Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 2778-2795 [2012-886]
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SUMMARY:
The Treasury Department’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control
(‘‘OFAC’’) is publishing the name of an
entity whose property and interests in
property have been unblocked pursuant
to Executive Order 13315 of August 28,
2003, ‘‘Blocking Property of the Former
Iraqi Regime, Its Senior Officials and
Their Family Members, and Taking
Certain Other Actions,’’ as amended by
Executive Order 13350 of July 30, 2004.
DATES: The removal of this entity from
the SDN List is effective as of January
10, 2012.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Assistant Director, Compliance
Outreach & Implementation, Office of
Foreign Assets Control, Department of
the Treasury, Washington, DC 20220,
tel.: (202) 622–2490.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
designated under Executive Order
12722 and related authorities.
The Department of the Treasury’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control has
determined that the entity identified
below, whose property and interests in
property were blocked pursuant to
Executive Order 13315, as amended,
should be removed from the SDN List.
The following designation is removed
from the SDN List:
Matrix Churchill Corporation, 5903
Harper Road, Cleveland, OH 44139
[IRAQ2]
The removal of this entity’s name
from the SDN List is effective as of
January 10, 2012. All property and
interests in property of the entity that
are in or hereafter come within the
United States or the possession or
control of United States persons are now
unblocked.
Electronic and Facsimile Availability
Dated: January 9, 2012.
Adam J. Szubin,
Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control.
The SDN List and additional
information concerning OFAC are
available from OFAC’s web site
(www.treasury.gov/ofac). Certain general
information pertaining to OFAC’s
sanctions programs also is available via
facsimile through a 24-hour fax-ondemand service, tel.: (202) 622–0077.
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Background
On August 28, 2003, the President
issued Executive Order 13315 (the
‘‘Order’’) pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq., the National
Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.,
section 5 of the United Nations
Participation Act, as amended, 22 U.S.C.
287c, section 301 of title 3, United
States Code, and in view of United
Nations Security Council Resolution
1483 of May 22, 2003. In the Order, the
President expanded the scope of the
national emergency declared in
Executive Order 13303 of May 22, 2003,
to address the unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national
security and foreign policy of the United
States posed by obstacles to the orderly
reconstruction of Iraq, the restoration
and maintenance of peace and security
in that country, and the development of
political, administrative, and economic
institutions in Iraq. The Order blocks
the property and interests in property
of, inter alia, persons listed on the
Annex to the Order.
On July 30, 2004, the President issued
Executive Order 13350, which, inter
alia, replaced the Annex to Executive
Order 13315 with a new Annex that
included the names of individuals and
entities, including individuals and
entities that had previously been
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[FR Doc. 2012–963 Filed 1–18–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–AL–P
UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION
Sentencing Guidelines for United
States Courts
United States Sentencing
Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed amendments
to sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, and commentary. Request
for public comment, including public
comment regarding retroactive
application of any of the proposed
amendments. Notice of public hearing.
AGENCY:
Pursuant to section 994(a),
(o), and (p) of title 28, United States
Code, the United States Sentencing
Commission is considering
promulgating certain amendments to the
sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, and commentary. This
notice sets forth the proposed
amendments and, for each proposed
amendment, a synopsis of the issues
addressed by that amendment. This
notice also sets forth a number of issues
for comment, some of which are set
forth together with the proposed
amendments; some of which are set
forth independent of any proposed
amendment; and one of which
(regarding retroactive application of
proposed amendments) is set forth in
the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION portion
of this notice.
The proposed amendments and issues
for comment in this notice are as
SUMMARY:
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follows: (1) A proposed amendment on
fraud and related offenses, including (A)
An issue for comment in response to the
issue of harm to the public and financial
markets, as raised by each of two
directives to the Commission in section
1079A of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Public Law 111–203; (B) a proposed
change to § 2B1.4 (Insider Trading) to
implement the directive in section
1079A(a)(1) of that Act, and related
issues for comment on insider trading,
securities fraud, and similar offenses;
(C) proposed changes to § 2B1.1 (Theft,
Property Destruction, and Fraud)
regarding mortgage fraud offenses to
implement the directive in section
1079A(a)(2) of that Act, and a related
issue for comment on mortgage fraud
and financial institution fraud; and (D)
issues for comment on the impact of the
loss table in § 2B1.1(b)(1) and the
victims table in § 2B1.1(b)(2) in cases
involving relatively large loss amounts;
(2) a proposed amendment on offenses
involving controlled substances and
chemical precursors, including (A) an
issue for comment on offenses involving
N–Benzylpiperazine (BZP); and (B) a
proposed change to § 2D1.11
(Unlawfully Distributing, Importing,
Exporting or Possessing a Listed
Chemical; Attempt or Conspiracy) that
would create a guidelines ‘‘safety valve’’
provision for offenses involving
chemical precursors that would be
analogous to the provision in § 2D1.1
(Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing,
Exporting, or Trafficking (Including
Possession with Intent to Commit These
Offenses); Attempt or Conspiracy); (3) a
proposed amendment on human rights
offenses, including (A) a proposed
guideline applicable to human rights
offenses; (B) proposed changes to
§ 2L2.1 (Trafficking in a Document
Relating to Naturalization, Citizenship,
or Legal Resident Status, or a United
States Passport; False Statement in
Respect to the Citizenship or
Immigration Status of Another;
Fraudulent Marriage to Assist Alien to
Evade Immigration Law) and § 2L2.2
(Fraudulently Acquiring Documents
Relating to Naturalization, Citizenship,
or Legal Resident Status for Own Use;
False Personation or Fraudulent
Marriage by Alien to Evade Immigration
Law; Fraudulently Acquiring or
Improperly Using a United States
Passport) to address cases in which the
offense of conviction is for immigration
or naturalization fraud but the
defendant had committed a serious
human rights offense; and (C) related
issues for comment on human rights
offenses; (4) a proposed amendment to
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§ 2L1.2 (Unlawfully Entering or
Remaining in the United States) to
respond to a circuit conflict over
application of the term ‘‘sentence
imposed’’ in that guideline when the
defendant’s original ‘‘sentence
imposed’’ was lengthened after the
defendant was deported; (5) a proposed
amendment presenting options for
specifying the types of documents that
may be considered in determining
whether a particular prior conviction
fits within a particular category of
crimes for purposes of specific guideline
provisions, and related issues for
comment; (6) a proposed amendment to
§ 4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for
Computing Criminal History) to respond
to an application issue regarding when
a defendant’s prior sentence for driving
while intoxicated or driving under the
influence (and similar offenses by
whatever name they are known) is
counted toward the defendant’s
criminal history score; (7) a proposed
amendment to § 4B1.2 (Definitions of
Terms Used in Section 4B1.1) to
respond to differences among the
circuits on when, if at all, burglary of a
non-dwelling qualifies as a crime of
violence for purposes of the guidelines,
and related issues for comment; (8) a
proposed amendment to § 5G1.2
(Sentencing on Multiple Counts of
Conviction) to respond to an application
issue regarding the applicable guideline
range in a case in which the defendant
is sentenced on multiple counts of
conviction, at least one of which
involves a mandatory minimum
sentence that is greater than the
minimum of the otherwise applicable
guideline range; (9) a proposed
amendment to § 5K2.19 (PostSentencing Rehabilitative Efforts) to
respond to Pepper v. United States, 131
S.Ct. 1229 (2011), which held, among
other things, that a defendant’s postsentencing rehabilitative efforts may be
considered when the defendant is
resentenced after appeal; and (10) a
proposed amendment in response to
miscellaneous issues arising from
legislation recently enacted, including
(A) proposed changes to § 2P1.2
(Providing or Possessing Contraband in
Prison) to respond to the Cell Phone
Contraband Act of 2010, Public Law
111–225, and (B) proposed changes to
Appendix A (Statutory Index) to address
certain criminal provisions in the
Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of
2009, Public Law 111–154, the Indian
Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of
2010, Public Law 111–211, the Animal
Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010,
Public Law 111–294, and certain other
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statutes, and a related issue for
comment.
(1) Written public comment.—
Written public comment regarding the
proposed amendments and issues for
comment set forth in this notice,
including public comment regarding
retroactive application of any of the
proposed amendments, should be
received by the Commission not later
than March 19, 2012.
(2) Public hearing.—The Commission
plans to hold a public hearing regarding
the proposed amendments and issues
for comment set forth in this notice.
Further information regarding the
public hearing, including requirements
for testifying and providing written
testimony, as well as the location, time,
and scope of the hearing, will be
provided by the Commission on its Web
site at www.ussc.gov.
ADDRESSES: Public comment should be
sent to: United States Sentencing
Commission, One Columbus Circle NE.,
Suite 2–500, Washington, DC 20002–
8002, Attention: Public Affairs.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Jeanne Doherty, Public Affairs Officer,
Telephone: (202) 502–4502.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
United States Sentencing Commission is
an independent agency in the judicial
branch of the United States
Government. The Commission
promulgates sentencing guidelines and
policy statements for federal courts
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a). The
Commission also periodically reviews
and revises previously promulgated
guidelines pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o)
and submits guideline amendments to
the Congress not later than the first day
of May each year pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
994(p).
The proposed amendments in this
notice are presented in one of two
formats. First, some of the amendments
are proposed as specific revisions to a
guideline or commentary. Bracketed text
within a proposed amendment indicates
a heightened interest on the
Commission’s part in comment and
suggestions regarding alternative policy
choices; for example, a proposed
enhancement of [2][4][6] levels indicates
that the Commission is considering, and
invites comment on, alternative policy
choices regarding the appropriate level
of enhancement. Similarly, bracketed
text within a specific offense
characteristic or application note means
that the Commission specifically invites
comment on whether the proposed
provision is appropriate. Second, the
Commission has highlighted certain
issues for comment and invites
DATES:
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suggestions on how the Commission
should respond to those issues.
The Commission requests public
comment regarding whether, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and 28 U.S.C.
994(u), any proposed amendment
published in this notice should be
included in subsection (c) of § 1B1.10
(Reduction in Term of Imprisonment as
a Result of Amended Guideline Range
(Policy Statement)) as an amendment
that may be applied retroactively to
previously sentenced defendants. The
Commission lists in § 1B1.10(c) the
specific guideline amendments that the
court may apply retroactively under 18
U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The background
commentary to § 1B1.10 lists the
purpose of the amendment, the
magnitude of the change in the
guideline range made by the
amendment, and the difficulty of
applying the amendment retroactively
to determine an amended guideline
range under § 1B1.10(b) as among the
factors the Commission considers in
selecting the amendments included in
§ 1B1.10(c). To the extent practicable,
public comment should address each of
these factors.
Additional information pertaining to
the proposed amendments described in
this notice may be accessed through the
Commission’s Web site at
www.ussc.gov.
Authority: 28 U.S.C. 994(a), (o), (p), (x);
USSC Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule
4.4.
Patti B. Saris,
Chair.
1. Dodd-Frank/Fraud
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment:
This proposed amendment is a multipart amendment that continues the
Commission’s multi-year review of
fraud offenses to ensure that the
guidelines provide appropriate penalties
(1) in cases involving securities fraud
and similar offenses and (2) in cases
involving mortgage fraud and financial
institution fraud.
Specifically, the proposed
amendment implements the two
directives to the Commission in the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Public Law
111–203 (the ‘‘Act’’). The first directive
relates to securities fraud and similar
offenses, and the second directive
relates to mortgage fraud and financial
institution fraud.
Each directive requires the
Commission to ‘‘review and, if
appropriate, amend’’ the guidelines and
policy statements applicable to the
offenses covered by the directive and
consider whether the guidelines
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appropriately account for the potential
and actual harm to the public and the
financial markets from those offenses.
Each directive also requires the
Commission to ensure that the
guidelines reflect (i) The serious nature
of the offenses, (ii) the need for
deterrence, punishment, and
prevention, and (iii) the effectiveness of
incarceration in furthering those
objectives.
Part A responds to the issue of harm
to financial markets, which is raised by
both directives; Part B responds to the
directive on securities fraud and similar
offenses; and Part C responds to the
directive on mortgage fraud and
financial institution fraud.
The proposed amendment also
includes a Part D, which responds to
concerns suggesting that the impact of
the loss table or the victims table (or the
combined impact of the loss table and
the victims table) may overstate the
culpability of certain offenders in cases
sentenced under § 2B1.1 that involve
relatively large loss amounts.
The parts are as follows:
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(A) Harm to Financial Markets
Issue for Comment:
1. The Commission requests comment
on whether the Guidelines Manual
provides penalties that appropriately
account for the potential and actual
harm to the public and the financial
markets from the offenses covered by
the directives. If not, what changes to
the Guidelines Manual would be
appropriate to respond to this
requirement in both directives?
Section 2B1.1 contains provisions that
address harm to the public and the
financial markets in various ways, by
taking into account the amount of the
loss, the number of victims, and other
factors contained in its specific offense
characteristics and departure
provisions. For example, subsection
(b)(14) provides an enhancement of
either (A) 2 levels, if the defendant
derived more than $1,000,000 in gross
receipts from one or more financial
institutions, or (B) 4 levels, if the offense
(i) substantially jeopardized the safety
and soundness of a financial institution,
(ii) substantially endangered the
solvency or financial security of an
organization that (I) was a publicly
traded company or (II) had 1,000 or
more employees, or (iii) substantially
endangered the solvency or financial
security of 100 or more victims.
Subsection (b)(14)(C) provides that the
cumulative adjustments from (b)(2) and
(b)(14)(B) shall not exceed 8 levels,
except as provided in subdivision (D).
Subdivision (D) provides a minimum
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offense level of level 24, if either (A) or
(B) applies.
Should the Commission amend
§ 2B1.1 to more directly account for the
potential and actual harms to the public
and the financial markets? For example,
should the Commission provide a new
prong in § 2B1.1(b)(14) that provides an
enhancement of [2][4][6] levels if the
offense involved a significant disruption
of a financial market or created a
substantial risk of such a disruption? In
the alternative, should the Commission
provide a new upward departure
provision in § 2B1.1 that applies if the
offense involved such a disruption or
created a substantial risk of such a
disruption?
If the Commission were to provide
such a provision, what guidance should
the Commission provide for
determining when the provision would
apply?
(B) Securities Fraud and Similar
Offenses
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment:
Section 1079A(a)(1)(A) of the Act
directs the Commission to ‘‘review and,
if appropriate, amend’’ the guidelines
and policy statements applicable to
‘‘persons convicted of offenses relating
to securities fraud or any other similar
provision of law, in order to reflect the
intent of Congress that penalties for the
offenses under the guidelines and policy
statements appropriately account for the
potential and actual harm to the public
and the financial markets from the
offenses.’’
In addition, section 1079A(a)(1)(B) of
the Act provides that, in promulgating
any such amendment, the Commission
shall—
(i) Ensure that the guidelines and
policy statements, particularly section
2B1.1(b)(14) and section 2B1.1(b)(17)
(and any successors thereto), reflect—
(I) The serious nature of the offenses
described in subparagraph (A);
(II) The need for an effective deterrent
and appropriate punishment to prevent
the offenses; and
(III) The effectiveness of incarceration
in furthering the objectives described in
subclauses (I) and (II);
(ii) Consider the extent to which the
guidelines appropriately account for the
potential and actual harm to the public
and the financial markets resulting from
the offenses;
(iii) Ensure reasonable consistency
with other relevant directives and
guidelines and Federal statutes;
(iv) Make any necessary conforming
changes to guidelines; and
(v) Ensure that the guidelines
adequately meet the purposes of
sentencing, as set forth in section
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3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States
Code.
Securities fraud is prosecuted under
18 U.S.C. 1348 (Securities and
commodities fraud), which makes it
unlawful to knowingly execute, or
attempt to execute, a scheme or artifice
(1) to defraud any person in connection
with a security or (2) to obtain, by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, any money
or property in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security. The
statutory maximum term of
imprisonment for an offense under
section 1348 is 25 years. Offenses under
section 1348 are referenced in Appendix
A (Statutory Index) to § 2B1.1.
Securities fraud is also prosecuted
under 18 U.S.C. 1350 (Failure of
corporate officers to certify financial
reports), violations of the provisions of
law referred to in 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47),
and violations of the rules, regulations,
and orders issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission pursuant to those
provisions of law. See § 2B1.1,
comment. (n.14(A)). In addition, there
are cases in which the defendant
committed a securities law violation but
is prosecuted under a general fraud
statute. In general, these offenses are
likewise referenced to § 2B1.1.
The directive contemplates that the
Commission also review offenses
‘‘under any other similar provision of
law’’. The Commission has received
comment indicating that commodities
fraud offenses and insider trading
offenses should be included within the
scope of its review.
The proposed amendment responds to
the directive by amending the insider
trading guideline, § 2B1.4 (Insider
Trading), in several ways.
First, it provides a specific offense
characteristic that applies if the offense
involved sophisticated insider trading.
The specific offense characteristic
provides an enhancement of [2] levels
and a minimum offense level of [12][14].
Second, it provides a 4-level
enhancement that applies if the
defendant, at the time of the offense,
held one of several listed positions of
trust. This enhancement parallels the
enhancement in § 2B1.1(b)(18).
Issues for comment are also provided,
both on insider trading offenses under
§ 2B1.4 and on securities fraud and
similar offenses under § 2B1.1.
Proposed Amendment:
Section 2B1.4(b) is amended by
striking ‘‘Characteristic’’ and inserting
‘‘Characteristics’’; and by inserting after
paragraph (1) the following:
‘‘(2) If the offense involved
sophisticated insider trading, increase
by 2 levels. If the resulting offense level
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is less than level [12][14], increase to
level [12][14].
(3) If, at the time of the offense, the
defendant was—
(A)(i) An officer or a director of a
publicly traded company; (ii) a
registered broker or dealer, or a person
associated with a broker or dealer; or
(iii) an investment adviser, or a person
associated with an investment adviser;
or
(B)(i) An officer or a director of a
futures commission merchant or an
introducing broker; (ii) a commodities
trading advisor; or (iii) a commodity
pool operator, increase by 4 levels.’’.
The Commentary to §2B1.4 captioned
‘‘Application Note’’ is amended in the
phrase ‘‘Application Note’’ by striking
‘‘Note’’ and inserting ‘‘Notes’’; by
redesignating Note 1 as Note 3; in that
Note, by striking ‘‘Section 3B1.3 (Abuse
of Position of Trust or Use of Special
Skill)’’ and inserting ‘‘If subsection
(b)(3) applies, do not apply §3B1.3. In
any other case, §3B1.3’’; and by striking
‘‘trust. Examples might include a
corporate president or’’ and inserting
‘‘trust, such as’’.
The Commentary to §2B1.4 captioned
‘Application Note’ is amended by
inserting before Note 3 (as so
redesignated) the following:
1. Application of Subsection (b)(2).—
For purposes of subsection (b)(2),
‘sophisticated insider trading’ means
especially complex or intricate offense
conduct pertaining to the execution or
concealment of the offense.
The following is a non-exhaustive list
of factors that the court shall consider
in determining whether subsection
(b)(2) applies:
(A) The number of transactions;
(B) The dollar value of the
transactions;
(C) The number of securities involved;
(D) The duration of the offense;
(E) Whether fictitious entities,
corporate shells, or offshore financial
accounts were used to hide transactions;
and
(F) Whether internal monitoring or
auditing systems or compliance and
ethics program standards or procedures
were subverted in an effort to prevent
the detection of the offense.
2. Application of Subsection (b)(3).—
For purposes of subsection (b)(3):
‘Commodity pool operator’ has the
meaning given that term in section 1a(5)
of the Commodity Exchange Act (7
U.S.C. 1a(5)).
‘Commodity trading advisor’ has the
meaning given that term in section 1a(6)
of the Commodity Exchange Act (7
U.S.C. 1a(6)).
‘Futures commission merchant’ has
the meaning given that term in section
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1a(20) of the Commodity Exchange Act
(7 U.S.C. 1a(20)).
‘Introducing broker’ has the meaning
given that term in section 1a(23) of the
Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C.
1a(23)).
‘Investment adviser’ has the meaning
given that term in section 202(a)(11) of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15
U.S.C. 80b–2(a)(11)).
‘Person associated with a broker or
dealer’ has the meaning given that term
in section 3(a)(18) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78c(a)(18)).
‘Person associated with an investment
adviser’ has the meaning given that term
in section 202(a)(17) of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b–
2(a)(17)).
‘Registered broker or dealer’ has the
meaning given that term in section
3(a)(48) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(48)).’’.
Issues for Comment:
1. Insider Trading. The Commission
has received public comment indicating
that some insider trading defendants
engage in serious offense conduct but
nonetheless, because of market forces or
other factors, do not necessarily realize
high gains. The concern has been raised
that in such cases, §2B1.4 may not
adequately account for the seriousness
of the conduct and the actual and
potential harms to individuals and
markets, because the guideline uses gain
alone as the measure of harm.
Should the Commission provide in
§2B1.4 one or more specific offense
characteristics that use aggravating
factors other than gain to account for the
seriousness of the conduct and the
actual or potential harm to individuals
and markets? If so, what should the
factor or factors be? For example, should
the Commission provide, as an
aggravating factor in §2B1.4, (i) The
number of transactions; (ii) the dollar
value of the transactions; (iii) the
number of securities involved; or some
other factor that distinguishes a
defendant who engages in multiple
instances or higher volumes of insider
trading from a defendant who does not?
If the Commission were to provide
one or more new specific offense
characteristics based on such
aggravating factors, what level or levels
of enhancement should the Commission
provide, and how should any such
enhancement interact with the
enhancement for gain in §2B1.4?
For example, in bid-rigging cases, the
guidelines currently provide a ‘‘volume
of commerce’’ enhancement in
subsection (b)(2) of §2R1.1 (Bid-Rigging,
Price-Fixing or Market-Allocation
Agreements Among Competitors). That
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enhancement provides a tiered
enhancement, ranging from 2 levels if
the volume of commerce was more than
$1,000,000, to 16 levels if the volume of
commerce was more than
$1,500,000,000. Should the Commission
consider an analogous tiered
enhancement (e.g., based on volume of
trading) for insider trading cases in
§2B1.4? If so, what guidance should the
Commission provide on how the
volume of trading is to be determined,
what volumes of trading should be used
for the tiered enhancement, and what
levels of enhancement should apply to
the various tiers?
Similarly, §2R1.1 provides a special
instruction under which the fine for an
organizational defendant is calculated
based on 20 percent of the volume of
commerce, rather than on the pecuniary
loss. See §2R1.1(d)(1). Should the
Commission consider an analogous
approach for insider trading cases in
§2B1.4? In particular, should the
Commission provide a special rule
under which the gain enhancement in
§2B1.4(b)(1) would use either the gain
or an amount equal to [20] percent of
the volume of trading, whichever is
greater?
2. Calculation of Loss in §2B1.1. The
Commission has received comment
indicating that determinations of loss in
cases under §2B1.1 involving securities
fraud and similar offenses are complex
and a variety of different methods are in
use, resulting in application issues and
possible sentencing disparities. Should
the Commission amend §2B1.1 to clarify
the method or methods used in
determining loss in such cases to ensure
that the guideline appropriately
accounts for the potential and actual
harm to the public and the financial
markets from those offenses?
For example, courts in cases involving
securities fraud and similar offenses
have used—
(A) A simple rescissory method
(under which loss is based upon the
price that the victim paid for the
security and the price of the security as
it existed after the fraud was disclosed),
see, e.g., United States v. Grabske, 260
F.Supp.2d 866, 872–73 (N.D. Cal. 2002);
(B) A modified rescissory method
(under which loss is based upon the
average price of the security during the
period that the fraud occurred and the
average price of the security during a set
period after the fraud was disclosed to
the market), see, e.g., United States v.
Brown, 595 F.3d 498 (3d Cir. 2010);
United States v. Bakhit, 218 F.Supp.2d
1232 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
(C) A market capitalization method
(under which loss is based upon the
price of the security shortly before the
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disclosure and the price of the security
shortly after the disclosure), see, e.g.,
United States v. Moskowitz, 215 F.3d
265, 272 (2d Cir. 2000), abrogated on
other grounds by Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 64 (2002);
United States v. Peppel, 2011 WL
3608139 (S.D. Ohio 2011); and
(D) A market-adjusted method (under
which loss is based upon the change in
value of the security, but excluding
changes in value that were caused by
external market forces), see, e.g., United
States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179
(2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Olis, 429
F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005).
The Commission seeks comment on
these four methods of calculating loss in
cases involving securities fraud and
similar offenses, and the relative
advantages and disadvantages of these
methods. The Commission also seeks
comment on whether there are any other
methods of calculating loss, other than
these four methods, that should be used
in such cases.
Should the Commission provide a
specific method or methods for use by
courts in determining loss in cases
involving securities fraud and similar
offenses? If so, which method or
methods should the Commission
provide? Should the method used
depend on the type of fraudulent
scheme, and if so, how?
In particular, two of the more
common types of securities fraud are (1)
investment fraud, in which victims are
fraudulently induced to invest in
companies or products related to
securities (a category that includes
Ponzi schemes); and (2) market or price
manipulation fraud, in which the
offender seeks to inflate the price of a
security through various means (a
category that includes so-called ‘‘pump
and dump’’ schemes as well as
accounting frauds). What method or
methods of loss calculation should be
used for investment fraud, and what
method or methods should be used for
market or price manipulation fraud? Are
there any other types of securities fraud
or similar offenses for which the
Commission should provide a specific
method or methods of loss calculation?
What changes, if any, should the
Commission make to the existing rules
for calculation of loss in cases involving
securities fraud or similar offenses? For
example, the calculation of loss in an
investment fraud case is covered by
Application Note 3(F)(iv) to § 2B1.1,
which provides:
Ponzi and Other Fraudulent Investment
Schemes.—In a case involving a fraudulent
investment scheme, such as a Ponzi scheme,
loss shall not be reduced by the money or the
value of the property transferred to any
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individual investor in the scheme in excess
of that investor’s principal investment (i.e.,
the gain to an individual investor in the
scheme shall not be used to offset the loss to
another individual investor in the scheme).
Should the Commission revise or
repeal this application note and provide
a different rule for investment fraud?
Should the Commission provide
further guidance regarding the causation
standard to be applied in calculating
loss in cases involving securities fraud
or similar offenses? For example, should
the Commission provide a loss
causation standard similar to the civil
loss causation standard articulated by
the Supreme Court in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336 (2005) (holding that a civil
securities fraud plaintiff must prove that
the plaintiff’s economic loss was
proximately caused by the defendant’s
misrepresentation (or other fraudulent
conduct) as opposed to other
independent market factors)?
Are there any other changes that the
Commission should make regarding the
determination of loss in cases involving
securities fraud or similar offenses to
ensure that the guidelines appropriately
account for the potential and actual
harm to the public and the financial
markets from those offenses?
3. Specific Provisions in § 2B1.1. The
directive requires the Commission to
consider, among other things, the
enhancements at § 2B1.1(b)(15) and
(b)(18) (formerly (b)(14) and (b)(17),
respectively). The Commission seeks
comment on whether any changes
should be made to either or both of
these provisions in response to the
directive. Should the Commission
expand the scope or the amounts of the
increases provided by subsection (b)(15)
or (b)(18), or both, to ensure that the
guidelines appropriately account for the
potential and actual harm to the public
and the financial markets? If so, how?
(C) Mortgage Fraud and Financial
Institution Fraud
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment:
This part of the proposed amendment
responds to the directive in section
1079A(a)(2) of the Act, which relates to
mortgage fraud and financial institution
fraud.
Specifically, section 1079A(a)(2)(A) of
the Act directs the Commission to
‘‘review and, if appropriate, amend’’ the
guidelines and policy statements
applicable to ‘‘persons convicted of
fraud offenses relating to financial
institutions or federally related
mortgage loans and any other similar
provisions of law, to reflect the intent of
Congress that the penalties for the
offenses under the guidelines and policy
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statements ensure appropriate terms of
imprisonment for offenders involved in
substantial bank frauds or other frauds
relating to financial institutions.’’
In addition, section 1079A(a)(2)(B) of
the Act provides that, in promulgating
any such amendment, the Commission
shall—
(i) Ensure that the guidelines and
policy statements reflect—
(I) The serious nature of the offenses
described in subparagraph (A);
(II) The need for an effective deterrent
and appropriate punishment to prevent
the offenses; and
(III) The effectiveness of incarceration
in furthering the objectives described in
subclauses (I) and (II);
(ii) Consider the extent to which the
guidelines appropriately account for the
potential and actual harm to the public
and the financial markets resulting from
the offenses;
(iii) Ensure reasonable consistency
with other relevant directives and
guidelines and Federal statutes;
(iv) Make any necessary conforming
changes to guidelines; and
(v) Ensure that the guidelines
adequately meet the purposes of
sentencing, as set forth in section
3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States
Code.
With regard to mortgage fraud, the
proposed amendment makes two
changes to Application Note 3 regarding
calculation of loss. The first change
addresses the credit against loss rule
and states that, in the case of a fraud
involving a mortgage loan in which the
collateral has been disposed of at a
foreclosure sale, use the amount
recovered from the foreclosure sale.
The second change specifies that, in
the case of a fraud involving a mortgage
loan, reasonably foreseeable pecuniary
harm includes the reasonably
foreseeable administrative costs to the
lending institution associated with
foreclosing on the mortgaged property,
provided that the lending institution
exercised due diligence in the initiation,
processing, and monitoring of the loan
and the disposal of the collateral.
With regard to financial institution
fraud more generally, the proposed
amendment broadens the applicability
of § 2B1.1(b)(15)(B), which provides an
enhancement of 4 levels if the offense
involved specific types of financial
harms (e.g., jeopardizing a financial
institution or organization). Application
Note 12 to § 2B1.1 lists factors to be
considered in determining whether to
apply the enhancement in subsection
(b)(15)(B) for jeopardizing a financial
institution or organization. Currently,
the court is directed to consider whether
the financial institution or organization
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suffered one or more listed harms (such
as becoming insolvent) as a result of the
offense. The proposed amendment
amends Note 12 to direct the court to
consider whether one of the listed
harms was likely to result from the
offense but did not result from the
offense because of federal government
intervention.
Issues for comment are also provided.
Proposed Amendment:
The Commentary to § 2B1.1 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 3(A)(v) by adding at the end the
following:
‘‘(IV) Fraud Involving a Mortgage Loan.—
In the case of a fraud involving a mortgage
loan, the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary
harm includes the reasonably foreseeable
administrative costs to the lending institution
associated with foreclosing on the mortgaged
property, provided that the lending
institution exercised due diligence in the
initiation, processing, and monitoring of the
loan and the disposal of the collateral.’’;
in Note 3(E)(ii) by adding at the end ‘‘In
the case of a fraud involving a mortgage
loan in which the collateral has been
disposed of at a foreclosure sale, use the
amount recovered from the foreclosure
sale.’’;
in Note 12(A) by adding at the end the
following:
‘‘(v) One or more of the criteria in clauses
(i) through (iv) was likely to result from the
offense but did not result from the offense
because of federal government intervention.’’;
and in Note 12(B)(ii) by inserting at the
end the following:
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‘‘(VII) One or more of the criteria in
subclauses (I) through (VI) was likely to
result from the offense but did not result
from the offense because of federal
government intervention.’’.
Issue for Comment:
1. The Commission requests comment
regarding whether the Guidelines
Manual provides penalties for mortgage
fraud and financial institution fraud that
appropriately account for the potential
and actual harm to the public and the
financial markets from these offenses
and ensure appropriate terms of
imprisonment for offenders involved in
substantial bank frauds or other frauds
relating to financial institutions and, if
not, what changes to the Guidelines
Manual would be appropriate to
respond to section 1079A(a)(2) of the
Act.
Bank fraud is prosecuted under 18
U.S.C. 1344 (Bank fraud), which makes
it unlawful to knowingly execute a
scheme or artifice (1) to defraud a
financial institution or (2) to obtain any
of the property of a financial institution
by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.
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The statutory maximum term of
imprisonment for an offense under
section 1344 is 30 years. Offenses under
section 1344 are referenced in Appendix
A (Statutory Index) to § 2B1.1. Other
statutes relating to financial institution
fraud or mortgage fraud include 18
U.S.C. 215, 656, 657, 1005, 1006, 1010,
1014, 1029, and 1033. These offenses
are likewise generally referenced to
§ 2B1.1.
A. Proposed Provisions
The proposed amendment would
make two changes regarding calculation
of loss in mortgage fraud cases. The
Commission invites comment on
whether there are other issues involving
loss in mortgage fraud cases that are not
adequately accounted for in the
guidelines and, if so, what changes
should be made to how loss is
calculated in mortgage fraud cases.
For example, the first change would
specify that in the case of a fraud
involving a mortgage loan in which the
collateral was disposed of at a
foreclosure sale, use the amount
recovered from the foreclosure sale.
Should the Commission provide an
additional special rule for determining
fair market value if the mortgaged
property has not been disposed of by the
time of sentencing? For example, should
the Commission provide that, if the
mortgaged property has not been
disposed of by that time, the most recent
tax assessment value of the mortgaged
property shall constitute prima facie
evidence of the fair market value, i.e., is
evidence sufficient to establish the fair
market value, if not rebutted?
The proposed amendment would also
expand the scope of § 2B1.1(b)(15) by
amending the commentary to provide
additional factors for the court to
consider in determining whether one or
more prongs of subsection (b)(15) apply.
The Commission invites comment on
whether it should make any further
changes to subsection (b)(15), such as by
expanding its scope or increasing its
penalties, or both, to ‘‘ensure
appropriate terms of imprisonment for
offenders involved in substantial bank
frauds or other frauds relating to
financial institutions’’. If so, what
changes to subsection (b)(15) should be
made?
B. Mitigating Factors
Are there mitigating factors in cases
involving mortgage fraud or financial
fraud that are not adequately accounted
for in the guidelines? If so, how should
the Commission amend the Guidelines
Manual to account for those mitigating
factors?
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2783
(D) Impact of Loss and Victims Tables
in Certain Cases
Issues for Comment:
1. The Commission has observed that
cases sentenced under § 2B1.1 involving
relatively large loss amounts have
relatively high rates of below-range
sentences (both government sponsored
and non-government sponsored),
particularly in the context of securities
fraud and similar offenses. The
Commission also has received public
comment and reviewed judicial
opinions suggesting that the impact of
the loss table or the victims table (or the
combined impact of the loss table and
the victims table) may overstate the
culpability of certain offenders in such
cases.
In response to these concerns, the
Commission is studying whether it
should limit the impact of the loss table
or the victims table (or both) in cases
sentenced under § 2B1.1 involving
relatively large loss amounts and, if so,
how it should limit the impact.
In particular, the Commission seeks
comment on whether one or more of the
following approaches should be
adopted:
(A) Limiting Impact of Loss Table if
the Defendant Had Relatively Little Gain
Relative to the Loss. Should the
Commission insert a new specific
offense characteristic in § 2B1.1 to limit
the impact of the loss table in cases
involving large loss amounts if the
defendant had relatively little gain
relative to the loss? Examples of such a
provision are the following:
(Ex. 1) If the defendant’s gain resulting
from the offense did not exceed $10,000, the
adjustment from application of subsection
(b)(1) shall not exceed [14]/[16] levels.
(Ex. 2) If the defendant’s gain resulting
from the offense did not exceed $25,000, the
adjustment from application of subsection
(b)(1) shall not exceed [16]/[18] levels.
(Ex. 3) If the defendant’s gain resulting
from the offense did not exceed $70,000, the
adjustment from application of subsection
(b)(1) shall not exceed [18]/[20] levels.
The maximum gain amount in the
examples corresponds to one percent of
the maximum loss amount. For
example, in Example 3, the maximum
gain amount is $70,000, which
corresponds to a maximum loss amount
of $7,000,000. (A loss amount of
$7,000,000, in turn, corresponds to an
enhancement of 18 levels, while a loss
amount of more than $7,000,000
corresponds to an enhancement of 20
levels.)
(B) Limiting Impact of Victims Table
if No Victims Were Substantially
Harmed by the Offense. Should the
Commission amend the victims table in
§ 2B1.1(b)(2) to limit the impact of the
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victims table if no victims were
substantially harmed by the offense? For
example, should the Commission
provide that the 4-level and 6-level
prongs of the victims table apply only
if the offense substantially endangered
the solvency or financial security of at
least one victim?
(C) Limiting Cumulative Impact of
Loss Table and Victims Table. Should
the Commission limit the cumulative
impact of the loss table and the victims
table? For example, should the
Commission provide that, if the
enhancement under the loss table is
[14]–[24] levels, do not apply the 4-level
or 6-level adjustment under the victims
table?
The Commission seeks comment on
these three approaches. The
Commission also seeks comment on
whether it should modify one or more
of these approaches to take the form of
departure provisions rather than
specific offense characteristics. Finally,
the Commission seeks comment on any
other approaches that would address the
impacts of the loss table and the victims
table in a manner that ensures they are
consistent with the purposes of
sentencing.
2. If the Commission were to limit the
impacts of the loss table or the victims
table, or both, should the limitation
apply in all cases sentenced under
’2B1.1, or only in a subset of such cases
(e.g., only in securities fraud cases)?
3. Many guidelines refer to the loss
table in § 2B1.1, such as § 2B5.3
(Criminal Infringement of Copyright or
Trademark), § 2C1.2 (Offering, Giving,
Soliciting, or Receiving a Gratuity), and
§ 2S1.1 (Laundering of Monetary
Instruments; Engaging in Monetary
Transactions in Property Derived From
Unlawful Activity). Other guidelines
maintain a certain proportionality with
the fraud guideline even though they do
not refer directly to the loss table in
§ 2B1.1, such as guidelines that use the
tax table in § 2T4.1. If the Commission
were to limit the impacts of the loss
table or the victims table, or both, in
§ 2B1.1, what changes, if any, should
the Commission make to other
guidelines for proportionality?
2. Drugs
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment:
This proposed amendment contains two
parts, each of which involves drug
offenses.
Part A sets forth detailed issues for
comment regarding offenses involving
N-Benzylpiperazine (BZP) and whether
the Commission should amend the
guidelines applicable to offenses
involving BZP, such as by providing a
specific reference for BZP in the Drug
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Quantity Table in § 2D1.1 (Unlawful
Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or
Trafficking (Including Possession with
Intent to Commit These Offenses);
Attempt or Conspiracy). Among other
things, the issues for comment ask
whether the Commission should base
the penalties for BZP on the penalties
for MDMA (Ecstasy), on the penalties
for amphetamine, or on some other
basis.
Part B sets forth a proposed
amendment that would create a ‘‘safety
valve’’ provision in the guideline for
chemical precursors, § 2D1.11
(Unlawfully Distributing, Importing,
Exporting or Possessing a Listed
Chemical; Attempt or Conspiracy), that
parallels the ‘‘safety valve’’ provision in
§ 2D1.1. The proposed amendment adds
a new specific offense characteristic at
§ 2D1.11(b)(6) and a corresponding new
application note. Under the proposed
amendment, certain first-time,
nonviolent offenders sentenced under
the chemical precursor guideline,
§ 2D1.11, would be eligible to receive
the same 2-level ‘‘safety valve’’
reduction (and using the same five
‘‘safety valve’’ criteria) as such offenders
are eligible to receive under § 2D1.1.
The two parts are as follows:
(A) BZP
Issues for Comment:
1. The Commission seeks comment
regarding whether the Commission
should amend the guidelines applicable
to offenses involving BZP, such as by
providing a specific reference for BZP in
the Drug Quantity Table in § 2D1.1.
Offenses involving BZP represent a
very small but increasing proportion of
the federal caseload. Courts have
reached different conclusions about
what the marijuana equivalency for BZP
should be, and those differences may be
resulting in unwarranted sentencing
disparities. The Commission has
received several requests to address BZP
offenses, including a request from the
Second Circuit in United States v.
Figueroa, 647 F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 2011)
(‘‘inasmuch as the parties inform us that
use of BZP, alone and in combination
with other substances, to mimic the
effects of other narcotics is increasingly
prominent in certain parts of this
Circuit, we direct the Clerk of the Court
to forward a certified copy of this
opinion to the Chairperson and Chief
Counsel of the United States Sentencing
Commission for whatever consideration
they may deem appropriate’’).
The Guidelines Manual does not
provide a specific reference for BZP in
the Drug Quantity Table in § 2D1.1 and
does not provide a marijuana
equivalency for BZP in the Drug
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Equivalency Table in Application Note
10(D) to § 2D1.1. Accordingly, guideline
penalties for offenses involving BZP are
determined under Application Note 5 to
§ 2D1.1, which directs the court to
determine the base offense level using
the marijuana equivalency of the ‘‘most
closely related controlled substance’’
referenced in the guideline. In
determining the most closely related
substance, the court shall, to the extent
practicable, consider the following:
(A) Whether the controlled substance
not referenced in this guideline has a
chemical structure that is substantially
similar to a controlled substance
referenced in this guideline.
(B) Whether the controlled substance
not referenced in this guideline has a
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic
effect on the central nervous system that
is substantially similar to the stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on
the central nervous system of a
controlled substance referenced in this
guideline.
(C) Whether a lesser or greater
quantity of the controlled substance not
referenced in this guideline is needed to
produce a substantially similar effect on
the central nervous system as a
controlled substance referenced in this
guideline.
See § 2D1.1, comment. (n.5).
District courts have suggested that the
substance most closely related to BZP
may be amphetamine, see United States
v. Rose, 722 F.Supp.2d 1286, 1289
(M.D.Ala. 2010) (‘‘BZP on its own may
arguably be most similar to
amphetamine’’), or methylphenidate
(Ritalin), see United States v. Beckley,
715 F.Supp.2d 743, 748 (E.D.Mich.
2010) (stating that, if the issue of BZP
alone were before the court, ‘‘it would
be obliged to conclude that the most
closely related controlled substance
* * * is methylphenidate’’). However,
the Eighth Circuit has upheld a district
court’s conclusion that BZP is most
closely related to MDMA. See United
States v. Bennett, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL
4950051 (8th Cir. 2011).
A. In General
The Commission invites general
comment on BZP offenses and BZP
offenders and how these offenses and
offenders compare with other drug
offenses and drug offenders. For
example, how is BZP manufactured?
How is it distributed and marketed?
How is it possessed and used? What are
the characteristics of the offenders
involved in these various activities?
What harms are posed by these
activities?
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B. Chemical Structure
Is the chemical structure of BZP
substantially similar to the chemical
structure of a controlled substance
referenced in § 2D1.1? If so, to what
substance?
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C. Effect on Central Nervous System,
and Relative Potency
Is the effect on the central nervous
system of BZP a stimulant, depressant,
or hallucinogenic effect? Is that effect
substantially similar to the stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on
the central nervous system of a
controlled substance referenced in
§ 2D1.1? If so, to what substance? Is the
quantity of BZP needed to produce that
effect lesser or greater than the quantity
needed of the other such substance? If
so, what is the difference in relative
potency?
The Drug Enforcement
Administration has described BZP as a
stimulant that is 10 to 20 times less
potent than amphetamine. See 75 FR
47451 (August 6, 2010) (‘‘BZP is about
20 times less potent than amphetamine
in producing [effects similar to
amphetamine]. However, in subjects
with a history of amphetamine
dependence, BZP was found to be about
10 times less potent than
amphetamine.’’). The Commission
invites comment on this description. If
this description is accurate, should the
Commission provide a marijuana
equivalency for BZP on this basis, e.g.,
by specifying a marijuana equivalency
for BZP equal to one-tenth or onetwentieth of the marijuana equivalency
for amphetamine? In particular, under
the Drug Equivalency Table, 1 gram of
amphetamine is equivalent to 2
kilograms of marijuana. Should the
Commission specify a marijuana
equivalency for BZP such that 1 gram of
BZP is equivalent to one-tenth or onetwentieth of this, i.e., 200 or 100 grams
of marijuana? If not, what should the
Commission specify as the marijuana
equivalency for BZP?
2. There have been cases in which the
offense involved BZP in combination
with another controlled substance (such
as MDMA), with non-controlled
substances (such as TFMPP or caffeine),
or both, in various proportions.
Courts have recognized that
distinctions between BZP alone and
BZP in combination with other
substances may be appropriate. For
example, the Second Circuit in United
States v. Chowdhury, 639 F.3d 583 (2d
Cir. 2011), upheld a determination that
BZP in combination with TFMPP is
most closely related to MDMA, but in
United States v. Figueroa, 647 F.3d 466
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(2d Cir. 2011), remanded a
determination that BZP alone is most
closely related to MDMA, finding
Chowdhury not applicable and the
record otherwise insufficient. See id. at
470 (‘‘Although we certainly do not
foreclose the determination that MDMA
is the appropriate substitute for BZP
alone, in the absence of an evidentiary
hearing to determine the nature of the
mixture, its chemical structure, and its
intended neurological effects, the record
on appeal does not permit us to
determine whether the proper substitute
is amphetamine * * *, MDMA, or
another substance on the Drug
Equivalency Table * * * ’’).
Should the guidelines make
distinctions between offenses involving
BZP alone and BZP in combination with
other substances? If so, what
distinctions should be made? Are there
particular combinations involving BZP
that should be specifically accounted for
in the guidelines and, if so, what are the
combinations and how should the
guidelines account for them?
What controlled substance or
substances are most closely related to
BZP in combination with these various
other substances? What marijuana
equivalency or equivalencies should be
provided for offenses involving BZP
under these various circumstances?
The tendency of the courts appears to
be to follow an approach under which
the BZP combination is most closely
related to MDMA (but possibly at
reduced potency). The Commission
invites comment on this approach. If
this approach is appropriate, should the
Commission provide a marijuana
equivalency for BZP combinations on
this basis, e.g., by specifying a
marijuana equivalency for BZP in
combination with other substances that
is equal to the marijuana equivalency
for MDMA (but possibly at reduced
potency)? In particular, under the Drug
Equivalency Table, 1 gram of MDMA is
equivalent to 500 grams of marijuana.
Should the Commission specify a
marijuana equivalency for BZP in
combination with other substances such
that 1 gram of BZP is equivalent to 500
grams of marijuana? Or should the
Commission specify an equivalency
lower than 500 grams to account for the
possible reduced potency?
3. What, if any, other considerations
should the Commission take into
account in determining how, if at all,
the guidelines should be amended as
they apply to offenses involving BZP?
(B) ‘‘Safety Valve’’ Provision in § 2D1.11
Proposed Amendment:
Section 2D1.11(b) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
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‘‘(6) If the defendant meets the criteria
set forth in subdivisions (1)–(5) of
subsection (a) of ’5C1.2 (Limitation on
Applicability of Statutory Minimum
Sentences in Certain Cases), decrease by
2 levels.’’.
The Commentary to § 2D1.11
captioned ‘‘Application Notes’’ is
amended by adding at the end the
following:
‘‘9. Applicability of Subsection
(b)(6).—The applicability of subsection
(b)(6) shall be determined without
regard to the offense of conviction. If
subsection (b)(6) applies, § 5C1.2(b)
does not apply. See § 5C1.2(b)(2)
(requiring a minimum offense level of
level 17 if the ‘statutorily required
minimum sentence is at least five
years’).’’.
3. Human Rights
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment:
This proposed two-part amendment is a
continuation of the Commission’s multiyear review to ensure that the guidelines
provide appropriate guidelines penalties
for cases involving human rights
violations.
A. Human Rights Offenses
Part A of the proposed amendment
addresses cases in which the defendant
is convicted of an offense that Congress
has indicated is a ‘‘serious human rights
offense,’’ i.e., an offense under 18 U.S.C.
1091 (Genocide), 2340A (Torture), 2441
(War crimes), and 2442 (Recruitment or
use of child soldiers). See 28 U.S.C.
509B(e). Such offenses are currently
accounted for in the guidelines as
follows:
(1) Genocide. Section 1091 offenses apply
to a range of conduct committed ‘‘with the
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in
substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or
religious group’’. See 18 U.S.C. 1091(a). The
range of conduct includes (i) Killing
members of the group; (ii) causing serious
bodily injury to members of the group; (iii)
causing permanent impairment of the mental
faculties of members of the group (e.g., by
drugs or torture); (iv) subjecting the group to
conditions of life that are intended to cause
the physical destruction of the group; (v)
imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group; and (vi) transferring
by force children of the group to another
group. Id. The statutory maximum term of
imprisonment is 20 years, or life
imprisonment if the conduct involved killing
and death resulted. See 18 U.S.C. 1091(b). In
addition, section 1091(c) makes it a crime to
‘‘directly and publicly incite[] another’’ to
violate section 1091(a); the statutory
maximum term of imprisonment for this
offense is 5 years. See 18 U.S.C. 1091(c).
Section 1091 offenses are referenced in
Appendix A (Statutory Index) to § 2H1.1
(Civil Rights).
(2) Torture. Section 2340A offenses apply
to whoever commits or attempts to commit
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torture (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2340). The
statutory maximum term of imprisonment is
20 years, or any term of years or life if death
resulted. See 18 U.S.C. 2340A(a). Section
2340A offenses are referenced in Appendix A
to §§ 2A1.1 (First Degree Murder), 2A1.2
(Second Degree Murder), 2A2.1 (Assault with
Intent to Commit Murder; Attempted
Murder), 2A2.2 (Aggravated Assault), and
2A4.1 (Kidnapping, Abduction, Unlawful
Restraint).
(3) War Crimes. Section 2441 offenses
apply to a range of conduct that constitute a
war crime (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2441(c)).
The range of conduct includes (i) Torture; (ii)
cruel or inhuman treatment; (iii) performing
biological experiments; (iv) murder; (v)
mutilation or maiming; (vi) intentionally
causing serious bodily injury; (vii) rape; (viii)
sexual assault or abuse; and (ix) taking
hostages. The statutory maximum term of
imprisonment is any term of years or life. See
18 U.S.C. 2441(a). Section 2441 offenses are
not referenced in Appendix A.
(4) Child Soldiers. Section 2442 offenses
apply to whoever knowingly (1) recruits,
enlists, or conscripts a child (i.e., a person
under 15 years of age) to serve in an armed
force or group or (2) uses a child to
participate actively in hostilities. See 18
U.S.C. 2442(a). The statutory maximum term
of imprisonment is 20 years, or any term of
years or life if death resulted. See 18 U.S.C.
2442(b). Section 2442 offenses are referenced
in Appendix A to § 2H4.1 (Peonage,
Involuntary Servitude, Slave Trade, and
Child Soldiers).
The proposed amendment provides
two options for cases in which the
defendant is convicted of such an
offense.
Option 1 establishes a new Chapter
Two offense guideline, at § 2H5.1
(Human Rights). The new offense
guideline reflects a consolidation into a
single guideline of the various base
offense levels and specific offender
characteristics that are involved in the
guidelines that currently account for
these offenses. The new offense
guideline contains alternative base
offense levels of [18] if the defendant is
convicted of the offense of incitement to
genocide (which generally has a
statutory maximum term of
imprisonment of 5 years) and [24]
otherwise. The guideline also contains
enhancements that apply if any victim
sustained serious bodily injury (2 to 4
levels); if any victim was sexually
exploited (6 to 10 levels); if any victim
was abducted, involuntarily detained, or
held in a condition of servitude (6 to 10
levels); if the number of victims was
[10][50] or more (2 levels); if death
resulted; or if the defendant was a
public official [or military official] or
the offense was committed under color
of law [or color of military authority].
Option 1 also amends Appendix A
(Statutory Index) to reference each of
these offenses of conviction to the new
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guideline and makes conforming
changes to other offense guidelines.
Option 2 establishes a new Chapter
Three adjustment, at § 3A1.5 (Human
Rights), that applies if the defendant
[was convicted of]/[committed] a
serious human rights offense. The
proposed guideline provides an
enhancement of [4]–[12] levels and a
minimum offense level of [24]–[32]. The
proposed guideline also requires that
the defendant be placed in Criminal
History Category [V][VI].
B. Immigration and Naturalization
Offenses Involving Serious Human
Rights Offenses
Part B of the proposed amendment
addresses cases in which the offense of
conviction is for immigration or
naturalization fraud but the defendant
had committed a serious human rights
offense. Immigration and naturalization
frauds are referenced in Appendix A to
§ 2L2.1 (Trafficking in a Document
Relating to Naturalization, Citizenship,
or Legal Resident Status, or a United
States Passport; False Statement in
Respect to the Citizenship or
Immigration Status of Another;
Fraudulent Marriage to Assist Alien to
Evade Immigration Law) or § 2L2.2
(Fraudulently Acquiring Documents
Relating to Naturalization, Citizenship,
or Legal Resident Status for Own Use;
False Personation or Fraudulent
Marriage by Alien to Evade Immigration
Law; Fraudulently Acquiring or
Improperly Using a United States
Passport), depending on the offense of
conviction.
The proposed amendment adds a new
specific offense characteristic to both
guidelines. The new specific offense
characteristic provides an enhancement
of [10]–[18] levels if the offense
reflected an effort to avoid detection or
responsibility for a serious human rights
offense.
Part C of the proposed amendment
sets forth issues for comment on human
rights offenses.
(A) Human Rights Offenses
Proposed Amendment:
Option 1:
Chapter 2, Part H is amended in the
heading by adding at the end ‘‘AND
HUMAN RIGHTS’’.
Chapter 2, Part H is amended by
adding at the end the following:
‘‘5. HUMAN RIGHTS
§ 2H5.1. Human Rights
(a) Base Offense Level:
(1) [24], except as provided below;
(2) [18], if the defendant is convicted
of an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1091(c).
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) (A) If any victim sustained
permanent or life-threatening bodily
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injury, increase by 4 levels; (B) if any
victim sustained serious bodily injury,
increase by 2 levels; or (C) if the degree
of injury is between that specified in
subdivisions (A) and (B), increase by 3
levels.
(2) (A) If any victim was sexually
exploited, increase by 6 levels; (B) if any
such victim had not attained the age of
sixteen years, increase by 8 levels; or (C)
if any such victim had not attained the
age of twelve years, increase by 10
levels.
(3) (A) If any victim was abducted,
involuntarily detained, or held in a
condition of servitude, increase by 6
levels; (B) if any such victim continued
to be so detained or held for at least 30
days, increase by 8 levels; or (C) if any
such victim continued to be so detained
or held for at least 180 days, increase by
10 levels.
(4) If the number of victims described
in subdivisions (1) through (3) was
[10][50] or more, increase by [2][4]
levels.
(5) If death resulted, increase to the
greater of:
(A) 2 plus the offense level as
determined above; or
(B) 2 plus the offense level from the
most analogous guideline from Chapter
Two, Part A, Subpart 1 (Homicide).
(6) If (A) the defendant was a public
official [or military official] at the time
of the offense; or (B) the offense was
committed under color of law [or color
of military authority], increase by 6
levels.
Commentary
Statutory Provisions: 18 U.S.C. 1091,
2340A, 2441, and 2442.
Application Notes:
1. Definitions.—For purposes of this
guideline—
Definitions of ‘serious bodily injury’
and ‘permanent or life-threatening
bodily injury’ are found in the
Commentary to § 1B1.1 (Application
Instructions). However, for purposes of
this guideline, ’serious bodily injury’
means conduct other than criminal
sexual abuse, which is taken into
account in the specific offense
characteristic under subsection (b)(2).
‘Sexually exploited’ includes offenses
set forth in 18 U.S.C. 2241–2244, 2251,
and 2421–2423.
2. Interaction With § 3A1.1 (Hate
Crime Motivation or Vulnerable
Victim).—
(A) Hate Crime Motivation
(§ 3A1.1(a)).—If the finder of fact at trial
or, in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, the court at sentencing
determines beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant intentionally selected
any victim or any property as the object
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of the offense because of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national
origin, ethnicity, gender, gender
identity, disability, or sexual orientation
of any person, an additional 3-level
enhancement from § 3A1.1(a) will
apply. An adjustment from § 3A1.1(a)
will not apply, however, if a 6-level
adjustment from § 2H5.1(b)(6) applies.
(B) Vulnerable Victim (§ 3A1.1(b)).—
The base offense level does not
incorporate the possibility that a victim
of the offense was a vulnerable victim
for purposes of § 3A1.1(b). Therefore, an
adjustment under ’3A1.1(b) would
apply, for example, in a case in which
the defendant recruited or used child
soldiers (see 18 U.S.C. 2442) or
transferred by force children of a
national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group (see 18 U.S.C. 1091(a)(5)).
3. Interaction with § 3A1.3 (Restraint
of Victim).—If subsection (b)(3) applies,
do not apply § 3A1.3 (Restraint of
Victim).
4. Interaction With § 3B1.3 (Abuse of
Position of Trust or Use of Special
Skill.—If subsection (b)(6) applies, do
not apply § 3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of
Trust or Use of Special Skill).
Background: This guideline covers a
range of conduct considered to be
serious human rights offenses, including
genocide, war crimes, torture, and the
recruitment or use of child soldiers. See
generally 28 U.S.C. 509B(e).’’.
The Commentary to § 2A1.1 captioned
‘‘Statutory Provisions’’ is amended by
striking ‘‘, 2340A’’.
The Commentary to § 2A1.2 captioned
‘‘Statutory Provisions’’ is amended by
striking ‘‘, 2340A’’.
The Commentary to § 2A2.2 captioned
‘‘Statutory Provisions’’ is amended by
striking ‘‘, 2340A’’.
The Commentary to § 2A4.1 captioned
‘‘Statutory Provisions’’ is amended by
striking ‘‘, 2340A’’.
The Commentary to § 2H1.1 captioned
‘‘Statutory Provisions’’ is amended by
striking ‘‘, 1091’’.
Chapter 2, Part H, Subpart 4 is
amended in the heading by striking
‘‘SLAVE TRADE, AND CHILD
SOLDIERS’’ and inserting ‘‘AND SLAVE
TRADE’’.
Section 2H4.1 is amended in the
heading by striking ‘‘Slave Trade, and
Child Soldiers’’ and inserting ‘‘and
Slave Trade’’.
The Commentary to § 2H4.1 captioned
‘‘Statutory Provisions’’ is amended by
striking ‘‘, 2442’’.
The Commentary to § 2H4.1 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in the
sentence beginning ‘‘’Peonage or
involuntary servitude’’’ by striking ‘‘,
slavery, and recruitment or use of child
soldiers’’ and inserting ‘‘and slavery’’.
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Appendix A (Statutory Index) is
amended in the line referenced to 18
U.S.C. 1091 by striking ‘‘2H1.1’’ and
inserting ‘‘2H5.1’’; in the line referenced
to 18 U.S.C. 2340A by striking ‘‘2A1.1,
2A1.2, 2A2.1, 2A2.2, 2A4.1’’ and
inserting ‘‘2H5.1’’; after the line
referenced to 18 U.S.C. 2425 by
inserting the following:
‘‘18 U.S.C. 2441 2H5.1’’;
and in the line referenced to 18 U.S.C.
2442 by striking ‘‘2H4.1’’ and inserting
‘‘2H5.1’’.
Option 2:
Chapter 3, Part A, Subpart 1 is
amended by adding at the end the
following:
‘‘§ 3A1.5. Serious Human Rights
Offense
(a) If the defendant [was convicted
of]/[committed] a serious human rights
offense, increase by [4]–[12] levels; but
if the resulting offense level is less than
level [24]–[32], increase to level [24]–
[32].
(b) In each such case, the defendant’s
criminal history category from Chapter
Four (Criminal History and Criminal
Livelihood) shall be [not lower than
Category V][Category VI].
Commentary
Application Notes:
1. ‘Serious Human Rights Offense’.—
For purposes of this guideline, ’serious
human rights offense’ means violations
of federal criminal laws relating to
genocide, torture, war crimes, and the
use or recruitment of child soldiers
under sections 1091, 2340, 2340A, 2441,
and 2442 of title 18, United States Code.
See 28 U.S.C. § 509B(e).
2. Computation of Criminal History
Category.—Under subsection (b), if the
defendant’s criminal history category as
determined under Chapter Four
(Criminal History and Criminal
Livelihood) is less than Category [V][VI],
it shall be increased to Category
[V][VI].’’.
(B) Immigration and Naturalization
Offenses Involving Serious Human
Rights Offenses
Proposed Amendment:
Section 2L2.1(b) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
‘‘(6) If the offense reflected an effort
to avoid detection or responsibility for
a serious human rights offense, increase
by [10]–[18] levels.’’.
The Commentary to § 2L2.1 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 1 by adding at the end the
following:
‘‘ ‘Serious human rights offense’
means violations of federal criminal
laws relating to genocide, torture, war
crimes, and the use or recruitment of
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child soldiers under sections 1091,
2340, 2340A, 2441, and 2442 of title 18,
United States Code. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 509B(e).’’.
Section 2L2.2(b) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
‘‘(4) If the offense reflected an effort
to avoid detection or responsibility for
a serious human rights offense, increase
by [10]–[18] levels.’’.
The Commentary to § 2L2.2 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended by
redesignating Notes 4 and 5 as Notes 5
and 6, respectively, and by inserting
after Note 3 the following:
‘‘4. Application of Subsection (b)(4).—
For purposes of subsection (b)(4),
’serious human rights offense’ means
violations of federal criminal laws
relating to genocide, torture, war crimes,
and the use or recruitment of child
soldiers under sections 1091, 2340,
2340A, 2441, and 2442 of title 18,
United States Code. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 509B(e).’’;
(C) Issues for Comment
Issues for Comment:
1. The Commission invites general
comment on human rights offenses and
human rights offenders and how these
offenses and offenders compare with
other offenses and offenders. For
example, what activities are involved in
human rights offenses? What are the
characteristics of the offenders involved
in these activities? What harms are
posed by these activities?
2. Do the guidelines provide
appropriate guidelines penalties for
cases involving human rights offenses?
If not, what amendments are
appropriate to ensure that the guidelines
provide appropriate guidelines penalties
for such cases? What penalty structure
or structures should the guidelines
provide for human rights offenses, and
what penalty levels should the
Commission provide? In considering
whether the penalty levels and penalty
structures for human rights offenses are
appropriately proportional to other
offenses, what are the other offenses to
which the human rights offenses should
be compared?
In addition, the Commission seeks
comment on whether Option 1 or
Option 2 of Part A of the proposed
amendment would provide appropriate
guidelines penalties for cases involving
human rights offenses. Should the
Commission adopt Option 1 or Option
2, or neither?
Are there particular changes to the
penalty levels in Option 1 that should
be made? Are the alternative base
offense levels appropriate, or should
they be raised or lowered? Are the levels
provided by the specific offense
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characteristics appropriate, or should
they be raised or lowered? Should the
Commission revise Option 1 to provide
cross-references to any other Chapter
Two offense guidelines?
Option 1 specifies the manner in
which the new guideline would interact
with certain Chapter Three adjustments.
Are there particular changes that should
be made to Option 1 to change how the
new guideline would interact with the
various Chapter Three adjustments?
3. The Commission seeks comment on
what guidance should be given to courts
in determining whether a particular
offense is, or is not, a human rights
offense for purposes of Parts A and B of
the proposed amendment. Parts A and
B would apply only to the offenses
defined as ‘‘serious human rights
offenses’’ in 28 U.S.C. 509B(e), which
includes genocide, war crimes, torture,
and the recruitment or use of child
soldiers. Should the Commission add
other offenses or categories of offenses
and, if so, what offenses or categories of
offenses?
4. The Commission seeks comment on
aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in cases involving human
rights offenses. In particular:
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A. Direct Prosecution of Human Rights
Offenses
In cases in which the defendant is
directly prosecuted for a human rights
offense, are there aggravating and
mitigating circumstances that should be
taken into account in establishing what
level of enhancement should apply,
what minimum offense level should
apply, and what Criminal History
Category should apply? If so, what are
the circumstances, and how should they
be taken into account in the guidelines?
B. Immigration and Naturalization
Fraud Involving Human Rights Offenses
In cases in which the defendant is
convicted of an immigration or
naturalization fraud involving a human
rights offense, are there aggravating and
mitigating circumstances that should be
taken into account in establishing what
level of enhancement should apply and
what minimum offense level should
apply? If so, what are the circumstances,
and how should they be taken into
account in the guidelines?
For example, there appear to be cases
in which the defendant is convicted of
an immigration or naturalization fraud
and the evidence is sufficient to
establish (1) That the defendant
concealed the defendant’s membership
in a foreign military or paramilitary
organization and (2) that the
organization was involved in a human
rights violation, but the evidence is not
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sufficient to establish (3) that the
defendant was involved in the human
rights violation. In such a case, should
the establishment of (1) and (2) (or, in
the alternative, of (1) alone) be an
aggravating factor in the guidelines,
warranting an enhancement or an
upward departure provision?
The enhancements in Part B of the
proposed amendment bracket a range of
penalty levels, from [10] to [18]. Should
the Commission provide a tiered
enhancement, with different levels of
enhancement based on different
aggravating or mitigating circumstances?
For example, should an enhancement of
10 levels apply in certain cases, and an
enhancement of 18 levels apply in
certain other cases? If so, what
aggravating or mitigating circumstances
should the Commission provide, and
what levels should apply?
C. Amnesty
How, if at all, should the guidelines
account for circumstances in which the
defendant committed a human rights
offense but received amnesty (or some
similar mitigating measure) in the
country where the conduct occurred?
Should such a circumstance warrant a
reduction or a downward departure?
4. ‘‘Sentence Imposed’’ in § 2L1.2
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment:
This proposed amendment responds to
a circuit conflict over application of the
term ‘‘sentenced imposed’’ in § 2L1.2
(Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in
the United States) when the defendant’s
original ‘‘sentence imposed’’ was
lengthened after the defendant was
deported.
Section 2L1.2(b)(1) provides an
enhancement if the defendant
previously was deported, or unlawfully
remained in the United States, after a
conviction for a felony drug trafficking
offense. The level of the enhancement
depends on the ‘‘sentence imposed’’ for
the felony drug trafficking offense.
Specifically:
(1) if the ‘‘sentence imposed’’
exceeded 13 months, the enhancement
is 16 or 12 levels, depending on whether
the conviction receives criminal history
points. See § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A); and
(2) if the ‘‘sentence imposed’’ was 13
months or less, the enhancement is 12
or 8 levels, depending on whether the
conviction receives criminal history
points. See § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B).
The term ‘‘sentence imposed’’ is
defined in Application Note 1(B)(vii) as
follows:
‘‘Sentence imposed’’ has the meaning
given the term ‘‘sentence of imprisonment’’
in Application Note 2 and subsection (b) of
§ 4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for
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Computing Criminal History), without regard
to the date of the conviction. The length of
the sentence imposed includes any term of
imprisonment given upon revocation of
probation, parole, or supervised release.
The conflict arises when the
defendant was sentenced on two or
more different occasions for the same
drug trafficking conviction (e.g., because
of a revocation of supervision), such
that there was a sentence imposed
before the defendant’s deportation and
another, longer sentence imposed after
the deportation.
The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits have held that the later, higher
sentence does not apply for purposes of
the enhancement in § 2L1.2(b)(1). See
United States v. Lopez, 634 F.3d 948
(7th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Guzman-Bera, 216 F.3d 1019 (11th Cir.
2000); United States v. Bustillos-Pena,
612 F.3d 863 (5th Cir. 2010). These
cases generally reason that there is a
‘‘temporal restriction’’ inherent in the
enhancement and conclude that the
‘‘sentence imposed’’ is determined as of
when the defendant was deported or
unlawfully remained in the United
States. See, e.g., Lopez, 634 F.3d at 950.
The Second Circuit has held
otherwise, concluding that the later,
higher sentence does apply. See United
States v. Compres-Paulino, 393 F.3d 116
(2d Cir. 2004). According to the Second
Circuit, the enhancement requires only
that the conviction have occurred, not
that the sentence also be imposed, as of
when the defendant was deported or
unlawfully remained in the United
States. For the Second Circuit, any
‘‘amended sentence, whenever imposed,
relates back to this conviction’’ and is
covered by the enhancement. See id. at
118.
The proposed amendment resolves
the conflict by amending the definition
of ‘‘sentence imposed’’ in Application
Note 1(B)(vii). Two bracketed options
are presented. The first option follows
the approach of the Fifth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits and specifies that a
post-revocation sentence increase is
included, ‘‘but only if the revocation
occurred before the defendant was
deported or unlawfully remained in the
United States’’. The second option
follows the approach of the Second
Circuit and specifies that a postrevocation sentence increase is
included, ‘‘without regard to whether
the revocation occurred before or after
the defendant previously was deported
or unlawfully remained in the United
States’’.
Proposed Amendment:
The Commentary to § 2L1.2 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
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Note 1(B)(vii) by inserting before the
period at the end the following:
‘‘[, but only if the revocation occurred
before the defendant was deported or
unlawfully remained in the United
States][, without regard to whether the
revocation occurred before or after the
defendant was deported or unlawfully
remained in the United States]’’.
5. Categorical Approach
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment:
This proposed amendment presents
options for specifying the types of
documents that may be considered in
determining whether a particular prior
conviction fits within a particular
category of crimes for purposes of
specific guidelines provisions (e.g.,
determining whether a defendant’s prior
conviction for nonresidential burglary
under a particular state statute qualifies
as an ‘‘aggravated felony’’ for purposes
of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C)).
A number of guidelines and statutes
contain provisions that use a prior
conviction as an aggravating factor if the
prior conviction fits within a particular
category of crimes. Two Supreme Court
decisions, Taylor v. United States, 495
U.S. 575 (1990), and Shepard v. United
States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), set forth a
‘‘categorical approach’’ for determining
whether a particular prior conviction
fits within a particular category of
crimes.
Taylor holds that, in making such a
determination, a sentencing court may
‘‘look only to the fact of conviction and
the statutory definition of the prior
offense.’’ Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
Because the court is not concerned with
the ‘‘facts underlying the prior
convictions,’’ id. at 600–02, the court
may not focus on the underlying
criminal conduct itself. This categorical
approach ‘‘may permit the sentencing
court to go beyond the mere fact of
conviction in a narrow range of cases
where a jury was actually required to
find all the elements’’ of the offense. Id.
at 602. Thus, a prior conviction fits
within the particular category of crimes
‘‘if either its statutory definition
substantially corresponds to [the
definition of the crime], or the charging
paper and jury instructions actually
required the jury to find all the elements
of [the specified crime] in order to
convict the defendant.’’ Id.
Shepard applied Taylor to a case in
which the prior conviction was the
result of a guilty plea. In such a case, the
Court held, the sentencing court may
look to a limited list of documents to
determine the class of offense: ‘‘The
terms of the charging document, the
terms of the plea agreement or transcript
of colloquy between judge and
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defendant in which the factual basis for
the plea was confirmed by the
defendant, or to some comparable
judicial record of this information.’’
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26.
In cases where the defendant’s prior
conviction involved a provision that
covers both conduct that fits within the
category and conduct that does not, the
Court has authorized courts to look at
the judicial record to determine whether
the prior conviction was in fact based
on conduct that fit within the category
of crimes. This analysis is called the
‘‘modified categorical approach.’’ Under
this modified approach, the court may
consider only those sources approved
by Taylor and Shepard—the charging
document, the jury instructions, any
plea agreement or plea statement, or
‘‘some comparable judicial record of
this information.’’ The Fifth Circuit has
extended this list to include New York
Certificates of Disposition, see United
States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647 (5th Cir.
2008), and the Ninth Circuit has
included California Minute Entries, see
United States v. Snellenberger, 548 F.3d
699 (9th Cir. 2008). On the other hand,
courts have disallowed the use of a
federal presentencing report, see, e.g.,
United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d
268 (5th Cir. 2005), a California abstract
of judgment, see, e.g., United States v.
Gutierrez-Ramirez, 405 F.3d 352 (5th
Cir. 2005), or a police report, see, e.g.,
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16; United States
v. Almazan-Becerra, 482 F.3d 1085,
1090 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that ‘‘[t]he
Supreme Court appears to have
foreclosed the use of police reports in a
Taylor analysis’’ but that such reports
may be used when stipulated to by the
defendant).
Notably, the Supreme Court cases
have involved statutes rather than
guidelines. However, lower courts have
by analogy applied the ‘‘categorical
approach’’ to guideline provisions.
The proposed amendment presents
options for specifying the types of
documents that may be considered for
purposes of the guidelines in
determining whether a particular prior
conviction fits within a particular
category of crimes. Option 1 would
apply only to determinations under the
illegal reentry guideline, § 2L1.2
(Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in
the United States). Option 2 would
apply throughout the Guidelines
Manual in any case in which the nature
of the prior conviction is a disputed
factor.
Both options contain four options,
each of which would specifically
authorize the sentencing court to look to
certain sources of information beyond
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2789
the fact of conviction and the statutory
definition of the prior offense.
It appears that Taylor and Shepard
specifically authorize the sentencing
court to look to four sources of
information beyond the fact of
conviction and the statutory definition
of the prior offense:
(i) The terms of the charging
document;
(ii) The terms of the plea agreement or
transcript of colloquy between judge
and defendant in which the factual basis
for the plea was confirmed by the
defendant;
(iii) Any explicit factual finding by
the trial judge to which the defendant
assented; and
(iv) Some comparable judicial record
of this information.
Option A would specify these four
sources of information. Option B would
incorporate Option A and add as a fifth
source of information ‘‘any
uncontradicted, internally consistent
parts of the record from the prior
conviction’’. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at
31 (‘‘I would expand that list to include
any uncontradicted, internally
consistent parts of the record from the
earlier conviction. That would include
the two sources the First Circuit relied
upon in this case,’’ which consisted of
‘‘the applications by which the police
had secured the criminal complaints
and the police reports attached to those
applications.’’ [Emphasis in original.])
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). Option C
would incorporate Option A and add as
a fifth source of information ‘‘any other
parts of the record from the prior
conviction, provided that the
information in such other parts of the
record has sufficient indicia of
reliability to support its probable
accuracy’’. See § 6A1.3 (Resolution of
Disputed Factors)(Policy Statement).
Option D would combine all three
options, incorporating Option A as well
as the additional sources of information
in both Options B and C.
Issues for comment are also included.
Proposed Amendment:
Option 1:
The Commentary to § 2L1.2 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 1 by adding at the end the
following:
‘‘[Option A:
(D) Documents Considered in
Determining Whether Prior Conviction
Falls Within Category of Offense.—In
determining for purposes of subsection
(b)(1) whether a prior conviction falls
within a category of offense (e.g.,
whether a prior conviction qualifies as
a ‘crime of violence’ or ‘aggravated
felony’), beyond the fact of conviction
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and the statutory definition of the prior
offense, the court may look only to—
(i) The terms of the charging
document,
(ii) The terms of the plea agreement or
transcript of colloquy between judge
and defendant in which the factual basis
for the plea was confirmed by the
defendant,
(iii) Any explicit factual finding by
the trial judge to which the defendant
assented, or
(iv) Some comparable judicial record
of this information.]
[Option B incorporates Option A, but
also adds:
(v) Any uncontradicted, internally
consistent parts of the record from the
prior conviction.]
[Option C incorporates Option A, but
also adds:
(v) Any other parts of the record from
the prior conviction, provided that the
information in such other parts of the
record has sufficient indicia of
reliability to support its probable
accuracy. See subsection (a) to § 6A1.3
(Resolution of Disputed Factors).]
[Option D combines all three options,
i.e., it incorporates Option A and also
adds the additional sources of
information in both Options B and C, as
follows:
(v) Any uncontradicted, internally
consistent parts of the record from the
prior conviction; or
(vi) Any other parts of the record from
the prior conviction, provided that the
information in such other parts of the
record has sufficient indicia of
reliability to support its probable
accuracy. See subsection (a) to § 6A1.3
(Resolution of Disputed Factors).]’’.
Option 2:
The Commentary to § 6A1.3 is
amended by adding at the end the
following:
‘‘[Option A:
In resolving a dispute as to whether
a prior conviction falls within a category
of offense for purposes of a guidelines
provision (e.g., whether a prior
conviction qualifies as a ‘crime of
violence’ or an ‘aggravated felony’),
beyond the fact of the conviction and
the statutory definition of the prior
offense, the information that has
sufficient indicia of reliability to
support its probable accuracy is limited
to—
(A) The terms of the charging
document;
(B) The terms of the plea agreement or
transcript of colloquy between judge
and defendant in which the factual basis
for the plea was confirmed by the
defendant;
(C) Any explicit factual finding by the
trial judge to which the defendant
assented; or
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(D) Some comparable judicial record
of this information.]
[Option B incorporates Option A, but
also adds:
(E) Any uncontradicted, internally
consistent parts of the record from the
prior conviction.]
[Option C incorporates Option A, but
also adds:
(E) Any other parts of the record from
the prior conviction for which there is
sufficient indicia of reliability to
support its probable accuracy.]
[Option D combines all three options,
i.e., it incorporates Option A and also
adds the additional sources of
information in both Options B and C, as
follows:
(E) Any uncontradicted, internally
consistent parts of the record from the
prior conviction; or
(F) Any other parts of the record from
the prior conviction for which there is
sufficient indicia of reliability to
support its probable accuracy.]’’.
Issues for Comment:
1. The proposed amendment provides
four options for specifying the types of
documents that may be considered in
determining whether a particular prior
conviction fits within a particular
category of crimes. Are there any other
types of documents that the
Commission should include among the
types of documents specified as
documents that may be considered for
this purpose? If so, what types of
documents?
2. Option 1 of the proposed
amendment amends only § 2L1.2.
However, the Supreme Court’s
‘‘categorical approach’’ has been applied
by lower courts to a variety of other
guidelines that contain provisions that
use a prior conviction as an aggravating
factor if the prior conviction fits within
a particular category of crimes. Among
the most commonly applied are § 2K2.1
(Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or
Transportation of Firearms or
Ammunition; Prohibited Transactions
Involving Firearms or Ammunition) and
§ 4B1.1 (Career Offender), each of which
contain provisions that use a prior
conviction as an aggravating factor if the
prior conviction is a ‘‘crime of violence’’
or a ‘‘controlled substance offense’’. See,
e.g., § 2K2.1(a)(1)–(4), § 4B1.1(a).
Accordingly, Option 2 of the proposed
amendment would apply throughout the
Guidelines Manual.
As an alternative to Options 1 and 2,
should the Commission apply the
proposed amendment more broadly
than Option 1 (§ 2L1.2-only) but more
narrowly than Option 2 (guidelineswide)? In particular, should the
Commission apply the proposed
amendment to § 2L1.2 as well as one or
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more other specific guidelines? If so,
which guidelines should the
Commission amend?
6. Driving While Intoxicated
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment:
This proposed amendment responds to
an application issue regarding when a
defendant’s prior sentence for driving
while intoxicated or driving under the
influence (and similar offenses by
whatever name they are known) is
counted toward the defendant’s
criminal history score. There appear to
be differences among the circuits on this
issue.
The issue does not occur when the
prior sentence is a felony, because
‘‘[s]entences for all felony offenses are
counted.’’ See subsection (c) of § 4A1.2
(Definitions and Instructions for
Computing Criminal History). However,
when the prior sentence is a
misdemeanor or petty offense, circuits
have taken different approaches.
When the prior sentence is a
misdemeanor or petty offense,
§ 4A1.2(c) specifies that the offense is
counted, but with two exceptions,
which are limited to cases in which the
prior offense is on (or similar to an
offense that is on) either of two lists. On
the first list are offenses from ‘‘careless
or reckless driving’’ to ‘‘trespassing,’’
and the exception applies if the prior
offense is on (or similar to an offense
that is on) the list. In such a case, the
sentence is counted only if (A) the
sentence was a term of probation of
more than one year or a term of
imprisonment of at least thirty days, or
(B) the prior offense was similar to an
instant offense. See § 4A1.2(c)(1). On the
second list are offenses from ‘‘fish and
game violations’’ to ‘‘vagrancy,’’ and the
exception applies to any offense that is
on (or similar to an offense that is on)
the list. In such a case, the sentence is
never counted. See § 4A1.2(c)(2).
Several circuits have held that a
sentence for driving while intoxicated—
whether a felony, misdemeanor, or petty
offense—is always counted toward the
criminal history score, without
exception, even if the offense met the
criteria for either of the two lists. These
circuits rely on Application Note 5 to
§ 4A1.2, which provides:
Sentences for Driving While Intoxicated or
Under the Influence.—Convictions for
driving while intoxicated or under the
influence (and similar offenses by whatever
name they are known) are counted. Such
offenses are not minor traffic infractions
within the meaning of § 4A1.2(c).
The Seventh Circuit has read
Application Note 5 as ‘‘reflect[ing] the
Sentencing Commission’s conclusion
‘that driving while intoxicated offenses
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are of sufficient gravity to merit
inclusion in the defendant’s criminal
history, however they might be
classified under state law.’ ’’ United
States v. LeBlanc, 45 F.3d 192, 195 (7th
Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 806 (2d Cir.
1992)). Thus, the Seventh Circuit has
held, a sentence for driving while
intoxicated is always counted, without
exception. For example, such a sentence
is counted even though it may otherwise
qualify for a second-list exception, see
LeBlanc, supra, 45 F.3d at 194–95
(sentence counts even though it was a
local ordinance violation that was not
also a violation under state criminal
law).
The Eighth Circuit has also relied on
Application Note 5 to hold that a
sentence for driving while intoxicated is
always counted, without exception. See
United States v. Pando, 545 F.3d 682
(8th Cir. 2008) (Colorado misdemeanor
for driving a vehicle when a person has
consumed alcohol or one or more other
drugs which ‘‘affects the person to the
slightest degree so that the person is less
able than the person ordinarily would
have been’’ to operate a vehicle was
‘‘similar’’ to driving while intoxicated or
under the influence, and therefore
automatically counted, without regard
to the exceptions in § 4A1.2(c)(1) and
(2)).
The Second Circuit took a different
approach in United States v. PotesCastillo, 638 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2011). In
that case, the Second Circuit held
Application Note 5 to be ambiguous and
could be read either (1) to ‘‘mean that,
like felonies, driving while ability
impaired sentences are always counted,
without possibility of exception’’ or (2)
‘‘as setting forth the direction that
driving while ability impaired sentences
must not be treated as minor traffic
infractions or local ordinance violations
and excluded under section
4A1.2(c)(2).’’ Id. at 110–11. The Second
Circuit adopted the second reading and,
accordingly, held that a prior sentence
for driving while ability impaired
‘‘should be treated like any other
misdemeanor or petty offense, except
that they cannot be exempted under
section 4A1.2(c)(2).’’ Id. at 113.
Accordingly, such a sentence can
qualify for an exception under the first
list (e.g., if it was similar to ‘‘careless or
reckless driving’’ and the other criteria
for a first-list exception were met).
The proposed amendment responds to
the application issue by amending
Application Note 5 consistent with the
approaches of the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits. Specifically, it amends
Application Note 5 to clarify that such
a sentence is always counted, without
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regard to how the offense is classified
and without regard to whether any
exception in § 4A1.2(c)(1) or (2)
otherwise applies.
Proposed Amendment:
The Commentary to § 4A1.2 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 5 by striking ‘‘are counted. Such
offenses are not minor traffic infractions
within the meaning of § 4A1.2(c).’’ and
inserting ‘‘are always counted, without
regard to how the offense is classified
and without regard to whether any
exception in § 4A1.2(c)(1) or (2)
otherwise applies.’’.
7. Burglary of a Non-Dwelling
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment:
This proposed amendment responds to
differences among the circuits on when,
if at all, burglary of a non-dwelling
qualifies as a crime of violence for
purposes of the guidelines. Under a
variety of guidelines, a defendant’s
sentence is subject to enhancement if
the defendant previously committed a
crime of violence.
The term ‘‘crime of violence’’ is
defined in several different ways in the
guidelines and in statute. The definition
that has given rise to the differences
among the circuits is contained in
subsection (a) of § 4B1.2 (Definitions of
Terms Used in Section 4B1.1). This
definition is used not only for
determining whether a defendant’s
sentence is subject to enhancement in
§ 4B1.1, but also for determining
whether a defendant’s sentence is
subject to enhancement in a variety of
other guidelines. See, e.g., § 2K1.3(a)(1)–
(2) & comment. (n.2); § 2K2.1(a)(1), (2),
(3)(B), (4)(A) & comment. (n.1),
§ 2K2.1(b)(5) & comment. (n.13(B));
§ 2S1.1(b)(1)(B)(ii) & comment. (n.1);
§ 4A1.1(e) & comment. (n.5).
The definition in § 4B1.2(a) provides,
among other things, that a felony is a
crime of violence if it ‘‘is burglary of a
dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves
use of explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another.’’
Thus, § 4B1.2(a) specifies that burglary
of a dwelling is always a crime of
violence but is silent about burglary of
a non-dwelling.
Courts have observed that this clause
in § 4B1.2(a) substantially parallels a
clause in 18 U.S.C. 924(e), except that
the statutory provision specifies that
any burglary is a crime of violence
while the guideline provision is more
limited, specifying that burglary of a
dwelling is a crime of violence. There
are different approaches among the
circuits about whether burglary of a
non-dwelling is a crime of violence
under § 4B1.2(a). The Fourth, Tenth,
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and Eleventh Circuits have held that
burglary of a non-dwelling is never a
crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a). See,
e.g., United States v. Smith, 10 F.3d 724,
733 (10th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)
(holding that, in promulgating § 4B1.2
with language limiting a crime of
violence to ‘‘burglary of a dwelling,’’ the
Commission ‘‘obviously declined’’ to
adopt the view that all burglaries
present the serious potential risk of
physical injury to another necessary to
bring the crime within the residual
clause); see also United States v.
Harrison, 58 F.3d 115, 119 (4th Cir.
1995); United States v. Spell, 44 F.3d
936, 938–39 (11th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam). The Second and Eighth
Circuits have held that burglary of a
non-dwelling is always a crime of
violence under § 4B1.2(a). See, e.g.,
United States v. Brown, 514 F.3d 256,
264–67 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that
burglary of a non-dwelling falls within
the residual clause at § 4B1.2(a) in light
of the identically worded residual
clause in § 924(e), the circuit court’s
previous holding that the residual
clause in § 924(e) includes burglary of a
non-dwelling, and the absence of a
relevant statement by the Commission
on the issue); see also United States v.
Ross, 613 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 2010).
The First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits have declined to adopt
per se rules, holding instead that the
question depends on the individual
circumstances of each case. See, e.g.,
United States v. Giggey, 551 F.3d 27 (1st
Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v.
Matthews, 374 F.3d 872, 880 (9th Cir.
2004); United States v. Hoults, 240 F.3d
647, 651–52 (7th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, 928 (6th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Turner, 349
F.3d 833 (5th Cir. 2003).
The proposed amendment presents
two options for resolving this issue. The
first option specifies that all burglaries
are crimes of violence. The second
option specifies that burglary of a nondwelling is not a crime of violence
[, unless the offense meets the
requirement of subsection (a)(1), i.e., it
has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another].
Two issues for comment are also
provided. The first issue for comment
asks whether the Commission should
consider a third option, i.e., to specify
that whether burglary of a non-dwelling
is a crime of violence depends on the
individual circumstances of each case.
The second issue for comment asks
whether the Commission should also
address the definition of ‘‘crime of
violence’’ in ’2L1.2, which presents a
similar issue.
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Proposed Amendment:
Option 1:
Section 4B1.2(a)(2) is amended by
striking ‘‘burglary of a dwelling’’ and
inserting ‘‘burglary’’.
The Commentary to § 4B1.2 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 1, in the paragraph that begins
‘‘ ‘Crime of violence’ includes’’, by
striking ‘‘burglary of a dwelling’’ and
inserting ‘‘burglary’’.
Option 2:
The Commentary to § 4B1.2 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 1 by inserting after the paragraph
that begins ‘‘ ‘Crime of violence’
includes’’ the following:
‘‘ ‘Crime of violence’ does not include
burglary of a structure other than a
dwelling [, unless the offense meets the
requirement of subsection (a)(1), i.e., it
has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another].’’.
Issues for Comment:
1. The two options presented in the
proposed amendment would amend
§ 4B1.2 in either of two ways—to
specify that the offense of burglary is
always a crime of violence, or to specify
that the offense of burglary of a nondwelling is never a crime of violence.
Should the Commission instead
consider a third option—to specify that,
in determining whether burglary of a
non-dwelling is a crime of violence
under § 4B1.2(a), the court should
determine whether the particular
offense satisfies the requirements of the
definition’s residual clause (i.e.,
whether the offense ‘‘involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another’’)?
2. The issue of whether burglary of a
non-dwelling is a crime of violence is
also presented in § 2L1.2 (Unlawfully
Entering or Remaining in the United
States), which contains its own
definition of ‘‘crime of violence’’. That
definition, as with the definition in
§ 4B1.2(a), specifies that burglary of a
dwelling is a crime of violence, but is
silent about burglary of a non-dwelling.
If the Commission amends the
definition in § 4B1.2 to clarify when, if
at all, burglary of a non-dwelling is a
crime of violence, should it also make
a parallel change to the definition in
§ 2L1.2?
8. Multiple Counts (§ 5G1.2)
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment:
This proposed amendment responds to
an application issue regarding the
applicable guideline range in a case in
which the defendant is sentenced on
multiple counts of conviction, at least
one of which involves a mandatory
minimum sentence that is greater than
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the minimum of the otherwise
applicable guideline range. There are
differences among the circuits on this
issue.
The issue arises under § 5G1.2
(Sentencing on Multiple Counts of
Conviction) when at least one count in
a multiple-count case involves a
mandatory minimum sentence that
affects the otherwise applicable
guideline range. In such cases, circuits
differ over whether the guideline range
is affected only for the count involving
the mandatory minimum or for all
counts in the case. The cases indicate
that there may also be an ancillary
application issue over how the ‘‘total
punishment’’ is to be determined and
imposed under § 5G1.1(b).
The Fifth Circuit has held that, in
such a case, the effect on the guideline
range applies to all counts in the case.
See United States v. Salter, 241 F.3d
392, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2001). In that case,
the guideline range on the Sentencing
Table was 87 to 108 months, but one of
the three counts carried a mandatory
minimum sentence of 10 years (120
months), which resulted in a guideline
sentence of 120 months. The Fifth
Circuit instructed the district court that
the appropriate guideline sentence was
120 months on each of the three counts.
The Ninth Circuit took a different
approach in United States v. EvansMartinez, 611 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 2010),
holding that, in such a case, ‘‘a
mandatory minimum count becomes the
starting point for any count that carries
a mandatory minimum sentence higher
than what would otherwise be the
Guidelines sentencing range,’’ but ‘‘[a]ll
other counts * * * are sentenced based
on the Guidelines sentencing range,
regardless of the mandatory minimum
sentences that apply to other counts.’’
See id. at 637. The Ninth Circuit stated
that it would be more ‘‘logical’’ to
follow the Fifth Circuit’s approach but
‘‘such logic is overcome by the precise
language of the Sentencing Guidelines’’.
See id.
The District of Columbia Circuit
appears to follow an approach similar to
the Ninth Circuit. See United States v.
Kennedy, 133 F.3d 53, 60–61 (DC Cir.
1998) (one of two counts carried a
mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment; district court treated life
imprisonment as the guidelines
sentence for both counts; Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the
appropriate guidelines range for the
other count was 262 to 327 months).
The proposed amendment adopts the
approach followed by the Fifth Circuit
and makes three changes to § 5G1.2.
First, it amends § 5G1.2(b) to clarify
that the court is to determine the total
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punishment (i.e., the combined length
of the sentences to be imposed) and
impose that total punishment on each
count, except to the extent otherwise
required by law.
Second, it amends the Commentary to
clarify that the defendant’s guideline
range in a multiple-count case may be
restricted by a mandatory minimum
penalty or statutory maximum penalty
in a manner similar to how the
guideline range in a single-count case
may be restricted by a minimum or
maximum penalty under § 5G1.1
(Sentencing on a Single Count of
Conviction). Specifically, it clarifies that
when any count involves a mandatory
minimum that restricts the defendant’s
guideline range, the guideline range is
restricted as to all counts. It also
provides examples of how these
restrictions operate.
Third, it amends the commentary to
clarify that in a case in which a
defendant’s guideline range was affected
or restricted by a mandatory minimum
penalty, the court is resentencing the
defendant, and the mandatory minimum
sentence no longer applies, the court
shall redetermine the defendant’s
guideline range for purposes of the
remaining counts without regard to the
mandatory minimum penalty.
Proposed Amendment:
Section 5G1.2 is amended by striking
subsection (b) and inserting the
following:
‘‘(b) For all counts not covered by
subsection (a), the court shall determine
the total punishment (i.e., the combined
length of the sentences to be imposed)
and shall impose that total punishment
on each such count, except to the extent
otherwise required by law.’’.
The Commentary to § 5G1.2 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 1, in the paragraph that begins ‘‘In
General.—’’, by striking the period at the
end and inserting ‘‘and determining the
defendant’s guideline range on the
Sentencing Table in Chapter Five, Part
A (Sentencing Table).’’; and by inserting
after such paragraph the following:
‘‘Note that the defendant’s guideline
range on the Sentencing Table may be
affected or restricted by a statutorily
authorized maximum sentence or a
statutorily required minimum sentence
not only in a single-count case, see
§ 5G1.1 (Sentencing on a Single Count
of Conviction), but also in a multiplecount case. See Note 3, below.’’.
The Commentary to § 5G1.2 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended by
redesignating Note 3 as Note 4; and by
inserting after Note 2 the following:
‘‘3. Application of Subsection (b).—
(A) In General.—Subsection (b)
provides that, for all counts not covered
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by subsection (a), the court shall
determine the total punishment (i.e., the
combined length of the sentences to be
imposed) and shall impose that total
punishment on each such count, except
to the extent otherwise required by law
(such as where a statutorily required
minimum sentence or a statutorily
authorized maximum sentence
otherwise requires).
(B) Effect on Guidelines Range of
Mandatory Minimum or Statutory
Maximum.—The defendant’s guideline
range on the Sentencing Table may be
affected or restricted by a statutorily
authorized maximum sentence or a
statutorily required minimum sentence
not only in a single-count case, see
§ 5G1.1, but also in a multiple-count
case.
In particular, where a statutorily
required minimum sentence on any
count is greater than the maximum of
the applicable guideline range, the
statutorily required minimum sentence
on that count shall be the guideline
sentence on all counts. See § 5G1.1(b).
Similarly, where a statutorily required
minimum sentence on any count is
greater than the minimum of the
applicable guideline range, the
guideline range for all counts is
restricted by that statutorily required
minimum sentence. See § 5G1.1(c)(2)
and accompanying Commentary.
However, where a statutorily
authorized maximum sentence on a
particular count is less than the
minimum of the applicable guideline
range, the sentence imposed on that
count shall not be greater than the
statutorily authorized maximum
sentence on that count. See § 5G1.1(a).
(C) Examples.—The following
examples illustrate how subsection (b)
applies, and how the restrictions in
subparagraph (B) operate, when a
statutorily required minimum sentence
is involved.
Defendant A and Defendant B are
each convicted of the same four counts.
Counts 1, 3, and 4 have statutory
maximums of 10 years, 20 years, and
2 years, respectively. Count 2 has a
statutory maximum of 30 years and a
mandatory minimum of 10 years.
For Defendant A, the court determines
that the final offense level is 19 and the
defendant is in Criminal History
Category I, which yields a guideline
range on the Sentencing Table of 30 to
37 months. Because of the 10-year
mandatory minimum on Count 2,
however, Defendant A’s guideline
sentence is 120 months. See
subparagraph (B), above. After
considering that guideline sentence, the
court determines that the appropriate
‘total punishment’ to be imposed on
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Defendant A is 120 months. Therefore,
subsection (b) requires that the total
punishment of 120 months be imposed
on each of Counts 1, 2, and 3. The
sentence imposed on Count 4 is limited
to 24 months, because a statutory
maximum of 2 years applies to that
particular count.
For Defendant B, in contrast, the court
determines that the final offense level is
30 and the defendant is in Criminal
History Category II, which yields a
guideline range on the Sentencing Table
of 108 to 135 months. Because of the
10-year mandatory minimum on Count
2, however, Defendant B’s guideline
range is restricted to 120 to 135 months.
See subparagraph (B), above. After
considering that restricted guideline
range, the court determines that the
appropriate ‘total punishment’ to be
imposed on Defendant B is 130 months.
Therefore, subsection (b) requires that
the total punishment of 130 months be
imposed on each of Counts 2 and 3. The
sentences imposed on Counts 1 and 4
are limited to 120 months (10 years) and
24 months (2 years), respectively,
because of the applicable statutory
maximums.
(D) Special Rule on Resentencing.—In
a case in which (i) the defendant’s
guideline range on the Sentencing Table
was affected or restricted by a statutorily
required minimum sentence (as
described in subparagraph (B)), (ii) the
court is resentencing the defendant, and
(iii) the statutorily required minimum
sentence no longer applies, the
defendant’s guideline range for
purposes of the remaining counts shall
be redetermined without regard to the
previous effect or restriction of the
statutorily required minimum
sentence.’’.
9. Rehabilitation
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment:
This proposed amendment responds to
Pepper v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 1229
(2011), which held, among other things,
that a defendant’s post-sentencing
rehabilitative efforts may be considered
when the defendant is resentenced after
appeal. See id. at 1236 (holding that
‘‘when a defendant’s sentence has been
set aside on appeal, a district court at
resentencing may consider evidence of
the defendant’s postsentencing
rehabilitation and that such evidence
may, in appropriate cases, support a
downward variance from the nowadvisory Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.’’).
The policy statement in the guidelines
on post-sentencing rehabilitation is
§ 5K2.19 (Post-Sentencing Rehabilitative
Efforts). Two options are presented:
Option 1 repeals § 5K2.19.
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Option 2 amends § 5K2.19 to provide
that rehabilitative efforts, whether preor post-sentencing, may be relevant in
determining whether a departure is
warranted, if the efforts, individually or
in combination with other
circumstances, are present to an
unusual degree and distinguish the case
from the typical cases covered by the
guidelines.
Option 2 also adds commentary to
§ 5K2.19 that sets forth a two-part test
for determining whether a departure
may be warranted and factors for the
court to consider in determining
whether a departure may be warranted.
See generally Pepper v. United States,
supra; Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 57–58 (2007) (in which the district
court ‘‘quite reasonably attached great
weight to the fact that [defendant]
voluntarily withdrew from the
conspiracy after deciding, on his own
initiative, to change his life’’).
Proposed Amendment:
Option 1:
Chapter Five, Part K, Subpart 2 is
amended by striking § 5K2.19 and its
accompanying commentary.
Option 2:
Chapter Five, Part K, Subpart 2 is
amended by striking § 5K2.19 and its
accompanying commentary and
inserting the following:
‘‘§ 5K2.19. Rehabilitative Efforts
(Policy Statement)
Rehabilitative efforts may be relevant
in determining whether a departure is
warranted if the rehabilitative efforts,
individually or in combination with
other circumstances, are present to an
unusual degree and distinguish the case
from the typical cases covered by the
guidelines.
In addition, pre-sentencing
rehabilitative efforts may be relevant in
determining acceptance of
responsibility under § 3E1.1
(Acceptance of Responsibility), and
post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts
may provide a basis for early
termination of supervised release under
18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(1).
Commentary
Application Note:
1. In determining whether to provide
a downward departure based on
rehabilitative efforts, the court should
consider whether the defendant engaged
in a pattern of activity that demonstrates
that (A) the defendant has been making
a genuine and purposeful effort to lead
a law-abiding life and (B) the effort is
likely to be successful.
The pattern of activity should involve
specific rehabilitative acts. Examples of
such acts are voluntarily withdrawing
from a conspiracy, obtaining counseling,
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entering drug treatment, maintaining
regular employment, making efforts to
remedy the harm caused by the offense,
and making educational progress.
The court may also consider the
extent to which the specific
rehabilitative acts were taken at the
defendant’s own initiative.
Background: A defendant’s postoffense rehabilitative efforts may be
considered at sentencing. See, e.g., Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
Such efforts may also be relevant in
determining whether an adjustment
applies under § 3E1.1 (Acceptance of
Responsibility) and whether a departure
is warranted under § 5K2.16 (Voluntary
Disclosure of Offense). Similarly, a
defendant’s post-sentencing
rehabilitative efforts may be considered
when the defendant is resentenced after
appeal. See Pepper v. United States, 131
S.Ct. 1229, 1236 (2011) (holding that
‘when a defendant’s sentence has been
set aside on appeal, a district court at
resentencing may consider evidence of
the defendant’s postsentencing
rehabilitation’ and that such evidence
‘may, in appropriate cases,’ support a
sentence below the applicable guideline
range).’’.
10. Miscellaneous
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment:
This proposed multi-part amendment
responds to miscellaneous issues arising
from recently enacted legislation.
Part A responds to the Cell Phone
Contraband Act of 2010, Public Law
111–225 (August 10, 2010), which
amended 18 U.S.C. 1791 (Providing or
possessing contraband in prison) to
make it a class A misdemeanor to
provide a mobile phone or similar
device to an inmate, or for an inmate to
possess a mobile phone or similar
device—specifically, ‘‘a phone or other
device used by a user of commercial
mobile service (as defined in section
332(d) of Title 47) in connection with
such service’’. See 18 U.S.C.
1791(d)(1)(F). Offenses under section
1791 are referenced in Appendix A
(Statutory Index) to § 2P1.2 (Providing
or Possessing Contraband in Prison).
The other class A misdemeanors in
section 1791 involve currency, alcohol,
and certain controlled substances; those
other types of contraband receive a base
offense level of 6 in § 2P1.2. The
proposed amendment amends § 2P1.2 to
assign mobile phones and similar
devices to a particular alternative base
offense level in the guidelines. Two
options are presented. Option 1 assigns
a base offense level of 13. Option 2
assigns a base offense level of 6.
Part B responds to the Prevent All
Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009 (PACT
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Act), Public Law 111–154 (enacted
March 31, 2010). The PACT Act made
a series of revisions to the Jenkins Act,
15 U.S.C. 575 et seq., which is one of
several laws governing the sale,
shipment and taxation of cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco. First, the PACT Act
raised the criminal penalty at 15 U.S.C.
377 for a knowing violation of the
Jenkins Act from a misdemeanor to a
felony with a statutory maximum term
of imprisonment of 3 years. The
proposed amendment amends
Appendix A (Statutory Index) to
reference section 377 offenses to § 2T2.1
(Non-Payment of Taxes). The possibility
of an additional reference, to § 2T2.2
(Regulatory Offenses), is bracketed.
Second, the PACT Act created a new
Class A misdemeanor at 18 U.S.C.
1716E, prohibiting the knowing
shipment of cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco through the United States mail.
The proposed amendment amends
Appendix A (Statutory Index) to
reference section 1716E offenses to
either or both of two bracketed options,
§ 2T2.1 and § 2T2.2.
Part C responds to the Indian Arts and
Crafts Amendments Act of 2010, Public
Law 111–211 (July 29, 2010), which
amended the criminal offense at 18
U.S.C. 1159 (Misrepresentation of
Indian produced goods and services) to
reduce penalties for first offenders when
the value of the goods involved is less
than $1,000. The maximum term of
imprisonment under section 1159 had
been 5 years for a first offender and 15
years for a repeat offender. The Act
retained this penalty structure, except
that the statutory maximum for a first
offender was reduced to 1 year in a case
in which the value of the goods
involved is less than $1,000. The
proposed amendment amends
Appendix A (Statutory Index) to
reference section 1159 offenses to
§ 2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction,
and Fraud).
Part C also addresses an existing
offense, 18 U.S.C. 1158 (Counterfeiting
Indian Arts and Crafts Board trade
mark), which makes it a crime to
counterfeit or unlawfully affix a
Government trade mark used or devised
by the Indian Arts and Crafts Board or
to make any false statement for the
purpose of obtaining the use of any such
mark. The maximum term of
imprisonment under section 1158 is 5
years for a first offender and 15 years for
a repeat offender. Offenses under
section 1158 are not referenced in
Appendix A (Statutory Index). The
proposed amendment references section
1158 offenses to both § 2B1.1 and
§ 2B5.3 (Criminal Infringement of
Copyright or Trademark).
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Part D responds to Public Law 111–
350 (enacted January 4, 2011), which
enacted certain laws relating to public
contracts as a new positive-law title of
the Code—title 41, ‘‘Public Contracts’’.
As part of this codification, two
criminal offenses, 41 U.S.C. 53 and
423(a)–(b), and their respective penalty
provisions, 41 U.S.C. 54 and 423(e),
were given new title 41 U.S.C. section
numbers: Sections 8702 and 8707 for
sections 53 and 54, and sections 2102
and 2105 for sections 423(a)–(b) and
423(e). The substantive offenses and
their related penalties did not change.
The proposed amendment makes
clerical changes to Appendix A
(Statutory Index) to reflect the
renumbering and includes a reference
for the new section 2102, whose
predecessor section 423(a)–(b) was not
referenced in Appendix A.
Part E responds to the Animal Crush
Video Prohibition Act of 2010, Public
Law 111–294 (enacted December 9,
2010), which substantially revised the
criminal offense at 18 U.S.C. 48 (Animal
crush videos). Section 48 makes it a
crime to create or distribute an ‘‘animal
crush video,’’ as defined in section 48
(which requires, among other things,
that the depiction be ‘‘obscene’’). The
maximum term of imprisonment for a
section 48 offense is 7 years. Section 48
is not referenced in Appendix A
(Statutory Index). The proposed
amendment amends Appendix A
(Statutory Index) to reference section 48
offenses to § 2G3.1 (Importing, Mailing,
or Transporting Obscene Matter;
Transferring Obscene Matter to a Minor;
Misleading Domain Names). An issue
for comment is also included.
Proposed Amendment
(A) Cell Phone Contraband Act
Section 2P1.2(a) is amended as
follows:
Option 1: In paragraph (2) by inserting
after ‘‘ammunition,’’ the following: ‘‘[a
mobile phone or similar device,]’’.
Option 2: In paragraph (3) by inserting
after ‘‘currency,’’ the following: ‘‘[a
mobile phone or similar device,]’’.
The Commentary to § 2P1.2 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended by
redesignating Notes 1 and 2 as Notes 2
and 3, respectively; and by inserting at
the beginning the following:
‘‘1. In this guideline, the term ‘mobile
phone or similar device’ means a phone
or other device as described in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1791(d)(1)(F).’’.
(B) Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act
Appendix A (Statutory Index) is
amended by inserting after the line
referenced to 15 U.S.C. 158 the
following:
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‘‘15 U.S.C. § 377
2T2.1 [, 2T2.2]’’;
and by inserting after the line referenced
to 18 U.S.C. 1716D the following:
‘‘18 U.S.C. § 1716E
[2T2.1],
[2T2.2]’’.
(C) Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments
Act
Appendix A (Statutory Index) is
amended by inserting after the line
referenced to 18 U.S.C. 1153 the
following:
‘‘18 U.S.C. § 1158
2B1.1, 2B5.3
18 U.S.C. § 1159
2B1.1’’.
(D) Public Law 111–350
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Appendix A (Statutory Index) is
amended by striking the following:
‘‘41 U.S.C. § 53
2B4.1
41 U.S.C. § 542B4.1
41 U.S.C. § 423(e)
2B1.1, 2C1.1’’;
and inserting the following:
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‘‘41 U.S.C. § 2102
41 U.S.C. § 2105
41 U.S.C. § 8702
41 U.S.C. § 8707
2B1.1, 2C1.1
2B1.1, 2C1.1
2B4.1
2B4.1’’.
(E) Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act
of 2010
Appendix A (Statutory Index) is
amended by inserting after the line
referenced to 18 U.S.C. 43 the following:
‘‘18 U.S.C. § 48
2G3.1’’.
Issue for Comment:
1. The proposed amendment would
reference offenses under 18 U.S.C. 48
(Animal crush videos) to § 2G3.1. That
guideline provides a base offense level
of 10 and enhancements for distribution
(ranging from 2 levels to 5 or more
levels), certain conduct with intent to
deceive a minor into viewing material
that is harmful to minors (2 levels), use
of a computer (2 levels), and material
portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct
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or other depictions of violence (2
levels).
The Commission invites comment on
offenses under section 48, including in
particular the conduct involved in such
offenses and the nature and seriousness
of the harms posed by such offenses. Do
the provisions in § 2G1.3 adequately
account for offenses under section 48? If
not, how should the Commission amend
the guideline to account for offenses
under section 48? For example, should
the Commission provide one or more
new alternative base offense levels,
specific offense characteristics, or
departure provisions to § 2G3.1 to better
account for offenses under section 48? If
so, what should the Commission
provide?
[FR Doc. 2012–886 Filed 1–18–12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 2210–40–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 12 (Thursday, January 19, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2778-2795]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-886]
=======================================================================
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UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION
Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts
AGENCY: United States Sentencing Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed amendments to sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, and commentary. Request for public comment, including
public comment regarding retroactive application of any of the proposed
amendments. Notice of public hearing.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: Pursuant to section 994(a), (o), and (p) of title 28, United
States Code, the United States Sentencing Commission is considering
promulgating certain amendments to the sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, and commentary. This notice sets forth the proposed
amendments and, for each proposed amendment, a synopsis of the issues
addressed by that amendment. This notice also sets forth a number of
issues for comment, some of which are set forth together with the
proposed amendments; some of which are set forth independent of any
proposed amendment; and one of which (regarding retroactive application
of proposed amendments) is set forth in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
portion of this notice.
The proposed amendments and issues for comment in this notice are
as follows: (1) A proposed amendment on fraud and related offenses,
including (A) An issue for comment in response to the issue of harm to
the public and financial markets, as raised by each of two directives
to the Commission in section 1079A of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203; (B) a proposed change
to Sec. 2B1.4 (Insider Trading) to implement the directive in section
1079A(a)(1) of that Act, and related issues for comment on insider
trading, securities fraud, and similar offenses; (C) proposed changes
to Sec. 2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud) regarding
mortgage fraud offenses to implement the directive in section
1079A(a)(2) of that Act, and a related issue for comment on mortgage
fraud and financial institution fraud; and (D) issues for comment on
the impact of the loss table in Sec. 2B1.1(b)(1) and the victims table
in Sec. 2B1.1(b)(2) in cases involving relatively large loss amounts;
(2) a proposed amendment on offenses involving controlled substances
and chemical precursors, including (A) an issue for comment on offenses
involving N-Benzylpiperazine (BZP); and (B) a proposed change to Sec.
2D1.11 (Unlawfully Distributing, Importing, Exporting or Possessing a
Listed Chemical; Attempt or Conspiracy) that would create a guidelines
``safety valve'' provision for offenses involving chemical precursors
that would be analogous to the provision in Sec. 2D1.1 (Unlawful
Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (Including
Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses); Attempt or
Conspiracy); (3) a proposed amendment on human rights offenses,
including (A) a proposed guideline applicable to human rights offenses;
(B) proposed changes to Sec. 2L2.1 (Trafficking in a Document Relating
to Naturalization, Citizenship, or Legal Resident Status, or a United
States Passport; False Statement in Respect to the Citizenship or
Immigration Status of Another; Fraudulent Marriage to Assist Alien to
Evade Immigration Law) and Sec. 2L2.2 (Fraudulently Acquiring
Documents Relating to Naturalization, Citizenship, or Legal Resident
Status for Own Use; False Personation or Fraudulent Marriage by Alien
to Evade Immigration Law; Fraudulently Acquiring or Improperly Using a
United States Passport) to address cases in which the offense of
conviction is for immigration or naturalization fraud but the defendant
had committed a serious human rights offense; and (C) related issues
for comment on human rights offenses; (4) a proposed amendment to
[[Page 2779]]
Sec. 2L1.2 (Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States) to
respond to a circuit conflict over application of the term ``sentence
imposed'' in that guideline when the defendant's original ``sentence
imposed'' was lengthened after the defendant was deported; (5) a
proposed amendment presenting options for specifying the types of
documents that may be considered in determining whether a particular
prior conviction fits within a particular category of crimes for
purposes of specific guideline provisions, and related issues for
comment; (6) a proposed amendment to Sec. 4A1.2 (Definitions and
Instructions for Computing Criminal History) to respond to an
application issue regarding when a defendant's prior sentence for
driving while intoxicated or driving under the influence (and similar
offenses by whatever name they are known) is counted toward the
defendant's criminal history score; (7) a proposed amendment to Sec.
4B1.2 (Definitions of Terms Used in Section 4B1.1) to respond to
differences among the circuits on when, if at all, burglary of a non-
dwelling qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of the
guidelines, and related issues for comment; (8) a proposed amendment to
Sec. 5G1.2 (Sentencing on Multiple Counts of Conviction) to respond to
an application issue regarding the applicable guideline range in a case
in which the defendant is sentenced on multiple counts of conviction,
at least one of which involves a mandatory minimum sentence that is
greater than the minimum of the otherwise applicable guideline range;
(9) a proposed amendment to Sec. 5K2.19 (Post-Sentencing
Rehabilitative Efforts) to respond to Pepper v. United States, 131
S.Ct. 1229 (2011), which held, among other things, that a defendant's
post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts may be considered when the
defendant is resentenced after appeal; and (10) a proposed amendment in
response to miscellaneous issues arising from legislation recently
enacted, including (A) proposed changes to Sec. 2P1.2 (Providing or
Possessing Contraband in Prison) to respond to the Cell Phone
Contraband Act of 2010, Public Law 111-225, and (B) proposed changes to
Appendix A (Statutory Index) to address certain criminal provisions in
the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009, Public Law 111-154,
the Indian Arts and Crafts Amendments Act of 2010, Public Law 111-211,
the Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, Public Law 111-294, and
certain other statutes, and a related issue for comment.
DATES: (1) Written public comment.--Written public comment regarding
the proposed amendments and issues for comment set forth in this
notice, including public comment regarding retroactive application of
any of the proposed amendments, should be received by the Commission
not later than March 19, 2012.
(2) Public hearing.--The Commission plans to hold a public hearing
regarding the proposed amendments and issues for comment set forth in
this notice. Further information regarding the public hearing,
including requirements for testifying and providing written testimony,
as well as the location, time, and scope of the hearing, will be
provided by the Commission on its Web site at www.ussc.gov.
ADDRESSES: Public comment should be sent to: United States Sentencing
Commission, One Columbus Circle NE., Suite 2-500, Washington, DC 20002-
8002, Attention: Public Affairs.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeanne Doherty, Public Affairs
Officer, Telephone: (202) 502-4502.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The United States Sentencing Commission is
an independent agency in the judicial branch of the United States
Government. The Commission promulgates sentencing guidelines and policy
statements for federal courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a). The
Commission also periodically reviews and revises previously promulgated
guidelines pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o) and submits guideline
amendments to the Congress not later than the first day of May each
year pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(p).
The proposed amendments in this notice are presented in one of two
formats. First, some of the amendments are proposed as specific
revisions to a guideline or commentary. Bracketed text within a
proposed amendment indicates a heightened interest on the Commission's
part in comment and suggestions regarding alternative policy choices;
for example, a proposed enhancement of [2][4][6] levels indicates that
the Commission is considering, and invites comment on, alternative
policy choices regarding the appropriate level of enhancement.
Similarly, bracketed text within a specific offense characteristic or
application note means that the Commission specifically invites comment
on whether the proposed provision is appropriate. Second, the
Commission has highlighted certain issues for comment and invites
suggestions on how the Commission should respond to those issues.
The Commission requests public comment regarding whether, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and 28 U.S.C. 994(u), any proposed amendment
published in this notice should be included in subsection (c) of Sec.
1B1.10 (Reduction in Term of Imprisonment as a Result of Amended
Guideline Range (Policy Statement)) as an amendment that may be applied
retroactively to previously sentenced defendants. The Commission lists
in Sec. 1B1.10(c) the specific guideline amendments that the court may
apply retroactively under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The background
commentary to Sec. 1B1.10 lists the purpose of the amendment, the
magnitude of the change in the guideline range made by the amendment,
and the difficulty of applying the amendment retroactively to determine
an amended guideline range under Sec. 1B1.10(b) as among the factors
the Commission considers in selecting the amendments included in Sec.
1B1.10(c). To the extent practicable, public comment should address
each of these factors.
Additional information pertaining to the proposed amendments
described in this notice may be accessed through the Commission's Web
site at www.ussc.gov.
Authority: 28 U.S.C. 994(a), (o), (p), (x); USSC Rules of
Practice and Procedure, Rule 4.4.
Patti B. Saris,
Chair.
1. Dodd-Frank/Fraud
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment is a multi-
part amendment that continues the Commission's multi-year review of
fraud offenses to ensure that the guidelines provide appropriate
penalties (1) in cases involving securities fraud and similar offenses
and (2) in cases involving mortgage fraud and financial institution
fraud.
Specifically, the proposed amendment implements the two directives
to the Commission in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Public Law 111-203 (the ``Act''). The first directive
relates to securities fraud and similar offenses, and the second
directive relates to mortgage fraud and financial institution fraud.
Each directive requires the Commission to ``review and, if
appropriate, amend'' the guidelines and policy statements applicable to
the offenses covered by the directive and consider whether the
guidelines
[[Page 2780]]
appropriately account for the potential and actual harm to the public
and the financial markets from those offenses. Each directive also
requires the Commission to ensure that the guidelines reflect (i) The
serious nature of the offenses, (ii) the need for deterrence,
punishment, and prevention, and (iii) the effectiveness of
incarceration in furthering those objectives.
Part A responds to the issue of harm to financial markets, which is
raised by both directives; Part B responds to the directive on
securities fraud and similar offenses; and Part C responds to the
directive on mortgage fraud and financial institution fraud.
The proposed amendment also includes a Part D, which responds to
concerns suggesting that the impact of the loss table or the victims
table (or the combined impact of the loss table and the victims table)
may overstate the culpability of certain offenders in cases sentenced
under Sec. 2B1.1 that involve relatively large loss amounts.
The parts are as follows:
(A) Harm to Financial Markets
Issue for Comment:
1. The Commission requests comment on whether the Guidelines Manual
provides penalties that appropriately account for the potential and
actual harm to the public and the financial markets from the offenses
covered by the directives. If not, what changes to the Guidelines
Manual would be appropriate to respond to this requirement in both
directives?
Section 2B1.1 contains provisions that address harm to the public
and the financial markets in various ways, by taking into account the
amount of the loss, the number of victims, and other factors contained
in its specific offense characteristics and departure provisions. For
example, subsection (b)(14) provides an enhancement of either (A) 2
levels, if the defendant derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts
from one or more financial institutions, or (B) 4 levels, if the
offense (i) substantially jeopardized the safety and soundness of a
financial institution, (ii) substantially endangered the solvency or
financial security of an organization that (I) was a publicly traded
company or (II) had 1,000 or more employees, or (iii) substantially
endangered the solvency or financial security of 100 or more victims.
Subsection (b)(14)(C) provides that the cumulative adjustments from
(b)(2) and (b)(14)(B) shall not exceed 8 levels, except as provided in
subdivision (D). Subdivision (D) provides a minimum offense level of
level 24, if either (A) or (B) applies.
Should the Commission amend Sec. 2B1.1 to more directly account
for the potential and actual harms to the public and the financial
markets? For example, should the Commission provide a new prong in
Sec. 2B1.1(b)(14) that provides an enhancement of [2][4][6] levels if
the offense involved a significant disruption of a financial market or
created a substantial risk of such a disruption? In the alternative,
should the Commission provide a new upward departure provision in Sec.
2B1.1 that applies if the offense involved such a disruption or created
a substantial risk of such a disruption?
If the Commission were to provide such a provision, what guidance
should the Commission provide for determining when the provision would
apply?
(B) Securities Fraud and Similar Offenses
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: Section 1079A(a)(1)(A) of the Act
directs the Commission to ``review and, if appropriate, amend'' the
guidelines and policy statements applicable to ``persons convicted of
offenses relating to securities fraud or any other similar provision of
law, in order to reflect the intent of Congress that penalties for the
offenses under the guidelines and policy statements appropriately
account for the potential and actual harm to the public and the
financial markets from the offenses.''
In addition, section 1079A(a)(1)(B) of the Act provides that, in
promulgating any such amendment, the Commission shall--
(i) Ensure that the guidelines and policy statements, particularly
section 2B1.1(b)(14) and section 2B1.1(b)(17) (and any successors
thereto), reflect--
(I) The serious nature of the offenses described in subparagraph
(A);
(II) The need for an effective deterrent and appropriate punishment
to prevent the offenses; and
(III) The effectiveness of incarceration in furthering the
objectives described in subclauses (I) and (II);
(ii) Consider the extent to which the guidelines appropriately
account for the potential and actual harm to the public and the
financial markets resulting from the offenses;
(iii) Ensure reasonable consistency with other relevant directives
and guidelines and Federal statutes;
(iv) Make any necessary conforming changes to guidelines; and
(v) Ensure that the guidelines adequately meet the purposes of
sentencing, as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United
States Code.
Securities fraud is prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 1348 (Securities and
commodities fraud), which makes it unlawful to knowingly execute, or
attempt to execute, a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud any person in
connection with a security or (2) to obtain, by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any money or
property in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. The
statutory maximum term of imprisonment for an offense under section
1348 is 25 years. Offenses under section 1348 are referenced in
Appendix A (Statutory Index) to Sec. 2B1.1.
Securities fraud is also prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 1350 (Failure
of corporate officers to certify financial reports), violations of the
provisions of law referred to in 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47), and violations
of the rules, regulations, and orders issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission pursuant to those provisions of law. See Sec.
2B1.1, comment. (n.14(A)). In addition, there are cases in which the
defendant committed a securities law violation but is prosecuted under
a general fraud statute. In general, these offenses are likewise
referenced to Sec. 2B1.1.
The directive contemplates that the Commission also review offenses
``under any other similar provision of law''. The Commission has
received comment indicating that commodities fraud offenses and insider
trading offenses should be included within the scope of its review.
The proposed amendment responds to the directive by amending the
insider trading guideline, Sec. 2B1.4 (Insider Trading), in several
ways.
First, it provides a specific offense characteristic that applies
if the offense involved sophisticated insider trading. The specific
offense characteristic provides an enhancement of [2] levels and a
minimum offense level of [12][14].
Second, it provides a 4-level enhancement that applies if the
defendant, at the time of the offense, held one of several listed
positions of trust. This enhancement parallels the enhancement in Sec.
2B1.1(b)(18).
Issues for comment are also provided, both on insider trading
offenses under Sec. 2B1.4 and on securities fraud and similar offenses
under Sec. 2B1.1.
Proposed Amendment:
Section 2B1.4(b) is amended by striking ``Characteristic'' and
inserting ``Characteristics''; and by inserting after paragraph (1) the
following:
``(2) If the offense involved sophisticated insider trading,
increase by 2 levels. If the resulting offense level
[[Page 2781]]
is less than level [12][14], increase to level [12][14].
(3) If, at the time of the offense, the defendant was--
(A)(i) An officer or a director of a publicly traded company; (ii)
a registered broker or dealer, or a person associated with a broker or
dealer; or (iii) an investment adviser, or a person associated with an
investment adviser; or
(B)(i) An officer or a director of a futures commission merchant or
an introducing broker; (ii) a commodities trading advisor; or (iii) a
commodity pool operator, increase by 4 levels.''.
The Commentary to Sec. 2B1.4 captioned ``Application Note'' is
amended in the phrase ``Application Note'' by striking ``Note'' and
inserting ``Notes''; by redesignating Note 1 as Note 3; in that Note,
by striking ``Section 3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of
Special Skill)'' and inserting ``If subsection (b)(3) applies, do not
apply Sec. 3B1.3. In any other case, Sec. 3B1.3''; and by striking
``trust. Examples might include a corporate president or'' and
inserting ``trust, such as''.
The Commentary to Sec. 2B1.4 captioned `Application Note' is
amended by inserting before Note 3 (as so redesignated) the following:
1. Application of Subsection (b)(2).--For purposes of subsection
(b)(2), `sophisticated insider trading' means especially complex or
intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of
the offense.
The following is a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court
shall consider in determining whether subsection (b)(2) applies:
(A) The number of transactions;
(B) The dollar value of the transactions;
(C) The number of securities involved;
(D) The duration of the offense;
(E) Whether fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore
financial accounts were used to hide transactions; and
(F) Whether internal monitoring or auditing systems or compliance
and ethics program standards or procedures were subverted in an effort
to prevent the detection of the offense.
2. Application of Subsection (b)(3).--For purposes of subsection
(b)(3): `Commodity pool operator' has the meaning given that term in
section 1a(5) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(5)).
`Commodity trading advisor' has the meaning given that term in
section 1a(6) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(6)).
`Futures commission merchant' has the meaning given that term in
section 1a(20) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(20)).
`Introducing broker' has the meaning given that term in section
1a(23) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(23)).
`Investment adviser' has the meaning given that term in section
202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-
2(a)(11)).
`Person associated with a broker or dealer' has the meaning given
that term in section 3(a)(18) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(18)).
`Person associated with an investment adviser' has the meaning
given that term in section 202(a)(17) of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(17)).
`Registered broker or dealer' has the meaning given that term in
section 3(a)(48) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78c(a)(48)).''.
Issues for Comment:
1. Insider Trading. The Commission has received public comment
indicating that some insider trading defendants engage in serious
offense conduct but nonetheless, because of market forces or other
factors, do not necessarily realize high gains. The concern has been
raised that in such cases, Sec. 2B1.4 may not adequately account for
the seriousness of the conduct and the actual and potential harms to
individuals and markets, because the guideline uses gain alone as the
measure of harm.
Should the Commission provide in Sec. 2B1.4 one or more specific
offense characteristics that use aggravating factors other than gain to
account for the seriousness of the conduct and the actual or potential
harm to individuals and markets? If so, what should the factor or
factors be? For example, should the Commission provide, as an
aggravating factor in Sec. 2B1.4, (i) The number of transactions; (ii)
the dollar value of the transactions; (iii) the number of securities
involved; or some other factor that distinguishes a defendant who
engages in multiple instances or higher volumes of insider trading from
a defendant who does not?
If the Commission were to provide one or more new specific offense
characteristics based on such aggravating factors, what level or levels
of enhancement should the Commission provide, and how should any such
enhancement interact with the enhancement for gain in Sec. 2B1.4?
For example, in bid-rigging cases, the guidelines currently provide
a ``volume of commerce'' enhancement in subsection (b)(2) of Sec. 2R1.1
(Bid-Rigging, Price-Fixing or Market-Allocation Agreements Among
Competitors). That enhancement provides a tiered enhancement, ranging
from 2 levels if the volume of commerce was more than $1,000,000, to 16
levels if the volume of commerce was more than $1,500,000,000. Should
the Commission consider an analogous tiered enhancement (e.g., based on
volume of trading) for insider trading cases in Sec. 2B1.4? If so, what
guidance should the Commission provide on how the volume of trading is
to be determined, what volumes of trading should be used for the tiered
enhancement, and what levels of enhancement should apply to the various
tiers?
Similarly, Sec. 2R1.1 provides a special instruction under which
the fine for an organizational defendant is calculated based on 20
percent of the volume of commerce, rather than on the pecuniary loss.
See Sec. 2R1.1(d)(1). Should the Commission consider an analogous
approach for insider trading cases in Sec. 2B1.4? In particular, should
the Commission provide a special rule under which the gain enhancement
in Sec. 2B1.4(b)(1) would use either the gain or an amount equal to
[20] percent of the volume of trading, whichever is greater?
2. Calculation of Loss in Sec. 2B1.1. The Commission has received
comment indicating that determinations of loss in cases under
Sec. 2B1.1 involving securities fraud and similar offenses are complex
and a variety of different methods are in use, resulting in application
issues and possible sentencing disparities. Should the Commission amend
Sec. 2B1.1 to clarify the method or methods used in determining loss in
such cases to ensure that the guideline appropriately accounts for the
potential and actual harm to the public and the financial markets from
those offenses?
For example, courts in cases involving securities fraud and similar
offenses have used--
(A) A simple rescissory method (under which loss is based upon the
price that the victim paid for the security and the price of the
security as it existed after the fraud was disclosed), see, e.g.,
United States v. Grabske, 260 F.Supp.2d 866, 872-73 (N.D. Cal. 2002);
(B) A modified rescissory method (under which loss is based upon
the average price of the security during the period that the fraud
occurred and the average price of the security during a set period
after the fraud was disclosed to the market), see, e.g., United States
v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Bakhit, 218
F.Supp.2d 1232 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
(C) A market capitalization method (under which loss is based upon
the price of the security shortly before the
[[Page 2782]]
disclosure and the price of the security shortly after the disclosure),
see, e.g., United States v. Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir.
2000), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 64 (2002); United States v. Peppel, 2011 WL 3608139 (S.D. Ohio
2011); and
(D) A market-adjusted method (under which loss is based upon the
change in value of the security, but excluding changes in value that
were caused by external market forces), see, e.g., United States v.
Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Olis, 429
F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005).
The Commission seeks comment on these four methods of calculating
loss in cases involving securities fraud and similar offenses, and the
relative advantages and disadvantages of these methods. The Commission
also seeks comment on whether there are any other methods of
calculating loss, other than these four methods, that should be used in
such cases.
Should the Commission provide a specific method or methods for use
by courts in determining loss in cases involving securities fraud and
similar offenses? If so, which method or methods should the Commission
provide? Should the method used depend on the type of fraudulent
scheme, and if so, how?
In particular, two of the more common types of securities fraud are
(1) investment fraud, in which victims are fraudulently induced to
invest in companies or products related to securities (a category that
includes Ponzi schemes); and (2) market or price manipulation fraud, in
which the offender seeks to inflate the price of a security through
various means (a category that includes so-called ``pump and dump''
schemes as well as accounting frauds). What method or methods of loss
calculation should be used for investment fraud, and what method or
methods should be used for market or price manipulation fraud? Are
there any other types of securities fraud or similar offenses for which
the Commission should provide a specific method or methods of loss
calculation?
What changes, if any, should the Commission make to the existing
rules for calculation of loss in cases involving securities fraud or
similar offenses? For example, the calculation of loss in an investment
fraud case is covered by Application Note 3(F)(iv) to Sec. 2B1.1,
which provides:
Ponzi and Other Fraudulent Investment Schemes.--In a case
involving a fraudulent investment scheme, such as a Ponzi scheme,
loss shall not be reduced by the money or the value of the property
transferred to any individual investor in the scheme in excess of
that investor's principal investment (i.e., the gain to an
individual investor in the scheme shall not be used to offset the
loss to another individual investor in the scheme).
Should the Commission revise or repeal this application note and
provide a different rule for investment fraud?
Should the Commission provide further guidance regarding the
causation standard to be applied in calculating loss in cases involving
securities fraud or similar offenses? For example, should the
Commission provide a loss causation standard similar to the civil loss
causation standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (holding that a
civil securities fraud plaintiff must prove that the plaintiff's
economic loss was proximately caused by the defendant's
misrepresentation (or other fraudulent conduct) as opposed to other
independent market factors)?
Are there any other changes that the Commission should make
regarding the determination of loss in cases involving securities fraud
or similar offenses to ensure that the guidelines appropriately account
for the potential and actual harm to the public and the financial
markets from those offenses?
3. Specific Provisions in Sec. 2B1.1. The directive requires the
Commission to consider, among other things, the enhancements at Sec.
2B1.1(b)(15) and (b)(18) (formerly (b)(14) and (b)(17), respectively).
The Commission seeks comment on whether any changes should be made to
either or both of these provisions in response to the directive. Should
the Commission expand the scope or the amounts of the increases
provided by subsection (b)(15) or (b)(18), or both, to ensure that the
guidelines appropriately account for the potential and actual harm to
the public and the financial markets? If so, how?
(C) Mortgage Fraud and Financial Institution Fraud
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This part of the proposed amendment
responds to the directive in section 1079A(a)(2) of the Act, which
relates to mortgage fraud and financial institution fraud.
Specifically, section 1079A(a)(2)(A) of the Act directs the
Commission to ``review and, if appropriate, amend'' the guidelines and
policy statements applicable to ``persons convicted of fraud offenses
relating to financial institutions or federally related mortgage loans
and any other similar provisions of law, to reflect the intent of
Congress that the penalties for the offenses under the guidelines and
policy statements ensure appropriate terms of imprisonment for
offenders involved in substantial bank frauds or other frauds relating
to financial institutions.''
In addition, section 1079A(a)(2)(B) of the Act provides that, in
promulgating any such amendment, the Commission shall--
(i) Ensure that the guidelines and policy statements reflect--
(I) The serious nature of the offenses described in subparagraph
(A);
(II) The need for an effective deterrent and appropriate punishment
to prevent the offenses; and
(III) The effectiveness of incarceration in furthering the
objectives described in subclauses (I) and (II);
(ii) Consider the extent to which the guidelines appropriately
account for the potential and actual harm to the public and the
financial markets resulting from the offenses;
(iii) Ensure reasonable consistency with other relevant directives
and guidelines and Federal statutes;
(iv) Make any necessary conforming changes to guidelines; and
(v) Ensure that the guidelines adequately meet the purposes of
sentencing, as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United
States Code.
With regard to mortgage fraud, the proposed amendment makes two
changes to Application Note 3 regarding calculation of loss. The first
change addresses the credit against loss rule and states that, in the
case of a fraud involving a mortgage loan in which the collateral has
been disposed of at a foreclosure sale, use the amount recovered from
the foreclosure sale.
The second change specifies that, in the case of a fraud involving
a mortgage loan, reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm includes the
reasonably foreseeable administrative costs to the lending institution
associated with foreclosing on the mortgaged property, provided that
the lending institution exercised due diligence in the initiation,
processing, and monitoring of the loan and the disposal of the
collateral.
With regard to financial institution fraud more generally, the
proposed amendment broadens the applicability of Sec. 2B1.1(b)(15)(B),
which provides an enhancement of 4 levels if the offense involved
specific types of financial harms (e.g., jeopardizing a financial
institution or organization). Application Note 12 to Sec. 2B1.1 lists
factors to be considered in determining whether to apply the
enhancement in subsection (b)(15)(B) for jeopardizing a financial
institution or organization. Currently, the court is directed to
consider whether the financial institution or organization
[[Page 2783]]
suffered one or more listed harms (such as becoming insolvent) as a
result of the offense. The proposed amendment amends Note 12 to direct
the court to consider whether one of the listed harms was likely to
result from the offense but did not result from the offense because of
federal government intervention.
Issues for comment are also provided.
Proposed Amendment:
The Commentary to Sec. 2B1.1 captioned ``Application Notes'' is
amended in Note 3(A)(v) by adding at the end the following:
``(IV) Fraud Involving a Mortgage Loan.--In the case of a fraud
involving a mortgage loan, the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm
includes the reasonably foreseeable administrative costs to the
lending institution associated with foreclosing on the mortgaged
property, provided that the lending institution exercised due
diligence in the initiation, processing, and monitoring of the loan
and the disposal of the collateral.'';
in Note 3(E)(ii) by adding at the end ``In the case of a fraud
involving a mortgage loan in which the collateral has been disposed of
at a foreclosure sale, use the amount recovered from the foreclosure
sale.'';
in Note 12(A) by adding at the end the following:
``(v) One or more of the criteria in clauses (i) through (iv)
was likely to result from the offense but did not result from the
offense because of federal government intervention.'';
and in Note 12(B)(ii) by inserting at the end the following:
``(VII) One or more of the criteria in subclauses (I) through
(VI) was likely to result from the offense but did not result from
the offense because of federal government intervention.''.
Issue for Comment:
1. The Commission requests comment regarding whether the Guidelines
Manual provides penalties for mortgage fraud and financial institution
fraud that appropriately account for the potential and actual harm to
the public and the financial markets from these offenses and ensure
appropriate terms of imprisonment for offenders involved in substantial
bank frauds or other frauds relating to financial institutions and, if
not, what changes to the Guidelines Manual would be appropriate to
respond to section 1079A(a)(2) of the Act.
Bank fraud is prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. 1344 (Bank fraud), which
makes it unlawful to knowingly execute a scheme or artifice (1) to
defraud a financial institution or (2) to obtain any of the property of
a financial institution by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises. The statutory maximum term of
imprisonment for an offense under section 1344 is 30 years. Offenses
under section 1344 are referenced in Appendix A (Statutory Index) to
Sec. 2B1.1. Other statutes relating to financial institution fraud or
mortgage fraud include 18 U.S.C. 215, 656, 657, 1005, 1006, 1010, 1014,
1029, and 1033. These offenses are likewise generally referenced to
Sec. 2B1.1.
A. Proposed Provisions
The proposed amendment would make two changes regarding calculation
of loss in mortgage fraud cases. The Commission invites comment on
whether there are other issues involving loss in mortgage fraud cases
that are not adequately accounted for in the guidelines and, if so,
what changes should be made to how loss is calculated in mortgage fraud
cases.
For example, the first change would specify that in the case of a
fraud involving a mortgage loan in which the collateral was disposed of
at a foreclosure sale, use the amount recovered from the foreclosure
sale. Should the Commission provide an additional special rule for
determining fair market value if the mortgaged property has not been
disposed of by the time of sentencing? For example, should the
Commission provide that, if the mortgaged property has not been
disposed of by that time, the most recent tax assessment value of the
mortgaged property shall constitute prima facie evidence of the fair
market value, i.e., is evidence sufficient to establish the fair market
value, if not rebutted?
The proposed amendment would also expand the scope of Sec.
2B1.1(b)(15) by amending the commentary to provide additional factors
for the court to consider in determining whether one or more prongs of
subsection (b)(15) apply. The Commission invites comment on whether it
should make any further changes to subsection (b)(15), such as by
expanding its scope or increasing its penalties, or both, to ``ensure
appropriate terms of imprisonment for offenders involved in substantial
bank frauds or other frauds relating to financial institutions''. If
so, what changes to subsection (b)(15) should be made?
B. Mitigating Factors
Are there mitigating factors in cases involving mortgage fraud or
financial fraud that are not adequately accounted for in the
guidelines? If so, how should the Commission amend the Guidelines
Manual to account for those mitigating factors?
(D) Impact of Loss and Victims Tables in Certain Cases
Issues for Comment:
1. The Commission has observed that cases sentenced under Sec.
2B1.1 involving relatively large loss amounts have relatively high
rates of below-range sentences (both government sponsored and non-
government sponsored), particularly in the context of securities fraud
and similar offenses. The Commission also has received public comment
and reviewed judicial opinions suggesting that the impact of the loss
table or the victims table (or the combined impact of the loss table
and the victims table) may overstate the culpability of certain
offenders in such cases.
In response to these concerns, the Commission is studying whether
it should limit the impact of the loss table or the victims table (or
both) in cases sentenced under Sec. 2B1.1 involving relatively large
loss amounts and, if so, how it should limit the impact.
In particular, the Commission seeks comment on whether one or more
of the following approaches should be adopted:
(A) Limiting Impact of Loss Table if the Defendant Had Relatively
Little Gain Relative to the Loss. Should the Commission insert a new
specific offense characteristic in Sec. 2B1.1 to limit the impact of
the loss table in cases involving large loss amounts if the defendant
had relatively little gain relative to the loss? Examples of such a
provision are the following:
(Ex. 1) If the defendant's gain resulting from the offense did
not exceed $10,000, the adjustment from application of subsection
(b)(1) shall not exceed [14]/[16] levels.
(Ex. 2) If the defendant's gain resulting from the offense did
not exceed $25,000, the adjustment from application of subsection
(b)(1) shall not exceed [16]/[18] levels.
(Ex. 3) If the defendant's gain resulting from the offense did
not exceed $70,000, the adjustment from application of subsection
(b)(1) shall not exceed [18]/[20] levels.
The maximum gain amount in the examples corresponds to one percent
of the maximum loss amount. For example, in Example 3, the maximum gain
amount is $70,000, which corresponds to a maximum loss amount of
$7,000,000. (A loss amount of $7,000,000, in turn, corresponds to an
enhancement of 18 levels, while a loss amount of more than $7,000,000
corresponds to an enhancement of 20 levels.)
(B) Limiting Impact of Victims Table if No Victims Were
Substantially Harmed by the Offense. Should the Commission amend the
victims table in Sec. 2B1.1(b)(2) to limit the impact of the
[[Page 2784]]
victims table if no victims were substantially harmed by the offense?
For example, should the Commission provide that the 4-level and 6-level
prongs of the victims table apply only if the offense substantially
endangered the solvency or financial security of at least one victim?
(C) Limiting Cumulative Impact of Loss Table and Victims Table.
Should the Commission limit the cumulative impact of the loss table and
the victims table? For example, should the Commission provide that, if
the enhancement under the loss table is [14]-[24] levels, do not apply
the 4-level or 6-level adjustment under the victims table?
The Commission seeks comment on these three approaches. The
Commission also seeks comment on whether it should modify one or more
of these approaches to take the form of departure provisions rather
than specific offense characteristics. Finally, the Commission seeks
comment on any other approaches that would address the impacts of the
loss table and the victims table in a manner that ensures they are
consistent with the purposes of sentencing.
2. If the Commission were to limit the impacts of the loss table or
the victims table, or both, should the limitation apply in all cases
sentenced under '2B1.1, or only in a subset of such cases (e.g., only
in securities fraud cases)?
3. Many guidelines refer to the loss table in Sec. 2B1.1, such as
Sec. 2B5.3 (Criminal Infringement of Copyright or Trademark), Sec.
2C1.2 (Offering, Giving, Soliciting, or Receiving a Gratuity), and
Sec. 2S1.1 (Laundering of Monetary Instruments; Engaging in Monetary
Transactions in Property Derived From Unlawful Activity). Other
guidelines maintain a certain proportionality with the fraud guideline
even though they do not refer directly to the loss table in Sec.
2B1.1, such as guidelines that use the tax table in Sec. 2T4.1. If the
Commission were to limit the impacts of the loss table or the victims
table, or both, in Sec. 2B1.1, what changes, if any, should the
Commission make to other guidelines for proportionality?
2. Drugs
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed amendment contains
two parts, each of which involves drug offenses.
Part A sets forth detailed issues for comment regarding offenses
involving N-Benzylpiperazine (BZP) and whether the Commission should
amend the guidelines applicable to offenses involving BZP, such as by
providing a specific reference for BZP in the Drug Quantity Table in
Sec. 2D1.1 (Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or
Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to Commit These
Offenses); Attempt or Conspiracy). Among other things, the issues for
comment ask whether the Commission should base the penalties for BZP on
the penalties for MDMA (Ecstasy), on the penalties for amphetamine, or
on some other basis.
Part B sets forth a proposed amendment that would create a ``safety
valve'' provision in the guideline for chemical precursors, Sec.
2D1.11 (Unlawfully Distributing, Importing, Exporting or Possessing a
Listed Chemical; Attempt or Conspiracy), that parallels the ``safety
valve'' provision in Sec. 2D1.1. The proposed amendment adds a new
specific offense characteristic at Sec. 2D1.11(b)(6) and a
corresponding new application note. Under the proposed amendment,
certain first-time, nonviolent offenders sentenced under the chemical
precursor guideline, Sec. 2D1.11, would be eligible to receive the
same 2-level ``safety valve'' reduction (and using the same five
``safety valve'' criteria) as such offenders are eligible to receive
under Sec. 2D1.1.
The two parts are as follows:
(A) BZP
Issues for Comment:
1. The Commission seeks comment regarding whether the Commission
should amend the guidelines applicable to offenses involving BZP, such
as by providing a specific reference for BZP in the Drug Quantity Table
in Sec. 2D1.1.
Offenses involving BZP represent a very small but increasing
proportion of the federal caseload. Courts have reached different
conclusions about what the marijuana equivalency for BZP should be, and
those differences may be resulting in unwarranted sentencing
disparities. The Commission has received several requests to address
BZP offenses, including a request from the Second Circuit in United
States v. Figueroa, 647 F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 2011) (``inasmuch as the
parties inform us that use of BZP, alone and in combination with other
substances, to mimic the effects of other narcotics is increasingly
prominent in certain parts of this Circuit, we direct the Clerk of the
Court to forward a certified copy of this opinion to the Chairperson
and Chief Counsel of the United States Sentencing Commission for
whatever consideration they may deem appropriate'').
The Guidelines Manual does not provide a specific reference for BZP
in the Drug Quantity Table in Sec. 2D1.1 and does not provide a
marijuana equivalency for BZP in the Drug Equivalency Table in
Application Note 10(D) to Sec. 2D1.1. Accordingly, guideline penalties
for offenses involving BZP are determined under Application Note 5 to
Sec. 2D1.1, which directs the court to determine the base offense
level using the marijuana equivalency of the ``most closely related
controlled substance'' referenced in the guideline. In determining the
most closely related substance, the court shall, to the extent
practicable, consider the following:
(A) Whether the controlled substance not referenced in this
guideline has a chemical structure that is substantially similar to a
controlled substance referenced in this guideline.
(B) Whether the controlled substance not referenced in this
guideline has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the
central nervous system that is substantially similar to the stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a
controlled substance referenced in this guideline.
(C) Whether a lesser or greater quantity of the controlled
substance not referenced in this guideline is needed to produce a
substantially similar effect on the central nervous system as a
controlled substance referenced in this guideline.
See Sec. 2D1.1, comment. (n.5).
District courts have suggested that the substance most closely
related to BZP may be amphetamine, see United States v. Rose, 722
F.Supp.2d 1286, 1289 (M.D.Ala. 2010) (``BZP on its own may arguably be
most similar to amphetamine''), or methylphenidate (Ritalin), see
United States v. Beckley, 715 F.Supp.2d 743, 748 (E.D.Mich. 2010)
(stating that, if the issue of BZP alone were before the court, ``it
would be obliged to conclude that the most closely related controlled
substance * * * is methylphenidate''). However, the Eighth Circuit has
upheld a district court's conclusion that BZP is most closely related
to MDMA. See United States v. Bennett, ---- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 4950051
(8th Cir. 2011).
A. In General
The Commission invites general comment on BZP offenses and BZP
offenders and how these offenses and offenders compare with other drug
offenses and drug offenders. For example, how is BZP manufactured? How
is it distributed and marketed? How is it possessed and used? What are
the characteristics of the offenders involved in these various
activities? What harms are posed by these activities?
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B. Chemical Structure
Is the chemical structure of BZP substantially similar to the
chemical structure of a controlled substance referenced in Sec. 2D1.1?
If so, to what substance?
C. Effect on Central Nervous System, and Relative Potency
Is the effect on the central nervous system of BZP a stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect? Is that effect substantially
similar to the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the
central nervous system of a controlled substance referenced in Sec.
2D1.1? If so, to what substance? Is the quantity of BZP needed to
produce that effect lesser or greater than the quantity needed of the
other such substance? If so, what is the difference in relative
potency?
The Drug Enforcement Administration has described BZP as a
stimulant that is 10 to 20 times less potent than amphetamine. See 75
FR 47451 (August 6, 2010) (``BZP is about 20 times less potent than
amphetamine in producing [effects similar to amphetamine]. However, in
subjects with a history of amphetamine dependence, BZP was found to be
about 10 times less potent than amphetamine.''). The Commission invites
comment on this description. If this description is accurate, should
the Commission provide a marijuana equivalency for BZP on this basis,
e.g., by specifying a marijuana equivalency for BZP equal to one-tenth
or one-twentieth of the marijuana equivalency for amphetamine? In
particular, under the Drug Equivalency Table, 1 gram of amphetamine is
equivalent to 2 kilograms of marijuana. Should the Commission specify a
marijuana equivalency for BZP such that 1 gram of BZP is equivalent to
one-tenth or one-twentieth of this, i.e., 200 or 100 grams of
marijuana? If not, what should the Commission specify as the marijuana
equivalency for BZP?
2. There have been cases in which the offense involved BZP in
combination with another controlled substance (such as MDMA), with non-
controlled substances (such as TFMPP or caffeine), or both, in various
proportions.
Courts have recognized that distinctions between BZP alone and BZP
in combination with other substances may be appropriate. For example,
the Second Circuit in United States v. Chowdhury, 639 F.3d 583 (2d Cir.
2011), upheld a determination that BZP in combination with TFMPP is
most closely related to MDMA, but in United States v. Figueroa, 647
F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 2011), remanded a determination that BZP alone is
most closely related to MDMA, finding Chowdhury not applicable and the
record otherwise insufficient. See id. at 470 (``Although we certainly
do not foreclose the determination that MDMA is the appropriate
substitute for BZP alone, in the absence of an evidentiary hearing to
determine the nature of the mixture, its chemical structure, and its
intended neurological effects, the record on appeal does not permit us
to determine whether the proper substitute is amphetamine * * *, MDMA,
or another substance on the Drug Equivalency Table * * * '').
Should the guidelines make distinctions between offenses involving
BZP alone and BZP in combination with other substances? If so, what
distinctions should be made? Are there particular combinations
involving BZP that should be specifically accounted for in the
guidelines and, if so, what are the combinations and how should the
guidelines account for them?
What controlled substance or substances are most closely related to
BZP in combination with these various other substances? What marijuana
equivalency or equivalencies should be provided for offenses involving
BZP under these various circumstances?
The tendency of the courts appears to be to follow an approach
under which the BZP combination is most closely related to MDMA (but
possibly at reduced potency). The Commission invites comment on this
approach. If this approach is appropriate, should the Commission
provide a marijuana equivalency for BZP combinations on this basis,
e.g., by specifying a marijuana equivalency for BZP in combination with
other substances that is equal to the marijuana equivalency for MDMA
(but possibly at reduced potency)? In particular, under the Drug
Equivalency Table, 1 gram of MDMA is equivalent to 500 grams of
marijuana. Should the Commission specify a marijuana equivalency for
BZP in combination with other substances such that 1 gram of BZP is
equivalent to 500 grams of marijuana? Or should the Commission specify
an equivalency lower than 500 grams to account for the possible reduced
potency?
3. What, if any, other considerations should the Commission take
into account in determining how, if at all, the guidelines should be
amended as they apply to offenses involving BZP?
(B) ``Safety Valve'' Provision in Sec. 2D1.11
Proposed Amendment:
Section 2D1.11(b) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(6) If the defendant meets the criteria set forth in subdivisions
(1)-(5) of subsection (a) of '5C1.2 (Limitation on Applicability of
Statutory Minimum Sentences in Certain Cases), decrease by 2 levels.''.
The Commentary to Sec. 2D1.11 captioned ``Application Notes'' is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``9. Applicability of Subsection (b)(6).--The applicability of
subsection (b)(6) shall be determined without regard to the offense of
conviction. If subsection (b)(6) applies, Sec. 5C1.2(b) does not
apply. See Sec. 5C1.2(b)(2) (requiring a minimum offense level of
level 17 if the `statutorily required minimum sentence is at least five
years').''.
3. Human Rights
Synopsis of Proposed Amendment: This proposed two-part amendment is
a continuation of the Commission's multi-year review to ensure that the
guidelines provide appropriate guidelines penalties for cases involving
human rights violations.
A. Human Rights Offenses
Part A of the proposed amendment addresses cases in which the
defendant is convicted of an offense that Congress has indicated is a
``serious human rights offense,'' i.e., an offense under 18 U.S.C. 1091
(Genocide), 2340A (Torture), 2441 (War crimes), and 2442 (Recruitment
or use of child soldiers). See 28 U.S.C. 509B(e). Such offenses are
currently accounted for in the guidelines as follows:
(1) Genocide. Section 1091 offenses apply to a range of conduct
committed ``with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in
substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group''.
See 18 U.S.C. 1091(a). The range of conduct includes (i) Killing
members of the group; (ii) causing serious bodily injury to members
of the group; (iii) causing permanent impairment of the mental
faculties of members of the group (e.g., by drugs or torture); (iv)
subjecting the group to conditions of life that are intended to
cause the physical destruction of the group; (v) imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group; and (vi) transferring
by force children of the group to another group. Id. The statutory
maximum term of imprisonment is 20 years, or life imprisonment if
the conduct involved killing and death resulted. See 18 U.S.C.
1091(b). In addition, section 1091(c) makes it a crime to ``directly
and publicly incite[] another'' to violate section 1091(a); the
statutory maximum term of imprisonment for this offense is 5 years.
See 18 U.S.C. 1091(c). Section 1091 offenses are referenced in
Appendix A (Statutory Index) to Sec. 2H1.1 (Civil Rights).
(2) Torture. Section 2340A offenses apply to whoever commits or
attempts to commit
[[Page 2786]]
torture (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2340). The statutory maximum term
of imprisonment is 20 years, or any term of years or life if death
resulted. See 18 U.S.C. 2340A(a). Section 2340A offenses are
referenced in Appendix A to Sec. Sec. 2A1.1 (First Degree Murder),
2A1.2 (Second Degree Murder), 2A2.1 (Assault with Intent to Commit
Murder; Attempted Murder), 2A2.2 (Aggravated Assault), and 2A4.1
(Kidnapping, Abduction, Unlawful Restraint).
(3) War Crimes. Section 2441 offenses apply to a range of
conduct that constitute a war crime (as defined in 18 U.S.C.
2441(c)). The range of conduct includes (i) Torture; (ii) cruel or
inhuman treatment; (iii) performing biological experiments; (iv)
murder; (v) mutilation or maiming; (vi) intentionally causing
serious bodily injury; (vii) rape; (viii) sexual assault or abuse;
and (ix) taking hostages. The statutory maximum term of imprisonment
is any term of years or life. See 18 U.S.C. 2441(a). Section 2441
offenses are not referenced in Appendix A.
(4) Child Soldiers. Section 2442 offenses apply to whoever
knowingly (1) recruits, enlists, or conscripts a child (i.e., a
person under 15 years of age) to serve in an armed force or group or
(2) uses a child to participate actively in hostilities. See 18
U.S.C. 2442(a). The statutory maximum term of imprisonment is 20
years, or any term of years or life if death resulted. See 18 U.S.C.
2442(b). Section 2442 offenses are referenced in Appendix A to Sec.
2H4.1 (Peonage, Involuntary Servitude, Slave Trade, and Child
Soldiers).
The proposed amendment provides two options for cases in which the
defendant is convicted of such an offense.
Option 1 establishes a new Chapter Two offense guideline, at Sec.
2H5.1 (Human Rights). The new offense guideline reflects a
consolidation into a single guideline of the various base offense
levels and specific offender characteristics that are involved in the
guidelines that currently account for these offenses. The new offense
guideline contains alternative base offense levels of [18] if the
defendant is convicted of the offense of incitement to genocide (which
generally has a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of 5 years) and
[24] otherwise. The guideline also contains enhancements that apply if
any victim sustained serious bodily injury (2 to 4 levels); if any
victim was sexually exploited (6 to 10 levels); if any victim was
abducted, involuntarily detained, or held in a condition of servitude
(6 to 10 levels); if the number of victims was [10][50] or more (2
levels); if death resulted; or if the defendant was a public official
[or military official] or the offense was committed under color of law
[or color of military authority].
Option 1 also amends Appendix A (Statutory Index) to reference each
of these offenses of conviction to the new guideline and makes
conforming changes to other offense guidelines.
Option 2 establishes a new Chapter Three adjustment, at Sec. 3A1.5
(Human Rights), that applies if the defendant [was convicted of]/
[committed] a serious human rights offense. The proposed guideline
provides an enhancement of [4]-[12] levels and a minimum offense level
of [24]-[32]. The proposed guideline also requires that the defendant
be placed in Criminal History Category [V][VI].
B. Immigration and Naturalization Offenses Involving Serious Human
Rights Offenses
Part B of the proposed amendment addresses cases in which the
offense of conviction is for immigration or naturalization fraud but
the defendant had committed a serious human rights offense. Immigration
and naturalization frauds are referenced in Appendix A to Sec. 2L2.1
(Trafficking in a Document Relating to Naturalization, Citizenship, or
Legal Resident Status, or a United States Passport; False Statement in
Respect to the Citizenship or Immigration Status of Another; Fraudulent
Marriage to Assist Alien to Evade Immigration Law) or Sec. 2L2.2
(Fraudulently Acquiring Documents Relating to Naturalization,
Citizenship, or Legal Resident Status for Own Use; False Personation or
Fraudulent Marriage by Alien to Evade Immigration Law; Fraudulently
Acquiring or Improperly Using a United States Passport), depending on
the offense of conviction.
The proposed amendment adds a new specific offense characteristic
to both guidelines. The new specific offense characteristic provides an
enhancement of [10]-[18] levels if the offense reflected an effort to
avoid detection or responsibility for a serious human rights offense.
Part C of the proposed amendment sets forth issues for comment on
human rights offenses.
(A) Human Rights Offenses
Proposed Amendment:
Option 1:
Chapter 2, Part H is amended in the heading by adding at the end
``AND HUMAN RIGHTS''.
Chapter 2, Part H is amended by adding at the end the following:
``5. HUMAN RIGHTS
Sec. 2H5.1. Human Rights
(a) Base Offense Level:
(1) [24], except as provided below;
(2) [18], if the defendant is convicted of an offense under 18
U.S.C. Sec. 1091(c).
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) (A) If any victim sustained permanent or life-threatening
bodily injury, increase by 4 levels; (B) if any victim sustained
serious bodily injury, increase by 2 levels; or (C) if the degree of
injury is between that specified in subdivisions (A) and (B), increase
by 3 levels.
(2) (A) If any victim was sexually exploited, increase by 6 levels;
(B) if any such victim had not attained the age of sixteen years,
increase by 8 levels; or (C) if any such victim had not attained the
age of twelve years, increase by 10 levels.
(3) (A) If any victim was abducted, involuntarily detained, or held
in a condition of servitude, increase by 6 levels; (B) if any such
victim continued to be so detained or held for at least 30 days,
increase by 8 levels; or (C) if any such victim continued to be so
detained or held for at least 180 days, increase by 10 levels.
(4) If the number of victims described in subdivisions (1) through
(3) was [10][50] or more, increase by [2][4] levels.
(5) If death resulted, increase to the greater of:
(A) 2 plus the offense level as determined above; or
(B) 2 plus the offense level from the most analogous guideline from
Chapter Two, Part A, Subpart 1 (Homicide).
(6) If (A) the defendant was a public official [or military
official] at the time of the offense; or (B) the offense was committed
under color of law [or color of military authority], increase by 6
levels.
Commentary
Statutory Provisions: 18 U.S.C. 1091, 2340A, 2441, and 2442.
Application Notes:
1. Definitions.--For purposes of this guideline--
Definitions of `serious bodily injury' and `permanent or life-
threatening bodily injury' are found in the Commentary to Sec. 1B1.1
(Application Instructions). However, for purposes of this guideline,
'serious bodily injury' means conduct other than criminal sexual abuse,
which is taken into account in the specific offense characteristic
under subsection (b)(2).
`Sexually exploited' includes offenses set forth in 18 U.S.C. 2241-
2244, 2251, and 2421-2423.
2. Interaction With Sec. 3A1.1 (Hate Crime Motivation or
Vulnerable Victim).--
(A) Hate Crime Motivation (Sec. 3A1.1(a)).--If the finder of fact
at trial or, in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the
court at sentencing determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant intentionally selected any victim or any property as the
object
[[Page 2787]]
of the offense because of the actual or perceived race, color,
religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, gender identity,
disability, or sexual orientation of any person, an additional 3-level
enhancement from Sec. 3A1.1(a) will apply. An adjustment from Sec.
3A1.1(a) will not apply, however, if a 6-level adjustment from Sec.
2H5.1(b)(6) applies.
(B) Vulnerable Victim (Sec. 3A1.1(b)).--The base offense level
does not incorporate the possibility that a victim of the offense was a
vulnerable victim for purposes of Sec. 3A1.1(b). Therefore, an
adjustment under '3A1.1(b) would apply, for example, in a case in which
the defendant recruited or used child soldiers (see 18 U.S.C. 2442) or
transferred by force children of a national, ethnic, racial, or
religious group (see 18 U.S.C. 1091(a)(5)).
3. Interaction with Sec. 3A1.3 (Restraint of Victim).--If
subsection (b)(3) applies, do not apply Sec. 3A1.3 (Restraint of
Victim).
4. Interaction With Sec. 3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use
of Special Skill.--If subsection (b)(6) applies, do not apply Sec.
3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill).