Passenger Train Emergency Systems II, 154-180 [2011-33103]

Agencies

• Federal Railroad Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 1 (Tuesday, January 3, 2012)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 154-180]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-33103]



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Vol. 77

Tuesday,

No. 1

January 3, 2012

Part II





Department of Transportation





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Federal Railroad Administration





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49 CFR Parts 238 and 239





Passenger Train Emergency Systems II; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 77 , No. 1 / Tuesday, January 3, 2012 / 
Proposed Rules

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 238 and 239

[Docket No. FRA-2009-0119, Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AC22


Passenger Train Emergency Systems II

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: This notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) is intended to 
further the safety of passenger train occupants through both 
enhancements and additions to FRA's existing requirements for emergency 
systems on passenger trains. In this NPRM, FRA is proposing to add 
requirements for interior vestibule doors and enhance emergency egress 
and rescue access signage requirements. FRA is also proposing to 
establish requirements for low-location emergency exit path markings to 
assist occupants in reaching and operating primary emergency exits, 
particularly under conditions of darkness or smoke. Further, FRA is 
proposing to add minimum emergency lighting standards for all existing 
passenger cars so that emergency lighting systems are provided in all 
passenger cars, and FRA is proposing to enhance requirements for the 
survivability of emergency lighting systems in new passenger cars. 
Finally, FRA is clarifying existing requirements for participation in 
debriefing and critique sessions following emergency situations and 
full-scale simulations.

DATES: (1) Written comments must be received by March 5, 2012. Comments 
received after that date will be considered to the extent possible 
without incurring additional expense or delay.
    (2) FRA anticipates being able to resolve this rulemaking without a 
public, oral hearing. However, if FRA receives a specific request for a 
public, oral hearing prior to February 2, 2012, one will be scheduled 
and FRA will publish a supplemental notice in the Federal Register to 
inform interested parties of the date, time, and location of any such 
hearing.

ADDRESSES: Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2006-25273 may 
be submitted by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting 
comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Docket Management Facility, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. 
ET, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
    Instructions: Note that all comments received will be posted 
without change to https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal 
information provided. Please see the Privacy Act heading below.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov at anytime, or to 
the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, West 
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET, Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays. Follow the online instructions for accessing 
the dockets.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brenda J. Moscoso, Office of Railroad 
Safety, Director, Safety Analysis, Mail Stop 25, Federal Railroad 
Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 
(telephone (202) 493-6282); or Michael Masci, Trial Attorney, Office of 
Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue 
SE., Washington, DC (telephone (202) 493-6037).

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Executive Summary
II. Statutory and Regulatory Background
III. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Overview
IV. History
V. Proceedings to Date
VI. Technical Background and Overview of Issues Addressed in this 
Proposal
    A. Doors
    B. Identification of Emergency Systems
    C. Emergency Lighting
    D. Emergency Egress and Rescue Access Marking and Instructions
    E. Low-Location Emergency Exit Path Marking
    F. Photoluminescent Material
    G. Emergency Communication System Marking
    H. Debriefing and Critique Session Following Emergency 
Situations and Full-Scale Simulations
VII. Section-by-Section Analysis
    A. Proposed Amendments to Part 238, Subparts B, C, and E
    B. Proposed Amendments to Part 239, Subpart B
VIII. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    G. Privacy Act

I. Executive Summary

    On May 20, 2003, FRA presented, and the Railroad Safety Advisory 
Committee (RSAC) accepted, the task of reviewing existing passenger 
equipment safety needs and programs and recommending consideration of 
specific actions that could be useful in advancing the safety of rail 
passenger service. The RSAC established the Passenger Safety Working 
Group (Working Group) to handle this task and develop recommendations 
for the full RSAC to consider. The Working Group met 14 times between 
September 9, 2003 and September 16, 2010. The Working Group 
successfully reached consensus on the following issues related to 
passenger train emergency systems: doors, emergency lighting, markings 
and instructions for selected emergency systems, photoluminescent 
materials, and participation of personnel at debriefing and critique 
sessions after emergencies. It also recommended consolidation of all 
requirements related to doors that are currently contained in parts 238 
and 239. The full RSAC voted to recommend the consensus issues to FRA 
on September 20, 2008. This NPRM is based on the RSAC recommendations.
    This NPRM proposes requirements related to the following subject 
areas: doors, emergency lighting, emergency markings and instruction 
for emergency egress and rescue access, emergency communication, low-
location emergency exit path markings, and debriefing and critique of 
emergency situations and simulations. The following is a brief overview 
of the proposal organized by the subject area:

Doors

     The proposal related to vestibule doors (and certain other 
interior doors), would require such doors in new passenger cars to be 
fitted with a removable panel or window for use in accessing and 
exiting the passenger compartment from the vestibule in the event that 
the vestibule door is inoperable. Additionally, FRA is proposing 
distinct requirements for bi-

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parting doors, including provisions for a manual override and retention 
mechanisms. For security reasons, an exception is included to allow 
railroads discretion when deciding whether or not to include an 
emergency panel in doors leading to a cab compartment. The proposal 
also sets forth requirements for the inspection, testing, reporting, 
and repairing of vestibule door safety mechanisms.

Emergency Lighting

     The proposed rule would require: minimum illumination 
levels within passenger cars; standards for the number and placement of 
power sources that power the emergency lighting system; and, establish 
requirements for testing lighting fixtures and power sources that are 
related to the emergency lighting system.
     Currently, emergency lighting power sources include 
batteries located under the passenger car, which are not reliable 
following a collision or derailment due to their location. The proposal 
is intended to ensure that these essential backup power sources are 
able to function as intended by requiring that they be located in the 
passenger compartment where they are better protected.

Emergency Egress and Rescue Access Markings & Instructions

     Emergency communication systems: this proposal contains 
more specific requirements for the luminescent material used to mark 
intercoms. Currently, the location of each intercom is required to be 
clearly marked with luminescent material, and legible and 
understandable operating instructions for operating the intercom must 
be posted at or near each such intercom to facilitate passenger use. 
Public address and intercom systems would be required to have back-up 
power to remain operational for at least 90 minutes when the primary 
power source fails.
     Emergency Roof Access: this proposal contains more 
specific requirements for providing markings of, and instructions for, 
emergency roof access locations. Currently, each emergency roof access 
location is required to be conspicuously marked with retroreflective 
material of contrasting color, and legible and understandable 
instructions must be provided near the emergency roof access.
     Emergency Signage: this proposal would enhance current 
signage requirements by specifying requirements for signage 
recognition, design requirements, location, size, color and contrast, 
and materials. This additional detail would help ensure that emergency 
egress points can be easily identified and operated by passengers and 
train crew members needing to evacuate a passenger car during an 
emergency.

Low-Location Emergency Exit Path Marking (LLEEPM)

     This proposal would establish minimum requirements for 
photoluminescent and electrically-powered LLEEPM to provide visual 
guidance for passengers and train crewmembers when the emergency 
lighting system has failed or when smoke conditions obscure overhead 
emergency lighting. The rule would also require railroads to conduct 
periodic inspections and tests to verify that all LLEPM system 
components, including power sources, function as intended.

Photoluminescent Materials

     The proposal related to signage standards, including the 
use of high-performance photoluminescent (HPPL) material and policies 
and procedures for ensuring proper placement and testing of 
photoluminescent materials to ensure maximum illumination in an 
emergency situation will ensure train occupants can identify emergency 
exits and the path to the nearest exit in the dark. Existing signage 
inside some passenger compartment areas within a passenger car has been 
ineffective due to their inability to absorb sufficient levels of 
ambient or electrical light. The requirements in this proposal would 
improve illumination of signage and marking in the passenger 
compartment, and thus increase the discernability of the exit signs and 
markings in the dark.

Debriefing and Critique

    FRA is proposing a modification to the existing debrief and 
critique requirement to clarify that passenger train personnel who have 
first-hand knowledge of an emergency are intended to participate in 
debriefing and critique sessions after the emergency occurs.
    FRA has assessed the cost to railroads that are expected to result 
from the implementation of this rule as proposed. For the 20-year 
period analyzed, the estimated quantified cost that would be imposed on 
industry totals $21.8 million with a present value (PV, 7 percent) of 
$13.4 million. The proposed rulemaking is expected to improve railroad 
safety by promoting the safe evacuation of passengers and crewmembers 
in the event of an emergency.

                     20-Year Cost for Proposed Rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
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Door/Removable Panels or Windows, and Bi-Parting              $4,399,223
 Doors...............................................
Emergency Lighting...................................          2,450,213
Emergency Egress and Rescue Access Marking and                 4,730,631
 Instructions........................................
Low-Location Emergency Exit Path Markings............          1,377,615
Debriefing and Critique..............................                N/A
Inspection, Testing, and Recordkeeping...............            405,296
                                                      ------------------
    Total............................................         13,362,979
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Dollars are discounted at a present value rate of 7 percent.

    The primary benefits include a heightened safety environment in 
egress from a passenger train after an accident. The requirements will 
enable passenger car occupants to more readily identify, reach, and 
operate emergency exits and emergency responders to more readily 
identify and operate rescue access points. This corresponds to a 
reduction of casualties and fatalities in the aftermath of collisions, 
derailments, and other emergency situations. FRA believes the value of 
the anticipated safety benefits would justify the cost of implementing 
the rule as proposed.

II. Statutory and Regulatory Background

    In September of 1994, the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) 
convened a meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail 
industry with the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one of the 
initiatives arising from this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary 
announced that

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DOT would begin developing safety standards for rail passenger 
equipment over a five-year period. In November of 1994, Congress 
adopted the Secretary's schedule for implementing rail passenger 
equipment safety regulations and included it in the Federal Railroad 
Safety Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act), Pub. L. 103-440, 108 Stat. 
4619, 4623-4624 (November 2, 1994). Congress also authorized the 
Secretary to consult with various organizations involved in passenger 
train operations for purposes of prescribing and amending these 
regulations, as well as issuing orders pursuant to them. Section 215 of 
the Act (codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133).

III. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee Overview

    In March 1996, FRA established the RSAC, which provides a forum for 
developing consensus recommendations on rulemakings and other safety 
program issues. The Committee includes representation from all of the 
agency's major stakeholders, including railroads, labor organizations, 
suppliers and manufacturers, and other interested parties. A list of 
member groups follows:

American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AARPCO);
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 
(AASHTO);
American Chemistry Council;
American Petroleum Institute;
American Public Transportation Association (APTA);
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA);
American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA);
Association of American Railroads (AAR);
Association of Railway Museums (ARM);
Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM);
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET);
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED);
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS);
Chlorine Institute;
Federal Transit Administration (FTA); *
Fertilizer Institute;
High Speed Ground Transportation Association (HSGTA);
Institute of Makers of Explosives;
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers;
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW);
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA); *
League of Railway Industry Women; *
National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP);
National Association of Railway Business Women; *
National Conference of Firemen & Oilers;
National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association;
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak);
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); *
Railway Supply Institute (RSI);
Safe Travel America (STA);
Secretaria de Communicaciones y Transporte; *
Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA);
Tourist Railway Association Inc.;
Transport Canada; *
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU);
Transportation Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC);
Transportation Security Administration; * and
United Transportation Union (UTU).
* Indicates associate membership.

    When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to the RSAC, and after 
consideration and debate, the RSAC may accept or reject the task. If 
accepted, the RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the 
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop 
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations 
are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more 
task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a 
given task. The task force then provides that information to the 
working group for consideration. If a working group comes to unanimous 
consensus on recommendations for action, the package is presented to 
the RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple majority 
of the RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. FRA then 
determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because FRA staff 
has played an active role at the working group level in discussing the 
issues and options and in drafting the language of the consensus 
proposal, FRA is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC 
recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the 
recommendation and the agency exercises its independent judgment on 
whether the recommended rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is 
soundly supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal 
requirements. Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC 
recommendation in developing the actual regulatory proposal or final 
rule. Any such variations would be noted and explained in the 
rulemaking document issued by FRA. However, to the maximum extent 
practicable, FRA utilizes RSAC to provide consensus recommendations 
with respect to both proposed and final agency action. If RSAC is 
unable to reach consensus on a recommendation for action, the task is 
withdrawn and FRA determines the best course of action.

IV. History

    On May 4, 1998, pursuant to Sec.  215 of the Act, FRA issued a 
Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness (PTEP) final rule. See 63 FR 
24629. The rule contains minimum Federal safety standards for the 
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness 
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains, 
including freight railroads hosting the operations of passenger rail 
service. Elements of the required emergency preparedness plan include: 
communication; employee training and qualification; joint operations; 
tunnel safety; liaison with emergency responders; on-board emergency 
equipment; and passenger safety information. This rule also established 
specific requirements for passenger train emergency systems. The 
requirements include: conspicuous marking of all emergency window exits 
with luminescent material on the interior and all windows intended for 
rescue access by emergency responders be marked on the exterior with 
retroreflective material and that instructions be provided for their 
use; all door exits intended for egress be lighted or marked; and all 
door exits intended for rescue access by emergency responders be marked 
and that instructions be provided for their use. In addition, the rule 
contains specific requirements for debriefing and critique sessions 
following emergency situations and full-scale simulations.
    On May 12, 1999, FRA issued the Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards (PESS) final rule. See 64 FR 25540. This rule established 
comprehensive safety standards for railroad passenger equipment. The 
standards included requirements for the size, and operation of exterior 
side doors used for emergency egress or access for all passenger cars 
and for emergency lighting for new passenger cars. After publication of 
the PESS final rule, interested parties filed petitions seeking FRA's 
reconsideration of certain requirements contained in the rule. These 
petitions generally related to the following subject areas: structural 
design; location of emergency exit

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windows; fire safety; training; inspection, testing, and maintenance; 
and movement of defective equipment. To address the petitions, FRA 
grouped issues together and published three sets of amendments to the 
final rule in 2000 and 2002 in the Federal Register. See 65 FR 41284; 
67 FR 19970; and 67 FR 42892.
    On February 1, 2008, FRA published a final rule on Passenger Train 
Emergency Systems (PTES) addressing: emergency communication, emergency 
egress, and rescue access. This rule expanded the applicability of 
requirements for public address systems to all passenger cars, for 
intercom systems, and for emergency responder roof access to all new 
passenger cars. It also enhanced existing requirements for emergency 
window exits and established requirements for rescue access windows 
used by emergency responders. See 73 FR 6370.
    During the development of the PESS rule and the PTES rule, FRA 
identified the following issues for possible future rulemaking: doors; 
emergency lighting; emergency signage and markings for egress, access, 
and emergency communication; and low-location emergency exit path 
markings. FRA determined that these issues would benefit from 
additional research, the gathering of additional operating experience, 
or the development of industry standards, or all three. FRA believes 
that these issues have sufficiently developed and is addressing these 
issues in this proposal.
    On May 20, 2003, FRA presented, and the RSAC accepted, the task of 
reviewing existing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and 
recommending consideration of specific actions that could be useful in 
advancing the safety of rail passenger service. The RSAC established 
the Working Group to handle this task and develop recommendations for 
the full RSAC to consider. Members of the Working Group, in addition to 
FRA, include the following:

AAR, including members from BNSF Railway Company, CSX Transportation, 
Inc., and Union Pacific Railroad Company;
AAPRCO;
AASHTO;
Amtrak;
APTA, including members from: Bombardier, Inc., Herzog Transit 
Services, Inc., Interfleet Technology Inc., Long Island Rail Road 
(LIRR), Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North), Northeast 
Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (Metra), Southern 
California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink), and Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA);
BLET;
BRS;
FTA;
HSGTA;
IBEW;
NARP;
NTSB;
RSI;
SMWIA;
STA;
TCIU/BRC;
TWU; and
UTU.

    Staff from DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems 
Center (Volpe Center) attended all of the meetings and contributed to 
the technical discussions. The Working Group has held meetings on the 
following dates and locations:

September 9-10, 2003, in Washington, DC;
November 6, 2003, in Philadelphia, PA;
May 11, 2004, in Schaumburg, IL;
October 26-27, 2004 in Linthicum/Baltimore, MD;
March 9-10, 2005, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
September 7, 2005 in Chicago, IL;
March 21-22, 2006 in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
September 12-13, 2006 in Orlando, FL;
April 17-18, 2007 in Orlando, FL;
December 11, 2007 in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
June 18, 2008 in Baltimore, MD;
November 13, 2008 in Washington, DC;
June 8, 2009 in Washington, DC; and
September 16, 2010 in Chicago, IL.

    At the meetings in Chicago and Ft. Lauderdale in 2005, FRA met with 
representatives of Metra and the South Florida Regional Transportation 
Authority (Tri-Rail), respectively, and toured their passenger 
equipment. The visits, which included demonstrations of emergency 
system features, were open to all members of the Working Group, and FRA 
believes they have added to the collective understanding of the Group 
in identifying and addressing passenger train emergency system issues.
    Due to the variety of issues involved, at its November 2003 
meeting, the Working Group established four task forces: Emergency 
Preparedness, Vehicle/Track Interaction, Crashworthiness/Glazing, and 
Mechanical. Each task force is a smaller group that develops 
recommendations on specific issues within each group's particular area 
of expertise. Members of the task forces include various 
representatives from the respective organizations that were part of the 
larger Working Group. Members of the Emergency Preparedness Task Force 
(Task Force), in addition to FRA, include (or have included) the 
following:

Amtrak;
APTA, including members from Bombardier, Ellcon National, Go Transit, 
Interfleet Technology, Inc, Jacobs Civil Engineering, Jessup 
Manufacturing Company, Kawasaki Rail Car, Inc., LIRR, LTK, Luminator, 
Maryland Transit Administration, Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority (MBTA), Metrolink, Metro-North, Northern Indiana Commuter 
Transit District (NICTD), SEPTA, San Diego Northern Commuter Railroad 
(Coaster), Permalight, Po's Ability USA, Inc., Prolink, Transit Design 
Group (TDG),Transit Safety Management (TSM), Translite, STV Inc., and 
Visual Marking Systems, Inc.;
BLET;
California Department of Transportation (Caltrans);
FTA;
NARP;
RSI, including Globe Transportation Graphics;
TWU; and
UTU.

    While they are not voting members of the Task Force, 
representatives from TSA, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), attended certain of the meetings and contributed to the 
discussions of the Task Force. In addition, staff from the Volpe Center 
attended all of the meetings and contributed to the technical 
discussions through their comments and presentations and by setting up 
various lighting, marking, and signage demonstrations.
    The task force held 17 meetings on the following dates and 
locations:

February 25-26, 2004, in Los Angeles, CA;
April 14-15, 2004, in Cambridge, MA;
July 7-8, 2004, in Washington, DC;
September 13-14, 2004, in New York, NY;
December 1-2, 2004, in San Diego, CA;
February 16-17, 2005, in Philadelphia, PA;
April 19-20, 2005, in Cambridge, MA;
August 2-3, 2005, in Cambridge, MA;
December 13-14, 2005, in Baltimore, MD;
August 10, 2006, in Grapevine, TX;
October 25-26, 2006, in Philadelphia, PA;
December 6-7, 2006, in Washington, DC;

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March 28-29, 2007, in Los Angeles, CA;
June 13-14, 2007, in San Francisco, CA;
October 17-18, 2007, in Arlington, VA;
May 13-14, 2008, in Arlington, VA; and
March 31, 2009, in Washington, DC.

    At meetings in Los Angeles, Cambridge, Washington, New York, San 
Diego, Philadelphia, and San Francisco, FRA met with representatives of 
Metrolink, MBTA, Amtrak, LIRR, Coaster, SEPTA, and Caltrans, 
respectively, and toured their passenger equipment. The visits were 
open to all members of the various task forces and included 
demonstration of emergency system features. As in the case of the 
Working Group visits, FRA believes they have added to the collective 
understanding of RSAC members in identifying and addressing passenger 
train safety issues for not only this rulemaking, but for other RSAC 
initiatives as well. After reaching consensus on a variety of issues, 
and receiving formal recommendations from the RSAC, FRA issued the PTES 
rule. As noted above, the final rule was published on February 1, 2008, 
and it addressed requirements for emergency window exits, rescue access 
windows, emergency communication, and roof access locations.

V. Proceedings to Date

    Like the first PTES rule, the NPRM in This rulemaking proceeding, 
Passenger Train Emergency Systems II (PTES II), was developed to 
address a number of the concerns raised, and issues discussed, during 
the various Task Force and Working Group meetings. The issues include: 
doors, emergency lighting, emergency marking and instruction for egress 
and access, emergency communication, low-location emergency exit path 
markings, and debriefing and critique of emergency situations and 
simulations. The Working Group reached full consensus on all the 
regulatory provisions contained in the NPRM at its meeting in December 
2007. The Working Group presented its consensus recommendations to the 
full RSAC for concurrence at its meeting on February 20, 2008. All of 
the members of the full RSAC in attendance at its February 2008 meeting 
accepted the regulatory recommendations submitted by the Working Group. 
Thus, the Working Group's recommendations became the full RSAC's 
recommendations to FRA. FRA subsequently met with the Task Force twice 
after that to make some non-substantive technical clarifications and 
review technical research findings related to potential enhancements of 
emergency systems. A Tier II Sub-Task Force also met to discuss the 
proposed requirements affecting Tier II equipment, i.e., passenger 
equipment operating at speeds in excess of 125 mph but not exceeding 
150 mph. It did not recommend any changes to the proposed rule text. 
After reviewing the full RSAC's recommendations, FRA agrees that the 
recommendations provide a sound basis for a proposed rule and hereby 
adopts the recommendations with generally minor changes for purposes of 
clarity and Federal Register formatting.

VI. Technical Background and Overview of Issues Addressed in this 
Proposal

    Experience with passenger train accidents and simulations, and 
technological advances in emergency systems provide the main impetus 
for these proposed enhancements and additions to FRA's existing 
requirements related to passenger train emergency systems, as 
highlighted below.

A. Doors

    In February 1996, as a result of a near head-on collision between a 
Maryland Mass Transit Administration MARC Train Service (MARC) train 
and an Amtrak train in Silver Spring, Maryland, and subsequent fire, 
eight passengers and three crewmembers died in one car. This incident 
raised concerns that at least some of the passengers in the MARC train 
tried unsuccessfully to exit via the exterior side doors in the rear 
vestibule of the lead, passenger-occupied cab car. Following its post-
collision investigation, the NTSB expressed concern regarding 
passengers' ability to exit through interior and exterior passageway 
doors. During the accident, the front end of the cab car that led the 
MARC train suffered extensive structural damage and fire destroyed the 
controls for the left- and right-side rear exterior doors. The left-
side exterior door's interior emergency release handle was also damaged 
by the fire and could not be pulled down to operate the door. The 
right-side door's interior emergency release handle was in a secured 
cabinet in the lavatory and it failed to open the door when later 
tested by the NTSB. The NTSB did note in its investigation report of 
the Silver Spring train collision that ``[e]xcept for those passengers 
who died of blunt trauma injuries, others may have survived the 
accident, albeit with thermal injuries, had proper and immediate egress 
from the car been available.'' NTSB/RAR-97/02 at page 63. The NTSB 
explained in its explicit findings on the collision that ``the 
emergency egress of passengers was impeded because the passenger cars 
lacked readily accessible and identifiable quick-release mechanisms for 
the exterior doors, removable windows or kick panels in the side doors, 
and adequate emergency instruction signage.'' Id. at 73.
    Specifically, the NTSB recommended that FRA ``[r]equire all 
passenger cars to have either removable windows, kick panels, or other 
suitable means for emergency exiting through the interior and exterior 
passageway doors where the door could impede passengers exiting in an 
emergency and take appropriate emergency measures to ensure corrective 
action until these measures are incorporated into minimum passenger car 
safety standards.'' R-97-15. In addition, the Task Force identified 
concerns related to door egress from a car that is not upright. 
Emergency egress simulations organized by the Volpe Center confirmed 
this. Such simulations at the FRA-funded ``roll-over rig,'' located at 
the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's training facility, 
demonstrated that egress from a passenger rail car that is not upright 
can be very challenging. The simulations have demonstrated that 
emergency egress from a car that is on its side could present a 
significant challenge related to the operation of the pocket doors. If 
the pocket for a door is situated on the side of the car that is above 
the door when the car comes to rest on its side, gravity would work 
against opening the door and maintaining it in place for occupants to 
egress. Although passenger rail cars with single-panel vestibule doors 
are usually designed such that on the two ends of a car the pockets are 
on opposite sides of the panel, emergency situations may affect either 
end of the car rendering one or more of the vestibule and end-frame 
doors unavailable for emergency egress. In addition, doors could be 
rendered inoperable due to structural deformation of the doors or their 
frames and surrounding structures following a collision or derailment, 
blocking the egress pathways.
    As with other items identified for future consideration during the 
PESS rulemaking proceedings, the Task Force gave thoughtful 
consideration to the issue of vestibule and end-frame door egress. With 
assistance from the Task Force, FRA explored the feasibility of 
designing removable panels or windows in interior and exterior 
passenger car doors that could be used for emergency egress, and funded 
research to develop and evaluate various designs. Interior door egress 
was examined first. In some passenger cars, exterior side or end-

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frame doors, or both, are located in vestibule areas that are separated 
from the seating area(s) by an interior vestibule door. Structural 
deformation or malfunctioning of vestibule doors would inhibit or 
unduly delay access to the vestibules from the passenger compartments. 
End-frame door egress was examined next. Ultimately, no design was 
identified that would address three overriding concerns related to end-
frame doors: (1) Unintentional removal of the door, which would result 
in a safety hazard for occupants attempting emergency egress from the 
train; (2) crashworthiness of the door containing the panel or window; 
and, (3) prevention of fluids, such as fuel, from entering the car 
during an accident. Therefore, the Task Force developed a 
recommendation that was limited to interior vestibule doors. The Task 
Force generally recommended requiring a removable panel or window in 
each vestibule door, and a retention mechanism for new passenger cars. 
In such cases, occupants could use a removable panel or window in the 
door to gain access from the seating area to the exterior doors in the 
vestibule. Alternatively, this panel or window could also facilitate 
passage in the opposite direction from the vestibule area to the 
seating area. Given the unique circumstances surrounding passenger 
train accidents, the Task Force considered it prudent to recommend that 
access be available from both areas.
    The Task Force specifically evaluated kick-panels and ultimately 
decided that such panels could be partially or fully removed 
unintentionally creating a safety hazard, particularly for small 
children who could get caught in the opening and become injured by the 
door sliding into its pocket. For security reasons, the Task Force also 
recommended an exception to the removable panel or window requirement 
for a vestibule door that leads directly into a cab compartment. The 
Task Force believed that each railroad is best situated to determine 
whether equipping such a vestibule door with a removable panel or 
window would be appropriate for its specific equipment and operation.
    FRA believes that its proposal in this rulemaking to require 
vestibule doors to be equipped with a removable panel or window would, 
in the event that vestibule doors are not operable, provide a means for 
occupants in the passenger seating area to reach the vestibules where 
exterior door are located. Once located near an exterior door, 
emergency responders will be able to reach the occupants. FRA further 
believes that its proposal would satisfy the safety concerns expressed 
in the NTSB's recommendation without raising other safety concerns both 
during normal operations and in accident situations.
    The Task Force considered requiring that existing equipment be 
retrofitted to comply with the proposed vestibule door requirement. 
Because of limitations posed by the design of existing doors, the Task 
Force decided not to recommend that the equipment be retrofitted. 
Vestibule doors are designed with a horizontal structural member, 
located approximately at the vertical center of the door, which 
provides rigidity. The design would significantly limit both the size 
and location of a properly functioning removable panel or window. 
Although there are existing windows in the upper half of certain 
vestibule doors, the windows are not sufficiently large for adults to 
pass through and would be difficult to access in many situations. In 
addition, the existing door pockets would require modification. 
Removable windows would likely be designed similarly to emergency 
windows that are equipped with a handle to facilitate the removal of 
the gasket that holds the emergency window in place. The doors would 
need to be modified to accommodate the protrusions in the door that 
would be created by adding the handle. As noted above, the Task Force 
also examined the emergency egress issue as it relates to exterior end-
frame doors. After much deliberation, the Task Force recommended not to 
proceed with a removable window or panel requirement for end-frame 
doors at this time, due to remaining concerns related to the 
crashworthiness of the exterior end-frame doors. The Task Force did, 
however, extend the proposed removable window or panel requirement to 
``any other interior door used for passage through a passenger car'' to 
further expand options for emergency egress.

B. Identification of Emergency Systems

    Passenger train evacuation can be complicated by various 
circumstances, such as: an overturned rail car(s); rail car(s) being 
located in a narrow bridge or tunnel; and the presence of smoke or 
darkness. Such circumstances necessitate enhanced systems for use in 
emergency evacuations. The PESS rule highlighted a systems approach to 
effective passenger train evacuation that takes into consideration the 
interrelationship between features such as the number of door and 
window exits in a passenger car, lighted signs that indicate and 
facilitate the use of the door and window exits, and floor exit path 
marking (such as that required by the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) for passenger aircraft), in addition to the general emergency 
lighting level in a car. 64 FR 25598. In particular, the PESS final 
rule stated that FRA was investigating emergency lighting requirements, 
as part of a systems approach to effective passenger train evacuation. 
FRA also stated that it would examine the APTA standard on emergency 
lighting to determine whether the standard satisfactorily addresses 
matters related to emergency signage, exit path marking, and egress 
capacity. See 64 FR 25598.
    As FRA was issuing comprehensive Federal requirements for passenger 
train safety in the late 1990s, APTA was also developing and 
authorizing complementary passenger rail equipment safety standards 
applicable to equipment operated by its commuter and intercity 
passenger railroad members. APTA developed a three-standard, systems-
based approach to facilitate the safe evacuation of a passenger car in 
an emergency under various circumstances. These three standards, (the 
most recent revised versions were approved by APTA in 2007) which 
address emergency lighting, signage, and low-location exit path 
markings, were designed to work together to provide a means for 
passengers and crew to identify, reach, and operate passenger car 
emergency exits.
    The most recent revised versions of the APTA standards approved by 
APTA and all authorized on October 7, 2007, are listed below and copies 
are included in the docket.
     APTA SS-E-013-99, Rev. 1 Standard for Emergency Lighting 
System Design for Passenger Cars.
     APTA SS-PS-002-98, Rev. 3 Standard for Emergency Signage 
for Egress/Access of Passenger Rail Equipment.
     APTA SS-PS-004-99, Rev. 2 Standard for Low Location Exit 
Path Marking.

The APTA approach recognizes that, in the majority of emergencies, the 
safest place for passengers and crew is on the train. Should evacuation 
from a particular rail car be required, the safest course of action for 
passengers and crew is normally to move into an adjacent car. This 
evacuation strategy avoids or minimizes the hazards inherent with 
evacuating passengers onto the railroad right-of-way. It is only in 
unavoidable or extreme life-threatening situations that it would be 
necessary for passengers

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and crew leaves the train to reach a place of safety.
    The Task Force was charged with reviewing the three APTA standards 
and recommending revisions that would enhance the existing emergency 
lighting requirements contained in Sec.  238.115 and the egress and 
rescue access marking requirements contained in Sec. Sec.  238.113 and 
238.114. In addition, the Task Force was charged with adding a new 
requirement for low location exit path marking. After careful review, 
the Task Force recommended that the three APTA standards be revised to 
address relevant evolving technology, and that the standards be 
incorporated by reference in their entirety into the Federal 
regulations. With assistance from the Task Force, APTA revised the 
three APTA standards to enable FRA to incorporate them by reference and 
take advantage of certain technological advances which allowed for 
certain other desired enhancements. In addition, the Task Force 
recommended applying the requirements of the emergency lighting, 
emergency signage, and low-location exit path marking APTA standards 
(as revised in 2007), which apply to both new and existing equipment. 
Incorporation by reference of these APTA standards into part 238 would 
extend their applicability to all commuter and intercity passenger 
railroads and make them enforceable by FRA.

C. Emergency Lighting

    Section 238.115 contains emergency lighting requirements applicable 
for new passenger cars. As noted in the PESS final rule, experience 
gained from emergency response to several passenger train accidents 
indicated that emergency lighting systems either did not work or failed 
after a short time, greatly hindering rescue operations. See 64 FR 
25596. Emergency lighting system failures, or low levels of 
illumination during these accidents, or both, have been cited as a 
cause for confusion and contributing to the injuries and casualties. 
For example, according to the NTSB accident report, two passengers in a 
coach car of the MARC train involved in the 1996 Silver Spring, 
Maryland, accident stated that emergency lighting was not available 
following the accident, and that, along with one passenger's injuries 
and another's loss of eyeglasses, made it more difficult to move in the 
darkness. See R-97-17. The coach car's tilted position also contributed 
to their disorientation and hindered mobility. Post accident 
investigation by the NTSB revealed that the main car battery powering 
the emergency lighting had been damaged as a result of the derailment.
    The NTSB expressed concern regarding emergency lighting 
survivability because the location of the battery supplying power to 
the emergency lighting system below the car made it susceptible to 
damage from the rail, the car's trucks, and the ground surface in the 
event of a derailment. The NTSB concluded that ``[a] need exists for 
Federal standards requiring passenger cars be equipped with reliable 
emergency lighting fixtures with a self-contained independent power 
source when the main power supply has been disrupted to ensure 
passengers can safely egress.'' The NTSB issued recommendation R-97-17 
to FRA, as follows:

    Require all passenger cars to contain reliable emergency 
lighting fixtures that are each fitted with a self-contained 
independent power source and incorporate the requirements into 
minimum passenger car safety standards.

    In addition, on May 16, 1994, in Selma, NC, an Amtrak train 
derailed after colliding with an intermodal trailer from a freight 
train on an adjacent track. This accident resulted in 1 fatality and 
121 injuries. According to the NTSB accident report, three of the 
injured passengers reported difficulty exiting the passenger cars 
because they could not identify the emergency exit windows in the 
darkness. NTSB/RAR-95/02. When they were finally able to escape through 
the doors leading outside, they said that they were not sure how far 
they were above a surface, which may not have been solid ground, 
because they could not see below the steps of the car. The NTSB found 
that fixed emergency lighting systems were not operating inside several 
passenger cars because the batteries and the wiring connecting the 
batteries to the lights were damaged as a result of the derailment.
    In the 1999 PESS final rule, FRA established performance criteria 
for emergency lighting, including minimum illumination levels for 
certain locations in new passenger car door locations, aisles, and 
passageways, because it would enable the occupants of the passenger 
cars to discern their immediate surroundings (situational awareness) 
and thereby minimize or avoid panic in an emergency. Establishing an 
illumination requirement at floor level adjacent to doors, was intended 
to permit passenger car occupants to see and negotiate thresholds and 
steps that are typically located near doors. The illumination 
requirement 25 inches above the floor for aisles and passageways was 
intended to permit passenger car occupants to see and make their way 
past obstacles as they exit a train in an emergency. FRA also pointed 
out that the existing requirement contained in Sec.  238.115 provides 
greater flexibility to railroads related to the placement of lighting 
fixtures for new equipment. FRA also required that the emergency 
lighting system remain operational on each car for 90 minutes, 
consistent with FAA requirements for passenger aircraft emergency 
lighting.
    With respect to existing equipment, FRA noted that it desired 
achievable emergency lighting enhancements and that it would evaluate 
an APTA emergency lighting standard when completed. The Task Force 
developed a revised APTA emergency lighting standard that would enhance 
the existing FRA emergency lighting requirements in Sec.  238.115 by: 
(1) applying the requirements to existing equipment; and, (2) improving 
the back-up power supply survivability requirement (with application to 
both new and existing cars). The APTA emergency lighting standard 
specifies the same minimum illumination levels and duration that are 
required by Sec.  238.115 for doors, aisleways, and passageways in new 
equipment. In addition, the APTA standard requires that additional 
locations be provided with emergency lighting, such as stairways and 
toilet rooms.
    The Task Force recommended revisions to the APTA emergency lighting 
standard to address older equipment not currently covered by the 
emergency lighting requirements contained in Sec.  238.115. The revised 
APTA standard now specifies minimum emergency lighting performance 
criteria for all passenger cars (new and existing). The levels of 
illumination and duration required for equipment ordered before 
September 8, 2000, and placed in service before September 9, 2002, are 
half the levels that are required for newer equipment. This takes into 
consideration the more limited capabilities of older electrical 
lighting systems. The APTA emergency lighting standard provides that 
these illumination and duration requirements be implemented by January 
1, 2015, or when the equipment is transferred, leased, or conveyed to 
another railroad for more than 6 months of operation, whichever occurs 
first. Some railroads indicated their intention to retire certain 
equipment by 2015. The Task Force agreed it would not be cost-justified 
to retrofit such equipment.
    In addition, the APTA emergency lighting standard requires that

[[Page 161]]

emergency lighting systems installed on each passenger car ordered on 
or after April 7, 2008, or placed in service for the first time on or 
after January 1, 2012, meet minimum illumination levels by means of an 
independent power source(s) that is located in or within one half of a 
car length of each light fixture it powers, and that operates when 
normal power is unavailable. As previously noted, these illumination 
levels are the same as the ones already specified in Sec.  238.115 for 
doors, aisleways, and passageways. The independent power source 
requirement is not currently contained in Sec.  238.115, and is being 
proposed in this rulemaking proceeding. The Task Force evaluated the 
feasibility of equipping each emergency lighting fixture with self-
contained power sources, as a back-up power source, independent of the 
main car battery. After deliberation, the Task Force concluded that 
maintenance would be very costly due to the high number of power 
sources. The Task Force examined other methods for addressing the issue 
of emergency lighting system reliability and assisted APTA in revising 
the APTA emergency lighting standard to better address those situations 
in which an emergency lighting system may be most beneficial. For 
example, in the event of a derailment resulting in a car rollover, the 
importance of situational awareness is heightened. Occupants are likely 
not in the same location as they were before the incident and, in 
conditions of darkness, are likely unaware as to where in the car they 
are located in relation to the nearest exit. APTA added four 
requirements that address NTSB's recommendation to FRA regarding 
emergency lighting survivability for new passenger cars, as described 
below.
    First, the APTA emergency lighting standard was revised to require 
an independent power source within the car body located no more than a 
half-car length away from the fixture it powers. For most passenger car 
designs, this translates into a minimum of two batteries, one in each 
end of the car. In the Silver Spring accident, passenger cars incurred 
collision and derailment damage to underfloor battery boxes, causing 
the wet cell batteries contained in those boxes to leak electrolyte. 
Because of the damage and leakage, the batteries failed to provide 
power to the emergency lighting on board the passenger cars. Placing 
the batteries within the car body will reduce the risk of damage to the 
battery during a collision, and increase the likelihood that the 
batteries will be capable of providing power to the emergency lighting.
    Second, each of these independent power sources is required to have 
an automatic self-diagnostic module to perform a discharge test to 
ensure timely detection and notification of a malfunction. Third, 
emergency lighting systems in new cars are required to be capable of 
operating in all equipment orientations to address accident situations 
resulting in the rollover of a car. During an accident, passenger cars 
may tilt, causing wet cell batteries contained in those cars to leak 
electrolyte and, as a consequence, fail to provide power to the 
emergency lighting on board the passenger cars. Wet cell batteries will 
likely leak when tilted in a rollover, because wet cell batteries are 
designed with a vent on top that allows liquid to escape when tipped 
over. Alternatively, a sealed battery is capable of functioning as 
intended regardless of the battery's orientation. When a sealed battery 
is tilted during an accident, it will not fail to provide power to 
emergency lighting merely as a result of the batteries being tilted. 
Finally, the APTA standards provides that emergency lighting systems 
must be designed so that at least 50 percent of the light fixtures 
operate notwithstanding the failure of any single fixture or power 
source.
    In support of revising the APTA emergency lighting standard, the 
Volpe Center researched various alternative, cost-effective 
technologies for addressing the reliability of emergency lighting 
systems. The Volpe Center found that the development of emergency-
lighting systems that can function reliably for a decade or more with 
minimal maintenance and that can withstand passenger train collision/
derailment forces has been greatly facilitated by two recent 
technologies:
     Solid-State Lighting (SSL)--most commonly known as light 
emitting diodes (LEDs)
     Supercapacitors--devices that store about 100 times as 
much electrical charge per unit volume as previous types of capacitors.
    Solid-state lighting includes conventional LEDs and other emerging 
technologies to produce illumination without the use of incandescent 
filaments or excited gases in glass containers. Compared with older 
lighting technologies, the solid-state lighting devices are much 
smaller, are able to withstand hundreds or thousands of times as much 
shock forces, and have service lives ten to one hundred times greater. 
Their light output per unit of electric power consumed is currently 
equivalent to fluorescent lighting, and continues to improve. 
Prototypes of new LED and other SSL devices use only half as much 
energy to produce a given amount of light as the best fluorescent 
lamps. The light output of current white LEDs ranges from 20 to 60 
lumens per Watt, which means that a large area can be illuminated to a 
required minimum value (one lumen per square foot) with only one Watt 
of power. Furthermore, use of LEDs avoids the disposal costs of 
mercury-containing lamps. For these reasons, railroads have already 
started specifying the use of LED devices for new passenger car 
lighting, and to some extent have already used LEDs for retrofitting 
existing car lighting.
    Capacitors are devices that store energy in an electrical field (as 
opposed to a battery, in which the energy is stored chemically). 
Chemicals that store and release energy in amounts that are useful in 
batteries are inherently corrosive, which limits battery life to about 
a thousand charge-discharge cycles, or about seven years in 
applications where the battery is rarely discharged. By avoiding use of 
corrosive chemicals, capacitors are far more durable; but until 
recently, they could not store enough energy to be useful in emergency 
lighting. New supercapacitors are rated for 500,000 charge-discharge 
cycles, and their service lives are expected to extend to at least ten 
years. Currently, commercial supercapacitors are available that store 
as much as 5 Watt-hours of energy. Combined with very efficient LEDs or 
other SSL devices, they allow the manufacture of emergency lighting 
systems using self-contained power with the ability to withstand 
collision forces of much greater magnitude than emergency lighting 
systems currently in use. As discussed in sections D, E, and F below, 
the brightness of newer photoluminescent materials which can be used 
for emergency egress signs and exit path marking can be a cost-
effective means of addressing concerns regarding the survivability of 
emergency lighting systems, particularly for older equipment in 
operation, until it is retired from service.

D. Marking and Instructions for Emergency Egress and Rescue Access

    To initially address emergency egress and rescue access, as well as 
other issues related to the 1996 Silver Spring accident cited earlier, 
FRA issued Emergency Order No. 20 (EO 20). 61 FR 6876. In addition to 
other requirements, EO 20 required commuter and intercity passenger 
railroads to mark the location, and provide instructions for the use, 
of emergency window exits by no later

[[Page 162]]

than April 20, 1996. In an effort to respond to this requirement as 
effectively as possible in the short timeframe provided, affected 
railroads began to install photo-luminescent emergency exit markings to 
mark doors intended for emergency egress and emergency window exits 
with photoluminescent materials that were available at the time for 
this purpose.
    On May 4, 1998, FRA issued the PTEP final rule that requires door 
exits that are intended for emergency egress to be lighted or 
conspicuously marked with luminescent material, and that instructions 
for their use be provided. The rule also requires that emergency window 
exits be conspicuously marked with luminescent material, and that 
instructions for their use be provided. See 63 FR 24630. Doors and 
windows intended for emergency access by emergency responders for 
extrication of passengers must also be marked with retroreflective 
material, and instructions for their use must be posted. Notably, the 
rule did not specify specific criteria for minimum luminance levels or 
letter size or sign color but stated that the marking of the door and 
window exits must be conspicuous enough so that a reasonable person, 
even while enduring the stress and panic of an emergency evacuation can 
determine where the closest and most accessible route out of the car is 
located. See 63 FR 24669. Many railroads installed signs made of zinc-
sulfide, which were capable of providing luminance only for a period of 
less than 10 minutes in many cases. Subsequently, photoluminescent sign 
technology evolved, and other materials began to be used, such as 
strontium-aluminate, which is capable of providing high levels of 
luminance for much longer periods.
    The original APTA emergency signage standard was revised in 1999 to 
require the installation of emergency exit signs with specific minimum 
``higher performance'' photoluminescent material, in terms of 
brightness and duration, as well as larger minimum letter sizes, color 
contrast, etc., for emergency exit signs. The second revision, 
authorized in 2002, included a reorganization of certain sections, 
citation of ASTM International (ASTM) retroreflectivity standards, as 
well as the revision of annex guidance to evaluate the performance 
characteristics of the emergency exit signs. FRA considered 
incorporating elements of the APTA standard into the PTES final rule in 
2008 so that emergency exit signs and intercom markings in passenger 
cars would be required to be made of photoluminescent material with 
higher levels of brightness for longer duration. However, the Task 
Force recommended that certain requirements in the APTA emergency 
signage standard be revised to address technical issues with the 
performance characteristics of certain types of photoluminescent 
materials already installed in existing passenger rail cars, as well as 
other necessary clarifications addressing sign size, color, and 
contrast, etc., before the standard is incorporated by reference by 
FRA. See 63 FR 6886.
    APTA revised its emergency signage standard to incorporate the Task 
Force recommendations. The recommendations were based on Volpe Center 
research findings and technological advances in photoluminescence (as 
discussed in Section F below). Substantively, the revised APTA standard 
requires that each passenger rail car have interior emergency signage 
to assist passengers and train crewmembers in more readily locating, 
reaching, and operating emergency exits in order to safely evacuate 
from the rail car or train; and exterior signage to assist emergency 
responders in more readily locating, reaching operating emergency 
access points, during an emergency situation that warrants immediate 
passenger rail car or train evacuation. To ensure visibility to 
passengers, signs that are required to mark the location of vestibule 
door markings must meet the brightness and duration performance 
criteria requirements for photoluminescent material, as specified in 
the APTA standard.
    Although the APTA emergency signage standard does not address 
emergency communication system signage, the Task Force also recommended 
applying certain criteria for photoluminescent marking specified in 
that standard to intercom systems, as further described in Section G 
below. The APTA standard also includes specifications for 
retroreflective marking and material, which are consistent with FRA 
requirements for rescue access point marking for doors, windows, and 
roof access locations. The APTA standard is more detailed than the 
relevant existing FRA requirements contained in part. For example, the 
APTA standard requires specific minimum letter sizes for doors and 
emergency window exits and includes specific criteria for color, color 
contrast, etc.
    The revised APTA emergency signage standard requires periodic 
testing of certain system components and contains procedures to ensure 
compliance. APTA designed its emergency signage standard to offer 
flexibility in application, as well as to achieve the desired goal of 
facilitating passenger and crew egress from potentially life-
threatening situations in passenger rail cars. Individual railroads 
have the responsibility to design, install, and maintain an emergency 
signage system that is compatible with their internal safety policies 
for emergency evacuation, while complying with the performance criteria 
specified in this standard.
    The Task Force recommended that FRA adopt the specific 
retroreflective material criteria contained in the 2007 APTA emergency 
signage standard related to rescue access windows and doors intended 
for access by emergency responders, into the new section 238.114 in the 
2008 rule which added a requirement for installation of a minimum 
number and the location of rescue access windows on all passenger cars. 
Thus, in the 2008 rule, FRA added a definition of ``retroreflective 
material'' that incorporates by reference criteria form ASTM's Standard 
D 4956-07 for Type 1 Sheeting, which is consistent with the APTA 
emergency signage standard. Accordingly, FRA requests comment regarding 
the need to keep the definition in the rule given the incorporation of 
the APTA emergency signage standard. FRA also made other revisions 
related to rescue access marking, consistent with the other rescue 
access marking requirements specified in the APTA. See 73 FR 6389.

E. Low-Location Emergency Exit Path Marking

    A review of past passenger rail accidents involving passenger and 
train crew emergency evacuation has indicated that, in certain cases, 
both passengers and emergency responders lacked sufficient information 
necessary for expedient emergency egress and responder access due to 
the absence of identifiable markings. A lack of adequate markings 
indicating the location of emergency exits, in conjunction with 
lighting system failures, or low levels of illumination, or both, 
during conditions of darkness when these accidents occurred caused 
confusion and contributed to injuries and casualties. In addition, the 
presence of fire or smoke may substantially increase the difficulty of 
evacuating passenger train occupants.
    To avoid the many hazards associated with evacuation onto the 
right-of-way, the preferred means of egress from a passenger car that 
is not located at a station is via the end door(s) to the next car. 
Under conditions of darkness, or when illumination from emergency 
lighting fixtures located at or near the ceiling are obscured by smoke, 
such

[[Page 163]]

markings (including exit signs) remain discernible. Particularly in the 
smoke situation, the most viable escape path is the more visible path, 
which is likely to be at or near the floor where occupants are forced 
to lower themselves towards (where the pathway markings are located) to 
avoid inhaling the smoke.
    The 1999 APTA standard for low-location emergency exit path marking 
(LLEPM) required high performance photoluminesent (HPPL) material t