defense-in-depth strategy includes
multiple layers of protection: (1)
Prevention of accidents by virtue of the
design, construction and operation of
the plant, (2) mitigation features to
prevent radioactive releases should an
accident occur, and (3) emergency
preparedness programs that include
measures such as sheltering and
evacuation. The defense-in-depth
strategy also provides for multiple
physical barriers to contain the
radioactive materials in the event of an
accident. The barriers are the fuel
cladding, the reactor coolant pressure
boundary, and the containment. These
defense-in-depth features are embodied
in the existing regulatory requirements
and thereby provide adequate protection
of public health and safety.
The events at Fukushima Dai-ichi
highlight the possibility that extreme
natural phenomena could challenge the
prevention, mitigation, and emergency
preparedness defense-in-depth layers.
At Fukushima, limitations in time and
unpredictable conditions associated
with the accident significantly
challenged attempts by the responders
to preclude core damage and
containment failure. In particular, the
operators were unable to successfully
operate the containment venting system.
The inability to reduce containment
pressure inhibited efforts to cool the
reactor core. If additional backup or
alternate sources of power had been
available to operate the containment
venting system remotely, or if certain
valves had been more accessible for
manual operation, the operators at
Fukushima may have been able to
depressurize the containment earlier.
This, in turn, could have allowed
operators to implement strategies using
low-pressure water sources that may
have limited or prevented damage to the
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reactor core. Thus, the events at
Fukushima demonstrate that reliable
hardened vents at BWR facilities with
Mark I and Mark II containment designs
are important to maintain core and
containment cooling.
The Commission has determined that
ensuring adequate protection of public
health and safety requires that all
operating BWR facilities with Mark I
and Mark II containments have a
reliable hardened venting capability for
events that can lead to core damage.
These new requirements provide greater
mitigation capability consistent with the
overall defense-in-depth philosophy,
and therefore greater assurance that the
challenges posed by severe external
events to power reactors do not pose an
undue risk to public health and safety.
To provide reasonable assurance of
adequate protection of public health and
safety, all licenses identified in
Attachment 1 to this Order shall be
modified to include the requirements
identified in Attachment 2 to this Order.
Accordingly, the NRC has concluded
that these measures are necessary to
ensure adequate protection of public
health and safety under the provisions
of the backfit rule, 10 CFR
50.109(a)(4)(ii), and is requiring
Licensee actions. In addition, pursuant
to 10 CFR 2.202, the NRC finds that the
public health, safety and interest require
that this Order be made immediately
effective.
IV
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections
161b, 161i, 161o, and 182 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and
the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR
2.202, ‘‘Orders,’’ and 10 CFR part 50, it
is hereby ordered, effective immediately,
that all licenses identified in attachment
1 to this order are modified as follows:
A. All Licensees shall,
notwithstanding the provisions of any
Commission regulation or license to the
contrary, comply with the requirements
described in Attachment 2 to this Order
except to the extent that a more
stringent requirement is set forth in the
license. These Licensees shall promptly
start implementation of the
requirements in Attachment 2 to the
Order and shall complete full
implementation no later than two (2)
refueling cycles following the submittal
of the overall integrated plan, as
required in Condition C.1. (scheduled to
be issued in August 2012), or December
31, 2016, whichever comes first.
B. 1. All Licensees shall, within
twenty (20) days of the date of this
Order, notify the Commission (1) if they
are unable to comply with any of the
requirements described in Attachment
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2, (2) if compliance with any of the
requirements is unnecessary in their
specific circumstances, or (3) if
implementation of any of the
requirements would cause the Licensee
to be in violation of the provisions of
any Commission regulation or the
facility license. The notification shall
provide the Licensee’s justification for
seeking relief from or variation of any
specific requirement.
2. Any Licensee that considers that
implementation of any of the
requirements described in Attachment 2
to this Order would adversely affect the
safe and secure operation of the facility
must notify the Commission, within
twenty (20) days of this Order, of the
adverse safety impact, the basis for its
determination that the requirement has
an adverse safety impact, and either a
proposal for achieving the same
objectives specified in the Attachment 2
requirement in question, or a schedule
for modifying the facility to address the
adverse safety condition. If neither
approach is appropriate, the Licensee
must supplement its response to
Condition B.1 of this Order to identify
the condition as a requirement with
which it cannot comply, with attendant
justifications as required in Condition
B.1.
C. 1. All Licensees shall, by
February 28, 2013, submit to the
Commission for review an overall
integrated plan including a description
of how compliance with the
requirements described in Attachment 2
will be achieved.
2. All Licensees shall provide an
initial status report sixty (60) days
following issuance of the final ISG, and
at six (6)-month intervals following
submittal of the overall integrated plan,
as required in Condition C.1, which
delineates progress made in
implementing the requirements of this
Order.
3. All Licensees shall report to the
Commission when full compliance with
the requirements described in
Attachment 2 is achieved.
Licensee responses to Conditions B.1,
B.2, C.1, C.2, and C.3 above shall be
submitted in accordance with 10 CFR
50.4, ‘‘Written Communications.’’
The Director, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation may, in writing,
relax or rescind any of the above
conditions upon demonstration by the
Licensee of good cause.
V
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the
Licensee must, and any other person
adversely affected by this Order may,
submit an answer to this Order, and
may request a hearing on this Order,
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within twenty (20) days of the date of
this Order. Where good cause is shown,
consideration will be given to extending
the time to answer or to request a
hearing. A request for extension of time
in which to submit an answer or request
a hearing must be made in writing to the
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555,
and include a statement of good cause
for the extension. The answer may
consent to this Order.
If a hearing is requested by a Licensee
or a person whose interest is adversely
affected, the Commission will issue an
Order designating the time and place of
any hearings. If a hearing is held, the
issue to be considered at such hearing
shall be whether this Order should be
sustained. Pursuant to 10 CFR
2.202(c)(2)(i), the licensee or any other
person adversely affected by this Order,
may, in addition to demanding a
hearing, at the time the answer is filed
or sooner, move the presiding officer to
set aside the immediate effectiveness of
the Order on the ground that the Order,
including the need for immediate
effectiveness, is not based on adequate
evidence but on mere suspicion,
unfounded allegations, or error.
All documents filed in NRC
adjudicatory proceedings, including a
request for hearing, a petition for leave
to intervene, any motion or other
document filed in the proceeding prior
to the submission of a request for
hearing or petition to intervene, and
documents filed by interested
governmental entities participating
under 10 CFR 2.315(c), must be filed in
accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule
(72 FR 49139, August 28, 2007). The EFiling process requires participants to
submit and serve all adjudicatory
documents over the internet, or in some
cases to mail copies on electronic
storage media. Participants may not
submit paper copies of their filings
unless they seek an exemption in
accordance with the procedures
described below.
To comply with the procedural
requirements of E-Filing, at least 10
days prior to the filing deadline, the
participant should contact the Office of
the Secretary by email at
hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by telephone
at (301) 415–1677, to request (1) a
digital ID certificate, which allows the
participant (or its counsel or
representative) to digitally sign
documents and access the E-Submittal
server for any proceeding in which it is
participating; and (2) advise the
Secretary that the participant will be
submitting a request or petition for
hearing (even in instances in which the
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participant, or its counsel or
representative, already holds an NRCissued digital ID certificate). Based upon
this information, the Secretary will
establish an electronic docket for the
hearing in this proceeding if the
Secretary has not already established an
electronic docket.
Information about applying for a
digital ID certificate is available on
NRC’s public Web site at https://
www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/
apply-certificates.html. System
requirements for accessing the ESubmittal server are detailed in NRC’s
‘‘Guidance for Electronic Submission,’’
which is available on the agency’s
public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/
site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants
may attempt to use other software not
listed on the Web site, but should note
that the NRC’s E-Filing system does not
support unlisted software, and the NRC
Meta System Help Desk will not be able
to offer assistance in using unlisted
software.
If a participant is electronically
submitting a document to the NRC in
accordance with the E-Filing rule, the
participant must file the document
using the NRC’s online, Web-based
submission form. In order to serve
documents through the Electronic
Information Exchange, users will be
required to install a Web browser plugin from the NRC Web site. Further
information on the Web-based
submission form, including the
installation of the Web browser plug-in,
is available on the NRC’s public Web
site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html.
Once a participant has obtained a
digital ID certificate and a docket has
been created, the participant can then
submit a request for hearing or petition
for leave to intervene. Submissions
should be in Portable Document Format
(PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance
available on the NRC public Web site at
https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html. A filing is considered
complete at the time the documents are
submitted through the NRC’s E-Filing
system. To be timely, an electronic
filing must be submitted to the E-Filing
system no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern
Time on the due date. Upon receipt of
a transmission, the E-Filing system
time-stamps the document and sends
the submitter an email notice
confirming receipt of the document. The
E-Filing system also distributes an email
notice that provides access to the
document to the NRC Office of the
General Counsel and any others who
have advised the Office of the Secretary
that they wish to participate in the
proceeding, so that the filer need not
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16101
serve the documents on those
participants separately. Therefore,
applicants and other participants (or
their counsel or representative) must
apply for and receive a digital ID
certificate before a hearing request/
petition to intervene is filed so that they
can obtain access to the document via
the E-Filing system.
A person filing electronically using
the agency’s adjudicatory E-Filing
system may seek assistance by
contacting the NRC Meta System Help
Desk through the ‘‘Contact Us’’ link
located on the NRC Web site at https://
www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html, by email at
MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a tollfree call at (866) 672–7640. The NRC
Meta System Help Desk is available
between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern
Time, Monday through Friday,
excluding government holidays.
Participants who believe that they
have a good cause for not submitting
documents electronically must file an
exemption request, in accordance with
10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper
filing requesting authorization to
continue to submit documents in paper
format. Such filings must be submitted
by: (1) First class mail addressed to the
Office of the Secretary of the
Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, Attention: Rulemaking and
Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier,
express mail, or expedited delivery
service to the Office of the Secretary,
Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North,
11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, 20852, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff.
Participants filing a document in this
manner are responsible for serving the
document on all other participants.
Filing is considered complete by firstclass mail as of the time of deposit in
the mail, or by courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service upon
depositing the document with the
provider of the service. A presiding
officer, having granted an exemption
request from using E-Filing, may require
a participant or party to use E-Filing if
the presiding officer subsequently
determines that the reason for granting
the exemption from use of E-Filing no
longer exists.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory
proceedings will appear in NRC’s
electronic hearing docket, which is
available to the public at https://
ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded
pursuant to an order of the Commission,
or the presiding officer. Participants are
requested not to include personal
privacy information, such as social
security numbers, home addresses, or
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home phone numbers in their filings,
unless an NRC regulation or other law
requires submission of such
information. With respect to
copyrighted works, except for limited
excerpts that serve the purpose of the
adjudicatory filings and would
constitute a Fair Use application,
participants are requested not to include
copyrighted materials in their
submission.
If a person other than the Licensee
requests a hearing, that person shall set
forth with particularity the manner in
which his interest is adversely affected
by this Order and shall address the
criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d).
In the absence of any request for
hearing, or written approval of an
extension of time in which to request a
hearing, the provisions specified in
Section IV above shall be final twenty
(20) days from the date of this Order
without further order or proceedings. If
an extension of time for requesting a
hearing has been approved, the
provisions specified in Section IV shall
be final when the extension expires if a
hearing request has not been received.
An answer or a request for hearing shall
not stay the immediate effectiveness of
this order.
For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated this 12th day of March 2012.
Eric J. Leeds,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
Operating Boiling Water Reactor
Licenses With Mark I and Mark II
Containments
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant ...............................................................................................................................................................
Tennessee Valley Authority.
Docket Nos. 50–259, 50–260 and 50–296.
License Nos. DPR–33, DPR–52 and DPR–68.
Mr. Preston D. Swafford.
Chief Nuclear Officer and Executive Vice President.
Tennessee Valley Authority.
3R Lookout Place.
1101 Market Street.
Chattanooga, TN 37402–2801.
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant .........................................................................................................................................................
Carolina Power & Light Co..
Docket Nos. 50–325 and 50–324.
License Nos. DPR–71 and DPR–62.
Mr. Michael J. Annacone.
Vice President.
Carolina Power & Light Company.
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant.
P.O. Box 10429.
Southport, NC 28461.
Columbia Generating Station .............................................................................................................................................................
Energy Northwest.
Docket No. 50–397.
License No. NPF–21.
Mr. Mark E. Reddemann.
Chief Executive Officer.
Energy Northwest.
MD 1023.
P.O. Box 968.
Richland, WA 99352.
Cooper Nuclear Station ......................................................................................................................................................................
Nebraska Public Power District.
Docket No. 50–298.
License No. DPR–46.
Mr. Brian J. O’Grady.
Vice President—Nuclear and Chief Nuclear Officer.
Nebraska Public Power District.
72676 648A Avenue.
P.O. Box 98.
Brownville, NE 68321.
Dresden Nuclear Power Station .........................................................................................................................................................
Exelon Generation Co., LLC.
Docket Nos. 50–237 and 50–249.
License Nos. DPR–19 and DPR–25.
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio.
President and Chief Nuclear Officer.
Exelon Nuclear.
4300 Winfield Road.
Warrenville, IL 60555.
Duane Arnold Energy Center .............................................................................................................................................................
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC.
Docket No. 50–331.
License No. DPR–49.
Mr. Peter Wells.
Site Vice President.
NextEra Energy.
Duane Arnold Energy Center.
3277 DAEC Road.
Palo, IA 52324–9785.
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant .............................................................................................................................................................
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BWR–Mark I.
BWR–Mark II.
BWR–Mark I.
BWR–Mark I.
BWR–Mark I.
BWR–Mark I.
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 53 / Monday, March 19, 2012 / Notices
emcdonald on DSK29S0YB1PROD with NOTICES
Southern Nuclear Operating Co..
Docket Nos. 50–321 and 50–366.
License Nos. DPR–57 and NPF–5.
Mr. Dennis R. Madison.
Vice President.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc..
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant.
11028 Hatch Parkway North.
Baxley, GA 31513.
Fermi ..................................................................................................................................................................................................
Detroit Edison Co..
Docket No. 50–341.
License No. NPF–43.
Mr. Jack M. Davis.
Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer.
Detroit Edison Company.
Fermi 2—210 NOC.
6400 North Dixie Highway.
Newport, MI 48166.
Hope Creek Generating Station .........................................................................................................................................................
PSEG Nuclear, LLC.
Docket No. 50–354.
License No. NPF–57.
Mr. Thomas Joyce.
President and Chief Nuclear Officer.
PSEG Nuclear LLC—N09.
P.O. Box 236.
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038.
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant ........................................................................................................................................
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc..
Docket No. 50–333.
License No. DPR–59.
Mike Colomb.
Vice President, Operations.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc..
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
P.O. Box 110.
Lycoming, NY 13093.
LaSalle County Station .......................................................................................................................................................................
Exelon Generation Co., LLC.
Docket Nos. 50–373 and 50–374.
License Nos. NPF–11 and NPF–18.
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio.
President and Chief Nuclear Officer.
Exelon Nuclear.
4300 Winfield Road.
Warrenville, IL 60555.
Limerick Generating Station ...............................................................................................................................................................
Exelon Generation Co., LLC.
Docket Nos. 50–352 and 50–353.
License Nos. NPF–39 and NPF–85.
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio.
President and Chief Nuclear Officer.
Exelon Nuclear.
4300 Winfield Road.
Warrenville, IL 60555.
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant .................................................................................................................................................
Northern States Power Company.
Docket No. 50–263.
License No. DPR–22.
Mr. Timothy J. O’Connor.
Site Vice President.
Northern States Power Company—Minnesota.
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.
2807 West County Road 75.
Monticello, MN 55362–9637.
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station .........................................................................................................................................................
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC.
Docket Nos. 50–220 and 50–410.
License Nos. DPR–63 and NPF–69.
Mr. Ken Langdon.
Vice President Nine Mile Point.
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC.
P.O. Box 63.
Lycoming, NY 13093.
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BWR–Mark I.
BWR–Mark I.
BWR–Mark I.
BWR–Mark II.
BWR–Mark II.
BWR–Mark I.
BWR–Mark I &
II.
16104
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 53 / Monday, March 19, 2012 / Notices
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station .........................................................................................................................................
Exelon Generation Co., LLC.
Docket No. 50–219.
License No. DPR–16.
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio.
President and Chief Nuclear Officer.
Exelon Nuclear.
4300 Winfield Road.
Warrenville, IL 60555.
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station .................................................................................................................................................
Exelon Generation Co., LLC.
Docket Nos. 50–277 and 50–278.
License Nos. DPR–44 and DPR–56.
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio.
President and Chief Nuclear Officer.
Exelon Nuclear.
4300 Winfield Road.
Warrenville, IL 60555.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1 ..........................................................................................................................................
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc..
Docket No. 50–293.
License No. DPR–35.
Mr. Robert Smith.
Vice President and Site Vice President.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc..
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.
600 Rocky Hill Road.
Plymouth, MA 02360–5508.
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station ...................................................................................................................................................
Exelon Generation Co., LLC.
Docket Nos. 50–254 and 50–265.
License Nos. DPR–29 and DPR–30.
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio.
President and Chief Nuclear Officer.
Exelon Nuclear.
4300 Winfield Road.
Warrenville, IL 60555.
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station ................................................................................................................................................
PPL Susquehanna, LLC.
Docket Nos. 50–387 and 50–388.
License Nos. NPF–14 and NPF–22.
Mr. Timothy S. Rausch.
Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer.
PPL Susquehanna, LLC.
769 Salem Boulevard.
NUCSB3.
Berwick, PA 18603–0467.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ...........................................................................................................................................
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc..
Docket No. 50–271.
License No. DPR–28.
Mr. Christopher J. Wamser.
Site Vice President.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc..
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.
320 Governor Hunt Road.
Vernon, VT 05354.
emcdonald on DSK29S0YB1PROD with NOTICES
Requirements for Reliable Hardened
Vent Systems at Boiling-Water Reactor
Facilities With Mark I And Mark II
Containments
1. Hardened Containment Venting
System (HCVS) Functional
Requirements
Boiling-Water Reactor (BWR) Mark I
and Mark II containments shall have a
reliable hardened vent to remove decay
heat and maintain control of
containment pressure within acceptable
limits following events that result in the
loss of active containment heat removal
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capability or prolonged Station Blackout
(SBO). The hardened vent system shall
be accessible and operable under a
range of plant conditions, including a
prolonged SBO and inadequate
containment cooling.
1.1 The design of the HCVS shall
consider the following performance
objectives:
1.1.1 The HCVS shall be designed to
minimize the reliance on operator
actions.
1.1.2 The HCVS shall be designed to
minimize plant operators’ exposure
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BWR–Mark I.
BWR–Mark I.
BWR–Mark I.
BWR–Mark I.
BWR–Mark II.
BWR–Mark I.
to occupational hazards, such as
extreme heat stress, while operating
the HCVS system.
1.1.3 The HCVS shall also be
designed to minimize radiological
consequences that would impede
personnel actions needed for event
response.
1.2 The HCVS shall include the
following design features:
1.2.1 The HCVS shall have the
capacity to vent the steam/energy
equivalent of 1 percent of licensed/
rated thermal power (unless a lower
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value is justified by analyses), and
be able to maintain containment
pressure below the primary
containment design pressure.
1.2.2 The HCVS shall be accessible
to plant operators and be capable of
remote operation and control, or
manual operation, during sustained
operations.
1.2.3 The HCVS shall include a
means to prevent inadvertent
actuation.
1.2.4 The HCVS shall include a
means to monitor the status of the
vent system (e.g., valve position
indication) from the control room or
other location(s). The monitoring
system shall be designed for
sustained operation during a
prolonged SBO.
1.2.5 The HCVS shall include a
means to monitor the effluent
discharge for radioactivity that may
be released from operation of the
HCVS. The monitoring system shall
provide indication in the control
room or other location(s), and shall
be designed for sustained operation
during a prolonged SBO.
1.2.6 The HCVS shall include design
features to minimize unintended
cross flow of vented fluids within a
unit and between units on the site.
1.2.7 The HCVS shall include
features and provision for the
operation, testing, inspection and
maintenance adequate to ensure
that reliable function and capability
are maintained.
1.2.8 The HCVS shall be designed
for pressures that are consistent
with maximum containment design
pressures as well as dynamic
loading resulting from system
actuation.
1.2.9 The HCVS shall discharge the
effluent to a release point above
main plant structures.
2. Hardened Containment Venting
System Quality Standards
The following quality standards are
necessary to fulfill the requirements for
a reliable HCVS:
2.1 The HCVS vent path up to and
including the second containment
isolation barrier shall be designed
consistent with the design basis of
the plant. These items include
piping, piping supports,
containment isolation valves,
containment isolation valve
actuators and containment isolation
valve position indication
components.
2.2 All other HCVS components shall
be designed for reliable and rugged
performance that is capable of
ensuring HCVS functionality
following a seismic event. These
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items include electrical power
supply, valve actuator pneumatic
supply and instrumentation (local
and remote) components.
3. Hardened Containment Venting
System Programmatic Requirements
3.1 The Licensee shall develop,
implement, and maintain
procedures necessary for the safe
operation of the HCVS. Procedures
shall be established for system
operations when normal and
backup power is available, and
during SBO conditions.
3.2 The Licensee shall train
appropriate personnel in the use of
the HCVS. The training curricula
shall include system operations
when normal and backup power is
available, and during SBO
conditions.
[FR Doc. 2012–6545 Filed 3–16–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–66581; File No. SR–ICEEU–
2012–04]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; ICE
Clear Europe Limited; Notice of Filing
of Proposed Rule Change To Provide
for a T+1 Settlement of the Initial
Payment Related to the CDS Contracts
Cleared by ICE Clear Europe Limited
March 13, 2012.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder 2
notice is hereby given that on March 6,
2012, ICE Clear Europe Limited (‘‘ICE
Clear Europe’’) filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule
change as described in Items I and II
below, which Items have been prepared
primarily by ICE Clear Europe. The
Commission is publishing this notice to
solicit comments on the proposed rule
change from interested persons.
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of Substance of
the Proposed Rule Change
ICE Clear Europe proposes rule
amendments that are intended to
modify the terms of each of the various
CDS Contracts cleared by ICE Clear
Europe (iTraxx Contracts, Standard
European Corporate and Sovereign
Contracts) to make the Initial Payment 3
1 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
CFR 240.19b–4.
3 Initial Payment means, in relation to a CDS
Contract, the payment, if any, specified as the
‘‘Initial Payment Amount’’ (or, in relation to certain
2 17
PO 00000
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
16105
date the first business day immediately
following the trade date, provided that
with respect to CDS Contracts that are
accepted for clearing after the trade
date, the Initial Payment date will be the
date that is the first business day
following the date when the CDS
Contract is accepted for clearing.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
In its filing with the Commission, ICE
Clear Europe included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for
the proposed rule change and discussed
any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of these
statements may be examined at the
places specified in Item IV below. ICE
Clear Europe has prepared summaries,
set forth in sections (A), (B), and (C)
below, of the most significant aspects of
these statements.4
(A) Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
As noted above, the proposed rule
changes amend the timing of Initial
Payments on a cleared CDS Contract.
The Initial Payment under a CDS
Contract is established at the time the
contract is executed and may be payable
from either the protection buyer to the
protection seller or vice versa. Under
the current ICE Clear Europe Rules (by
way of the incorporated ISDA Credit
Derivatives Definitions), and consistent
with practice in the market for
uncleared credit default swaps, the
Initial Payment is required to be made
on the third business day following the
trade date (the execution date). ICE
Clear Europe proposes to amend the
definition of Initial Payment in its
Clearing Rules to provide instead that
the Initial Payment is to be made on the
first business day following the trade
date (or, if the transaction is accepted
for clearing after the trade date, the
initial payment is to be made on the first
business day following the date of
acceptance for clearing). ICE Clear
Europe believes that this change from
T+3 settlement to T+1 settlement will
reduce settlement risk for the
CDS Contracts relating to indices, as the
‘‘Additional Amount’’) under the Contract Terms
for such CDS Contract and, in relation to a Bilateral
CDS Transaction, the payment, usually described
therein as the ‘‘Initial Payment Amount’’ or
‘‘Additional Amount,’’ payable by one party thereto
to the other on the third business day after the trade
date of such Bilateral CDS Transaction. See ICE
Clear Europe Clearing Rules, Section 1, Rule 101.
4 The Commission has modified the text of the
summaries prepared by ICE Clear Europe.
E:\FR\FM\19MRN1.SGM
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 53 (Monday, March 19, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16098-16105]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-6545]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. (as shown in Attachment 1); License Nos. (as shown in
Attachment 1); EA-12-050; [NRC-2012-0069]
In the Matter of All Operating Boiling Water Reactor Licensees
With Mark I and Mark II Containments; Order Modifying Licenses With
Regard To Reliable Hardened Containment Vents (Effective Immediately)
I
The Licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order hold
licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or
Commission) authorizing operation of nuclear power plants in accordance
with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) part 50, ``Domestic Licensing of
Production and Utilization Facilities.'' Specifically, these Licensees
operate boiling-water reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and Mark II
containment designs.
II
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the coast
of the Japanese island of Honshu. The earthquake resulted in a large
tsunami, estimated to have exceeded 14 meters (45 feet) in height,
which inundated the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant site. The
earthquake and tsunami produced widespread devastation across
northeastern Japan, and significantly affected the infrastructure and
industry in the northeastern coastal areas of Japan.
When the earthquake occurred, Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, and 3
were in operation and Units 4, 5, and 6 were shut down for routine
refueling and maintenance activities. The Unit 4 reactor fuel was
offloaded to the Unit 4 spent fuel pool. Following the earthquake, the
three operating units automatically shut down and offsite power was
lost to the entire facility. The emergency diesel generators (EDGs)
started at all six units providing alternating current (ac) electrical
power to critical systems at each unit. The
[[Page 16099]]
facility response to the earthquake appears to have been normal.
Approximately 40 minutes following the earthquake and shutdown of
the operating units, the first large tsunami wave inundated the site,
followed by additional waves. The tsunami caused extensive damage to
site facilities and resulted in a complete loss of all ac electrical
power at Units 1 through 5, a condition known as station blackout
(SBO). In addition, all direct current electrical power was lost early
in the event on Units 1 and 2, and after some period of time at the
other units. Unit 6 retained the function of one air-cooled EDG.
Despite their actions, the operators lost the ability to cool the fuel
in the Unit 1 reactor after several hours, in the Unit 2 reactor after
about 70 hours, and in the Unit 3 reactor after about 36 hours,
resulting in damage to the nuclear fuel shortly after the loss of
cooling capabilities.
Operators first considered using the facility's hardened vent to
control pressure in the containment within an hour following the loss
of all ac power at Unit 1. The Emergency Response Center began
reviewing accident management procedures and checking containment
venting procedures to determine how to open the containment vent valves
without power.\1\ Ultimately, without adequate core and containment
cooling, primary containment (drywell) pressure and temperature in
Units 1, 2, and 3 substantially exceeded the design values for the
containments. When the operators attempted to vent the containments,
they were significantly challenged in opening the hardened wetwell
(suppression chamber) vents because of complications from the prolonged
SBO, and high radiation fields that impeded access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) report
``INPO 11-005, Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Revision 0,'' issued
November 2011, p. 72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, 3, and 4, venting the wetwell
involved opening motor- and air-operated valves. Similar features are
used in many hardened vent systems that were installed in U.S. BWR Mark
I containment plants following issuance of Generic Letter (GL) 89-16,
``Installation of a Hardened Wetwell Vent.'' In the prolonged SBO
situation that occurred at Fukushima, operator actions were not
possible from the control room because of the loss of power, and the
loss of pneumatic supply pressure to the air-operated valves. The
resultant delay in venting the containment precluded early injection of
coolant into the reactor vessel. The lack of coolant, in turn, resulted
in extensive core damage, high radiation levels, hydrogen production
and containment failure. The leakage of hydrogen gas into the reactor
buildings resulted in explosions in the secondary containment buildings
of Units 1, 3, and 4, and the ensuing damage to the facility
contributed to the uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the
environment.
Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, 3, and 4 use the Mark I containment
design; however, because Mark II containment designs are only slightly
larger in volume than Mark I containment designs and use wetwell
pressure suppression, it can reasonably be concluded that a Mark II
under similar circumstances would have suffered similar consequences.
Following the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant,
the NRC established a senior-level agency task force referred to as the
Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF was tasked with conducting a
systematic and methodical review of the NRC regulations and processes
and determining if the agency should make additional improvements to
these programs in light of the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi. As a
result of this review, the NTTF developed a comprehensive set of
recommendations, documented in SECY-11-0093, ``Near-Term Report and
Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan,''
dated July 12, 2011. These recommendations were enhanced by the NRC
staff following interactions with stakeholders. Documentation of the
staff's efforts is contained in SECY-11-0124, ``Recommended Actions To
Be Taken Without Delay From the Near-Term Task Force Report,'' dated
September 9, 2011, and SECY-11-0137, ``Prioritization of Recommended
Actions To Be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,'' dated
October 3, 2011.
As directed by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) for SECY-11-
0093, the NRC staff reviewed the NTTF recommendations within the
context of the NRC's existing regulatory framework and considered the
various regulatory vehicles available to the NRC to implement the
recommendations. SECY-11-0124 and SECY-11-0137 established the staff's
prioritization of the recommendations based upon the potential safety
enhancements.
Current regulatory requirements and existing plant capabilities
allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore,
continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an
imminent threat to public health and safety. However, the importance of
reliable operation of hardened vents during emergency conditions was
already well established and this understanding has been reinforced by
the clear lessons of Fukushima. While not required, hardened vents have
been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many
years but a wide variance exists with regard to the reliability of the
vents. Additionally, hardened vents are not required on plants with BWR
Mark II containments although as discussed above, Mark II containments
are only slightly larger than Mark I. Reliable hardened venting systems
in BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments are needed to
ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is
maintained.
In SRM-SECY-11-0137, the Commission directed the NRC staff to take
certain actions and provided further guidance including directing the
staff to consider filtered vents. The staff has determined that there
are policy issues that need to be resolved before any regulatory action
can be taken to require Licensees to install filtered vents. These
policy issues include consideration of severe accident conditions in
the design and operation of the vent, addition of filters to hardened
reliable vent systems, and consideration of vents in areas other than
primary containment. However, the NRC has also determined that
Licensees should promptly begin the implementation of short-term
actions relating to reliable hardened vents and to focus these actions
on improvements that will assist in the prevention of core damage. As
such, this Order requires Licensees to take the necessary actions to
install reliable hardened venting systems in BWR facilities with Mark I
and Mark II containments to assist strategies relating to the
prevention of core damage. With respect to the policy issues discussed
above, the NRC staff plans to submit a Policy Paper to the Commission
in July 2012.
Additional details on an acceptable approach for complying with
this Order will be contained in final Interim Staff Guidance (ISG)
scheduled to be issued by the NRC in August 2012. This guidance will
also include a template to be used for the plan that will be submitted
in accordance with Section IV, C.1 below.
III
Reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health
and safety and assurance of the common
[[Page 16100]]
defense and security are the fundamental NRC regulatory objectives.
Compliance with NRC requirements plays a critical role in giving the
NRC confidence that Licensees are maintaining an adequate level of
public health and safety and common defense and security. While
compliance with NRC requirements presumptively assures adequate
protection, new information may reveal that additional requirements are
warranted. In such situations, the Commission may act in accordance
with its statutory authority under Section 161 of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended, to require Licensees to take action in order to
protect health and safety and common defense and security.
To protect public health and safety from the inadvertent release of
radioactive materials, the NRC's defense-in-depth strategy includes
multiple layers of protection: (1) Prevention of accidents by virtue of
the design, construction and operation of the plant, (2) mitigation
features to prevent radioactive releases should an accident occur, and
(3) emergency preparedness programs that include measures such as
sheltering and evacuation. The defense-in-depth strategy also provides
for multiple physical barriers to contain the radioactive materials in
the event of an accident. The barriers are the fuel cladding, the
reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment. These defense-
in-depth features are embodied in the existing regulatory requirements
and thereby provide adequate protection of public health and safety.
The events at Fukushima Dai-ichi highlight the possibility that
extreme natural phenomena could challenge the prevention, mitigation,
and emergency preparedness defense-in-depth layers. At Fukushima,
limitations in time and unpredictable conditions associated with the
accident significantly challenged attempts by the responders to
preclude core damage and containment failure. In particular, the
operators were unable to successfully operate the containment venting
system. The inability to reduce containment pressure inhibited efforts
to cool the reactor core. If additional backup or alternate sources of
power had been available to operate the containment venting system
remotely, or if certain valves had been more accessible for manual
operation, the operators at Fukushima may have been able to
depressurize the containment earlier. This, in turn, could have allowed
operators to implement strategies using low-pressure water sources that
may have limited or prevented damage to the reactor core. Thus, the
events at Fukushima demonstrate that reliable hardened vents at BWR
facilities with Mark I and Mark II containment designs are important to
maintain core and containment cooling.
The Commission has determined that ensuring adequate protection of
public health and safety requires that all operating BWR facilities
with Mark I and Mark II containments have a reliable hardened venting
capability for events that can lead to core damage. These new
requirements provide greater mitigation capability consistent with the
overall defense-in-depth philosophy, and therefore greater assurance
that the challenges posed by severe external events to power reactors
do not pose an undue risk to public health and safety. To provide
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and
safety, all licenses identified in Attachment 1 to this Order shall be
modified to include the requirements identified in Attachment 2 to this
Order.
Accordingly, the NRC has concluded that these measures are
necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety
under the provisions of the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(ii), and
is requiring Licensee actions. In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202,
the NRC finds that the public health, safety and interest require that
this Order be made immediately effective.
IV
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 161b, 161i, 161o, and 182 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations
in 10 CFR 2.202, ``Orders,'' and 10 CFR part 50, it is hereby ordered,
effective immediately, that all licenses identified in attachment 1 to
this order are modified as follows:
A. All Licensees shall, notwithstanding the provisions of any
Commission regulation or license to the contrary, comply with the
requirements described in Attachment 2 to this Order except to the
extent that a more stringent requirement is set forth in the license.
These Licensees shall promptly start implementation of the requirements
in Attachment 2 to the Order and shall complete full implementation no
later than two (2) refueling cycles following the submittal of the
overall integrated plan, as required in Condition C.1. (scheduled to be
issued in August 2012), or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first.
B. 1. All Licensees shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of
this Order, notify the Commission (1) if they are unable to comply with
any of the requirements described in Attachment 2, (2) if compliance
with any of the requirements is unnecessary in their specific
circumstances, or (3) if implementation of any of the requirements
would cause the Licensee to be in violation of the provisions of any
Commission regulation or the facility license. The notification shall
provide the Licensee's justification for seeking relief from or
variation of any specific requirement.
2. Any Licensee that considers that implementation of any of the
requirements described in Attachment 2 to this Order would adversely
affect the safe and secure operation of the facility must notify the
Commission, within twenty (20) days of this Order, of the adverse
safety impact, the basis for its determination that the requirement has
an adverse safety impact, and either a proposal for achieving the same
objectives specified in the Attachment 2 requirement in question, or a
schedule for modifying the facility to address the adverse safety
condition. If neither approach is appropriate, the Licensee must
supplement its response to Condition B.1 of this Order to identify the
condition as a requirement with which it cannot comply, with attendant
justifications as required in Condition B.1.
C. 1. All Licensees shall, by February 28, 2013, submit to the
Commission for review an overall integrated plan including a
description of how compliance with the requirements described in
Attachment 2 will be achieved.
2. All Licensees shall provide an initial status report sixty (60)
days following issuance of the final ISG, and at six (6)-month
intervals following submittal of the overall integrated plan, as
required in Condition C.1, which delineates progress made in
implementing the requirements of this Order.
3. All Licensees shall report to the Commission when full
compliance with the requirements described in Attachment 2 is achieved.
Licensee responses to Conditions B.1, B.2, C.1, C.2, and C.3 above
shall be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4, ``Written
Communications.''
The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation may, in writing,
relax or rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the
Licensee of good cause.
V
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order,
[[Page 16101]]
within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. Where good cause is
shown, consideration will be given to extending the time to answer or
to request a hearing. A request for extension of time in which to
submit an answer or request a hearing must be made in writing to the
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of good cause
for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order.
If a hearing is requested by a Licensee or a person whose interest
is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating
the time and place of any hearings. If a hearing is held, the issue to
be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be
sustained. Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the licensee or any other
person adversely affected by this Order, may, in addition to demanding
a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move the
presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the Order
on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion,
unfounded allegations, or error.
All documents filed in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including a
request for hearing, a petition for leave to intervene, any motion or
other document filed in the proceeding prior to the submission of a
request for hearing or petition to intervene, and documents filed by
interested governmental entities participating under 10 CFR 2.315(c),
must be filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule (72 FR 49139,
August 28, 2007). The E-Filing process requires participants to submit
and serve all adjudicatory documents over the internet, or in some
cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. Participants may not
submit paper copies of their filings unless they seek an exemption in
accordance with the procedures described below.
To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 10
days prior to the filing deadline, the participant should contact the
Office of the Secretary by email at hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by
telephone at (301) 415-1677, to request (1) a digital ID certificate,
which allows the participant (or its counsel or representative) to
digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal server for any
proceeding in which it is participating; and (2) advise the Secretary
that the participant will be submitting a request or petition for
hearing (even in instances in which the participant, or its counsel or
representative, already holds an NRC-issued digital ID certificate).
Based upon this information, the Secretary will establish an electronic
docket for the hearing in this proceeding if the Secretary has not
already established an electronic docket.
Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is
available on NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/apply-certificates.html. System requirements for accessing
the E-Submittal server are detailed in NRC's ``Guidance for Electronic
Submission,'' which is available on the agency's public Web site at
https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. Participants may
attempt to use other software not listed on the Web site, but should
note that the NRC's E-Filing system does not support unlisted software,
and the NRC Meta System Help Desk will not be able to offer assistance
in using unlisted software.
If a participant is electronically submitting a document to the NRC
in accordance with the E-Filing rule, the participant must file the
document using the NRC's online, Web-based submission form. In order to
serve documents through the Electronic Information Exchange, users will
be required to install a Web browser plug-in from the NRC Web site.
Further information on the Web-based submission form, including the
installation of the Web browser plug-in, is available on the NRC's
public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html.
Once a participant has obtained a digital ID certificate and a
docket has been created, the participant can then submit a request for
hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions should be in
Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC guidance
available on the NRC public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the time the
documents are submitted through the NRC's E-Filing system. To be
timely, an electronic filing must be submitted to the E-Filing system
no later than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of
a transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends
the submitter an email notice confirming receipt of the document. The
E-Filing system also distributes an email notice that provides access
to the document to the NRC Office of the General Counsel and any others
who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for
and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition
to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document
via the E-Filing system.
A person filing electronically using the agency's adjudicatory E-
Filing system may seek assistance by contacting the NRC Meta System
Help Desk through the ``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site
at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals.html, by email at
MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a toll-free call at (866) 672-7640. The
NRC Meta System Help Desk is available between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m.,
Eastern Time, Monday through Friday, excluding government holidays.
Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not
submitting documents electronically must file an exemption request, in
accordance with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing
requesting authorization to continue to submit documents in paper
format. Such filings must be submitted by: (1) First class mail
addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or
expedited delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth
Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff.
Participants filing a document in this manner are responsible for
serving the document on all other participants. Filing is considered
complete by first-class mail as of the time of deposit in the mail, or
by courier, express mail, or expedited delivery service upon depositing
the document with the provider of the service. A presiding officer,
having granted an exemption request from using E-Filing, may require a
participant or party to use E-Filing if the presiding officer
subsequently determines that the reason for granting the exemption from
use of E-Filing no longer exists.
Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in
NRC's electronic hearing docket, which is available to the public at
https://ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded pursuant to an order of the
Commission, or the presiding officer. Participants are requested not to
include personal privacy information, such as social security numbers,
home addresses, or
[[Page 16102]]
home phone numbers in their filings, unless an NRC regulation or other
law requires submission of such information. With respect to
copyrighted works, except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose
of the adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use
application, participants are requested not to include copyrighted
materials in their submission.
If a person other than the Licensee requests a hearing, that person
shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is
adversely affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set
forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d).
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in Section IV above shall be final twenty (20) days from the
date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the
provisions specified in Section IV shall be final when the extension
expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a
request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this
order.
For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated this 12th day of March 2012.
Eric J. Leeds,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Operating Boiling Water Reactor Licenses With Mark I and Mark II
Containments
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant...................... BWR-Mark I.
Tennessee Valley Authority..................
Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296.......
License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68......
Mr. Preston D. Swafford.....................
Chief Nuclear Officer and Executive Vice
President.
Tennessee Valley Authority..................
3R Lookout Place............................
1101 Market Street..........................
Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801..................
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant.................. BWR-Mark I.
Carolina Power & Light Co.......................
Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324...............
License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62..............
Mr. Michael J. Annacone.....................
Vice President..............................
Carolina Power & Light Company..............
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant..............
P.O. Box 10429..............................
Southport, NC 28461.........................
Columbia Generating Station..................... BWR-Mark II.
Energy Northwest............................
Docket No. 50-397...........................
License No. NPF-21..........................
Mr. Mark E. Reddemann.......................
Chief Executive Officer.....................
Energy Northwest............................
MD 1023.....................................
P.O. Box 968................................
Richland, WA 99352..........................
Cooper Nuclear Station.......................... BWR-Mark I.
Nebraska Public Power District..............
Docket No. 50-298...........................
License No. DPR-46..........................
Mr. Brian J. O'Grady........................
Vice President--Nuclear and Chief Nuclear
Officer.
Nebraska Public Power District..............
72676 648A Avenue...........................
P.O. Box 98.................................
Brownville, NE 68321........................
Dresden Nuclear Power Station................... BWR-Mark I.
Exelon Generation Co., LLC..................
Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249...............
License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25..............
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio......................
President and Chief Nuclear Officer.........
Exelon Nuclear..............................
4300 Winfield Road..........................
Warrenville, IL 60555.......................
Duane Arnold Energy Center...................... BWR-Mark I.
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC............
Docket No. 50-331...........................
License No. DPR-49..........................
Mr. Peter Wells.............................
Site Vice President.........................
NextEra Energy..............................
Duane Arnold Energy Center..................
3277 DAEC Road..............................
Palo, IA 52324-9785.........................
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant.................... BWR-Mark I.
[[Page 16103]]
Southern Nuclear Operating Co...............
Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366...............
License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5...............
Mr. Dennis R. Madison.......................
Vice President..............................
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.....
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant................
11028 Hatch Parkway North...................
Baxley, GA 31513............................
Fermi........................................... BWR-Mark I.
Detroit Edison Co...........................
Docket No. 50-341...........................
License No. NPF-43..........................
Mr. Jack M. Davis...........................
Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear
Officer.
Detroit Edison Company......................
Fermi 2--210 NOC............................
6400 North Dixie Highway....................
Newport, MI 48166...........................
Hope Creek Generating Station................... BWR-Mark I.
PSEG Nuclear, LLC...........................
Docket No. 50-354...........................
License No. NPF-57..........................
Mr. Thomas Joyce............................
President and Chief Nuclear Officer.........
PSEG Nuclear LLC--N09.......................
P.O. Box 236................................
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038...................
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant........ BWR-Mark I.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.............
Docket No. 50-333...........................
License No. DPR-59..........................
Mike Colomb.................................
Vice President, Operations..................
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.............
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant....
P.O. Box 110................................
Lycoming, NY 13093..........................
LaSalle County Station.......................... BWR-Mark II.
Exelon Generation Co., LLC..................
Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374...............
License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18..............
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio......................
President and Chief Nuclear Officer.........
Exelon Nuclear..............................
4300 Winfield Road..........................
Warrenville, IL 60555.......................
Limerick Generating Station..................... BWR-Mark II.
Exelon Generation Co., LLC..................
Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353...............
License Nos. NPF-39 and NPF-85..............
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio......................
President and Chief Nuclear Officer.........
Exelon Nuclear..............................
4300 Winfield Road..........................
Warrenville, IL 60555.......................
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant............. BWR-Mark I.
Northern States Power Company...............
Docket No. 50-263...........................
License No. DPR-22..........................
Mr. Timothy J. O'Connor.....................
Site Vice President.........................
Northern States Power Company--Minnesota....
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.........
2807 West County Road 75....................
Monticello, MN 55362-9637...................
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station................. BWR-Mark I & II.
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC........
Docket Nos. 50-220 and 50-410...............
License Nos. DPR-63 and NPF-69..............
Mr. Ken Langdon.............................
Vice President Nine Mile Point..............
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC........
P.O. Box 63.................................
Lycoming, NY 13093..........................
[[Page 16104]]
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station......... BWR-Mark I.
Exelon Generation Co., LLC..................
Docket No. 50-219...........................
License No. DPR-16..........................
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio......................
President and Chief Nuclear Officer.........
Exelon Nuclear..............................
4300 Winfield Road..........................
Warrenville, IL 60555.......................
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station............... BWR-Mark I.
Exelon Generation Co., LLC..................
Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278...............
License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56..............
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio......................
President and Chief Nuclear Officer.........
Exelon Nuclear..............................
4300 Winfield Road..........................
Warrenville, IL 60555.......................
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1........ BWR-Mark I.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.............
Docket No. 50-293...........................
License No. DPR-35..........................
Mr. Robert Smith............................
Vice President and Site Vice President......
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.............
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station...............
600 Rocky Hill Road.........................
Plymouth, MA 02360-5508.....................
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station............... BWR-Mark I.
Exelon Generation Co., LLC..................
Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265...............
License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30..............
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio......................
President and Chief Nuclear Officer.........
Exelon Nuclear..............................
4300 Winfield Road..........................
Warrenville, IL 60555.......................
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station.............. BWR-Mark II.
PPL Susquehanna, LLC........................
Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388...............
License Nos. NPF-14 and NPF-22..............
Mr. Timothy S. Rausch.......................
Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear
Officer.
PPL Susquehanna, LLC........................
769 Salem Boulevard.........................
NUCSB3......................................
Berwick, PA 18603-0467......................
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station............ BWR-Mark I.
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.............
Docket No. 50-271...........................
License No. DPR-28..........................
Mr. Christopher J. Wamser...................
Site Vice President.........................
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.............
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station........
320 Governor Hunt Road......................
Vernon, VT 05354............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requirements for Reliable Hardened Vent Systems at Boiling-Water
Reactor Facilities With Mark I And Mark II Containments
1. Hardened Containment Venting System (HCVS) Functional Requirements
Boiling-Water Reactor (BWR) Mark I and Mark II containments shall
have a reliable hardened vent to remove decay heat and maintain control
of containment pressure within acceptable limits following events that
result in the loss of active containment heat removal capability or
prolonged Station Blackout (SBO). The hardened vent system shall be
accessible and operable under a range of plant conditions, including a
prolonged SBO and inadequate containment cooling.
1.1 The design of the HCVS shall consider the following performance
objectives:
1.1.1 The HCVS shall be designed to minimize the reliance on
operator actions.
1.1.2 The HCVS shall be designed to minimize plant operators'
exposure to occupational hazards, such as extreme heat stress, while
operating the HCVS system.
1.1.3 The HCVS shall also be designed to minimize radiological
consequences that would impede personnel actions needed for event
response.
1.2 The HCVS shall include the following design features:
1.2.1 The HCVS shall have the capacity to vent the steam/energy
equivalent of 1 percent of licensed/rated thermal power (unless a lower
[[Page 16105]]
value is justified by analyses), and be able to maintain containment
pressure below the primary containment design pressure.
1.2.2 The HCVS shall be accessible to plant operators and be
capable of remote operation and control, or manual operation, during
sustained operations.
1.2.3 The HCVS shall include a means to prevent inadvertent
actuation.
1.2.4 The HCVS shall include a means to monitor the status of the
vent system (e.g., valve position indication) from the control room or
other location(s). The monitoring system shall be designed for
sustained operation during a prolonged SBO.
1.2.5 The HCVS shall include a means to monitor the effluent
discharge for radioactivity that may be released from operation of the
HCVS. The monitoring system shall provide indication in the control
room or other location(s), and shall be designed for sustained
operation during a prolonged SBO.
1.2.6 The HCVS shall include design features to minimize unintended
cross flow of vented fluids within a unit and between units on the
site.
1.2.7 The HCVS shall include features and provision for the
operation, testing, inspection and maintenance adequate to ensure that
reliable function and capability are maintained.
1.2.8 The HCVS shall be designed for pressures that are consistent
with maximum containment design pressures as well as dynamic loading
resulting from system actuation.
1.2.9 The HCVS shall discharge the effluent to a release point
above main plant structures.
2. Hardened Containment Venting System Quality Standards
The following quality standards are necessary to fulfill the
requirements for a reliable HCVS:
2.1 The HCVS vent path up to and including the second containment
isolation barrier shall be designed consistent with the design basis of
the plant. These items include piping, piping supports, containment
isolation valves, containment isolation valve actuators and containment
isolation valve position indication components.
2.2 All other HCVS components shall be designed for reliable and rugged
performance that is capable of ensuring HCVS functionality following a
seismic event. These items include electrical power supply, valve
actuator pneumatic supply and instrumentation (local and remote)
components.
3. Hardened Containment Venting System Programmatic Requirements
3.1 The Licensee shall develop, implement, and maintain procedures
necessary for the safe operation of the HCVS. Procedures shall be
established for system operations when normal and backup power is
available, and during SBO conditions.
3.2 The Licensee shall train appropriate personnel in the use of the
HCVS. The training curricula shall include system operations when
normal and backup power is available, and during SBO conditions.
[FR Doc. 2012-6545 Filed 3-16-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
