Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements, 330-403 [2011-33078]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 2 (Wednesday, January 4, 2012)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 330-403]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-33078]



[[Page 329]]

Vol. 77

Wednesday,

No. 2

January 4, 2012

Part II





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration





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14 CFR Parts 117, 119, and 121





Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 77 , No. 2 / Wednesday, January 4, 2012 / 
Rules and Regulations

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 117, 119, and 121

[Docket No. FAA-2009-1093; Amdt. Nos. 117-1, 119-16, 121-357]
RIN 2120-AJ58


Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This rule amends the FAA's existing flight, duty and rest 
regulations applicable to certificate holders and their flightcrew 
members operating under the domestic, flag, and supplemental operations 
rules. The rule recognizes the universality of factors that lead to 
fatigue in most individuals and regulates these factors to ensure that 
flightcrew members in passenger operations do not accumulate dangerous 
amounts of fatigue. Fatigue threatens aviation safety because it 
increases the risk of pilot error that could lead to an accident. This 
risk is heightened in passenger operations because of the additional 
number of potentially impacted individuals. The new requirements 
eliminate the current distinctions between domestic, flag and 
supplemental passenger operations. The rule provides different 
requirements based on the time of day, whether an individual is 
acclimated to a new time zone, and the likelihood of being able to 
sleep under different circumstances.

DATES: Effective January 14, 2014.

ADDRESSES: For information on where to obtain copies of rulemaking 
documents and other information related to this final rule, see ``How 
To Obtain Additional Information'' in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues: Dale E. Roberts, 
Air Transportation Division (AFS-200), Flight Standards Service, 
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., 
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-5749; email: 
dale.e.roberts@faa.gov. For legal issues: Rebecca MacPherson, Office of 
the Chief Counsel, Regulations Division (AGC-200), 800 Independence 
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-3073; email: 
rebecca.macpherson@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in 
Title 49 of the United States Code. This rulemaking is promulgated 
under the authority described in 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5), which requires 
the Administrator to promulgate regulations and minimum safety 
standards for other practices, methods, and procedures necessary for 
safety in air commerce and national security. This rulemaking is also 
promulgated under the authority described in 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(4), 
which requires the Administrator to promulgate regulations in the 
interest of safety for the maximum hours or periods of service of 
airmen and other employees of air carriers.

Table of Contents

I. Overview of Final Rule
II. Background
    A. Statement of the Problem
    B. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Recommendations
    C. Flight and Duty Time Limitations and Rest Requirements 
Aviation Rulemaking Committee
    D. Congressional Mandate
    E. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
III. Discussion of Public Comments and Final Rule
    A. Applicability
    B. Definitions
    C. Fitness for Duty
    D. Fatigue Education and Training
    E. Fatigue Risk Management System
    F. Flight Duty Period--Unaugmented
    G. Flight Time Limitations
    H. Flight Duty Period--Augmented
    I. Schedule Reliability
    J. Extensions of Flight Duty Periods
    K. Split Duty
    L. Consecutive Nights
    M. Reserve
    N. Cumulative Limits
    O. Rest
    P. Deadhead Transportation
    Q. Emergency and Government Sponsored Operations
    R. Miscellaneous Issues
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
    A. Regulatory Evaluation
    B. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
    C. International Trade Impact Assessment
    D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
    E. Paperwork Reduction Act
    F. International Compatibility
    G. Environmental Analysis
V. Executive Order Determinations
    A. Executive Order 12866
    B. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
    C. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect 
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
VI. How To Obtain Additional Information
    A. Rulemaking Documents
    B. Comments Submitted to the Docket
    C. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

I. Overview of Final Rule

    The FAA is issuing this final rule to address the risk that fatigue 
poses to passenger operations conducted under 14 CFR part 121. Part 121 
applies to the majority of flights flown by the American public. As 
such, changes to the existing flight, duty and rest rules in part 121 
will directly affect the flying public. This rule applies to all part 
121 passenger operations, including traditional scheduled service and 
large charter operations. The FAA has removed the existing distinctions 
between domestic, supplemental and flag passenger operations because 
the factors leading to fatigue are universal and addressing the risk to 
the flying public should be consistent across the different types of 
operations.
    This final rule addresses fatigue risk in several ways. The 
underlying philosophy of the rule is that no single element of the rule 
mitigates the risk of fatigue to an acceptable level; rather, the FAA 
has adopted a system approach, whereby both the carrier and the pilot 
accept responsibility for mitigating fatigue. The carrier provides an 
environment that permits sufficient sleep and recovery periods, and the 
crewmembers take advantage of that environment. Both parties must meet 
their respective responsibilities in order to adequately protect the 
flying public.
    The final rule recognizes the natural circadian rhythms experienced 
by most people that causes them to be naturally more tired at night 
than during the day. Under the final rule, flightcrew members will be 
able to work longer hours during the day than during the night. 
Significant changes in time zones, a situation unique to aviation, are 
accounted for to reduce the risk to the flying public posed by 
``jetlag''.
    The FAA has decided against adopting various provisions proposed in 
the NPRM. The final rule does not apply to all-cargo operations, 
although those carriers have the ability to fly under the new rules if 
they so choose. The proposal that carriers meet certain schedule 
reliability requirements has been dropped, as has the proposed 
requirement that carriers evaluate flightcrew members for fatigue. The 
FAA has determined that these provisions were either overly costly or 
impractical to implement.

1. Fitness for Duty

    This rule places a joint responsibility on the certificate holder 
and each flightcrew member. In order for the flightcrew member to 
report for an FDP properly rested, the certificate holder must provide 
the flightcrew member

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with a meaningful rest opportunity that will allow the flightcrew 
member to get the proper amount of sleep. Likewise, the flightcrew 
member bears the responsibility of actually sleeping during the rest 
opportunity provided by the certificate holder instead of using that 
time to do other things. The consequence of a flightcrew member 
reporting for duty without being properly rested is that he or she is 
prohibited from beginning or continuing an FDP until he or she is 
properly rested.

2. Fatigue Education and Training

    Part 121 air carriers are currently statutorily-required to 
annually provide, as part of their Fatigue Risk Management Plan, 
fatigue-related education and training to increase the trainees' 
awareness of: (1) Fatigue; (2) ``the effects of fatigue on pilots;'' 
and (3) ``fatigue countermeasures.'' Today's rule adopts the same 
standard of training as required by the statute. In addition, today's 
rule adopts a mandatory update of the carriers' education and training 
program every two years, as part of the update to their FRMP. Both of 
these regulatory provisions merely place the existing statutory 
requirements in the new flight and duty regulations for the ease and 
convenience of the regulated parties and the FAA.

3. Fatigue Risk Management System

    The FAA proposed a Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) as an 
alternative regulatory approach to provide a means of monitoring and 
mitigating fatigue. Under an FRMS, a certificate holder develops 
processes that manage and mitigate fatigue and meet an equivalent level 
of safety. The FAA is adopting that proposal largely as proposed. The 
FAA has also decided to extend the voluntary FRMS program to all-cargo 
operations, which are not required to operate under part 117. Under the 
FRMS provisions that this rule adds to subparts Q, R, and S of part 
121, an all-cargo operator that does not wish to operate under part 117 
can nevertheless utilize an FRMS as long as it has the pertinent FAA 
approval.

4. Unaugmented Operations

    One of the regulatory concepts that this rule introduces is the 
restriction on flightcrew members' maximum Flight Duty Period (FDP). In 
creating a maximum FDP limit, the FAA attempted to address three 
concerns. First, flightcrew members' circadian rhythms needed to be 
addressed because studies have shown that flightcrew members who fly 
during their window of circadian low (WOCL) can experience severe 
performance degradation. Second, the amount of time spent at work 
needed to be taken into consideration because longer shifts increase 
fatigue. Third, the number of flight segments in a duty period needed 
to be taken into account because flying more segments requires more 
takeoffs and landings, which are both the most task-intensive and the 
most safety-critical stages of flight. To address these concerns, the 
FAA is adopting as part of the regulatory text a table limiting maximum 
FDP based on the time of day and the number of segments flown during 
the FDP period. Under today's rule an FDP begins when a flightcrew 
member is required to report for duty that includes a flight and ends 
when the aircraft is parked after the last flight and there is no plan 
for further aircraft movement by the same flightcrew member. The 
maximum FDP limit is reduced during nighttime hours to account for 
being awake during the WOCL; when an FDP period consists of multiple 
flight segments in order to account for the additional time on task; 
and if a flightcrew member is unacclimated to account for the fact that 
the unacclimated flightcrew member's circadian rhythm is not in sync 
with the theater in which he or she is operating. Actual time at the 
controls (flight time) is limited to 8 or 9 hours, depending on the 
time of day that the FDP commences.

5. Augmented Operations

    In order to accommodate common operational practices, the final 
rule allows longer duty periods in instances where the carrier provides 
additional crew and adequate on-board rest facilities. The extended 
FDPs are laid out in a table and provide maximum credit when an 
operator employs a 4-man crew and provides the highest quality on-board 
rest facility.

6. Extensions of Flight Duty Periods

    This rule sets forth the limits on the number of FDPs that may be 
extended; implements reporting requirements for affected FDPs; and 
distinguishes extended FDPs due to unforeseen operational circumstances 
that occur prior to takeoff from those unforeseen operational 
circumstances that arise after takeoff. The FAA agrees that an 
extension must be based on exceeding the maximum FDP permitted in the 
regulatory tables rather than on the times that the air carrier had 
originally intended for an FDP, which may be considerably less than the 
tables allow. It is unreasonable to limit extensions on FDPs that are 
less than what the certificate holder can legally schedule. In 
addition, there is a 30-minute buffer attached to each FDP to provide 
certificate holders with the flexibility to deal with delays that are 
minimal.

7. Split Duty

    Split duty rest breaks provide carriers with nighttime operations 
with additional flexibility. Typically split duty rest would benefit 
carriers who conduct late night and early morning operations where the 
flightcrew members would typically be afforded some opportunity to 
sleep, but would not receive a legal rest period. Under today's rule 
split duty rest must be at least 3 hours long and must be scheduled in 
advance. The actual split duty rest breaks may not be shorter than the 
scheduled split duty rest breaks. The rationale for this is that 
flightcrew members must, at the beginning of their FDP, evaluate their 
ability to safely complete their entire assigned FDP. In order to do 
so, they must not only know the length of the FDP, but any scheduled 
split duty rest breaks that they will receive during the FDP.

8. Consecutive Night Operations

    In formulating this rule, the FAA was particularly concerned about 
cumulative fatigue caused by repeatedly flying at night. Modeling shows 
substantially deteriorating performance after the third consecutive 
nighttime FDP for flightcrew members who worked nightshifts during 
their WOCL and obtained sleep during the day. However, if a sleep 
opportunity is provided during each nighttime FDP, that sleep 
opportunity may sustain flightcrew member performance for five 
consecutive nights. Based on modeling results, the FAA has determined 
that a 2-hour nighttime sleep opportunity each night improves pilot 
performance sufficient to allow up to 5 nights of consecutive nighttime 
operations.

9. Reserve

    The FAA has decided to rely on the expertise represented in the ARC 
to address the issue of reserve duty. The adopted regulatory provisions 
addressing reserve and unaugmented operations provide that the total 
number of hours a flightcrew member may spend in a flight duty period 
and reserve availability period may not exceed 16 hours or the maximum 
applicable flight duty period table plus four hours, whichever is less. 
This will allow most FDPs to be accommodated by a flightcrew member on 
short-call reserve. This rule adopts the proposal that limits the 
short-call reserve availability period, in which the

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flightcrew member is not called to report to work, to 14 hours.

10. Cumulative Limits

    The FAA is adopting cumulative limits for FDP and flight-time 
limits. The FAA has decided to retain both of these cumulative limits 
because (1) the FDP limits restrict the amount of cumulative fatigue 
that a flightcrew member accumulates before and during flights; and (2) 
the flight-time limits allow the FAA to provide air carriers with more 
scheduling flexibility by setting higher cumulative FDP limits in this 
rule. This additional scheduling flexibility justifies the added 
restrictions on cumulative flight time, which can easily be tracked by 
scheduling programs currently in use throughout the industry. The FAA 
has decided to eliminate the cumulative duty-period limits, which 
should greatly simplify compliance with this section.

11. Rest

    Carriers will be required to provide their crew with a 10-hour rest 
opportunity prior to commencing a duty period that includes flying. 
While the 10-hour rest period may include the amount of time it takes 
to get to or from a flightcrew member's house or hotel room, the actual 
amount of time required for a sleep opportunity may not be reduced 
below 8 hours. In addition, the length of continuous time off during a 
7-day period has been extended from 24 hours under the existing rules 
to 30 hours. Additional time off is required for individuals whose 
internal clock may be off because of flipping back and forth between 
different time zones.

12. Emergency and Government Sponsored Operations

    This rulemaking also addresses operations that require flying into 
or out of hostile areas, and politically sensitive, remote areas that 
do not have rest facilities. These operations range from an emergency 
situation to moving armed troops for the U.S. military, conducting 
humanitarian relief, repatriation, Air Mobility Command (AMC), and 
State Department missions. The applicability provision of this section 
now specifically articulates the two categories of operations that are 
affected. This section applies to operations conducted pursuant to 
contracts with the U.S. Government department and agencies. This 
section also applies to operations conducted pursuant to a deviation 
issued by the Administrator under Sec.  119.57 that authorizes an air 
carrier to deviate from the requirements of parts 121 and 135 to 
perform emergency operations. This authority is issued on a case-by-
case basis during an emergency situation as determined by the 
Administrator. The FAA concludes that these two categories are the only 
types of operations that warrant separate consideration because of the 
unique operating circumstances that otherwise limit a certificate 
holder's flexibility to deal with unusual circumstances.
Costs and Benefits
    We have analyzed the benefits and the costs associated with the 
requirements contained in this final rule. We provide a range of 
estimates for our quantitative benefits. Our base case estimate is $376 
million ($247 million present value at 7% and $311 million at 3%) and 
our high case estimate is $716 million ($470 million present value at 
7% and $593 million at 3%). The FAA believes there are also not-
quantified benefits to the rule that, when added to the base case 
estimate, make the rule cost beneficial. The total estimated cost of 
the final rule is $390 million ($297 million present value at 7% and 
$338 million at 3%).

                      Summary Over a 10 Year Period
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                        Total quantified benefits
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                                     Nominal      PV at 7%     PV at 3%
             Estimate               (millions)   (millions)   (millions)
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Base.............................         $376         $247         $311
High.............................          716          470          593
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                         Total quantified costs
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                                     Nominal      PV at 7%     PV at 3%
            Component               (millions)   (millions)   (millions)
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Flight Operations................         $236         $157         $191
Rest Facilities..................          138          129          134
Training.........................           16           11           13
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    Total........................          390          297          338
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    The FAA has made significant changes to the final rule since the 
NPRM. The training requirement has been substantially reduced because 
the FAA has determined that pilots are already receiving the requisite 
training as part of the statutorily required Fatigue Risk Management 
Plans. The FAA also has removed all-cargo operations from the 
applicability section of the new part 117 because their compliance 
costs significantly exceed the quantified societal benefits.\1\ All-
cargo carriers may choose to comply with the new part 117 but are not 
required to do so. Since the carrier would decide voluntarily to comply 
with the new requirements, those costs are not attributed to the costs 
of this rule. The costs associated with the rest facilities occur in 
the two years after the rule is published. The other costs of the rule 
and the benefits are then estimated over the next ten years.
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    \1\ The projected cost for all-cargo operations is $306 million 
($214 million present value at 7% and $252 million at 3%). The 
projected benefit of avoiding one fatal all-cargo accident ranges 
between $20.35 million and $32.55 million, depending on the number 
of crewmembers on board the aircraft.
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II. Background

    On September 14, 2010, the FAA published a Flightcrew Member Duty 
and Rest Requirements notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) setting out 
proposed flight, duty, and rest regulations intended to limit 
flightcrew member fatigue in part 121 operations. These proposed 
regulations applied to all operations conducted pursuant to part 121, 
and the regulations would

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have imposed, among other things, the following limits/requirements: 
(1) A requirement that a flightcrew member must notify the certificate 
holder (air carrier) when he or she is not fit for duty and that a 
certificate holder must also independently evaluate its flightcrew 
members for fitness for duty; (2) a limit on daily flight duty period 
(FDP) and flight-time hours that varies depending on the time of day 
that the FDP begins; (3) cumulative limits on FDPs, flight times, and 
duty periods; (4) a schedule reliability requirement, which stated that 
a certificate holder's scheduled FDPs must be at least 95% consistent 
with actual FDPs; (5) a requirement that a flightcrew member be 
provided with at least 9 consecutive hours of rest between FDPs, as 
measured from the time the flightcrew member reaches a suitable 
accommodation; and (6) credit for employing fatigue-mitigating measures 
such as split-duty rest and augmentation.
    The FAA received over 8,000 comments in response to the NPRM. In 
response to the comments, the FAA has made a number of changes to the 
regulatory provisions proposed in the NPRM. These changes include the 
following:
     The mandatory provisions of the NPRM do not apply to all-
cargo operations. Instead, this rule permits all-cargo operations to 
voluntarily opt into the new flight, duty, and rest limitations imposed 
by this rule.
     Certificate holders are no longer required to 
independently verify whether flightcrew members are fit for duty.
     Most of the daily FDP limits have been increased to 
provide certificate holders with more scheduling flexibility. One of 
the daily flight-time limits has been decreased to address safety 
considerations.
     The cumulative duty-period limit has been removed from 
this rule.
     The schedule-reliability requirement has been largely 
removed from the final rule. The remaining parts of the schedule-
reliability process have been changed to only apply to instances in 
which a flightcrew member exceeds the FDP and/or flight-time limits 
imposed by this rule.
     The flightcrew member must now be provided with 10 hours 
of rest between FDP periods, but that rest is measured from the time 
that the flightcrew member is released from duty. The rest must provide 
for an 8-hour sleep opportunity.
     The amount of credit provided for split-duty rest and 
augmentation has been increased, and changes to the final rule make 
these credits easier to obtain.
    The changes listed above are just some of the amendments that were 
made to the NPRM in response to the comments. The Discussion of Public 
Comments and Final Rule section of this preamble contains a discussion 
of the changes that were made to the NPRM in response to issues raised 
by the commenters.

A. Statement of the Problem

    Fatigue is characterized by a general lack of alertness and 
degradation in mental and physical performance. Fatigue manifests in 
the aviation context not only when pilots fall asleep in the cockpit in 
flight, but perhaps more importantly, when they are insufficiently 
alert during take-off and landing. Reported fatigue-related events have 
included procedural errors, unstable approaches, lining up with the 
wrong runway, and landing without clearances.
    There are three types of fatigue: Transient, cumulative, and 
circadian. Transient fatigue is acute fatigue brought on by extreme 
sleep restriction or extended hours awake within 1 or 2 days. 
Cumulative fatigue is fatigue brought on by repeated mild sleep 
restriction or extended hours awake across a series of days. Circadian 
fatigue refers to the reduced performance during nighttime hours, 
particularly during an individual's WOCL (typically between 2 a.m. and 
6 a.m.).
    Common symptoms of fatigue include:
     Measurable reduction in speed and accuracy of performance,
     Lapses of attention and vigilance,
     Delayed reactions,
     Impaired logical reasoning and decision-making, including 
a reduced ability to assess risk or appreciate consequences of actions,
     Reduced situational awareness, and
     Low motivation to perform optional activities.
    A variety of factors contribute to whether an individual 
experiences fatigue as well as the severity of that fatigue. The major 
factors affecting fatigue include:
     Time of day. Fatigue is, in part, a function of circadian 
rhythms. All other factors being equal, fatigue is most likely, and, 
when present, most severe, between the hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m.
     Amount of recent sleep. If a person has had significantly 
less than 8 hours of sleep in the past 24 hours, he or she is more 
likely to be fatigued.
     Time awake. A person who has been continually awake for a 
long period of time since his or her last major sleep period is more 
likely to be fatigued.
     Cumulative sleep debt. For the average person, cumulative 
sleep debt is the difference between the amount of sleep a person has 
received over the past several days, and the amount of sleep he or she 
would have received with 8 hours of sleep a night.
     Time on task. The longer a person has continuously been 
doing a job without a break, the more likely he or she is to be 
fatigued.
     Individual variation. Individuals respond to fatigue 
factors differently and may become fatigued at different times, and to 
different degrees of severity, under the same circumstances.
    Scientific research and experimentation have consistently 
demonstrated that adequate sleep sustains performance. For most people, 
8 hours of sleep in each 24-hour period sustains performance 
indefinitely. Sleep opportunities during the WOCL are preferable 
because sleep that occurs during the WOCL provides the most 
recuperative value. Within limits, shortened periods of nighttime sleep 
may be nearly as beneficial as a consolidated sleep period when 
augmented by additional sleep periods, such as naps before evening 
departures, during flights with augmented flightcrews, and during 
layovers. Sleep should not be fragmented with interruptions. In 
addition, environmental conditions, such as temperature, noise, and 
turbulence, impact how beneficial sleep is and how performance is 
restored.
    When a person has accumulated a sleep debt, recovery sleep is 
necessary to fully restore the person's ``sleep reservoir.'' Recovery 
sleep should include at least one physiological night, that is, one 
sleep period during nighttime hours in the time zone in which the 
individual is acclimated. The average person requires in excess of 9 
hours of sleep a night to recover from a sleep debt. \2\
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    \2\ Recovery sleep does not require additional sleep equal to 
the cumulative sleep debt; that is, an 8-hour sleep debt does not 
require 8 additional hours of sleep.
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    Several aviation-specific work schedule factors \3\ can affect 
sleep and subsequent alertness. These include early start times, 
extended work periods, insufficient time off between work periods, 
insufficient recovery time off between consecutive work periods, amount 
of work time within a shift or duty period, number of consecutive work 
periods, night work through one's window of circadian low, daytime 
sleep

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periods, and day-to-night or night-to-day transitions.
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    \3\ Rosekind MR. Managing work schedules: an alertness and 
safety perspective. In: Kryger MH, Roth T, Dement WC, editors. 
Principles and Practice of Sleep Medicine; 2005:682.
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    The FAA believes that its current regulations do not adequately 
address the risk of fatigue. The impact of this risk is greater in 
passenger operations due to the number of persons placed at risk. 
Presently, flightcrew members are effectively allowed to work up to 16 
hours a day (regardless of the time of day), with all of that time 
spent on tasks directly related to aircraft operations. The regulatory 
requirement for 9 hours of rest is regularly reduced, with flightcrew 
members spending rest time traveling to or from hotels and being 
provided with little to no time to decompress. Additionally, 
certificate holders regularly exceed the allowable duty periods by 
conducting flights under part 91 instead of part 121, where the 
applicable flight, duty and rest requirements are housed. As the 
National Transportation Safety Board repeatedly notes, the FAA's 
regulations do not account for the impact of circadian rhythms on 
alertness. The entire set of regulations is overly complicated, with a 
different set of regulations for domestic operations, flag operations, 
and supplemental operations. In addition, these regulations do not 
consider other factors that can lead to varying degrees of fatigue. 
Instead, each set of operational rules (i.e. those applicable to 
domestic, flag, or supplemental operations) sets forth a singular 
approach toward addressing fatigue, regardless of the operational 
circumstances that may be more or less fatiguing.\4\
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    \4\ While several of the commenters have claimed that the NPRM 
proposed a ``one-size-fits-all'' regulatory structure, the FAA 
believes this suggestion is misleading. In the NPRM, and in the 
final rule with regard to passenger-carrying operations, the FAA has 
eliminated distinctions between domestic, flag, and supplemental 
operations, but in all of these operations, the rule imposes 
differing requirements based on the operating environment.
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B. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Recommendations

    The NTSB has long been concerned about the effects of fatigue in 
the aviation industry. The first aviation safety recommendations, 
issued in 1972, involved human fatigue, and aviation safety 
investigations continue to identify serious concerns about the effects 
of fatigue, sleep, and circadian rhythm disruption. Currently, the 
NTSB's list of Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements includes 
safety recommendations regarding pilot fatigue. These recommendations 
are based on two accident investigations and an NTSB safety study on 
commuter airline safety.\5\
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    \5\ On February 2, 2010, the NTSB released a press release 
summarizing the results of its investigation into the Colgan Air 
crash of February 12, 2009, which resulted in the death of 50 
people. The NTSB did not state that fatigue was causal factor to the 
crash; however, it did recommend that the FAA take steps to address 
pilot fatigue.
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    In February 2006 the NTSB issued safety recommendations after a 
BAE-J3201 operated under part 121 by Corporate Airlines struck trees on 
final approach and crashed short of the runway at Kirksville Regional 
Airport, Kirksville, Missouri. The captain, first officer, and 11 of 
the 13 passengers died. The NTSB determined the probable cause of the 
October 19, 2004 accident was the pilots' failure to follow established 
procedures and properly conduct a non-precision instrument approach at 
night in instrument meteorological conditions. The NTSB concluded that 
fatigue likely contributed to the pilots' performance and decision-
making ability. This conclusion was based on the less than optimal 
overnight rest time available to the pilots, the early report time for 
duty, the number of flight legs, and the demanding conditions 
encountered during the long duty day.
    As a result of the accident, the NTSB issued the following safety 
recommendations related to flight and duty time limitations: (1) Modify 
and simplify the flightcrew hours-of-service regulations to consider 
factors such as length of duty day, starting time, workload, and other 
factors shown by recent research, scientific evidence, and current 
industry experience to affect crew alertness (recommendation No. A-06-
10); and (2) require all part 121 and part 135 certificate holders to 
incorporate fatigue-related information similar to the information 
being developed by the DOT Operator Fatigue Management Program into 
initial and recurrent pilot training programs. The recommendation notes 
that this training should address the detrimental effects of fatigue 
and include strategies for avoiding fatigue and countering its effects 
(recommendation No. A-06-10).
    The NTSB's list of Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements 
also includes a safety recommendation on pilot fatigue and ferry 
flights conducted under 14 CFR part 91. Three flightcrew members died 
after a Douglas DC-8-63 operated by Air Transport International was 
destroyed by ground impact and fire during an attempted three-engine 
takeoff at Kansas City International Airport in Kansas City, Missouri. 
The NTSB noted that the flightcrew conducted the flight as a 
maintenance ferry flight under part 91 after a shortened rest break 
following a demanding round trip flight to Europe that crossed multiple 
time zones. The NTSB further noted that the international flight, 
conducted under part 121, involved multiple legs flown at night 
following daytime rest periods that caused the flightcrew to experience 
circadian rhythm disruption. In addition, the NTSB found the captain's 
last rest period before the accident was repeatedly interrupted by the 
certificate holder.
    In issuing its 1995 recommendations, the NTSB stated that the 
flight time limits and rest requirements under part 121 that applied to 
the flightcrew before the ferry flight did not apply to the ferry 
flight operated under part 91. As a result, the regulations permitted a 
substantially reduced flightcrew rest period for the nonrevenue ferry 
flight. As a result of the investigation, the NTSB reiterated earlier 
recommendations to (1) finalize the review of current flight and duty 
time limitations to ensure the limitations consider research findings 
in fatigue and sleep issues and (2) prohibit certificate holders from 
assigning a flightcrew to flights conducted under part 91 unless the 
flightcrew met the flight and duty time limits under part 121 or other 
applicable regulations (recommendation No. A-95-113).
    In addition to recommending a comprehensive approach to fatigue 
with flight duty limits based on fatigue research, circadian rhythms, 
and sleep and rest requirements, the NTSB has also stated that a 
Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) may hold promise as an approach 
to dealing with fatigue in the aviation environment. However, the NTSB 
noted that it considers fatigue management plans to be a complement to, 
not a substitute for, regulations to address fatigue.

C. Flight and Duty Time Limitations and Rest Requirements Aviation 
Rulemaking Committee

    As part of this rulemaking action, the FAA chartered an aviation 
rulemaking committee (ARC) on June 24, 2009. The FAA brought together 
pilots, airlines, and scientific experts to collaborate and develop 
options for an FAA-proposed rulemaking to help mitigate pilot fatigue. 
The ARC provided a forum for the U.S. aviation community to discuss 
current approaches to mitigate fatigue found in international standards 
(e.g., the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standard, 
the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 371, and the 
European Aviation Safety Agency

[[Page 335]]

Notice of Proposed Amendment). The ARC provided its report, a copy of 
which is in this rulemaking docket, to the agency on September 9, 2009.

D. Congressional Mandate

    On August 1, 2010, the President signed the Airline Safety and 
Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-
216). Section 212 of Public Law 111-216 required ``the FAA 
Administrator to issue regulations to limit the number of flight and 
duty time hours allowed for pilots to address pilot fatigue.'' This 
section, in subsection 212(a)(3), set a deadline of 180 days for the 
FAA to publish an NPRM and 1 year for the FAA to issue a final rule.

E. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

    On September 14, 2010, the FAA published in the Federal Register 
the Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements NPRM.\6\ The NPRM 
proposed to amend the FAA's existing flight, duty, and rest regulations 
applicable to certificate holders and their flightcrew members. The 
proposal recognized the factors that lead to fatigue in most 
individuals, and it proposed to regulate these factors to ensure that 
flightcrew members do not accumulate dangerous amounts of fatigue. 
Because the proposed rule addressed fatigue factors that apply 
universally, the proposed requirements eliminated the existing 
distinctions between domestic, flag and supplemental operations. The 
proposal also provided different requirements based on the time of day, 
whether an individual is acclimated to a new time zone, and the 
likelihood of being able to sleep under different circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ 75 FR 55852; September 14, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NPRM provided for a 60-day comment period, which ended on 
November 15, 2010. Following publication of the NPRM, the FAA received 
a number of requests to extend the comment period and to clarify 
various sections of the preamble, regulatory text, and the Regulatory 
Impact Analysis (RIA). In response, the agency published two actions in 
the Federal Register.
    The first action was a ``Notice of procedures for submission of 
clarifying questions.'' \7\ Persons asking for clarifications were 
advised to file their questions to the rulemaking docket by October 15, 
2010. The FAA said it would respond by October 22, 2010. On October 22, 
2010, the agency filed two response documents to the rulemaking docket: 
``Response to Clarifying Questions to the RIA'' and ``Response to 
Clarifying Questions to the NPRM.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ 75 FR 62486; October 12, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The second action was a ``Response to requests for a comment period 
extension.'' \8\ The FAA provided notice that the comment period would 
not be extended. The agency's rationale for this decision is outlined 
in the October 15, 2010 action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ 75 FR 63424; October 15, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA received more than 8,000 comment submissions, containing 
multiple comments on various sections of the preamble and the rule. 
Many comment submissions also included specific recommendations for 
changes and clarifications.

III. Discussion of Public Comments and Final Rule

A. Applicability

    In the NPRM, the FAA stated that fatigue factors are ``universal.'' 
\9\ The FAA noted that sleep science, while still evolving, was clear 
in several important respects:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ 75 FR 55852, 55857 (Sep. 14, 2010).

    Most people need eight hours of sleep to function effectively, 
most people find it more difficult to sleep during the day than 
during the night, resulting in greater fatigue if working at night; 
the longer one has been awake and the longer one spends on task, the 
greater the likelihood of fatigue; and fatigue leads to an increased 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
risk of making a mistake.

Id. In light of its determination concerning the universal 
applicability of factors underlying fatigue, the FAA proposed a single 
set of flight, duty, and rest regulations that would regulate these 
factors. The proposed regulations would have been applicable to all 
part 121 domestic, flag, and supplemental operations. The proposed 
regulations would also have applied to all part 91 flights conducted by 
part 121 certificate holders, including flights, such as ferry flights, 
that have historically been conducted under part 91. The NPRM also 
stated that ``the part 135 community should expect to see an NPRM 
addressing its operations that looks very similar to, if not exactly 
like, the final rule the agency anticipates issuing as part of its 
rulemaking initiative.'' Id. The comments received in response to the 
proposed applicability of this rule and the corresponding FAA responses 
are included below.
    The National Air Carrier Association (NACA) and a number of air 
carriers operating non-scheduled flights objected to the proposed rule 
applying to supplemental operations. These industry commenters stated 
that non-scheduled operations require additional scheduling flexibility 
because they are fundamentally different from scheduled operations. The 
industry commenters stated that, unlike scheduled operations, non-
scheduled operations provide on-demand operations on behalf of private 
and government consumers on a timetable that is determined by the 
consumer. According to the industry commenters, non-scheduled carriers 
do not have regularly-set schedules that they know months in advance, 
but are instead called to fly with little advance notice, making it 
more difficult to plan flightcrew member flight times and rest periods. 
The industry commenters emphasized that this difficulty is exacerbated 
by the fact that non-scheduled operations' flight times (especially 
departure times) are controlled largely by the consumer and not the air 
carrier.
    The non-scheduled industry commenters also asserted that non-
scheduled carriers serve remote, sometimes hostile locations, with no 
established crew bases. Thus, they do not have the same extensive 
infrastructure that scheduled operations have access to and must 
deadhead flightcrew members into remote locations in order to be able 
to swap out flightcrew members during an operation. These commenters 
emphasized that the certificate holders running non-scheduled 
operations are largely small businesses that will have difficulty 
adjusting to the burdens imposed by this rule.
    Based on the differences between non-scheduled and scheduled 
operations, the industry commenters stated that a ``one-size-fits-all'' 
approach does not work for non-scheduled operations. The industry 
commenters stated that the existing regulations governing supplemental 
operations have existed for over 60 years, and that changing these 
regulations will adversely affect air security and national defense 
missions conducted through the use of non-scheduled operations. The 
commenters emphasized that the existing supplemental flight, duty, and 
rest regulations ensure aviation safety by containing additional rest 
requirements that are not a part of this rule. In conclusion, the 
industry commenters suggested that the FAA either: (1) Retain the 
existing flight, duty, and rest regulations governing supplemental 
operations, and/or (2) adopt the alternative proposal put forward by 
the industry commenters.
    In addition to the concerns expressed by non-scheduled air 
carriers, the Cargo Airline Association (CAA) and a number of air 
carriers operating all-cargo flights have also objected to the

[[Page 336]]

proposed rule applying to supplemental operations. These industry 
commenters asserted that, while a passenger-operation accident can 
result in numerous fatalities, an all-cargo accident would consist 
primarily of property damage.
    The commenters also stated that the cargo industry is composed of 
both scheduled and on-demand operators, and that it specializes in 
express delivery services. To effectuate these express delivery 
services, some all-cargo carriers do not maintain U.S. domicile bases 
and regularly operate long-haul flights and point-to-point operations 
outside the United States, traveling across multiple time zones at all 
hours of the day and night. The industry commenters also stated that 
all-cargo carriers regularly operate around the world in all directions 
with extended overseas routings, not with quick overnight turns at 
foreign destinations. This results in a lower aircraft utilization rate 
than domestic passenger operations. According to the industry 
commenters, these types of nighttime and around-the-world operations 
are the norm for all-cargo carriers.
    The all-cargo industry commenters added that, similar to non-
scheduled operations, some all-cargo operations also fly to remote, 
undeveloped, and sometimes hostile locations. According to the industry 
commenters, these types of operations are driven by the same 
considerations as similar non-scheduled operations: (1) The schedule is 
determined primarily by the customer, and (2) there is a lack of 
infrastructure, which necessitates deadheading in flightcrew members. 
The industry commenters emphasized that many all-cargo carriers 
currently provide their flightcrew members with split duty rest while 
cargo is being sorted at sorting facilities, and that the carriers have 
invested millions of dollars in high-quality rest facilities. The 
industry commenters also stated that flightcrew members working in all-
cargo operations fly fewer total hours than their passenger-
transporting counterparts. The industry commenters concluded by asking 
the FAA to either: (1) Retain the existing flight, duty, and rest 
regulations that govern supplemental operations, or (2) adopt the 
alternative proposal that they have included in their comments.
    Conversely, a number of labor groups submitted comments approving 
of a single flight, duty, and rest standard. These groups stated that 
they were ``pleased that the FAA has acknowledged the current science 
and recognizes that pilot fatigue does not differ whether the pilot is 
operating domestically, internationally or in supplemental 
operations.'' The NTSB also expressed support for a single flight, 
duty, and rest standard, commending the proposed rule for recognizing 
that ``human fatigue factors are the same across [domestic, flag, and 
supplemental] operations and science cannot support the notion of 
allowing longer duty hours for certain subgroups.'' Numerous individual 
commenters have also stated that the existing 16-hour duty periods 
utilized by supplemental operations result in an unsafe amount of 
fatigue.
    In addition to the concerns expressed by the preceding comments, 
United Air Lines (United) objected to the applicability of this rule to 
flightcrew members who conduct only part 91 operations on behalf of 
part 121 certificate holders. United stated that the original reason 
for the applicability of this rule to part 91 operations on behalf of 
part 121 certificate holders was to ensure that flightcrew members 
operating under part 121 did not use part 91 to avoid their flight, 
duty, and rest requirements under part 121. Because flightcrew members 
who only conduct part 91 operations cannot conduct part 121 flights, 
United argued that these flightcrew members should not be subject to 
this rule.
    The FAA also received a number of other questions and concerns 
about the applicability of this rule. The NetJets Association of Shared 
Aircraft Pilots (NJASAP) asked how this rule would apply to certificate 
holders who operate under several different parts of the regulation 
(e.g., Part 121, Part 135, Subpart 91K). The Regional Airline 
Association (RAA) asked the FAA to amend this section in order to 
clarify that this rule applies to ``operations directed by the 
certificate holder under part 91 of this chapter.'' In addition, a 
number of part 135 certificate holders objected to having their 
operations included in the proposed flight, duty, and rest 
requirements. These commenters asserted that part 135 operations are 
fundamentally different from part 121 operations, and thus, these 
operations should not be subject to the same requirements.
    In response to concerns expressed by part 135 certificate holders, 
the FAA emphasizes that this rule does not apply to part 135 
operations. If, in the future, the FAA initiates a rulemaking to change 
the existing part 135 flight, duty, and rest regulations, the FAA will 
solicit comments from the affected stakeholders and respond to part-
135-specific concerns at that time.
    Turning to concerns expressed by United, this rule applies to some 
part 91 operations because many flightcrew members involved in part 121 
operations have routinely used part 91 as a way of exceeding the limits 
imposed by the part 121 flight, duty, and rest requirements. However, 
the FAA agrees with United that there is no reason to require 
flightcrew members who do not fly any part 121 operations to comply 
with part 121 flight, duty, and rest requirements. Accordingly, the FAA 
has amended this rule so that it applies to flightcrew members 
operating under part 91 only if at least one their flight segments is 
operated under part 117. Flightcrew members operating under part 91 and 
who do not have any flight segments subject to part 117 (e.g. pilots 
flying only part 91 operations) are not subject to the provisions of 
this rule.
    Turning to concerns expressed by air carriers conducting all-cargo 
operations, as discussed in the regulatory evaluation, the FAA has 
determined that this rule would create far smaller benefits for all-
cargo operations than it does for passenger operations. Consequently, 
the FAA is unable to justify imposing the cost of this rule on all-
cargo operations. The FAA notes that in the past it has excluded all-
cargo operations from certain mandatory requirements due to the 
different cost-benefit comparison that applies to all-cargo operations. 
For example, in 2007, the FAA excluded all-cargo operations of 
airplanes with more than two engines from many of the requirements of 
the extended range operations (ETOPS) rule because the cost of these 
provisions for all-cargo operations relative to the potential societal 
benefit was simply too high.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ 72 FR 1808, 1816 (2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the cost-benefit analysis of this rule and its past 
precedent, the FAA has amended this rule to make compliance with part 
117 voluntary for all-cargo operations and to allow those operations to 
continue operating under the existing part 121 flight, duty, and rest 
regulations if they choose to do so. As such, this rule now allows all-
cargo operations to voluntarily determine, as part of their collective 
bargaining and business decisions, whether they wish to operate under 
part 117.
    In order to prevent manipulation of this voluntary provision, 
certificate holders who wish to operate their all-cargo operations 
under part 117 cannot pick and choose specific flights to operate under 
this rule. Instead, the certificate holders can only elect to operate 
under part 117: (1) All of their all-cargo operations conducted under 
contract to a U.S. government agency; and (2) all of their all-cargo 
operations

[[Page 337]]

not conducted under contract to a U.S. Government agency.
    Turning to the objections expressed by non-scheduled passenger 
operations, the FAA notes that existing regulations set out different 
flight, duty, and rest standards for part 121 domestic, flag, and 
supplemental operations. Under these regulations, supplemental 
operations consist of non-scheduled, all-cargo, and public-charter 
flights. The existing regulations provide supplemental operations with 
significant scheduling flexibility because they allow air carriers 
conducting supplemental operations to schedule unaugmented flightcrew 
members for 16-hour FDPs \11\ and augmented flightcrew members for 30-
hour FDPs \12\ regardless of the time of day.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ 14 CFR 121.505(b). The existing regulations do not regulate 
FDPs, but instead, regulate the length of duty time. The FAA 
believes that duty time, as used in the existing regulations, is 
roughly equivalent to the concept of an FDP because flightcrew 
members typically begin and end their duty periods at about the same 
times as an FDP, as defined by this rule, would begin and end.
    \12\ 14 CFR 121.523(c).
    \13\ An unaugmented flight contains the minimum number of 
flightcrew members necessary to safely pilot an aircraft. An 
augmented flight contains additional flightcrew members and at least 
one onboard rest facility, which allows flightcrew members to work 
in shifts and sleep during the flight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA acknowledges that this rule will significantly impact 
supplemental passenger operations because it reduces the existing 16- 
and 30-hour across-the-board limits. This section discusses these 
reductions and why they are justified in light of the flexibility 
concerns of non-scheduled passenger operations. The other changes made 
by this rule that affect supplemental operations are discussed in the 
other parts of this preamble.
    The FAA has decided to impose the same FDP limits on supplemental 
passenger operations as other part 121 operations because it has 
determined that the 16-hour unaugmented FDP and the 30-hour augmented 
FDP permitted by existing supplemental flight, duty, and rest 
regulations are almost always unsafe for passenger operations.\14\ As 
discussed in other parts of this preamble, a series of studies 
analyzing the national accident rate as a function of the amount of 
hours worked have shown that after a person works for about eight or 
nine hours, the risk of an accident increases exponentially for each 
additional hour worked.\15\ According to these studies, the risk of an 
accident in the 12th hour of a work shift is ``more than double'' the 
risk of an accident in the 8th hour of a work shift.\16\ Based on this 
exponential increase in the accident rate, the FAA has determined that 
the risk of an accident in the 16th hour of an unaugmented FDP rises to 
unacceptable levels for passenger operations, especially for shifts 
that take place during the WOCL. The FAA has also determined, based on 
the above data, that a 30-hour FDP likewise poses an unacceptably high 
risk of an accident for passenger operations even with the fatigue-
mitigation benefits provided by augmentation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ The FAA notes that this rule technically allows an 
unaugmented flightcrew member to work on a 16-hour FDP if a 14-hour 
FDP is extended through the use of a 2-hour FDP extension. However, 
a 14-hour unaugmented FDP is only permitted during periods of peak 
circadian alertness, and the 2-hour FDP extension is subject to 
additional safeguards. A 30-hour FDP is never permitted, although a 
carrier could potentially develop an FRMS that allowed a 30-hour FDP 
in augmented operations.
    \15\ See Simon Folkard & Philip Tucker, Shift work, safety and 
productivity, Occupational Medicine, Feb. 1, 2003, at 98 (analyzing 
three studies that reported a trend in risk over successive hours on 
duty).
    \16\ Id. The FAA notes that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration, another DOT agency, has examined studies comparing 
crash risk to hours worked in certain truck operations. Similar to 
the Folkard & Tucker study, these studies found a steady rise in 
crash risk with additional work hours; however, they did not show an 
increase as rapid as the results reported by Folkard and Tucker. 
(See, for example, Blanco, M., Hanowski, R., Olson, R., Morgan, J., 
Soccolich, S., Wu, S.C., and Guo, F., ``The Impact of Driving, Non-
Driving Work, and Rest Breaks on Driving Performance in Commercial 
Motor vehicle Operations,'' FMCSA, April 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In determining that a 16-hour unaugmented and a 30-hour augmented 
FDP is unsafe for passenger operations, the FAA has also taken into 
account the fact that aviation-specific data shows that FDPs of this 
length significantly increase the risk of an accident. A study 
published in 2003 analyzed the accident rate of pilots as a function of 
the amount of time that the pilots spent on duty.\17\ The study found 
that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Jeffrey H. Goode, Are pilots at risk of accidents due to 
fatigue?, Journal of Safety Research 34 (2003) 309-13.

    [T]he proportion of accidents associated with pilots having 
longer duty periods is higher than the proportion of longer duty 
periods for all pilots. For 10-12 hours of duty time, the proportion 
of accident pilots with this length of duty period is 1.7 times as 
large as for all pilots. For pilots with 13 or more hours of duty, 
the proportion of accident pilot duty periods is over five and a 
half times as high.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ Id. at 311.

    Because studies examining the national accident rate and aviation-
specific accidents have both shown that working over 13 hours 
significantly increases the risk of an accident, the FAA has decided to 
disallow the 16-hour unaugmented and 30-hour augmented FDPs currently 
permitted in supplemental passenger operations by subjecting 
supplemental passenger operations to the same FDP limits as other part 
121 passenger operations. The effect that other provisions of this rule 
will have on supplemental passenger operations and the reasons why the 
FAA has chosen to adopt these provisions are discussed in the 
corresponding portions of this preamble.
    The FAA understands that including supplemental passenger 
operations in this rule will take away a portion of the scheduling 
flexibility currently enjoyed by non-scheduled passenger operations. 
However, this rule contains a number of provisions that ease the burden 
of current rules on non-scheduled operations in a way that does not 
decrease safety.
    The most significant way in which this rule eases the burden of 
existing rules on supplemental passenger operations is the elimination 
of compensatory rest requirements. Under the existing rules, a pilot 
who flies an aircraft for over 8 hours in a supplemental operation must 
receive a compensatory rest period that is 16 hours or longer 
(depending on whether the flight was augmented) at the conclusion of 
his or her duty day. This compensatory rest requirement imposed a 
significant burden on supplemental passenger operations because pilots 
had to be provided with at least 16 hours of rest simply for flying for 
9 hours. In addition, the FAA found that by focusing on flight time and 
not on FDP, the existing supplemental flight, duty, and rest 
regulations led to counterintuitive results in which long 16- and 30-
hour FDPs were permitted with only a 9-hour required rest period, but a 
9-hour flight time with a relatively-short FDP resulted in a 16- to 18-
hour required rest period.
    In order to address the concerns discussed in the preceding 
paragraph and because there was an absence of scientific data showing 
that rest periods providing for more than 8 hours of sleep were always 
necessary to combat transient fatigue, this rule eliminates the 
existing compensatory rest requirements for supplemental passenger 
operations. The removal of this additional rest requirement will allow 
certificate holders conducting non-scheduled passenger operations to 
fly augmented international operations, including those that are under 
contract with the United States Government, without having to provide 
flightcrew members with an additional 6 hours of rest at the end of the 
operation. In addition, to ensure that certificate holders

[[Page 338]]

conducting supplemental operations are able to provide critical 
services in support of government operations, this rule also contains 
an Emergency and Government Sponsored Operations section that allows 
operations performed in accordance with a government contract to exceed 
this rule's flight, duty, and rest limits in certain situations.
    Another example of a provision in this rule that benefits 
supplemental passenger operations is the increase of the flight-time 
limits for augmented and unaugmented flights. This increase will allow 
certificate holders conducting supplemental operations to schedule 
unaugmented flightcrew members for 9 hours of flight time during peak 
circadian times after providing them with only 10 hours of rest. The 
existing regulations would require certificate holders conducting 
supplemental operations to provide their flightcrew members with 18 
hours of rest after an operation involving 9 hours of unaugmented 
flight time.
    In addition to including provisions that ease the burden of the 
maximum-FDP-limit reduction on supplemental operations, the FAA has 
also made adjustments to this rulemaking in response to concerns raised 
by air carriers (certificate holders) conducting non-scheduled 
passenger operations. Thus, the FAA has: (1) Increased the unaugmented 
and augmented FDP limits in Tables B and C, (2) increased the amount of 
the split-duty credit and made that credit easier to obtain, and (3) 
largely eliminated the scheduling reliability requirements that were 
proposed in the NPRM. All of these adjustments were made, at least in 
part, in response to the concerns raised by certificate holders 
conducting non-scheduled operations, and they should significantly ease 
the burden of this rule on these types of operations. In making these 
adjustments, the FAA has, where possible, incorporated into this rule 
portions of the alternative proposal put forward by the industry 
commenters who conduct non-scheduled passenger operations.
    While air-carrier business models for passenger operations may 
differ, the factors that give rise to unsafe levels of fatigue are the 
same for each flightcrew member involved in these operations. A 
flightcrew member working a 16 or 30-hour FDP as part of a supplemental 
passenger operation will not be less tired simply because he or she is 
working in a supplemental type of operation instead of a domestic type 
operation. To account for this fact and ensure that fatigue is limited 
to safe levels, the FAA has decided to set a single flight, duty, and 
rest standard for all part 121 certificate holders conducting passenger 
operations. The FAA is sympathetic to the fact that supplemental 
passenger operations require additional flexibility that is not 
required by other business models and as a result, may bear a 
disproportionate cost of this rule. T