Security Considerations for Lavatory Oxygen Systems, 11385-11387 [2012-4571]
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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 38 / Monday, February 27, 2012 / Rules and Regulations
At present, Oman has no nuclear
research or power program; however,
Oman does have the need for
radioactive sources for legitimate
industrial, medical, and research
purposes in support of important
economic and commercial development
projects. Exports of radioactive sources
from the United States for such
purposes would be facilitated by
removal of Oman from the restricted
destinations list in Part 110.
The NRC staff has determined that
removing Oman from the restricted
destinations list is consistent with
current U.S. law and policy, and will
pose no unreasonable risk to the public
health and safety or to the common
defense and security of the United
States
Because this rule involves a foreign
affairs function of the United States, the
notice and comment provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act do not
apply (5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1)). This rule will
become effective immediately upon
publication.
II. Voluntary Consensus Standards
The National Technology Transfer
and Advancement Act of 1995 (Pub. L.
104–113) requires that Federal Agencies
use technical standards that are
developed or adopted by voluntary
consensus standards bodies unless,
using such a standard is inconsistent
with applicable law or otherwise
impractical. This final rule does not
constitute the establishment of a
standard for which the use of a
voluntary consensus standard would be
applicable.
wreier-aviles on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES
III. Environmental Impact: Categorical
Exclusion
The NRC has determined that this
final rule is the type of action described
in categorical exclusion 10 CFR
51.22(c)(1). Therefore, neither an
environmental impact statement nor an
environmental assessment has been
prepared for the rule.
IV. Paperwork Reduction Act
Statement
This final rule does not contain new
or amended information collection
requirements subject to the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501
et seq.). Existing requirements were
approved by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), Approval Number
3150–0036.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor,
and a person is not required to respond
to, a request for information or an
information collection requirement
VerDate Mar<15>2010
14:41 Feb 24, 2012
Jkt 226001
11385
unless the requesting document
displays a currently valid OMB control
number.
PART 110—EXPORT AND IMPORT OF
NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND
MATERIAL
V. Regulatory Analysis
■
Removal of Oman from the restricted
destinations list in § 110.29 means that
exports of certain radioactive materials
to Oman may qualify for the NRC
general license specified in §§ 110.21
through 110.24. There is no alternative
to amending the regulations for the
export and import of nuclear equipment
and materials. This final rule is
expected to have no changes in the
information collection burden or cost to
the public.
1. The authority citation for part 110
continues to read as follows:
As required by the Regulatory
Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)),
the Commission certifies that this final
rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. This rule
affects only companies exporting
nuclear equipment and materials to
Oman which do not fall within the
scope of the definition of ‘‘small
entities’’ set forth in the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601(3)), or the
Size Standards established by the NRC
(10 CFR 2.810).
Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 54, 57, 63, 64, 65,
81, 82, 103, 104, 109, 111, 126, 127, 128, 129,
161, 181, 182, 183, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929,
930, 931, 932, 933, 936, 937, 948, 953, 954,
955, 956, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073,
2074, 2077, 2092–2095, 2111, 2112, 2133,
2134, 2139, 2139a, 2141, 2154–2158, 2201,
2231–2233, 2237, 2239); sec. 201, 88 Stat.
1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841; sec. 5,
Pub. L. 101–575, 104 Stat 2835 (42 U.S.C.
2243); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C.
3504 note); Energy Policy Act of 2005; Pub.
L. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
Sections 110.1(b)(2) and 110.1(b)(3) also
issued under Pub. L. 96–92, 93 Stat. 710 (22
U.S.C. 2403). Section 110.11 also issued
under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152)
and secs. 54c and 57d, 88 Stat. 473, 475 (42
U.S.C. 2074). Section 110.27 also issued
under sec. 309(a), Pub. L. 99–440. Section
110.50(b)(3) also issued under sec. 123, 92
Stat. 142 (42 U.S.C. 2153). Section 110.51
also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Section 110.52
also issued under sec. 186, 68 Stat. 955 (42
U.S.C. 2236). Sections 110.80–110.113 also
issued under 5 U.S.C. 552, 554. Sections
110.130–110.135 also issued under 5 U.S.C.
553. Sections 110.2 and 110.42(a)(9) also
issued under sec. 903, Pub. L. 102–496 (42
U.S.C. 2151 et seq.).
VII. Backfit Analysis
§ 110.29
VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
The NRC has determined that a
backfit analysis is not required for this
rule, because these amendments do not
include any provisions that would
impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR
Chapter I.
VIII. Congressional Review Act
Under the Congressional Review Act
of 1996, the NRC has determined that
this action is not a major rule and has
verified this determination with the
Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs of OMB.
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 110
Administrative practice and
procedure, Classified information,
Criminal penalties, Export, Import,
Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear
materials, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Scientific equipment.
For the reasons set out in the
preamble and under the authority of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,
as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553,
the NRC is adopting the following
amendments to 10 CFR part 110.
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
[Amended]
2. Section 110.29 is amended by
removing ‘‘Oman’’ from the list of
restricted destinations.
■
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day
of February 2012.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michael F. Weber,
Acting Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. 2012–4556 Filed 2–24–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 21, 25, 121, and 129
[Docket No. FAA–2011–0186; Amdt. Nos.
21–94, 25–133, 121–354, 129–50; SFAR 111]
RIN 2120–AJ92
Security Considerations for Lavatory
Oxygen Systems
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Interim final rule; disposition of
comments.
AGENCY:
On March 8, 2011, the FAA
published an interim final rule, request
SUMMARY:
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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 38 / Monday, February 27, 2012 / Rules and Regulations
wreier-aviles on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES
for comments (Amendment Nos. 21–94,
25–133, 121–354, 129–50; SFAR 111) on
security considerations for lavatory
oxygen systems (77 FR 12550). The
interim final rule addresses a security
vulnerability and is needed so the
affected airplanes can continue
operating until the non-compliance to
airworthiness standards and operating
rules is resolved. We sought public
comment on the interim final rule even
though it became effective upon
publication. This action responds to the
public comments the FAA received.
ADDRESSES: You may review the public
docket for this rulemaking (Docket No.
FAA–2011–0186) at the Docket
Management Facility in Room W12–140
of the West Building Ground Floor at
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC, 20590–0001 between
9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays. You
may also review the public docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
technical questions concerning this
action, contact Jeff Gardlin, Airframe
and Cabin Safety Branch, ANM–115,
Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service, Federal Aviation
Administration, Northwest Mountain
Region, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton,
WA 98057–3356; telephone: (425) 227–
2136; email: jeff.gardlin@faa.gov.
For legal questions concerning this
action, contact Douglas Anderson,
Federal Aviation Administration, Office
of the Regional Counsel, ANM–7,
Northwest Mountain Region, 1601 Lind
Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356;
telephone: (425) 227–2166; email:
douglas.anderson@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The FAA became aware of a security
vulnerability with certain types of
oxygen systems installed inside the
lavatories of most transport category
airplanes. As a result, the FAA issued
Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2011–04–
09, which mandated that these oxygen
systems be rendered inoperative until
the vulnerability could be eliminated.
However, by completing the mandated
actions in AD 2011–04–09, operators
were no longer in compliance with the
requirements of Title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 25.1447,
121.329, and 121.333, and could not
legally continue flight operations. AD
2011–04–09 also affects newly
manufactured airplanes and airplanes
undergoing other modification. The
Special Federal Aviation Regulation
(SFAR) is needed to address the security
VerDate Mar<15>2010
14:41 Feb 24, 2012
Jkt 226001
vulnerability and allow the affected
operators to continue flight operations
until the non-compliance to
airworthiness standards and operating
rules created by the AD is resolved.
The FAA chartered an Aviation
Rulemaking Committee (ARC) primarily
comprised of industry representatives in
March 2011. The ARC’s purpose was to
recommend regulatory changes and
guidance that could be used to restore
oxygen in affected lavatories while
addressing the security vulnerability.
The ARC submitted its
recommendations to the FAA on August
3, 2011. The FAA is reviewing the
recommendations and will initiate
additional rulemaking as necessary. The
recommendations will facilitate
developing future rulemaking to address
existing and new certifications of
aircraft. As stated in SFAR 111, we
envision a two- to four-year regulatory
process to restore the affected oxygen
systems to their full operational
capability. Complete restoration
includes any new regulatory changes, as
well as incorporating any new oxygen
system designs into airplanes currently
in service.
Discussion of Comments
The FAA received comments from ten
commenters: Aerox Aviation Oxygen
Systems, Inc., The Boeing Company,
and eight private citizens. Boeing and
three citizens supported the SFAR with
the overall assertion that removing
chemical oxygen generators from the
lavatories poses a risk to a small number
of passengers compared to putting all of
the passengers on the airplane at risk by
keeping the chemical oxygen generators
installed.
Five citizens opposed the SFAR,
asserting that the safety benefit gained
by removing the chemical oxygen
system from lavatories to preclude the
unlikely event of a terrorist attack does
not outweigh the potential risk of
individual passengers experiencing
hypoxia in the event of a
decompression. These commenters also
suggested that the FAA consider other
options, such as installing an alternative
oxygen system in the lavatories, rather
than simply removing the chemical
oxygen system.
We disagree with the commenters’
assertion that the potential risk of a
security breach is outweighed by the
potential individual risk of hypoxia for
a passenger in the lavatory during cabin
decompression. We continue to believe
that the approach taken by the FAA—
to temporarily allow a non-compliance
with existing regulations until a
solution is found to the problem
identified in the underlying AD—
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
appropriately addresses risk. While
there is some risk of hypoxia, the
emergency descent procedures initiated
by the flightcrew are the primary
protection against hypoxia provided to
passengers.
Pressure loss events have not resulted
in a cabin pressure altitude that was
instantaneously equal to the airplane
altitude. Even when decompressions
have occurred when the airplane is at a
high altitude, such as 40,000 feet, cabin
occupants have not been exposed to
those altitudes because it takes time for
the cabin pressure to leak from the
fuselage. Flightcrews initiate an
emergency descent shortly after they
receive notification that the cabin
pressure cannot be maintained. The
airplane is already descending by the
time the internal cabin pressure is equal
to the airplane altitude.
We carefully considered all of the
variables and determined that the risk to
all of the passengers due to the security
vulnerability was significantly greater
than the potential individual risk of
hypoxia in the event of cabin
decompression. AD 2011–04–09 and
SFAR 111 are only interim measures,
and we are actively pursuing regulatory
changes intended to restore
supplemental oxygen in the affected
lavatories, while considering the
security issues.
We partially agree with the
commenters’ suggestions to consider
other rulemaking alternatives because
other alternatives could be used to
restore oxygen in the affected lavatories.
We disagree with the commenters’
suggestions to accomplish longer-term
rulemaking actions while leaving the
chemical oxygen generators installed in
the lavatories. The security vulnerability
would remain until final corrective
actions were identified and completed.
Accomplishing the actions in AD 2011–
04–09 eliminates the security
vulnerability until additional actions
can be identified and taken to restore
the oxygen system with a design that
would consider the security risk.
Boeing stated that in and of itself, the
SFAR does not require removing or
expending the contents of the chemical
oxygen generators. This will likely
cause confusion and is not consistent
with the actions in AD 2011–04–09.
Boeing recommended that the SFAR be
revised to require the oxygen generators
to be either removed or expended and
that the wording be the same as that in
the AD; we disagree. The affected
chemical oxygen generators have
already been removed or expended in
accordance with AD 2011–04–09, and
the SFAR does not supersede AD 2011–
04–09. The SFAR provides interim relief
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27FER1
wreier-aviles on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 38 / Monday, February 27, 2012 / Rules and Regulations
to operators from type design
requirements that the operators would
have been out of compliance with once
the actions mandated in AD 2011–04–09
were completed. No changes to SFAR
111 were made as a result of this
comment.
Boeing also suggested that the SFAR
be clarified to allow the applicant for a
type certificate to receive a production
certificate and an airworthiness
approval for domestic operators affected
by AD 2011–04–09 (14 CFR part 121
operators) or for foreign operators (14
CFR part 129) in countries where the
local civil aviation authority has issued
a mandatory action equivalent to AD
2011–04–09. We infer that Boeing is
requesting we clarify SFAR 111 for
airplanes registered outside the United
States because only foreign registered
airplanes could be subject to a
mandatory action similar to AD 2011–
04–09. We disagree because SFAR 111
does not apply to airplanes registered
outside the United States. We cannot
provide relief from airworthiness
standards issued by civil aviation
authorities in other countries. The
responsible civil aviation authority must
grant relief from an airworthiness
standard. Furthermore, SFAR 111,
paragraph (b)(2) already provides this
relief for airplanes registered in the
United States but operated by foreign
carriers. No changes were made to the
SFAR as a result of this comment.
Boeing suggested paragraph (c) of the
SFAR be revised to indicate that it is the
operators’ responsibility to provide
flightcrew training procedures for
airplanes with a disabled lavatory
oxygen system. We disagree that this
clarification is necessary because the
SFAR does not include a requirement to
revise existing flightcrew training
procedures. Operators currently have
the option to add or revise existing
training for the cabin or flightcrew as
they deem necessary. No changes were
made to the SFAR as a result of this
comment.
Aerox Aviation provided information
pertaining to the availability of a small
portable, gaseous oxygen supply and
stated that such equipment could
provide an emergency oxygen supply.
We are familiar with the Aerox portable
oxygen equipment as well as other
portable oxygen equipment from other
suppliers. It is possible for operators to
incorporate installation of portable
gaseous oxygen equipment for use in the
lavatory under existing regulations. If
such equipment were to be installed, it
would need to be approved by the FAA
in accordance with existing procedures
applicable to type design changes.
Neither AD 2011–04–09 nor SFAR 111
VerDate Mar<15>2010
14:41 Feb 24, 2012
Jkt 226001
would prevent installation of portable
gaseous oxygen equipment for use in the
lavatory. No changes were made to the
SFAR as a result of this comment.
Conclusion
After analyzing the comments
submitted in response to SFAR 111, the
FAA has determined that no further
revisions to the SFAR are necessary at
this time. The FAA determined this
interim rule remains necessary because
it addresses an emergency safety
situation that made it imperative to
immediately implement the
rulemaking’s provisions. While the
chemical oxygen supply is intended to
provide passengers with supplemental
oxygen when necessary, lavatories
become privately enclosed areas when
in use. Possible tampering with that
chemical oxygen supply presented a
security vulnerability that this
rulemaking addresses. Therefore,
Amendments 21–94, 25–133, 121–354,
and 129–50 remain in effect.
The FAA is currently assessing the
recommendations of the ARC discussed
above. We are using these
recommendations to develop additional
rulemaking actions that will restore the
affected oxygen systems to their full
operational capability in existing and
new certifications of affected aircraft,
while eliminating the potential security
threat posed by the previous systems.
Issued in Washington, DC, on February 15,
2012.
Frank P. Paskiewicz,
Deputy Director, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2012–4571 Filed 2–24–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Coast Guard
33 CFR Part 165
[Docket No. USCG–2012–0068]
RIN 1625–AA00
Safety Zone; Lauderdale Air Show,
Atlantic Ocean, Fort Lauderdale, FL
Coast Guard, DHS.
Temporary final rule.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
The Coast Guard is
establishing a temporary safety zone on
the waters of the Atlantic Ocean in the
vicinity of Fort Lauderdale, Florida
during the Lauderdale Air Show. The
event is scheduled to take place on
Saturday, April 28, 2012 and Sunday,
April 29, 2012. The safety zone is
SUMMARY:
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
11387
necessary for the safety of air show
participants, participant aircraft,
spectators, and the general public
during the event. Persons and vessels
are prohibited from entering, transiting
through, anchoring in, or remaining
within the safety zone unless authorized
by the Captain of the Port Miami or a
designated representative.
DATES: This rule is effective from
11 a.m. on April 28, 2012 through 4:15
p.m. on April 29, 2012. This rule will
be enforced daily from 11 a.m. until
4:15 p.m. on April 28, 2012 and April
29, 2012.
ADDRESSES: Documents indicated in this
preamble as being available in the
docket are part of docket USCG–2012–
0068 and are available online by going
to https://www.regulations.gov, inserting
USCG–2012–0068 in the ‘‘Keyword’’
box, and then clicking ‘‘Search.’’ They
are also available for inspection or
copying at the Docket Management
Facility (M–30), U.S. Department of
Transportation, West Building Ground
Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590,
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If
you have questions on this temporary
final rule, call or email Lieutenant
Jennifer S. Makowski, Sector Miami
Prevention Department, Coast Guard;
telephone (305) 535–8724, email
Jennifer.S.Makowski@uscg.mil. If you
have questions on viewing the docket,
call Renee V. Wright, Program Manager,
Docket Operations, telephone (202)
366–9826.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Regulatory Information
The Coast Guard is issuing this
temporary final rule without prior
notice and opportunity to comment
pursuant to authority under section 4(a)
of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) (5 U.S.C. 553(b)). This provision
authorizes an agency to issue a rule
without prior notice and opportunity to
comment when the agency for good
cause finds that those procedures are
‘‘impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary
to the public interest.’’ Under 5 U.S.C.
553(b)(B), the Coast Guard finds that
good cause exists for not publishing a
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
with respect to this rule because the
Coast Guard did not receive necessary
information regarding the event until
January 17, 2012. As a result, the Coast
Guard did not have sufficient time to
publish an NPRM and to receive public
comments prior to the event. Any delay
in the effective date of this rule would
be contrary to the public interest
E:\FR\FM\27FER1.SGM
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 38 (Monday, February 27, 2012)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 11385-11387]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-4571]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 21, 25, 121, and 129
[Docket No. FAA-2011-0186; Amdt. Nos. 21-94, 25-133, 121-354, 129-50;
SFAR 111]
RIN 2120-AJ92
Security Considerations for Lavatory Oxygen Systems
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Interim final rule; disposition of comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: On March 8, 2011, the FAA published an interim final rule,
request
[[Page 11386]]
for comments (Amendment Nos. 21-94, 25-133, 121-354, 129-50; SFAR 111)
on security considerations for lavatory oxygen systems (77 FR 12550).
The interim final rule addresses a security vulnerability and is needed
so the affected airplanes can continue operating until the non-
compliance to airworthiness standards and operating rules is resolved.
We sought public comment on the interim final rule even though it
became effective upon publication. This action responds to the public
comments the FAA received.
ADDRESSES: You may review the public docket for this rulemaking (Docket
No. FAA-2011-0186) at the Docket Management Facility in Room W12-140 of
the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC, 20590-0001 between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays. You may also review the public docket
on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning
this action, contact Jeff Gardlin, Airframe and Cabin Safety Branch,
ANM-115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service, Federal Aviation Administration, Northwest Mountain Region,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone: (425) 227-2136;
email: jeff.gardlin@faa.gov.
For legal questions concerning this action, contact Douglas
Anderson, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Regional
Counsel, ANM-7, Northwest Mountain Region, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone: (425) 227-2166; email:
douglas.anderson@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The FAA became aware of a security vulnerability with certain types
of oxygen systems installed inside the lavatories of most transport
category airplanes. As a result, the FAA issued Airworthiness Directive
(AD) 2011-04-09, which mandated that these oxygen systems be rendered
inoperative until the vulnerability could be eliminated. However, by
completing the mandated actions in AD 2011-04-09, operators were no
longer in compliance with the requirements of Title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations (14 CFR) 25.1447, 121.329, and 121.333, and could not
legally continue flight operations. AD 2011-04-09 also affects newly
manufactured airplanes and airplanes undergoing other modification. The
Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) is needed to address the
security vulnerability and allow the affected operators to continue
flight operations until the non-compliance to airworthiness standards
and operating rules created by the AD is resolved.
The FAA chartered an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) primarily
comprised of industry representatives in March 2011. The ARC's purpose
was to recommend regulatory changes and guidance that could be used to
restore oxygen in affected lavatories while addressing the security
vulnerability. The ARC submitted its recommendations to the FAA on
August 3, 2011. The FAA is reviewing the recommendations and will
initiate additional rulemaking as necessary. The recommendations will
facilitate developing future rulemaking to address existing and new
certifications of aircraft. As stated in SFAR 111, we envision a two-
to four-year regulatory process to restore the affected oxygen systems
to their full operational capability. Complete restoration includes any
new regulatory changes, as well as incorporating any new oxygen system
designs into airplanes currently in service.
Discussion of Comments
The FAA received comments from ten commenters: Aerox Aviation
Oxygen Systems, Inc., The Boeing Company, and eight private citizens.
Boeing and three citizens supported the SFAR with the overall assertion
that removing chemical oxygen generators from the lavatories poses a
risk to a small number of passengers compared to putting all of the
passengers on the airplane at risk by keeping the chemical oxygen
generators installed.
Five citizens opposed the SFAR, asserting that the safety benefit
gained by removing the chemical oxygen system from lavatories to
preclude the unlikely event of a terrorist attack does not outweigh the
potential risk of individual passengers experiencing hypoxia in the
event of a decompression. These commenters also suggested that the FAA
consider other options, such as installing an alternative oxygen system
in the lavatories, rather than simply removing the chemical oxygen
system.
We disagree with the commenters' assertion that the potential risk
of a security breach is outweighed by the potential individual risk of
hypoxia for a passenger in the lavatory during cabin decompression. We
continue to believe that the approach taken by the FAA--to temporarily
allow a non-compliance with existing regulations until a solution is
found to the problem identified in the underlying AD--appropriately
addresses risk. While there is some risk of hypoxia, the emergency
descent procedures initiated by the flightcrew are the primary
protection against hypoxia provided to passengers.
Pressure loss events have not resulted in a cabin pressure altitude
that was instantaneously equal to the airplane altitude. Even when
decompressions have occurred when the airplane is at a high altitude,
such as 40,000 feet, cabin occupants have not been exposed to those
altitudes because it takes time for the cabin pressure to leak from the
fuselage. Flightcrews initiate an emergency descent shortly after they
receive notification that the cabin pressure cannot be maintained. The
airplane is already descending by the time the internal cabin pressure
is equal to the airplane altitude.
We carefully considered all of the variables and determined that
the risk to all of the passengers due to the security vulnerability was
significantly greater than the potential individual risk of hypoxia in
the event of cabin decompression. AD 2011-04-09 and SFAR 111 are only
interim measures, and we are actively pursuing regulatory changes
intended to restore supplemental oxygen in the affected lavatories,
while considering the security issues.
We partially agree with the commenters' suggestions to consider
other rulemaking alternatives because other alternatives could be used
to restore oxygen in the affected lavatories. We disagree with the
commenters' suggestions to accomplish longer-term rulemaking actions
while leaving the chemical oxygen generators installed in the
lavatories. The security vulnerability would remain until final
corrective actions were identified and completed. Accomplishing the
actions in AD 2011-04-09 eliminates the security vulnerability until
additional actions can be identified and taken to restore the oxygen
system with a design that would consider the security risk.
Boeing stated that in and of itself, the SFAR does not require
removing or expending the contents of the chemical oxygen generators.
This will likely cause confusion and is not consistent with the actions
in AD 2011-04-09. Boeing recommended that the SFAR be revised to
require the oxygen generators to be either removed or expended and that
the wording be the same as that in the AD; we disagree. The affected
chemical oxygen generators have already been removed or expended in
accordance with AD 2011-04-09, and the SFAR does not supersede AD 2011-
04-09. The SFAR provides interim relief
[[Page 11387]]
to operators from type design requirements that the operators would
have been out of compliance with once the actions mandated in AD 2011-
04-09 were completed. No changes to SFAR 111 were made as a result of
this comment.
Boeing also suggested that the SFAR be clarified to allow the
applicant for a type certificate to receive a production certificate
and an airworthiness approval for domestic operators affected by AD
2011-04-09 (14 CFR part 121 operators) or for foreign operators (14 CFR
part 129) in countries where the local civil aviation authority has
issued a mandatory action equivalent to AD 2011-04-09. We infer that
Boeing is requesting we clarify SFAR 111 for airplanes registered
outside the United States because only foreign registered airplanes
could be subject to a mandatory action similar to AD 2011-04-09. We
disagree because SFAR 111 does not apply to airplanes registered
outside the United States. We cannot provide relief from airworthiness
standards issued by civil aviation authorities in other countries. The
responsible civil aviation authority must grant relief from an
airworthiness standard. Furthermore, SFAR 111, paragraph (b)(2) already
provides this relief for airplanes registered in the United States but
operated by foreign carriers. No changes were made to the SFAR as a
result of this comment.
Boeing suggested paragraph (c) of the SFAR be revised to indicate
that it is the operators' responsibility to provide flightcrew training
procedures for airplanes with a disabled lavatory oxygen system. We
disagree that this clarification is necessary because the SFAR does not
include a requirement to revise existing flightcrew training
procedures. Operators currently have the option to add or revise
existing training for the cabin or flightcrew as they deem necessary.
No changes were made to the SFAR as a result of this comment.
Aerox Aviation provided information pertaining to the availability
of a small portable, gaseous oxygen supply and stated that such
equipment could provide an emergency oxygen supply. We are familiar
with the Aerox portable oxygen equipment as well as other portable
oxygen equipment from other suppliers. It is possible for operators to
incorporate installation of portable gaseous oxygen equipment for use
in the lavatory under existing regulations. If such equipment were to
be installed, it would need to be approved by the FAA in accordance
with existing procedures applicable to type design changes. Neither AD
2011-04-09 nor SFAR 111 would prevent installation of portable gaseous
oxygen equipment for use in the lavatory. No changes were made to the
SFAR as a result of this comment.
Conclusion
After analyzing the comments submitted in response to SFAR 111, the
FAA has determined that no further revisions to the SFAR are necessary
at this time. The FAA determined this interim rule remains necessary
because it addresses an emergency safety situation that made it
imperative to immediately implement the rulemaking's provisions. While
the chemical oxygen supply is intended to provide passengers with
supplemental oxygen when necessary, lavatories become privately
enclosed areas when in use. Possible tampering with that chemical
oxygen supply presented a security vulnerability that this rulemaking
addresses. Therefore, Amendments 21-94, 25-133, 121-354, and 129-50
remain in effect.
The FAA is currently assessing the recommendations of the ARC
discussed above. We are using these recommendations to develop
additional rulemaking actions that will restore the affected oxygen
systems to their full operational capability in existing and new
certifications of affected aircraft, while eliminating the potential
security threat posed by the previous systems.
Issued in Washington, DC, on February 15, 2012.
Frank P. Paskiewicz,
Deputy Director, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2012-4571 Filed 2-24-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
