Interpretation of Protection System Reliability Standard, 7526-7531 [2012-3272]
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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 29 / Monday, February 13, 2012 / Rules and Regulations
and 1.5 miles south of the 096° bearing from
the airport extending from the 2.6-mile
radius to 3.9 miles east of the airport,
excluding the Los Angeles Airport Class D
airspace. This Class D airspace is effective
during the specific dates and times
established in advance by a Notice to
Airmen. The effective date and time will
thereafter be continuously published in the
Airport/Facility Directory.
Paragraph 6004 Class E airspace areas
designated as an extension to Class D or
Class E surface area.
*
*
*
*
*
AWP CA E4 Hawthorne, CA [Revised]
Jack Northrop Field/Hawthorne Municipal
Airport, CA
(Lat. 33°55′22″ N., long. 118°20′07″ W.)
That airspace extending upward from the
surface within 2 miles north and 1.5 miles
south of the 096° bearing from Jack Northrop
Field/Hawthorne Municipal Airport,
beginning 3.9 miles east of the airport
extending to 6.3 miles east of the airport.
This Class E airspace area is effective during
the specific dates and times established in
advance by a Notice to Airmen. The effective
date and time will thereafter be continuously
published in the Airport/Facility Directory.
Issued in Seattle, Washington, on February
1, 2012.
Johanna Forkner,
Acting Manager, Operations Support Group,
Western Service Center.
[FR Doc. 2012–3149 Filed 2–10–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Before Commissioners: Jon Wellinghoff,
Chairman; Philip D. Moeller, John R.
Norris, and Cheryl A. LaFleur.
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
Final Rule (Issued February 3, 2012.)
18 CFR Part 40
[Docket No. RM10–5–000; Order No. 758]
Interpretation of Protection System
Reliability Standard
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
On November 17, 2009, the
North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) submitted a
petition (Petition) requesting approval
of NERC’s interpretation of Requirement
R1 of Commission-approved Reliability
Standard PRC–005–1 (Transmission and
Generation Protection System
Maintenance and Testing). On
December 16, 2010, the Commission
issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NOPR). In the NOPR, the Commission
proposed to accept the NERC proposed
interpretation of Requirement R1 of
Reliability Standard PRC–005–1, and
proposed to direct NERC to develop
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SUMMARY:
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modifications to the PRC–005–1
Reliability Standard through its
Reliability Standards development
process to address gaps in the Protection
System maintenance and testing
standard that were highlighted by the
proposed interpretation. As a result of
the comments received in response to
the NOPR, in this order the Commission
adopts the NOPR proposal to accept
NERC’s proposed interpretation. In
addition, as discussed below, the
Commission accepts, in part, NERC’s
commitment to address the concerns in
the Protection System maintenance and
testing standard that were identified by
the NOPR within the Reliability
Standards development process, and
directs, in part, that the concerns
identified by the NOPR with regard to
reclosing relays be addressed within the
reinitiated PRC–005 revisions.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule will
become effective March 14, 2012.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Ron LeComte (Legal Information), Office
of General Counsel, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 888 First
Street NE., Washington, DC 20426,
(202) 502–8405, ron.lecomte@ferc.gov.
Danny Johnson (Technical Information),
Office of Electric Reliability, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street NE., Washington, DC
20426, (202) 502–8892,
danny.johnson@ferc.gov.
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1. On November 17, 2009, NERC
submitted the Petition requesting
approval of NERC’s interpretation of
Requirement R1 of Commissionapproved Reliability Standard PRC–
005–1 (Transmission and Generation
Protection System Maintenance and
Testing). NERC developed the
interpretation in response to a request
for interpretation submitted to NERC by
the Regional Entities Compliance
Monitoring Processes Working Group
(Working Group).1 In a December 16,
2010 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NOPR),2 the Commission proposed to
accept the NERC proposed
interpretation of Requirement R1 of
Reliability Standard PRC–005–1, and
1 The Working Group is a subcommittee of the
Regional Entity Management Group which consists
of the executive management of the eight Regional
Entities.
2 Interpretation of Protection System Reliability
Standard, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 75 FR
81,152 (Dec. 27, 2010), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,669
(2010).
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proposed to direct NERC to develop
modifications to the PRC–005–1
Reliability Standard through its
Reliability Standards development
process to address gaps in the Protection
System maintenance and testing
standard highlighted by the proposed
interpretation. As a result of the
comments received in response to the
NOPR, in this order the Commission
adopts the NOPR proposal to accept
NERC’s proposed interpretation. In
addition, the Commission accepts, in
part, NERC’s commitments to address
the concerns in the Protection System
maintenance and testing standard that
were identified by the NOPR within the
Reliability Standards development
process, and directs, in part, that the
concerns identified by the NOPR with
regard to reclosing relays be addressed
within the reinitiated PRC–005
revisions.
I. Background
2. Section 215 of the Federal Power
Act (FPA) requires a Commissioncertified Electric Reliability
Organization (ERO) to develop
mandatory and enforceable Reliability
Standards, which are subject to
Commission review and approval.3
Specifically, the Commission may
approve, by rule or order, a proposed
Reliability Standard or modification to a
Reliability Standard if it determines that
the Standard is just, reasonable, not
unduly discriminatory or preferential,
and in the public interest.4 Once
approved, the Reliability Standards may
be enforced by the ERO, subject to
Commission oversight, or by the
Commission independently.5
3. Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA,
the Commission established a process to
select and certify an ERO,6 and
subsequently certified NERC.7 On April
4, 2006, NERC submitted to the
Commission a petition seeking approval
of 107 proposed Reliability Standards.
On March 16, 2007, the Commission
issued a Final Rule, Order No. 693,8
approving 83 of the 107 Reliability
Standards, including Reliability
3 16
U.S.C. 824 (2006).
824o(d)(2).
5 Id. 824o(e)(3).
6 Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric
Reliability Organization; and Procedures for the
Establishment, Approval, and Enforcement of
Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,204, order on reh’g, Order No.
672–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,212 (2006).
7 North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116
FERC ¶ 61,062, order on reh’g & compliance, 117
FERC ¶ 61,126 (2006), aff’d sub nom. Alcoa, Inc.
v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
8 Mandatory Reliability Standards for the BulkPower System, Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,242, order on reh’g, Order No. 693–A, 120
FERC ¶ 61,053 (2007).
4 Id.
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Standard PRC–005–1. In addition,
pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the
FPA,9 the Commission directed NERC to
develop modifications to 56 of the 83
approved Reliability Standards,
including PRC–005–0.10
4. NERC’s Rules of Procedure provide
that a person that is ‘‘directly and
materially affected’’ by Bulk-Power
System reliability may request an
interpretation of a Reliability
Standard.11 In response, the ERO will
assemble a team with relevant expertise
to address the requested interpretation
and also form a ballot pool. NERC’s
Rules of Procedure provide that, within
45 days, the team will draft an
interpretation of the Reliability
Standard and submit it to the ballot
pool. If approved by the ballot pool and
subsequently by the NERC Board of
Trustees (Board), the interpretation is
appended to the Reliability Standard
and filed with the applicable regulatory
authorities for approval.
II. Reliability Standard PRC–005–1
5. The purpose of PRC–005–1 is to
‘‘ensure all transmission and generation
Protection Systems affecting the
reliability of the Bulk Electric System
(BES) are maintained and tested.’’ In
particular, Requirement R1, requires
that:
R1. Each Transmission Owner and
any Distribution Provider that owns a
transmission Protection System and
each Generator Owner that owns a
generation Protection System shall have
a Protection System maintenance and
testing program for Protection Systems
that affect the reliability of the BES. The
program shall include:
R1.1. Maintenance and testing
intervals and their basis.
R1.2. Summary of maintenance and
testing procedures.
6. NERC currently defines ‘‘Protection
System’’ as follows: ‘‘Protective relays,
associated communication systems,
voltage and current sensing devices,
station batteries and DC control
circuitry.’’ 12
III. NERC Proposed Interpretation
7. In the NERC Petition, NERC
explains that it received a request from
9 16
U.S.C. 824o(d)(5).
No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,242 at
P 1475.
11 NERC Rules of Procedure, Appendix 3A,
Reliability Standards Development Procedure,
Version 6.1, at 26–27 (2007).
12 In Docket No. RD11–13–000, NERC has
proposed to revise the definition of Protection
System effective on the first day of the first calendar
quarter twelve months from approval. The
Commission is approving this revision in an order
issued concurrently with this order. See North
American Electric Reliability Corp., 138 FERC
¶ 61,095 (2012).
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10 Order
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the Working Group for an interpretation
of Reliability Standard PRC–005–1,
Requirement R1, addressing five
specific questions. Specifically, the
Working Group questions and NERC
proposed interpretations include:
Request 1: ‘‘Does R1 require a
maintenance and testing program for the
battery chargers for the ‘station batteries’
that are considered part of the
Protection System?’’
Response: ‘‘While battery chargers are
vital for ensuring ‘station batteries’ are
available to support Protection System
functions, they are not identified within
the definition of ‘Protection Systems.’
Therefore, PRC–005–1 does not
currently require maintenance and
testing of battery chargers.’’ 13
Request 2: ‘‘Does R1 require a
maintenance and testing program for
auxiliary relays and sensing devices? If
so, what types of auxiliary relays and
sensing devices? (i.e., transformer
sudden pressure relays).’’
Response: ‘‘The existing definition of
‘Protection System’ does not include
auxiliary relays; therefore, maintenance
and testing of such devices is not
explicitly required. Maintenance and
testing of such devices is addressed to
the degree that an entity’s maintenance
and testing program for DC control
circuits involves maintenance and
testing of imbedded auxiliary relays.
Maintenance and testing of devices that
respond to quantities other than
electrical quantities (for example,
sudden pressure relays) are not
included within Requirement R1.’’
Request 3: ‘‘Does R1 require
maintenance and testing of transmission
line re-closing relays?’’
Response: ‘‘No. ‘Protective Relays’
refer to devices that detect and take
action for abnormal conditions.
Automatic restoration of transmission
lines is not a ‘protective’ function.’’
Request 4: ‘‘Does R1 require a
maintenance and testing program for the
DC circuitry that is just the circuitry
with relays and devices that control
actions on breakers, etc., or does R1
require a program for the entire circuit
from the battery charger to the relays to
circuit breakers and all associated
wiring?’’
Response: ‘‘PRC–005–1 requires that
entities (1) address DC control circuitry
within their program, (2) have a basis
13 The revised definition of Protection System
accepted in Docket No. RD11–13–000 includes
battery chargers as an element of the Protection
System and, as a result of that change, battery
chargers must be maintained and tested. Thus, the
modified definition of Protection System approved
in Docket No. RD11–13–000, when effective, shall
supersede the interpretation of Requirement R1 of
Reliability Standard PRC–005–1 approved in this
order.
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for the way they address this item, and
(3) execute the program. Specific
additional requirements relative to the
scope and/or methods are not
established.’’
Request 5: ‘‘For R1, what are
examples of ‘associated
communications systems’ that are part
of ‘Protection Systems’ that require a
maintenance and testing program?’’
Response: ‘‘ ‘Associated
communication systems’ refer to
communication systems used to convey
essential Protection System tripping
logic, sometimes referred to as pilot
relaying or teleprotection. Examples
include the following:
—Communications equipment involved
in power-line-carrier relaying;
—Communications equipment involved
in various types of permissive
protection system applications;
—Direct transfer-trip systems;
—Digital communication
systems * * *.’’
8. In its Petition requesting that the
Commission accept the proposed
interpretation, NERC recognized that
greater clarity to the requirement
language in PRC–005–1a is necessary to
provide a complete framework for
maintenance and testing of equipment
necessary to ensure the reliability of the
Bulk Power System. In its Petition,
NERC also stated that this activity is
already underway in the scope of
Project 2007–17—Protection System
Maintenance and Testing, coupled with
the revised definition of Protection
System.
IV. Commission NOPR
9. In the NOPR, the Commission
proposed to accept the NERC proposed
interpretation of Requirement R1 of
Reliability Standard PRC–005–1. In
addition, the Commission proposed to
direct NERC to develop modifications to
the PRC–005–1 Reliability Standard
through its Reliability Standards
development process to address gaps in
the Protection System maintenance and
testing standard that were highlighted
by the proposed interpretation. The
specific modifications are discussed
below.
V. Comments
10. Comments on the Commission’s
proposed interpretation were received
by the NERC, Edison Electric Institute
(EEI), ISO/RTO Council (IRC), American
Public Power Association (APPA),
National Rural Electric Cooperative
Association (NRECA), Transmission
Access Policy Study Group (TAPS),
Cities of Anaheim and Riverside,
California (Joint Cities), Northwest
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Commenters,14 International
Transmission Company (ITC), PSEG
Companies,15 and MidAmerican Energy
Holdings Company (MidAmerican),
Constellation/CENG,16 and Manitoba
Hydro (Manitoba). In general,
commenters support NERC’s proposed
interpretation, and oppose the further
directives in the NOPR. Commenters
also state that modifications to the
Reliability Standards should be
addressed within the NERC standards
development process and that certain of
the modifications are currently being
addressed.
VI. Discussion
11. As a result of the comments
received in response to the proposal, the
Commission adopts the NOPR proposal
to accept NERC’s proposed
interpretation. As discussed below, 17
the Commission accepts, in part,
NERC’s commitments to address the
concerns in the Protection System
maintenance and testing standard that
were identified by the NOPR within the
Reliability Standards development
process, and directs, in part, that the
concerns identified by the NOPR with
regard to reclosing relays be addressed
within the reinitiated PRC–005
revisions.
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A. Maintenance and Testing of
Auxiliary and Non-Electrical Sensing
Relays
12. In the NOPR, the Commission
noted a concern that the proposed
interpretation may not include all
components that serve in some
protective capacity.18 The Commission’s
concerns included the proposed
interpretation’s exclusion of auxiliary
and non-electrical sensing relays. The
Commission proposed to direct NERC to
develop a modification to the Reliability
Standard to include any component or
device that is designed to detect
defective lines or apparatuses or other
power system conditions of an abnormal
or dangerous nature, including devices
14 Lincoln People’s Utility District, Columbia
River People’s Utility District, Inland Power and
Light Company, Northwest Public Power
Association, Northwest Requirements Utilities,
Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative, Public
Power Council, Public Utility District No. 1 of
Snohomish County, and Tillamook People’s Utility
District.
15 Public Service Electric and Gas Company,
PSEG Fossil LLC, and PSEG Nuclear LLC.
16 Constellation Energy Group, Inc., Baltimore
Gas & Electric Company, Constellation Energy
Commodities Group, Inc., Constellation Energy
Control and Dispatch, LLC, Constellation
NewEnergy, Inc., and Constellation Power Source
Generation, Inc. (together, Constellation) and
Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC (CENG).
17 See infra, P 15, P 18, P 20.
18 NOPR at P 11–14.
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designed to sense or take action against
any abnormal system condition that will
affect reliable operation, and to initiate
appropriate control circuit actions.
13. In their comments NERC, EEI,
Joint Cities, Manitoba, NRECA, ITC,
MidAmerican, and PSEG expressed
varying levels of disagreement with the
NOPR’s proposed directive. The
disagreements are based on a concern
that the proposed directive will create
an increase in scope that will capture
many items not used in BES protection.
NERC is concerned the scope of this
proposed directive is so broad that any
device that is installed on the BulkPower System to monitor conditions in
any fashion may be included.19 NERC
states that many of these devices are
advisory in nature and should not be
reflected within NERC Reliability
Standards if they do not serve a
necessary reliability purpose.20 NERC
does not believe it is necessary for the
Commission to issue a directive to
address this issue. Instead, NERC
proposes to develop, either
independently or in association with
other technical organizations such as
IEEE, one or more technical documents
which:
1. Describe the devices and functions
(to include sudden pressure relays
which trip for fault conditions) that
should address FERC’s concern; and
2. Propose minimum maintenance
activities for such devices and
maximum maintenance intervals,
including the technical basis for each.21
14. NERC states that these technical
documents will address those protective
relays that are necessary for the reliable
operation of the Bulk-Power System and
will allow for differentiation between
protective relays that detect faults from
other devices that monitor the health of
the individual equipment and are
advisory in nature (e.g., oil
temperature). Following development of
the above-referenced document(s),
NERC states that it will ‘‘propose a new
or revised standard (e.g. PRC–005) using
the NERC Reliability Standards
development process to include
maintenance of such devices, including
establishment of minimum maintenance
activities and maximum maintenance
intervals.’’ 22 Accordingly, NERC
proposes to ‘‘add this issue to the
Reliability Standards issues database for
inclusion in the list of issues to address
the next time the PRC–005 standard is
revised.’’ 23
19 NERC
February 25, 2011 Comments at 7.
20 Id.
15. The Commission accepts NERC’s
proposal, and directs NERC to file,
within sixty days of publication of this
Final Rule, a schedule for informational
purposes regarding the development of
the technical documents referenced
above, including the identification of
devices that are designed to sense or
take action against any abnormal system
condition that will affect reliable
operation. NERC shall include in the
informational filing a schedule for the
development of the changes to the
standard that NERC stated it would
propose as a result of the abovereferenced documents.24 NERC should
update its schedule when it files its
annual work plan.
B. Reclosing Relays
16. In the NOPR, the Commission
noted that while a reclosing relay is not
identified as a specific component of the
Protection System, if it either is used in
coordination with a Protection System
to achieve or meet system performance
requirements established in other
Commission-approved Reliability
Standards, or can exacerbate fault
conditions when not properly
maintained and coordinated, then
excluding the maintenance and testing
of these reclosing relays will result in a
gap in the maintenance and testing of
relays affecting the reliability of the
Bulk-Power System.25 Accordingly, the
Commission proposed that NERC
modify the Reliability Standard to
include the maintenance and testing of
reclosing relays affecting the reliability
of the Bulk-Power System.
17. NERC, EEI, IRC, ITC
MidAmerican, NRECA, and PSEG
opposed the NOPR’s directive to
include reclosing relays. In general,
commenters state that reclosing relays
used for stability purposes are already
included in maintenance and testing
programs, and that reclosing relays that
are primarily used to minimize
customer outages times and maximize
availability of system components
should not be included. PSEG and
MidAmerican contend that the NERC
standards development process should
be utilized to determine the
maintenance and testing of those
reclosing relays that affect the reliability
of the Bulk-Power System.
18. ISO/RTO contends that the
primary purpose of reclosing relays is to
allow more expeditious restoration of
lost components of the system, not to
maintain the reliability of the BulkPower System. Therefore, ISO/RTO
maintains that automatic reclosing
21 Id.
22 Id.
24 Id.
23 Id.
25 NOPR
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at P 15.
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relays should not be subject to the NERC
Reliability Standard for relay
maintenance and testing. MidAmerican
states that there are only limited
circumstances when a reclosing relay
can actually affect the reliability of the
Bulk-Power System. MidAmerican
contends that it would be overbroad for
the Commission to direct a modification
to the standard that encompasses all
reclosing relays that can ‘‘exacerbate
fault conditions when not properly
maintained and coordinated,’’ as this
would improperly include many types
of reclosing relays that do not
necessarily affect the reliability of the
Bulk-Power System.
19. ITC agrees with the Commission’s
proposal that reclosing relays that are
required for system stability should be
maintained and tested under
Requirement R1 of PRC–005–1.
However, ITC contends that since most
bulk electric system automatic reclosing
relay systems are applied to minimize
customer outage times and to maximize
availability of system components, only
some ‘‘high speed’’ reclosing relays will
affect the reliability of the Bulk-Power
System. Therefore, ITC proposes that
the Commission should direct NERC to
draft specific requirements or selection
criteria that should be used in
identifying the types of re-closing relays
for maintenance and testing under
Requirement R1 of PRC–005–1.26
20. While NRECA notes that reclosing
relays operate to restore, not protect a
system, NRECA also notes that there are
reclosing schemes that directly affect
and are required for automatic stability
control of the system, but that such
schemes are already covered under
Special Protection Schemes that are
subject to reliability standards. NRECA,
notes that some transmission operators
do not allow reclosing relays on the
bulk power system to remove the
possibility of reclosing in on a
permanent fault, thus avoiding further
potential damage to the bulk power
system.27
21. Similarly, NERC comments that in
most cases reclosing relays cannot be
relied on to meet system performance
requirements because of the need to
consider the impact of auto-reclosing
into a permanent fault; however, NERC
states that applications that may exist in
which automatic restoration is used to
meet system performance requirements
following temporary faults. NERC
comments that where reclosing relays
are applied to meet performance
requirements in approved NERC
Reliability Standards, or where
26 ITC
Comments at 7.
Comments at 13–14.
27 NRECA
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automatic restoration of service is
fundamental to derivation of an
Interconnection Reliability Operating
Limit (IROL), it is reasonable to require
maintenance and testing of autoreclosing relays.28 However, NERC does
not believe it is necessary for the
Commission to issue a directive.29
NERC states that the proposed revisions
to Reliability Standard PRC–005–1 that
are under development include
maintenance of reclosing devices that
are part of Special Protection Systems.30
NERC proposes ‘‘to add the remaining
concerns relating to this issue to the
Reliability Standards issues database for
inclusion in the list of issues to address
the next time Reliability Standard PRC–
005 is revised.’’ 31
22. As NERC and other commenters
point out, reclosing relays are used in a
broad range of applications; e.g., meet
system performance requirements in
approved Reliability Standards,
derivation of IROLs, maintain system
stability, minimize customer outage
times, to maximize availability of
system components, etc. While
commenters acknowledge that reclosing
relays have several applications,
commenters also appear to be divided
on which applications, if any, should be
included in a maintenance and testing
program.
23. The NOPR raised a concern that
excluding the maintenance and testing
of reclosing relays that can exacerbate
fault conditions when not properly
maintained and coordinated will result
in a gap affecting Bulk-Power System
reliability.32 We agree with
MidAmerican that while there are only
limited circumstances when a reclosing
relay can actually affect the reliability of
the Bulk-Power System, there are some
reclosing relays, e.g., whose failure to
operate or that misoperate during an
event due to lack of maintenance and
testing, may negatively impact the
reliability of the Bulk-Power System.33
We agree with NERC that where
reclosing relays are applied to meet
performance requirements in approved
NERC Reliability Standards, or where
automatic restoration of service is
fundamental to derivation of an
Interconnection Reliability Operating
Limit (IROL), it is reasonable to require
28 NERC
February 25, 2011 Comments at 9.
urges the Commission to use its authority
pursuant to section 215(d)(5) in circumstances
where there is a clear need for such a directive.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 NOPR at P 15, noting one such outage resulting
in the loss of over 4,000 MW of generation and
multiple 765 kV lines.
33 MidAmerican Comments at 6.
29 TAPs
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maintenance and testing of autoreclosing relays.
24. In the NOPR we stated that a
misoperating or miscoordinated
reclosing relay may result in the
reclosure of a Bulk-Power System
element back onto a fault or that a
misoperating or miscoordinated
reclosing relay may fail to operate after
a fault has been cleared, thus failing to
restore the element to service. As a
result, the reliability of the Bulk-Power
System would be affected. In addition,
misoperated or miscoordinated relays
may result in damage to the Bulk-Power
System. For example, a misoperation or
miscoordination of a reclosing relay
causing the reclosing of Bulk-Power
System facilities into a permanent fault
can subject generators to excessive shaft
torques and winding stresses and
expose circuit breakers to systems
conditions less than optimal for correct
operation, potentially damaging the
circuit breaker.34
25. While some commenters argue
that reclosing relays do not affect the
reliability of the Bulk-Power System, the
record supports our concern. For
example, we note NERC’s concern
regarding the ‘‘* * * need to consider
the impact of autoreclosing into a
permanent fault.’’ We also note
NRECA’s comments that ‘‘* * * some
transmission operators do not allow
reclosing on the bulk electric system
facilities to remove the opportunity of
closing in on a permanent fault’’ and
‘‘* * * by its [automatic reclosing] use
a utility understands the potential for
further damage that may occur by
reclosing.’’ 35 Because the misoperation
or miscommunication of reclosing
relays can exacerbate fault conditions,
we find that reclosing relays that may
affect the reliability of the Bulk-Power
System should be maintained and
tested.36
26. For the reasons discussed above,
we conclude that it is important to
maintain and test reclosing relays that
may affect the reliability of the BulkPower System. We agree with ITC that
specific requirements or selection
criteria should be used to identify
reclosing relays that affect the reliability
of the Bulk-Power System. As
MidAmerican suggests, the standard
should be modified, through the
34 NERC System Protection and Control
Subcommittee, ‘‘Advantages and Disadvantages of
EHV Automatic Reclosing, ‘‘December 9, 2009, p.
14.
35 NRECA Comments at 13.
36 As NERC notes, there may be applications of
reclosing relays where the misoperation or
miscommunication may does not have a
detrimental effect on the reliability of the BulkPower System.
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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 29 / Monday, February 13, 2012 / Rules and Regulations
Reliability Standards development
process, to provide the Transmission
Owner, Generator Owner, and
Distribution Provider with the
discretion to include in a Protection
System maintenance and testing
program only those reclosing relays that
the entity identifies as having an affect
on the reliability of the Bulk-Power
System.
27. We note that the original project
to revise Reliability Standard PRC–005
failed a recirculation ballot in July of
2011. The project was subsequently
reinitiated to continue the efforts to
develop Reliability Standard PRC–005–
2. Given that the project to draft
proposed revisions to Reliability
Standard PRC–005–1 continues in this
reinitiated effort, and the importance of
maintaining and testing reclosing relays,
we direct NERC to include maintenance
and testing of reclosing relays that can
affect the reliable operation of the BulkPower System, as discussed above,
within these reinitiated efforts to revise
Reliability Standard PRC–005.37
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C. DC Control Circuitry and
Components
28. In the NOPR, the Commission
explained its understanding that a
maintenance and testing program for DC
control circuitry would include all
components of DC control circuitry
necessary for ensuring Reliable
Operation of the Bulk-Power System,
and that not establishing the specific
requirements of such a maintenance and
testing program results in a gap in the
maintenance and testing of Protection
System components.38
29. Joint Cities, MidAmerican, and
NRECA expressed concern that the
NOPR’s directive is too broad and
unnecessarily burdensome. NERC agrees
that maintenance and testing should be
required for all DC control circuitry.39
NERC further stated that draft standard
PRC–005–2 being developed in Project
2007–17 ‘‘includes extensive, specific
maintenance activities (with maximum
maintenance intervals) related to the DC
control circuits.’’ 40 The Commission
accepts NERC’s commitment to include
the development of specific
requirements of such a maintenance and
37 On December 13, 2011, NERC submitted its
Standards Development Plan for 2012–2014. NERC
estimates that Project 2007–17 will be completed in
the second quarter of 2012. By July 30, 2012, NERC
should submit to the Commission either the
completed project which addresses the remaining
issues consistent with this order, or an
informational filing that provides a schedule for
how NERC will address such issues in the Project
2007–17 reinitiated efforts.
38 NOPR at P 16.
39 NERC February 25, 2011 Comments at 10.
40 Id.
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14:45 Feb 10, 2012
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testing program described above in
Project 2007–17.41
VII. Information Collection Statement
30. The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) regulations require that
OMB approve certain reporting and
recordkeeping (collections of
information) imposed by an agency.42
The Commission submits reporting and
recording keeping requirements to OMB
under section 3507 of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995.43
31. As stated above, the Commission
previously approved, in Order No. 693,
the Reliability Standard that is the
subject of the current Final Rule. This
Final Rule accepts an interpretation of
the currently approved Reliability
Standard. The interpretation of the
current Reliability Standard at issue in
this final rule is not expected to change
the reporting burden or the information
collection requirements. The
informational filing required of NERC is
part of currently active collection
FERC–725 and does not require
additional approval by OMB.
32. We will submit this final rule to
OMB for informational purposes only.
X. Document Availability
VIII. Environmental Analysis
33. The Commission is required to
prepare an Environmental Assessment
or an Environmental Impact Statement
for any action that may have a
significant adverse effect on the human
environment.44 The Commission has
categorically excluded certain actions
from this requirement as not having a
significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion
are rules that are clarifying, corrective,
or procedural or that do not
substantially change the effect of the
regulations being amended.45 The
actions proposed herein fall within this
categorical exclusion in the
Commission’s regulations.
IX. Regulatory Flexibility Act
34. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980 (RFA) generally requires a
description and analysis of final rules
that will have significant economic
41 As previously noted, NERC estimates that
Project 2007–17 will be completed by the second
quarter of 2012. By July 30, 2012, NERC should
submit to the Commission either the completed
project which addresses the remaining issues
consistent with this order, or an informational filing
that provides a schedule for how NERC will address
such issues in the Project 2007–17 reinitiated
efforts.
42 5 CFR 1320.
43 44 U.S.C. 3507.
44 Regulations Implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Order No. 486,
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,783 (1987).
45 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
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Sfmt 4700
impact on a substantial number of small
entities.46 The RFA mandates
consideration of regulatory alternatives
that accomplish the stated objectives of
a proposed rule and that minimize any
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
The Small Business Administration’s
(SBA) Office of Size Standards develops
the numerical definition of a small
business.47 The SBA has established a
size standard for electric utilities,
stating that a firm is small if, including
its affiliates, it is primarily engaged in
the transmission, generation and/or
distribution of electric energy for sale
and its total electric output for the
preceding twelve months did not exceed
four million megawatt hours.48 The RFA
is not implicated by this Final Rule
because the interpretation accepted
herein does not modify the existing
burden or reporting requirements.
Because this Final Rule accepts an
interpretation of the currently approved
Reliability Standard, the Commission
certifies that this Final Rule will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
35. In addition to publishing the full
text of this document in the Federal
Register, the Commission provides all
interested persons an opportunity to
view and/or print the contents of this
document via the Internet through
FERC’s Home Page (https://www.ferc.gov)
and in FERC’s Public Reference Room
during normal business hours (8:30 a.m.
to 5 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First
Street NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC
20426.
36. From FERC’s Home Page on the
Internet, this information is available on
eLibrary. The full text of this document
is available on eLibrary in PDF and
Microsoft Word format for viewing,
printing, and/or downloading. To access
this document in eLibrary, type the
docket number excluding the last three
digits of this document in the docket
number field.
37. User assistance is available for
eLibrary and the FERC’s Web site during
normal business hours from FERC
Online Support at 202–502–6652 (toll
free at 1–866–208–3676) or email at
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the
Public Reference Room at (202) 502–
8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. Email the
Public Reference Room at
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
46 5
U.S.C. 601–612.
CFR 121.201.
48 Id. n.1.
47 13
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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 29 / Monday, February 13, 2012 / Rules and Regulations
XI. Effective Date and Congressional
Notification
38. This Final Rule is effective March
14, 2012. The Commission has
determined, with the concurrence of the
Administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs of
OMB that this rule is not a ‘‘major rule’’
as defined in section 351 of the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996.
List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 40
Applicability, Mandatory reliability
standards, Availability of reliability
standards.
By the Commission.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012–3272 Filed 2–10–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
40 CFR Part 52
[EPA–R08–OAR–2011–0100; FRL–9495–9]
Disapproval and Promulgation of Air
Quality Implementation Plans;
Montana; Revisions to the
Administrative Rules of Montana—Air
Quality, Subchapter 7, Exclusion for
De Minimis Changes
Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
EPA is taking final action to
partially approve and partially
disapprove State Implementation Plan
(SIP) revisions and new rules as
submitted by the State of Montana on
June 25, 2010 and May 28, 2003. The
revisions contain new rules in
Subchapter 7 (Permit, Construction, and
Operation of Air Contaminant Sources)
that pertain to the issuance of Montana
air quality permits, in addition to other
minor administrative changes to other
subchapters of the Administrative Rules
of Montana (ARM). In this action, EPA
is approving those portions of the rules
that are approvable and disapproving
those portions of the rules that are
inconsistent with the Clean Air Act
(CAA). This action is being taken under
section 110 of the CAA.
DATES: Effective Date: This final rule is
effective March 14, 2012.
ADDRESSES: EPA has established a
docket for this action under Docket ID
No. EPA–R08–OAR–2011–0100. All
documents in the docket are listed in
the www.regulations.gov Web site.
erowe on DSK2VPTVN1PROD with RULES
SUMMARY:
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14:45 Feb 10, 2012
Jkt 226001
Although listed in the index, some
information is not publicly available,
e.g., CBI or other information whose
disclosure is restricted by statute.
Certain other material, such as
copyrighted material, will be publicly
available only in hard copy. Publicly
available docket materials are available
either electronically in www.regulations.
gov or in hard copy at the Air Program,
Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), Region 8, 1595 Wynkoop Street,
Denver, Colorado 80202–1129. EPA
requests you contact the individual
listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section to view the hard copy
of the docket. You may view the hard
copy of the docket Monday through
Friday, 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., excluding
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kevin Leone, Air Program, Mailcode
8P–AR, Environmental Protection
Agency, Region 8, 1595 Wynkoop
Street, Denver, Colorado 80202–1129,
(303) 312–6227, or leone.kevin@epa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Definitions
For the purpose of this document, we
are giving meaning to certain words or
initials as follows:
(i) The words or initials Act or CAA
mean or refer to the Clean Air Act,
unless the context indicates otherwise.
(ii) The words EPA, we, us or our
mean or refer to the United States
Environmental Protection Agency.
(iii) The initials SIP mean or refer to
State Implementation Plan.
(iv) The words State or Montana
mean the State of Montana, unless the
context indicates otherwise.
Table of Contents
I. What action is EPA taking?
A. Summary of Final Action
B. Other Relevant Actions Related to the
Montana SIP Revision Submittals
II. What is the background?
A. Brief Discussion of Statutory and
Regulatory Requirements
B. Summary of the Submittals Addressed
in This Final Action
III. Response to Comments
IV. What are the grounds for this approval
action?
V. What are the grounds for this disapproval
action?
VI. Final Action
VII. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
I. What action is EPA taking?
A. Summary of Final Action
EPA is taking final action to approve
new rule ARM 17.8.745 as submitted by
the State of Montana on June 25, 2010.
Montana adopted this rule on May 14,
2010 and it became State effective on
May 28, 2010. We are also taking final
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Frm 00015
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
7531
action to approve all references to ARM
17.8.745, submitted by Montana on May
28, 2003. Specifically, the following
phrases in 17.8.740(8)(a) and (c),
respectively, (1) ‘‘except when a permit
is not required under ARM 17.8.745’’
and (2) ‘‘except as provided in ARM
17.8.745,’’ the phrase ‘‘and 17.8.745’’ in
ARM 17.8.743(1) and the phrase ‘‘the
emission increase meets the criteria in
ARM 17.8.745 for a de minimis change
not requiring a permit in ARM
17.8.864(1)(b). These references were
adopted on December 6, 2002, and
became State effective on December 27,
2002. EPA is also taking final action to
disapprove the phrase ‘‘asphalt concrete
plants, mineral crushers’’ in new rule
ARM 17.8.743(1)(b) as submitted by the
State of Montana on May 28, 2003. This
rule was adopted on December 6, 2002,
and became State effective on December
27, 2002.
ARM 17.8.745, as submitted by the
State of Montana on June 25, 2010, and
all references to ARM 17.8.745, as
submitted by the State of Montana on
May 28, 2003, meet the requirements of
the Act and EPA’s minor New Source
Review (NSR) regulations. ARM
17.8.743(1)(b), as submitted by the State
of Montana on May 28, 2003, does not
meet the requirements of the Act and
EPA’s minor NSR regulations.
EPA proposed an action for the above
SIP revision submittals on September
26, 2011 (76 FR 59338). We accepted
comments from the public on this
proposal from September 27, 2011, until
October 26, 2011. A summary of the
comments received and our evaluation
thereof is discussed in section III below.
In the proposed rule, we described our
basis for the actions identified above.
The reader should refer to the proposed
rule, and sections III and IV of this
preamble, for additional information
regarding this final action.
EPA reviews a SIP revision
submission for its compliance with the
Act and EPA regulations. CAA
110(k)(3). We evaluated the submitted
Program based upon the regulations and
associated record that have been
submitted and are currently before EPA.
In order for EPA to ensure that Montana
has a Program that meets the
requirements of the CAA, the State must
demonstrate the Program is as stringent
as the Act and the implementing
regulations discussed in this notice. For
example, EPA must have sufficient
information to make a finding that the
new Program will ensure protection of
the NAAQS, and noninterference with
the Montana SIP control strategies, as
required by section 110(l) of the Act.
The provisions in these submittals
were not submitted to meet a mandatory
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 29 (Monday, February 13, 2012)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 7526-7531]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-3272]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
18 CFR Part 40
[Docket No. RM10-5-000; Order No. 758]
Interpretation of Protection System Reliability Standard
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: On November 17, 2009, the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) submitted a petition (Petition) requesting approval
of NERC's interpretation of Requirement R1 of Commission-approved
Reliability Standard PRC-005-1 (Transmission and Generation Protection
System Maintenance and Testing). On December 16, 2010, the Commission
issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR). In the NOPR, the
Commission proposed to accept the NERC proposed interpretation of
Requirement R1 of Reliability Standard PRC-005-1, and proposed to
direct NERC to develop modifications to the PRC-005-1 Reliability
Standard through its Reliability Standards development process to
address gaps in the Protection System maintenance and testing standard
that were highlighted by the proposed interpretation. As a result of
the comments received in response to the NOPR, in this order the
Commission adopts the NOPR proposal to accept NERC's proposed
interpretation. In addition, as discussed below, the Commission
accepts, in part, NERC's commitment to address the concerns in the
Protection System maintenance and testing standard that were identified
by the NOPR within the Reliability Standards development process, and
directs, in part, that the concerns identified by the NOPR with regard
to reclosing relays be addressed within the reinitiated PRC-005
revisions.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule will become effective March 14, 2012.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Ron LeComte (Legal Information), Office of General Counsel, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC
20426, (202) 502-8405, ron.lecomte@ferc.gov.
Danny Johnson (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington,
DC 20426, (202) 502-8892, danny.johnson@ferc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Before Commissioners: Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman; Philip D. Moeller,
John R. Norris, and Cheryl A. LaFleur.
Final Rule (Issued February 3, 2012.)
1. On November 17, 2009, NERC submitted the Petition requesting
approval of NERC's interpretation of Requirement R1 of Commission-
approved Reliability Standard PRC-005-1 (Transmission and Generation
Protection System Maintenance and Testing). NERC developed the
interpretation in response to a request for interpretation submitted to
NERC by the Regional Entities Compliance Monitoring Processes Working
Group (Working Group).\1\ In a December 16, 2010 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NOPR),\2\ the Commission proposed to accept the NERC
proposed interpretation of Requirement R1 of Reliability Standard PRC-
005-1, and proposed to direct NERC to develop modifications to the PRC-
005-1 Reliability Standard through its Reliability Standards
development process to address gaps in the Protection System
maintenance and testing standard highlighted by the proposed
interpretation. As a result of the comments received in response to the
NOPR, in this order the Commission adopts the NOPR proposal to accept
NERC's proposed interpretation. In addition, the Commission accepts, in
part, NERC's commitments to address the concerns in the Protection
System maintenance and testing standard that were identified by the
NOPR within the Reliability Standards development process, and directs,
in part, that the concerns identified by the NOPR with regard to
reclosing relays be addressed within the reinitiated PRC-005 revisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Working Group is a subcommittee of the Regional Entity
Management Group which consists of the executive management of the
eight Regional Entities.
\2\ Interpretation of Protection System Reliability Standard,
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 75 FR 81,152 (Dec. 27, 2010), FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 32,669 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Background
2. Section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA) requires a
Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) to develop
mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, which are subject to
Commission review and approval.\3\ Specifically, the Commission may
approve, by rule or order, a proposed Reliability Standard or
modification to a Reliability Standard if it determines that the
Standard is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or
preferential, and in the public interest.\4\ Once approved, the
Reliability Standards may be enforced by the ERO, subject to Commission
oversight, or by the Commission independently.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ 16 U.S.C. 824 (2006).
\4\ Id. 824o(d)(2).
\5\ Id. 824o(e)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Pursuant to section 215 of the FPA, the Commission established a
process to select and certify an ERO,\6\ and subsequently certified
NERC.\7\ On April 4, 2006, NERC submitted to the Commission a petition
seeking approval of 107 proposed Reliability Standards. On March 16,
2007, the Commission issued a Final Rule, Order No. 693,\8\ approving
83 of the 107 Reliability Standards, including Reliability
[[Page 7527]]
Standard PRC-005-1. In addition, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the
FPA,\9\ the Commission directed NERC to develop modifications to 56 of
the 83 approved Reliability Standards, including PRC-005-0.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability
Organization; and Procedures for the Establishment, Approval, and
Enforcement of Electric Reliability Standards, Order No. 672, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,204, order on reh'g, Order No. 672-A, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ] 31,212 (2006).
\7\ North American Electric Reliability Corp., 116 FERC
61,062, order on reh'g & compliance, 117 FERC ] 61,126
(2006), aff'd sub nom. Alcoa, Inc. v. FERC, 564 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
\8\ Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk-Power System,
Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,242, order on reh'g, Order
No. 693-A, 120 FERC ] 61,053 (2007).
\9\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5).
\10\ Order No. 693, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,242 at P 1475.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. NERC's Rules of Procedure provide that a person that is
``directly and materially affected'' by Bulk-Power System reliability
may request an interpretation of a Reliability Standard.\11\ In
response, the ERO will assemble a team with relevant expertise to
address the requested interpretation and also form a ballot pool.
NERC's Rules of Procedure provide that, within 45 days, the team will
draft an interpretation of the Reliability Standard and submit it to
the ballot pool. If approved by the ballot pool and subsequently by the
NERC Board of Trustees (Board), the interpretation is appended to the
Reliability Standard and filed with the applicable regulatory
authorities for approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ NERC Rules of Procedure, Appendix 3A, Reliability Standards
Development Procedure, Version 6.1, at 26-27 (2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Reliability Standard PRC-005-1
5. The purpose of PRC-005-1 is to ``ensure all transmission and
generation Protection Systems affecting the reliability of the Bulk
Electric System (BES) are maintained and tested.'' In particular,
Requirement R1, requires that:
R1. Each Transmission Owner and any Distribution Provider that owns
a transmission Protection System and each Generator Owner that owns a
generation Protection System shall have a Protection System maintenance
and testing program for Protection Systems that affect the reliability
of the BES. The program shall include:
R1.1. Maintenance and testing intervals and their basis.
R1.2. Summary of maintenance and testing procedures.
6. NERC currently defines ``Protection System'' as follows:
``Protective relays, associated communication systems, voltage and
current sensing devices, station batteries and DC control circuitry.''
\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ In Docket No. RD11-13-000, NERC has proposed to revise the
definition of Protection System effective on the first day of the
first calendar quarter twelve months from approval. The Commission
is approving this revision in an order issued concurrently with this
order. See North American Electric Reliability Corp., 138 FERC ]
61,095 (2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. NERC Proposed Interpretation
7. In the NERC Petition, NERC explains that it received a request
from the Working Group for an interpretation of Reliability Standard
PRC-005-1, Requirement R1, addressing five specific questions.
Specifically, the Working Group questions and NERC proposed
interpretations include:
Request 1: ``Does R1 require a maintenance and testing program for
the battery chargers for the `station batteries' that are considered
part of the Protection System?''
Response: ``While battery chargers are vital for ensuring `station
batteries' are available to support Protection System functions, they
are not identified within the definition of `Protection Systems.'
Therefore, PRC-005-1 does not currently require maintenance and testing
of battery chargers.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The revised definition of Protection System accepted in
Docket No. RD11-13-000 includes battery chargers as an element of
the Protection System and, as a result of that change, battery
chargers must be maintained and tested. Thus, the modified
definition of Protection System approved in Docket No. RD11-13-000,
when effective, shall supersede the interpretation of Requirement R1
of Reliability Standard PRC-005-1 approved in this order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Request 2: ``Does R1 require a maintenance and testing program for
auxiliary relays and sensing devices? If so, what types of auxiliary
relays and sensing devices? (i.e., transformer sudden pressure
relays).''
Response: ``The existing definition of `Protection System' does not
include auxiliary relays; therefore, maintenance and testing of such
devices is not explicitly required. Maintenance and testing of such
devices is addressed to the degree that an entity's maintenance and
testing program for DC control circuits involves maintenance and
testing of imbedded auxiliary relays. Maintenance and testing of
devices that respond to quantities other than electrical quantities
(for example, sudden pressure relays) are not included within
Requirement R1.''
Request 3: ``Does R1 require maintenance and testing of
transmission line re-closing relays?''
Response: ``No. `Protective Relays' refer to devices that detect
and take action for abnormal conditions. Automatic restoration of
transmission lines is not a `protective' function.''
Request 4: ``Does R1 require a maintenance and testing program for
the DC circuitry that is just the circuitry with relays and devices
that control actions on breakers, etc., or does R1 require a program
for the entire circuit from the battery charger to the relays to
circuit breakers and all associated wiring?''
Response: ``PRC-005-1 requires that entities (1) address DC control
circuitry within their program, (2) have a basis for the way they
address this item, and (3) execute the program. Specific additional
requirements relative to the scope and/or methods are not
established.''
Request 5: ``For R1, what are examples of `associated
communications systems' that are part of `Protection Systems' that
require a maintenance and testing program?''
Response: `` `Associated communication systems' refer to
communication systems used to convey essential Protection System
tripping logic, sometimes referred to as pilot relaying or
teleprotection. Examples include the following:
--Communications equipment involved in power-line-carrier relaying;
--Communications equipment involved in various types of permissive
protection system applications;
--Direct transfer-trip systems;
--Digital communication systems * * *.''
8. In its Petition requesting that the Commission accept the
proposed interpretation, NERC recognized that greater clarity to the
requirement language in PRC-005-1a is necessary to provide a complete
framework for maintenance and testing of equipment necessary to ensure
the reliability of the Bulk Power System. In its Petition, NERC also
stated that this activity is already underway in the scope of Project
2007-17--Protection System Maintenance and Testing, coupled with the
revised definition of Protection System.
IV. Commission NOPR
9. In the NOPR, the Commission proposed to accept the NERC proposed
interpretation of Requirement R1 of Reliability Standard PRC-005-1. In
addition, the Commission proposed to direct NERC to develop
modifications to the PRC-005-1 Reliability Standard through its
Reliability Standards development process to address gaps in the
Protection System maintenance and testing standard that were
highlighted by the proposed interpretation. The specific modifications
are discussed below.
V. Comments
10. Comments on the Commission's proposed interpretation were
received by the NERC, Edison Electric Institute (EEI), ISO/RTO Council
(IRC), American Public Power Association (APPA), National Rural
Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA), Transmission Access Policy
Study Group (TAPS), Cities of Anaheim and Riverside, California (Joint
Cities), Northwest
[[Page 7528]]
Commenters,\14\ International Transmission Company (ITC), PSEG
Companies,\15\ and MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company (MidAmerican),
Constellation/CENG,\16\ and Manitoba Hydro (Manitoba). In general,
commenters support NERC's proposed interpretation, and oppose the
further directives in the NOPR. Commenters also state that
modifications to the Reliability Standards should be addressed within
the NERC standards development process and that certain of the
modifications are currently being addressed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Lincoln People's Utility District, Columbia River People's
Utility District, Inland Power and Light Company, Northwest Public
Power Association, Northwest Requirements Utilities, Pacific
Northwest Generating Cooperative, Public Power Council, Public
Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, and Tillamook People's
Utility District.
\15\ Public Service Electric and Gas Company, PSEG Fossil LLC,
and PSEG Nuclear LLC.
\16\ Constellation Energy Group, Inc., Baltimore Gas & Electric
Company, Constellation Energy Commodities Group, Inc., Constellation
Energy Control and Dispatch, LLC, Constellation NewEnergy, Inc., and
Constellation Power Source Generation, Inc. (together,
Constellation) and Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC (CENG).
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VI. Discussion
11. As a result of the comments received in response to the
proposal, the Commission adopts the NOPR proposal to accept NERC's
proposed interpretation. As discussed below, \17\ the Commission
accepts, in part, NERC's commitments to address the concerns in the
Protection System maintenance and testing standard that were identified
by the NOPR within the Reliability Standards development process, and
directs, in part, that the concerns identified by the NOPR with regard
to reclosing relays be addressed within the reinitiated PRC-005
revisions.
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\17\ See infra, P 15, P 18, P 20.
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A. Maintenance and Testing of Auxiliary and Non-Electrical Sensing
Relays
12. In the NOPR, the Commission noted a concern that the proposed
interpretation may not include all components that serve in some
protective capacity.\18\ The Commission's concerns included the
proposed interpretation's exclusion of auxiliary and non-electrical
sensing relays. The Commission proposed to direct NERC to develop a
modification to the Reliability Standard to include any component or
device that is designed to detect defective lines or apparatuses or
other power system conditions of an abnormal or dangerous nature,
including devices designed to sense or take action against any abnormal
system condition that will affect reliable operation, and to initiate
appropriate control circuit actions.
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\18\ NOPR at P 11-14.
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13. In their comments NERC, EEI, Joint Cities, Manitoba, NRECA,
ITC, MidAmerican, and PSEG expressed varying levels of disagreement
with the NOPR's proposed directive. The disagreements are based on a
concern that the proposed directive will create an increase in scope
that will capture many items not used in BES protection. NERC is
concerned the scope of this proposed directive is so broad that any
device that is installed on the Bulk-Power System to monitor conditions
in any fashion may be included.\19\ NERC states that many of these
devices are advisory in nature and should not be reflected within NERC
Reliability Standards if they do not serve a necessary reliability
purpose.\20\ NERC does not believe it is necessary for the Commission
to issue a directive to address this issue. Instead, NERC proposes to
develop, either independently or in association with other technical
organizations such as IEEE, one or more technical documents which:
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\19\ NERC February 25, 2011 Comments at 7.
\20\ Id.
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1. Describe the devices and functions (to include sudden pressure
relays which trip for fault conditions) that should address FERC's
concern; and
2. Propose minimum maintenance activities for such devices and
maximum maintenance intervals, including the technical basis for
each.\21\
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\21\ Id.
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14. NERC states that these technical documents will address those
protective relays that are necessary for the reliable operation of the
Bulk-Power System and will allow for differentiation between protective
relays that detect faults from other devices that monitor the health of
the individual equipment and are advisory in nature (e.g., oil
temperature). Following development of the above-referenced
document(s), NERC states that it will ``propose a new or revised
standard (e.g. PRC-005) using the NERC Reliability Standards
development process to include maintenance of such devices, including
establishment of minimum maintenance activities and maximum maintenance
intervals.'' \22\ Accordingly, NERC proposes to ``add this issue to the
Reliability Standards issues database for inclusion in the list of
issues to address the next time the PRC-005 standard is revised.'' \23\
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\22\ Id.
\23\ Id.
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15. The Commission accepts NERC's proposal, and directs NERC to
file, within sixty days of publication of this Final Rule, a schedule
for informational purposes regarding the development of the technical
documents referenced above, including the identification of devices
that are designed to sense or take action against any abnormal system
condition that will affect reliable operation. NERC shall include in
the informational filing a schedule for the development of the changes
to the standard that NERC stated it would propose as a result of the
above-referenced documents.\24\ NERC should update its schedule when it
files its annual work plan.
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\24\ Id. at 7, 8.
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B. Reclosing Relays
16. In the NOPR, the Commission noted that while a reclosing relay
is not identified as a specific component of the Protection System, if
it either is used in coordination with a Protection System to achieve
or meet system performance requirements established in other
Commission-approved Reliability Standards, or can exacerbate fault
conditions when not properly maintained and coordinated, then excluding
the maintenance and testing of these reclosing relays will result in a
gap in the maintenance and testing of relays affecting the reliability
of the Bulk-Power System.\25\ Accordingly, the Commission proposed that
NERC modify the Reliability Standard to include the maintenance and
testing of reclosing relays affecting the reliability of the Bulk-Power
System.
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\25\ NOPR at P 15.
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17. NERC, EEI, IRC, ITC MidAmerican, NRECA, and PSEG opposed the
NOPR's directive to include reclosing relays. In general, commenters
state that reclosing relays used for stability purposes are already
included in maintenance and testing programs, and that reclosing relays
that are primarily used to minimize customer outages times and maximize
availability of system components should not be included. PSEG and
MidAmerican contend that the NERC standards development process should
be utilized to determine the maintenance and testing of those reclosing
relays that affect the reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
18. ISO/RTO contends that the primary purpose of reclosing relays
is to allow more expeditious restoration of lost components of the
system, not to maintain the reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
Therefore, ISO/RTO maintains that automatic reclosing
[[Page 7529]]
relays should not be subject to the NERC Reliability Standard for relay
maintenance and testing. MidAmerican states that there are only limited
circumstances when a reclosing relay can actually affect the
reliability of the Bulk-Power System. MidAmerican contends that it
would be overbroad for the Commission to direct a modification to the
standard that encompasses all reclosing relays that can ``exacerbate
fault conditions when not properly maintained and coordinated,'' as
this would improperly include many types of reclosing relays that do
not necessarily affect the reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
19. ITC agrees with the Commission's proposal that reclosing relays
that are required for system stability should be maintained and tested
under Requirement R1 of PRC-005-1. However, ITC contends that since
most bulk electric system automatic reclosing relay systems are applied
to minimize customer outage times and to maximize availability of
system components, only some ``high speed'' reclosing relays will
affect the reliability of the Bulk-Power System. Therefore, ITC
proposes that the Commission should direct NERC to draft specific
requirements or selection criteria that should be used in identifying
the types of re-closing relays for maintenance and testing under
Requirement R1 of PRC-005-1.\26\
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\26\ ITC Comments at 7.
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20. While NRECA notes that reclosing relays operate to restore, not
protect a system, NRECA also notes that there are reclosing schemes
that directly affect and are required for automatic stability control
of the system, but that such schemes are already covered under Special
Protection Schemes that are subject to reliability standards. NRECA,
notes that some transmission operators do not allow reclosing relays on
the bulk power system to remove the possibility of reclosing in on a
permanent fault, thus avoiding further potential damage to the bulk
power system.\27\
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\27\ NRECA Comments at 13-14.
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21. Similarly, NERC comments that in most cases reclosing relays
cannot be relied on to meet system performance requirements because of
the need to consider the impact of auto-reclosing into a permanent
fault; however, NERC states that applications that may exist in which
automatic restoration is used to meet system performance requirements
following temporary faults. NERC comments that where reclosing relays
are applied to meet performance requirements in approved NERC
Reliability Standards, or where automatic restoration of service is
fundamental to derivation of an Interconnection Reliability Operating
Limit (IROL), it is reasonable to require maintenance and testing of
auto-reclosing relays.\28\ However, NERC does not believe it is
necessary for the Commission to issue a directive.\29\ NERC states that
the proposed revisions to Reliability Standard PRC-005-1 that are under
development include maintenance of reclosing devices that are part of
Special Protection Systems.\30\ NERC proposes ``to add the remaining
concerns relating to this issue to the Reliability Standards issues
database for inclusion in the list of issues to address the next time
Reliability Standard PRC-005 is revised.'' \31\
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\28\ NERC February 25, 2011 Comments at 9.
\29\ TAPs urges the Commission to use its authority pursuant to
section 215(d)(5) in circumstances where there is a clear need for
such a directive.
\30\ Id.
\31\ Id.
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22. As NERC and other commenters point out, reclosing relays are
used in a broad range of applications; e.g., meet system performance
requirements in approved Reliability Standards, derivation of IROLs,
maintain system stability, minimize customer outage times, to maximize
availability of system components, etc. While commenters acknowledge
that reclosing relays have several applications, commenters also appear
to be divided on which applications, if any, should be included in a
maintenance and testing program.
23. The NOPR raised a concern that excluding the maintenance and
testing of reclosing relays that can exacerbate fault conditions when
not properly maintained and coordinated will result in a gap affecting
Bulk-Power System reliability.\32\ We agree with MidAmerican that while
there are only limited circumstances when a reclosing relay can
actually affect the reliability of the Bulk-Power System, there are
some reclosing relays, e.g., whose failure to operate or that
misoperate during an event due to lack of maintenance and testing, may
negatively impact the reliability of the Bulk-Power System.\33\ We
agree with NERC that where reclosing relays are applied to meet
performance requirements in approved NERC Reliability Standards, or
where automatic restoration of service is fundamental to derivation of
an Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit (IROL), it is reasonable
to require maintenance and testing of auto-reclosing relays.
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\32\ NOPR at P 15, noting one such outage resulting in the loss
of over 4,000 MW of generation and multiple 765 kV lines.
\33\ MidAmerican Comments at 6.
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24. In the NOPR we stated that a misoperating or miscoordinated
reclosing relay may result in the reclosure of a Bulk-Power System
element back onto a fault or that a misoperating or miscoordinated
reclosing relay may fail to operate after a fault has been cleared,
thus failing to restore the element to service. As a result, the
reliability of the Bulk-Power System would be affected. In addition,
misoperated or miscoordinated relays may result in damage to the Bulk-
Power System. For example, a misoperation or miscoordination of a
reclosing relay causing the reclosing of Bulk-Power System facilities
into a permanent fault can subject generators to excessive shaft
torques and winding stresses and expose circuit breakers to systems
conditions less than optimal for correct operation, potentially
damaging the circuit breaker.\34\
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\34\ NERC System Protection and Control Subcommittee,
``Advantages and Disadvantages of EHV Automatic Reclosing,
``December 9, 2009, p. 14.
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25. While some commenters argue that reclosing relays do not affect
the reliability of the Bulk-Power System, the record supports our
concern. For example, we note NERC's concern regarding the ``* * * need
to consider the impact of autoreclosing into a permanent fault.'' We
also note NRECA's comments that ``* * * some transmission operators do
not allow reclosing on the bulk electric system facilities to remove
the opportunity of closing in on a permanent fault'' and ``* * * by its
[automatic reclosing] use a utility understands the potential for
further damage that may occur by reclosing.'' \35\ Because the
misoperation or miscommunication of reclosing relays can exacerbate
fault conditions, we find that reclosing relays that may affect the
reliability of the Bulk-Power System should be maintained and
tested.\36\
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\35\ NRECA Comments at 13.
\36\ As NERC notes, there may be applications of reclosing
relays where the misoperation or miscommunication may does not have
a detrimental effect on the reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
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26. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that it is
important to maintain and test reclosing relays that may affect the
reliability of the Bulk-Power System. We agree with ITC that specific
requirements or selection criteria should be used to identify reclosing
relays that affect the reliability of the Bulk-Power System. As
MidAmerican suggests, the standard should be modified, through the
[[Page 7530]]
Reliability Standards development process, to provide the Transmission
Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider with the discretion
to include in a Protection System maintenance and testing program only
those reclosing relays that the entity identifies as having an affect
on the reliability of the Bulk-Power System.
27. We note that the original project to revise Reliability
Standard PRC-005 failed a recirculation ballot in July of 2011. The
project was subsequently reinitiated to continue the efforts to develop
Reliability Standard PRC-005-2. Given that the project to draft
proposed revisions to Reliability Standard PRC-005-1 continues in this
reinitiated effort, and the importance of maintaining and testing
reclosing relays, we direct NERC to include maintenance and testing of
reclosing relays that can affect the reliable operation of the Bulk-
Power System, as discussed above, within these reinitiated efforts to
revise Reliability Standard PRC-005.\37\
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\37\ On December 13, 2011, NERC submitted its Standards
Development Plan for 2012-2014. NERC estimates that Project 2007-17
will be completed in the second quarter of 2012. By July 30, 2012,
NERC should submit to the Commission either the completed project
which addresses the remaining issues consistent with this order, or
an informational filing that provides a schedule for how NERC will
address such issues in the Project 2007-17 reinitiated efforts.
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C. DC Control Circuitry and Components
28. In the NOPR, the Commission explained its understanding that a
maintenance and testing program for DC control circuitry would include
all components of DC control circuitry necessary for ensuring Reliable
Operation of the Bulk-Power System, and that not establishing the
specific requirements of such a maintenance and testing program results
in a gap in the maintenance and testing of Protection System
components.\38\
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\38\ NOPR at P 16.
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29. Joint Cities, MidAmerican, and NRECA expressed concern that the
NOPR's directive is too broad and unnecessarily burdensome. NERC agrees
that maintenance and testing should be required for all DC control
circuitry.\39\ NERC further stated that draft standard PRC-005-2 being
developed in Project 2007-17 ``includes extensive, specific maintenance
activities (with maximum maintenance intervals) related to the DC
control circuits.'' \40\ The Commission accepts NERC's commitment to
include the development of specific requirements of such a maintenance
and testing program described above in Project 2007-17.\41\
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\39\ NERC February 25, 2011 Comments at 10.
\40\ Id.
\41\ As previously noted, NERC estimates that Project 2007-17
will be completed by the second quarter of 2012. By July 30, 2012,
NERC should submit to the Commission either the completed project
which addresses the remaining issues consistent with this order, or
an informational filing that provides a schedule for how NERC will
address such issues in the Project 2007-17 reinitiated efforts.
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VII. Information Collection Statement
30. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations require
that OMB approve certain reporting and recordkeeping (collections of
information) imposed by an agency.\42\ The Commission submits reporting
and recording keeping requirements to OMB under section 3507 of the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.\43\
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\42\ 5 CFR 1320.
\43\ 44 U.S.C. 3507.
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31. As stated above, the Commission previously approved, in Order
No. 693, the Reliability Standard that is the subject of the current
Final Rule. This Final Rule accepts an interpretation of the currently
approved Reliability Standard. The interpretation of the current
Reliability Standard at issue in this final rule is not expected to
change the reporting burden or the information collection requirements.
The informational filing required of NERC is part of currently active
collection FERC-725 and does not require additional approval by OMB.
32. We will submit this final rule to OMB for informational
purposes only.
VIII. Environmental Analysis
33. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental
Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may
have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\44\ The
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this
requirement as not having a significant effect on the human
environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying,
corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the
effect of the regulations being amended.\45\ The actions proposed
herein fall within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's
regulations.
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\44\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, Order No. 486, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 30,783 (1987).
\45\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii).
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IX. Regulatory Flexibility Act
34. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) generally requires
a description and analysis of final rules that will have significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.\46\ The RFA
mandates consideration of regulatory alternatives that accomplish the
stated objectives of a proposed rule and that minimize any significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The Small
Business Administration's (SBA) Office of Size Standards develops the
numerical definition of a small business.\47\ The SBA has established a
size standard for electric utilities, stating that a firm is small if,
including its affiliates, it is primarily engaged in the transmission,
generation and/or distribution of electric energy for sale and its
total electric output for the preceding twelve months did not exceed
four million megawatt hours.\48\ The RFA is not implicated by this
Final Rule because the interpretation accepted herein does not modify
the existing burden or reporting requirements. Because this Final Rule
accepts an interpretation of the currently approved Reliability
Standard, the Commission certifies that this Final Rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
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\46\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
\47\ 13 CFR 121.201.
\48\ Id. n.1.
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X. Document Availability
35. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the
Internet through FERC's Home Page (https://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's
Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE., Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426.
36. From FERC's Home Page on the Internet, this information is
available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on
eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or
downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket
number excluding the last three digits of this document in the docket
number field.
37. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's Web
site during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at 202-502-
6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502-
8371, TTY (202) 502-8659. Email the Public Reference Room at
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
[[Page 7531]]
XI. Effective Date and Congressional Notification
38. This Final Rule is effective March 14, 2012. The Commission has
determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB that this rule is not a
``major rule'' as defined in section 351 of the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996.
List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 40
Applicability, Mandatory reliability standards, Availability of
reliability standards.
By the Commission.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012-3272 Filed 2-10-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
