Connect America Fund; A National Broadband Plan for Our Future; Establishing Just and Reasonable Rates for Local Exchange Carriers; High-Cost Universal Service Support, 81562-81664 [2011-32411]
Download as PDF
81562
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 0, 1, 20, 36, 51, 54, 61,
64, and 69
[WC Docket Nos. 10–90, 07–135, 05–337,
03–109; GN Docket No. 09–51; CC Docket
Nos. 01–92, 96–45; WT Docket No. 10–208;
FCC 11–161]
Connect America Fund; A National
Broadband Plan for Our Future;
Establishing Just and Reasonable
Rates for Local Exchange Carriers;
High-Cost Universal Service Support
Federal Communications
Commission.
ACTION: Final rule; policy statement.
AGENCY:
In a rule published November
29, 2011, the Federal Communications
Commission (Commission)
comprehensively reformed and
modernized the universal service and
intercarrier compensation systems to
ensure that robust, affordable voice and
broadband service, both fixed and
mobile, are available to Americans
throughout the nation. The Commission
adopted fiscally responsible,
accountable, incentive-based policies to
transition these outdated systems to the
Connect America Fund, ensuring
fairness for consumers and addressing
the communications infrastructure
challenges of today and tomorrow. The
Commission uses measured but firm
glide paths to provide industry with
certainty and sufficient time to adapt to
a changed regulatory landscape, and
establish a framework to distribute
universal service funding in the most
efficient and technologically neutral
manner possible, through market-based
mechanisms such as competitive
bidding. This document provides
additional information to the final rule
document published on November 29,
2011.
SUMMARY:
DATES:
Effective December 29, 2011.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Amy Bender, Wireline Competition
Bureau, (202) 418–1469, Victoria
Goldberg, Wireline Competition Bureau,
(202) 418–7353, and Margaret Wiener,
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau,
(202) 418–2176 or TTY: (202) 418–0484.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a
summary of the Commission’s Report
and Order (R&O) in WC Docket Nos. 10–
90, 07–135, 05–337, 03–109; GN Docket
No. 09–51; CC Docket Nos. 01–92, 96–
45; WT Docket No. 10–208; FCC 11–161,
released on November 18, 2011. The
executive summary of the R&O, and the
final rules adopted by the R&O were
published in the Federal Register on
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
November 29, 2011, 76 FR 73830. The
full text of this document is available for
public inspection during regular
business hours in the FCC Reference
Center, Room CY–A257, 445 12th Street
SW., Washington, DC 20554. Or at the
following Internet address: https://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/FCC-11-161A1.pdf.
I. Adoption of a New Principle for
Universal Service
1. In November 2010, the FederalState Joint Board on Universal Service
(Joint Board) recommended that the
Commission ‘‘specifically find that
universal service support should be
directed where possible to networks that
provide advanced services, as well as
voice services,’’ and adopt such a
principle pursuant to its 47 U.S.C.
254(b)(7) authority. The Joint Board
believes that this principle is consistent
with 47 U.S.C. 254(b)(3) and would
serve the public interest. The
Commission agrees. 47 U.S.C. 254(b)(3)
provides that consumers in rural,
insular and high-cost areas should have
access to ‘‘advanced
telecommunications and information
services * * * that are reasonably
comparable to those services provided
in urban areas.’’ 47 U.S.C. 254(b)(2)
likewise provides that ‘‘Access to
advanced telecommunications and
information services should be provided
in all regions of the Nation.’’ Providing
support for broadband networks will
further all of these goals.
2. Accordingly, the Commission
adopts ‘‘support for advanced services’’
as an additional principle upon which
the Commission will base policies for
the preservation and advancement of
universal service, and thereby act on
one of the Joint Board’s 2010
recommendations. For the reasons
discussed above, the Commission finds,
per 47 U.S.C. 254(b)(7), that this new
principle is ‘‘necessary and
appropriate.’’ Consistent with the Joint
Board’s recommendation, the
Commission defines this principle as:
‘‘Support for Advanced Services—
Universal service support should be
directed where possible to networks that
provide advanced services, as well as
voice services.’’
II. Goals
3. Discussion. The Commission
adopts five performance goals to
preserve and advance service in high
cost, rural, and insular areas through the
Connect America Fund and existing
support mechanisms. The Commission
also adopts performance measures for
the first, second, and fifth of these goals,
and direct the Wireline Competition
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Bureau and the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau (Bureaus)
to further develop other measures. The
Commission delegates authority to the
Bureaus to finalize performance
measures as appropriate consistent with
these goals.
4. Preserve and Advance Voice
Service. The first performance goal is to
preserve and advance universal
availability of voice service. In doing so,
the Commission reaffirms its
commitment to ensuring that all
Americans have access to voice service
while recognizing that, over time, voice
service will increasingly be provided
over broadband networks.
5. As a performance measure for this
goal, the Commission will use the
telephone penetration rate, which
measures subscription to telephone
service. The telephone penetration rate
has historically been used by the
Commission as a proxy for network
deployment and, as a result, will be a
consistent measure of the universal
service program’s effects. The
Commission will also continue to use
the Census Bureau’s Current Population
Survey (CPS) to collect data regarding
telephone penetration. Although CPS
data does not specifically break out
wireless, VoIP, or over-the-top voice
options available to consumers, a better
data set is not currently available. In
recognition of the limitations of existing
data, the Commission is considering
revising the types of data it collects, and
the Commission anticipates further
Commission action in this proceeding,
which may provide more complete
information that can be used to evaluate
this performance goal.
6. Ensure Universal Availability of
Voice and Broadband to Homes,
Businesses, and Community Anchor
Institutions. The second performance
goal is to ensure the universal
availability of modern networks capable
of delivering broadband and voice
service to homes, businesses, and
community anchor institutions as now
defined in 47 CFR 54.5. All Americans
in all parts of the nation, including
those in rural, insular, and high-cost
areas, should have access to affordable
modern communications networks
capable of supporting the necessary
applications that empower them to
learn, work, create, and innovate. The
Commission uses the term ‘‘modern
networks’’ because supported
equipment and services are expected to
change over time to keep up with
technological advancements.
7. As an outcome measure for this
goal, the Commission will use the
number of residential, business, and
community anchor institution locations
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
that newly gain access to broadband
service. As an efficiency measure, the
Commission will use the change in the
number of homes, businesses, and
community anchor institutions passed
or covered per million USF dollars
spent. To collect data, the Commission
will use the National Broadband Map
and/or Form 477. The Commission will
also require CAF recipients to report on
the number of community anchor
institutions that newly gain access to
fixed broadband service as a result of
CAF support. Although these measures
are imperfect, the Commission believes
that they are the best available. Other
options, such as the Mercatus Centers’
suggestion of using an assessment of
what might have occurred without the
programs, are not administratively
feasible at this time. But the Bureaus are
directed to revisit these measures at a
later point, and to consider refinements
and alternatives.
8. Ensure Universal Availability of
Mobile Voice and Broadband Where
Americans Live, Work, or Travel. The
third performance goal is to ensure the
universal availability of modern
networks capable of delivering mobile
broadband and voice service in areas
where Americans live, work, or travel.
Like the preceding parallel goal, the
third performance goal is designed to
help ensure that all Americans in all
parts of the nation, including those in
rural, insular, and high-cost areas, have
access to affordable technologies that
will empower them to learn, work,
create, and innovate. But the
Commission believes that ensuring
universal advanced mobile coverage is
an important goal on its own, and that
the Commission will be better able track
program performance if the Commission
measures it separately.
9. The Commission declines to adopt
performance measures for this goal at
this time but direct the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau to develop
one or more appropriate measures for
this goal.
10. Ensure Reasonably Comparable
Rates for Broadband and Voice Services.
The fourth performance goal is to ensure
that rates are reasonably comparable for
voice as well as broadband service,
between urban and rural, insular, and
high cost areas. Rates must be
reasonably comparable so that
consumers in rural, insular, and high
cost areas have meaningful access to
these services.
11. The Commission also declines to
adopt measures for this goal at this time.
Although the Commission proposed one
outcome measure and asked about
others in the USF/ICC Transformation
NPRM, 75 FR 26906, May 13, 2010, the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
Commission received only limited input
on that proposal. The Mercatus Center
agrees that ‘‘[t]he ratio of prices to
income is an intuitively sensible way of
defining ‘reasonably comparable’’’ but
cautions that, again, the real challenge
is crafting measures that distinguish
how the programs affect rates apart from
other factors. The Bureaus may seek to
further develop the record on the
performance and efficiency measures
suggested by the Mercatus Center, the
Commission’s original proposals, and
any other measures commenters think
would be appropriate. In undertaking
this analysis, the Commission directs
the Bureau to develop separate
measures for (1) broadband services for
homes, businesses, and community
anchor institutions; and (2) mobile
services.
12. Minimize Universal Service
Contribution Burden on Consumers and
Businesses. The fifth performance goal
is to minimize the overall burden of
universal service contributions on
American consumers and businesses.
With this performance goal, the
Commission seeks to balance the
various objectives of 47 U.S.C. 254(b) of
the Act, including the objective of
providing support that is sufficient but
not excessive so as to not impose an
excessive burden on consumers and
businesses who ultimately pay to
support the Fund. As the Commission
has previously recognized, ‘‘if the
universal service fund grows too large,
it will jeopardize other statutory
mandates, such as ensuring affordable
rates in all parts of the country, and
ensuring that contributions from carriers
are fair and equitable.’’
13. As a performance measure for this
goal, the Commission will divide the
total inflation-adjusted expenditures of
the existing high-cost program and CAF
(including the Mobility Fund) each year
by the number of American households
and express the measure as a monthly
dollar figure. This calculation will be
relatively straightforward and rely on
publicly available data. As such, the
measure will be transparent and easily
verifiable. By adjusting for inflation and
looking at the universal service burden,
the Commission will be able to
determine whether the overall burden of
universal service contribution costs is
increasing or decreasing for the typical
American household. As an efficiency
measure, the Mercatus Center suggests
comparing the estimate of economic
deadweight loss associated with the
contribution mechanism to the
deadweight loss associated with
taxation. The Commission anticipates
that the Bureaus may seek further input
on this option and any others
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81563
commenters believe would be
appropriate.
14. Program Review. Using the
adopted goals and measures, the
Commission will, as required by GPRA,
monitor the performance of the
universal service program as the
Commission modernizes the current
high-cost program and transition to the
CAF. If the programs are not meeting
these performance goals, the
Commission will consider corrective
actions. Likewise, to the extent that the
adopted measures do not help us assess
program performance, the Commission
will revisit them as well.
III. Legal Authority
15. 47 U.S.C. 254. The principle that
all Americans should have access to
communications services has been at
the core of the Commission’s mandate
since its founding. Congress created this
Commission in 1934 for the purpose of
making ‘‘available * * * to all the
people of the United States * * * a
rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and worldwide wire and radio communication
service with adequate facilities at
reasonable charges.’’ In the 1996 Act,
Congress built upon that longstanding
principle by enacting 47 U.S.C. 254.
Section 254 of the Act sets forth six
principles upon which the Commission
must ‘‘base policies for the preservation
and advancement of universal service.’’
Among these principles are that
‘‘[q]uality services should be available at
just, reasonable, and affordable rates,’’
that ‘‘[a]ccess to advanced
telecommunications and information
services should be provided in all
regions of the Nation,’’ and that
‘‘[c]onsumers in all regions of the
Nation * * * should have access to
telecommunications and information
services, including * * * advanced
telecommunications and information
services, that are reasonably comparable
to those services provided in urban
areas’’ and at reasonably comparable
rates.
16. Under 47 U.S.C. 254, the
Commission has express statutory
authority to support
telecommunications services that the
Commission has designated as eligible
for universal service support. Section
254(c)(1) of the Act defines ‘‘[u]niveral
service’’ as ‘‘an evolving level of
telecommunications services that the
Commission shall establish periodically
under this section, taking into account
advances in telecommunications and
information technologies and services.’’
As discussed more fully below, in this
R&O, the Commission adopts the
proposal to simplify how the
Commission describes the various
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81564
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
supported services that the Commission
historically has defined in functional
terms (e.g., voice grade access to the
PSTN, access to emergency services)
into a single supported service
designated as ‘‘voice telephony service.’’
To the extent carriers offer traditional
voice telephony services as
telecommunications services over
traditional circuit-switched networks,
the authority to provide support for
such services is well established.
17. Increasingly, however, consumers
are obtaining voice services not through
traditional means but instead through
interconnected VoIP providers offering
service over broadband networks. As
AT&T notes, ‘‘[c]ircuit-switched
networks deployed primarily for voice
service are rapidly yielding to packetswitched networks,’’ which offer voice
as well as other types of services.’’ The
data bear this out. As the Commission
observed in the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM, ‘‘[f]rom 2008 to
2009, interconnected VoIP subscriptions
increased by 22 percent, while switched
access lines decreased by 10 percent.’’
Interconnected VoIP services, among
other things, allow customers to make
real-time voice calls to, and receive calls
from, the PSTN, and increasingly appear
to be viewed by consumers as
substitutes for traditional voice
telephone services. Our authority to
promote universal service in this
context does not depend on whether
interconnected VoIP services are
telecommunications services or
information services under the
Communications Act.
18. Section 254 grants the
Commission the authority to support
not only voice telephony service but
also the facilities over which it is
offered. Section 254(e) makes clear that
‘‘[a] carrier that receives such [universal
service] support shall use that support
only for the provision, maintenance,
and upgrading of facilities and services
for which the support is intended.’’ By
referring to ‘‘facilities’’ and ‘‘services’’
as distinct items for which federal
universal service funds may be used, the
Commission believes Congress granted
the Commission the flexibility not only
to designate the types of
telecommunications services for which
support would be provided, but also to
encourage the deployment of the types
of facilities that will best achieve the
principles set forth in 47 U.S.C. 254(b)
and any other universal service
principle that the Commission may
adopt under 47 U.S.C. 254(b)(7). For
instance, under the longstanding ‘‘no
barriers’’ policy, the Commission allows
carriers receiving high-cost support ‘‘to
invest in infrastructure capable of
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
providing access to advanced services’’
as well as supported voice services.
That policy furthers the policy Congress
set forth in 47 U.S.C. 254(b) of
‘‘ensuring access to advanced
telecommunications and information
services throughout the nation.’’ While
this policy was enunciated in an Order
adopting rule changes for rural
incumbent carriers, by its terms it is not
limited to such carriers. The ‘‘nobarriers’’ policy has applied, and will
continue to apply, to all eligible
telecommunications carriers (ETCs), and
the Commission codifies it in the rules.
Section 254(e) thus contemplates that
carriers may receive federal support to
enable the deployment of broadband
facilities used to provide supported
telecommunications services as well as
other services.
19. The Commission further
concludes that the authority under 47
U.S.C. 254 allows the Commission to go
beyond the ‘‘no barriers’’ policy and
require carriers receiving federal
universal service support to invest in
modern broadband-capable networks.
Nothing in 47 U.S.C. 254 requires the
Commission simply to provide federal
funds to carriers and hope that they will
use such support to deploy broadband
facilities. To the contrary, the
Commission has a ‘‘mandatory duty’’ to
adopt universal service policies that
advance the principles outlined in 47
U.S.C. 254(b), and the Commission has
the authority to ‘‘create some
inducement’’ to ensure that those
principles are achieved. Congress made
clear in 47 U.S.C. 254 that the
deployment of, and access to,
information services—including
‘‘advanced’’ information services—are
important components of a robust and
successful federal universal service
program. Furthermore, the Commission
adopts the recommendation of the
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal
Service to establish a new universal
service principle pursuant to 47 U.S.C.
254(b)(7) that universal service support
should be directed where possible to
networks that provide advanced
services, as well as voice services.’’ In
today’s communications environment,
achievement of these principles
requires, at a minimum, that carriers
receiving universal service support
invest in and deploy networks capable
of providing consumers with access to
modern broadband capabilities, as well
as voice telephony services.
Accordingly, as explained in greater
detail below, the Commission will
exercise the authority under 47 U.S.C.
254 to require that carriers receiving
support—both CAF support, including
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Mobility Fund support, and support
under the existing high-cost support
mechanisms—offer broadband
capabilities to consumers. The
Commission concludes that this
approach is sufficient to ensure access
to voice and broadband services and,
therefore, the Commission does not, at
this time, add broadband to the list of
supported services, as some have urged.
20. 47 U.S.C. 1302. The Commission
also has independent authority under 47
U.S.C. 1302 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 to fund the deployment of
broadband networks. In 47 U.S.C. 1302,
Congress recognized the importance of
ubiquitous broadband deployment to
Americans’ civic, cultural, and
economic lives and, thus, instructed the
Commission to ‘‘encourage the
deployment on a reasonable and timely
basis of advanced telecommunications
capability to all Americans.’’ Of
particular importance, Congress adopted
a definition of ‘‘advanced
telecommunications capability’’ that is
not confined to a particular technology
or regulatory classification. Rather,
‘‘‘advanced telecommunications
capability’ is defined, without regard to
any transmission media or technology,
as high-speed, switched, broadband
telecommunications capability that
enables users to originate and receive
high-quality voice, data, graphics, and
video communications using any
technology.’’ Section 1302 of the Act
further requires the Commission to
‘‘determine whether advanced
telecommunications capability is being
deployed to all Americans in a
reasonable and timely fashion’’ and, if
the Commission concludes that it is not,
to ‘‘take immediate action to accelerate
deployment of such capability by
removing barriers to infrastructure
investment and by promoting
competition in the telecommunications
market.’’ The Commission has found
that broadband deployment to all
Americans has not been reasonable and
timely and observed in its most recent
broadband deployment report that ‘‘too
many Americans remain unable to fully
participate in our economy and society
because they lack broadband.’’ This
finding triggers the duty under 47 U.S.C.
1302(b) to ‘‘remov[e] barriers to
infrastructure investment’’ and
‘‘promot[e] competition in the
telecommunications market’’ in order to
accelerate broadband deployment
throughout the Nation.
21. Providing support for broadband
networks helps achieve 47 U.S.C.
1302(b)’s objectives. First, the
Commission has recognized that one of
the most significant barriers to
investment in broadband infrastructure
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
is the lack of a ‘‘business case for
operating a broadband network’’ in
high-cost areas ‘‘[i]n the absence of
programs that provide additional
support.’’ Extending federal support to
carriers deploying broadband networks
in high-cost areas will thus eliminate a
significant barrier to infrastructure
investment and accelerate broadband
deployment to unserved and
underserved areas of the Nation. The
deployment of broadband infrastructure
to all Americans will in turn make
services such as interconnected VoIP
service accessible to more Americans.
22. Second, supporting broadband
networks helps ‘‘promot[e] competition
in the telecommunications market,’’
particularly with respect to voice
services. As the Commission has long
recognized, ‘‘interconnected VoIP
service ‘is increasingly used to replace
analog voice service.’’’ Thus, the
Commission previously explained that
requiring interconnected VoIP providers
to contribute to federal universal service
support mechanisms promoted
competitive neutrality because it
‘‘reduces the possibility that carriers
with universal service obligations will
compete directly with providers without
such obligations.’’ Just as ‘‘we do not
want contribution obligations to shape
decisions regarding the technology that
interconnected VoIP providers use to
offer voice services to customers or to
create opportunities for regulatory
arbitrage,’’ the Commission does not
want to create regulatory distinctions
that serve no universal service purpose
or that unduly influence the decisions
providers will make with respect to how
best to offer voice services to
consumers. The ‘‘telecommunications
market’’—which includes
interconnected VoIP and by statutory
definition is broader than just
telecommunications services—will be
more competitive, and thus will provide
greater benefits to consumers, as a result
of the decision to support broadband
networks, regardless of regulatory
classification.
23. By exercising the authority under
47 U.S.C. 1302 in this manner, the
Commission furthers Congress’s
objective of ‘‘accelerat[ing] deployment’’
of advanced telecommunications
capability ‘‘to all Americans.’’ Under the
approach, federal support will not turn
on whether interconnected VoIP
services or the underlying broadband
service falls within traditional
regulatory classifications under the
Communications Act. Rather, the
approach focuses on accelerating
broadband deployment to unserved and
underserved areas, and allows providers
to make their own judgments as to how
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
best to structure their service offerings
in order to make such deployment a
reality.
24. The Commission disagrees with
commenters who assert that the
Commission lacks authority under 47
U.S.C. 1302(b) to support broadband
networks. While 47 U.S.C. 1302(a)
imposes a general duty on the
Commission to encourage broadband
deployment through the use of ‘‘price
cap regulation, regulatory forbearance,
measures that promote competition in
the local telecommunications market, or
other regulating methods that remove
barriers to infrastructure investment,’’
47 U.S.C. 1302(b) is triggered by a
specific finding that broadband
capability is not being ‘‘deployed to all
Americans in a reasonable and timely
fashion.’’ Upon making that finding
(which the Commission has done), 47
U.S.C. 1302(b) requires the Commission
to ‘‘take immediate action to accelerate’’
broadband deployment. Given the
statutory structure, the Commission
reads 47 U.S.C. 1302(b) as conferring on
the Commission the additional
authority, beyond what the Commission
possesses under 47 U.S.C. 1302(a) or
elsewhere in the Act, to take steps
necessary to fulfill Congress’s
broadband deployment objectives.
Indeed, it is hard to see what additional
work 47 U.S.C. 1302(b) does if it is not
an independent source of statutory
authority.
25. The Commission also rejects the
view that providing support for
broadband networks under 47 U.S.C.
1302(b) conflicts with 47 U.S.C. 254,
which defines universal service in terms
of telecommunications services.
Information services are not excluded
from 47 U.S.C. 254 because of any
policy judgment made by Congress. To
the contrary, Congress contemplated
that the federal universal service
program would promote consumer
access to both advanced
telecommunications and advanced
information services ‘‘in all regions of
the Nation.’’ When Congress enacted the
1996 Act, most consumers accessed the
Internet through dial-up connections
over the PSTN, and broadband
capabilities were provided over tariffed
common carrier facilities.
Interconnected VoIP services had only a
nominal presence in the marketplace in
1996. It was not until 2002 that the
Commission first determined that one
form of broadband—cable modem
service—was a single offering of an
information service rather than separate
offerings of telecommunications and
information services, and only in 2005
did the Commission conclude that
wireline broadband service should be
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81565
governed by the same regulatory
classification. Thus, marketplace and
technological developments and the
Commission’s determinations that
broadband services may be offered as
information services have had the effect
of removing such services from the
scope of the explicit reference to
‘‘universal service’’ in 47 U.S.C. 254(c).
Likewise, Congress did not exclude
interconnected VoIP services from the
federal universal service program;
indeed, there is no reason to believe it
specifically anticipated the
development and growth of such
services in the years following the
enactment of the 1996 Act.
26. The principles upon which the
Commission ‘‘shall base policies for the
preservation and advancement of
universal service’’ make clear that
supporting networks used to offer
services that are or may be information
services for purposes of regulatory
classification is consistent with
Congress’s overarching policy
objectives. For example, 47 U.S.C.
254(b)(2)’s principle that ‘‘[a]ccess to
advanced telecommunications and
information services should be provided
in all regions of the Nation’’ dovetails
comfortably with 47 U.S.C. 1302(b)’s
policy that ‘‘advanced
telecommunications capability [be]
deployed to all Americans in a
reasonable and timely fashion.’’ Our
decision to exercise authority under 47
U.S.C. 1302 does not undermine 47
U.S.C. 254’s universal service
principles, but rather ensures their
fulfillment. By contrast, limiting federal
support based on the regulatory
classification of the services offered over
broadband networks as
telecommunications services would
exclude from the universal service
program providers who would
otherwise be able to deploy broadband
infrastructure to consumers. The
Commission sees no basis in the statute,
the legislative history of the 1996 Act,
or the record of this proceeding for
concluding that such a constricted
outcome would promote the
Congressional policy objectives
underlying 47 U.S.C. 254 and 1302.
27. Finally, the Commission notes the
limited extent to which the Commission
is relying on 47 U.S.C. 706(b) in this
proceeding. Consistent with the
longstanding policy of minimizing
regulatory distinctions that serve no
universal service purpose, the
Commission is not adopting a separate
universal service framework under 47
U.S.C. 1302(b). Instead, the Commission
is relying on 47 U.S.C. 1302(b) as an
alternative basis to 47 U.S.C. 254 to the
extent necessary to ensure that the
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81566
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
federal universal service program covers
services and networks that could be
used to offer information services as
well as telecommunications services.
Carriers seeking federal support must
still comply with the same universal
service rules and obligations set forth in
47 U.S.C. 254 and 214, including the
requirement that such providers be
designated as eligible to receive support,
either from state commissions or, if the
provider is beyond the jurisdiction of
the state commission, from this
Commission. In this way, the
Commission ensures that exercise of 47
U.S.C. 1302(b) authority will advance,
rather than detract from, the universal
service principles established under 47
U.S.C. 254 of the Act.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
IV. Public Interest Obligations
A. Voice Service
28. Discussion. The Commission
determines that it is appropriate to
describe the core functionalities of the
supported services as ‘‘voice telephony
service.’’ Some commenters support
redefining the voice functionalities as
voice telephony services, while others
oppose the change, arguing that the
current list of functionalities remains
important today, the term ‘‘voice
telephony’’ is too vague, and such a
modification may result in a lower
standard of voice service. Given that
consumers are increasingly obtaining
voice services over broadband networks
as well as over traditional circuit
switched telephone networks, the
Commission agrees with commenters
that urge the Commission to focus on
the functionality offered, not the
specific technology used to provide the
supported service.
29. The decision to classify the
supported services as voice telephony
should not result in a lower standard of
voice service: Many of the enumerated
services are universal today, and the
Commission requires eligible providers
to continue to offer those particular
functionalities as part of voice
telephony. Rather, the modified
definition simply shifts to a
technologically neutral approach,
allowing companies to provision voice
service over any platform, including the
PSTN and IP networks. This
modification will benefit both providers
(as they may invest in new
infrastructure and services) and
consumers (who reap the benefits of the
new technology and service offerings).
Accordingly, to promote technological
neutrality while ensuring that the new
approach does not result in lower
quality offerings, the Commission
amends 47 CFR 54.101 of the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
Commission rules to specify that the
functionalities of eligible voice
telephony services include voice grade
access to the public switched network
or its functional equivalent; minutes of
use for local service provided at no
additional charge to end users; toll
limitation to qualifying low-income
consumers; and access to the emergency
services 911 and enhanced 911 services
to the extent the local government in an
eligible carrier’s service area has
implemented 911 or enhanced 911
systems. The Commission finds that
changes in the marketplace allow for the
elimination of the requirements to
provide single-party service, operator
services, and directory assistance.
30. Today, all ETCs, whether
designated by a state commission or this
Commission, are required to offer the
supported service—voice telephony
service—throughout their designated
service area. ETCs also must provide
Lifeline service throughout their
designated service area. In the USF/ICC
Transformation FNPRM, the
Commission seeks comment on
modifying incumbent ETCs’ obligations
to provide voice service in situations
where the incumbent’s high-cost
universal service funding is eliminated,
for example as a result of a competitive
bidding process in which another ETC
wins universal support for an area and
is subject to accompanying voice and
broadband service obligations.
(Throughout this R&O, unless otherwise
specified, the term ‘‘ETC’’ does not
include ETCs that are designated only
for the purposes of the low income
program.)
31. As a condition of receiving
support, the Commission requires ETCs
to offer voice telephony as a standalone
service throughout their designated
service area, meaning that consumers
must not be required to purchase any
other services (e.g., broadband) in order
to purchase voice service. As indicated
above, ETCs may use any technology in
the provision of voice telephony service.
32. Additionally, consistent with the
47 U.S.C. 254(b) principle that
‘‘[c]onsumers in all regions of the
Nation * * * should have access to
telecommunications and information
services * * * that are available at rates
that are reasonably comparable to rates
charged for similar services in urban
areas,’’ ETCs must offer voice telephony
service, including voice telephony
service offered on a standalone basis, at
rates that are reasonably comparable to
urban rates. The Commission finds that
these requirements are appropriate to
help ensure that consumers have access
to voice telephony service that best fits
their particular needs.
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
33. The Commission declines to
preempt state obligations regarding
voice service, including COLR
obligations, at this time. Proponents of
such preemption have failed to support
their assertion that state service
obligations are inconsistent with federal
rules and burden the federal universal
service mechanisms, nor have they
identified any specific legacy service
obligations that represent an unfunded
mandate that make it infeasible for
carriers to deploy broadband in highcost areas. Carriers must therefore
continue to satisfy state voice service
requirements.
34. That said, the Commission
encourages states to review their
respective regulations and policies in
light of these changes and revisit the
appropriateness of maintaining those
obligations for entities that no longer
receive federal high-cost universal
service funding, just as the Commission
intends to explore the necessity of
maintaining ETC obligations when ETCs
no longer are receiving funding. For
example, states could consider
providing state support directly to the
incumbent LEC to continue providing
voice service in areas where the
incumbent is no longer receiving federal
high-cost universal service support or,
alternatively, could shift COLR
obligations from the existing incumbent
to another provider who is receiving
federal or state universal service support
in the future.
35. Voice Rates. The Commission will
consider rural rates for voice service to
be ‘‘reasonably comparable’’ to urban
voice rates under 47 U.S.C. 254(b)(3) if
rural rates fall within a reasonable range
of urban rates for reasonably comparable
voice service. Consistent with the
existing precedent, the Commission will
presume that a voice rate is within a
reasonable range if it falls within two
standard deviations above the national
average.
36. Because the data used to calculate
the national average price for voice
service is out of date, the Commission
directs the Wireline Competition Bureau
and the Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau to develop and conduct an
annual survey of voice rates in order to
compare urban voice rates to the rural
voice rates that ETCs will be reporting
to us. The results of this survey will be
published annually. For purposes of
conducting the survey, the Bureaus
should develop a methodology to survey
a representative sample of facilitiesbased fixed voice service providers
taking into account the relative
categories of fixed voice providers as
determined in the most recent FCC
Form 477 data collection. In the USF/
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
ICC Transformation FNPRM, the
Commission seeks comment on whether
to collect separate data on fixed and
mobile voice rates and whether fixed
and mobile voice services should have
different benchmarks for purposes of
determining reasonable comparability.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
B. Broadband Service
37. As a condition of receiving federal
high-cost universal service support, all
ETCs, whether designated by a state
commission or the Commission, will be
required to offer broadband service in
their supported area that meets certain
basic performance requirements and to
report regularly on associated
performance measures. Although the
Commission does not at this time
require it, the Commission expects that
ETCs that offer standalone broadband
service in any portion of their service
territory will also offer such service in
all areas that receive CAF support. By
standalone service, the Commission
means that consumers are not required
to purchase any other service (e.g., voice
or video) in order to purchase
broadband service. ETCs must make this
broadband service available at rates that
are reasonably comparable to offerings
of comparable broadband services in
urban areas.
38. In developing these performance
requirements, the Commission seeks to
ensure that the performance of
broadband available in rural and high
cost areas is ‘‘reasonably comparable’’ to
that available in urban areas. All
Americans should have access to
broadband that is capable of enabling
the kinds of key applications that drive
efforts to achieve universal broadband,
including education (e.g., distance/
online learning), health care (e.g.,
remote health monitoring), and personto-person communications (e.g., VoIP or
online video chat with loved ones
serving overseas).
1. Broadband Performance Metrics
39. Broadband services in the market
today vary along several important
dimensions. As discussed more fully
below, the Commission focuses on
speed, latency, and capacity as three
core characteristics that affect what
consumers can do with their broadband
service, and the Commission therefore
includes requirements related to these
three characteristics in defining ETCs’
broadband service obligations.
40. For each of these characteristics,
the Commission requires that funding
recipients offer service that is
reasonably comparable to comparable
services offered in urban areas. By
limiting reasonable comparability to
‘‘comparable services,’’ the Commission
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
is intending to ensure that fixed
broadband services in rural areas are
compared to fixed broadband services in
urban areas and mobile broadband
services in rural areas are compared to
mobile broadband services in rural
areas. The actual download and upload
speeds, latency, and usage limits (if any)
for providers’ broadband must be
reasonably comparable to the typical
speeds, latency, and usage limits (if any)
of comparable broadband services in
urban areas. Funding recipients may use
any wireline, wireless, terrestrial, or
satellite technology, or combination of
technologies, to deliver service that
satisfies this requirement.
41. Speed. Users and providers
commonly refer to the bandwidth of a
broadband connection as its ‘‘speed.’’
The bandwidth (speed) of a connection
indicates the rate at which information
can be transmitted by that connection,
typically measured in bits, kilobits
(kbps), or megabits per second (Mbps).
The speed of consumers’ broadband
connections affects their ability to
access and utilize Internet applications
and content. To ensure that consumers
are getting the full benefit of broadband,
the Commission requires funding
recipients to provide broadband that
meets performance metrics for actual
speeds, measured as described below,
rather than ‘‘advertised’’ or ‘‘up to’’
metrics.
42. In the past two Broadband
Progress Reports, the Commission found
that the availability of residential
broadband connections that actually
enable an end user to download content
from the Internet at 4 Mbps and to
upload such content at 1 Mbps over the
broadband provider’s network was a
reasonable benchmark for the
availability of ‘‘advanced
telecommunications capability,’’
defined by the statute as ‘‘high-speed,
switched, broadband
telecommunications capability that
enables users to originate and receive
high-quality voice, data, graphics, and
video telecommunications using any
technology.’’ This conclusion was based
on the Commission’s examination of
overall Internet traffic patterns, which
revealed that consumers increasingly
are using their broadband connections
to view high-quality video, and want to
be able to do so while still using basic
functions such as email and web
browsing. The evidence shows that
streaming standard definition video in
near real-time consumes anywhere from
1–5 Mbps, depending on a variety of
factors. This conclusion also was drawn
from the National Broadband Plan,
which, based on an analysis of user
behavior, demands this usage places on
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81567
the network, and recent experience in
network evolution, recommended as a
national broadband availability target
that every household in America have
access to affordable broadband service
offering actual download speeds of at
least 4 Mbps and actual upload speeds
of at least 1 Mbps.
43. Given the foregoing, other than for
the Phase I Mobility Fund, the
Commission adopts an initial minimum
broadband speed benchmark for CAF
recipients of 4 Mbps downstream and 1
Mbps upstream. Broadband connections
that meet this speed threshold will
provide subscribers in rural and high
cost areas with the ability to use critical
broadband applications in a manner
reasonably comparable to broadband
subscribers in urban areas. Requiring 4
Mbps/1 Mbps to be provided to all
locations, including the more distant
locations on a landline network and
regardless of the served location’s
position in a wireless network, implies
that customers located closer to the
wireline switch or wireless tower will
be capable of receiving service in excess
of the this minimum standard.
44. Some commenters, including DSL
and mobile wireless broadband
providers, observe that the 1 Mbps
upload speed requirement in particular
could impose costs well in excess of the
benefits of 1 Mbps versus 768 kilobits
per second (kbps) upstream. In general,
the Commission expects new
installations to provide speeds of at
least 1 Mbps upstream. However, to the
extent a CAF recipient can demonstrate
that support is insufficient to enable 1
Mbps upstream for all locations,
temporary waivers of the upstream
requirement for some locations will be
available. The Commission delegates
authority to the Wireline Competition
Bureau and Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau to address
such waiver requests. The Commission
expects that those facilities that are not
currently capable of providing the
minimum upstream speed will
eventually be upgraded, consistent with
the build-out requirements adopted
below, with scalable technology capable
of meeting future speed increases.
45. Latency. Latency is a measure of
the time it takes for a packet of data to
travel from one point to another in a
network. Because many communication
protocols depend on an
acknowledgement that packets were
received successfully, or otherwise
involve transmission of data packets
back and forth along a path in the
network, latency is often measured by
round-trip time in milliseconds. Latency
affects a consumer’s ability to use realtime applications, including interactive
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81568
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
voice or video communication, over the
network. The Commission requires
ETCs to offer sufficiently low latency to
enable use of real-time applications,
such as VoIP. The Commission’s
broadband measurement test results
showed that most terrestrial wireline
technologies could reliably provide
latency of less than 100 milliseconds.
46. Capacity. Capacity is the total
volume of data sent and/or received by
the end user over a period of time. It is
often measured in gigabytes (GB) per
month. Several broadband providers
have imposed monthly data usage
limits, restricting users to a
predetermined quantity of data, and
these limits typically vary between fixed
and mobile services. The terms of
service may include an overage fee if a
consumer exceeds the monthly limit.
Some commenters recommended the
Commission specifies a minimum usage
limit.
47. Although at this time the
Commission declines to adopt specific
minimum capacity requirements for
CAF recipients, the Commission
emphasizes that any usage limits
imposed by an ETC on its USFsupported broadband offering must be
reasonably comparable to usage limits
for comparable broadband offerings in
urban areas (which could include, for
instance, use of a wireless data card if
it can provide the performance
characteristics described herein). In
particular, ETCs whose support is
predicated on offering of a fixed
broadband service—namely, all ETCs
other than recipients of the Phase I
Mobility Funds—must allow usage at
levels comparable to residential
terrestrial fixed broadband service in
urban areas. The Commission defines
terrestrial fixed broadband service as
one that serves end users primarily at
fixed endpoints using stationary
equipment, such as the modem that
connects an end user’s home router,
computer or other Internet access device
to the network. This term includes fixed
wireless broadband services (including
those offered over unlicensed
spectrum).
48. In 2009, residential broadband
users who subscribed to fixed
broadband service with speeds between
3 Mbps and 5 Mbps used, on average,
10 GB of capacity per month, and
annual per-user growth was between 30
and 35 percent. AT&T’s DSL usage limit
is 150 GB and its U-Verse offering has
a 250 GB limit. Since 2008, Comcast has
had a 250 GB monthly data usage
threshold on residential accounts.
Without endorsing or approving of these
or other usage limits, the Commission
provides guidance by noting that a
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
usage limit significantly below these
current offerings (e.g., a 10 GB monthly
data limit) would not be reasonably
comparable to residential terrestrial
fixed broadband in urban areas. (This
should not be interpreted to mean that
the Commission intends to regulate
usage limits.) A 250 GB monthly data
limit for CAF-funded fixed broadband
offerings would likely be adequate at
this time because 250 GB appears to be
reasonably comparable to major current
urban broadband offerings. The
Commission recognizes, however, that
both pricing and usage limitations
change over time. The Commission
delegates authority to the Wireline
Competition Bureau and Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau to monitor
urban broadband offerings, including by
conducting an annual survey, in order
to specify an appropriate minimum for
usage allowances, and to adjust such a
minimum over time.
49. Similarly, for Mobility Fund Phase
I, the Commission declines to adopt a
specific minimum capacity requirement
that supported providers must offer
mobile broadband users. However, the
Commission emphasizes that any usage
limits imposed by a provider on its
mobile broadband offerings supported
by the Mobility Fund must be
reasonably comparable to any usage
limits for mobile comparable broadband
offerings in urban areas.
50. Areas with No Terrestrial
Backhaul. Recognizing that satellite
backhaul may limit the performance of
broadband networks as compared to
terrestrial backhaul, the Commission
relaxes the broadband public interest
obligation for carriers providing fixed
broadband that are compelled to use
satellite backhaul facilities. The
Regulatory Commission of Alaska
reports that ‘‘for many areas of Alaska,
satellite links may be the only viable
option to deploy broadband.’’ Carriers
seeking relaxed public interest
obligations because they lack the ability
to obtain terrestrial backhaul—either
fiber, microwave, or other technology—
and are therefore compelled to rely
exclusively on satellite backhaul in their
study area, must certify annually that no
terrestrial backhaul options exist, and
that they are unable to satisfy the
broadband public interest obligations
adopted above due to the limited
functionality of the available satellite
backhaul facilities. Any such funding
recipients must offer broadband service
speeds of at least 1 Mbps downstream
and 256 kbps upstream within the
supported area served by satellite
middle-mile facilities. Latency and
capacity requirements discussed above
will not apply to this subset of
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
providers. Buildout obligations—which
are dependent on the mechanism by
which a carrier receives funding—
remain the same for this class of
carriers. The Commission will monitor
and review the public interest
obligations for satellite backhaul areas.
To the extent that new terrestrial
backhaul facilities are constructed, or
existing facilities improve sufficiently to
meet the public interest obligations, the
Commission requires funding recipients
to satisfy the relevant broadband public
interest obligations in full within twelve
months of the new backhaul facilities
becoming commercially available. This
limited exemption is only available to
providers that have no access in their
study area to any terrestrial backhaul
facilities, and does not apply to any
providers that object to the cost of
backhaul facilities. Similarly, providers
relying on terrestrial backhaul facilities
today will not be allowed this
exemption if they elect to transition to
satellite backhaul facilities.
51. Community Anchor Institutions.
The Commission expects that ETCs will
likely offer broadband at greater speeds
to community anchor institutions in
rural and high cost areas, although the
Commission does not set requirements
at this time, as the 4 Mbps/1 Mbps
standard will be met in the more rural
areas of an ETC’s service territory, and
community anchor institutions are
typically located in or near small towns
and more inhabited areas of rural
America. There is nothing in this R&O
that requires a carrier to provide
broadband service to a community
anchor institution at a certain rate, but
the Commission acknowledges that
community anchor institutions
generally require more bandwidth than
a residential customer, and expect that
ETCs would provide higher bandwidth
offerings to community anchor
institutions in high-cost areas at rates
that are reasonably comparable to
comparable offerings to community
anchor institutions in urban areas.
52. The Commission also expects
ETCs to engage with community anchor
institutions in the network planning
stages with respect to the deployment of
CAF-supported networks. The
Commission requires ETCs to identify
and report on the community anchor
institutions that newly gain access to
fixed broadband service as a result of
CAF support. In addition, the Wireline
Competition Bureau will invite further
input on the unique needs of
community anchor institutions as it
develops a forward-looking cost model
to estimate the cost of serving locations,
including community anchor locations,
in price cap territories.
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
53. Broadband Buildout Obligations.
All CAF funding comes with obligations
to build out broadband within an ETC’s
service area, subject to certain
limitations. The timing and extent of
these obligations varies across the
different CAF mechanisms. However, all
broadband buildout obligations for fixed
broadband are conditioned on not
spending the funds to serve customers
in areas already served by an
‘‘unsubsidized competitor.’’ The
Commission defines an unsubsidized
competitor as a facilities-based provider
of residential terrestrial fixed voice and
broadband service. The best data
available at this time to determine
whether broadband is available from an
unsubsidized competitor at speeds at or
above the 4 Mbps/1 Mbps speed
threshold will likely be data on
broadband availability at 3 Mbps
downstream and 768 kbps upstream,
which is collected for the National
Broadband Map and through the
Commission’s Form 477. Such data may
therefore be used as a proxy for the
availability of 4 Mbps/1 Mbps
broadband. Depending on the
anticipated reform to the Form 477 data
collection, the Commission may have
additional data in the future upon
which the Commission may rely.
54. The Commission limits this
definition to fixed, terrestrial providers
because the Commission thinks these
limitations will disqualify few, if any,
broadband providers that meet CAF
speed, capacity, or latency minimums
for all locations within relevant areas of
comparison, while significantly easing
administration of the definition. For
example, the record suggests that
satellite providers are generally unable
to provide affordable voice and
broadband service that meets the
minimum capacity requirements
without the aid of a subsidy: Consumer
satellite services have limited capacity
allowances today, and future satellite
services appear unlikely to offer
capacity reasonably comparable to
urban offerings in the absence of
universal service support. Likewise,
while 4G mobile broadband services
may meet the speed requirements in
many locations, meeting minimum
speed and capacity guarantees is likely
to prove challenging over larger areas,
particularly indoors. And because the
performance offered by mobile services
varies by location, it would be very
difficult and costly for a CAF recipient
or the Commission to evaluate whether
such a service met the performance
requirements at all homes and
businesses within a study area, census
block, or other required area. A wireless
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
provider that currently offers mobile
service can become an ‘‘unsubsidized
competitor,’’ however, by offering a
fixed wireless service that guarantees
speed, capacity, and latency minimums
will be met at all locations with the
relevant area. Taken together, these
considerations persuade us that the
advantages of limiting the definition of
unsubsidized providers outweigh any
potential concerns that the Commission
may unduly disqualify service providers
that otherwise meet the performance
requirements. As mobile and satellite
services develop over time, the
Commission will revisit the definition
of ‘‘unsubsidized competitor’’ as
warranted. Recognizing the benefits of
certainty, however, the Commission
does not anticipate changing the
definition for the next few years.
55. Because most of these funding
mechanisms are aimed at immediately
narrowing broadband deployment gaps,
both fixed and mobile, their
performance benchmarks reflect
technical capabilities and user needs
that are expected at this time to be
suitable for today and the next few
years. However, the Commission must
also lay the groundwork for longer-term
evolution of CAF broadband obligations,
as the Commission expects technical
capabilities and user needs will
continue to evolve. The Commission
therefore commits to monitoring trends
in the performance of urban broadband
offerings through the survey data the
Commission will collect and rural
broadband offerings through the
reporting data the Commission will
collect, and to initiating a proceeding no
later than the end of 2014 to review the
performance requirements and ensure
that CAF continues to support
broadband service that is reasonably
comparable to broadband service in
urban areas.
56. In advance of that future
proceeding, the Commission relies on
its predictive judgment to provide
guidance to CAF recipients on metrics
that will satisfy the expectation that
they invest the public’s funds in robust,
scalable broadband networks. The
National Broadband Plan estimated that
by 2017, average advertised speeds for
residential broadband would be
approximately 5.76 Mbps downstream.
Applying growth rates measured by
Akamai, one finds a projected average
actual downstream speed by 2017 of 5.2
Mbps, and a projected average actual
peak downstream speed of 6.86 Mbps.
57. Based on these projections, the
Commission establishes a benchmark of
6 Mbps downstream and 1.5 Mbps
upstream for broadband deployments in
later years of CAF Phase II.
PO 00000
Frm 00009
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81569
2. Measuring and Reporting Broadband
58. The Commission will require
recipients of funding to test their
broadband networks for compliance
with speed and latency metrics and
certify to and report the results to the
Universal Service Administrative
Company (USAC) on an annual basis.
These results will be subject to audit. In
addition, as part of the federal-state
partnership for universal service, the
Commission expects and encourage
states to assist us in monitoring and
compliance and therefore require
funding recipients to send a copy of
their annual broadband performance
report to the relevant state or Tribal
government.
59. Commenters generally supported
testing and reporting of broadband
performance. While some preferred only
certifications without periodic testing,
the Commission finds that requiring
ETCs to submit verifiable test results to
USAC and the relevant state
commissions will strengthen the ability
of this Commission and the states to
ensure that ETCs that receive universal
service funding are providing at least
the minimum broadband speeds, and
thereby using support for its intended
purpose as required by 47 U.S.C. 254(e).
60. The Commission adopts the
proposal in the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM that actual speed
and latency be measured on each ETC’s
access network from the end-user
interface to the nearest Internet access
point. The end-user interface end-point
would be the modem, the customer
premise equipment typically managed
by a broadband provider as the last
connection point to the managed
network, while the nearest Internet
access point end-point would be the
Internet gateway, the closest peering
point between the broadband provider
and the public Internet for a given
consumer connection. The results of
Commission testing of wired networks
suggest that ‘‘broadband performance
that falls short of expectations is caused
primarily by the segment of an ISP’s
network from the consumer gateway to
the ISP’s core network.’’
61. In the USF/ICC Transformation
FNPRM, the Commission seeks further
comment on the specific methodology
ETCs should use to measure the
performance of their broadband services
subject to these general guidelines, and
the format in which funding recipients
should report their results. The
Commission directs the Wireline
Competition Bureau, the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau, and the
Office of Engineering and Technology to
work together to refine the methodology
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81570
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
for such testing, which the Commission
anticipates will be implemented in
2013.
3. Reasonably Comparable Rates for
Broadband Service
62. As with voice services, for
broadband services the Commission will
consider rural rates to be ‘‘reasonably
comparable’’ to urban rates under 47
U.S.C. 254(b)(3) if rural rates fall within
a reasonable range of urban rates for
reasonably comparable broadband
service. However, the Commission has
never compared broadband rates for
purposes of 47 U.S.C. 254(b)(3), and
therefore the Commission directs the
Bureaus to develop a specific
methodology for defining that
reasonable range, taking into account
that retail broadband service is not rate
regulated and that retail offerings may
be defined by price, speed, usage limits,
if any, and other elements. In the USF/
ICC Transformation FNPRM, the
Commission seeks comment on how
specifically to define a reasonable range.
63. The Commission also delegates to
the Wireline Competition Bureau and
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
the authority to conduct an annual
survey of urban broadband rates, if
necessary, in order to derive a national
range of rates for broadband service. The
Commission does not currently have
sufficient data to establish such a range
for broadband pricing, and are unaware
of any adequate third-party sources of
data for the relevant levels of service to
be compared. The Commission therefore
delegates authority to the Bureaus to
determine the appropriate components
of such a survey. By conducting its own
survey, the Commission believes it will
be able to tailor the data specifically to
the need to satisfy the statutory
obligation. The Commission requires
recipients of funding to provide
information regarding their pricing for
service offerings, as described more
fully below. The Commission also
encourages input from the states and
other stakeholders as the Bureaus
develop the survey.
V. Establishing the Connect America
Fund
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
A. The Budget
64. Discussion. For the first time, the
Commission now establishes a defined
budget for the high-cost component of
the universal service fund. For purposes
of this budget, the term ‘‘high-cost’’
includes all support mechanisms in
place as of the date of this order,
specifically, high-cost loop support,
safety net support, safety valve support,
local switching support, interstate
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
common line support, high cost model
support, and interstate access support,
as well as the new Connect America
Fund, which includes funding to
support and advance networks that
provide voice and broadband services,
both fixed and mobile, and funding
provided in conjunction with the
recovery mechanism adopted as part of
intercarrier compensation reform.
65. The Commission believes the
establishment of such a budget will best
ensure that the Commission has in place
‘‘specific, predictable, and sufficient’’
funding mechanisms to achieve the
universal service objectives. The
Commission is taking important steps to
control costs and improve
accountability in USF, and the estimates
of the funding necessary for components
of the CAF and legacy high-cost
mechanisms represent its predictive
judgment as to how best to allocate
limited resources at this time. The
Commission anticipates that it may
revisit and adjust accordingly the
appropriate size of each of these
programs by the end of the six-year
period the Commission budgets for
today, based on market developments,
efficiencies realized, and further
evaluation of the effect of these
programs in achieving the goals.
66. Importantly, establishing a CAF
budget ensures that individual
consumers will not pay more in
contributions due to these reforms.
Indeed, were the CAF to significantly
raise the end-user cost of services, it
could undermine the broader policy
objectives to promote broadband and
mobile deployment and adoption.
67. The Commission therefore
establishes an annual funding target, set
at the same level as the current estimate
for the size of the high-cost program for
FY 2011, of no more than $4.5 billion.
The $4.5 billion budget includes only
disbursements of support and does not
include administrative expenses, which
will continue to be collected consistent
with past practices. Similarly, the $4.5
billion budget does not include prior
period adjustments associated with
support attributable to years prior to
2012. To the extent that those true-ups
result in increased support for 2010,
those disbursements would not apply to
the budget discussed here.
68. This budgetary target will remain
in place until changed by a vote of the
Commission. The Commission believes
that setting the budget at this year’s
support levels will minimize disruption
and provide the greatest certainty and
predictability to all stakeholders. The
Commission does not find that amount
to be excessive given the reforms the
Commission adopts today, which
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
expand the high-cost program in
important ways to promote broadband
and mobility; facilitate intercarrier
compensation reform; and preserve
universal voice connectivity. At the
same time, the Commission does not
believe a higher budget is warranted,
given the substantial reforms the
Commission concurrently adopts to
modernize the legacy funding
mechanisms to address long-standing
inefficiencies and wasteful spending.
The Commission concludes that it is
appropriate, in the first instance, to
evaluate the effect of these reforms
before adjusting the budget.
69. The total $4.5 billion budget will
include CAF support resulting from
intercarrier compensation reform, as
well as new CAF funding for broadband
and support for legacy programs during
a transitional period. As part of this
budget, the Commission will provide
$500 million per year in support
through the Mobility Fund, of which up
to $100 million in funding will be
reserved for Tribal lands. Throughout
this document, ‘‘Tribal lands’’ include
any federally recognized Indian tribe’s
reservation, pueblo or colony, including
former reservations in Oklahoma,
Alaska Native regions established
pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims
Settlements Act (85 Stat. 688), and
Indian Allotments, 47 CFR 54.400(e), as
well as Hawaiian Home Lands—areas
held in trust for native Hawaiians by the
state of Hawaii, pursuant to the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act,
1920, Act July 9, 1921, 42 Stat. 108, et
seq., as amended. The Commission
adopts a definition of ‘‘Tribal lands’’
that includes Hawaiian Home Lands, as
the term was used in the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM. The
Commission notes that Hawaiian Home
Lands were not included within the
Tribal definition in the 2007 order that
adopted an interim cap on support for
competitive eligible
telecommunications carriers, with an
exemption of Tribal lands from that cap.
The Commission agrees with the State
of Hawaii that Hawaiian Home Lands
should be included in the definition of
Tribal lands in the context of these
comprehensive reforms for the universal
service program.
70. The Commission will also provide
at least $100 million to subsidize service
in the highest cost areas. The remaining
amount—approximately $4 billion—
will be divided between areas served by
price cap carriers and areas served by
rate-of-return carriers, with no more
than $1.8 billion available annually for
price cap territories after a transition
period and up to $2 billion available
annually for rate-of-return territories,
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
including, in both instances, intercarrier
compensation recovery. The
Commission also institutes a number of
safeguards in this new framework to
ensure that carriers that warrant
additional funding have the opportunity
to petition for such relief. Although the
Commission expects that in some years
CAF may distribute less than the total
budget, and in other years slightly more,
the Commission adopts mechanisms
later in this R&O to keep the
contribution burden at no more than
$4.5 billion per year, plus
administrative expenses,
notwithstanding variations on the
distribution side. Meanwhile, the
Commission will closely monitor the
CAF mechanisms for longer-term
consistency with the overall budget
goal, while ensuring the budget remains
at appropriate levels to satisfy the
statutory mandates.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
B. Providing Support in Areas Served by
Price Cap Carriers
1. Immediate Steps To Begin
Rationalizing Support Levels for Price
Cap Carriers
71. Discussion. Effective January 1,
2012, the Commission freezes all
support under the existing high-cost
support mechanisms, HCLS, forwardlooking model support (HCMS), safety
valve support, LSS, IAS, and ICLS, on
a study area basis for price cap carriers
and their rate-of-return affiliates. On an
interim basis, the Commission will
provide this ‘‘frozen high-cost support’’
to such carriers equal to the amount of
support each carrier received in 2011 in
a given study area. Frozen high-cost
support amounts will be calculated by
USAC, and will be equal to the amount
of support disbursed in 2011, without
regard to prior period adjustments
related to years other than 2011 and as
determined by USAC on January 31,
2012. USAC shall publish each carrier’s
frozen high-cost support amount 2011
support, as calculated, on its Web site,
no later than February 15, 2012. As a
consequence of this action, rate-ofreturn operating companies that will be
treated as price cap areas will no longer
be required to perform cost studies for
purposes of calculating HCLS or LSS, as
their support will be frozen on a study
area basis as of year-end 2011.
72. Frozen high-cost support will be
reduced to the extent that a carrier’s
rates for local voice service fall below an
urban local rate floor that the
Commission adopts below to limit
universal service support where there
are artificially low rates. In addition to
frozen high-cost support, the
Commission will distribute up to $300
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
million in ‘‘incremental support’’ to
price cap carriers and their rate of return
affiliates using a simplified forwardlooking cost estimate, based on the
existing cost model.
73. This simplified, interim approach
is based on a proposal in the record
from several carriers. Support will be
determined as follows: First, a forwardlooking cost estimate will be generated
for each wire center served by a price
cap carrier. Our existing forwardlooking cost model, designed to estimate
the costs of providing voice service,
generates estimates only for wire centers
served by non-rural carriers; it cannot be
applied to areas served by rural carriers
without obtaining additional data from
those carriers. The simplest, quickest,
and most efficient means to provide
support solely based on forward-looking
costs for both rural and non-rural price
cap carriers is to extend the existing cost
model by using an equation designed to
reasonably predict the output of the
existing model for wire centers it
already applies to, and apply it to data
that are readily available for wire
centers in all areas served by price cap
carriers and their affiliates, including
areas the current model does not apply
to. Three price cap carriers submitted an
estimated cost equation that was
derived through a regression analysis of
support provided under the existing
high-cost model, and they submitted,
under protective order, the data
necessary to replicate their analysis. No
commenter objected to the proponents’
cost-estimation function. Following its
own assessment of the regression
analysis and the proposed costestimation function, the Commission
concludes that the proposed function
will serve the purpose well to estimate
costs on an interim basis in wire centers
now served by rural price cap carriers,
and the Commission adopts it. That
cost-estimation function is defined as:
ln(Total cost) = 7.08 + 0.02 * ln(distance
to nearest central office in feet + 1)
¥0.15 * ln(number of households +
businesses in the wire center + 1)
+ 0.22 * ln(total road feed in wire center
+ 1)
+ 0.06 * (ln(number of households +
businesses in wire center + 1)) ∧2
¥0.01 * (ln(number of businesses in
wire center + 1))¥2
¥0.07 * ln((number of households +
businesses)/square miles) + 1)
74. The output of the cost-estimation
function will be converted into dollars
and then further converted into a perlocation cost in the wire center. The
resulting per-location cost for each wire
center will be compared to a funding
threshold, which, as explained below,
PO 00000
Frm 00011
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81571
will be determined by the budget
constraint. Support will be calculated
based on the wire centers where the cost
for the wire center exceeds the funding
threshold. Specifically, the amount by
which the per-location cost exceeds the
funding threshold will be multiplied by
the total number of household and
business locations in the wire center.
75. The funding threshold will be set
so that, using the distribution process
described above, all $300 million of
incremental support potentially
available under the mechanism would
be allocated. The Commission delegates
to the Wireline Competition Bureau the
task of performing the calculations
necessary to determine the support
amounts and selecting any necessary
data sources for that task. In the event
the Wireline Competition Bureau
concludes that appropriate data are not
readily available for these purposes for
certain areas, such as some or all U.S.
territories served by price cap carriers,
the Bureau may exclude such areas from
the analysis for this interim mechanism,
which would result in the carriers in
such areas continuing to receive frozen
support. The Bureau will announce
incremental support amounts via Public
Notice; the Commission anticipates the
Bureau will complete its work and
announce such support amounts on or
before March 31, 2012. USAC will
disburse CAF Phase I funds on its
customary schedule.
76. The Commission intends for CAF
Phase I to enable additional deployment
beyond what carriers would otherwise
undertake, absent this reform. Thus,
consistent with the other reforms, the
Commission will require carriers that
accept incremental support under CAF
Phase I to meet concrete broadband
deployment obligations. The
Commission acknowledges that the
existing cost model, on which the
distribution mechanism for CAF Phase
I incremental funding is based,
calculates the cost of providing voice
service rather than broadband service,
although the Commission is requiring
carriers to meet broadband deployment
obligations if they accept CAF Phase I
incremental funding. The Commission
finds that using estimates of the cost of
deploying voice service, even though
the Commission imposes broadband
deployment obligations, is reasonable in
the context of this interim support
mechanism.
77. Specifically, the Bureau will
calculate, on a holding company basis,
how much CAF Phase I incremental
support price cap carriers are eligible
for. Carriers may elect to receive all,
none, or a portion of the incremental
support for which they are eligible. A
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81572
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
carrier accepting incremental support
will be required to deploy broadband to
a number of locations equal to the
amount it accepts divided by $775. For
example, a carrier projected to receive
$7,750,000 will be permitted to accept
up to that amount of incremental
support. If it accepts the full amount, it
will be required to deploy broadband to
at least 10,000 unserved locations; if it
accepts $3,875,000, it will be required to
deploy broadband to at least 5,000
unserved locations. To the extent
incremental support is declined, it may
be used in other ways to advance the
broadband objectives pursuant to the
statutory authority. For instance, the
funds could be held as part of
accumulated reserve funds that would
help minimize budget fluctuations in
the event the Commission grants some
petitions for waiver. Also, a number of
parties have urged us to use high-cost
funding to advance adoption programs.
The Commission notes that the
Commission has an open proceeding to
reform the low income assistance
programs, which specifically
contemplates broadband pilots in the
Lifeline and LinkUp programs. To the
extent that savings were available from
CAF programs, the Commission could
reallocate that funding for broadband
adoption programs, consistent with the
statutory authority, while still
remaining within the budget target.
Alternatively, savings could be used to
reduce the contribution burden.
78. Our objective is to articulate a
measurable, enforceable obligation to
extend service to unserved locations
during CAF Phase I. For this interim
program, the Commission is not
attempting to identify the precise cost of
deploying broadband to any particular
location. Instead, the Commission is
trying to identify an appropriate
standard to spur immediate broadband
deployment to as many unserved
locations as possible, given the budget
constraint. In this context, the
Commission finds that a one-time
support payment of $775 per unserved
location for the purpose of calculating
broadband deployment obligations for
companies that elect to receive
additional support is appropriate.
79. To develop that performance
obligation, the Commission considered
broadband deployment projects
undertaken by a mid-sized price cap
carrier under the Broadband Initiatives
Program (BIP). The average per-location
cost of deployment for those projects—
including both the public contribution
and the company’s own capital
contribution—was $557, significantly
lower than $775 per-location—which
does not include any company
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
contribution. Analysis indicated that the
per-location cost for deployments
funded through the BIP program varied
considerably. In addition, the BIP
program’s requirements differ from
these requirements. Specifically,
carriers could obtain BIP funding for
improving service to underserved
locations as well as deploying to
unserved locations, while carriers can
meet their CAF Phase I deployment
obligations only by deploying
broadband to unserved locations. For
these reasons, while the Commission
finds this average per-location cost to be
relevant, the Commission declines to set
the requirement at a per-location cost of
$557.
80. In addition, the Commission
considered data from the analysis done
as part of the National Broadband Plan.
The cost model used in developing the
National Broadband Plan estimated that
the median cost of upgrading existing
unserved homes is approximately $650
to $750, with approximately 3.5 million
locations whose upgrade cost is below
that figure.
81. Commission staff also conducted
an analysis using the ABC plan cost
model, which calculates the cost of
deploying broadband to unserved
locations on a census block basis.
Commission staff estimated that the
median cost of a brownfield deployment
of broadband to low-cost unserved
census blocks is $765 per location (i.e.,
there are 1.75 million unserved, lowcost locations in areas served by price
cap carriers with costs below $765); the
cost of deploying broadband to the
census block at the 25th percentile of
the cost distribution is approximately
$530 per location (under this analysis,
there are 875,000 such locations whose
cost is below $530). Although the
Commission does not adopt the
proposed cost model to calculate
support amounts for CAF Phase II, these
estimates provide additional data points
to consider.
82. In addition, the Commission notes
that several carriers placed estimates of
the per-location cost of extending
broadband to unserved locations in their
respective territories into the record.
While several carriers claim that the
cost to serve unserved locations is
higher than the figure the Commission
adopts, those estimates did not provide
supporting data sufficient to fully
evaluate them.
83. Taking into account all of these
factors, including the cost estimates
developed in the course of BIP
applications as well as the flexibility the
Commission provides to carriers
accepting such funding to determine
where to deploy and the expectation
PO 00000
Frm 00012
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
that carriers will supplement
incremental support with their own
investment, the Commission concludes
that the $775 per unserved location
figure represents a reasonable estimate
of an interim performance obligation for
this one-time support. The Commission
also emphasizes that CAF Phase I
incremental support is optional—
carriers that cannot meet the broadband
deployment requirement may decline to
accept incremental support or may
choose to accept only a portion of the
amount for which they are eligible.
84. The Commission find that, in this
interim support mechanism, setting the
broadband deployment obligations
based on the costs of deploying to
lower-cost wire centers that would not
otherwise be served, even though the
Commission bases support on the
predicted costs of the highest-cost wire
centers, is reasonable because the
Commission is trying to expand voice
and broadband availability as much and
as quickly as possible. The Commission
distributes support based on the costs of
the highest-cost wire centers because
the ultimate goal of the reforms is to
ensure that all areas get broadbandcapable networks, whether through the
operation of the market or through
support from USF. In this interim
mechanism, the Commission distributes
funding to those carriers that provide
service in the highest-cost areas because
these are the areas where the
Commission can be most confident,
based on available information, that
USF support will be necessary in order
to realize timely deployment. Thus, the
Commission can be confident the
Commission is allocating support to
carriers that will need it to deploy
broadband in some portion of their
service territory. At the same time, to
promote the most rapid expansion of
broadband to as many households as
possible, the Commission wishes to
encourage carriers to use the support in
lower-cost areas where there is no
private sector business case for
deployment of broadband, to the extent
carriers also serve such areas. Although
at this time the Commission lacks data
sufficient to identify these areas, the
Commission can encourage this use of
funding by setting the deployment
requirement based on the overall
estimate of upgrade costs in lower cost
unserved areas, while providing carriers
flexibility to allocate funding to these
areas, rather than the highest cost wire
centers identified by the cost-estimation
equation. Accordingly, while the
Commission allocates CAF Phase I
support on the basis of carriers’ service
to the highest-cost areas, the
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Commission allows carriers to use that
support in lower-cost areas, and sizes
their deployment obligations
accordingly. The Commission notes
that, historically, carriers have always
been able to use support in wire centers
other than the ones for which support
is paid, and nothing in the Act
constrains that flexibility such that it
applies only within state boundaries.
Accordingly, in the context of this
interim mechanism, the Commission
will permit carriers to continue to have
such flexibility.
85. Within 90 days of being informed
of the amount of incremental support it
is eligible to receive, each carrier must
provide notice to the Commission, the
Administrator, the relevant state or
territorial commission, and any affected
Tribal government, identifying the
amount of support it wishes to accept
and the areas by wire center and census
block in which the carrier intends to
deploy broadband to meet its obligation,
or stating that the carrier declines to
accept incremental support for that year.
Carriers accepting incremental support
must make the following certifications.
First, the carrier must certify that
deployment funded through CAF Phase
I incremental support will occur in
areas shown on the most current version
of the National Broadband Map as
unserved by fixed broadband with a
minimum speed of 768 kbps
downstream and 200 kbps upstream,
and that, to the best of the carrier’s
knowledge, are, in fact, unserved by
fixed broadband at those speeds.
Second, the carrier must certify that the
carrier’s current capital improvement
plan did not already include plans to
complete broadband deployment to that
area within the next three years, and
that CAF Phase I incremental support
will not be used to satisfy any merger
commitment or similar regulatory
obligation.
86. Carriers must complete
deployment to no fewer than two-thirds
of the required number of locations
within two years, and all required
locations within three years, after filing
their notices of acceptance. Carriers
must provide a certification to that
effect to the Commission, the
Administrator, the relevant state or
territorial commission, and any affected
Tribal government, as part of their
annual certifications pursuant to new 47
CFR 54.313 of the rules, following both
the two-thirds and completion
milestones. To fulfill their deployment
obligation, carriers must offer
broadband service of at least 4 Mbps
downstream and 1 Mbps upstream, with
latency sufficiently low to enable the
use of real-time communications,
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
including VoIP, and with usage limits,
if any, that are reasonably comparable to
those for comparable services in urban
areas. Carriers failing to meet a
deployment milestone will be required
to return the incremental support
distributed in connection with that
deployment obligation and will be
potentially subject to other penalties,
including additional forfeitures, as the
Commission deems appropriate. If a
carrier fails to meet the two-thirds
deployment milestone within two years
and returns the incremental support
provided, and then meets its full
deployment obligation associated with
that support by the third year, it will be
eligible to have support it returned
restored to it.
87. Our expectation is that CAF Phase
II will begin on January 1, 2013.
However, absent further Commission
action, if CAF Phase II has not been
implemented to go into effect by that
date, CAF Phase I will continue to
provide support as follows. Annually,
no later than December 15, the Bureau
will announce via Public Notice CAF
Phase I incremental support amounts for
the next term of incremental support,
indicating whether support will be
allocated for the full year or for a shorter
term. The Commission delegates to the
Wireline Competition Bureau the
authority to adjust the term length of
incremental support amounts, and to
pro-rate obligations as appropriate, to
the extent Phase II CAF is anticipated to
be implemented on a date after the
beginning of the calendar year. The
amount of incremental support to be
distributed during a term will be
calculated in the manner described
above, based on allocating $300 million
through the incremental support
mechanism, but that amount will be
reduced by a factor equal to the portion
of a year that the term will last. Within
90 days of the beginning of each term of
support, carriers must provide notice to
the Commission, the relevant state
commission, and any affected Tribal
government, identifying the amount of
support it wishes to accept and the areas
by wire center and census block in
which the carrier intends to deploy
broadband or stating that the carrier
declines to accept incremental support
for that term, with the same certification
requirements described above. For
purposes of this R&O, a carrier
accepting incremental support in terms
after 2012 will be required to deploy
broadband to a number of locations
equal to the amount of incremental
support it accepts divided by $775,
similar to the obligation for accepting
support in 2012.
PO 00000
Frm 00013
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81573
88. CAF Phase I will also begin the
process of transitioning all federal highcost support to price cap carriers to
supporting modern communications
networks capable of supporting voice
and broadband in areas without an
unsubsidized competitor. Consistent
with the goal of providing support to
price cap companies on a forwardlooking cost basis, rather than based on
embedded costs, the Commission will,
for the purposes of CAF Phase I, treat as
price cap carriers the rate-of-return
operating companies that are affiliated
with holding companies for which the
majority of access lines are regulated
under price caps. That is, the
Commission will freeze their universal
service support and consider them as
price cap areas for the purposes of the
new CAF Phase I distribution
mechanism. Effective January 1, 2012,
the Commission requires carriers to use
their frozen high-cost support in a
manner consistent with achieving
universal availability of voice and
broadband. If CAF Phase II has not been
implemented to go into effect on or
before January 1, 2013, the Commission
will phase in a requirement that carriers
use such support for building and
operating broadband-capable networks
used to offer their own retail service in
areas substantially unserved by an
unsubsidized competitor.
89. Specifically, in 2013, all carriers
receiving frozen high-cost support must
use at least one-third of that support to
build and operate broadband-capable
networks used to offer the provider’s
own retail broadband service in areas
substantially unserved by an
unsubsidized competitor. For 2014, at
least two-thirds of the frozen high-cost
support must be used in such fashion,
and for 2015 and subsequent years, all
of the frozen high-cost support must be
spent in such fashion. Carriers will be
required to certify that they have spent
frozen high-cost support consistent with
these requirements in their annual
filings pursuant to new 47 CFR 54.313
of the rules.
90. These interim reforms to the
support mechanisms for price cap
carriers are an important step in the
transition to full implementation of the
Connect America Fund. While the
Commission intends to complete
implementation of the CAF rapidly, the
Commission finds that these interim
reforms offer immediate improvements
over the existing support mechanisms.
First, existing support for price cap
carriers will be frozen and no longer
calculated based on embedded costs.
Rather, the Commission begins the
process of transitioning all high-cost
support to forward-looking costs and
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81574
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
market-based mechanisms, which will
improve incentives for carriers to invest
efficiently. Second, these reforms begin
the process of eliminating the
distinction, for the purposes of
calculating high-cost support, between
price cap carriers that are classified as
rural and those that are classified as
non-rural, a classification that has no
direct or necessary relation to the cost
of providing voice and broadband
services. In this way, the support
mechanisms will be better aligned with
the text of 47 U.S.C. 254, which directs
us to focus on the needs of consumers
in ‘‘rural, insular, and high cost areas’’
but makes no reference to the
classification of the company receiving
support. In addition, the Commission
notes that the reforms the Commission
adopts today, which include providing
immediate support to spur broadband
deployment, can be implemented
quickly, without the need to overhaul
an admittedly dated cost model that
does not reflect modern broadband
network architecture. Thus, although
the simplified interim mechanism is
imperfect in some respects, it will allow
us to begin providing additional support
to price cap carriers on a more efficient
basis, while spurring immediate and
material broadband deployment
pending implementation of CAF
competitive bidding- and model-based
support for price cap areas.
91. No Effect on Interstate Rates.
Historically, IAS was intended to
replace allowable common line
revenues that otherwise are not
recovered through SLCs, while some
carriers received frozen ICLS because,
due to the timing of their conversion to
price cap regulation, they could not
receive IAS. The Commission notes that
many price cap carriers did not object
to the elimination of the IAS
mechanism, as long is it did not occur
before the implementation of CAF. The
Commission has no indication that
these price cap carriers expect to raise
their SLCs, presubscribed interexchange
carrier charges, or other interstate rates
as a result of any reform that would
eliminate IAS. For clarity, however, the
Commission specifically notes that
while carriers receive support under
CAF Phase I, the amount of their frozen
high cost support equal to the amount
of IAS for which each carrier was
eligible in 2011 as being received under
IAS, including, but not limited to, for
the purposes of calculating interstate
rates will be treated as IAS for purposes
of the existing rules. To the extent that
a carrier believes that it cannot meet its
obligations with the revenues it receives
under the CAF and ICC reforms, it may
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
avail itself of the total cost and earnings
review process described below.
92. Elimination of State Rate
Certification Filings. Under 47 CFR
54.316 of the existing rules, states are
required to certify annually whether
residential rates in rural areas of their
state served by non-rural carriers are
reasonably comparable to urban rates
nationwide. As part of these reforms,
however, the Commission requires
carriers to file rate information directly
with the Commission. For this reason,
the Commission concludes that
continuing to impose this obligation on
the states is unnecessary, and the
Commission relieves state commissions
of their obligations under that provision.
93. Hawaiian Telcom Petition for
Waiver. Hawaiian Telcom, a non-rural
price cap incumbent local exchange
carrier, previously sought a waiver of
certain rules relating to the support to
which it would be entitled under the
high-cost model. As Hawaiian Telcom
explained, it received no high-cost
model support at all because support
under the model was based not on the
estimated costs of individual wire
centers but rather the statewide average
of the costs of all individual wire
centers included in the model. In its
petition, Hawaiian Telcom requested
that its support under the model be
determined on a wire center basis,
without regard to the statewide average
of estimated costs calculated under the
high-cost model.
94. In light of these reforms for
support to price cap carriers, the
Commission denies the Hawaiian
Telcom petition. These reforms are
largely consistent with the thrust of
Hawaiian Telcom’s petition. Phase II
support will not involve statewide
averaging of costs determined by a
model, but instead will be determined
on a much more granular basis. In Phase
I, the Commission adopts, on an interim
basis, a new method for distributing
support to price cap carriers. While the
Commission freezes existing support,
the Commission provides incremental
support to price cap carriers through a
mechanism that, consistent with
Hawaiian Telcom’s proposal, identifies
carriers serving the highest-cost wire
centers but does not average wire center
costs in a state. The Commission
therefore believes that these reforms
will achieve the relief Hawaiian Telcom
seeks in its waiver petition and that, to
the extent they do not, Hawaiian
Telcom may seek additional targeted
support through a request for waiver.
PO 00000
Frm 00014
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
2. New Framework for Ongoing Support
in Price Cap Territories
a. Budget for Price Cap Areas
95. Within the total $4.5 billion
annual budget, the Commission sets the
total annual CAF budget for areas
currently served by price cap carriers at
no more than $1.8 billion for a five-year
period. For purposes of CAF Phase II,
consistent with the approach in CAF
Phase I, the Commission will treat as
price cap carriers the rate-of-return
operating companies that are affiliated
with holding companies for which the
majority of access lines are regulated
under price caps. A ‘‘price cap territory’’
therefore includes a study area served
by a rate-of-return operating company
affiliated with price cap companies.
96. In 2010, the most recent year for
which complete disbursement data are
available, price cap carriers and their
rate-of-return affiliates received
approximately $1.076 billion in support.
Collectively, more than 83 percent of
the unserved locations in the nation are
in price cap areas, yet such areas
currently receive approximately 25
percent of high-cost support.
97. The Commission concludes that
increased support to areas served by
price cap carriers, coupled with
rigorous, enforceable deployment
obligations, is warranted in the near
term to meet the universal service
mandate to unserved consumers
residing in these communities. At the
same time, the Commission seeks to
balance many competing demands for
universal service funds, including the
need to extend advanced mobile
services and to preserve and advance
universal service in areas currently
served by rate-of-return companies.
Budgeting up to $1.8 billion for price
cap territories, in the judgment,
represents a reasonable balance of these
considerations. The Commission also
stresses that these subsidies will go to
carriers serving price cap areas, not
necessarily incumbent price cap
carriers. Before 2018, the Commission
will re-evaluate the need for ongoing
support at these levels and determine
how best to drive support to efficient
levels, given consumer demand and
technological developments at that time.
b. Price Cap Public Interest Obligations
98. Price cap ETCs that accept a statelevel commitment must provide
broadband service that is reasonably
comparable to terrestrial fixed
broadband service in urban America.
Specifically, price cap ETCs that receive
model-based CAF support will be
required, for the first three years they
receive support, to offer broadband at
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
actual speeds of at least 4 Mbps
downstream and 1 Mbps upstream, with
latency suitable for real-time
applications, such as VoIP, and with
usage capacity reasonably comparable to
that available in comparable offerings in
urban areas. By the end of the third
year, ETCs must offer at least 4 Mbps/
1 Mbps broadband service to at least 85
percent of their high-cost locations—
including locations on Tribal lands—
covered by the state-level commitment,
as described below. By the end of the
fifth year, price cap ETCs must offer at
least 4 Mbps/1 Mbps broadband service
to all supported locations, and at least
6 Mbps/1.5 Mbps to a number of
supported locations to be specified.
99. The Commission establishes the
85 percent third-year milestone to
ensure that recipients of funding remain
on track to meet their performance
obligations. While a number of parties
agreed generally with the concept of
setting specific, enforceable interim
milestones to safeguard the use of
public funds, there are few concrete
suggestions in the record on what those
intermediate deadlines should be. The
Commission agrees with the State
Members of the Joint Board that there
should be intermediate milestones for
the required broadband deployment
obligations. The Commission sets an
initial requirement of offering
broadband to at least 85 percent of
supported locations by the end of the
third year, and to all supported
locations by the end of the fifth year. As
set forth more fully below, recipients of
funding will be required annually to
report on their progress in extending
broadband throughout their areas and
must meet the interim deadline
established for the third year, or face
loss of support.
100. Before the end of the fifth year,
the Commission expects to have
reviewed the minimum broadband
performance metrics in light of expected
increases in speed, and other broadband
characteristics, in the intervening years.
Based on the information before us
today, the Commission expects that
consumer usage of applications,
including those for health and
education, may evolve over the next five
years to require speeds higher than 4
Mbps downstream/1 Mbps upstream.
For this reason, the Commission expects
ETCs to build robust, scalable networks
that will provide speeds of at least 6
Mbps/1.5 Mbps to a number of
supported locations to be determined in
the model development process, as set
forth more fully below.
101. After the end of the five-year
term of CAF Phase II, the Commission
expects to be distributing all CAF
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
support in price cap areas pursuant to
a market-based mechanism, such as
competitive bidding. However, if such a
mechanism is not implemented by the
end of the five-year term of CAF Phase
II, the incumbent ETCs will be required
to continue providing broadband with
performance characteristics that remain
reasonably comparable to the
performance characteristics of terrestrial
fixed broadband service in urban
America, in exchange for ongoing CAF
Phase II support.
c. Methodology for Allocating Support
102. Discussion. The Commission
concludes that the Connect America
Fund should ultimately rely on marketbased mechanisms, such as competitive
bidding, to ensure the most efficient and
effective use of public resources.
However, the CAF is not created on a
blank slate, but rather against the
backdrop of a decades-old regulatory
system. The continued existence of
legacy obligations, including state
carrier of last resort obligations for
telephone service, complicate the
transition to competitive bidding. In the
transition, the Commission seeks to
avoid consumer disruption—including
the loss of traditional voice service—
while getting robust, scalable broadband
to substantial numbers of unserved rural
Americans as quickly as possible.
Accordingly, the Commission adopts an
approach that enables competitive
bidding for CAF Phase II support in the
near-term in some price cap areas, while
in other areas holding the incumbent
carrier to broadband and other public
interest obligations over large
geographies in return for five years of
CAF support.
103. Specifically, the Commission
adopts the following methodology for
providing CAF support in price cap
areas. First, the Commission will model
forward-looking costs to estimate the
cost of deploying broadband-capable
networks in high-cost areas and identify
at a granular level the areas where
support will be available. Second, using
the cost model, the Commission will
offer each price cap LEC annual support
for a period of five years in exchange for
a commitment to offer voice across its
service territory within a state and
broadband service to supported
locations within that service territory,
subject to robust public interest
obligations and accountability
standards. Third, for all territories for
which price cap LECs decline to make
that commitment, the Commission will
award ongoing support through a
competitive bidding mechanism.
104. The Commission anticipates
adoption of the selected model by the
PO 00000
Frm 00015
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81575
end of 2012 for purposes of providing
support beginning January 1, 2013.
105. Determination of Eligible Areas.
The Commission will use a forwardlooking cost model to determine, on a
census block or smaller basis, areas that
will be eligible for CAF Phase II
support. In doing so, the Commission
will allocate the budget of no more than
$1.8 billion for price cap areas to
maximize the number of expensive-toserve residences, businesses, and
community anchor institutions that will
have access to modern networks
providing voice and robust, scalable
broadband. Specifically, the
Commission will use the model to
identify those census blocks where the
cost of service is likely to be higher than
can be supported through reasonable
end-user rates alone, and, therefore,
should be eligible for CAF support. The
Commission will also use the model to
identify, from among these, a small
number of extremely high-cost census
blocks that should receive funding
specifically set aside for remote and
extremely high-cost areas, as described
below, rather than receiving CAF Phase
II support, in order to keep the total size
of the CAF and legacy high-cost
mechanisms within the $4.5 billion
budget.
106. This methodology balances the
desire to extend robust, scalable
broadband to all Americans with the
recognition that the very small
percentage of households that are most
expensive to serve via terrestrial
technology represent a disproportionate
share of the cost of serving currently
unserved areas. In light of this fact, the
State Members of the Joint Board
propose that universal service support
be limited to not more than $100 per
high-cost location per month, which
they suggest is somewhat higher than
the prevailing retail price of satellite
service. Similarly, ABC Plan proponents
recommend an alternative technology
benchmark of $256 per month based on
the plan proponents’ cost model—the
CostQuest Broadband Analysis Tool
(CQBAT)—which would limit support
per location to no more than $176 per
month ($256–$80 cost benchmark). The
Commission agrees that the highest cost
areas are more appropriately served
through alternative approaches, and in
the USF/ICC Transformation FNPRM
the Commission seeks comment on how
best to utilize at least $100 million in
annual CAF funding to maximize the
availability of affordable broadband in
such areas. Here, the Commission
adopts a methodology for calculating
support that will target support to areas
that exceed a specified cost benchmark,
but not provide support for areas that
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81576
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
exceed an ‘‘extremely high cost’’
threshold.
107. The Commission delegates to the
Wireline Competition Bureau the
responsibility for setting the extremely
high-cost threshold in conjunction with
adoption of a final cost model. The
threshold should be set to maintain total
support in price cap areas within the up
to $1.8 billion annual budget.
108. In determining the areas eligible
for support, the Commission will also
exclude areas where, as of a specified
future date as close as possible to the
completion of the model and to be
determined by the Wireline Competition
Bureau, an unsubsidized competitor
offers affordable broadband that meets
the initial public interest obligations
that the Commission establishes in this
R&O for CAF Phase I, i.e., speed,
latency, and usage requirements. The
model scenarios submitted by the ABC
Plan proponents excluded areas already
served by a cable company offering
broadband. State Members propose, at a
minimum, excluding areas with
unsubsidized wireline competition, and
suggested that areas with reliable 4G
wireless service could also be excluded.
In an ‘‘Amended ABC Plan,’’ NCTA
proposes to exclude areas where there is
an unsupported wireline or wireless
broadband competitor, and areas that
received American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act stimulus funding
from Rural Utilities Service (RUS) or
NTIA to build broadband facilities. The
Commission concludes, on balance, that
it would be appropriate to exclude any
area served by an unsubsidized
competitor that meets the initial
performance requirements, and the
Commission delegates to the Wireline
Competition Bureau the task of
implementing the specific requirements
of this rule.
109. State-Level Commitment.
Following adoption of the cost model,
which the Commission anticipates will
be before the end of 2012, the Bureau
will publish a list of all eligible census
blocks associated with each incumbent
price cap carrier within each state. After
the list is published, there will be an
opportunity for comments and data to
be filed to challenge the determination
of whether or not areas are unserved by
an unsubsidized competitor. Each
incumbent carrier will then be given an
opportunity to accept, for each state it
serves, the public interest obligations
associated with all the eligible census
blocks in its territory, in exchange for
the total model-derived annual support
associated with those census blocks, for
a period of five years. The modelderived support amount associated with
each census block will be the difference
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
between the model-determined cost in
that census block, provided that cost is
below the highest-cost threshold, and
the cost benchmark used to identify
high-cost areas. If the incumbent accepts
the state-level broadband commitment,
it shall be subject to the public interest
obligations described above for all
locations for which it receives support
in that state, and shall be the
presumptive recipient of the modelderived support amount for the five-year
CAF Phase II period. In meeting its
obligation to serve a particular number
of locations in a state, an incumbent that
has accepted the state-level commitment
may choose to serve some census blocks
with costs above the highest cost
threshold instead of eligible census
blocks (i.e., census blocks with lower
costs), provided that it meets the public
interest obligations in those census
blocks, and provided that the total
number of unserved locations and the
total number of locations covered is
greater than or equal to the number of
locations in the eligible census blocks.
110. Carriers accepting a state-level
commitment will receive funding for
five years. At the end of the five-year
term, in the areas where the price cap
carriers have accepted the five-year state
level commitment, the Commission
expects to use competitive bidding to
award CAF support on a going-forward
basis, and may use the competitive
bidding structure adopted by the
Commission for use in areas where the
state-level commitment is declined.
111. The Commission concludes that
the state-level commitment framework
the Commission adopts is preferable to
the right of first refusal approach
proposed by the Commission in the
USF/ICC Transformation NPRM, which
would have been offered at the study
area level, and to a right of first refusal
offered at the wire center level, as
proposed by some commenters. Both of
these approaches would have allowed
price cap carriers to pick and choose on
a granular basis the areas where they
would receive model-based support
within a state. This would allow the
incumbent to cherry pick the most
attractive areas within its service
territory, leaving the least desirable
areas for a competitive process. This
concern was greatest with the ABC
proposal, under which carriers would
have been able to exercise a right of first
refusal on a wire center basis, but also
applies to the study area proposal in the
USF/ICC Transformation NPRM.
Although for some price cap carriers,
their study areas are their entire service
area within a state, other carriers still
have many study areas within a state.
These carriers may have acquired
PO 00000
Frm 00016
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
various properties over time and chosen
to keep them as separate study areas for
various reasons, including potentially to
maximize universal service support.
Rather than enshrine such past
decisions in the new CAF, the
Commission concludes that it is more
equitable to treat all price cap carriers
the same and require them to offer
service to all high-cost locations
between an upper and lower threshold
within their service territory in a state,
consistent with the public interest
obligations described above, in
exchange for support. Requiring carriers
to accept or decline a commitment for
all eligible locations in their service
territory in a state should reduce the
chances that eligible locations that may
be less economically attractive to serve,
even with CAF support, get bypassed,
and increase the chance such areas get
served along with eligible locations that
are more economically attractive.
112. In determining how best to
award CAF support in price cap areas,
the Commission carefully weighed the
risks and benefits of alternatives,
including using competitive bidding
everywhere, without first giving
incumbent LECs an opportunity to enter
a state-level service commitment. The
Commission concludes that, on balance,
the approach the Commission adopts
will best ensure continued universal
voice service and speed the deployment
of broadband to all Americans over the
next several years, while minimizing the
burden on the Universal Service Fund.
113. In particular, several
considerations support the
determination not to immediately adopt
competitive bidding everywhere for the
distribution of CAF support. Because
the Commission excludes from the price
cap areas eligible for support all census
blocks served by an unsubsidized
competitor, the Commission will
generally be offering support for areas
where the incumbent LEC is likely to
have the only wireline facilities, and
there may be few other bidders with the
financial and technological capabilities
to deliver scalable broadband that will
meet the requirements over time. In
addition, it is the predictive judgment
that the incumbent LEC is likely to have
at most the same, and sometimes lower,
costs compared to a new entrant in
many of these areas. The Commission
also weighs the fact that incumbent
LECs generally continue to have carrier
of last resort obligations for voice
services. While some states are
beginning to re-evaluate those
obligations, in many states the
incumbent carrier still has the
continuing obligation to provide voice
service and cannot exit the marketplace
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
absent state permission. On balance, the
Commission believes that that the
approach best serves consumers in these
areas in the near term, many of whom
are receiving voice services today
supported in part by universal service
funding and some of whom also receive
broadband, and will speed the delivery
of broadband to areas where consumers
have no access today.
114. The Commission disagrees with
commenters who assert that the
principle of competitive neutrality
precludes the Commission from giving
incumbent carriers an opportunity to
commit to deploying broadband
throughout their service areas in a state
in exchange for five years of funding.
The principle of competitive neutrality
states that ‘‘[u]niversal service support
mechanisms and rules should be
competitively neutral,’’ which means
that they should not ‘‘unfairly advantage
nor disadvantage one provider over
another, and neither unfairly favor nor
disfavor one technology over another.’’
The competitive neutrality principle
does not require all competitors to be
treated alike, but ‘‘only prohibits the
Commission from treating competitors
differently in ‘unfair’ ways.’’ Moreover,
neither the competitive neutrality
principle nor the other 47 U.S.C. 254(b)
principles impose inflexible
requirements for the Commission’s
formulation of universal service rules
and policies. Instead, the ‘‘promotion of
any one goal or principle should be
tempered by a commitment to ensuring
the advancement of each of the
principles’’ in 47 U.S.C. 254(b).
115. As an initial matter, the
Commission notes that the USF reforms
generally advance the principle of
competitive neutrality by limiting
support to only those areas of the nation
that lack unsubsidized providers. Thus,
providers that offer service without
subsidy will no longer face competitors
whose service in the same area is
subsidized by federal universal service
funding. Especially in this light, the
Commission concludes that any
departure from strict competitive
neutrality occasioned by affording
incumbent LECs an opportunity to
commit to deploying broadband in their
statewide service areas is outweighed by
the advancement of other 47 U.S.C.
254(b) principles, in particular, the
principles that ‘‘[a]ccess to advanced
telecommunications and information
services should be provided in all
regions of the Nation,’’ and that
consumers in rural areas should have
access to advanced services comparable
to those available in urban areas.
Although other classes of providers may
be well situated to make broadband
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
commitments with respect to relatively
small geographic areas such as discrete
census blocks, the purpose of the fiveyear commitment is to establish a
limited, one-time opportunity for the
rapid deployment of broadband services
over a large geographic area. The fact
that incumbent LECs’ have had a long
history of providing service throughout
the relevant areas—including the fact
that incumbent LECs generally have
already obtained the ETC designation
necessary to receive USF support
throughout large service areas—puts
them in a unique position to deploy
broadband networks rapidly and
efficiently in such areas. The
Commission sees nothing in the record
that suggests a more competitively
neutral way of achieving that objective
quickly, without abandoning altogether
the goal of obtaining large-area build-out
commitments or substantially
ballooning the cost of the program.
116. Moreover, it is important to
emphasize the limited scope and
duration of the state-level commitment
procedure. Incumbent LECs are afforded
only a one-time opportunity to make a
commitment to build out broadband
networks throughout their service areas
within a state. If the incumbent declines
that opportunity in a particular state,
support to serve the unserved areas
located within the incumbent’s service
area will be awarded by competitive
bidding, and all providers will have an
equal opportunity to seek USF support,
as described below. Furthermore, even
where the incumbent LEC makes a statelevel commitment, its right to support
will terminate after five years, and the
Commission expects that support after
such five-year period will be awarded
through a competitive bidding process
in which all eligible providers will be
given an equal opportunity to compete.
Thus, the Commission anticipates that
funding will soon be allocated on a fully
competitive basis. In light of all these
considerations, the Commission
concludes that adhering to strict
competitive neutrality at the expense of
the state-level commitment process
would unreasonably frustrate
achievement of the universal service
principles of ubiquitous and comparable
broadband services and promoting
broadband deployment, and unduly
elevate the interests of competing
providers over those of unserved and
under-served consumers who live in
high-cost areas of the country, as well as
of all consumers and
telecommunications providers who
make payments to support the Universal
Service Fund.
117. Competitive Bidding. In areas
where the incumbent declines a state-
PO 00000
Frm 00017
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81577
level commitment, the Commission will
use a competitive bidding mechanism to
distribute support. In the USF/ICC
Transformation FNPRM, the
Commission proposes to design this
mechanism in a way that maximizes the
extent of robust, scalable broadband
service subject to the budget. Assigning
support in this way should enable us to
identify those providers that will make
most effective use of the budgeted
funds, thereby extending services to as
many consumers as possible. The
Commission proposes to use census
blocks as the minimum geographic unit
eligible for competitive bidding and
seek comment on ways to allow
aggregation of such blocks. Although the
Commission proposes using the same
areas identified by the CAF Phase II
model as eligible for support, the
Commission also seeks comment on
other approaches—for example,
excluding areas served by any
broadband provider, or using different
cost thresholds. The Commission also
seeks targeted comment on other issues,
including bidder eligibility, auction
design, and auction process.
118. Transition to New Support
Levels. Support under CAF Phase II will
be phased in, in the following manner.
For a carrier accepting the state-wide
commitment, in the first year, the carrier
will receive one-half the full amount the
carrier will receive under CAF Phase II
and one-half the amount the carrier
received under CAF Phase I for the
previous year (which would be the
frozen amount if the carrier declines
Phase I or the frozen amount plus the
incremental amount if the carrier
accepts Phase I); in the second year,
each carrier accepting the state-wide
commitment will receive the full CAF
Phase II amount. To the extent a carrier
will receive less money from CAF Phase
II than it will receive under frozen highcost support, there will be an
appropriate multi-year transition to the
lower amount. It is premature to specify
the length of that transition now, before
the cost model is adopted, but it will be
addressed in conjunction with
finalization of the cost model that will
be developed with public input.
119. For a carrier declining the statewide commitment, the carrier will
continue to receive support in an
amount equal to its CAF Phase I support
amount until the first month that the
winner of any competitive process
receives support under CAF Phase II; at
that time, the carrier declining the statewide commitment will cease to receive
high-cost universal service support. No
additional broadband obligations apply
to funds received during the transition
period. That is, carriers accepting the
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81578
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
state-wide commitment are obliged to
meet the Phase II broadband obligations
described above, while carriers
declining the state-wide commitment
will be required to meet their preexisting Phase I obligations, but will not
be required to deploy additional
broadband in connection with their
receipt of transitional funding.
d. Forward-Looking Cost Model
120. Discussion. Although the
Commission agrees with both the State
Members and the ABC Plan proponents
that the Commission should use a
forward-looking model to assist in
setting support levels in price cap
territories, the Commission does not
adopt the CQBAT cost model proposed
by the ABC Coalition, nor does the
Commission accept the State Board’s
proposal that the Commission simply
update the existing cost model. Instead,
the Commission initiates a public
process to develop a robust cost model
for the Connect America Fund to
accurately estimate the cost of a modern
voice and broadband capable network,
and delegate to the Wireline
Competition Bureau the responsibility
of completing it.
121. In light of the limited
opportunity the public has received to
review and modify the ABC Coalition’s
proposed CQBAT model, the
Commission rejects the group’s
suggestion that the Commission adopts
that model at this time. The
Commission has previously held that
before any cost model may be ‘‘used to
calculate the forward-looking economic
costs of providing universal service in
rural, insular, and high cost areas,’’ the
‘‘model and all underlying data,
formulae, computations, and software
associated with the model must be
available to all interested parties for
review and comment. All underlying
data should be verifiable, engineering
assumptions reasonable, and outputs
plausible.’’ The Commission sees no
reason to depart from this conclusion
here, and the CQBAT model, as
presented to the Commission at this
time, does not meet this requirement.
122. The Commission likewise rejects
the State Members’ proposal to modify
the Commission’s existing cost model to
estimate the costs of modern voice and
broadband-capable network. The
Commission’s existing cost model does
not fully reflect the costs associated
with modern voice and broadband
networks because the model calculates
cost based on engineering assumptions
and equipment appropriate to the 1990s.
In addition, modeling techniques and
capabilities have advanced significantly
since 1998, when the Commission’s
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
existing high cost model was developed,
and the new techniques could
significantly improve the accuracy of
modeled costs in a new model relative
to an updated version of the
Commission’s existing model. For
example, new models can estimate the
costs of efficient routing along roads in
a way that the older model cannot. The
Commission sees the benefits of
leveraging the existing model to rapidly
deploy interim support, and does just
that for Phase I of the CAF. For the
longer-term disbursement of support,
however, the Commission concludes
that it is preferable to use a more
accurate, up to date model based on
modern techniques.
123. To expedite the process of
finalizing the model to be used as part
of the state-level commitment, the
Commission delegates to the Wireline
Competition Bureau the authority to
select the specific engineering cost
model and associated inputs, consistent
with this R&O. For the reasons below,
the model should be of wireline
technology and at a census block or
smaller level. In other respects, the
Commission directs the Wireline
Competition Bureau to ensure that the
model design maximizes the number of
locations that will receive robust,
scalable broadband within the budgeted
amounts. Specifically, the model should
direct funds to support 4 Mbps/1 Mbps
broadband service to all supported
locations, subject only to the waiver
process for upstream speed described
above, and should ensure that the most
locations possible receive a 6 Mbps/1.5
Mbps or faster service at the end of the
five year term, consistent with the CAF
Phase II budget. The Wireline
Competition Bureau’s ultimate choice of
a greenfield or brownfield model, the
modeled architecture, and the costs and
inputs of that model should ensure that
the public interest obligations are
achieved as cost-effectively as possible.
124. Geographic Granularity. The
Commission concluded that the CAF
Phase II model should estimate costs at
a granular level—the census block or
smaller—in all areas of the country.
Geographic granularity is important in
capturing the forward-looking costs
associated with deploying broadband
networks in rural and remote areas.
Using the average cost per location of
existing deployments in large areas,
even when adjusted for differences in
population and linear densities,
presents a risk that costs may be
underestimated in rural areas.
Deployments in rural markets are likely
to be subscale, so an analysis based on
costs averaged over large areas,
particularly large areas that include both
PO 00000
Frm 00018
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
low- and high-density zones, will be
inaccurate. A granular approach,
calculating costs based on the plant and
hardware required to serve each
location in a small area (i.e., census
block or smaller), will provide sufficient
geographic and cost-component
granularity to accurately capture the
true costs of subscale markets. For
example, if only one home in an area
with very low density is connected to a
DSLAM, the entire cost of that DSLAM
should be allocated to the home rather
than the fraction based on DSLAM
capacity. Furthermore, to the extent that
a home is served by a long section of
feeder or distribution cabling that serves
only that home, the entire cost of such
cabling should be allocated to the home
as well.
125. Wireline Network Architecture.
The Commission concludes that the
CAF Phase II model should estimate the
cost of a wireline network. For a number
of reasons, the Commission rejects some
commenters’ suggestion that the
Commission should attempt to model
the costs of both wireline and wireless
technologies and base support on
whichever technology is lower cost in
each area of the country.
126. For one, the Commission has
concerns about the feasibility of
developing a wireless cost model with
sufficient accuracy for use in the CAF
Phase II framework. The Commission
recognizes that all cost models involve
a certain degree of imprecision. As the
Commission noted in the USF Reform
NOI/NPRM, 75 FR 26906, May 13, 2010,
however, accurately modeling wireless
deployment may raise challenges
beyond those that exist for wireline
models, particularly where highly
localized cost estimates are required.
For example, the availability of
desirable cell sites can significantly
affect the cost of covering any given
small geographic area and is challenging
to model without detailed local siting
information. Propagation characteristics
may vary based on local and difficult to
model features like foliage. Access to
spectrum, which substantially affects
overall network costs, varies
dramatically among potential funding
recipients and differs across
geographies. Because the cost model for
CAF Phase II will need to calculate costs
for small areas (census-block or
smaller), high local variability in the
accuracy of outputs will create
challenges, even if a cost model
provides high quality results when
averaged over a larger area. In light of
the issues with modeling wireless costs,
the Commission remains concerned that
a lowest-cost technology model
including both wireless and wireline
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
components could introduce greater
error than a wireline-only model in
identifying eligible areas. The
Commission does not believe that
delaying implementation of CAF Phase
II to resolve these issues serves the
public interest.
127. Finally, the record fails to
persuade us that, in general, the costs of
cellular wireless networks are likely to
be significantly lower than wireline
networks for providing broadband
service that meets the CAF Phase II
speed, latency, and capacity
requirements. In particular, the
Commission emphasizes that, as
described above, carriers receiving CAF
Phase II support should expect to offer
service with increasing download and
upload speeds over time, and that
allows monthly usage reasonably
comparable to terrestrial fixed
residential broadband offerings in urban
areas. The National Broadband Plan
modeled the nationwide costs of a
wireless broadband network
dimensioned to support typical usage
patterns for fixed services to homes, and
found that the cost was similar to that
of wireline networks. None of the
parties advocating for the use of a
wireless model has submitted into the
record a wireless model for fixed service
and, therefore, the Commission has no
evidence that such service would be less
costly.
128. Process for Adopting the Model.
The Commission anticipates that the
Wireline Competition Bureau will adopt
the specific model to be used for
purposes of estimating support amounts
in price cap areas by the end of 2012 for
purposes of providing support
beginning January 1, 2013. Before the
model is adopted, the Commission will
ensure that interested parties have
access to the underlying data,
assumptions, and logic of all models
under consideration, as well as the
opportunity for further comment. When
the Commission adopted its existing
cost model, it did so in an open,
deliberative process with ample
opportunity for interested parties to
participate and provide valuable
assistance. The Commission has had
three rounds of comment on the use of
a model for purposes of determining
Connect America Fund support and
remains committed to a robust public
comment process. To expedite this
process, the Commission delegates to
the Wireline Competition Bureau the
authority to select the specific
engineering cost model and associated
inputs, consistent with this R&O. The
Commission directs the Wireline
Competition Bureau to issue a public
notice within 30 days of release of this
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
R&O requesting parties to file models for
consideration in this proceeding
consistent with this R&O, and to report
to the Commission on the status of the
model development process no later
than June 1, 2012.
129. The Commission notes that price
cap carriers serving Alaska, Hawaii,
Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and
Northern Marianas Islands argue they
face operating conditions and
challenges that differ from those faced
by carriers in the contiguous 48 states.
The Commission directs the Wireline
Competition Bureau to consider the
unique circumstances of these areas
when adopting a cost model, and further
directs the Wireline Competition Bureau
to consider whether the model
ultimately adopted adequately accounts
for the costs faced by carriers serving
these areas. If, after reviewing the
evidence, the Wireline Competition
Bureau determines that the model
ultimately adopted does not provide
sufficient support to any of these areas,
the Bureau may maintain existing
support levels, as modified in this R&O,
to any affected price cap carrier, without
exceeding the overall budget of $1.8
billion per year for price cap areas.
C. Universal Service Support for Rateof-Return Carriers
1. Public Interest Obligations of Rate-ofReturn Carriers
130. The Commission recognizes that,
in the absence of any federal mandate to
provide broadband, rate-of-return
carriers have been deploying broadband
to millions of rural Americans, often
with support from a combination of
loans from lenders such as RUS and
ongoing universal service support. The
Commission now requires that
recipients use their support in a manner
consistent with achieving universal
availability of voice and broadband.
131. To implement this policy, rather
than establishing a mandatory
requirement to deploy broadbandcapable facilities to all locations within
their service territory, the Commission
continues to offer a more flexible
approach for these smaller carriers.
Specifically, beginning July 1, 2012, the
Commission requires the following of
rate-of-return carriers that continue to
receive HCLS or ICLS or begin receiving
new CAF funding in conjunction with
the implementation of intercarrier
compensation reform, as a condition of
receiving that support: Such carriers
must provide broadband service at
speeds of at least 4 Mbps downstream
and 1 Mbps upstream with latency
suitable for real-time applications, such
as VoIP, and with usage capacity
PO 00000
Frm 00019
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81579
reasonably comparable to that available
in residential terrestrial fixed broadband
offerings in urban areas, upon
reasonable request. The Commission
thus requires rate-of-return carriers to
provide their customers with at least the
same initial minimum level of
broadband service as those carriers who
receive model-based support, but given
their generally small size, the
Commission determines that rate-ofreturn carriers should be provided
greater flexibility in edging out their
broadband-capable networks in
response to consumer demand. At this
time the Commission does not adopt
intermediate build-out milestones or
increased speed requirements for future
years, but the Commission expects
carriers will deploy scalable broadband
to their communities and will monitor
their progress in doing so, including
through the annual reports they will be
required to submit. The broadband
deployment obligation the Commission
adopts is similar to the voice
deployment obligations many of these
carriers are subject to today.
132. The Commission believes these
public interest obligations are
reasonable. Although many carriers may
experience some reduction in support as
a result of the reforms adopted herein,
those reforms are necessary to eliminate
waste and inefficiency and improve
incentives for rational investment and
operation by rate-of-return LECs. The
Commission notes that these carriers
benefit by receiving certain and
predictable funding through the CAF
created to address access charge reform.
In addition, rate-of-return carriers will
not necessarily be required to build out
to and serve the most expensive
locations within their service area.
133. Upon receipt of a reasonable
request for service, carriers must deploy
broadband to the requesting customer
within a reasonable amount of time. The
Commission agrees with the State
Members of the Federal-State Joint
Board on Universal Service that
construction charges may be assessed,
subject to limits. In the Accountability
and Oversight section of this R&O, the
Commission requires ETCs to include in
their annual reports to USAC and to the
relevant state commission and Tribal
government, if applicable, the number
of unfulfilled requests for service from
potential customers and the number of
customer complaints, broken out
separately for voice and broadband
services. The Commission will monitor
carriers’ filings to determine whether
reasonable requests for broadband
service are being fulfilled, and the
Commission encourages states and
Tribal governments to do the same. As
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81580
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
discussed in the legal authority section
above, the Commission is funding a
broadband-capable voice network, so
the Commission believes that to the
extent states retain jurisdiction over
voice service, states will have
jurisdiction to monitor these carriers’
responsiveness to customer requests for
service.
134. The Commission recognizes that
smaller carriers serve some of the
highest cost areas of the nation. The
Commission seeks comment in the USF/
ICC Transformation FNPRM below on
alternative ways to meet the needs of
consumers in these highest cost areas.
Pending development of the record and
resolution of these issues, rate-of-return
carriers are simply required to extend
broadband on reasonable request. The
Commission expects that rate-of-return
carriers will follow pre-existing state
requirements, if any, regarding service
line extensions in their highest-cost
areas.
2. Limits on Reimbursable Capital and
Operating Costs
135. Discussion. The Commission
concludes that the Commission should
use regression analyses to limit
reimbursable capital expenses and
operating expenses for purposes of
determining high-cost support for rateof-return carriers. The methodology will
generate caps, to be updated annually,
for each rate-of-return company. This
rule change will place important
constraints on how rate-of-return
companies invest and operate that over
time will incent greater operational
efficiencies. The Commission delegates
authority to the Wireline Competition
Bureau to implement a methodology
and expect that limits will be
implemented no later than July 1, 2012.
136. Several commenters support the
proposal to impose reasonable limits on
reimbursable capital and operating
expenses. Although many small rate-ofreturn carriers seem to imply that the
Commission should not adopt operating
expense benchmarks because their
operating expenses are ‘‘fixed,’’ other
representatives of rural rate-of-return
companies support the concept of
imposing reasonable benchmarks. The
Rural Associations concede that ‘‘[t]o
the extent any ‘race to the top’ occurs,
it undermines predictability and
stability for current USF recipients.’’
137. The Commission sets forth in the
USF/ICC Transformation FNPRM and
Appendix H a specific methodology for
capping recovery for capital expenses
and operating expenses using quantile
regression techniques and publicly
available cost, geographic and
demographic data. The net effect would
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
be to limit high-cost loop support
amounts for rate-of-return carriers to
reasonable amounts relative to other
carriers with similar characteristics.
Specifically, the methodology uses
National Exchange Carrier Association
(NECA) cost data and 2010 Census data
to cap permissible expenses for certain
costs used in the HCLS formula. The
Commission invites public input in the
accompanying USF/ICC Transformation
FNPRM on that methodology and
anticipates that HCLS benchmarks will
be implemented for support calculations
beginning in July 2012.
138. The Commission sets forth here
the parameters of the methodology that
the Bureau should use to limit payments
from HCLS. The Commission requires
that companies’ costs be compared to
those of similarly situated companies.
The Commission concludes that
statistical techniques should be used to
determine which companies shall be
deemed similarly situated. For purposes
of this analysis, the Commission
concludes the following non-exhaustive
list of variables may be considered:
Number of loops, number of housing
units (broken out by whether the
housing units are in urbanized areas,
urbanized clusters, and nonurban areas),
as well as geographic measures such as
land area, water area, and the number of
census blocks (all broken out by
urbanized areas, urbanized clusters, and
nonurban areas). The Commission
grants the Bureau discretion to
determine whether other variables, such
as soil type, would improve the
regression analysis. The Commission
notes that the soils data from the
Natural Resource Conservation Service
(NRCS) that the Nebraska study used to
generate soil, frost and wetland
variables do not cover the entire United
States. These data, called the Soil
Survey Geographic Database or
SSURGO, do not cover about 24 percent
of the United States land mass,
including Puerto Rico, Guam, American
Samoa, U.S. Virgin Islands and
Northern Mariana Islands as well as
Alaska. The Commission seeks
comment in the USF/ICC
Transformation FNPRM on sources of
other publicly available soil data. The
Commission delegates authority to the
Bureau to adopt the initial methodology,
to update it as it gains more experience
and additional information, and to
update its regression analysis annually
with new cost data.
139. Each year the Wireline
Competition Bureau will publish in a
public notice the updated capped values
that will be used in the NECA formula
in place of an individual company’s
actual cost data for those rate-of-return
PO 00000
Frm 00020
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
cost companies whose costs exceed the
caps, which will result in revised
support amounts. The Commission
directs NECA to modify the high-cost
loop support universal service formula
for average schedule companies
annually to reflect the caps derived from
the cost company data.
140. The Commission concludes that
establishing reasonable limits on
recovery for capital expenses and
operating expenses will provide better
incentives for carriers to invest
prudently and operate efficiently than
the current system. Under the current
HCLS rules, a company receives support
when its costs are relatively high
compared to a national average—
without regard to whether a lesser
amount would be sufficient to provide
supported services to its customers. The
current rules fail to create incentives to
reduce expenditures; indeed, because of
the operation of the overall cap on
HCLS, carriers that take prudent
measures to cut costs under the current
rules may actually lose HCLS support to
carriers that significantly increase their
costs in a given year.
141. Under the new rule, the
Commission will place limits on the
HCLS provided to carriers whose costs
are significantly higher than other
companies that are similarly situated,
and support will be redistributed to
those carriers whose unseparated loop
cost is not limited by operation of the
benchmark methodology. The
Commission notes that the fact that an
individual company will not know how
the benchmark affects its support levels
until after investments are made is no
different from the current operation of
high-cost loop support, in which a
carrier receives support based on where
its own cost per loop falls relative to a
national average that changes from year
to year. Even today, companies can only
estimate whether their expenditures
will be reimbursed through HCLS. In
contrast to the current situation, the
new rule will discourage companies
from over-spending relative to their
peers. The new rule will provide
additional support to those companies
that are otherwise at risk of losing HCLS
altogether, and would not otherwise be
well-positioned to further advance
broadband deployment.
142. The Commission rejects the
argument that imposing benchmarks in
this fashion would negatively impact
companies that have made past
investments in reliance upon the
current rules or the ‘‘no barriers to
advanced services’’ policy. 47 U.S.C.
254 does not mandate the receipt of
support by any particular carrier.
Rather, as the Commission has indicated
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
and the courts have agreed, the
‘‘purpose of universal service is to
benefit the customer, not the carrier.’’
That is, while 47 U.S.C. 254 directs the
Commission to provide support that is
sufficient to achieve universal service
goals, that obligation does not create any
entitlement or expectation that ETCs
will receive any particular level of
support or even any support at all. The
new rule will inject greater
predictability into the current HCLS
mechanism, as companies will have
more certainty of support if they manage
their costs to be in alignment with their
similarly situated peers.
143. Our obligation to consumers is to
ensure that they receive supported
services. Our expectation is that carriers
will provide such services to their
customers through prudent facility
investment and maintenance. To the
extent costs above the benchmark are
disallowed under this new rule,
companies are free to file a petition for
waiver to seek additional support.
144. The Commission finds that the
approach—which limits allowable
investment and expenses with reference
to similarly situated carriers—is a
reasonable way to place limits on
recovery of loop costs. The Rural
Associations propose an alternative
limitation on capital investment that
would tie the amount of a rural
company’s recovery of prospective
investment that qualifies for high-cost
support to the accumulated depreciation
in its existing loop plant. Their proposal
would limit only future annual loop
investment for individual companies by
multiplying (a) the ratio of accumulated
loop depreciation to total loop plant or
(b) twenty percent, whichever is lower,
times (c) an estimated total loop plant
investment amount (adjusted for
inflation). This proposal would do little
to limit support for capital expenses if
past investments for a particular
company were high enough to be more
than sufficient to provide supported
services, and would do nothing to limit
support for operating expenses, which
are on average more than half of total
loop costs. In addition, it would likely
be administratively impracticable for
the Commission to verify the inflation
adjustments each company would make
for various pieces of equipment
acquired at various times.
145. The Commission also concludes
that the approach can be more readily
implemented and updated than the
specific proposal presented by the
Nebraska Companies. Consultants for
the Nebraska Companies, in their
regression analyses, used proprietary
cost data. Because the proprietary cost
data were not placed in the record,
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
Commission staff was not able to verify
the results of the Nebraska Companies’
studies. The Nebraska Companies
subsequently proposed that the
Commission begin collecting similar
investment and operating expense data,
as well as independent variables such as
density per route mile, to be used in
similar regression analyses. For
example, they suggest that ‘‘[o]ne useful
source for this data would be the
investment costs associated with actual
broadband construction projects that
meet or exceed current engineering
standards.’’ Although the Nebraska
Companies’ proposal shares objectives
similar to the methodology, it would
require the collection of additional data
that the Commission does not currently
have, which would lead to considerable
delay in implementation. The
Commission also is concerned about the
difficulty in obtaining a sufficiently
representative and standardized data set
based on construction projects that will
vary in size, scope and duration.
Moreover, regressions based on such
data could not easily be updated on a
regular basis without further data
collection and standardization. On
balance, the Commission does not
believe that any advantages of the
Nebraska Companies’ approach
outweigh the benefits of relying on cost
data that the Commission already
collects on a regular basis. As explained
in detail in the accompanying USF/ICC
Transformation FNPRM and Appendix
H, Commission staff used publicly
available NECA cost data and other
publicly available geographic and
demographic data sets to develop the
proposed benchmarks.
146. Finally, the Commission notes
that while the methodology in
Appendix H is specifically designed to
modify the formula for determining
HCLS, the Commission concludes that
the Commission should also develop
similar benchmarks for determining
ICLS. The Commission directs NECA to
file the detailed revenue requirement
data it receives from carriers, no later
than thirty days after release of this
R&O, so that the Wireline Competition
Bureau can evaluate whether it should
adopt a methodology using these data.
Over time, benchmarks to limit
reimbursable recovery of costs will
provide incentives for each individual
company to keep its costs lower than its
own cap from prior years, and more
generally moderate expenditures and
improve efficiency, and the Commission
believes these objectives are as
important in the context of ICLS as they
are for HCLS. The Commission seeks
comment in the USF/ICC
PO 00000
Frm 00021
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81581
Transformation FNPRM on ICLS
benchmarks.
147. The Commission delegates
authority to the Wireline Competition
Bureau to finalize a methodology to
limit HCLS and ICLS reimbursements
after this further input.
3. Corporate Operations Expense
148. Discussion. As supported by
many parties, the Commission will
adopt the more modest reform proposal
to extend the limit on recovery of
corporate operations expense to ICLS
effective January 1, 2012. The
Commission concluded in the Universal
Service First Report and Order, 62 FR
32862, June 17, 1997, that the amount
of recovery of corporate operations
expense from HCLS should be limited to
help ensure that carriers use such
support only to offer better service to
their customers through prudent facility
investment and maintenance, consistent
with their obligations under 47 U.S.C.
254(k). The Commission now concludes
that the same reasoning applies to ICLS.
Extending the limit on the recovery of
corporate operations expenses to ICLS
likewise furthers the goal of fiscal
responsibility and accountability.
149. The Commission notes, however,
that the current formula for limiting the
eligibility of corporate operations
expenses for HCLS has not been revised
since 2001. The initial formula was
implemented in 1998, based on 1995
cost data. In 2001, the formula was
modified to reflect increases in Gross
Domestic Product-Chained Price Index
(GDP–CPI), but has not been updated
since then.
150. There have been considerable
changes in the telecommunications
industry in the last decade, given the
‘‘ongoing evolution of the voice network
into a broadband network,’’ and the
Commission believes updating the
formula based on more recent cost data
will ensure that it reflects the current
economics of serving rural areas and
appropriately provides incentives for
efficient operations. Therefore, the
Commission now updates the limitation
formula based on an analysis of the
most recent actual corporate operations
expense submitted by rural incumbent
LECs. As set forth in Appendix C of the
Report and Order, which is available in
its entirety at https://transition.fcc.gov/
Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2011/
db1122/FCC–11-161A1.pdf, and as
summarized below in section V.C.3.a,
the basic statistical methods for
developing the limitation formula and
the structure of the formula are the same
as before. The Commission also
concludes that the updated formula the
Commission adopts should include a
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81582
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
growth factor, consistent with the
current formula that applies to HCLS.
151. Accordingly, effective January 1,
2012, the Commission modifies the
existing limitation on corporate
operations expense formula as follows:
• For study areas with 6,000 or fewer
total working loops the monthly amount
per loop shall be (a) $42.337¥(.00328 ×
number of total working loops), or (b)
$63,000/number of total working loops,
whichever is greater;
• For study areas with more than
6,000, but fewer than 17,887 total
working loops, the monthly amount per
loop shall be $3.007 + (117,990/number
of total working loops); and
• For study areas with 17,887 or more
total working loops, the monthly
amount per loop shall be $9.56;
• Beginning January 1, 2013, the
monthly per-loop limit shall be adjusted
each year to reflect the annual
percentage change in GDP–CPI.
a. Explanation of Methodology for
Modifications to Corporate Operations
Expense Formulae
152. The Basic Formulae. The
Commission conducted a statistical
analysis using actual incumbent local
exchange carrier data submitted by
NECA. The Commission used statistical
regression techniques that focused on
corporate operations expense per loop
and the number of loops, in which the
cap on corporate operations expense per
loop declines as the number of loops
increases so that economies of scale,
which are evident in the data, can be
reflected in the model. As in the
previous corporate operations expense
limitation formulae, the linear spline
model developed has two line segments
joined together at a single point or knot.
In general, the linear spline model
allows the per-line cap on corporate
operations expense to decline as the
number of loops increases for the
smaller study areas having fewer loops
than the knot point. Estimates produced
by the linear spline model suggest that
the per-loop cap on corporate operations
expense for study areas with a number
of loops higher than the spline knot is
constant.
153. The linear spline model requires
selecting a knot, the point at which the
two line segments of differing slopes
meet. The Commission retained the knot
point at 10,000 loops from the
Commission’s previous analysis. The
regression results are as follows:
• For study areas having fewer than
10,000 total working loops, the
projected monthly corporate operations
expense per-loop equals
$36.815¥0.00285 × (number of working
loops);
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
• For study areas with total working
loops equal or greater than 10,000 loops,
the projected monthly corporate
operations expense per-loop equals
$8.12.
154. Correcting for Non-monotonic
Behavior in the Model’s Total Corporate
Operations Expense. The linear spline
model has one undesirable feature. For
a certain range, it yields a total
allowable corporate operations expense
that declines as the number of working
loops increases. This occurs because
multiplying the linear function that
defines the first line segment of the
estimated spline model
(36.815¥(0.00285 × the number of
loops)) by the number of loops defines
a quadratic function that determines
total allowable corporate operations
expense. This quadratic function
produces a maximum value at 6,459
loops, well below the selected knot
point of 10,000. To correct this problem,
we refined the formulae to ensure that
the total allowable corporate operations
expense always increases as the number
of loops increases. The Commission
chose a point to the left of the point at
which the total corporate operations
expense estimate peaks. At that selected
point, the slope of the function defining
total corporate operations expense is
positive. We then calculated the slope at
that point and extended a line with the
same slope upward to the right of that
point until the line intersected the
original estimated total operations
expense, which is represented by 8.315
× the number of loops. Thus, the
Commission we created a line segment
with constant slope covering the region
over which the original model of
corporate operations expenses declines
so that total corporate operations
expense continues to increase with the
number of loops. The Commission
chose the point that leads to a line
segment that yields the highest R2.
155. Using this procedure, the
Commission selected 6,000 as the point.
The slope of total operations expense at
this point is 2.615 and the line extended
intersects the original total operations
expense model at 17,887. Accordingly,
the line segment formed for total
corporate operations expenses, to be
applied from 6,000 loops to 17,887
loops, is $2.615 × the number of
working loops + $102,600. Dividing this
number by the number of working loops
defines the maximum allowable
corporate operations expense per-loop
for the range from 6,000 to 17,887
working loops, i.e., $2.615 + ($102,600/
number of working loops). Therefore,
the projected per-loop corporate
operations expense formulae are:
PO 00000
Frm 00022
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
• For study areas having fewer than
6,000 total working loops, the projected
monthly corporate operations expense
per-loop equals $ 36.815¥0.00285 ×
(number of total working loops);
• For study areas having 6,000 or
more total working loops, but less than
17,887 total working loops, the
projected monthly corporate operations
expense per-loop equals $2.615 +
(102,600/number of total working
loops);
• For study areas having total
working loops greater than or equal to
17,887 total working loops, the
projected monthly corporate operations
expense per-loop equals $8.315.
156. The Commission concluded
previously that the amount of corporate
operations expense per-loop that is
supported through our universal service
programs should fall within a range of
reasonableness. Consistent with the
formulae currently in place, we define
this range of reasonableness for each
study area as including levels of
reported corporate operations expense
per-loop up to a maximum of 115
percent of projected level of corporate
operations expense per-loop. Therefore,
each of the above formulae is multiplied
by 115 percent to yield the maximum
allowable monthly per-loop corporate
operations expense as follows:
• For study areas having fewer than
6,000 total working loops, the maximum
allowable monthly corporate operations
expense per-loop equals $42.337 ¥
0.00328 × number of total working
loops;
• For study areas having 6,000 or
more total working loops, but fewer
than 17,887 total working loops, the
maximum allowable monthly corporate
operations expense per-loop equals
$3.007 + (117,990/number of total
working loops);
• For study areas with total working
loops greater than or equal to 17,887
total working loops, the maximum
allowable monthly corporate operations
expense per-loop equals $9.562.
157. Consistent with the existing
rules, we will adjust the monthly perloop limit to reflect the annual change
in GDP–CPI.
4. Reducing High Cost Loop Support for
Artificially Low End-User Rates
158. Discussion. The Commission
now adopts a rule to limit high-cost
support where end-user rates do not
meet a specified local rate floor. This
rule will apply to both rate-of-return
carriers and price cap companies. 47
U.S.C. 254 obligates states to share in
the responsibility of ensuring universal
service. The Commission recognizes
some state commissions may not have
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
examined local rates in many years, and
carriers may lack incentives to pursue a
rate increase when federal universal
service support is available. Based on
evidence in the record, however, there
are a number of carriers with local rates
that are significantly lower than rates
that urban consumers pay. Indeed, there
are local rates paid by customers of
universal service recipients as low as $5
in some areas of the country. For
example, the Commission notes that two
carriers in Iowa and one carrier in
Minnesota offer local residential rates
below $5 per month. The Commission
does not believe that Congress intended
to create a regime in which universal
service subsidizes artificially low local
rates in rural areas when it adopted the
reasonably comparable principle in 47
U.S.C. 254(b); rather, it is clear from the
overall context and structure of the
statute that its purpose is to ensure that
rates in rural areas not be significantly
higher than in urban areas.
159. The Commission focuses here on
the impact of such a rule on rate-ofreturn companies. Data submitted by
NECA summarizing residential R–1
rates for over 600 companies—a broad
cross-section of carriers that typically
receive universal service support—show
that approximately 60 percent of those
study areas have local residential rates
that are below the 2008 national average
local rate of $15.62. Most rates fall
within a five-dollar range of the national
average, but more than one hundred
companies, collectively representing
hundreds of thousands of access lines,
have a basic R–1 rate that is
significantly lower. This appears
consistent with rate data filed by other
commenters.
160. It is inappropriate to provide
federal high-cost support to subsidize
local rates beyond what is necessary to
ensure reasonable comparability. Doing
so places an undue burden on the Fund
and consumers that pay into it.
Specifically, the Commission does not
believe it is equitable for consumers
across the country to subsidize the cost
of service for some consumers that pay
local service rates that are significantly
lower than the national urban average.
161. Based on the foregoing, and as
described below, the Commission will
limit high-cost support where local enduser rates plus state regulated fees
(specifically, state SLCs, state universal
service fees, and mandatory extended
area service charges) do not meet an
urban rate floor representing the
national average of local rates plus such
state regulated fees. Our calculation of
this urban rate floor does not include
federal SLCs, as the purposes of this
rule change are to ensure that states are
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
contributing to support and advance
universal service and that consumers
are not contributing to the Fund to
support customers whose rates are
below a reasonable level.
162. The Commission will phase in
this rate floor in three steps, beginning
with an initial rate floor of $10 for the
period July 1, 2012 through June 30,
2013 and $14 for the period July 1, 2013
through June 30, 2014. Beginning July 1,
2014, and in each subsequent calendar
year, the rate floor will be established
after the Wireline Competition Bureau
completes an updated annual survey of
voice rates. Under this approach, the
Commission will reduce, on a dollar-fordollar basis, HCLS and CAF Phase I
support to the extent that a carrier’s
local rates (plus state regulated fees) do
not meet the urban rate floor.
163. To the extent end-user rates do
not meet the rate floor, USAC will make
appropriate reductions in HCLS
support. This calculation will be
pursuant to a rule that is separate from
the existing rules for calculation of
HCLS, which is subject to an annual
cap. As a consequence, any calculated
reductions will not flow to other carriers
that receive HCLS, but rather will be
used to fund other aspects of the CAF
pursuant to the reforms the Commission
adopts today.
164. This offset does not apply to
ICLS because that mechanism provides
support for interstate rates, not
intrastate end-user rates. Accordingly,
the Commission will revise the rules to
limit a carrier’s high-cost loop support
when its rates do not meet the specified
local urban rate floor.
165. Phasing in this requirement in
three steps will appropriately limit the
impact of the new requirement in a
measured way. Based on the NECA data,
the Commission estimates that there are
only 257,000 access lines in study areas
having local rates less than $10—which
would be affected by the rule change in
the second half of 2012—and there are
827,000 access lines in study areas that
potentially would be affected in 2013.
The Commission assumes, however,
that by 2013 carriers will have taken
necessary steps to mitigate the impact of
the rule change. By adopting a multiyear transition, the Commission seeks to
avoid a flash cut that would
dramatically affect either carriers or the
consumers they serve.
166. In addition, because the
Commission anticipates that the rate
floor for the third year will be set at a
figure close to the sum of $15.62 plus
state regulated fees, the Commission is
confident that $10 and $14 are
conservative levels for the rate floors for
the first two years. $15.62 was the
PO 00000
Frm 00023
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81583
average monthly charge for flat-rate
service in 2008, the most recent year for
which data was available. Under the
definition of ‘‘reasonably comparable,’’
rural rates are reasonably comparable to
urban rates under 47 U.S.C. 254(b) if
they fall within a reasonable range
above the national average. Under this
definition, the Commission could set
the rate floor above the national average
urban rate but within a range considered
reasonable. In the present case, the
Commission is expecting to set the end
point rate floor at the average rate, and
the Commission is setting rate floors
well below the current best estimate of
the average during the multi-year
transition period.
167. Although the high-cost program
is not the primary universal service
program for addressing affordability, the
Commission notes that some
commenters have argued that if rates
increase, service could become
unaffordable for low-income consumers.
However, staff analysis suggests that
this rule change should not
disproportionately affect low-income
consumers, because there is no
correlation between local rates and
average incomes in rate-of-return study
areas—that is, rates are not
systematically lower where consumer
income is lower and higher where
consumer income is higher. The
Commission further notes that the
Commission’s Lifeline and Link Up
program remains available to lowincome consumers regardless of this
rule change.
168. In 2010, 1,048 rate-of-return
study areas received HCLS support.
Using data from the NECA survey filed
pursuant to the Protective Order in this
proceeding and U.S. Census data from
third-party providers, the Commission
analyzed monthly local residential rate
data for 641 of these study areas and
median income data for 618 of those 641
study areas. Based on the 618 study
areas for which the Commission has
both local rate data and median income
data, when the Commission sets one
variable dependent upon the other
(price as a function of income), the
Commission does not observe prices
correlating at all with median income
levels in the given study areas. The
Commission observes a wide range of
prices—many are higher than expected
and just as many are lower than
expected. In fact, some areas with
extremely low residential rates exhibit
higher than average consumer income.
169. To implement these rule
changes, The Commission directs that
all carriers receiving HCLS must report
their basic voice rates and state
regulated fees on an annual basis, so
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81584
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
that necessary support adjustments can
be calculated. In addition, all carriers
receiving frozen high-cost support will
be required to report their basic voice
rates and state regulated fees on an
annual basis. Carriers will be required to
report their rates to USAC, as set forth
more fully below. As noted above, the
Commission has delegated authority to
the Wireline Competition Bureau and
the Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau to take all necessary steps to
develop an annual rate survey for voice
services. The Commission expects this
annual survey to be implemented as
part of the annual survey described
above in the section discussing public
interest obligations for voice telephony.
The Commission expects the initial
annual rate survey will be completed
prior to the implementation of the third
step of the transition.
170. Finally, the Commission notes
that the Rural Associations contend that
a benchmark approach for voice services
fails to address rate comparability for
broadband services. Although the
Commission addresses only voice
services here, elsewhere in this R&O the
Commission addresses reasonable
comparability in rates for broadband
services. The Commission believes that
it is critical to reduce support for
voice—the supported service—where
rates are artificially low. Doing so will
relieve strain on the USF and, thus,
greatly assist the efforts in bringing
about the overall transformation of the
high-cost program into the CAF.
5. Safety Net Additive
171. Discussion. The Commission
concludes the safety net additive is not
designed effectively to encourage
additional significant investment in
telecommunications plant, and therefore
eliminate the rule immediately. The
Commission grandfathers existing
recipients and begin phasing out their
support in 2012.
172. Several commenters suggest that
rather than eliminate the safety net
additive, the Commission revises the
rule to base qualification on the total
year-over-year changes in TPIS, rather
than on per-line change in TPIS. The
Commission declines to adopt this
suggestion, and the Commission
concludes instead that it should phase
out safety net additive rather than
modify how it operates. While revising
the rule as some commenters suggested
would address one deficiency with
safety net additive support, doing so
would not address the overarching
concern that safety net additive as a
whole does not provide the right
incentives for investment in modern
communications networks. It does not
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
ensure that investment is reasonable or
cost-efficient, nor does it ensure that
investment is targeted to areas that
would not be served absent support. For
example, even if the Commission
changed the rule as proposed, safety net
additive could continue to allow
incumbent LECs to get additional
support if, for instance, they choose to
build fiber-to-the-home on an
accelerated basis in an area that is also
served by an unsubsidized cable
competitor. That said, the Commission
does modify the proposed phase out of
safety net additive based on the record.
173. The Commission concludes that
beneficiaries of safety net additive
whose total TPIS increased by more
than 14 percent over the prior year at
the time of their initial qualification
should continue to receive such support
for the remainder of their eligibility
period, consistent with the original
intent of the rule. For the remaining
beneficiaries of safety net, the
Commission finds that such support
should be phased down in 2012 because
such support is not being paid on the
basis of significant investment in
telecommunications plant. Specifically,
for the latter group of beneficiaries, the
safety net additive will be reduced 50
percent in 2012, and eliminated in 2013.
The Commission does not provide any
new safety net support for costs
incurred after 2009.
6. Local Switching Support
174. Discussion. The Commission
agrees with the Rural Associations that
reforms to LSS should be integrated
with reforms to ICC and the
accompanying creation of a CAF to
provide measured replacement of lost
intercarrier revenues. The Commission
continues to believe that the rationale
for LSS has weakened with the advent
of cheaper, more scalable switches and
routers. The Commission also agrees
with the Ad Hoc Telecommunications
Users Committee that the LSS funding
mechanism provides a disincentive for
those carriers owning multiple study
areas in the same state to combine those
study areas, potentially resulting in
inefficient, costly deployment of
resources. Further, because qualification
is solely based on the number of lines
in the study area, LSS does not
appropriately target funding to high-cost
areas, nor does it target funding to areas
that are unserved with broadband.
175. At the same time, the
Commission recognizes that today many
small companies recover a portion of
the costs of their switching investment,
both for circuit switches and recently
purchased soft switches, through LSS.
LSS is a form of explicit recovery for
PO 00000
Frm 00024
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
switching investment that otherwise
would be recovered through intrastate
access charges or end user rates. As
such, any reductions in LSS would
result in a revenue requirement flowing
back to the state jurisdiction.
176. For all of these reasons, the
Commission concludes that it is time to
end LSS as a stand-alone universal
service support mechanism, but that, as
discussed in more detail in the ICC
section of this R&O, limited recovery of
the costs previously covered by LSS
should be available pursuant to the ICC
reform and the accompanying creation
of an ICC recovery mechanism through
the CAF. Effective July 1, 2012 the
Commission will eliminate LSS as a
separate support mechanism. In order to
simplify the transition of LSS, beginning
January 1, 2012 and until June 30, 2012,
LSS payments to each eligible
incumbent LEC shall be frozen at 2011
support levels subject to true-up based
on 2011 operating results. To the extent
that the elimination of LSS support
affects incumbent LECs interstate
switched access revenue requirement,
the Commission addresses that issue in
the ICC context.
7. Other High-Cost Rule Changes
a. Adjusted High Cost Loop Cap for
2012
177. Discussion. NECA projects that
the high-cost loop cap will be $858
million for all rural incumbent LECs for
2012, which is $48 million less than the
$906 million projected to be disbursed
in 2011. Due to the elimination of HCLS
for price cap companies as discussed
above, the Commission is lowering the
HCLS cap for 2012 by the amount of
HCLS support price cap carriers would
have received for 2012. The
Commission resets the 2012 high-cost
loop cap to the level that remaining rateof-return carriers are projected to
receive in 2012. Although price cap
holding companies currently receive
HCLS in a few rate-of- return study
areas, as a result of the rule changes
discussed above, all of their remaining
rate-of-return support will be
distributed through a new transitional
CAF program, rather than existing
mechanisms like HCLS. Accordingly,
NECA is required to re-calculate the
HCLS cap for 2012 after deducting all
HCLS that price cap carriers and their
affiliated rate-of-return study areas
would have received for 2012. NECA is
required to submit to the Wireline
Bureau the revised 2012 HCLS cap
within 30 days of the release of this
R&O. NECA shall provide to the
Wireline Bureau all calculations and
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
assumptions used in re-calculating the
HCLS cap.
b. Study Area Waivers
i. Standards for Review
178. Discussion. The Commission
concludes that the one-percent
guideline is no longer an appropriate
guideline to evaluate whether a study
area waiver would result in an adverse
effect on the fund and, therefore,
eliminate the one-percent guideline in
evaluating petitions for study area
waiver. Therefore, on a prospective
basis, the standards for evaluating
petitions for study area waiver are: (1)
The state commission having regulatory
authority over the transferred exchanges
does not object to the transfer and (2)
the transfer must be in the public
interest. As proposed in the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM, the evaluation
of the public interest benefits of a
proposed study area waiver will
include: (1) the number of lines at issue;
(2) the projected universal service fund
cost per line; and (3) whether such a
grant would result in consolidation of
study areas that facilitates reductions in
cost by taking advantage of the
economies of scale, i.e., reduction in
cost per line due to the increased
number of lines. The Commission
stresses that these guidelines are only
guidelines and not rigid measures for
evaluating a petition for study area
waiver. The Commission believes that
this streamlined process will provide
greater regulatory certainty and a more
certain timetable for carriers seeking to
invest in additional exchanges.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
ii. Streamlining the Study Area Waiver
Process
179. Discussion. To more efficiently
and effectively process petitions for
waiver of the study area freeze, the
Commission adopts the proposal to
streamline the study are waiver process.
Upon receipt of a petition for study area
waiver, a public notice shall be issued
seeking comment on the petition. As is
the usual practice, comments and reply
comments will be due within 30 and 45
days, respectively, after release of the
public notice. Absent any further action
by the Bureau, the waiver will be
deemed granted on the 60th day after
the reply comment due date.
Additionally, any study area waiver
related waiver requests that petitioners
routinely include in petitions for study
area waiver and the Commission
routinely grants—such as requests for
waiver of 47 CFR 69.3(e)(11) (to include
any acquired lines in the NECA pool)
and 69.605(c) (to remain an average
schedule company after an acquisition
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
of exchanges)—will also be deemed
granted on the 60th day after the reply
comment due date absent any further
action by the Bureau. Should the Bureau
have concerns with any aspect of the
petition for study area waiver or related
waivers, however, the Bureau may issue
a second public notice stating that the
petition will not be deemed granted on
the 60th day after the reply comment
due date and is subject to further
analysis and review.
c. Revising the ‘‘Parent Trap’’ Rule,
Section 54.305
180. Discussion. The Commission
finds that the proposed minor revision
to the rule will better effectuate the
intent of 47 CFR 54.305 that incumbent
LECs not purchase exchanges merely to
increase their high-cost universal
service support and should not dissuade
any transactions that are in the public
interest. Therefore, effective January 1,
2012, any incumbent LEC currently and
prospectively subject to the provisions
of 47 CFR 54.305, that would otherwise
receive no support or lesser support
based on the actual costs of the study
area, will receive the lesser of the
support pursuant to 47 CFR 54.305 or
the support based on its own costs.
181. The Commission notes that
above, the Commission freezes all
support under the existing high-cost
support mechanisms on a study area
basis for price cap carriers and their
rate-of-return affiliates, at 2011 levels,
effective January 1, 2012. The
modification of the operation of 47 CFR
54.305 is not intended to reduce support
levels for those companies; they will
receive frozen high-cost support equal
to the amount of support each carrier
received in 2011 in a given study area,
adjusted downward as necessary to the
extent local rates are below the specified
urban rate floor.
8. Limits on Total per Line High-Cost
Support
182. Discussion. After consideration
of the record, the Commission finds it
appropriate to implement responsible
fiscal limits on universal service
support by immediately imposing a
presumptive per-line cap on universal
service support for all carriers,
regardless of whether they are
incumbents or competitive ETCs. For
administrative reasons, the Commission
finds that the cap shall be implemented
based on a $250 per-line monthly basis
rather than a $3,000 per-line annual
basis because USAC disburses support
on a monthly basis, not on an annual
basis. The Commission finds that
support drawn from limited public
funds in excess of $250 per-line
PO 00000
Frm 00025
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81585
monthly (not including any new CAF
support resulting from ICC reform)
should not be provided without further
justification.
183. This rule change will be phased
in over three years to ease the potential
impact of this transition. From July 1,
2012 through June 30, 2013, carriers
shall receive no more than $250 per-line
monthly plus two-thirds of the
difference between their uncapped perline amount and $250. From July 1,
2013 through June 30, 2014, carriers
shall receive no more than $250 per-line
monthly plus one-third of the difference
between their uncapped per-line
amount and $250. July 1, 2014, carriers
shall receive no more than $250 per-line
monthly.
184. The Rural Associations argue
that a cap on total annual per-line highcost support should not be imposed
without considering individual
circumstances and that if such a cap is
imposed only on non-tribal companies
located in the contiguous 48 states,
about 12,000 customers would
experience rate increases of $9.24 to
$1,200 per month and the overall effect
would reduce high-cost disbursements
by less than $15 million. The Rural
Associations also point out while that it
is reasonable to ask whether it makes
sense for USF to support extremely high
per-line levels going forward, the
Commission must consider the
consequences of imposing such a limit
on companies with high costs based on
past investments.
185. The Commission emphasizes that
virtually all (99 percent) of incumbent
LEC study areas currently receiving
support are under the $250 per-line
monthly limit. Only eighteen incumbent
carriers and one competitive ETC today
receive support in excess of $250 perline monthly, and as a result of the other
reforms described above, the
Commission estimates that only twelve
will continue to receive support in
excess of $250 per-line monthly.
186. The Commission also recognizes
that there may be legitimate reasons
why certain companies have extremely
high support amounts per line. For
example, some of these extremely highcost study areas exist because states
sought to ensure a provider would serve
a remote area. The Commission
estimates that the cap the Commission
adopts today will affect companies
serving approximately 5,000 customers,
many of whom live in extremely remote
and high-cost service territories. That is,
all of the affected study areas total just
5,000 customers. Therefore, as suggested
by the Rural Associations, the
Commission will consider individual
circumstances when applying the $250
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81586
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
per-line monthly cap. Any carrier
affected by the $250 per-line monthly
cap may file a petition for waiver or
adjustment of the cap that would
include additional financial data,
information, and justification for
support in excess of the cap using the
process set forth below. The
Commission does not anticipate
granting any waivers of undefined
duration, but rather would expect
carriers to periodically re-validate any
need for support above the cap. The
Commission also notes that even if a
carrier can demonstrate the need for
funding above the $250 per-line
monthly cap, they are only entitled to
the amount above the cap they can show
is necessary, not the amount they were
previously receiving.
187. Absent a waiver or adjustment of
the $250 per-line monthly cap, USAC
shall commence reductions of the
affected carrier’s support to $250 perline monthly six months after the
effective date of these rules. This six
month delay should provide an
opportunity for companies to make
operational changes, engage in
discussions with their current lenders,
and bring any unique circumstances to
the Commission’s attention through the
waiver process. To reach the $250 perline cap, USAC shall reduce support
provided from each universal support
mechanism, with the exception of LSS,
based on the relative amounts received
from each mechanism.
9. Elimination of Support in Areas With
100 Percent Overlap
188. Discussion. Providing universal
service support in areas of the country
where another voice and broadband
provider is offering high-quality service
without government assistance is an
inefficient use of limited universal
service funds. The Commission agrees
with commenters that ‘‘USF support
should be directed to areas where
providers would not deploy and
maintain network facilities absent a USF
subsidy, and not in areas where
unsubsidized facilities-based providers
already are competing for customers.’’
For this reason, the Commission
excludes from the CAF areas that are
overlapped by an unsubsidized
competitor (see infra Section VII.C).
Likewise, the Commission does not
intend to continue to provide current
levels of high-cost support to rate-ofreturn companies where there is overlap
with one or more unsubsidized
competitors.
189. At the same time, the
Commission recognizes that there are
instances where an unsubsidized
competitor offers broadband and voice
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
service to a significant percentage of the
customers in a particular study area
(typically where customers are
concentrated in a town or other higher
density sub-area), but not to the
remaining customers in the rest of the
study area, and that continued support
may be required to enable the
availability of supported voice services
to those remaining customers. In those
cases, the Commission agrees with the
Rural Associations that there should be
a process to determine appropriate
support levels.
190. Accordingly, the Commission
adopts a rule to phase out all high-cost
support received by incumbent rate-ofreturn carriers over three years in study
areas where an unsubsidized
competitor—or a combination of
unsubsidized competitors—offers voice
and broadband service at speeds of at
least 4 Mbps downstream/1 Mbps
upstream, and with latency and usage
limits that meet the broadband
performance requirements described
above, for 100 percent of the residential
and business locations in the
incumbent’s study area.
191. The USF/ICC Transformation
FNPRM seeks comment on the
methodology and data for determining
overlap. Upon receiving a record on
those issues, the Commission directs the
Wireline Competition Bureau to publish
a finalized methodology for determining
areas of overlap and to publish a list of
companies for which there is a 100
percent overlap. In study areas where
there is 100 percent overlap, the
Commission will freeze the incumbent’s
high-cost support at its total 2010
support, or an amount equal to $3,000
times the number of reported lines as of
year end 2010, whichever is lower, and
reduce such support over three years
(i.e. by 33 percent each year). For this
purpose, ‘‘total 2010 support’’ is the
amount of support disbursed to carrier
for 2010, without regard to prior period
adjustments related to years other than
2010 and as determined by USAC on
January 31, 2011. In addition, in the
USF/ICC Transformation FNPRM, the
Commission seeks comment on a
process for determining support in
study areas with less than 100 percent
overlap.
10. Impact of These Reforms on Rate-ofReturn Carriers and the Communities
They Serve
192. The Commission agrees with the
Rural Associations that ‘‘there is * * *
without question a need to modify
certain of the existing universal service
mechanism to enhance performance and
improve sustainability.’’ The
Commission takes a number of
PO 00000
Frm 00026
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
important steps to do so in this R&O,
and the Commission is careful to
implement these changes in a gradual
manner so that the efforts do not
jeopardize service to consumers or
investments made consistent with
existing rules. It is essential that the
Commission ensures the continued
availability and affordability of offerings
in the rural and remote communities
served by many rate-of-return carriers.
The existing regulatory structure and
competitive trends have placed many
small carriers under financial strain and
inhibited the ability of providers to raise
capital.
193. The Commission reaffirms its
commitment to these communities. The
Commission provides rate-of-return
carriers the predictability of remaining
under the legacy universal service
system in the near-term, while giving
notice that the Commission intends to
transition to more incentive-based
regulation in the near future. The
Commission also provides greater
certainty and a more predictable flow of
revenues than the status quo through
the intercarrier compensation reforms,
and set a total budget to direct up to $2
billion in annual universal service
(including CAF associated with
intercarrier compensation reform)
payments to areas served by rate-ofreturn carriers. The Commission
believes that this global approach will
provide a more stable base going
forward for these carriers, and the
communities they serve.
194. Today’s package of universal
service reforms is targeted at eliminating
inefficiencies and closing gaps in the
system, not at making indiscriminate
industry-wide reductions. Many of the
rules addressed today have not been
comprehensively examined in more
than a decade, and direct funding in
ways that may no longer make sense in
today’s marketplace. By providing an
opportunity for a stable 11.25 percent
interstate return for rate-of-return
companies, regardless of the necessity
or prudence of any given investment,
the current system imposes no practical
limits on the type or extent of network
upgrades or investment. Our system
provides universal service support to
both a well-run company operating as
efficiently as possible, and a company
with high costs due to imprudent
investment decisions, unwarranted
corporate overhead, or an inefficient
operating structure.
195. In this R&O, the Commission
takes the overdue steps necessary to
address the misaligned incentives in the
current system by correcting program
design flaws, extending successful
safeguards, ensuring basic fiscal
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
responsibility, and closing loopholes to
ensure the rules reward only prudent
and efficient investment in modern
networks. Today’s reforms will help
ensure rate-of-return carriers retain the
incentive and ability to invest and
operate modern networks capable of
delivering broadband as well as voice
services, while eliminating unnecessary
spending that unnecessarily limits
funding that is available to consumers
in high-cost, unserved communities.
196. Because the approach is focused
on rooting out inefficiencies, these
reforms will not affect all carriers in the
same manner or in the same magnitude.
After significant analysis, including
review of numerous cost studies
submitted by individual small
companies and cost consultants, NECA
and USAC data, and aggregated
information provided by the RUS on
their current loan portfolio, the
Commission is confident that these
incremental reforms will not endanger
existing service to consumers. Further,
the Commission believes strongly that
carriers that invest and operate in a
prudent manner will be minimally
affected by this R&O.
197. Indeed, based on calendar year
2010 support levels, the analysis shows
that nearly 9 out of 10 rate-of-return
carriers will see reductions in high-cost
universal service receipts of less than 20
percent annually, and approximately 7
out of 10 will see reductions of less than
10 percent. In fact, almost 34 percent of
rate-of-return carriers will see no
reductions whatsoever, and more than
12 percent of providers will see an
increase in high-cost universal service
receipts. This, coupled with a stabilized
path for ICC, will provide the
predictability and certainty needed for
new investment.
198. Looking more broadly at all
revenues, the Commission believes that
the overall regulatory and revenue
predictability and certainty for rate-ofreturn carriers under today’s reforms
will help facilitate access to capital and
efficient network investment.
Specifically, it is critical to underscore
that legacy high-cost support is but one
of four main sources of revenues for
rate-of-return providers: universal
service revenues account for
approximately 30 percent of the typical
rate-of-return carrier’s total revenues.
Today’s action does not alter a
provider’s ability to collect regulated or
unregulated end-user revenues, and
comprehensively reforms the fourth
main source of revenues, the intercarrier
compensation system. Importantly, ICC
reforms will provide rate-of-return
carriers with access to a new explicit
recovery mechanism in CAF, offering a
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
source of stable and certain revenues
that the current intercarrier system can
no longer provide. Taking into account
these other revenue streams, and the
complete package of reforms, the
Commission believes that rate-of-return
carriers on the whole will have a
stronger and more certain foundation
from which to operate, and, therefore,
continue to serve rural parts of America.
199. The Commission is, therefore,
equally confident that these reforms,
while ensuring significant overall cost
savings and improving incentives for
rational investment and operation by
rate-of-return carriers, will in general
not materially impact the ability of these
carriers to service their existing debt.
Based on an analysis of the reform
proposals in the Notice, RUS projects
that the Times Interest Earned Ratio
(TIER) for some borrowers could fall
below 1.0, which RUS considers a
minimum baseline level for a healthy
borrower. However, the package of
reforms adopted in this R&O is more
modest than the set proposed in the
Notice. In addition, companies may still
have positive cash flow and be able to
service their debt even with TIERs of
less than 1.0. Indeed of the 444 RUS
borrowers in 2010, 75 (17 percent) were
below TIER 1.0. Moreover, whereas RUS
assumed that all USF reductions
directly impact borrowers’ bottom lines,
in fact the Commission expects many
borrowers affected by the reforms will
be able to achieve operational
efficiencies to reduce operating
expenses, for instance, by sharing
administrative or operating functions
with other carriers, and thereby offset
reductions in universal service support.
200. The Commission, therefore,
rejects the sweeping argument that the
rule changes the Commission adopts
today would unlawfully necessarily
affect a taking. Commenters seem to
suggest that they are entitled to
continued USF support as a matter of
right. Precedent makes clear, however,
that carriers have no vested property
interest in USF. To recognize a property
interest, carriers must ‘‘have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to’’ USF support.
Such entitlement would not be
established by the Constitution, but by
independent sources of law. 47 U.S.C.
254 does not expressly or impliedly
provide that particular companies are
entitled to ongoing USF support.
Indeed, there is no statutory provision
or Commission rule that provides
companies with a vested right to
continued receipt of support at current
levels, and the Commission is not aware
of any other, independent source of law
that gives particular companies an
entitlement to ongoing USF support.
PO 00000
Frm 00027
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81587
Carriers, therefore, have no property
interest in or right to continued USF
support.
201. Additionally, carriers have not
shown that elimination of USF support
will result in confiscatory end-user
rates. To be confiscatory, governmentregulated rates must be so low that they
threaten a regulated entity’s ‘‘financial
integrity’’ or ‘‘destroy the value’’ of the
company’s property. Carriers face a
‘‘heavy burden’’ in proving confiscation
as a result of rate regulation. To the
extent that any rate-of-return carrier can
effectively demonstrate that it needs
additional support to avoid
constitutionally confiscatory rates, the
Commission will consider a waiver
request for additional support. The
Commission will seek the assistance of
the relevant state commission in review
of such a waiver to the extent that the
state commission wishes to provide
insight based on its understanding of
the carrier’s activities and other
circumstances in the state. The
Commission does not expect to
routinely grant requests for additional
support, but this safeguard is in place to
help protect the communities served by
rate-of-return carriers.
D. Rationalizing Support for Mobility
202. Mobile voice and mobile
broadband services are increasingly
important to consumers and to our
nation’s economy. Given the important
benefits of and the strong consumer
demand for mobile services, ubiquitous
mobile coverage must be a national
priority. Yet despite growth in annual
funding for competitive ETCs of almost
1000 percent over the past decade, there
remain many areas of the country where
people live, work, and travel that lack
any mobile voice coverage, and still
larger geographic areas that lack current
generation mobile broadband coverage.
To increase the availability of current
generation mobile broadband, as well as
mobile voice, across the country,
universal service funding for mobile
networks must be deployed in a more
targeted and efficient fashion than it is
today.
203. With the R&O, the Commission
adopts reforms that will secure funding
for mobility directly, rather than as a
side-effect of the competitive ETC
system, while rationalizing how
universal service funding is provided to
ensure that it is cost-effective and
targeted to areas that require public
funding to receive the benefits of
mobility.
204. To accomplish the universal
service goal of ubiquitous availability of
mobile services, the Commission
establishes the Mobility Fund. The first
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81588
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
phase of the Mobility Fund will provide
one-time support through a reverse
auction, with a total budget of $300
million, and will provide the
Commission with experience in running
reverse auctions for universal service
support. The Commission expects to
distribute this support as quickly as
feasible, with the goal of holding an
auction in 2012, with support beginning
to flow no later than 2013. As part of
this first phase, the Commission also
designates an additional $50 million for
one-time support for advanced mobile
services on Tribal lands, for which the
Commission expects to hold an auction
in 2013. The second phase of the
Mobility Fund will provide ongoing
support for mobile service with the goal
of holding the auction in the third
quarter of 2013 and support disbursed
starting in 2014, with an annual budget
of $500 million. This dedicated support
for mobile service supplements the
other competitive bidding mechanisms
under the CAF.
1. Mobility Fund Phase I
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
a. Overall Design of Mobility Fund
Phase I
i. Legal Authority
205. In other parts of the R&O, the
Commission discussed its authority to
provide universal service funding to
support the provision of voice
telephony services. The Commission
explained that, pursuant to its statutory
authority, it may require that universal
service support be used to ensure the
deployment of broadband networks
capable of offering not only voice
telephony services, but also advanced
telecommunications and information
services, to all areas of the nation, as
contemplated by the principles set forth
in 47 U.S.C. 254(b). In this section of the
R&O, the Commission applies the legal
analysis of its statutory authority to the
establishment of Phase I and II of the
Mobility Fund.
206. As an initial matter, it is wholly
apparent that mobile wireless providers
offer ‘‘voice telephony services’’ and
thus offer services for which federal
universal support is available.
Furthermore, wireless providers have
long been designated as ETCs eligible to
receive universal service support.
Nonetheless, a number of parties
responding to the Mobility Fund NPRM,
75 FR 67060, November 1, 2010,
question the Commission’s authority to
establish the Mobility Fund as described
below. The Commission rejects those
arguments.
207. First, the Commission rejects the
argument that it may not support mobile
networks that offer services other than
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
the services designated for support
under 47 U.S.C. 254. Under its
longstanding ‘‘no barriers’’ policy, the
Commission allows carriers receiving
high-cost support ‘‘to invest in
infrastructure capable of providing
access to advanced services’’ as well as
supported voice services. Moreover, 47
U.S.C. 254(e)’s reference to ‘‘facilities’’
and ‘‘services’’ as distinct items for
which federal universal service funds
may be used demonstrates that the
federal interest in universal service
extends not only to supported services,
but also the nature of the facilities over
which they are offered. Specifically, the
Commission has an interest in
promoting the deployment of the types
of facilities that will best achieve the
principles set forth in 47 U.S.C. 254(b)
(and any other universal service
principle that the Commission may
adopt under 47 U.S.C. 254(b)(7)),
including the principle that universal
service program be designed to bring
advanced telecommunications and
information services to all Americans, at
rates and terms that are comparable to
the rates and terms enjoyed in urban
areas. Those interests are equally strong
in the wireless arena. The Commission
thus concludes that USF support may be
provided to networks, including 3G and
4G wireless services networks, that are
capable of providing additional services
beyond supported voice services.
208. For similar reasons, the
Commission rejects arguments made by
MetroPCS, NASUCA, and US Cellular
that the Mobility Fund would
impermissibly support an ‘‘information
service;’’ by Free Press and the Florida
Commission that establishment of the
Mobility Fund would violate 47 U.S.C.
254 because mobile data service is not
a supported service; and by various
parties that 47 U.S.C. 254(c)(1) prohibits
funding for services to which a
substantial majority of residential
customers do not subscribe. All of these
arguments incorrectly assume that the
Mobility Fund will be used to support
mobile data service as a supported
service in its own right. To the contrary,
the Mobility Fund will be used to
support the provision of ‘‘voice
telephony service’’ and the underlying
mobile network. That the network will
also be used to provide information
services to consumers does not make the
network ineligible to receive support; to
the contrary, such use directly advances
the policy goals set forth in 47 U.S.C.
254(b), the new universal service
principle recommended by the Joint
Board, as well as 47 U.S.C. 1302.
209. The Commission also rejects the
argument that the Mobility Fund
violates the principle in 47 U.S.C.
PO 00000
Frm 00028
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
254(b)(5) that ‘‘[t]here should be
specific, predictable and sufficient
Federal and State mechanisms to
preserve and advance universal
service.’’ The Commission disagrees
with commenters argue that nonrecurring funding won in a reverse
auction is not ‘‘predictable’’ because the
final amount of support is not known in
advance of the bidding or ‘‘sufficient’’
because non-recurring funding will not
meet recurring costs. The terms
‘‘predictable’’ and ‘‘sufficient’’ modify
‘‘Federal and State mechanisms.’’
Reverse auction rules establish a
predictable mechanism to support
universal service in that the carrier
receiving support has notice of its rights
and obligations before it undertakes to
fulfill its universal service obligations.
Moreover, this interpretation of the
statute was upheld by the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Alenco Communications v.
FCC, 201 F.3d 608 (5th Cir 2000).
210. The mechanism adopted in the
R&O is also ‘‘sufficient.’’ The auction
process is effectively a self-selecting
mechanism: Bidders are presumed to
understand that Mobility Fund Phase I
will provide one-time support, that
bidders will face recurring costs when
providing service, and that they must
tailor their bid amounts accordingly.
The Commission declines to interpret
the ‘‘sufficiency’’ requirement so
broadly as to require it to guarantee that
carriers who receive support make the
correct business judgments in deciding
how to structure their bids or their
service offerings to consumers.
211. The Commission also disagrees
with Cellular South’s contention that
‘‘by collecting USF contributions from
all ETCs and awarding distributions to
only a limited set of ETCs, support
auctions would transform the Fund into
an unconstitutional tax.’’ As the
Supreme Court explained in United
States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385,
398 (1990), ‘‘a statute that creates a
particular governmental program and
that raises revenue to support that
program, as opposed to a statute that
raises revenue to support Government
generally, is not a ‘Bil[l] for raising
Revenue’ within the meaning of the
Origination Clause.’’ This analysis
clearly applies to the sections of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996
authorizing the Universal Service Fund,
including the Mobility Fund. Moreover,
the Commission concludes that the Fifth
Circuit’s analysis of this issue in Texas
Office of Public Utility Counsel et al v.
FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 428 (5th Cir. 1999),
with respect to paging carriers applies
equally to all carriers. As that court
explained: ‘‘universal service
contributions are part of a particular
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
program supporting the expansion of,
and increased access to, the public
institutional telecommunications
network. Each paging carrier directly
benefits from a larger and larger network
and, with that in mind, Congress
designed the universal service scheme
to exact payments from those companies
benefiting from the provision of
universal service.’’ Finally, there is
always likely to be a disparity between
the contributions parties make to the
USF and the amounts that they receive
from the USF. Indeed, 47 U.S.C. 254(d)
requires contributions from ‘‘every
telecommunications carrier that
provides interstate telecommunications
services,’’ not just ETCs or funding
recipients.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
ii. Size of Mobility Fund Phase I
212. The Commission concludes that
$300 million is an appropriate amount
for one-time Mobility Fund Phase I
support, and is consistent with the goal
of swiftly extending current generation
wireless coverage in areas where it is
cost effective to do so with one-time
support. The Commission believes that
there are unserved areas for which such
support will be useful, and that
competition among wireless carriers for
support to serve these areas will be
sufficient to ensure that the available
funds are distributed efficiently and
effectively. The Commission concludes
that a one-time infusion of $300 million
should be sufficient to enable the
deployment of 3G or better mobile
broadband to many of the areas where
such services are unavailable, while at
the same time ensuring adequate
universal service monies are available
for other priorities, including broader
reform initiatives to address ongoing
support.
iii. Basic Structure for Mobility Fund
Phase I
213. The Commission declines to
adopt the structure of the current
competitive ETC rules, which provide
support for multiple providers in an
area. That structure has led to
duplicative investment by multiple
competitive ETCs in certain areas at the
expense of investment that could be
directed elsewhere, including areas that
are not currently served. Therefore, as a
general matter, the Commission should
not award Mobility Fund Phase I
support to more than one provider per
area unless doing so would increase the
number of units (road miles) served, as
is possible with partially overlapping
bids. Priority in awarding USF support
should be to expand service; permitting
multiple winners as a routine matter in
any geographic area to serve the same
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
pool of customers would drain Mobility
Fund resources with limited
corresponding benefits to consumers. In
certain limited circumstances, however,
the most efficient use of resources may
result in small overlaps in supported
service. Thus, the Commission delegates
to the Bureaus, as part of the auctions
procedures process, the question of the
circumstances, if any, in which to allow
overlaps in supported service to permit
the widest possible coverage given the
overall budget.
214. While 47 U.S.C. 214(e) allows the
states to designate more than one
provider as an eligible
telecommunications provider in any
given area, nothing in the statute
compels the states (or this Commission)
to do so; rather, the states (and this
Commission) must determine whether
that is in the public interest. Likewise,
nothing in the statute compels that
every party eligible for support actually
receive it.
215. In the past, the Commission
concluded that universal service
subsidies should be portable, and
allowed multiple competitive ETCs to
receive support in a given geographic
area. Based on the experience of a
decade, however, this prior policy of
supporting multiple networks may not
be the most effective way of achieving
universal service. In this case, the
Commission chooses not to subsidize
competition through universal service
in areas that are challenging for even
one provider to serve. Given that
Mobility Fund Phase I seeks to expand
the availability of current and next
generation services, it will be used to
offer services where no provider
currently offers such service. The public
interest is best served by maximizing
the expansion of networks into
currently unserved communities given
the available budget, which will
generally result in providing support to
no more than one provider in a given
area.
216. Participation in Mobility Fund
Phase I, however, is conditioned on
collocation and data roaming
obligations designed to minimize
anticompetitive behavior. Recipients
must also provide services with
Mobility Fund Phase I support at
reasonably comparable rates. These
obligations should help address the
concerns of those that argue for
continued support of multiple providers
in a particular geographic area and
further the goal to ensure the widest
possible reach of Phase I of the Mobility
Fund.
PO 00000
Frm 00029
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81589
iv. Auction To Determine Awards of
Support
217. The goal of Mobility Fund Phase
I is to extend the availability of mobile
voice service on networks that provide
3G or better performance and to
accelerate the deployment of 4G
wireless networks in areas where it is
cost effective to do so with one-time
support. The purpose of the mechanism
the Commission chooses is to identify
those areas where additional investment
can make as large a difference as
possible in improving currentgeneration mobile wireless coverage.
The Commission adopts a reverse
auction format because it believes such
a format is the best available tool for
identifying such areas—and associated
support amounts—in a transparent,
simple, speedy, and effective way. In
such a reverse auction, bidders are
asked to indicate the amount of onetime support they would require to
achieve the defined performance
standards for specified numbers of units
in given unserved areas. A reverse
auction is the best way to achieve the
Commission’s overall objective of
maximizing consumer benefits given the
available funds.
218. Objections to using a competitive
bidding mechanism largely challenge or
misunderstand the goals of the instant
proposal. Mobility Fund Phase I is
focused solely on identifying recipients
that can extend coverage with one-time
support. Phase I has a limited and
targeted purpose and is not intended to
ensure that the highest cost areas
receive support. Those issues are
addressed separately in the sections of
the R&O discussing Mobility Fund
Phase II and other aspects of CAF, as
well as in the USF/ICC Transformation
FNPRM.
219. Others contend that funding will
be directed to areas that will be built out
with private investment even without
support. The goal in establishing the
Mobility Fund, however, is to provide
the necessary ‘‘jump start’’ to accelerate
service to areas where it is cost effective
to do so. The Commission will also
exclude from auction those areas where
a provider has made a regulatory
commitment to provide 3G or better
wireless service, or has received a
funding commitment from a federal
executive department or agency in
response to the carrier’s commitment to
provide 3G or better service. Taken
together, these measures provide
sufficient safeguards to exclude funding
for areas that would otherwise be built
with private investment in the near
term.
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81590
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
220. Delegation of Authority. The
Commission delegates to the Bureaus
authority to administer the policies,
programs, rules and procedures to
implement Mobility Fund Phase I. In
addition to the specific tasks noted
elsewhere in the R&O, such as
identifying areas eligible for Mobility
Fund support and the number of units
associated with each, this delegation
includes all authority necessary to
conduct a Mobility Fund Phase I
auction and conduct program
administration and oversight consistent
with the policies and rules adopted in
the R&O.
v. Identifying Unserved Areas Eligible
for Support
(a) Using Census Blocks To Identify
Unserved Areas
221. The Commission will identify
areas eligible for Mobility Fund Phase I
support at the census block level. Such
a granular review will allow the
Commission to identify unserved areas
with greater accuracy than if it used
larger areas. Although census blocks,
particularly in rural areas, may include
both served and unserved areas, it is not
feasible to identify unserved areas on a
more granular level for Mobility Fund
Phase I, since as noted, census blocks
are the smallest unit for which the
Census Bureau provides data.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
(b) Identifying Unserved Census Blocks
(i) Using American Roamer Data
222. American Roamer data is the best
available choice at this time for
determining wireless service at the
census-block level. American Roamer
data is recognized as the industry
standard for the presence of service,
although commenters note that the data
may not be comprehensive and accurate
in all cases. The Bureaus will exercise
their delegated authority to use the most
recent American Roamer data available
in advance of a Phase I auction in 2012.
In so doing, they should use the data to
determine the geographic coverage of
networks using EV–DO, EV–DO Rev A,
UMTS/HSPA, or better technologies. In
identifying unserved census blocks, the
Commission will exclude census blocks
that are served by 3G or better service.
Better than 3G service would include
any 4G technologies, including, for
example, HSPA+ or LTE.
223. Some commenters to the Mobility
Fund NPRM observe that American
Roamer data relies on reporting by
existing providers and therefore may
tend to over-report the extent of existing
coverage. While the Commission
intends to be as accurate as possible in
determining the extent of coverage,
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
perfect information is not available, and
the Commission knows of no data
source that is more reliable than
American Roamer, nor does the record
reflect any other viable options.
224. Several commenters note that the
potential for error is unavoidable and
therefore advocate that some provision
be made for outside parties to appeal or
initiate a review of the initial coverage
determination for a particular area. The
Commission will, within a limited
timeframe only, entertain challenges to
its determinations regarding unserved
geographic areas for purposes of
Mobility Fund Phase I. Specifically, the
Commission will make public a list of
unserved areas as part of the pre-auction
process and afford parties a reasonable
opportunity to respond by
demonstrating that specific areas
identified as unserved are actually
served and/or that additional unserved
areas should be included. The
Commission’s goal is to accelerate
expanded availability of mobile voice
service over current-generation or better
networks by providing one-time support
from a limited source of funds, and any
more extended pre-auction review
process might risk undue delay in
making any support available. Providing
for post-auction challenges would
similarly inject uncertainty and delay
into the process. It is important to
provide finality prior to the auction
with respect to the specific unserved
census blocks eligible for support.
Accordingly, the Bureaus will finalize
determinations with respect to which
areas are eligible for support in a public
notice establishing final procedures for
a Mobility Fund Phase I auction.
(ii) Other Service-Related Factors
225. The Commission will not
consider the presence in a census block
of voice or broadband services over nonmobile networks in determining which
census blocks are unserved. Mobile
services provide benefits, consistent
with, and in furtherance of the
principles of 47 U.S.C. 254, not offered
by fixed services. The ability to
communicate from any point within a
mobile network’s coverage area lets
people communicate at times when they
may need it most, including during
emergencies. The fact that fixed
communications may be available
nearby does not detract from this critical
benefit. Moreover, the Internet access
provided by current and next generation
mobile networks renders them
qualitatively different from existing
voice-only mobile networks. Current
and next generation networks offer the
ability to tap resources well beyond the
resources available through basic voice
PO 00000
Frm 00030
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
networks. Accordingly, in identifying
blocks eligible for Mobility Fund
support, the Commission will not
consider whether voice and/or
broadband services are available using
non-mobile technologies or pre-3G
mobile wireless technologies.
226. To help focus Mobility Fund
Phase I support toward unserved
locations where it will have the most
significant impact, the Commission
provides that support will not be offered
in areas where, notwithstanding the
current absence of 3G wireless service,
any provider has made a regulatory
commitment to provide 3G or better
wireless service, or has received a
funding commitment from a federal
executive department or agency in
response to the carrier’s commitment to
provide 3G or better wireless service.
227. To implement this decision, the
Commission will require that all
wireless competitive ETCs that receive
USF high cost support, under either
legacy or reformed programs, as well as
all parties that seek Mobility Fund
support, review the list of areas eligible
for Mobility Fund support when
published by the Commission and
identify any areas with respect to which
they have made a regulatory
commitment to provide 3G or better
wireless service or received a federal
executive department or agency funding
commitment in exchange for their
commitment to provide 3G or better
wireless service. A regulatory
commitment ultimately may not result
in service to the area in question.
Nevertheless, given the limited
resources provided for Mobility Fund
Phase I and the fact that the
commitments were made in the absence
of any support from the Mobility Fund,
it would not be an appropriate use of
available resources to utilize Mobility
Fund support in such areas.
(iii) Using Centroid Method
228. The Commission will consider
any census block as unserved, if the
American Roamer data indicates that
the geometric center of the block—
referred to as the centroid—is not
covered by networks using EV–DO, EV–
DO Rev A, or UMTS/HSPA or better.
Employing the centroid method is
relatively simple and straightforward,
and will be an effective method for
determining whether a block is
uncovered. The centroid method is an
administratively simple and efficient
approach that, when used here, will
permit the Commission to begin
distributing this support without undue
delay.
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
(c) Offering Support for Unserved Areas
by Census Block
229. The census block should be the
minimum geographic building block for
defining areas for which support is
provided. Using census blocks as the
minimum geographic area gives the
Commission and bidders more
flexibility to tailor their bids to their
business plans. Because census blocks
are numerous and can be quite small,
the Commission will need to provide at
the auction for the aggregation of census
blocks for purposes for bidding.
Therefore, the Commission delegates to
the Bureaus, as part of the auctions
procedures process, the task of deciding
whether to provide a minimum area for
bidding comprised of an aggregation of
eligible census blocks or whether to
permit bidding on individual census
blocks and provide bidders with the
opportunity to make ‘‘all-or-nothing’’
package bids on combinations of census
blocks. Package bidding procedures
could specify certain predefined
packages, or could provide bidders
greater flexibility in defining their own
areas, comprised of census blocks.
However, any aggregation, whether
predetermined by the Bureaus or
defined by bidders, should not exceed
the bounds of one Cellular Market Area
(CMA).
230. The unique circumstances raised
by the large size of census areas in
Alaska may require that bidding be
permitted on individual census blocks,
rather than a larger pre-determined area,
such as a census tract or block group. In
Alaska, the average census block is more
than 50 times the size of the average
census block in the other 49 states and
the District of Columbia, such that the
large size of census areas poses
distinctive challenges in identifying
unserved communities and providing
service.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
(d) Establishing Unserved Units
231. The Commission will use the
number of linear road miles—rather
than population, as proposed in the
Mobility Fund NPRM—as the basis for
calculating the number of units in each
unserved census block. This decision is
based on a number of factors. First,
requiring additional coverage of road
miles more directly reflects the Mobility
Fund’s goal of extending current
generation mobile services. Using road
miles, rather than population, as a unit
for bids and awards of support is also
more consistent with the Commission’s
decision to measure mobile broadband
service based on drive tests and to
require coverage of a specified
percentage of road miles. Moreover,
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
using per-road mile bids as a basis for
awarding support implicitly will take
into account many of the other factors
that commenters argue are important—
such as business locations, recreation
areas, and work sites—since roads are
used to access those areas. Because
bidders are likely to take potential
roaming and subscriber revenues into
account when deciding where to bid for
support under Mobility Fund Phase I,
support will tend to be disbursed to
areas where there is greater traffic, even
without our factoring traffic into the
number of road mile units. Further,
using road miles as the basic unit for the
Mobility Fund Phase I will be relatively
simple to administer, since standard
nationwide data exists for road miles, as
it does for population. In both cases, the
data can be disaggregated to the census
block level.
232. The TIGER road miles data made
available by the Census Bureau can be
used to establish the road miles
associated with each census block
eligible for Mobility Fund Phase I
support. TIGER data is comprehensive
and consistent nationwide, and
available at no cost. As with the
standard for identifying census blocks
that will be eligible for Phase I support,
the Bureaus will, in the pre-auction
process, establish the road miles
associated with each and identify the
specific road categories considered—for
example, interstate highways, etc.—to
be consistent with the performance
requirements and with the goal of
extending coverage to the areas where
people live, work, and travel.
(e) Distributing Mobility Fund Phase I
Support Among Unserved Areas
233. The Commission creates a
separate Mobility Fund Phase I to
support the extension of current
generation wireless service in Tribal
lands. For both general and Tribal
Mobility Fund Phase I support,
providers seeking to serve Tribal lands
must engage with the affected Tribal
governments, where appropriate. The
Commission will also provide a bidding
credit for Tribally-owned and controlled
providers seeking to serve Tribal lands
with which they are associated. Apart
from these provisions, the Commission
concludes that it should not attempt to
prioritize within the areas otherwise
eligible for support from Phase I.
(ii) Public Interest Obligations
(a) Mobile Performance Requirements
234. In addition to the public interest
obligations applicable to all recipients
of CAF support, mobile service
providers receiving non-recurring
PO 00000
Frm 00031
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81591
Mobility Fund Phase I support will be
obligated to provide supported services
over a 3G or better network that has
achieved particular data rates under
particular conditions. Specifically,
Phase I recipients will be required to
specify whether they will be deploying
a network that meets 3G requirements or
4G requirements in areas eligible for
support as those requirements are
detailed here.
235. Recognizing the unavoidable
variability of mobile service within a
covered area, the Commission proposed
and adopted performance standards that
will adopt a strong floor for the service
provided. Consequently, many users
may receive much better service when,
for example, accessing the network from
a fixed location or when close to a base
station. In light of this fact, and the
decision to permit providers to elect
whether to provide 3G or 4G service, the
Commission is adopting different
speeds than originally proposed for
those providing 3G, while retaining the
original proposal for those that offer 4G.
236. For purposes of meeting a
commitment to deploy a 3G network,
providers must offer mobile
transmissions to and from the network
meeting or exceeding an outdoor
minimum of 200 kbps downstream and
50 kbps upstream to handheld mobile
devices.
237. Recipients that commit to
provide supported services over a
network that represents the latest
generation of mobile technologies, or
4G, must offer mobile transmissions to
and from the network meeting or
exceeding the following minimum
standards: outdoor minimum of 768
kbps downstream and 200 kbps
upstream to handheld mobile devices.
238. For both 3G and 4G networks,
the data rates should be achievable in
both fixed and mobile conditions, at
vehicle speeds consistent with typical
speeds on the roads covered. These
minimum standards must be achieved
throughout the cell area, including at
the cell edge.
239. With respect to latency, in order
to assure that recipients offer service
that enables the use of real-time
applications such as VoIP, the
Commission also requires that round
trip latencies for communications over
the network be low enough for this
purpose.
240. With respect to capacity, the
Commission declines at this time to
adopt a specific minimum capacity
requirement that supported providers
must offer mobile broadband users.
However, any usage limits imposed by
a provider on its mobile broadband
offerings supported by the Mobility
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81592
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Fund must be reasonably comparable to
any usage limits for comparable mobile
broadband offerings in urban areas.
241. Recipients that elect to provide
supported services over 3G networks
will have two years to meet their
requirements and those that elect to
deploy 4G networks will have three
years. At the end of the applicable
period for build-out, providers will be
obligated to provide the service defined
above in the areas for which they
receive support, over at least 75 percent
of the road miles associated with census
blocks identified as unserved by the
Bureaus in advance of the Mobility
Fund Phase I auction. The Commission
delegates to the Bureaus the question of
whether a higher coverage threshold
should be required should the Bureaus
permit bidding on individual census
blocks. A higher coverage threshold may
be appropriate in such circumstances
because bidders can choose the
particular census blocks they can cover.
Presumably, this would allow them to
choose areas in which their coverage
can be 95 to 100 percent, as suggested
by the Mobility Fund NPRM.
242. Should the Bureaus choose to
implement a coverage area requirement
of less than 100 percent, a recipient will
receive support only for those road
miles actually covered and not for the
full 100 percent of road miles of the
census blocks or tracts for which it is
responsible. For example, if a recipient
covers 90 percent of the road miles in
the minimum geographic area (and it
meets the threshold), then that recipient
will receive 90 percent of the total
support available for that area. To the
extent that a recipient covers additional
road miles, it will receive support in an
amount based on its bid per road mile
up to 100 percent of the road miles
associated with the specific unserved
census blocks covered by a bid.
243. In contrast to other support
provided under CAF, support provided
through Mobility Fund Phase I will be
non-recurring. Consequently, the
Commission does not plan to modify the
service obligations of providers that
receive Phase I support.
(b) Measuring and Reporting Mobile
Broadband
244. As proposed in the Mobility
Fund NPRM, Mobility Fund support
recipients must demonstrate that they
have deployed a network that covers the
relevant area and meets their public
interest obligations with data from drive
tests. The drive test data satisfying the
requirements must be submitted by the
deadline for providing the service. Drive
test data must also be submitted to
demonstrate the recipient has met the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
50 percent minimum coverage
requirement to receive the second
payment of Mobility Fund Phase I
support.
245. The requirement regarding drive
tests demonstrating data speeds ‘‘to the
network’’ means to the physical location
of core network equipment, such as the
mobile switching office or the evolved
packet core. Therefore, a test server
utilized to conduct drive tests should be
at such a central location rather than at
a base station, so that the drive test
results take into account the effect of
backhaul on communication speeds.
(c) Collocation
246. Recipients of Mobility Fund
support must allow for reasonable
collocation by other providers of
services that would meet the
technological requirements of the
Mobility Fund on newly constructed
towers that Mobility Fund recipients
own or manage in the unserved area for
which they receive support. This
includes a duty: (1) To construct towers
where reasonable in a manner that will
accommodate collocations; and (2) to
engage in reasonable negotiations on a
not unreasonably discriminatory basis
with any party that seeks to collocate
equipment at such a site in order to offer
service that would meet the
technological requirements of the
Mobility Fund. Furthermore, Mobility
Fund recipients must not enter into
arrangements with third parties for
access to towers or other siting facilities
wherein the Mobility Fund recipients
restrict the third parties from allowing
other providers to collocate on their
facilities.
247. These collocation requirements
are in the public interest because they
will help increase the benefits of the
expanded coverage made possible by
the Mobility Fund, by facilitating
service that meets the requirements of
the Mobility Fund by providers using
different technologies. Mobility Fund
recipients will not be required to favor
providers of services that meet Mobility
Fund requirements over other
applicants for limited collocation
spaces.
248. The Commission agrees with
those commenters that attempting to
specify collocation practices that are
applicable in all circumstances may
unduly complicate efforts to expand
coverage, and thus declines to adopt
more specific requirements for
collocation by any specific number of
providers or require any specific terms
or conditions as part of any agreement
for collocation.
PO 00000
Frm 00032
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
(d) Voice and Data Roaming
249. Recipients of Mobility Fund
support must comply with the
Commission’s voice and data roaming
requirements on networks that are built
through Mobility Fund support.
Specifically, recipients of Mobility Fund
support must provide roaming pursuant
to 47 CFR 20.12 on networks that are
built through Mobility Fund support.
250. Some commenters responding to
the Mobility Fund NPRM contend that
there is no need to adopt a data roaming
requirement specifically for Mobility
Fund recipients because the
Commission’s general data roaming
rules already address the issue or that
such a requirement is unrelated to the
goals of the Mobility Fund. Making
compliance with these rules a condition
of universal service support, however,
will mean that violations can result in
the withholding or clawing back of
universal service support—sanctions
based on the receipt of federal support—
that would be in addition to penalties
for violation of the Commission’s
generally applicable data roaming rules.
Moreover, in addition to the sanctions
that would apply to any party violating
the general requirements, Mobility Fund
recipients may lose their eligibility for
future Mobility Fund participation as a
consequence of any violation.
Recipients shall comply with these
requirements without regard to any
judicial challenge thereto.
251. Consistent with the R&O, any
interested party may file a formal or
informal complaint using the
Commission’s existing processes if it
believes a Mobility Fund recipient has
violated the Commission’s roaming
requirements. As noted, the
Commission intends to address
roaming-related disputes expeditiously.
The Commission also has the authority
to initiate enforcement actions on its
own motion.
(e) Reasonably Comparable Rates
252. The Commission will evaluate
the rates for services offered with
Mobility Fund Phase I support based on
whether they fall within a reasonable
range of urban rates for mobile service.
To implement the statutory principle
regarding comparable rates while
offering Mobility Fund Phase I support
at the earliest time feasible, the Bureaus
may develop target rate(s) for Mobility
Fund Phase I before fully developing all
the data to be included in a
determination of comparable rates with
respect to other CAF support. Mobility
Fund Phase I recipients must certify
annually that they offer service in areas
with support at rates that are within a
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
reasonable range of rates for similar
service plans offered by mobile wireless
providers in urban areas. Recipients’
service offerings will be subject to this
requirement for a period ending five
years after the date of award of support.
The Bureaus, under their delegated
authority, may define these conditions
more precisely in the pre-auction
process. The Commission will retain its
authority to look behind recipients’
certifications and take action to rectify
any violations that develop.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
b. Mobility Fund Phase I Eligibility
Requirements
253. The Commission proposed that
to be eligible for Mobility Fund support,
entities must (1) be designated as a
wireless ETC pursuant to 47 U.S.C.
214(e) by the state public utilities
commission (‘‘PUC’’) (or the
Commission, where the state PUC does
not have jurisdiction to designate ETCs)
in any area that it seeks to serve; (2)
have access to spectrum capable of 3G
or better service in the geographic area
to be served; and (3) certify that it is
financially and technically capable of
providing service within the specified
timeframe. With a limited exception, the
Commission adopts these requirements.
254. The Commission also adopts a
two-stage application filing process for
participants in the Mobility Fund Phase
I auction, similar to that used in
spectrum license auctions, which will,
among other things, require potential
Mobility Fund recipients to make
disclosures and certifications
establishing their eligibility.
Specifically, in the pre-auction ‘‘shortform’’ application, a potential bidder
will need to establish its eligibility to
participate in the Mobility Fund Phase
I auction and, in a post-auction ‘‘longform’’ application, a winning bidder
will need to establish its eligibility to
receive support. Such an approach
should provide an appropriate screen to
ensure serious participation without
being unduly burdensome.
(i) ETC Designation
255. Mobility Fund Phase I
participants must be ETCs prior to
participating in the auction. As a
practical matter, this means that parties
that seek to participate in the auction
must be ETCs in the areas for which
they will seek support at the deadline
for applying to participate in the
auction. As discussed elsewhere in the
R&O, the Commission provides a
narrow exception to permit
participation by Tribally-owned or
controlled entities that have filed for
ETC designation prior to the short-form
application deadline. An ETC must be
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
designated (or have applied for
designation under the exception) with
respect to an area that includes area(s)
on which it wishes to receive Mobility
Fund support. Moreover, a recipient of
Mobility Fund support will remain
obligated to provide supported services
throughout the area for which it is
designated an ETC if that area is larger
than the areas for which it receives
Mobility Fund support.
256. By statute, the states, along with
the Commission, are empowered to
designate common carriers as ETCs. In
light of the roughly comparable amounts
of time required for the Commission and
states to process applications to be
designated as an ETC and the time
required to move from the adoption of
the R&O to the acceptance of
applications to participate in a Mobility
Fund Phase I auction, parties
contemplating requesting new
designations as ETCs for purposes of
participating in the auction should act
promptly to begin the process. The
Commission will make every effort to
process such applications in a timely
fashion, and it urges the states to do
likewise.
257. The Commission retains existing
ETC requirements and obligations, in
addition to requiring that parties be
ETCs in the area in which they seek
Mobility Fund support. It is sufficient
for purposes of an application to
participate in the Mobility Fund Phase
I auction, however, that the applicant
has received its ETC designation
conditioned only upon receiving
Mobility Fund Phase I support.
258. The Commission generally will
not allow parties to bid for support prior
to being designated an ETC because
such an approach would inject
uncertainties as to eligibility that could
interfere with speedy deployment of
networks by those that are awarded
support, or disrupt the Mobility Fund
auction. Moreover, requiring that
applicants be designated as ETCs prior
to a Mobility Fund Phase I auction may
help ensure that the pool of bidders is
serious about seeking support and
meeting the obligations that receipt of
support would entail.
(ii) Access to Spectrum
259. Any applicant for a Mobility
Fund Phase I auction must have access
to the necessary spectrum to fulfill any
obligations related to support. Thus,
those eligible for Mobility Fund Phase I
support include all entities that, prior to
an auction, hold a license authorizing
use of appropriate spectrum in the
geographic area(s) for which support is
sought. The spectrum access
requirement can also be met by leasing
PO 00000
Frm 00033
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81593
appropriate spectrum, prior to an
auction, covering the relevant
geographic area(s). Spectrum access
through a license or leasing arrangement
must be in effect prior to auction for an
applicant to be eligible for an award of
support. Regardless of whether an
applicant claims required access to
spectrum through a license or a lease, it
must retain such access for at least five
years from the date of award of Phase
I support. For purposes of calculating
term length, parties may include
opportunities for license and/or lease
renewal.
260. Further, parties may satisfy the
spectrum access requirement if they
have acquired spectrum access,
including any necessary renewal
expectancy, that is contingent on their
obtaining support in the auction. Other
contingencies, however, will render the
relevant spectrum access insufficient for
the party to meet the Commission’s
requirements for participation.
261. Entities seeking to receive
support from the Mobility Fund must
certify that they have access to spectrum
capable of supporting the required
services. While the Commission
declines to restrict the frequencies
applicants must use to be eligible for
Mobility Fund Support, certain
spectrum bands will not support mobile
broadband (for example, paging service).
Applicants will be required to identify
the particular frequency bands and the
nature of the access on which they
assert their eligibility for support, and
the Commission will assess the
reasonableness of eligibility
certifications based on information
submitted in short- and long-form
applications. Should entities make this
certification and not have access to the
appropriate level of spectrum, they will
be subject to the penalties described
elsewhere in the R&O.
(iii) Certification of Financial and
Technical Capability
262. Each applicant for Mobility Fund
Phase I support must certify, in its preauction short-form application and in its
post-auction long-form application, that
it is financially and technically capable
of providing 3G or better service within
the specified timeframe in the
geographic areas for which it seeks
support. Given that Mobility Fund
Phase I provides non-recurring support,
applicants for Phase I funds need to
assure the Commission that they can
provide the requisite service without
any assurance of ongoing support for the
area in question after Phase I support
has been exhausted.
263. Applicants making certifications
to the Commission expose themselves to
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81594
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
liability for false certifications.
Applicants should take care to review
their resources and their plans before
making the required certification and be
prepared to document their review, if
necessary.
(iv) Other Qualifications
264. The Commission will not impose
any additional eligibility requirements
to participation in the Mobility Fund,
with one exception. One commenter to
the Mobility Fund NPRM questions
whether the Mobility Fund should be
available to parties in particular areas if
the party previously (that is, without
respect to Mobility Fund support)
indicated an intention to deploy
wireless voice and broadband service in
that area. The Commission concludes
that this concern has merit and it will
restrict parties from bidding for support
in certain limited circumstances to
assure that Mobility Fund Phase I
support does not go to finance coverage
that carriers would have provided in the
near term without any subsidy. In
particular, an applicant for Mobility
Fund Phase I support must certify that
it will not seek support for any areas in
which it has made a public commitment
to deploy 3G or better wireless service
by December 31, 2012. This restriction
will not prevent a provider from seeking
and receiving support for a geographic
area where another carrier has
announced such a commitment to
deploy 3G or better, but it may conserve
funds and avoid displacing private
investment by making a carrier that
made such a commitment ineligible for
Mobility Fund Phase I support with
respect to the identified geographic
area(s). Because circumstances are more
likely to change over a longer term,
providers should not be held to
statements for any time period beyond
December 31, 2012.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
c. Reverse Auction Mechanism
265. In the R&O, the Commission
establishes program and auction rules
for the Mobility Fund Phase I, to be
followed by a process conducted by the
Bureaus on delegated authority
identifying areas eligible for support,
and seeking comment on specific
detailed auction procedures to be used,
consistent with the R&O. This process
will be initiated by the release of a
Public Notice announcing an auction
date, to be followed by a subsequent
Public Notice specifying the auction
procedures, including dates, deadlines,
and other details of the application and
bidding process.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
(i) Basic Auction Design
266. A single-round sealed bid format
appears to be most appropriate for a
Mobility Fund Phase I reverse auction,
although the Commission does not make
a final determination in the R&O, but
delegates such determination to the
Bureaus, to be addressed in the preauction development of specific
procedures.
(ii) Application Process
267. The Commission adopts a twostage application process. In the first
stage Mobility Fund auction short-form
application, each auction applicant
must provide information to establish
its identity, including disclosure of
parties with ownership interests,
consistent with the ownership interest
disclosure required in 47 CFR part 1 for
applicants for spectrum licenses, and
any agreements the applicant may have
relating to the support to be sought
through the auction. With respect to
eligibility requirements relating to ETC
designation and spectrum access,
applicants will be required to disclose
and certify their ETC status as well as
the source of the spectrum they plan to
use to meet Mobility Fund obligations
in the particular area(s) for which they
plan to bid. Specifically, applicants will
be required to disclose whether they
currently hold or lease the spectrum, or
have entered into a binding agreement,
and have submitted an application with
the Commission, to either hold or lease
spectrum. Moreover, applicants will be
required to certify that they will retain
their access to the spectrum for at least
five years from the date of award of
support. The Bureaus should exercise
their delegated authority to establish the
specific form in which such information
will be collected from applicants.
(iii) Bidding Process
268. The Commission delegates
authority to the Bureaus to administer
the policies, programs, rules, and
procedures for Mobility Fund Phase I
and take all actions necessary to
conduct a Phase I auction. The Bureaus
should exercise this authority by
conducting a pre-auction notice-andcomment process to establish the
specific procedures for the auction.
Such procedures will enable the
establishment of procedures for
reviewing bids and determining
winning bidders. The overall objective
of the bidding in this context is to
maximize the number of units to be
covered in unserved areas given the
overall budget for support. The Bureaus
have discretion to adopt the best
procedures to achieve this objective
PO 00000
Frm 00034
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
during the pre-auction process taking
into account all relevant factors,
including the implementation feasibility
and the simplicity of bidder
participation.
269. Maximum Bids and Reserve
Prices. The Commission adopts its
proposed rule to provide for maximum
acceptable per-unit bid amounts and
reserve amounts, separate and apart
from any maximum opening bids, and
to provide that those reserves may be
disclosed or undisclosed and anticipates
that, as detailed procedures for a
Mobility Fund Phase I auction are
established during the pre-auction
period, the Bureaus will consider all
proposals with respect to reserve prices
in light of the specific timing of and
other circumstances related to the
auction.
270. Aggregating Service Areas and
Package Bidding. The Bureaus will
address issues relating to package
bidding as part of the pre-auction
process, which is consistent with the
way the Commission approaches this
issue for spectrum auctions. Interested
parties will have an opportunity to
comment on the desirability of package
bidding in the pre-auction process in
connection with the determination of
the minimum area for bidding. Potential
bidders will be able to provide input on
whether specific package bidding
procedures would allow them to
formulate and implement bidding
strategies to incorporate Mobility Fund
Phase I support into their business plans
and capture efficiencies, and on how
well those procedures will facilitate the
realization of the Commission’s
objectives for Mobility Fund Phase I.
271. Refinements to the Selection
Mechanism to Address Limited
Available Funds.
272. The Commission adopts a rule
that would provide the Bureaus with
discretion to establish procedures in the
pre-auction process to deal with the
possibility that funds may remain
available after the auction has identified
the last lowest per-unit bid that does not
assign support exceeding the total funds
available. The Commission also
proposed a rule to give discretion to
address a situation where there are two
or more bids for the same per-unit
amount but for different areas (‘‘tied
bids’’) and remaining funds are
insufficient to satisfy all of the tied bids.
The Bureaus should develop
appropriate procedures to address these
issues during the pre-auction noticeand-comment process. These
procedures shall be consistent with the
objective of awarding support so as to
maximize the number of units that will
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
gain coverage in unserved areas subject
to the overall budget for support.
273. Withdrawn Bids. In the R&O, the
Commission adopts a rule to provide for
procedures for withdrawing
provisionally winning bids, but does not
expect the Bureaus to permit withdrawn
bids, particularly if the Mobility Fund
Phase I auction will be conducted in a
single round.
274. Preference for Tribally-Owned or
Controlled Providers. The Commission
adopts a 25 percent bidding credit for
Tribally-owned or controlled providers
that participate in a Mobility Fund
Phase I auction. The preference would
act as a ‘‘reverse’’ bidding credit that
would effectively reduce the bid amount
by 25 percent for the purpose of
comparing it to other bids, thus
increasing the likelihood that a Triballyowned or controlled entity would
receive funding. The preference would
be available solely with respect to the
eligible census blocks located within the
geographic area defined by the
boundaries of the Tribal land associated
with the Tribal entity seeking support.
(iv) Information and Competition
275. The Commission adopts rules to
prohibit applicants competing for
support in the auction from
communicating with one another
regarding the substance of their bids or
bidding strategies and to limit public
disclosure of auction-related
information as appropriate. These rules
are similar to those used for spectrum
license auctions, and the Bureaus
should seek comment during the preauction procedures process and decide
on the details and extent of information
to be withheld until the close of the
auction.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
(v) Auction Cancellation
276. The Commission adopts a rule to
provide discretion to delay, suspend, or
cancel bidding before or after a reverse
auction begins under a variety of
circumstances, including natural
disasters, technical failures,
administrative necessity, or any other
reason that affects the fair and efficient
conduct of the bidding. Based on its
experience with a similar rule for
spectrum license auctions, the
Commission concludes that such a rule
is necessary.
d. Post-Auction Long-Form Application
Process
(i) Long-Form Application
277. The Commission adopts the longform application process proposed in
the Mobility Fund NPRM and delegates
to the Bureaus responsibility for
establishing the necessary FCC
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
application form(s). After bidding for
Mobility Fund Phase I support has
ended, the Commission will declare the
bidding closed and identify and notify
the winning bidders. Unless otherwise
specified by public notice, within 10
business days after being notified that it
is a winning bidder for Mobility Fund
support, a winning bidder will be
required to submit a long-form
application, providing certain
information described below.
(ii) Ownership Disclosure
278. The Commission adopts for the
Mobility Fund the existing ownership
disclosure requirements in 47 CFR part
1 that already apply to short-form
applicants to participate in spectrum
license auctions and long-form
applicants for licenses in the wireless
services. Thus, an applicant for Mobility
Fund support will be required to fully
disclose its ownership structure as well
as information regarding the real partyor parties-in-interest of the applicant or
application. Wireless providers that
have participated in spectrum auctions
will already be familiar with these
requirements, and are likely to already
have ownership disclosure information
reports (FCC Form 602) on file with the
Commission, which may simply need to
be updated. To minimize the reporting
burden on winning bidders, applicants
will be able to use ownership
information stored in existing
Commission databases and update that
ownership information as necessary.
(iii) Eligibility To Receive Support
279. ETC Designation. The
Commission will, with a limited
exception, require any entity bidding for
Mobility Fund support to be designated
an ETC prior to the Mobility Fund
auction short-form application deadline.
A winning bidder will be required to
submit with its long-form application
appropriate documentation of its ETC
designation in all of the areas for which
it will receive support. However, in the
event that a winning bidder receives an
ETC designation conditioned upon
receiving Mobility Fund support, it may
submit documentation of its conditional
designation, provided that it promptly
submits documentation of its final
designation after its long-form
application has been approved but
before any disbursement of Mobility
Fund funds.
280. Access to Spectrum. Applicants
for Mobility Fund support must also
identify the particular frequency bands
and the nature of the access (for
example, licenses or leasing
arrangements) on which they assert
their eligibility for support. Because not
PO 00000
Frm 00035
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81595
all spectrum bands are capable of
supporting mobile broadband, and
leasing arrangements can be subject to a
wide variety of conditions and
contingencies, before an initial
disbursement of support is approved,
the Commission will assess the
reasonableness of these assertions. An
applicant whose access to spectrum
derives from a spectrum manager
leasing arrangement pursuant to 47 CFR
1.9020 may have a greater burden than
other licensees and spectrum lessees to
demonstrate through the execution of
contractual conditions in its leasing
arrangements that it has the necessary
access to spectrum required to qualify
for disbursement of Mobility Fund
support. Should an applicant not have
access to the appropriate level of
spectrum, it will be found not qualified
to receive Mobility Fund support and
will be subject to an auction default
payment.
(iv) Project Construction
281. A winning bidder’s long-form
application must include a description
of the network it will construct with
Mobility Fund support. Carriers must
specify on their long-form applications
whether the supported project will
qualify as either a 3G or 4G network,
including the proposed technology
choice and demonstration of technical
feasibility. Applications should also
include a detailed description of the
network design and contracting phase,
construction period, and deployment
and maintenance period. Applicants
must also provide a complete projected
budget for the project and a project
schedule and timeline. Recipients will
be required to provide updated
information in their annual reports and
in the information they provide to
obtain a disbursement of funds. In
addition, winning bidders of areas that
include Tribal lands must comply with
Tribal engagement obligations to
demonstrate that they have engaged
Tribal governments in the planning
process and that the service to be
provided will advance the goals
established by the Tribe.
(v) Financial Security and Guarantee of
Performance
282. Winning bidders for Mobility
Fund support must provide the
Commission with an irrevocable standby Letter of Credit (‘‘LOC’’) issued by a
bank that is acceptable to the
Commission, in an amount equal to the
amount of support as it is disbursed,
plus an additional percentage of the
amount of support disbursed which
shall serve as a default payment, which
percentage will be determined by the
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81596
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Bureaus in advance of the auction. The
LOC should be in substantially the same
form as set forth in the model LOC
provided in Appendix N to the R&O and
must be acceptable in all respects to the
Commission.
283. The Commission is primarily
concerned with protecting the integrity
of the USF funds disbursed to the
recipient. Should a recipient default on
its obligations under the Mobility Fund,
the priority should be to secure a return
of the USF funds disbursed to it for this
purpose, so that the Commission can
reassign the support consistent with its
goal to maximize the number of units
covered given the funds available. A
Mobility Fund recipient’s failure to
fulfill its obligations may also impose
significant costs on the Commission and
higher support costs for USF. Therefore,
the Commission also concludes that it is
necessary to adopt a default payment
obligation for performance defaults.
284. Consistent with its goal of using
the LOC to protect the government’s
interest in the funds it disburses in
Mobility Fund Phase I, the Commission
will require winning bidders to obtain
an LOC in an amount equal to the
amount of support it receives plus an
additional percentage of the amount of
support disbursed to safeguard against
costs to the Commission and the USF.
The precise amount of this additional
percentage will not exceed 20 percent
and will be determined by the Bureaus
as part of its process for establishing the
procedures for the auction. Thus, before
an application for Mobility Fund
support is granted and funds are
disbursed, each winning bidder must
provide an LOC in the amount of the
first one-third of the support associated
with the unserved census tract that will
be disbursed upon grant of its
application, plus the established
additional default payment percentage.
Before a participant receives the second
third of its total support, it will be
required to provide a second LOC or
increase the initial LOC to correspond to
the amount of that second support
payment such that LOC coverage will be
equal to the total support amount plus
the established default payment
percentage. The LOC(s) will remain
open and must be renewed to secure the
amounts disbursed as necessary until
the recipient has met the requirements
for demonstrating coverage and final
payment is made. This approach will
help to reduce the costs recipients incur
for maintaining the LOCs, because they
will only have to maintain LOCs in
amounts that correspond to the actual
USF funds as they are being disbursed.
285. Consistent with the purpose of
the LOC, recipients must maintain the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
LOC in place until at least 120 days after
they have completed their supported
expansion to unserved areas and
received their final payment of Mobility
Fund Phase I support. Under the terms
of the LOC, the Commission will be
entitled to draw upon the LOC upon a
recipient’s failure to comply with the
terms and conditions upon which USF
support was granted. The Commission,
for example, will draw upon the LOC
when the recipient fails to meet its
required deployment milestone(s).
Failure to satisfy essential terms and
conditions upon which USF support
was granted or to ensure completion of
the supported project, including failure
to timely renew the LOC, will be
deemed a failure to properly use USF
support and will entitle the Commission
to draw the entire amount of the LOC.
Failure to comply will be evidenced by
a letter issued by the Chief of either the
Wireless Bureau or Wireline Bureau or
their designees, which letter, attached to
an LOC draw certificate, shall be
sufficient for a draw on the LOC. In
addition, a recipient that fails to comply
with the terms and conditions of the
Mobility Fund support it is granted
could be disqualified from receiving
additional Mobility Fund support or
other USF support.
286. In the Mobility Fund NPRM, the
Commission sought comment on the
relative merits of performance bonds
and LOCs and the extent to which
performance bonds, in the event of the
bankruptcy of the recipient of Mobility
Fund support, might frustrate the
Commission’s goal of ensuring timely
build-out of the network. The
Commission concludes that an LOC will
better serve its objective of minimizing
the possibility that Mobility Fund
support becomes property of a
recipient’s bankruptcy estate for an
extended period of time, thereby
preventing the funds from being used
promptly to accomplish the Mobility
Fund’s goals. It is well established that
an LOC and the proceeds thereunder are
not property of a debtor’s estate under
11 U.S.C. 541 (the ‘‘Bankruptcy Code’’).
In a proper draw upon an LOC, the
issuer honors a draft under the LOC
from its own assets and not from the
assets of the debtor who caused the LOC
to be issued. Because the proceeds
under an LOC are not property of the
bankruptcy estate, absent extreme
circumstances such as fraud, neither the
LOC nor the funds drawn down under
it are subject to the automatic stay
provided by the Bankruptcy Code.
287. In the long-form application
filing, each winning bidder must submit
a commitment letter from the bank
issuing the LOC. The commitment letter
PO 00000
Frm 00036
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
will at a minimum provide the dollar
amount of the LOC and the issuing
bank’s agreement to follow the terms
and conditions of the Commission’s
model LOC, found in Appendix N to the
R&O. The winning bidder will,
however, be required to have its LOC in
place before it is authorized to receive
Mobility Fund Phase I support and
before any Mobility Fund Phase I
support is disbursed. Further, at the
time it submits its LOC, a winning
bidder must provide an opinion letter
from legal counsel clearly stating,
subject only to customary assumptions,
limitations and qualifications, that in a
proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code,
the bankruptcy court would not treat the
LOC or proceeds of the LOC as property
of winning bidder’s bankruptcy estate,
or the bankruptcy estate of any other
bidder-related entity requesting
issuance of the LOC, under 11 U.S.C.
541.
(vi) Other Funding Restrictions
288. While the Commission agrees
with commenters that Mobility Fund
recipients might benefit if they were
able to leverage resources from other
federal programs, it must also take care
to ensure that USF funds are put to their
most efficient and effective use.
Therefore, the Commission will exclude
all areas from the Mobility Fund where,
prior to the short-form filing deadline,
any carrier has made a regulatory
commitment to provide 3G or better
service, or has received a funding
commitment from a federal executive
department or agency in response to the
carrier’s commitment to provide 3G or
better service.
(vii) Post-Auction Certifications
289. Prior to receiving Mobility Fund
support, an applicant must certify in its
long-form application to the availability
of funds for all project costs that exceed
the amount of support to be received
from the Mobility Fund and certify that
they will comply with all program
requirements.
290. As discussed elsewhere in the
R&O, recipients of Mobility Fund
support are required by statute to offer
services in rural areas at rates that are
reasonably comparable to those charged
to customers in urban areas.
Accordingly, the post-auction
certifications made in the long-form
application will include a certification
that the applicant will offer services in
rural areas at rates that are reasonably
comparable to those charged to
customers in urban areas.
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
(viii) Auction Defaults
291. Auction Default Payments. The
Commission will impose a default
payment on winning bidders that fail to
timely file a long-form application. Such
a payment is also appropriate if a bidder
is found ineligible or unqualified to
receive Mobility Fund support, its longform application is dismissed for any
reason, or it otherwise defaults on its
bid or is disqualified for any reason after
the close of the auction.
292. Failures to fulfill auction
obligations may undermine the stability
and predictability of the auction
process, and impose costs on the
Commission and higher support costs
for USF. In the case of a reverse auction
for USF support, a default payment is
appropriate to ensure the integrity of the
auction process and to safeguard against
costs to the Commission and the USF.
The size of the payment and the method
by which it is calculated may vary
depending on the procedures
established for the auction, including
auction design. In advance of the
auction, the Bureaus will determine
whether a default payment should be a
percentage of the defaulted bid amount
or should be calculated using another
method, such as basing the amount on
differences between the defaulted bid
and the next best bid(s) to cover the
same number of road miles as without
the default. If the Bureaus establish a
default payment to be calculated as a
percentage of the defaulted bid, that
percentage will not exceed 20 percent of
the total amount of the defaulted bid.
However it is determined, agreeing to
that payment in event of a default will
be a condition for participating in
bidding. The Bureaus may determine
prior to bidding that all participants will
be required to furnish a bond or place
funds on deposit with the Commission
in the amount of the maximum
anticipated default payment. A winning
bidder will be deemed to have defaulted
on its bid under a number of
circumstances if it withdraws its bid
after the close of the auction, it fails to
timely file a long-form application, it is
found ineligible or unqualified to
receive Mobility Fund Phase I support,
its long-form application is dismissed
for any reason, or it otherwise defaults
on its bid or is disqualified for any
reason after the close of the auction. In
addition to being liable for an auction
default payment, a bidder that defaults
on its bid may be subject to other
sanctions, including but not limited to
disqualification from future competitive
bidding for USF support.
293. The Commission distinguishes
between a Mobility Fund auction
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
applicant that defaults on its winning
bid and a winning bidder whose longform application is approved but
subsequently fails or is unable to meet
its minimum coverage requirement or
demonstrate an adequate quality of
service that complies with Mobility
Fund requirements. In the latter case of
a recipient’s performance default, in
addition to being liable for a
performance default payment, the
recipient will be required to repay all of
the Mobility Fund support it has
received and, depending on the
circumstances involved, could be
disqualified from receiving any
additional Mobility Fund or other USF
support. The Commission may obtain its
performance default payment and
repayment of a recipient’s Mobility
Fund support by drawing upon the
irrevocable stand-by LOC that recipients
will be required to provide in the full
amount of support received.
294. Undisbursed Support Payments.
When a winning bidder defaults on its
bid or is disqualified for any reason after
the close of the auction, the funds that
would have been provided to such an
applicant will be used in a manner
consistent with the purposes of the
Universal Service program.
e. Accountability and Oversight
295. In the Mobility Fund NPRM, the
Commission sought comment on issues
relating to the administration,
management and oversight of the
Mobility Fund. On a number of these
issues, the Commission adopts uniform
requirements that will apply to all
recipients of high-cost and CAF support,
including recipients of Mobility Fund
Phase I support. Recipients of Phase I
support will be subject generally to the
reporting, audit, and record retention
requirements that are discussed in the
Accountability and Oversight section of
the R&O. In addition, recipients of
Mobility Fund Phase I support will be
subject to certain aspects of support
disbursement and annual reporting and
record retention requirements.
(i) Disbursing Support Payments
296. Mobility Fund Phase I support
will be provided in three installments.
This approach strikes the appropriate
balance between advancing funds to
expand service and assuring that service
is actually expanded. Specifically, each
party receiving support will be eligible
to receive from USAC a disbursement of
one-third of the amount of support
associated with any specific census tract
once its long-form application for
support is granted. To qualify for the
second installment of support, a
recipient will be required to
PO 00000
Frm 00037
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81597
demonstrate it has met 50 percent of its
minimum coverage requirement using
the same drive tests that will be used to
analyze network coverage to provide
proof of deployment at the end of the
project to receive its final installment of
support. The report a recipient files for
this purpose will be subject to review
and verification before support is
disbursed. A party will receive the
remainder of its support after filing with
USAC a report with the required data
that demonstrates that it has deployed a
network covering at least the required
percent of the relevant road miles in the
unserved census block(s) within the
census tract. This data will be subject to
review and verification before the final
support payment for an unserved area is
disbursed to the recipient. A party’s
final payment would be the difference
between the total amount of support
based on the road miles of unserved
census blocks actually covered, i.e., a
figure between the required percent and
100 percent of the road miles, and any
support previously received.
297. To minimize that risk of lost
funds to parties that ultimately fail to
meet their obligations, the Commission
is requiring participants to maintain
their LOCs in place until after they have
completed their supported network
construction and received their final
payment of Mobility Fund Phase I
support. In addition, participants must
certify that they are in compliance with
all requirements for receipt of Mobility
Fund Phase I support at the time that
they request disbursements.
(ii) Annual Reports
298. Parties receiving Mobility Fund
support must file annual reports with
the Commission demonstrating the
coverage provided with support from
the Mobility Fund for five years after the
winning bidder is authorized to receive
Mobility Fund support. The reports
must include maps illustrating the
scope of the area reached by new
services, the population residing in
those areas (based on Census Bureau
data and estimates), and the linear road
miles covered. In addition, annual
reports must include all coverage test
data for the supported areas that the
party receives or makes use of, whether
the tests were conducted pursuant to
Commission requirements or any other
reason. Further, annual reports will
include any updated project information
including updates to the project
description, budget and schedule.
299. However, to the extent that a
recipient of Mobility Fund support is a
carrier subject to other existing or new
annual reporting requirements under 47
CFR 54.313 based on their receipt of
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81598
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
USF support under another high cost
mechanism, it will be permitted to
satisfy its Mobility Fund Phase I
reporting requirements by filing a
separate Mobility Fund annual report or
by including this additional information
in a separate section of its other annual
report filed with the Commission.
Mobility Fund recipients choosing to
fulfill their Mobility Fund reporting
requirements in an annual report filed
under 47 CFR 54.313 must, at a
minimum, file a separate Mobility Fund
annual report notifying us that the
required information is included the
other annual report.
(iii) Record Retention
300. Elsewhere in the R&O, the
Commission adopts revised
requirements that extend the record
retention period to ten years for all
recipients of high-cost and CAF support,
including recipients of Mobility Fund
Phase I. This new retention period will
be adequate to facilitate audits of
Mobility Fund program participants,
with one clarification regarding the
required retention period: for the
purpose of the Mobility Fund program,
the ten-year period for which records
must be maintained will begin to run
only after a recipient has received its
final payment of Mobility Fund support.
That is, because recipients will receive
Mobility Fund support in up to three
installments, but recipients that
ultimately fail to deploy a network that
meets the Commission’s minimum
coverage and performance requirements
or otherwise fail to meet their Mobility
Fund public interest obligations will be
liable for repayment of all previously
disbursed Mobility Fund support,
recipients must retain records for ten
years from the receipt of the final
disbursement of Mobility Fund funds.
2. Service to Tribal Lands
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
a. Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I
301. The Commission establishes a
separate Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I to
provide one-time support to deploy
mobile broadband to unserved Tribal
lands, which have significant
telecommunications deployment and
connectivity challenges. The
Commission anticipates that an auction
will occur as soon as feasible after a
general Mobility Fund Phase I auction,
providing for a limited period of time in
between so that applicants that may
wish to participate in both auctions may
plan and prepare for a Tribal Phase I
auction after a general Phase I auction.
The decision to establish a Tribal
Mobility Fund Phase I stems from the
Commission’s policy regarding
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
‘‘Covered Locations,’’ and represents its
commitment to Tribal lands, including
Alaska.
302. The Commission allocates $50
million from universal service funds
reserves for Tribal Mobility Fund Phase
I, separate and apart from the $300
million allocated for the general
Mobility Fund Phase I. Providers in
Tribal lands will be eligible for both the
general and Tribal Mobility Fund Phase
I auctions. Consistent with the general
Mobility Fund Phase I, the Commission
delegates to the Bureaus authority to
administer the policies, programs, rules
and procedures to implement Tribal
Mobility Fund Phase I as established in
the R&O. The Commission determines
that allocating $50 million from
universal service fund reserves to
support the deployment of mobile
broadband to unserved Tribal lands is
necessary, separate and apart from the
$300 million we are allocating for
Mobility Fund Phase I, because of
special challenges involved in
deploying mobile broadband on Tribal
lands. Various characteristics of Tribal
lands may increase the cost of entry and
reduce the profitability of providing
service, including: ‘‘(1) The lack of basic
infrastructure in many tribal
communities; (2) a high concentration of
low-income individuals with few
business subscribers; (3) cultural and
language barriers where carriers serving
a tribal community may lack familiarity
with the Native language and customs of
that community; (4) the process of
obtaining access to rights-of-way on
tribal lands where tribal authorities
control such access; and (5)
jurisdictional issues that may arise
where there are questions concerning
whether a state may assert jurisdiction
over the provision of
telecommunications services on tribal
lands.’’
303. Promoting the development of
telecommunications infrastructure on
Tribal lands is consistent with the
Commission’s unique trust relationship
with Tribes. The Commission
previously observed that ‘‘by increasing
the total number of individuals, both
Indian and non-Indian, who are
connected to the network within a tribal
community the value of the network for
tribal members in that community is
greatly enhanced.’’ By structuring the
support to benefit Tribal lands, rather
than attempting to require wireless
providers to distinguish between Tribal
and non-Tribal customers, the
Commission will ‘‘reduc[e] the possible
administrative burdens associated with
implementation of the enhanced federal
support, [and] eliminate a potential
disincentive to providing service on
PO 00000
Frm 00038
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Tribal lands.’’ Support for Tribal lands
generally will be awarded on the same
terms and subject to the same rules as
general Mobility Fund Phase I support.
Therefore, the Commission incorporates
by reference the eligible geographic
area, provider eligibility, public interest
obligations, auction and post-auction
processes, and program management
and oversight measures established for
Phase I of the Mobility Fund. However,
in some instances, a more tailored
approach is appropriate and the
Commission adopts modest revisions to
its general rules. As discussed in the
USF–ICC Transformation FNPRM, the
Commission also proposes an ongoing
support mechanism for Tribal lands in
Phase II of the Mobility Fund, as well
as a separate CAF mechanism to reach
the most remote areas, including Tribal
lands.
304. Size of Fund. The Commission
dedicates $50 million in one-time
support for the Tribal Mobility Fund
Phase I, which should help facilitate
mobile deployment in unserved areas
on Tribal lands. This amount is in
addition to the $300 million to be
provided under the general Mobility
Fund Phase I, for which qualifying
Tribal lands would also be eligible, and
is in addition to the up to $100 million
in ongoing support being dedicated to
Tribal lands in the Tribal Mobility Fund
Phase II. A one-time infusion of $50
million through the Tribal Mobility
Fund can make a difference in
expanding the availability of mobile
broadband in Tribal lands unserved by
3G. The more targeted nature of this
support will enhance the impact of this
significant one-time addition to current
support levels. At the same time, this
funding level is consistent with the
Commission’s commitment to fiscal
responsibility and the varied objectives
the Commission has for its limited
funds, including its proposals for
ongoing support for mobile services as
established below.
305. Mechanism To Award Support.
Consistent with the general approach to
awarding Phase I support, to maximize
consumer benefits, the Commission
generally will award support to one
provider per qualifying area by reverse
auction and will only award support to
more than one provider per area where
doing so would cover more total units
given the budget constraint. In certain
limited circumstances, however,
depending on the bidding at auction,
allowing small overlaps in support
could result in greater overall coverage.
306. Because it is essential to award
support in a way that respects and
reflects Tribal needs, the Commission
adopts Tribal engagement obligations to
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
ensure that needs are identified and
appropriate solutions are developed.
The Commission also adopts a bidding
credit for Tribally-owned or controlled
providers seeking to expand service on
their Tribal lands. A reverse auction
mechanism, together with the Tribal
engagement and preferences adopted in
the R&O, would best achieve the
Commission’s goals in expanding
service to Tribal lands in a respectful,
fair, and fiscally responsible manner.
307. Establishing Unserved Units. For
purposes of determining the number of
unserved units in a given geographic
area, the Commission concludes that,
for a Tribal Phase I auction, a
population-based metric is more
appropriate than road miles, which will
be used in a general Mobility Fund
Phase I auction. In light of this
conclusion, the ‘‘drive tests’’ used to
demonstrate coverage supported by
Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I may be
conducted by means other than in
automobiles on roads. Providers may
demonstrate coverage of an area with a
statistically significant number of tests
in the vicinity of residences being
covered. Moreover, equipment to
conduct the testing can be transported
by off-road vehicles, such as snowmobiles or other vehicles appropriate to
local conditions.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
b. Tribal Engagement Obligation
308. The Commission agrees with
commenters that have repeatedly
stressed the essential role that Tribal
consultation and engagement plays in
the successful deployment of mobile
broadband service. Therefore, for both
the general and Tribal Mobility Fund
Phase I auctions, the Commission
encourages applicants seeking to serve
Tribal lands to begin engaging with the
affected Tribal government as soon as
possible but no later than the
submission of its long-form application.
Any such engagement, however, must
be done consistent with the
Commission’s auction rules prohibiting
certain communications during the
competitive bidding process.
309. Moreover, any bidder winning
support for areas within Tribal lands
must notify the relevant Tribal
government no later than five business
days after being identified by Public
Notice as such a winning bidder.
Thereafter, at the long-form application
stage, in annual reports, and prior to any
disbursement of support from USAC,
Mobility Fund Phase I winning bidders
will be required to comply with the
general Tribal engagement obligations
discussed infra.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
c. Preference for Tribally-Owned or
Controlled Providers
310. The Commission adopts a
preference for Tribally-owned or
controlled providers seeking general or
Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I support.
Eligible entities include Tribes or tribal
consortia, and entities majority owned
or controlled by Tribes. The preference
will act as a ‘‘reverse’’ bidding credit
that will effectively reduce the bid
amount of a qualified Tribally ownedor controlled provider by a designated
percentage for the purpose of comparing
it to other bids, thus increasing the
likelihood that Tribally-owned and
controlled entities will receive funding.
The preference will be available with
respect to the eligible census blocks
located within the geographic area
defined by the boundaries of the Tribal
land associated with the Tribal entity
seeking support. In the spectrum
auction context, the Commission
typically awards small business bidding
credits ranging from 15 to 35 percent,
depending on varying small business
size standards. The Commission
believes that a bidding credit in that
range would further Tribal selfgovernment by increasing the likelihood
that the bid would be awarded to a
Tribal entity associated with the
relevant Tribal land, without providing
an unfair advantage over substantially
more cost-competitive bids.
Accordingly, it adopts a 25 percent
bidding credit.
d. ETC Designation for Tribally-Owned
or Controlled Entities
311. To afford Tribes an increased
opportunity to participate at auction, in
recognition of their interest in selfgovernment and self-provisioning on
their own lands, the Commission will
permit a Tribally-owned or controlled
entity that has an application for ETC
designation pending at the relevant
short-form application deadline to
participate in an auction to seek general
and Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I
support for eligible census blocks
located within the geographic area
defined by the boundaries of the Tribal
land associated with the Tribe that owns
or controls the entity. Allowing such
participation at auction in no way
prejudges the ultimate decision on a
Tribally-owned or controlled entity’s
ETC designation and that support will
be disbursed only after it receives such
designation.
e. Tribal Priority
312. Further comment is warranted
before the Commission moves forward
with any Tribal priority process that
PO 00000
Frm 00039
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81599
would afford Tribes ‘‘priority units’’ to
allocate to areas of particular
importance to them. Therefore, the
Commission seeks additional input on
this proposal in the context of the Tribal
Mobility Fund Phase II. In the
meantime, the Tribal engagement
obligations adopted in the R&O,
combined with build-out obligations,
will ensure that Tribal needs are met in
bringing service to unserved Tribal
communities in the Mobility Fund
Phase I.
3. Mobility Fund Phase II
313. In addition to Phase I of the
Mobility Fund, the Commission also
establishes in the R&O Phase II of the
Mobility Fund, which will provide
ongoing support for mobile services in
areas where such support is needed.
Whereas Mobility Fund Phase I will
provide one-time funding for the
expansion of current and next
generation mobile networks, Phase II of
the Mobility Fund recognizes that there
are areas in which offering of mobile
services will require ongoing support.
314. The Commission designates $500
million annually for ongoing support for
mobile services, to be distributed in
Phase II of the Mobility Fund. Of this
amount, the Commission anticipates
that it would designate up to $100
million to address the special
circumstances of Tribal lands. The
Commission sets a budget of $500
million to promote mobile broadband in
these areas, where a private sector
business case cannot be met without
federal support. Although the budget for
fixed services exceeds the budget for
mobile services, significantly more
Americans at this time have access to
3G mobile coverage than have access to
residential broadband via fixed wireless,
DSL, cable, or fiber. The Commission
expects that as 4G mobile service is
rolled out, this disparity will persist—
private investment will enable the
availability of 4G mobile service to a
larger number of Americans than will
have access to fixed broadband with
speeds of at least 4 Mbps downstream
and 1 Mbps upstream.
315. In 2010, wireless ETCs other than
Verizon Wireless and Sprint received
$921 million in high-cost support.
Under 2008 commitments to phase
down their competitive ETC support,
Verizon Wireless and Sprint have
already given up significant amounts of
the support they received under the
identical support rule, and there is
nothing in the record showing that
either carrier is reducing coverage or
shutting down towers even as this
support is eliminated. Nor is there
anything in the record that suggests
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81600
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
AT&T or T-Mobile would reduce
coverage or shut down towers in the
absence of ETC support. It reasonable to
assume that the four national carriers
will maintain at least their existing
coverage footprints even if the support
they receive today is phased out. In
2010, $579 million flowed to regional
and small carriers, i.e., carriers other
than the four nationwide providers. Of
this $579 million, in many instances
this support is being provided to
multiple wireless carriers in the same
geographic area. The State Members of
the Federal State Joint Board on
Universal Service have proposed that
the Commission establish a dedicated
Mobility Fund that would provide $50
million in the first year, $100 million in
the second year, and then increase by
$100 million each year until support
reaches $500 million annually. A $500
million annual budget should be
sufficient to sustain and expand the
availability of mobile broadband.
Moreover, mobile providers may also be
eligible for support in CAF 1 in areas
where price cap carriers opt not to
accept the state-level commitment, in
addition to Mobility Fund Phase II
support.
316. Some small proportion of
geographic areas may be served by a
single wireless ETC, which might
reduce coverage if it fails to win ongoing
support within the $500 million budget.
But the current record does not
persuade the Commission that the best
approach to ensure continuing service
in those instances is to increase its
overall $500 million budget. Rather, the
Commission has established a waiver
process as discussed elsewhere in the
R&O that a wireless ETC may use to
demonstrate that additional support is
needed for its customers to continue
receiving mobile voice service in areas
where there is no terrestrial mobile
alternative.
317. Of the $500 million, the
Commission sets aside up to $100
million for a separate Tribal Mobility
Fund, for the same reasons articulated
with respect to the Tribal Mobility Fund
Phase I. In addition, many Tribal lands
require ongoing support in order to
provide service and therefore the
Commission designates a substantial
level of funding to ensure that these
communities are not left behind. This
amount is roughly equivalent to the
amount of funding currently provided to
Tribal lands in the lower 48 states and
in Alaska, excluding support awarded to
study areas that include the most
densely populated communities in
Alaska.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
4. Eliminating the Identical Support
Rule
318. Discussion. The Commission
eliminates the identical support rule.
Based on more than a decade of
experience with the operation of the
current rule and having received a
multitude of comments noting that the
current rule fails to efficiently target
support where it is needed, the
Commission reiterates the conclusion
that this rule has not functioned as
intended. As described in more detail
below, identical support does not
provide appropriate levels of support for
the efficient deployment of mobile
services in areas that do not support a
private business case for mobile voice
and broadband. Because the explicit
support for mobility the Commission
adopts today will be designed to
appropriately target funds to such areas,
the identical support rule is no longer
necessary or in the public interest.
319. The Commission anticipated that
universal service support would be
driven to the most efficient providers as
they captured customers from the
incumbent provider in a competitive
marketplace. It originally expected that
growth in subscribership to a
competitive ETC’s services would
necessarily result in a reduction in
subscribership to the incumbent’s
services. Instead, the vast majority of
competitive ETC support has been
attributable to the growing role of
wireless in the United States.
Overwhelmingly, high-cost support for
competitive ETCs has been distributed
to wireless carriers providing mobile
services. Although nearly 30 percent of
households nationwide have cut the
cord and have only wireless voice
service, many households subscribe to
both wireline voice service and wireless
voice service. Moreover, because
households typically have multiple
mobile phones, wireless competitive
ETCs have been able to receive multiple
subsidies for the same household.
Although the expansion of wireless
service has brought many benefits to
consumers, the identical support rule
was not designed to efficiently provide
appropriate levels of support for
mobility.
320. The support levels generated by
the identical support rule bear no
relation to the efficient cost of providing
mobile voice service in a particular
geography. In areas where the
incumbent’s support per line is high, a
competitive ETC will receive relatively
high levels of support per line, while it
would receive markedly less support in
an adjacent area with the same cost
characteristics, if the incumbent there is
PO 00000
Frm 00040
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
receiving relatively little support per
line. This makes little sense.
Demographics, topography, and demand
by travelers for mobile coverage along
roads, as opposed to residences, are
considerations that may create different
business cases for fixed vs. mobile voice
services in different areas, with a
resulting effect on the level of need for
subsidization. As a result of these and
other differences in cost and revenue
structures, the per-line amounts
received by competitive ETCs are a
highly imperfect approximation of the
amount of subsidy necessary to support
mobile service in a particular
geographic area and such structures
have simply missed the mark.
321. Given the way the identical
support rule operates, wireless
competitive ETCs often do not have
appropriate incentives for entry. Some
areas with per-line support amounts
that are relatively high may be attracting
multiple competitive ETCs, each of
which invests in its own duplicative
infrastructure. Indeed, many areas have
four or more competitive ETCs
providing overlapping service. These
areas may be attracting investment that
could otherwise be directed elsewhere,
including areas that are not currently
served. Conversely, in some areas the
subsidy provided by the identical
support rule may be too low, so that no
competitive ETCs seek to serve the area,
resulting in inadequate mobile coverage.
322. Moreover, today, competitive
ETC support is calculated, and lines are
reported, according to the billing
address of the subscriber. Although the
identical support rule provides a perline subsidy for each competitive ETC
handset in service, the customer need
not use the handset at the billing
address in order to receive support.
Indeed, mobile competitive ETCs may
receive support for some customers that
rarely use their handsets in high-cost
areas, but typically use their cell phones
on highways and in towns or other
places in which coverage would be
available even without support. As
currently constructed, the rule fails to
ensure that facilities are built in areas
that actually lack coverage.
323. The Commission rejects
contentions that competitive ETCs
serving certain types of areas should be
exempted from elimination of the
identical support rule. For example, a
number of commenters from Alaska
suggest that Alaska should be excluded
altogether from today’s reforms, and that
high-cost support should generally
continue in Alaska at existing levels
with redistribution of that support
within the state. The Commission
appreciates and recognizes that Alaska
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
faces uniquely challenging operating
conditions, and agrees that national
solutions may require modification to
serve the public interest in Alaska. The
Commission does not, however, believe
that the Alaskan proposals ultimately
best serve the interest of Alaskan
consumers. The Commission believes
that the package of reforms adopted in
the R&O targeting funding for
broadband and mobility, eliminating
duplicative support, and ensuring all
mechanisms provide incentives for
prudent and efficient network
investment and operation is the best
approach for all parts of the Nation,
including Alaska.
324. That said, it is important to
ensure our approach is flexible enough
to take into account the unique
conditions in places like Alaska, and the
Commission makes a number of
important modifications to the national
rules, particularly with respect to public
interest obligations, the Mobility Funds,
and competitive ETC phase down, to
account for those special circumstances,
such as its remoteness, lack of roads,
challenges and costs associated with
transporting fuel, lack of scalability per
community, satellite and backhaul
availability, extreme weather
conditions, challenging topography, and
short construction season. Further, to
the extent specific proposals have a
disproportionate or inequitable impact
on any carriers (wireline or wireless)
serving Alaska, the Commission notes
that it will provide for expedited
treatment of any related waiver requests
for all Tribal and insular areas. The
Commission believes this approach, on
balance, provides the benefits of our
national approach while taking into
account the unique operating conditions
in some communities. Analogous
proposals to maintain existing wireline
and wireless support levels in other
geographic areas, including the U.S.
Territories and other Tribal lands, suffer
the same infirmities as the proposals
related to Alaska, and are also rejected.
325. The Commission notes that the
elimination of the identical support rule
applies also to competitive ETCs
providing fixed services, including
competitive wireline service providers.
The reforms the Commission adopts
elsewhere in the R&O are designed to
achieve nearly ubiquitous broadband
deployment. In those states where the
incumbent price cap carrier declines to
make a state-level commitment to build
broadband in exchange for model-based
support, all competitive ETCs will have
the opportunity to compete to provide
supported services. In other areas,
where the incumbent service providers
will be responsible for achieving the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
universal service goals, the Commission
finds it would not be in the public
interest to provide additional support to
carriers providing duplicative services.
In addition, in areas where
unsubsidized providers have built out
service, no carrier—incumbent or
competitive—will receive support,
placing all providers on even footing.
326. The Commission rejects any
arguments that the Commission may not
eliminate the identical support rule
because doing so would prevent some
carriers from receiving high-cost
support. 47 U.S.C. 254 does not
mandate the receipt of support by any
particular carrier. Rather, as the
Commission has indicated and the
courts have agreed, the ‘‘purpose of
universal service is to benefit the
customer, not the carrier.’’ ETCs are not
entitled to the expectation of any
particular level of support, or even any
support, so long as the level of support
provided is sufficient to achieve
universal service goals. As explained
above, the Commission finds that the
identical support rule does not provide
an amount to any particular carrier that
is reasonably calculated to be sufficient
but not excessive for universal service
purposes.
327. For all of these reasons, the
Commission finds the identical support
rule does not effectively serve the
Commission’s goals, and the
Commission eliminates the rule
effective January 1, 2012.
5. Transition of Competitive ETC
Support to CAF
328. Discussion. The Commission
transitions existing competitive ETC
support to the CAF, including our
reformed system for supporting mobile
service over a five-year period beginning
July 1, 2012. The Commission finds that
a transition is desirable in order to avoid
shocks to service providers that may
result in service disruptions for
consumers. Several commenters
supported longer transition periods, but
the Commission does not find their
arguments compelling. The Commission
understands that current recipients
would prefer a slower, longer transition
that provides them with more universal
service revenues under the current
system. The Commission finds,
however, that a five-year transition will
be sufficient for competitive ETCs that
are currently receiving high-cost
support to adjust and make necessary
operational changes to ensure that
service is maintained during the
transition.
329. Moreover, during this period,
competitive ETCs offering mobile
wireless services will have the
PO 00000
Frm 00041
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81601
opportunity to bid in the Mobility Fund
Phase I auction in 2012 and participate
in the second phase of the Mobility
Fund in 2013. Competitive ETCs
offering broadband services that meet
the performance standards described
above will also have the opportunity to
participate in competitive bidding for
CAF support in areas where price cap
companies decline to make a state-level
broadband commitment in exchange for
model-determined support, as described
above, in 2013. With these new funding
opportunities, many carriers, including
wireless carriers, could receive similar
or even greater amounts of funding after
our reforms than before, albeit with that
funding more appropriately targeted to
the areas that need additional support.
330. For the purpose of this transition,
the Commission concludes that each
competitive ETC’s baseline support
amount will be equal to its total 2011
support in a given study area, or an
amount equal to $3,000 times the
number of reported lines as of year-end
2011, whichever is lower. For the
purpose of this transition, ‘‘total 2011
support’’ is the amount of support
disbursed to a competitive ETC for
2011, without regard to prior period
adjustments related to years other than
2011 and as determined by USAC on
January 31, 2012. Using a full calendar
year of support to set the baseline will
provide a reasonable approximation of
the amount that competitive ETCs
would currently expect to receive,
absent reform, and a natural starting
point for the phase-down of support.
331. In addition, the Commission
limits the baseline to $3,000 per line in
order to reflect similar changes to our
rules limiting support for incumbent
wireline carriers to $3,000 per line per
year. For the purpose of applying the
$3,000 per line limit, USAC shall use
the average of lines reported by a
competitive ETC pursuant to line count
filings required for December 31, 2010,
and December 31, 2011. This will
provide an approximation of the
number of lines typically served during
2011. As discussed above, the per-line
amounts received by competitive ETCs
are a highly imperfect approximation of
the amount of subsidy necessary to
support mobile service in a particular
geographic area. There is no indication
in the record before us that competitive
ETCs need support in excess of $3,000
per line to maintain existing service
pending transition to the Mobility Fund.
Moreover, if the Commission did not
apply the $3,000 per line limit to the
baseline amount for competitive ETCs,
their baselines could, in some
circumstances, be much higher than the
amount that they would have been
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81602
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
permitted had the Commission retained
the identical support rule going forward,
due to other changes that may lower
support for the incumbent carrier.
332. Because the amount of Mobility
Fund Phase II support provided will be
designed to provide a sufficient level of
support for a mobile carrier to provide
service, the Commission finds there is
no need for any carrier receiving
Mobility Fund Phase II support to also
continue receiving legacy support.
Therefore, any such carrier will cease to
be eligible for phase-down support in
the first month it is eligible to receive
support pursuant to the Mobility Fund
Phase II. The receipt of support
pursuant to Mobility Fund Phase I will
not impact a carrier’s receipt of support
under the phase-down. Similarly, the
receipt of support pursuant to Mobility
Fund Phase II for service to a particular
area will not affect a carrier’s receipt of
phase-down support in other areas.
333. The Commission notes that,
pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 214(e) of the Act,
competitive ETCs are required to offer
service throughout their designated
service areas. This requirement remains
in place, even as support provided
pursuant to the identical support rule is
phased down. A competitive ETC may
request modification of its designated
service area by petitioning the entity
with the relevant jurisdictional
authority. In considering such petitions,
the Commission will examine how an
ETC modification would affect areas for
which there is no other mobile service
provider, and the Commission
encourages state commissions to do the
same.
334. Competitive ETC support per
study area will be frozen at the 2011
baseline, and that monthly baseline
amount will be provided from January
1, 2012 to June 30, 2012. Each
competitive ETC will then receive 80
percent of its monthly baseline amount
from July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013, 60
percent of its baseline amount from July
1, 2013, to June 30, 2014, 40 percent
from July 1, 2014, to June 30, 2015, 20
percent from July 1, 2015, to June 30,
2016, and no support beginning July 1,
2016. The Commission expects that the
Mobility Fund Phase I auction will
occur in 2012, and that ongoing support
through the Mobility Fund Phase II will
be implemented by 2013, with $500
million expressly dedicated to mobility.
If the Mobility Fund Phase II is not
operational by June 30, 2014, the
Commission will halt the phase-down of
support until it is operational. The
Commission will similarly halt the
phase-down of support for competitive
ETCs serving Tribal lands if the
Mobility Fund Phase II for Tribal lands
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
has not been implemented at that time.
The Commission anticipates that any
temporary halt of the phase-down
would be accompanied by additional
mobile broadband public interest
obligations, to be determined. The
temporary halt will apply to wireline
competitive ETCs as well as competitive
ETCs providing mobile services.
335. The Commission notes that
Verizon Wireless and Sprint will
continue to be subject to the phasedown commitments they made in the
November 2008 merger Orders.
Consistent with the process set forth in
the Corr Wireless Order, their specific
phase downs will be applied to the
revised rules of general applicability the
Commission adopts today. As a result,
each carrier will have its baseline
support calculated based on
disbursements, with a 20 percent
reduction applied beginning July 1,
2012. Sprint, which elected Option A
described in the Corr Wireless Order,
will, in 2012, have an additional
reduction applied as necessary to
reduce its support to 20 percent of its
2008 baseline amount. Verizon
Wireless, which elected Option B, will,
in 2012, have an 80 percent reduction
applied to the support it would
otherwise receive. In 2013, neither
carrier will receive phase down support,
consistent with the commitments. To
the extent that they qualify by
remaining ETCs or obtaining ETC
designations and agreeing to the
obligations imposed on all Mobility
Fund recipients, they will be permitted
to participate in Mobility Fund Phases
I and II.
336. In determining this transition
process, the Commission also
considered (a) applying the reduction
factors to each state’s interim cap
amount, or (b) converting each
competitive ETC’s baseline amount to a
per-line amount, to which the reduction
factor would be applied. The
Commission rejects these alternatives
because they would provide less
certainty regarding support amounts for
competitive ETCs during the transition
and would create greater administrative
burdens and complexity. Under the first
alternative, an individual competitive
ETC’s support would continue to be
affected by line counts, support
calculations and relinquishments for
other, unrelated carriers within the
state. Under the second alternative, a
competitive ETC’s support would
fluctuate based on line growth or loss.
The Commission believes, on balance,
that the additional certainty to all
competitive ETCs and the
administrative efficiencies for USAC of
freezing study area support as the
PO 00000
Frm 00042
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
baseline, particularly at a time when
considerable demands will be placed on
USAC to implement an entirely new
support mechanism, outweigh the
potential negative impact to any
individual competitive ETCs that
otherwise might receive greater support
amounts during the transition to the
CAF. In addition, competitive ETCs will
be relieved of the obligation to file
quarterly line counts, which will reduce
their administrative burden as well.
337. In the USF/ICC Transformation
NPRM, the Commission sought
comment on whether exceptions to the
phase down or other modified
transitions should be permitted for some
carriers. Although the Commission
adopts limited exceptions for some
remote parts of Alaska described below
and for one Tribally-owned carrier
whose ETC designation was modified
after release of the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM, the Commission
declines to adopt any general exceptions
to our transition. Although some
commenters have argued that broad
exceptions will be needed, they did not
generally provide the sort of detailed
data and analysis that would enable us
to develop a general rule for which
carriers would qualify. The purpose of
the phase down is to avoid unnecessary
consumer disruption as the Commission
transitions to new programs that will be
better designed to achieve universal
service goals, especially with respect to
promoting investment in and
deployment of mobile service to areas
not yet served. The Commission does
not wish to encourage further
investment based on the inefficient
subsidy levels generated by the identical
support rule. The Commission
concludes that phasing down and
transitioning existing competitive
support will not create significant or
widespread risks that consumers in
areas that currently have service,
including mobile service, will be left
without any viable mobile service
provider serving their area.
338. The Commission will, however,
consider waiver requests on a case-bycase basis. Consistent with the phasedown support’s purpose of protecting
existing service during the transition to
the Mobility Fund programs, the
Commission would not find persuasive
arguments that waivers are necessary in
order to expand deployment and service
offerings to new areas. The Commission
anticipates that future investment
supported with universal service
support will be provided pursuant to
the new programs.
339. The Commission will carefully
consider all requests for waiver of the
phase down that meet the requirements
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
described above. The Commission
expects that those requests will not be
numerous. The Commission notes that
two of the four nationwide carriers—
Verizon Wireless and Sprint—have
already given up significant amounts of
the support they received under the
identical support rule, and there is no
indication in the record before us that
those companies have turned off towers
as a consequence of relinquishing their
support.
340. The Commission notes that the
transition the Commission adopts here
will include those carriers currently
receiving support under the Covered
Locations exception to the interim cap
and those carriers that have sought to
take advantage of the own-costs
exception to the cap. In adopting the
Covered Locations exception to the
funding cap in the 2008 Interim Cap
Order, the Commission recognized that
penetration rates for basic telephone
service on Tribal lands were lower than
for the rest of the Nation, and the
Commission concluded that competitive
ETCs serving those areas were not
merely providing complementary
services. Under this exception,
competitive ETCs serving Tribal lands
have operated without a cap, and have
benefited from significant funding
increases. Indeed, support provided for
service in Covered Locations has nearly
doubled, from an estimated $72 million
in 2008 to an estimated $150 million in
2011, while competitive ETC high-cost
support for the remainder of the nation
was frozen.
341. A significant number of
supported lines under the Covered
Locations exception are in larger cities
in Alaska where multiple competitive
ETCs often serve the same area. The
result is that a significant amount of
support in Alaska is provided to
competitive ETCs serving the three
largest Alaskan cities, Anchorage,
Fairbanks, and Juneau.
342. The interim cap—along with its
exceptions—was intended to be in place
only until the Commission adopted
comprehensive reforms to the high-cost
program. The Commission adopts those
reforms today. It is therefore
appropriate, as the Commission
transitions away from the identical
support rule and the interim cap to a
new high-cost support mechanism,
including for mobile services, that this
transition should begin for all
competitive ETCs, including those that
previously received uncapped support
under exceptions to the interim cap.
343. With respect to Covered
Locations, the Commission recognizes
the significant strides that competitive
ETCs have made in Covered Locations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
in the last two years, and that more still
must be done to support expanded
mobile coverage on Tribal lands. But, as
with the rest of the Nation, the
Commission concludes that the most
effective way to do so will be through
mechanisms that specifically and
explicitly target support to expand
coverage in Tribal lands where there is
no economic business case to provide
mobile service, not through the
permanent continuation of the identical
support rule. Our newly created
Mobility Funds will provide dedicated
funding to Tribal lands in a manner
consistent with the policy objectives
underlying our Covered Locations
policy to continue to promote
deployment in these communities.
344. The Commission therefore lifts
the Covered Locations exception, and
concludes that those carriers serving
Tribal lands will be subject to the
national five-year transition period. The
Commission finds persuasive, however,
arguments that carriers serving remote
parts of Alaska, including Alaska Native
villages, should have a slower transition
path in order to preserve newly initiated
services and facilitate additional
investment in still unserved and
underserved areas during the national
transition to the Mobility Funds. Over
50 remote communities in Alaska have
no access to mobile voice service today,
and many remote Alaskan communities
have access to only 2G services. While
carriers serving other parts of Alaska
will be subject to the national five-year
transition period, the Commission is
convinced a more gradual approach is
warranted for carriers in remote parts of
Alaska. For purposes of this R&O, the
Commission will treat as remote areas of
Alaska all areas other than the study
areas, or portions thereof, that include
the three major cities in Alaska with
over 30,000 in population, Anchorage,
Juneau, and Fairbanks. With respect to
Anchorage, the Commission excludes
the ACS of Anchorage study area (SAC
613000) as well as Eagle River Zones 1
and 2 and Chugiak Zones 1 and 2 of the
Matanuska Telephone Authority study
area (SAC 619003). For Fairbanks, the
Commission excludes zone 1 of the ACS
of Fairbanks (SAC 613008), and for
Juneau, the Commission excludes the
ACS Alaska-Juneau study area (SAC
613012). The Commission notes that
ACS and GCI concur that the study
areas, or portions thereof, that include
these three cities are an appropriate
proxy for non-remote areas of Alaska.
There is no evidence on the record that
any accommodation is necessary to
preserve service or protect consumers in
these larger Alaskan communities.
PO 00000
Frm 00043
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81603
345. Specifically, in lifting the
Covered Locations exception, the
Commission delays the beginning of the
five-year transition period for a two-year
period for remote areas of Alaska. As a
result, the Commission expects that
ongoing support through the Mobility
Fund Phase II, including the Tribal
Mobility Fund Phase II, will be
implemented prior to the beginning of
the five-year transition period in July
2014 for remote parts of Alaska,
providing greater certainty and stability
for carriers in these areas. During this
two-year period, the Commission
establishes an interim cap for remote
areas of Alaska for high-cost support for
competitive ETCs, which balances the
need to control the growth in support to
competitive ETCs in uncapped areas
and the need to provide a more gradual
transition for the very remote and very
high-cost areas in Alaska to reflect the
special circumstances carriers and
consumers face in those communities.
This cap will be modeled on the stateby-state interim cap that has been in
place under the Interim Cap Order.
Specifically, the interim cap for remote
areas of Alaska will be set at the total
of all competitive ETC’s baseline
support amounts in remote areas of
Alaska using the same process described
above. On a quarterly basis, USAC will
calculate the support each competitive
ETC would have received under the
frozen per-line support amount as of
December 31, 2011 capped at $3000 per
year, and then, if necessary, calculate a
state reduction factor to reduce the total
amount down to the cap amount for
remote areas of Alaska. Specifically,
USAC will compare the total amount of
uncapped support to the interim cap for
remote areas of Alaska. Where the total
uncapped support is greater than the
available support amount, USAC will
divide the interim cap support amount
by the total uncapped amount to yield
the reduction factor. USAC will then
apply the reduction factor to the
uncapped amount for each competitive
ETC within remote areas of Alaska to
arrive at the capped level of high-cost
support. If the uncapped support is less
than the available capped support
amount, no reduction will be required.
346. In addition, the Commission
adopts a limited exception to the phasedown of support for Standing Rock
Telecommunications, Inc. (Standing
Rock), a Tribally-owned competitive
ETC that had its ETC designation
modified within calendar year 2011 for
the purpose of providing service
throughout the entire Standing Rock
Sioux Reservation. The Commission
recognizes that Tribally-owned ETCs
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81604
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
play a vital role in serving their
communities, often in remote, lowincome, and unserved and underserved
regions. The Commission finds that a
tailored approach in this particular
instance is appropriate because of the
unique federal trust relationship the
Commission shares with federally
recognized Tribes, which requires the
federal government to adhere to certain
fiduciary standards in its dealings with
Tribes. In this regard, the federal
government has a longstanding policy of
promoting Tribal self-sufficiency and
economic development, as embodied in
various federal statutes. As an
independent agency of the federal
government, ‘‘the Commission
recognizes its own general trust
relationship with, and responsibility to,
federally recognized Tribes.’’ In keeping
with this recognition, the Commission
has previously taken actions to aid
Tribally-owned companies, which are
entities of their Tribal governments and
instruments of Tribal selfdetermination. For example, the
Commission has adopted licensing
procedures to increase radio station
ownership by Tribes and Triballyowned entities through the use of a
‘‘Tribal Priority.’’
347. A limited exception to the phasedown of competitive ETC support will
give Standing Rock, a nascent Triballyowned ETC that was designated to serve
its entire Reservation and the only such
ETC to have its ETC designation
modified since release of the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM in February
2011, the opportunity to ramp up its
operations in order to reach a
sustainable scale to serve consumers in
its service territory. The Commission
finds that granting a two-year exception
to the phase-down of support to this
Tribally-owned competitive ETC is in
the public interest. For a two-year
period, Standing Rock will receive perline support amounts that are the same
as the total support per line received in
the fourth quarter of this year. The
Commission adopts this approach in
order to enable Standing Rock to reach
a sustainable scale so that consumers on
the Reservation can realize the benefits
of connectivity that, but for Standing
Rock, they might not otherwise have
access to.
348. The Commission concludes that
carriers that have sought to take
advantage of the ‘‘own-costs’’ exception
to the existing interim cap on
competitive ETC funds should not be
exempted from the phase down of
support. The ‘‘own costs’’ exception was
intended to exempt carriers filing their
own cost data from the interim cap to
the extent their costs met an appropriate
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
threshold. Because the Commission is
transitioning away from support based
on the identical support rule and toward
new high-cost support mechanisms, the
Commission sees no reason to continue
to make the exception available going
forward.
E. Connect America Fund in Remote
Areas
349. In this section of the R&O, the
Commission establishes a budget for
CAF support in remote areas. This
reflects the Commission’s commitment
to ensuring that Americans living in the
most remote areas of the nation, where
the cost of deploying wireline or
cellular terrestrial broadband
technologies is extremely high, can
obtain affordable broadband through
alternative technology platforms such as
satellite and unlicensed wireless. As the
National Broadband Plan observes, the
cost of providing service is typically
much higher for terrestrial networks in
the hardest-to-serve areas of the country
than in less remote but still rural areas.
Accordingly, the Commission has
exempted the most remote areas,
including fewer than 1 percent of all
American homes, from the home and
business broadband service obligations
that otherwise apply to CAF recipients.
By setting aside designated funding for
these difficult-to-serve areas, however,
and by modestly relaxing the broadband
performance obligations associated with
this funding to encourage its use by
providers of innovative technologies
like satellite and fixed wireless, which
may be significantly less costly to
deploy in these remote areas, the
Commission can ensure that those who
live and work in remote locations also
have access to affordable broadband
service.
350. Although the Commission seeks
further comment on the details of
distributing dedicated remote-areas
funding in the Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking accompanying
the R&O, the Commission sets as the
budget for this funding at least $100
million annually. The choice of budget
necessarily involves the reasonable
exercise of predictive judgment, rather
than a precise calculation: Many of the
innovative, lower-cost approaches to
serving hard to reach areas continue to
evolve rapidly; the Commission is not
setting the details of the distribution
mechanism in the R&O; and the
Commission is balancing competing
priorities for funding. Nevertheless, a
budget of at least $100 million per year
is likely to make a significant difference
in ensuring meaningful broadband
access in the most difficult-to-serve
areas.
PO 00000
Frm 00044
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
351. Based on the RUS’s prior
experience with dedicated satellite
funding to remote areas, a budget of at
least $100 million could make a
significant difference in expanding
availability of affordable broadband
service at such locations. Satellite
broadband is already available to most
households and small businesses in
remote areas, and is likely to be
available at increasing speeds over time,
but current satellite services tend to
have significantly higher prices to endusers than terrestrial fixed broadband
services, and include substantial upfront installation costs. To help
overcome these barriers in the RUS’s
BIP satellite program, supported
providers received a one-time upfront
payment per location to offer service for
at least one year at a reduced price.
There has been substantial consumer
participation in this program, with
providers estimating that they would be
able to provide service to approximately
424,000 people at the reduced rates.
Were the Commission to take a similar
approach in distributing the $100
million set aside for remote areas
funding, it could, in principle, provide
a one-time sign-up subsidy to almost all
of the estimated 670,000 remote,
terrestrially-unserved locations within 4
years.
352. Such a calculation is only
illustrative. For one, the Commission
does not anticipate restricting the
technology that can be used for remote
area support. To the contrary, it seeks to
encourage maximum participation of
providers able to serve these most
difficult to reach areas. In addition, the
Commission may choose to disburse
funding for remote areas in ways that
either increase or decrease the dollars
per supported customer, as compared to
the RUS program. For example, the
Commission may choose to provide
ongoing support, in addition to or
instead of a one-time subsidy, or it may
adopt a means-tested approach to
reducing the cost of service in remote
areas, to target support to those most in
need. The Commission seeks comment
on each of these approaches in the
Further Notice.
353. Notwithstanding this
uncertainty, however, the record is
sufficient for the Commission to
conclude that a budget of at least $100
million falls within a reasonable initial
range for a program targeted at
innovative broadband technologies in
remote areas. The Commission expects
to revisit this decision over time, and
will adjust support levels as
appropriate.
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
F. Petitions for Waiver
354. During the course of this
proceeding, various parties, both
incumbents and competitive ETCs, have
argued that reductions in current
support levels would threaten their
financial viability, imperiling service to
consumers in the areas they serve. The
Commission cannot, however, evaluate
those claims absent detailed information
about individualized circumstances,
and conclude that they are better
handled in the course of case-by-case
review. Accordingly, the Commission
permits any carrier negatively affected
by these universal service reforms to file
a petition for waiver that clearly
demonstrates that good cause exists for
exempting the carrier from some or all
of those reforms, and that waiver is
necessary and in the public interest to
ensure that consumers in the area
continue to receive voice service.
355. The Commission does not,
however, expect to grant waiver
requests routinely, and caution
petitioners that the Commission intends
to subject such requests to a rigorous,
thorough and searching review
comparable to a total company earnings
review. In particular, the Commission
intends to take into account not only all
revenues derived from network facilities
that are supported by universal service
but also revenues derived from
unregulated and unsupported services
as well. The intent of this waiver
process is not to shield companies from
secular market trends, such as line loss
or wireless substitution. Waiver would
be warranted where an ETC can
demonstrate that, without additional
universal service funding, its support
would not be ‘‘sufficient to achieve the
purposes of [section 254 of the Act].’’ In
particular, a carrier seeking such waiver
must demonstrate that it needs
additional support in order for its
customers to continue receiving voice
service in areas where there is no
terrestrial alternative. The Commission
envisions granting relief only in those
circumstances in which the petitioner
can demonstrate that the reduction in
existing high-cost support would put
consumers at risk of losing voice
services, with no alternative terrestrial
providers available to provide voice
telephony service using the same or
other technologies that provide the
functionalities required for supported
voice service. The Commission
envisions granting relief only in those
circumstances in which the petitioner
can demonstrate that the reduction in
existing high-cost support would put
consumers at risk of losing voice
services, with no alternative terrestrial
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
providers available to provide voice
telephony service to consumers using
the same or other technologies that
provide the functionalities required for
supported voice service. The
Commission will also consider whether
the specific reforms would cause a
provider to default on existing loans
and/or become insolvent. For mobile
providers, the Commission will
consider as a factor specific showings
regarding the impact on customers,
including roaming customers, if a
petitioner is the only provider of CDMA
or GSM coverage in the affected area.
356. Petitions for waiver must include
a specific explanation of why the waiver
standard is met in a particular case.
Conclusory assertions that reductions in
support will cause harm to the carrier or
make it difficult to invest in the future
will not be sufficient.
357. In addition, petitions must
include all financial data and other
information sufficient to verify the
carrier’s assertions, including, at a
minimum, the following information:
• Density characteristics of the study
area or other relevant geographic area
including total square miles, subscribers
per square mile, road miles, subscribers
per road mile, mountains, bodies of
water, lack of roads, remoteness,
challenges and costs associated with
transporting fuel, lack of scalability per
community, satellite and backhaul
availability, extreme weather
conditions, challenging topography,
short construction season or any other
characteristics that contribute to the
area’s high costs.
• Information regarding existence or
lack of alternative providers of voice
and whether those alternative providers
offer broadband.
• (For incumbent carriers) How
unused or spare equipment or facilities
is accounted for by providing the Part
32 account and Part 36 separations
category this equipment is assigned to.
• Specific details on the make-up of
corporate operations expenses such as
corporate salaries, the number of
employees, the nature of any overhead
expenses allocated from affiliated or
parent companies, or other expenses.
• Information regarding all end user
rate plans, both the standard residential
rate and plans that include local calling,
long distance, Internet, texting, and/or
video capabilities.
• (For mobile providers) A map or
maps showing (1) the area it is licensed
to serve; (2) the area in which it actually
provides service; (3) the area in which
it is designated as a CETC; (4) the area
in which it is the sole provider of
mobile service; (5) location of each cell
site. For the first four of these areas, the
PO 00000
Frm 00045
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81605
provider must also submit the number
of road-miles, population, and square
miles. Maps shall include roads,
political boundaries, and major
topographical features. Any areas,
places, or natural features discussed in
the provider’s waiver petition shall be
shown on the map.
• (For mobile providers) Evidence
demonstrating that it is the only
provider of mobile service in a
significant portion of any study area for
which it seeks a waiver. A mobile
provider may satisfy this evidentiary
requirement by submitting industryrecognized carrier service availability
data, such as American Roamer data, for
all wireless providers licensed by the
FCC to serve the area in question. If a
mobile provider claims to be the sole
provider in an area where an industryrecognized carrier service availability
data indicates the presence of other
service, then it must support its claim
with the results of drive tests
throughout the area in question. In the
parts of Alaska or other areas where
drive testing is not feasible, a mobile
provider may offer a statistically
significant number of tests in the
vicinity of locations covered. Moreover,
equipment to conduct the testing can be
transported by off-road vehicles, such as
snow-mobiles or other vehicles
appropriate to local conditions. Testing
must examine a statistically meaningful
number of call attempts (originations)
and be conducted in a manner
consistent with industry best practices.
Waiver petitioners that submit test
results must fully describe the testing
methodology, including but not limited
to the test’s geographic scope, sampling
method, and test set-up (equipment
models, configuration, etc.). Test results
must be submitted for the waiver
petitioner’s own network and for all
carriers that the industry-recognized
carrier service availability data shows to
be serving the area in which the
petitioner claims to be the only provider
of mobile service.
• (For mobile providers). Revenue
and expense data for each cell site for
the three most recent fiscal years.
Revenues shall be broken out by source:
End user revenues, roaming revenues,
other revenues derived from facilities
supported by USF, all other revenues.
Expenses shall be categorized: Expenses
that are directly attributable to a specific
cell site, network expenses allocated
among all sites, overhead expenses
allocated among sites. Submissions
must include descriptions the manner
in which shared or common costs and
corporate overheads are allocated to
specific cell sites. To the extent that a
mobile provider makes arguments in its
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81606
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
waiver petition based on the
profitability of specific cell sites,
petitioner must explain why its cost
allocation methodology is reasonable.
• (For mobile providers) Projected
revenues and expenses, on cell-site
basis, for 5 years, with and without the
waiver it seeks. In developing revenue
and expense projections, petitioner
should assume that it is required to
serve those areas in which it is the sole
provider for the entire five years and
that it is required to fulfill all of its
obligations as an ETC through December
2013.
• A list of services other than voice
telephone services provided over the
universal service supported plant, e.g.,
video or Internet, and the percentage of
the study area’s telephone subscribers
that take these additional services.
• (For incumbent carriers) Procedures
for allocating shared or common costs
between incumbent LEC regulated
operations, competitive operations, and
other unregulated or unsupported
operations.
• Audited financial statements and
notes to the financial statements, if
available, and otherwise unaudited
financial statements for the most recent
three fiscal years. Specifically, the cash
flow statement, income statement and
balance sheets. Such statements shall
include information regarding costs and
revenues associated with unregulated
operations, e.g., video or Internet.
• Information regarding outstanding
loans, including lender, loan terms, and
any current discussions regarding
restructuring of such loans.
• Identification of the specific
facilities that will be taken out of
service, such as specific cell towers for
a mobile provider, absent grant of the
requested waiver.
• For Tribal lands and insular areas,
any additional information about the
operating conditions, economic
conditions, or other reasons warranting
relief based on the unique
characteristics of those communities.
358. Failure to provide the listed
information shall be grounds for
dismissal without prejudice. In addition
to the above, the petitioner shall
respond and provide any additional
information as requested by
Commission staff. The Commission will
also welcome any input that the
relevant state commission may wish to
provide on the issues under
consideration, with a particular focus on
the availability of alternative
unsubsidized voice competitors in the
relevant area and recent rate-setting
activities at the state level, if any.
359. The Commission delegates to the
Wireline Competition and Wireless
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
Telecommunications Bureaus the
authority to approve or deny all or part
of requests for waiver of the phase-down
in support adopted herein. Such
petitions will be placed on public
notice, with a minimum of 45 days
provided for comments and reply
comments to be filed by the general
public and relevant state commission.
The Commission directs the Bureaus to
prioritize review of any applications for
waiver filed by providers serving Tribal
lands and insular areas, and to complete
their review of petitions from providers
serving Tribal lands and insular areas
within 45 days of the record closing on
such waiver petitions.
G. Enforcing the Budget for Universal
Service
1. Creating New Flexibility To Manage
Fluctuations in Demand
360. Discussion. The Commission
adopts the proposed amendment to 47
CFR 54.709(b) to permit the
Commission to instruct USAC to take
alternative action with regard to prior
period adjustments when making its
quarterly demand filings. Currently, the
section requires that excess
contributions received in a quarter ‘‘will
be carried forward to the following
quarter.’’ The Commission amends the
rule to add paragraph 54.709(b)(1),
which shall read, ‘‘The Commission
may instruct USAC to treat excess
contributions in a manner other than as
prescribed in paragraph (b). Such
instructions may be made in the form of
a Commission Order or a Public Notice
released by the Wireline Competition
Bureau. Any such Public Notice will
become effective fourteen days after
release of the Public Notice, absent
further Commission action.’’
361. Permitting the Commission to
modify its current treatment of excess
contributions as necessary on a case-bycase basis will permit it to better
manage the effects of one-time and
seasonal events that may create undue
volatility in the contribution factor.
Programmatic changes, one-time
distributions of support (such as
Mobility Fund Phase I), and other
transitional processes will likely cause
the quarterly funding demands to
fluctuate considerably until the
transitions are complete, similarly to
how large, unforecasted one-time
contributions have caused significant
fluctuations in the past. The ability to
provide specific, case-by-case
instructions will allow the Commission
to smooth the effects of such events on
the contribution factor, rendering it
more predictable for the consumers who
ultimately pay for universal service.
PO 00000
Frm 00046
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
362. In response to the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM seeking
comment on whether to modify 47 CFR
54.709(b), some commenters raise
questions about whether 47 U.S.C. 254
of the Act provides the Commission the
authority to establish a broadband
reserve fund intended to make
disbursements according to rules that
were, at the time, not yet adopted. As
RICA put it, 47 U.S.C. 254 requires
carriers to contribute to the ‘‘specific,
predictable, and sufficient mechanisms
established (not to be established) by the
Commission to preserve and advance
Universal Service.’’ Verizon, similarly,
suggests that 47 U.S.C. 254’s reference
to ‘‘‘specific’ and ‘predictable’ USF
programs and support—and
contributions collected for ‘established’
universal service mechanisms—
counsels against reserving support for
mechanisms that do not yet exist.’’
Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth
below, the Commission concludes that a
broadband reserve account is consistent
with 47 U.S.C. 254 of the Act.
363. The Commission does not read
47 U.S.C. 254(d) as limiting the
Commission’s authority to require
contributions only to support specific
mechanisms that are already established
at the time the contributions are
required, for several reasons.
364. Broadly speaking, the
Commission understands 47 U.S.C.
254(d) to be directed to explaining who
must contribute to the Federal universal
service mechanisms—specifically,
telecommunications carriers that
provide interstate telecommunications
services, unless exempted by the
Commission, as well as other providers
of interstate telecommunications if the
Commission determines the public
interest so requires. The reference in 47
U.S.C. 254(d) to ‘‘the specific,
predictable, and sufficient mechanisms
established by the Commission to
preserve and advance universal service’’
is not, as these commenters suggest, a
limitation on what kinds of
mechanisms—i.e., already-established
mechanisms—will be supported; it is
instead a reference to language in 47
U.S.C. 254(b), which directs the
Commission (as well as the Joint Board)
to be guided by several principles in
establishing universal service policies,
including the principle that ‘‘[t]here
should be specific, predictable and
sufficient Federal and State mechanisms
to preserve and advance universal
service.’’ In other words, it merely
requires that contributions under 47
U.S.C. 254 are to be used to support the
Federal mechanisms that are established
under 47 U.S.C. 254.
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
365. The Commission also finds that
commenters’ argument is unpersuasive
given the grammatical construction of
the relevant section of the law. In the
phrase ‘‘mechanisms established by the
Commission,’’ the clause ‘‘established
by the Commission’’ functions as an
adjectival phrase identifying which
mechanisms are funded through 47
U.S.C. 254(d). Specifically, the
mechanisms funded by 47 U.S.C. 254(d)
are the mechanisms ‘‘established by the
Commission’’ consistent with the
principles of 47 U.S.C. 254(b) (that they
be specific, predictable, and sufficient).
When used in this way, the word
‘‘established’’ is not a word in the past
tense; it is not a word that signifies any
particular tense at all. Commenters who
read the word ‘‘established’’ as
signifying the past tense are, the
Commission concludes, improperly
reading ‘‘already’’ into the phrase, so
that it would read ‘‘mechanisms already
established by the Commission.’’
Congress could have written the statute
that way, but it did not. Admittedly,
Congress could have written the statute
in yet other ways that would have made
clearer that these commenters’ concerns
are misplaced. But that indicates only
that the statute is amenable to various
interpretations. And for the reasons
explained here, the Commission
concludes its interpretation is the better
reading of the statute.
366. These commenters’ view also
raises troubling questions of
interpretation, which the Commission
believes Congress did not intend. That
is, under these commenters’ reading of
the statute, contributions may only be
collected to fund a mechanism that has
already been established. Broadly
speaking, all of the rule changes that the
Commission has implemented since the
1996 Act, including those adopted in
this R&O, have been to effectuate the
general statutory directive that
consumers should have access to
telecommunication and information
services in rural and high cost areas. As
such, the entire collection of rules can
be viewed as the ‘‘high-cost
mechanism,’’ and the specific existing
programs, as well as the Connect
America Fund, are part of that high-cost
mechanism.
367. To read the statute in any other
way would create significant
administrative issues that the
Commission cannot believe Congress
would have intended. How would the
Commission—or a court— decide
whether a modified mechanism is a
new, not-yet-established mechanism
(which could not provide support until
new funds are collected for it), or
whether the modifications are minor
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
enough such that the mechanism,
although different, is still the
mechanism that was already
established? The Commission does not
believe that Congress intended either
the Commission or a court to be
required to wrestle with such questions,
which serve no obvious congressional
purpose. Alternatively, any change, no
matter how minor, could transform the
mechanism into one that was not-yetestablished. Interpreting the statute in
that way would similarly serve no
identifiable congressional purpose, but
would serve only to slow down and
complicate reforms to support
mechanisms that the Commission
determines are appropriate to advance
the public interest. Significantly in this
regard, Congress in 47 U.S.C. 254
specifically contemplated that universal
service programs would change over
time; reading the statute the way these
commenters suggest would add
unnecessary burdens to that process.
2. Setting Quarterly Demand To Meet
the $4.5 Billion Budget
368. Discussion. Various parties have
submitted proposed budgets into the
record suggesting that the Commission
could maintain an overall $4.5 billion
annual budget by collecting that amount
in the near term, projecting that actual
demand will be lower than that amount,
and using those funds in subsequent
quarters to address actual demand that
exceeds $1.125 billion. The Commission
is persuaded that, on balance, it would
be appropriate to provide greater
flexibility to USAC to use past
contributions to meet future program
demand so that the Commission can
implement the Connect America Fund
in a way that does not cause dramatic
swings in the contribution factor. The
Commission now sets forth general
instructions to USAC on how to
implement the $4.5 billion budget
target.
369. First, beginning with the
quarterly demand filing for the first
quarter of 2012, USAC should forecast
total high-cost universal service demand
as no less than $1.125 billion, i.e., one
quarter of the annual high-cost budget.
To the extent that USAC forecasts
demand will actually be higher than
that amount, USAC should reflect that
higher forecast in its quarterly demand
filing. If high-cost demand actually
exceeds $1.125 billion, no additional
funds will accumulate in the reserve
account for that quarter and, consistent
with the third instruction below, the
reserve account will be used to
constrain the high-cost demand in the
contribution factor. USAC should no
longer forecast total competitive ETC
PO 00000
Frm 00047
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81607
support at the original interim cap
amount, as previously instructed, but
should forecast competitive ETC
support subject to the rules the
Commission adopts today. Specifically,
USAC shall forecast competitive ETC
demand as set by the frozen baseline per
study area as of year end 2011, as
adjusted by the phase-down in the
relevant time period.
370. Second, consistent with the
newly revised section 54.709(b) of the
rules, the Commission instructs USAC
not to make prior period adjustments
related to high-cost support if actual
contributions exceed demand. Excess
contributions shall instead be credited
to a new Connect America Fund reserve
account, to be used as described below.
371. Third, beginning with the second
quarter of 2012, the Commission directs
USAC to use the balances accrued in the
CAF reserve account to reduce high-cost
demand to $1.125 billion in any quarter
that would otherwise exceed $1.125
billion.
372. The Commission expects the
reforms the Commission adopts today to
keep annual contributions for the CAF
and any existing high-cost support
mechanisms to no more than $4.5
billion. And through the use of
incentive-based rules and competitive
bidding, the fund could require less
than $4.5 billion to achieve its goals in
future years. However, if actual program
demand, exclusive of funding provided
from the CAF or Corr Wireless reserve
accounts, for CAF and existing high-cost
mechanisms exceed an annualized $4.5
billion over any consecutive four
quarters, this situation will
automatically trigger a process to bring
demand back under budget.
Specifically, immediately upon
receiving information from USAC
regarding actual quarterly demand, the
Wireline Competition Bureau will notify
each Commissioner and publish a
Public Notice indicating that program
demand has exceeded $4.5 billion over
the last four quarters. Then, within 75
days of the Public Notice being
published, the Bureau will develop
options and provide to the
Commissioners a recommendation and
specific action plan to immediately
bring expenditures back to no more than
$4.5 billion.
3. Drawing Down the Corr Wireless
Reserve Account
373. Discussion. In order to wind
down the current broadband reserve
account, the Commission provides the
following instructions to USAC.
374. First, the Commission directs
USAC to utilize $300 million in the Corr
Wireless reserve account to fund
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81608
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
commitments that the Commission
anticipates will be made in 2012 to
recipients of the Mobility Fund Phase I
to accelerate advanced mobile services.
The Commission also directs USAC to
use the remaining funds and any
additional funding necessary for Phase
I of the CAF for price cap carriers in
2012. Those actions together should
exhaust the Corr Wireless reserve
account.
375. Second, the Commission
instructs USAC not to use the Corr
Wireless reserve account to fund
inflation adjustments to the e-rate cap
for the current 2011 funding year.
Inflation adjustments to the e-rate cap
for Funding Year 2011 and future years
shall be included in demand projections
for the e-rate program.
VI. Accountability and Oversight
376. The billons of dollars that the
Universal Service Fund disburses each
year to support vital communications
services come from American
consumers and businesses, and
recipients must be held accountable for
how they spend that money. This
requires vigorous ongoing oversight by
the Commission, working in partnership
with the states, Tribal governments,
where appropriate, and U.S. Territories,
and the Fund administrator, USAC.
Because the CAF, including the
Mobility Fund, are part of USF, the
Commission concludes that USAC shall
administer these new programs under
the terms of its current appointment as
Administrator, subject to all existing
Commission rules and orders applicable
to the Administrator. The Commission
hereby designates the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau as a point
of contact, in addition to the Wireline
Competition Bureau, on policy matters
relating to USF administration.
A. Uniform Framework for ETC
Oversight
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
1. Need for Uniform Standards for
Accountability and Oversight
377. Discussion. A uniform national
framework for accountability, including
unified reporting and certification
procedures, is critical to ensure
appropriate use of high-cost support and
to allow the Commission to determine
whether it is achieving its goals
efficiently and effectively. Therefore,
the Commission now establishes a
national framework for oversight that
will be implemented as a partnership
between the Commission and the states,
U.S. Territories, and Tribal
governments, where appropriate. As set
forth more fully in the subsections
immediately following, this national
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
framework will include annual
reporting and certification requirements
for all ETCs receiving universal funds—
not just federally-designated ETCs—
which will provide federal and state
regulators the factual basis to determine
that all USF recipients are using support
for the intended purposes, and are
receiving support that is sufficient, but
not excessive. The Commission has
authority to require all ETCs to comply
with these national requirements as a
condition of receiving federal high-cost
universal service support. (For purposes
of this section, the references to ETCs
include those ETCs that receive highcost support pursuant to legacy highcost programs and CAF programs
adopted in this R&O. It does not
generally include ETCs that receive
support solely pursuant to Mobility
Fund Phase I, which has separate
reporting obligations. Where the
requirements discussed in this section
also apply to ETCs receiving only Phase
I Mobility Fund support, the
Commission specifically states so. In the
USF/ICC Transformation FNPRM, the
Commission seeks comment on
alternative reporting requirements for
Mobility Fund support to reflect basic
differences in the nature and purpose of
the support provided for mobile
services.)
378. The Commission clarifies that
the specific reporting and certification
requirements adopted below are a floor
rather than a ceiling for the states. In 47
U.S.C. 254(f), Congress expressly
permitted states to take action to
preserve and advance universal service,
so long as not inconsistent with the
Commission’s universal service rules.
The statute permits states to adopt
additional regulations to preserve and
advance universal service so long as
they also adopt state mechanisms to
support those additional substantive
requirements. Consistent with this
federal framework, state commissions
may require the submission of
additional information that they believe
is necessary to ensure that ETCs are
using support consistent with the
statute and the implementing
regulations, so long as those additional
reporting requirements do not create
burdens that thwart achievement of the
universal service reforms set forth in
this R&O.
379. The Commission notes, however,
that one benefit of a uniform reporting
and certification framework for ETCs is
that it will minimize regulatory
compliance costs for those ETCs that
operate in multiple states. ETCs should
be able to implement uniform policies
and procedures in all of their operating
companies to track, validate, and report
PO 00000
Frm 00048
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
the necessary information. Although the
Commission adopts a number of new
reporting requirements below, the
Commission concludes that the critical
benefit of such reporting—to ensure that
statutory and regulatory requirements
associated with the receipt of USF funds
are met—outweighs the imposition of
some additional time and cost on
individual ETCs to make the necessary
reports. Under this uniform framework,
ETCs will provide annual reports and
certifications regarding specific aspects
of their compliance with public interest
obligations to the Commission, USAC,
and the relevant state commission,
relevant authority in a U.S. Territory, or
Tribal government, as appropriate by
April 1 of each year. These annual
reporting requirements should provide
the factual basis underlying the annual
47 U.S.C. 254(e) certification by the
state commission (or ETC in the case of
federally designated ETCs) by October 1
of every year that support is being used
for the intended purposes.
2. Reporting Requirements
380. Discussion. First, the
Commission extends the current federal
annual reporting requirements to all
ETCs, including those designated by
states. These requirements will now be
located in new 47 CFR 54.313.
Specifically, the Commission concludes
that all ETCs must include in their
annual reports the information that is
currently required by 47 CFR
54.209(a)(1)–(a)(6)—specifically, a
progress report on their five-year buildout plans; data and explanatory text
concerning outages; unfulfilled requests
for service; complaints received; and
certifications of compliance with
applicable service quality and consumer
protection standards and of the ability
to function in emergency situations. If
ETCs are complying with any voluntary
code (e.g., the voluntary code of conduct
concerning ‘‘bill shock’’ or the CTIA
Consumer Code for Wireless Service),
they should so indicate in their reports.
The Commission concludes that it is
necessary and appropriate to obtain
such information from all ETCs, both
federal- and state-designated, to ensure
the continued availability of highquality voice services and monitor
progress in achieving the broadband
goals and to assist the FCC in
determining whether the funds are
being used appropriately. As the
Commission said at the time the
Commission adopted these
requirements for federally-designated
ETCs, these reporting requirements
ensure that ETCs comply with the
conditions of the ETC designation and
that universal service funds are used for
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
their intended purposes. They also help
prevent carriers from seeking ETC status
for purposes unrelated to providing
rural and high-cost consumers with
access to affordable telecommunications
and information services. Accordingly,
the Commission now concludes that
these requirements should serve as a
baseline requirement for all ETCs.
381. All ETCs that receive high-cost
support will file the information
required by new 47 CFR 54.313 with the
Commission, USAC, and the relevant
state commission, relevant authority in
a U.S. Territory, or Tribal government,
as appropriate. USAC will review such
information as appropriate to inform its
ongoing audit program, in depth data
validations, and related activities. 47
CFR 54.313 reports will be due annually
by April 1, beginning on April 1, 2012.
(The Commission delegates authority to
the Wireline Competition Bureau to
modify the initial filing deadline as
necessary to comply with the
requirements of the Paperwork
Reduction Act.) The Commission will
also require that an officer of the
company certify to the accuracy of the
information provided and make the
certifications required by new 47 CFR
54.313, with all certifications subject to
the penalties for false statements
imposed under 18 U.S.C. 1001.
382. Second, the Commission
incorporates new reporting
requirements described below to ensure
that recipients are complying with the
new broadband public interest
obligations adopted in this R&O,
including broadband public interest
obligations associated with CAF ICC.
This information must be included in
annual 47 CFR 54.313 reports filed with
Commission, USAC, and the relevant
state commission, relevant authority in
a U.S. Territory, or Tribal government,
as appropriate. However, some of the
new elements are tied to new public
interest obligations that will be
implemented in 2013 or a subsequent
year and, therefore, they need not be
included until that time, as detailed
below.
383. Competitive ETCs whose support
is being phased down will not be
required to submit any of the new
information or certifications below
related solely to the new broadband
public interest obligations, but must
continue to submit information or
certifications with respect to their
provision of voice service.
384. The Commission delegates to the
Wireline Competition Bureau and
Wireless Telecommunication Bureaus
the authority to determine the form in
which recipients of support must report
this information.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
385. Speed and latency. Starting in
2013, the Commission will require all
ETCs to include the results of network
performance tests conducted in
accordance with the requirements of
this R&O and any further requirements
adopted after consideration of the
record received in response to the
FNPRM. Additionally, in the calendar
year no later than three years after
implementation of CAF Phase II, price
cap recipients must certify that they are
meeting all interim speed and latency
milestones, including the 4 Mbps/1
Mbps speed standard required by this
R&O. In the calendar year no later than
five years after implementation of CAF
Phase II, those price cap recipients must
certify that they are meeting the default
speed and latency standards applicable
at the time.
386. Capacity. Starting in 2013, the
Commission requires all ETCs to
include a self-certification letter
certifying that usage capacity limits (if
any) for their services that are subject to
the broadband public interest standard
associated with the type of funding they
are receiving are reasonably comparable
to usage capacity limits for comparable
terrestrial residential fixed broadband
offerings in urban areas, as set forth in
the Public Interest Obligations sections
above. ETCs will also be required to
report on specific capacity requirements
(if any) in conjunction with reporting of
pricing of their broadband offerings that
meet the public interest obligations, as
discussed below.
387. Build-out/Service. Recognizing
that existing five-year build out plans
may need to change to account for new
broadband obligations set forth in this
R&O, the Commission requires all ETCs
to file a new five-year build-out plan in
a manner consistent with 54.202(a)(1)(ii)
by April 1, 2013. Under the terms of
new 47 CFR 54.313(a), all ETCs will be
required to include in their annual
54.313 reports information regarding
their progress on this five-year
broadband build-out plan beginning
April 1, 2014. This progress report shall
include the number, names, and
addresses of community anchor
institutions to which the ETCs newly
offer broadband service. As discussed
above, the Commission expects ETCs to
use their support in a manner consistent
with achieving universal availability of
voice and broadband. Incumbent
carriers, both rate-of-return and price
cap, should make certifications to that
effect beginning April 1, 2013 for the
2012 calendar year.
388. In addition, all ETCs must
supply the following information:
(a) Rate-of-Return Territories. The
Commission requires all rate-of-return
PO 00000
Frm 00049
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81609
ETCs receiving support to include a selfcertification letter certifying that they
are taking reasonable steps to offer
broadband service meeting the
requirements established above
throughout their service area, and that
requests for such service are met within
a reasonable amount of time. As noted
above, these carriers must also notify
the Commission, USAC, and the
relevant state commission, relevant
authority in a U.S. Territory, or Tribal
government, as appropriate, of all
unfulfilled requests for broadband
service meeting the 4 Mbps/1 Mbps
standard the Commission establishes as
the initial CAF requirement, and the
status of such requests.
(b) Price Cap Territories. The
Commission requires all ETCs receiving
CAF support in price cap territories
based on a forward-looking cost model
to include a self-certification letter
certifying that they are meeting the
interim deployment milestones as set
forth in the Public Interest Obligations
section above and that they are taking
reasonable steps to meet increased
speed obligations that will exist for a
specified number of supported locations
before the expiration of the five-year
term for CAF Phase II funding. ETCs
that receive CAF support awarded
through a competitive process will also
be required to file such selfcertifications, subject to any
modifications adopted pursuant to the
FNPRM below.
389. In addition, as discussed above,
price cap ETCs will be able to elect to
receive CAF Phase I incremental
funding under a transitional distribution
mechanism prior to adoption and
implementation of an updated forwardlooking broadband-focused cost model
for CAF Phase II. As a condition of
receiving such support, those
companies will be required to deploy
broadband to a certain number of
unserved locations within three years,
with deployment to no fewer than twothirds of the required number of
locations within two years and to all
required locations within three years
after filing their notices of acceptance.
As of that time, carriers must offer
broadband service of at least 4 Mbps
downstream and 1 Mbps upstream, with
latency sufficiently low to enable the
use of real-time communications,
including VoIP, and with usage limits,
if any, that are reasonably comparable to
those in urban areas. As noted above, no
later than 90 days after being informed
of its eligible incremental support
amount, each price cap ETC must
provide notice to the Commission and
to the relevant state commission,
relevant authority in a U.S. Territory, or
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81610
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Tribal government, as appropriate,
identifying the areas, by wire center and
census block, in which the carrier
intends to deploy broadband to meet
this obligation, or stating that the carrier
declines to accept incremental support
for that year.
390. The carrier must also certify that
(1) deployment funded by CAF Phase I
incremental support will occur in areas
shown as unserved by fixed broadband
on the National Broadband Map that is
most current at that time, and that, to
the best of the carrier’s knowledge, are
unserved by fixed broadband with a
minimum speed of 768 kbps
downstream and 200 kbps upstream,
and that, to the best of the carrier’s
knowledge, are, in fact, unserved by
fixed broadband at those speeds; and
(2) the carrier’s current capital
improvement plan did not already
include plans to deploy broadband to
that area within three years, and that
CAF Phase I support will not be used to
satisfy any merger commitment or
similar regulatory obligation. In
addition, carriers must certify that: (1)
Within two years after filing a notice of
acceptance, they have deployed to no
fewer than two-thirds of the required
number of locations; and (2) within
three years after filing a notice of
acceptance, they have deployed to all
required locations and that they are
offering broadband service of at least 4
Mbps downstream and 1 Mbps
upstream, with latency sufficiently low
to enable the use of real-time
communications, including VoIP, and
with usage limits, if any, that are
reasonably comparable to those in urban
areas. These certifications must be
included in the first annual report due
following the year in which the carriers
reach the required milestones.
391. In addition, price cap carriers
that receive frozen high-cost support
will be required to certify that they are
using such support in a manner
consistent with achieving universal
availability of voice and broadband.
Specifically, in the 2013 certification,
all price cap carriers receiving frozen
high-cost support must certify to the
Commission, the relevant state
commission, relevant authority in a U.S.
Territory, and to any affected Tribal
government that they used such support
in a manner consistent with achieving
the universal availability of voice and
broadband. In the 2014 certification, all
price cap carriers receiving frozen highcost support must certify that at least
one-third of the frozen-high cost support
they received in 2013 was used to build
and operate broadband-capable
networks used to offer the provider’s
own retail broadband service in areas
VerDate Mar<15>2010
20:39 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
substantially unserved by an
unsubsidized competitor. In the 2015
certification, carriers must certify that at
least two-thirds of the frozen high-cost
support the carrier received in 2014 was
used in such fashion, and for 2016 and
subsequent years, carriers must certify
that all frozen high-cost support they
received in the previous year was used
in such fashion. These certifications
must be included in the carriers’ annual
reports due April 1 of each year. Price
cap companies that receive CAF ICC
also are obligated to certify that they are
using such support for building and
operating broadband-capable networks
used to offer their own retail service in
areas substantially unserved by an
unsubsidized competitor.
392. Price. The Commission requires
all ETCs to submit a self-certification
that the pricing of their voice services is
no more than two standard deviations
above the national average urban rate for
voice service, which will be specified
annually in a public notice issued by
the Wireline Competition Bureau. This
certification requirement begins April 1,
2013, to cover 2012.
393. ETCs receiving only Mobility
Fund Phase I support will self-certify
annually that they offer service in areas
with support at rates that are within a
reasonable range of rates for similar
service plans offered by mobile wireless
providers in urban areas. ETCs receiving
any other support will submit a selfcertification that the pricing of their
broadband service is within a specified
reasonable range. That range will be
established and published as more fully
described above for recipients of highcost and CAF support, other than
Mobility Fund Phase I. This certification
requirement begins April 1, 2013, to
cover 2012.
394. ETCs must also report pricing
information for both voice and
broadband offerings. They must submit
the price and capacity range (if any) for
the broadband offering that meets the
relevant speed requirement in their
annual reporting. In addition, beginning
April 1, 2012, subject to PRA approval,
all incumbent local exchange company
recipients of HCLS, frozen high-cost
support, and CAF also must report their
flat rate for residential local service to
USAC so that USAC can calculate
reductions in support levels for those
carriers with R1 rates below the
specified rate floor, as established
above. Carriers may not request
confidential treatment for such pricing
and rate information.
395. Financial Reporting. The
Commission sought comment on
requiring all ETCs to provide financial
information, including balance sheets,
PO 00000
Frm 00050
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
income statements, and statements of
cash flow.
396. Upon consideration of the
record, the Commission now adopts a
less burdensome variation of this
proposal. The Commission concludes
that it is not necessary to require
submission of such information from
publicly traded companies, as we can
obtain such information directly for SEC
registrants. Likewise, the Commission
concludes at this time it is not necessary
to require the filing of such information
by recipients of funding determined
through a forward-looking cost model or
through a competitive bidding process,
even if those recipients are privately
held. The Commission expects that a
model developed through a transparent
and rigorous process will produce
support levels that are sufficient but not
excessive, and that support awarded
through competitive processes will be
disciplined by market forces. The design
of those mechanisms should drive
support to efficient levels.
397. The Commission emphasizes,
however, that it may request additional
information on a case-by-case basis from
all ETCs, both private and public, as
necessary to discharge the universal
service oversight responsibilities.
398. For privately-held rate-of-return
carriers that continue to receive support
based in part on embedded costs, the
Commission adopts a more limited
reporting requirement, beginning in
2012. The Commission requires all
privately-held rate-of-return carriers
receiving high-cost and/or CAF support
to file with the Commission, USAC, and
the relevant state commission, relevant
authority in a U.S. Territory, or Tribal
government, as appropriate beginning
April 1, 2012, subject to PRA approval,
a full and complete annual report of
their financial condition and operations
as of the end of their preceding fiscal
year, which is audited and certified by
an independent certified public
accountant in a form satisfactory to the
Commission, and accompanied by a
report of such audit. The annual report
shall include balance sheets, income
statements, and cash flow statements
along with necessary notes to clarify the
financial statements. The income
statements shall itemize revenue by its
sources.
399. The ETCs subject to this new
requirement are all already subject to
the Uniform System of Accounts, which
specifies how required financial
information shall be maintained in
accordance with Part 32 of the
Commission’s rules. Because Part 32 of
the rules already requires incumbent
carriers to break down accounting by
study area, it should provide an
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
accurate picture of how recipients are
using the high-cost support they receive
in particular study areas. Additionally,
Part 32 provides a uniform system of
accounting that allows for an accurate
comparison among carriers. ETCs that
receive loans from the Rural Utility
Service (RUS) are already required to
provide RUS with annual financial
reports maintained in accordance with
Part 32. The Commission will allow
these carriers to satisfy their financial
reporting obligation by simply
providing electronic copies of their
annual RUS reports to the Commission,
which should not impose any additional
burden. All other rate-of-return carriers,
in their initial filing after adoption of
this R&O, shall provide the required
financial information as kept in
accordance with Part 32 of the
Commission’s rules.
400. The Commission delegates to the
Wireline Competition Bureau the
authority to resolve all other questions
regarding the appropriate format for
carriers’ first financial filing following
this R&O, as well as the authority to set
the format for subsequent reports. The
Commission may in future years
implement a standardized electronic
filing system, and the Commission also
delegates to the Wireline Competition
Bureau the task of establishing an
appropriate format for transmission of
this information.
401. The Commission does not expect
privately held ETCs will face a
significant burden in producing the
financial disclosures required herein
because such financial accounting
statements are normally prepared in the
usual course of business. In particular,
because incumbent LECs are already
required to maintain their accounts in
accordance with Part 32, the required
disclosures are expected to impose
minimal new burdens. Indeed, for the
many carriers that already provide Part
32 financial reports to RUS, there will
be no additional burden.
402. Finally, the Commission
concludes that these carriers’ financial
disclosures should be made publicly
available. The only comment the
Commission received on this issue came
from NASUCA, which strongly urged
the Commission to require public
disclosure of all financial reports.
NASUCA rightly observed that
recipients of high-cost and/or CAF
support receive extensive public
funding, and therefore the public has a
legitimate interest in being able to verify
the efficient use of those funds.
Moreover, by making this information
public, the Commission will be assisted
in its oversight duties by public interest
watchdogs, consumer advocates, and
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
others who seek to ensure that
recipients of support receive funding
that is sufficient but not excessive.
403. Ownership Information. The
Commission now adopts a rule
requiring all ETCs to report annually the
company’s holding company, operating
companies, affiliates, and any branding
(a ‘‘dba,’’ or ‘‘doing-business-as
company’’ or brand designation). In
addition, filers will be required to report
relevant universal service identifiers for
each such entity by Study Area Codes.
This will help the Commission reduce
waste, fraud, and abuse and increase
accountability in the universal service
programs by simplifying the process of
determining the total amount of public
support received by each recipient,
regardless of corporate structure. Such
information is necessary in order for the
Commission to ensure compliance with
various requirements adopted today that
take into account holding company
structure. For purposes of this
requirement, affiliated interests shall be
reported consistent with 47 U.S.C. 3(2)
of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended.
404. Tribal Engagement. ETCs serving
Tribal lands must include in their
reports documents or information
demonstrating that they have
meaningfully engaged Tribal
governments in their supported areas.
The demonstration must document that
they had discussions that, at a
minimum, included: (1) A needs
assessment and deployment planning
with a focus on Tribal community
anchor institutions; (2) feasibility and
sustainability planning; (3) marketing
services in a culturally sensitive
manner; (4) rights of way processes,
land use permitting, facilities siting,
environmental and cultural preservation
review processes; and (5) compliance
with Tribal business and licensing
requirements.
405. Elimination of Certain Data
Reporting Requirements. Finally, as
discussed above, the Commission is
eliminating LSS and IAS as standalone
support mechanisms. This obviates the
need for reporting requirements specific
to 54.301(b) and 54.802 of the rules (and
54.301(e) after December 31, 2012).
406. Overall, the changes to the
reporting requirements do not impose
an undue burden on ETCs and that the
benefits outweigh any burdens. Given
the extensive public funding these
entities receive, the expanded goals of
the program, and the need for greater
oversight, as noted by the GAO, it is
prudent to impose narrowly tailored
reporting requirements focused on the
information that will demonstrate
compliance with statutory requirements
PO 00000
Frm 00051
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81611
and the implementing rules. These
specific reporting requirements are
tailored to ensure that ETCs are
complying with their public interest
obligations and using support for the
intended purposes, as required by 47
U.S.C. 254(e) of the Act. Where possible,
the Commission is minimizing burdens
by requiring certifications in lieu of
collecting data, and by allowing the
filing of reports already prepared for
other government agencies in lieu of
new reports. Moreover, the Commission
is eliminating some of the existing
requirements, which will reduce
burdens for some ETCs. Finally, to the
extent ETCs currently provide
information either to their state or to the
Commission, they will not bear any
significant additional burden in now
also providing copies of such
information to the other regulatory
body.
3. Annual Section 254(e) Certifications
407. Discussion. First, the
Commission requires that states—and
entities not falling within the states’
jurisdiction (i.e., federally-designated
ETCs)—certify that all federal high-cost
and CAF support was used in the
preceding calendar year and will be
used in the new calendar year only for
the provision, maintenance, and
upgrading of facilities and services for
which the support is intended,
regardless of the rule under which that
support is provided. This corrects a
defect in the current rules, which
require only a certification with respect
to the coming year. The certifications
required by new 47 CFR 54.314 will be
due by October 1 of each year,
beginning with October 1, 2012. The
certification requirement applies to all
recipients of high-cost and CAF support,
including those that receive only Phase
I Mobility Fund support.
408. Second, the Commission
maintains states’ ongoing role in annual
certifications. Several commenters take
the position that responsibility for
ensuring USF recipients comply with
their public interest obligations should
remain with the states. As discussed
above, the Commission agrees that the
states should play an integral role in
assisting the Commission in monitoring
compliance, consistent with an
overarching uniform national
framework. States will continue to
certify to the Commission that support
is used by state-designated ETCs for the
intended purpose, which is modified to
include the provision, maintenance, and
upgrading of facilities capable of
delivering voice and broadband services
to homes, businesses and community
anchor institutions.
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81612
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
409. Under the reformed rules, as
before, some recipients of support may
be designated by the Commission rather
than the states. States are not required
to file certifications with the
Commission with respect to carriers that
do not fall within their jurisdiction.
However, consistent with the
partnership between the Commission
and the states to preserve and enhance
universal service, and the recognition
that states will continue to be the first
place that consumers may contact
regarding consumer protection issues,
the Commission encourages states to
bring to its attention issues and
concerns about all carriers operating
within their boundaries, including
information regarding non-compliance
with the rules by federally-designated
ETCs. The Commission similarly
encourages Tribal governments, where
appropriate, to report to the
Commission any concerns about noncompliance with the rules by all
recipients of support operating on Tribal
lands. Any such information should be
provided to the Wireline Competition
Bureau and the Consumer &
Governmental Affairs Bureau. Through
such collaborative efforts, the
Commission will work together to
ensure that consumer interests are
appropriately protected.
410. Third, the Commission clarifies
that it expects a rigorous examination of
the factual information provided in the
annual 47 CFR 54.313 reports prior to
issuance of the annual 47 U.S.C. 254(e)
certifications. Because the underlying
reporting requirements for recipients of
Mobility Fund Phase I support differ
from the reporting requirements for
ETCs receiving other high-cost support,
Mobility Fund Phase I recipients’
certifications will be based on the
factual information they provide in the
annual reports they file pursuant to 47
CFR 54.1009 of the Mobility Fund rules.
Because ETCs of Mobility Fund Phase I
support that receive support pursuant to
other high-cost mechanisms are subject
to the reporting requirements of new 47
CFR 54.313, those companies’
certifications will be based on the
factual information in the annual
reports they file pursuant to both new
47 CFR 54.313 and 47 CFR 54.1009 of
the Mobility Fund rules.
411. The Commission expects that
states (or the ETC if the state lacks
jurisdiction) will use the information
reported in April of each year for the
prior calendar year in determining
whether they can certify that carriers’
support has been used and will be used
for the intended purposes. In light of the
public interest obligations the
Commission adopts in this R&O, a key
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
component of this certification will now
be that support is being used to
maintain and extend modern networks
capable of providing voice and
broadband service. Thus, for example, if
a state commission determines, after
reviewing the annual 47 CFR 54.313
report, that an ETC did not meet its
speed or build-out requirements for the
prior year, a state commission should
refuse to certify that support is being
used for the intended purposes. In
conjunction with such review, to the
extent the state has a concern about ETC
performance, the Commission welcomes
a recommendation from the state
regarding prospective support
adjustments or whether to recover past
support amounts. As discussed more
fully below, failure to meet all
requirements will not necessarily result
in a total loss of support, to the extent
the Commission concludes, based on a
review of the circumstances, that a
lesser reduction is warranted. Likewise,
the Commission will look at ETCs’
annual 54.313 reports to verify
certifications by ETCs (in instances
where the state lacks jurisdiction) that
support is being used for the intended
purposes.
412. Fourth, the Commission
streamlines existing certifications.
Today, the Commission has two
different state certification rules, one for
rural carriers and one for non-rural
carriers. There is no substantive
difference between the existing
certification rules for the two classes of
carriers, and as a matter of
administrative convenience, the
Commission consolidates all
certifications into a single rule.
Moreover, because the net effect of the
changes that the Commission is
implementing to the high-cost programs
is, as a practical matter, to shift the
focus from whether a company is
classified as ‘‘rural’’ versus ‘‘non-rural’’
to whether a company receives all
support through a forward-looking
model or competitive process or,
instead, based in part on embedded
costs, it does not make sense to
maintain separate certification rules for
‘‘rural’’ and ‘‘non-rural’’ carriers. The
Commission sees no substantive
difference in the certifications that
should be made. Thus, the Commission
eliminates the certification requirements
currently found in 47 CFR 54.313 and
54.314 of the rules and implement new
47 CFR 54.314.
413. Finally, the Commission also
eliminates carriers’ separate certification
requirements for IAS and ICLS. As
discussed above, the Commission is
eliminating IAS as a standalone support
mechanism, and this obviates the need
PO 00000
Frm 00052
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
for IAS-specific certifications. Although
ICLS will remain in place for some
carriers, those carriers will certify
compliance through new 47 CFR 54.314.
However, to ensure there is no gap in
coverage, those carriers will file a final
certification under 47 CFR 54.904 due
June 30, 2012, covering the 2012–13
program year. Thus, by this R&O, the
Commission eliminates 47 CFR 54.809
and, effective July 2013, 47 CFR 54.904
of the rules. And as discussed above, the
Commission also eliminates 47 CFR
54.316 of the rules, relating to rate
comparability.
B. Consequences for Non-Compliance
With Program Rules
414. Discussion. Effective
enforcement is necessary to ensure that
the reforms R&O achieve their intended
goal. Our existing rules already have
self-effectuating mechanisms to incent
prompt filing of requisite certifications
and information necessary to calculate
support amounts, as companies lose
support to the extent such information
is not provided in a timely fashion.
While the Commission needs such
information to ensure that support is
being used for the intended purposes,
consistent with 47 U.S.C. 254(e) of the
Act, the Commission also needs to
ensure that such certifications, which
will be based upon the certifications
and information provided in the new 47
CFR 54.313 annual reports, adequately
address all areas of material noncompliance with program obligations.
415. The Commission believes that in
the majority of cases involving repeated
failures to timely file certifications or
data, the Commission’s existing
enforcement procedures and penalties
will adequately deter noncompliance
with the Commission’s rules, as herein
amended, regarding high-cost and CAF
support. The Commission adopts the
provisions of 47 CFR 54.209(b) in new
47 CFR 54.313, which provides for
reductions in support for failing to file
the reports required by 47 CFR 54.209(a)
in a timely fashion, and extend those
provisions to all recipients of high-cost
support. The Commission also adopts
new 47 CFR 54.314, which provides for
a similar reduction in support for the
late filing of annual certifications that
the funds received were used in the
preceding calendar year and will be
used in the coming calendar year only
for the provision, maintenance, and
upgrading of facilities and services for
which the support is intended. The
rules also provide for debarment of
those convicted of or found civilly liable
for defrauding the high-cost support
program, and the Commission
emphasizes that those rules apply with
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
equal force to CAF, including the
Mobility Fund Phase I.
416. To further ensure that the
recipients of existing high-cost and/or
CAF support use those funds for the
purposes for which they are provided,
the Commission creates a rule that
entities receiving such support will
receive reduced support should they fail
to fulfill their public interest
obligations, such as by failing to meet
deployment milestones, to provide
broadband at the speeds required by this
R&O, or to provide service at reasonably
comparable rates. This is consistent
with the suggestions of the State
Members of the Federal-State Joint
Board on Universal Service, who further
note that revoking a carrier’s ETC
designation is too blunt an instrument.
The Commission agrees that revoking a
carrier’s ETC status is not an
appropriate consequence for
noncompliance, except in the most
egregious circumstances. In the FNPRM,
the Commission seeks comment on
appropriate enforcement options for
partial non-performance. The
Commission does not rule out the
option of revoking an ETC’s status, but
the Commission seeks comment on
what circumstances would justify such
a remedy and what alternatives might be
appropriate in other circumstances. The
Commission delegates to the Wireline
Competition Bureau and Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau the task of
implementing reductions in support
based on the record received in
response to the FNPRM.
C. Record Retention
417. Discussion. The Commission
finds that the current record retention
requirements, although adequate to
facilitate audits of program participants,
are not adequate for purposes of
litigation under the False Claims Act,
which can involve conduct that relates
back substantially more than five years.
Thus, the Commission revises the
record retention requirements to extend
the retention period to ten years.
418. Additionally, the Commission
believes the record retention
requirements need clarification. The
current record retention requirements
appear in 47 CFR 54.202(e) of the
Commission’s rules. 47 CFR 54.202 is
entitled: ‘‘Additional requirements for
Commission designation of eligible
telecommunications carriers.’’
Subsections (a) through (d) of that
section apply, by their terms, only to
ETCs designated under 47 U.S.C.
214(e)(6) of the Act—i.e., ETCs
designated by the Commission rather
than by the states. Subsection (e),
however, is not so limited. Indeed, the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
Commission intended the requirements
of 47 CFR 54.202(e) to apply to all
recipients of high-cost support. To fully
support ongoing oversight, the record
retention requirements must apply to all
recipients of high-cost and CAF support.
Thus, by this R&O, the Commission
amends the rules by re-designating 47
CFR 54.202(e) as new 47 CFR 54.320 to
clarify that these ten-year record
retention requirements apply to all
recipients of high-cost and CAF support.
To ensure access to documents and
information needed for effective
ongoing oversight, the Commission
includes in new 47 CFR 54.320 a
requirement that all documents be made
available upon request to the
Commission and any of its Bureaus or
offices, the Administrator, and their
respective auditors.
D. USAC Oversight Process
419. Discussion. As noted in the USF/
ICC Transformation NPRM, audits are
an essential tool for the Commission
and USAC to ensure program integrity
and to detect and deter waste, fraud,
and abuse. In the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM, the Commission
discussed the concerns expressed by the
GAO in 2008 regarding, among other
things, the audit process that existed at
the time. The USF/ICC Transformation
NPRM also acknowledged USAC’s
December 2010 Final Report, which
detailed the findings of the audits
conducted at the direction of the
Commission’s Office of Inspector
General.
420. As directed by the Commission’s
Office of the Managing Director, USAC
now has two programs in place to
safeguard the Universal Service Fund—
the Beneficiary/Contributor Compliance
Audit Program (BCAP) and Payment
Quality Assurance (PQA) program. The
Commission created these programs, in
conjunction with USAC, in order to
address the shortcomings of the audit
processes discussed in the GAO HighCost Report and USAC’s December 2010
Final Report. The PQA program was
launched in August 2010, and the first
round of BCAP audits were announced
on December 1, 2010. OMD oversees
USAC’s implementation of both
programs.
421. The Commission directs USAC to
review and revise the BCAP and PQA
programs to take into account the
changes adopted in this R&O. The
Commission directs USAC to annually
assess compliance with the new
requirements established for recipients,
including for recipients of CAF Phase I
and Phase II. For CAF Phase I, the
Commission establishes above a
requirement that companies have
PO 00000
Frm 00053
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81613
completed build-out to two-thirds of the
requisite number of locations within
two years. The Commission directs
USAC to assess compliance with this
requirement for each holding company
that receives CAF Phase I funds. ETCs
that receive CAF Phase I funding should
ensure that their underlying books and
records support the assertion that assets
necessary to offer broadband service
have been placed in service in the
requisite number of locations. The
Commission also directs USAC to test
the accuracy of certifications made
pursuant to the new reporting
requirements. Any oversight program to
assess compliance should be designed
to ensure that management is reporting
accurately to the Commission, USAC,
and the relevant state commission,
relevant authority in a U.S. Territory, or
Tribal government, as appropriate, and
should be designed to test some of the
underlying data that forms the basis for
management’s certification of
compliance with various requirements.
This list is not intended to be
exhaustive, but rather illustrative of the
modifications that USAC should make
to its existing oversight activities. The
Commission directs USAC to submit a
report to WCB, WTB, and OMD within
60 days of release of this R&O proposing
changes to the BCAP and PQA programs
consistent with this R&O.
422. To assist USAC’s audit and
review efforts, the Commission clarifies
in new 47 CFR 54.320 that all ETCs that
receive high-cost support are subject to
random compliance audits and other
investigations to ensure compliance
with program rules and orders.
E. Access to Cost and Revenue Data
423. Discussion. The Commission
takes two steps to facilitate the exchange
of information needed to administer and
oversee universal service programs.
First, the Commission the rules to
clarify that USAC has a right to obtain—
at any time and in any unaltered
format—all cost and revenue
submissions and related information
that carriers submit to NECA that is
used to calculate payments under any of
the existing programs and any new
programs, including the new CAF ICC
(access replacement) support.
424. Second, the Commission modfies
the rules to ensure that the Commission
has timely access to relevant data.
Specifically, the Commission requires
that USAC (and NECA to the extent
USAC does not directly receive such
information from carriers) provide to the
Commission upon request all
underlying data collected from ETCs to
calculate payments under current
support mechanisms—specifically,
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81614
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
HCLS, ICLS, LSS, SNA, SVS, HCMS and
IAS—as well as to calculate CAF
payments. This includes information or
data underlying existing and future
analyses that USAC uses to determine
the amount of federal universal service
support disbursed in the past or the
future, including the new CAF.
425. The Commission anticipates that
NECA and USAC will submit summary
filings to the Commission on a regular
basis, and the Commission delegates to
the Wireline Competition Bureau
authority to determine the format and
timing of such summary filings, but the
Commission emphasizes that USAC and
NECA must timely provide any
underlying data upon request. The
Commission also modifies the rules to
require rate-of-return carriers to submit
to the Commission upon request a copy
of all cost and revenue data and related
information submitted to NECA for
purposes of calculating intercarrier
compensation and any new CAF
payments resulting from intercarrier
compensation reform adopted in this
R&O.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
VII. Additional Issues
A. Tribal Engagement
426. The deep digital divide that
persists between the Native Nations of
the United States and the rest of the
country is well-documented. Many
residents of Tribal lands lack not only
broadband access, but even basic
telephone service. Throughout this
reform proceeding, commenters have
repeatedly stressed the essential role
that Tribal consultation and engagement
play in the successful deployment of
service on Tribal lands. For example,
the National Tribal Telecommunications
Association, the National Congress of
American Indians, and the Affiliated
Tribes of Northwest Indians have
stressed the importance of measures to
‘‘specifically support and enhance tribal
sovereignty, with emphasis on
consultation with Tribes.’’
427. The Commission agrees that
engagement between Tribal
governments and communications
providers either currently providing
service or contemplating the provision
of service on Tribal lands is vitally
important to the successful deployment
and provision of service. The
Commission, therefore, will require that,
at a minimum, ETCs to demonstrate on
an annual basis that they have
meaningfully engaged Tribal
governments in their supported areas.
At a minimum, such discussions must
include: (1) A needs assessment and
deployment planning with a focus on
Tribal community anchor institutions;
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
(2) feasibility and sustainability
planning; (3) marketing services in a
culturally sensitive manner; (4) rights of
way processes, land use permitting,
facilities siting, environmental and
cultural preservation review processes;
and (5) compliance with Tribal business
and licensing requirements. Tribal
business and licensing requirements
include business practice licenses that
Tribal and non-Tribal business entities,
whether located on or off Tribal lands,
must obtain upon application to the
relevant Tribal government office or
division to conduct any business or
trade, or deliver any goods or services
to the Tribes, Tribal members, or Tribal
lands. These include certificates of
public convenience and necessity,
Tribal business licenses, master
licenses, and other related forms of
Tribal government licensure.
428. In requiring Tribal engagement,
the Commission does not seek to
supplant the Commission’s own
ongoing obligation to consult with
Tribes on a government-to-government
basis, but instead recognize the
important role that all parties play in
expediting service to Tribal lands. As
discussed above, support recipients will
be required to submit to the
Commission and appropriate Tribal
government officials an annual
certification and summary of their
compliance with this Tribal government
engagement obligation. Appropriate
Tribal government officials are elected
or duly authorized government officials
of federally recognized American Indian
Tribes and Alaska Native Villages. In
the instance of the Hawaiian Home
Lands, this engagement must occur with
the State of Hawaii Department of
Hawaiian Home Lands and Office of
Hawaiian Affairs. Carriers failing to
satisfy the Tribal government
engagement obligation would be subject
to financial consequences, including
potential reduction in support should
they fail to fulfill their engagement
obligations. The Commission envisions
that the Office of Native Affairs and
Policy (‘‘ONAP’’), in coordination with
the Wireline and Wireless Bureaus,
would utilize their delegated authority
to develop specific procedures regarding
the Tribal engagement process as
necessary.
B. Interstate Rate of Return Prescription
429. In the USF/ICC Transformation
Notice, the Commission sought
comment on whether to initiate a
proceeding to represcribe the authorized
interstate rate of return for rate-of-return
carriers if it determines that such
carriers should continue to receive highcost support under a modified rate-of-
PO 00000
Frm 00054
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
return system. The Commission has not
revisited the current 11.25 percent rate
of return for over 20 years. Several
commenters supported our proposal to
initiate a represcription proceeding.
Others offered comments on how the
Commission should proceed in the
event it does initiate such a proceeding.
We, therefore, conclude that the
Commission should represcribe the
authorized interstate rate of return for
rate-of-return carriers, and we initiate
that represcription process today. In the
FNPRM, we propose that the interstate
rate of return should be adjusted to
ensure that it more accurately reflects
the true cost of capital today. Based on
our preliminary analysis and record
evidence, we believe the current rate of
return of 11.25 percent is no longer
consistent with the Act and today’s
financial conditions. In this Order, we
find good cause to waive certain
procedural requirements in the
Commission’s rules relating to rate
represcriptions to streamline and
modernize this process to align it with
the current Commission practice.
1. Represcription
430. Section 205(a) of the Act
authorizes the Commission, on an
appropriate record, to prescribe just and
reasonable charges of common carriers.
The Commission last adjusted the
authorized rate of return in 1990,
reducing it from 12 percent to 11.25
percent. In 1998, the Commission
initiated a proceeding to represcribe the
authorized rate of return for rate-ofreturn carriers. However, in the MAG
Order, the Commission terminated that
prescription proceeding. Given the time
that has elapsed since the authorized
rate of return was last prescribed, and
the major changes that have occurred in
the market since then, we find that the
authorized interstate rate of return
should be reviewed and begin that
process, seeking the information
necessary to prescribe a new rate of
return.
431. The Commission’s rules provide
that the trigger for a new prescription
proceeding is satisfied if the monthly
average yields on ten-year United States
Treasury securities remain, for a
consecutive six month period, at least
150 basis points above or below the
average of the monthly average yields in
effect for the consecutive six month
period immediately prior to the effective
date of the current prescription. The
monthly average yields for the past six
months have been over 450 basis points
below the monthly average yields in the
six months immediately prior to the last
prescription. Our trigger is easily
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
satisfied, and we initiate the
represcription now.
2. Procedural Requirements
432. Section 205(a) requires the
Commission to give ‘‘full opportunity
for hearing’’ before prescribing a rate.
However, a formal evidentiary hearing
is not required under section 205, and
we have on multiple occasions
prescribed individual rates in notice
and comment rulemaking proceedings.
Although we have found it useful in the
past to impose somewhat more detailed
requirements in rate of return
prescription proceedings, we have
expressly rejected the proposition that
we could not ‘‘lawfully use simple
notice and comment procedures to
prescribe the rate of return authorized
for LEC interstate access services.’’
Accordingly, in the FNPRM we initiate
a new rate of return prescription
proceeding using notice and comment
procedures, and on our own motion, we
waive certain existing procedural rules
to facilitate a more efficient process.
433. The Commission’s current
interstate rate of return represcription
rules in Part 65 contemplate a
streamlined paper hearing process.
These procedural rules are more specific
and detailed than the Commission’s
rules for filing comments, replies, and
written ex parte presentations in permitbut-disclose proceedings. The Part 65
rules require that:
—An original and four copies of all
submissions must be filed with the
Secretary (rule 65.103(d)),
—All participants in the proceeding
state in their initial pleading whether
they wish to receive service of
documents filed in the proceeding
(rule 65.100(b)), and filing parties
must serve copies of their
submissions (other than initial
submissions) on all participants who
properly so requested (rule 65.103(e)),
—Parties may file ‘‘direct case
submissions, responses, and
rebuttals,’’ with direct case
submissions due 60 days after the
beginning of the proceeding,
responses due 60 days thereafter, and
rebuttals due 21 days thereafter (rule
65.103(b),
—Direct case submissions and
responses are subject to a 70-page
limit, and rebuttals to a 50-page limit
(rule 65.104(a)–(c)),
—Parties must file copies of all
information (such as financial
analysts’ reports) that they relied on
in preparing their submissions (rule
65.105(a)), and
—Parties may file written interrogatories
and discovery requests directed at any
other party’s submissions, and the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
submitting parties may oppose those
requests (rule 65.105(b)–(f)).
434. We find good cause to waive
some of these procedural requirements
on our own motion. We find that these
procedures would be onerous and are
not necessary to ensure adequate public
participation. For instance, there is no
need for parties to file an original plus
four copies of submissions with the
Secretary. The Commission recently
revised its rules to encourage electronic
filing of comments and replies
whenever technically feasible, and to
require that ex parte submissions be
filed electronically unless doing so
poses a hardship. Given the vast
improvements to the electronic filing
system, and the usual practice now of
many parties to file documents
electronically rather than on paper, we
see no reason to require the submission
of paper copies. Rather, parties to this
proceeding may comply with our usual
procedures in permit-but-disclosure
proceedings. Pleadings other than ex
parte submissions may be filed
electronically or may be filed on paper
with the Secretary’s office. If they are
filed on paper, the original and one
copy should be provided.
435. The Part 65 rules also
contemplate that all parties to the
proceeding will be served with copies of
all other parties’ submissions. Again,
this is no longer necessary. Before the
greater and more accepted use of
electronic filing, service may have been
a reasonable requirement to assure
timely distribution of relevant materials.
However, our electronic filing system
generally makes filings available within
24 hours, and the vast majority of
parties have access to these materials
via the Internet. We, therefore, find that
service is not required, and we waive
the requirement. Any party that wishes
to receive an electronic notification
when new documents are filed in the
proceeding may subscribe to an RSS
feed, available from ECFS.
436. In addition, we waive the
specific filing schedule contained in
section 65.103(b) of the Commission’s
rules so that comments may be filed
pursuant to the pleading cycle adopted
for sections XVII.A–K of the FNPRM.
We also find the page limits applicable
to rate represcription proceedings to be
inappropriate here. Lastly, we waive the
requirement in section 65.301 that the
Commission publish in this notice the
cost of debt, cost of preferred stock, and
capital structure computed under our
rules, because, as detailed in the
FNPRM, the data set necessary to
calculate those formulas is no longer
collected by the Commission. We seek
PO 00000
Frm 00055
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81615
comment in the FNRPM on those
calculations and the related data and
methodology issues.
C. Pending Matters
437. The Commission also denies four
pending high-cost maters currently
pending before the Commission: two
petitions for reconsideration of the Corr
Wireless Order; Puerto Rico Telephone
Company, Inc.’s petition to reconsider
the decision declining to adopt a new
high-cost support mechanism for nonrural insular carriers; and Verizon
Wireless’s Petition for Reconsideration
of the Wireline Competition Bureau’s
letter directing the USAC to implement
certain caps on high-cost universal
service support for two companies,
known as the ‘‘company-specific caps.’’
D. Deletion of Obsolete Universal
Service Rules and Conforming Changes
to Existing Rules
438. As part of comprehensive reform,
the Commission makes conforming
changes to delete obsolete rules from the
Code of Federal Regulations.
Specifically, we eliminate the rules
governing Long Term Support, which
the Commission eliminated as a discrete
support program in the MAG Order, and
Interim Hold Harmless Support for NonRural Carriers, which addressed nonrural carriers’ transition from high-cost
loop support to high-cost model
support. Because these rules are
obsolete, the Commission finds good
cause to delete them without notice and
comment. The Commission also makes
conforming changes to existing rules to
ensure they are consistent with changes
made in this R&O.
VIII. Measures To Address Arbitrage
A. Rules To Reduce Access Stimulation
439. In this section, the Commission
adopts revisions to its interstate
switched access charge rules to address
access stimulation. Access stimulation
occurs when a LEC with high switched
access rates enters into an arrangement
with a provider of high call volume
operations such as chat lines, adult
entertainment calls, and ‘‘free’’
conference calls. The arrangement
inflates or stimulates the access minutes
terminated to the LEC, and the LEC then
shares a portion of the increased access
revenues resulting from the increased
demand with the ‘‘free’’ service
provider, or offers some other benefit to
the ‘‘free’’ service provider. The shared
revenues received by the service
provider cover its costs, and it therefore
may not need to, and typically does not,
assess a separate charge for the service
it is offering. Meanwhile, the wireless
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81616
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
and interexchange carriers (collectively
IXCs) paying the increased access
charges are forced to recover these costs
from all their customers, even though
many of those customers do not use the
services stimulating the access demand.
440. Access stimulation schemes
work because when LECs enter trafficinflating revenue-sharing agreements,
they are currently not required to reduce
their access rates to reflect their
increased volume of minutes. The
combination of significant increases in
switched access traffic with unchanged
access rates results in a jump in
revenues and thus inflated profits that
almost uniformly make the LEC’s
interstate switched access rates unjust
and unreasonable under section 201(b)
of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 201(b). Consistent
with the approach proposed in the USF/
ICC Transformation NPRM, the
Commission adopts a definition of
access stimulation that includes two
conditions. If a LEC meets those
conditions, the LEC generally must
reduce its interstate switched access
tariffed rates to the rates of the price cap
LEC in the state with the lowest rates,
which are presumptively consistent
with the Act. This will reduce the extent
to which IXC customers that do not use
the stimulating services are forced to
subsidize the customers that do use the
services.
441. Based on the record received in
response to the single-pronged trigger
proposed in the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM, the Commission
modifies its approach from defining an
access stimulation trigger to defining
access stimulation. The access
stimulation definition the Commission
adopts now has two conditions: (1) A
revenue sharing condition, revised
slightly from the proposal in the USF/
ICC Transformation NPRM; and (2) an
additional traffic volume condition,
which is met where the LEC either: (a)
Has a three-to-one interstate
terminating-to-originating traffic ratio in
a calendar month; or (b) has had more
than a 100 percent growth in interstate
originating and/or terminating switched
access MOU in a month compared to the
same month in the preceding year. If
both conditions are satisfied, the LEC
generally must file revised tariffs to
account for its increased traffic.
442. Adoption of the definition of
access stimulation with two conditions
will facilitate enforcement of the new
access stimulation rules in instances
where a LEC meets the conditions for
access stimulation but does not file
revised tariffs. In particular, IXCs will
be permitted to file complaints based on
evidence from their traffic records that
a LEC has exceeded either of the traffic
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
measurements of the second condition,
i.e., that the second condition has been
met. If the IXC filing the complaint
makes this showing, the burden will
shift to the LEC to establish that it has
not met the access stimulation
definition and therefore that it is not in
violation of its rules. This burdenshifting approach will enable IXCs to
bring complaints based on their own
traffic data, and will help the
Commission to identify circumstances
where a LEC may be in violation of its
rules.
443. The Commission concludes that
these revised interstate access rules are
narrowly tailored to minimize the costs
of the rule revisions on the industry,
while reducing the adverse effects of
access stimulation and ensuring that
interstate access rates are at levels
presumptively consistent with section
201(b) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 201(b).
1. Discussion
a. Need for Reform To Address Access
Stimulation
444. The record confirms the need for
prompt Commission action to address
the adverse effects of access stimulation
and to help ensure that interstate
switched access rates remain just and
reasonable, as required by section 201(b)
of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 201(b).
Commenters agree that the interstate
switched access rates being charged by
access stimulating LECs do not reflect
the volume of traffic associated with
access stimulation. As a result, access
stimulating LECs realize significant
revenue increases and thus inflated
profits that almost uniformly make their
interstate switched access rates unjust
and unreasonable.
445. Access stimulation imposes
undue costs on consumers, inefficiently
diverting capital away from more
productive uses such as broadband
deployment. When access stimulation
occurs in locations that have higher
than average access charges, which is
the predominant case today, the average
per-minute cost of access and thus the
average cost of long-distance calling is
increased. Because of the rate
integration requirements of section
254(g) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 254(g), longdistance carriers are prohibited from
passing on the higher access costs
directly to the customers making the
calls to access stimulating entities.
Therefore, all customers of these longdistance providers bear these costs, even
though many of them do not use the
access stimulator’s services, and, in
essence, ultimately support businesses
designed to take advantage of today’s
PO 00000
Frm 00056
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
above-cost intercarrier compensation
rates.
446. The record indicates that a
significant amount of access traffic is
going to LECs engaging in access
stimulation. TEOCO estimates that the
total cost of access stimulation to IXCs
has been more than $2.3 billion over the
past five years. Verizon estimates the
overall costs to IXCs to be between $330
and $440 million per year, and states
that it expected to be billed between $66
and $88 million by access stimulators
for approximately two billion wireline
and wireless long-distance minutes in
2010. Other parties indicate that
payment of access charges to access
stimulating LECs is the subject of large
numbers of disputes in a variety of
forums. When carriers pay more access
charges as a result of access stimulation
schemes, the amount of capital available
to invest in broadband deployment and
other network investments that would
benefit consumers is substantially
reduced.
447. Access stimulation also harms
competition by giving companies that
offer a ‘‘free’’ calling service a
competitive advantage over companies
that charge their customers for the
service. For example, conference calling
provider ZipDX indicates that, by not
engaging in access stimulation, it is at
`
a disadvantage vis-a-vis competitors that
engage in access stimulation. Providers
of conferencing services, like ZipDX, are
recovering the costs of the service, such
as conference bridges, marketing, and
billing, from the user of the service
rather than, as explained above in the
case of access stimulators, spreading
those costs across the universe of longdistance subscribers. As a result, the
services offered by ‘‘free’’ conferencing
providers that leverage arbitrage
opportunities put companies that
recover the cost of services from their
customers at a distinct competitive
disadvantage.
448. How access revenues are used is
not relevant in determining whether
switched access rates are just and
reasonable in accordance with section
201(b), 47 U.S.C. 201(b). In addition,
excess revenues that are shared in
access stimulation schemes provide
additional proof that the LEC’s rates are
above cost. Moreover, Congress created
an explicit universal service fund to
spur investment and deployment in
rural, high cost, and insular areas, and
the Commission is taking action here
and in other proceedings to facilitate
such deployment.
(i) Access Stimulation Definition
449. The Commission adopts a
definition to identify when an access
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
stimulating LEC must refile its interstate
access tariffs at rates that are
presumptively consistent with the Act.
After reviewing the record, the
Commission makes a few changes to the
USF/ICC Transformation NPRM
proposal, including defining access
stimulation as occurring when two
conditions are met. The first condition
is that the LEC has entered into an
access revenue sharing agreement, and
the Commission clarifies what types of
agreements qualify as ‘‘revenue
sharing.’’ The second condition is met
where the LEC either has had a threeto-one interstate terminating-tooriginating traffic ratio in a calendar
month, or has had a greater than 100
percent increase in interstate originating
and/or terminating switched access
MOU in a month compared to the same
month in the preceding year. The
Commission adopts these changes to
ensure that the access stimulation
definition is not over-inclusive and to
improve its enforceability.
450. Definition of a Revenue Sharing
Agreement. After reviewing the record,
the Commission clarifies the scope of
the access revenue sharing agreement
condition of the new access stimulation
definition. The access revenue sharing
condition of the access stimulation
definition the Commission adopts
herein is met when a rate-of-return LEC
or a competitive LEC: ‘‘has an access
revenue sharing agreement, whether
express, implied, written or oral, that,
over the course of the agreement, would
directly or indirectly result in a net
payment to the other party (including
affiliates) to the agreement, in which
payment by the rate-of-return LEC or
competitive LEC is based on the billing
or collection of access charges from
interexchange carriers or wireless
carriers. When determining whether
there is a net payment under this rule,
all payments, discounts, credits,
services, features, functions, and other
items of value, regardless of form,
provided by the rate-of-return LEC or
competitive LEC to the other party to
the agreement shall be taken into
account.’’
451. This rule focuses on revenue
sharing that would result in a net
payment to the other entity over the
course of the agreement arising from the
sharing of access revenues. The use of
‘‘over the course of the agreement’’ does
not preclude an IXC from filing a
complaint if the traffic measurement
condition is met. The agreement is to be
interpreted in terms of what the
anticipated net payments would be over
the course of the agreement. The
Commission clarifies that patronage
dividends paid by cooperatives
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
generally do not constitute revenue
sharing as contemplated by this
definition. However, a cooperative, like
other LECs, could structure payments in
a manner to engage in revenue sharing
that would cause it to meet the
definition as discussed herein. The
Commission intends the net payment
language to limit the revenue sharing
definition in a manner that, along with
the traffic measurements discussed
below, best identifies the revenue
sharing agreements likely to be
associated with access stimulation and
thus those cases in which a LEC must
refile its switched access rates. Revenue
sharing may include payments
characterized as marketing fees or other
similar payments that result in a net
payment to the access stimulator.
However, this rule does not encompass
typical, widely available, retail
discounts offered by LECs through, for
example, bundled service offerings.
452. If a LEC’s circumstances change
because it terminates the access revenue
sharing agreement(s), it may file a tariff
to revise its rates under the rules
applicable when access stimulation is
not occurring. As part of that tariff
filing, an officer of the LEC must certify
that it has terminated the revenue
sharing agreement(s).
453. As proposed in the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM, the Commission
does not declare revenue sharing to be
a per se violation of section 201(b) of the
Act, 47 U.S.C. 201(b). A ban on all
revenue sharing arrangements could be
overly broad, and no party has
suggested a way to overcome this
shortcoming. Nor does the Commission
find that parties have demonstrated that
traffic directed to access stimulators
should not be subject to tariffed access
charges in all cases. The Commission
notes that the access stimulation rules it
adopts in this R&O are part of the
Commission’s comprehensive
intercarrier compensation reform. That
reform will, as the transition unfolds,
address remaining incentives to engage
in access stimulation.
454. The rules adopted here pursuant
to sections 201 and 202 of the Act, 47
U.S.C. 201, 202, address conferencing
services being provided by a third party,
whether affiliated with the LEC or not.
Section 254(k), 47 U.S.C. 254(k), would
apply to a LEC’s operation of an access
stimulation plan within its own
corporate organization. In that context,
as the Commission has found in other
proceedings, terminating access is a
monopoly service. The conferencing
activity, as portrayed by the parties
engaged in access stimulation, would be
a competitive service. Thus, the use of
non-competitive terminating access
PO 00000
Frm 00057
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81617
revenues to support competitive
conferencing service within the LEC
operating entity would violate section
254(k), 47 U.S.C. 254(k), and
appropriate sanctions could be imposed.
455. Addition of a Traffic
Measurement Condition. After
reviewing the record, the Commission
agrees that it is appropriate to include
a traffic measurement condition in the
definition of access stimulation.
Accordingly, in addition to requiring
the existence of a revenue sharing
agreement, the Commission adds a
second condition to the definition
requiring that a LEC: ‘‘Has either an
interstate terminating-to-originating
traffic ratio of at least 3:1 in a calendar
month, or has had more than a 100
percent growth in interstate originating
and/or terminating switched access
MOU in a month compared to the same
month in the preceding year.’’ The
addition of a traffic measurement
component to the access stimulation
definition creates a bright-line rule that
responds to record concerns about using
access revenue sharing alone. The
Commission concludes that these
measurements of switched access traffic
of all carriers exchanging traffic with the
LEC reflect the significant growth in
traffic volumes that would generally be
observed in cases where access
stimulation is occurring and thus
should make detection and enforcement
easier. Carriers paying switched access
charges can observe their own traffic
patterns for each of these traffic
measurements and file complaints based
on their own traffic patterns. Thus, this
will not place a burden on LECs to file
traffic reports, as some proposals would.
456. The record offers support for
both a terminating-to-originating traffic
ratio and a traffic growth factor. The
Commission adopted a 3:1 ratio in its
2001 ISP-Remand Order to address a
similar arbitrage scheme based on
artificially increasing reciprocal
compensation minutes. Further, the
Wireline Competition Bureau employed
a 100 percent traffic growth factor as a
benchmark in a tariff investigation to
address the potential that some rate-ofreturn LECs might engage in access
stimulation after having filed tariffs
with high switched access rates. In each
case, the approach was largely
successful in identifying and reducing
the practice.
457. The Commission concludes that
the use of a terminating-to-originating
traffic ratio in conjunction with a traffic
growth factor as alternative traffic
measures addresses the shortcomings of
using either component separately. A
few parties argue that carriers can game
the terminating-to-originating traffic
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81618
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
ratio component by simply increasing
the number of originating MOU. The
traffic growth component protects
against this possibility because
increasing the originating access traffic
to avoid tripping the 3:1 component
would likely mean total access traffic
would increase enough to trip the
growth component. The terminating-tooriginating traffic ratio component will
capture those current access stimulation
situations that already have very high
volumes that could otherwise continue
to operate without tripping the growth
component. For example, a LEC that has
been engaged in access stimulation for
a significant period of time would have
a high terminating traffic volume that,
under a traffic growth factor alone,
could continue to expand its operations,
possibly avoiding the condition entirely
by controlling its terminating traffic.
Because these alternative traffic
measurements are combined with the
requirement that an access revenue
sharing agreement exist, the
Commissions reduces the risk that the
terminating-to-originating traffic ratio or
traffic growth components of the
definition could be met by legitimate
changes in a LEC’s calling patterns. The
combination of these two traffic
measurements as alternatives is
preferable to either standing alone, as
some parties have urged. A terminatingto-originating traffic ratio or traffic
growth condition alone could prove to
be overly inclusive by encompassing
LECs that had realized access traffic
growth through general economic
development, unaided by revenue
sharing. Such situations could include
the location of a customer support
center in a new community without any
revenue sharing arrangement, or a new
competitive LEC that is experiencing
substantial growth from a small base.
State Joint Board Members propose a
condition for access stimulation based
on a terminating ratio one standard
deviation above the national average
terminating ratio annually. Under their
proposal, a carrier meeting this
condition would set new rates so that
the terminating revenue for any carrier
equals the carrier’s initial rate times its
originating minutes times the
terminating ratio at the one standard
deviation point. The Commission
declines to adopt this proposal because
it is unclear that using originating traffic
volumes would produce a rate that
adequately reflects the increased
terminating traffic volumes sufficient to
ensure that rates are just and reasonable
as required by Section 201(b) of the Act,
47 U.S.C. 201(b).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
(ii) Remedies
458. If a LEC meets both conditions of
the definition, it must file a revised
tariff except under certain limited
circumstances. As explained in more
detail below, a rate-of-return LEC must
file its own cost-based tariff under
section 61.38 of the Commission’s rules,
47 CFR 61.38, and may not file based on
historical costs under section 61.39 of
the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 61.39,
or participate in the NECA trafficsensitive tariff. If a competitive LEC
meets the definition, it must benchmark
its tariffed access rates to the rates of the
price cap LEC with the lowest interstate
switched access rates in the state, rather
than to the rates of the BOC or the
largest incumbent LEC in the state (as
proposed in the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM). The
Commission concludes, however, that if
a LEC has terminated its revenue
sharing agreement(s) before the deadline
the Commission establishes for filing its
revised tariff, or if the competitive LEC’s
rates are already below the benchmark
rate, such a LEC does not have to file a
revised interstate switched access tariff.
However, once a rate-of-return LEC or a
competitive LEC has met both
conditions of the definition and has
filed revised tariffs, when required, it
may not file new tariffs at rates other
than those required by the revised
pricing rules until it terminates its
revenue sharing agreement(s), even if
the LEC no longer meets the 3:1
terminating-to-originating traffic ratio
condition of the definition or traffic
growth threshold. As price cap LECs
reduce their switched access rates under
the ICC reforms the Commission adopts
herein, competitive LECs must
benchmark to the reduced rates.
459. Rate-of-Return Carriers Filing
Tariffs Based on Historical Costs and
Demand: 47 CFR 61.39. The
Commission adopts its proposal in the
USF/ICC Transformation NPRM that a
LEC filing access tariffs pursuant to 47
CFR 61.39 would lose its ability to base
its rates on historical costs and demand
if it is engaged in access stimulation.
Incumbent LECs filing access tariffs
pursuant to 47 CFR 61.39 of the
Commission’s rules currently base their
rates on historical costs and demand,
which, because of their small size,
generally results in high switched
access rates based on the high costs and
low demand of such carriers. The
limited comment in the record was
supportive of the Commission’s
proposal for the reasons set forth in the
USF/ICC Transformation NPRM. The
Commission accordingly revises 47 CFR
61.39 to bar a carrier otherwise eligible
PO 00000
Frm 00058
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
to file tariffs pursuant to 47 CFR 61.39
from doing so if it meets the access
stimulation definition. The Commission
also requires such a carrier to file a
revised interstate switched access tariff
pursuant to 47 CFR 61.38 within 45
days after meeting the definition, or
within 45 days after the effective date of
this rule in cases where the carrier
meets the definition on that date.
460. Participation in NECA Tariffs. In
the USF/ICC Transformation NPRM, the
Commission proposed that a carrier
engaging in revenue sharing would lose
its eligibility to participate in the NECA
tariffs 45 days after engaging in access
stimulation, or 45 days after the
effective date of this rule in cases where
it currently engages in access
stimulation. A carrier leaving the NECA
tariff thus would have to file its own
tariff for interstate switched access,
pursuant to section 61.38 of the rules,
47 CFR 61.38.
461. The record is generally
supportive of this approach for the
reasons stated in the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM, and the
Commission adopts it, subject to one
modification. The Commission clarifies
that, pursuant to 47 CFR 69.3(e)(3) of
the rules, a LEC required to leave the
NECA interstate tariff (which includes
both switched and special access
services) because it has met the access
stimulation definition must file its own
tariff for both interstate switched and
special access services. USTelecom
suggests that given that shared revenues
are not appropriately included in a
carrier’s revenue requirement, the
Commission does not need to address
eligibility for participation in NECA
tariffs in its access stimulation rules—a
carrier would either stop sharing, or file
its own tariff without any mandate to do
so. The Commission disagrees, because
current rules only provide for a
participating carrier to leave the NECA
tariff at the time of the annual tariff
filing. A rule prohibiting LECs from
further participating in the NECA tariff
when the definition is met, and
providing for advance notice to NECA,
spells out the procedure.
462. The Commission also adopts a
revision to the proposed rule similar to
a suggestion by the Louisiana Small
Carrier Committee, which recommends
that rate-of-return carriers be given an
opportunity to show that they are in
compliance with the Commission’s
rules before being required to file a
revised tariff. Accordingly, the
Commission concludes that if a carrier
sharing access revenues terminates its
access revenue sharing agreement before
the date on which its revised tariff must
be filed, it does not have to file a revised
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
tariff. The Commission believes that
when sharing agreements are
terminated, in most instances traffic
patterns should return to levels that
existed prior to the LEC entering into
the access revenue sharing agreement.
This eliminates a burden on such
carriers when there is no ongoing reason
for requiring such a filing.
463. Rate of Return Carriers Filing
Tariffs Based On Projected Costs and
Demand: 47 CFR 61.38. In the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM, the Commission
proposed that a carrier filing interstate
switched access tariffs based on
projected costs and demand pursuant to
47 CFR 61.38 of the rules be required to
file revised access tariffs within 45 days
of commencing access revenue sharing,
or within 45 days of the effective date
of the rule if the LEC on that date is
engaged in access revenue sharing,
unless the costs and demand arising
from the new revenue sharing
arrangement had been reflected in its
most recent tariff filing. The
Commission further proposed that
payments made by a LEC pursuant to an
access revenue sharing arrangement
should not be included as costs in the
rate-of-return LEC’s interstate switched
access revenue requirement because
such payments have nothing to do with
the provision of interstate switched
access service and are thus not used and
useful in the provision of such service.
Thus, the Commission proposed to
clarify prospectively that a rate-of-return
carrier that shares access revenue,
provides other compensation to an
access stimulating entity, or directly
provides the stimulating activity, and
bundles those costs with access, is
engaging in an unreasonable practice
that violates 47 U.S.C. 201(b) and the
prudent expenditure standard. The
prudent expenditure standard is
associated with the ‘‘used and useful’’
doctrine, which together are employed
in evaluating whether a carrier’s rates
are just and reasonable.
464. The Commission adopts the
approach proposed in the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM. Commenters
that addressed this issue support the
approach. In particular, the Commission
adopts a rule requiring carriers filing
interstate switched access tariffs based
on projected costs and demand pursuant
to 47 CFR 61.38 of the rules to file
revised access tariffs within 45 days of
commencing access revenue sharing, or
within 45 days of the effective date of
the rule if the LEC on that date was
engaged in access revenue sharing,
unless the costs and demand arising
from the new access revenue sharing
agreement were reflected in its most
recent tariff filing. This tariff filing
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
requirement provides the carrier with
the opportunity to show, and the
Commission to review, any projected
increase in costs, as well as to consider
the higher anticipated demand in setting
revised rates. If the access revenue
sharing agreement(s) that required the
new tariff filing has been terminated by
the time the revised tariff is required to
be filed, the Commission will not
require the filing of a revised tariff, as
the proposal would have. A refiling in
that instance would be unnecessary
because the original rates will now more
likely reflect the cost/demand
relationship of the carrier. If a LEC,
however, subsequently reactivates the
same telephone numbers in connection
with a new access revenue sharing
agreement, the Commission will
presumptively treat that action to be
furtive concealment resulting in the loss
of deemed lawful status for the LEC’s
tariff, as discussed below in conjunction
with the discussion of section 204(a)(3)
of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 204(a)(3). As
described therein, a carrier may be
required to make refunds if its tariff
does not have deemed lawful status.
This will prevent a LEC from entering
into a series of access revenue sharing
agreements to avoid the 45-day filing
requirement, while benefiting from the
advertising of those telephone numbers
used under previous agreements.
465. The Commission also adopts the
proposal that payments made by a LEC
pursuant to an access revenue sharing
agreement are not properly included as
costs in the rate-of-return LEC’s
interstate switched access revenue
requirement. This proposal received
broad support in the record.
466. The rule the Commission adopts
will require 47 CFR 61.38 carriers to set
their rates based on projected costs and
demand data.
467. Competitive LECs. In the USF/
ICC Transformation NPRM, the
Commission proposed that when a
competitive LEC is engaged in access
stimulation, it would be required to
benchmark its interstate switched access
rates to the rate of the BOC in the state
in which the competitive LEC operates,
or the independent incumbent LEC with
the largest number of access lines in the
state if there is no BOC in the state, and
if the competitive LEC is not already
benchmarking to that carrier’s rate.
Under the proposal, a competitive LEC
would have to file a revised tariff within
45 days of engaging in access
stimulation, or within 45 days of the
effective date of the rule if it currently
engages in access stimulation.
468. After reviewing the record, the
Commission adopts its proposal with
one modification to ensure that the LEC
PO 00000
Frm 00059
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81619
refiles at a rate no higher than the
lowest rate of a price cap LEC in the
state. In so doing, the Commission
concludes that neither the switched
access rate of the rate-of-return LEC in
whose territory the competitive LEC is
operating nor the rate used in the rural
exemption is an appropriate benchmark
when the competitive LEC meets the
access stimulation definition. In those
instances, the access stimulator’s traffic
vastly exceeds the volume of traffic of
the incumbent LEC to whom the access
stimulator is currently benchmarking.
Thus, the competitive LEC’s traffic
volumes no longer operationally
resemble the carrier’s traffic volumes
whose rates it had been benchmarking
because of the significant increase in
interstate switched access traffic
associated with access stimulation.
Instead, the access stimulating LEC’s
traffic volumes are more like those of
the price cap LEC in the state, and it is
therefore appropriate and reasonable for
the access stimulating LEC to
benchmark to the price cap LEC.
469. Although many parties support
using the switched access rates of the
BOC in the state, or the rates of the
largest independent LEC in the state if
there is no BOC, as the Commission
proposed, the Commission concludes
that the lowest interstate switched
access rate of a price cap LEC in the
state is the rate to which a competitive
LEC must benchmark if it meets the
definition. Generally, the BOC will have
the lowest interstate switched access
rates. However, the record reveals that
in California, Pacific Bell’s interstate
switched access rates are higher than
those of other price cap LECs in the
state, as well as being higher than the
interstate switched access rates of price
cap LECs in other states. Benchmarking
to the lowest price cap LEC interstate
switched access rate in the state will
reduce rate variance among states and
will significantly reduce the rates
charged by competitive LECs engaging
in access stimulation, even if it does not
entirely eliminate the potential for
access stimulation. However, should the
traffic volumes of a competitive LEC
that meets the access stimulation
definition substantially exceed the
traffic volumes of the price cap LEC to
which it benchmarks, the Commission
may reevaluate the appropriateness of
the competitive LEC’s rates and may
evaluate whether any further reductions
in rates is warranted. In addition, the
Commission believes the reforms it
adopts elsewhere in this R&O will, over
time, further reduce intercarrier
payments and the incentives for this
type of arbitrage.
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81620
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
470. The Commission requires a
competitive LEC to file a revised
interstate switched access tariff within
45 days of meeting the definition, or
within 45 days of the effective date of
the rule if on that date it meets the
definition. A competitive LEC whose
rates are already at or below the rate to
which they would have to benchmark in
the refiled tariff will not be required to
make a tariff filing.
471. The Commission’s benchmarking
approach addresses access stimulation
within the parameters of the existing
access charge regulatory structure. The
Commission expects that the approach
it adopts will reduce the effects of
access stimulation significantly, and the
intercarrier compensation reforms the
Commission adopts should resolve
remaining concerns.
472. Section 204(a)(3), 47 U.S.C.
204(a)(3) (‘‘Deemed Lawful’’)
Considerations. The Commission
concludes that the policy objectives of
this proceeding can be achieved without
creating an exception to the statutory
tariffing timelines. LECs that meet the
access stimulation trigger are required to
refile their interstate switched access
tariffs as outlined above. Any issues that
arise in these refiled tariffs can be
addressed through the suspension and
rejection authority of the Commission
contained in section 204 of the Act, 47
U.S.C. 204, or through appropriate
enforcement action.
473. The Commission concludes that
a LEC’s failure to comply with the
requirement that it file a revised tariff if
the trigger is met constitutes a violation
of the Commission’s rules, which is
sanctionable under section 503 of the
Act, 47 U.S.C. 503. Section 503(b)(2)(B)
of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 503(b)(2)(B),
authorizes the Commission to assess a
forfeiture of up to $150,000 for each
violation, or each day of a continuing
violation, up to a statutory maximum of
$1,500,000 for a single act or failure to
act by common carriers, 47 CFR
1.80(b)(2). In 2008, the Commission
amended its rules to increase the
maximum forfeiture amounts in
accordance with the inflation
adjustment requirements contained in
the Debt Collection Improvement Act of
1996, 28 U.S.C. 2461. The Commission
also concludes that such a failure would
constitute ‘‘furtive concealment’’ as
described by the DC Circuit in ACS of
Anchorage, Inc. v. FCC, 290 F.3d 403
(D.C. Cir. 2002). In 2002, the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, in reversing a Commission
decision that had found a tariff filing
did not qualify for deemed lawful
treatment and was thus subject to
possible refund liability, noted that it
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
was not addressing ‘‘the case of a carrier
that furtively employs improper
accounting techniques in a tariff filing,
thereby concealing potential rate of
return violations.’’ The Commission
therefore puts parties on notice that if it
finds in a complaint proceeding under
sections 206–209 of the Act, 47 U.S.C
206–209, that such ‘‘furtive
concealment’’ has occurred, that finding
will be applicable to the tariff as of the
date on which the revised tariff was
required to be filed and any refund
liability will be applied as of such date.
The Commission concludes that this
approach will eliminate any incentives
that LECs may have to delay or avoid
complying with the requirement that
they file revised tariffs. Several parties
support this approach.
474. All American Telephone Co.
filed a petition for declaratory ruling
requesting that the Commission find
that commercial agreements involving
the sharing of access revenues between
LECs and ‘‘free’’ service providers do
not violate the Communications Act. In
this R&O, the Commission adopts a
definition of access revenue sharing
agreement and prescribe that a LEC
meeting the conditions of that definition
must file revised tariffs. Given the
findings and the rules adopted in this
R&O, the Commission declines to
address the All American petition and
it is dismissed.
company with whom the LEC is alleged
to have a revenue sharing agreement(s)
associated with access stimulation that
that entity has not, or is not currently,
engaged in access stimulation and
related revenue sharing with the LEC. If
the LEC challenges that it has met either
of the traffic measurements, it must
provide the necessary traffic data to
establish its contention. With the
guidance in this R&O, the Commission
believes parties should in good faith be
able to determine whether the definition
is met without further Commission
intervention.
476. Non-payment Disputes. Several
parties have requested that the
Commission address alleged self-help
by long distance carriers who they claim
are not paying invoices sent for
interstate switched access services. As
the Commission has previously stated,
‘‘[w]e do not endorse such withholding
of payment outside the context of any
applicable tariffed dispute resolution
provisions.’’ The Commission otherwise
declines to address this issue in this
R&O, but cautions parties of their
payment obligations under tariffs and
contracts to which they are a party. The
new rules the Commission adopts in
this R&O will provide clarity to all
affected parties, which should reduce
disputes and litigation surrounding
access stimulation and revenue sharing
agreements.
(iii) Enforcement
475. The revised interstate access
rules adopted in this R&O will facilitate
enforcement through the Commission’s
complaint procedures, if necessary.
Given the two-year statute of limitations
in section 405 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 405,
a complaining IXC would have two
years from the date the cause of action
accrued (the date after the tariff should
have been filed) to file its complaint.
Because the rules the Commission
adopts are prospective, they will have
no binding effect on pending
complaints. A complaining carrier may
rely on the 3:1 terminating-tooriginating traffic ratio and/or the traffic
growth factor for the traffic it exchanges
with the LEC as the basis for filing a
complaint. This will create a rebuttable
presumption that revenue sharing is
occurring and the LEC has violated the
Commission’s rules. The LEC then
would have the burden of showing that
it does not meet both conditions of the
definition. The Commission declines to
require a particular showing, but, at a
minimum, an officer of the LEC must
certify that it has not been, or is no
longer engaged in access revenue
sharing, and the LEC must also provide
a certification from an officer of the
(iv) Conclusion
477. The rules the Commission adopt
in this section will require rates
associated with access stimulation to be
just and reasonable because those rates
will more closely reflect the access
stimulators’ actual traffic volume.
Taking this basic step will immediately
reduce some of the inefficient incentives
enabled by the current intercarrier
compensation system, and permit the
industry to devote resources to
innovation and investment rather than
access stimulation and disputes. The
Commission has balanced the need for
the new rules to address traffic
stimulation with the costs that may be
imposed on LECs and have concluded
that the benefits justify any burdens.
The Commission’s new rules will work
in tandem with the comprehensive
intercarrier compensation reforms the
Commission adopts below, which will,
when fully implemented, eliminate the
incentives in the present system that
give rise to access stimulation.
PO 00000
Frm 00060
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
B. Phantom Traffic
478. In this portion of the R&O, the
Commission amends the Commission’s
rules to address ‘‘phantom traffic’’ by
ensuring that terminating service
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
providers receive sufficient information
to bill for telecommunications traffic
sent to their networks, including
interconnected VoIP traffic. The
amendments the Commission adopts
close loopholes that are being used to
manipulate the intercarrier
compensation system.
479. ‘‘Phantom traffic’’ refers to traffic
that terminating networks receive that
lacks certain identifying information. In
some cases, service providers in the call
path intentionally remove or alter
identifying information to avoid paying
the terminating rates that would apply
if the call were accurately signaled and
billed. For example, some parties have
sought to avoid payment of relatively
high intrastate access charges by making
intrastate traffic appear interstate or
international in nature. Parties have also
disguised or routed non-local traffic
subject to access charges to avoid those
charges in favor of lower reciprocal
compensation rates. Collectively,
problems involving unidentifiable or
misidentified traffic appear to be
widespread. Parties have documented
that phantom traffic is a sizeable
problem, with estimates ranging from 3–
20 percent of all traffic on carriers’
networks, which costs carriers—and
ultimately consumers—potentially
hundreds of millions of dollars
annually. In turn, carriers are diverting
resources to investigate and pursue
billing disputes, rather than use such
resources for more productive purposes
such as capital investment. This sort of
gamesmanship distorts the intercarrier
compensation system and chokes off
revenue that carriers depend on to
deliver broadband and other essential
services to consumers, particularly in
rural and difficult to serve areas of the
country.
480. Based on the record developed in
this proceeding, the Commission now
adopts its original proposal with the
minor modifications described in
further detail below. Service providers
that originate interstate or intrastate
traffic on the PSTN, or that originate
inter- or intrastate interconnected VoIP
traffic destined for the PSTN, will now
be required to transmit the telephone
number associated with the calling
party to the next provider in the call
path. Intermediate providers must pass
calling party number or charge number
signaling information they receive from
other providers unaltered, to subsequent
providers in the call path. These
requirements will assist service
providers in appropriately billing for
calls traversing their networks.
481. By ensuring that the calling party
telephone number information is
provided and transmitted for all types of
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
traffic originating or terminating on the
PSTN, the revised rules will assist
service providers in accurately
identifying and billing for traffic
terminating on their networks, and help
to guard against further arbitrage
practices. These measures will work in
tandem with the Commission’s reforms
adopted elsewhere in this R&O, which,
by minimizing intercarrier
compensation rate differences, promise
to eliminate the incentive for providers
to engage in phantom traffic arbitrage.
Together, these changes will benefit
consumers by enabling providers to
devote more resources to investment
and innovation that would otherwise
have been spent resolving billing
disputes.
1. Revised Call Signaling Rules
482. The Commission adopts the
proposal contained in the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM to require that
the CN be passed unaltered where it is
different from the CPN. The
Commission believes that this
requirement will be an adequate remedy
to the problem of CN number
substitution that disguises the
characteristics of traffic to terminating
service providers. Additionally, the
Commission notes that the CN field may
only be used to contain a calling party’s
charge number, and that it may not
contain or be populated with a number
associated with an intermediate switch,
platform, or gateway, or other number
that designates anything other than a
calling party’s charge number. The
Commission is not persuaded by
objections to this requirement. First,
unsupported objections that there may
be ‘‘circumstances where a CN may be
different from the CPN but cannot be
easily transmitted’’ are unpersuasive
without more specific evidence. Second,
the Commission notes that it addressed
similar circumstances in Regulation of
Prepaid Calling Card Services, WC
Docket No. 05–68, Declaratory Ruling
and Report and Order, 71 FR 43667,
Aug. 2, 2006 (Prepaid Calling Card
Order), and prohibited carriers that
serve prepaid calling card providers
from passing the telephone number
associated with the platform in the
charge number parameter. In this case,
the Commission agrees with the analysis
of the Prepaid Calling Card Order that
‘‘[b]ecause industry standards allow for
the use of CN to populate carrier billing
records * * * passing the number of the
[] platform in the parameters of the SS7
stream to carriers involved in
terminating a call may lead to incorrect
treatment of the call for billing
purposes.’’ In sum, the record
demonstrates that CN substitution is a
PO 00000
Frm 00061
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81621
technique that leads to phantom traffic,
and the proposed rules are a necessary
and reasonable response.
483. The Commission amends its
rules to require service providers using
MF signaling to pass the number of the
calling party (or CN, if different) in the
MF ANI field. This requirement will
provide consistent treatment across
signaling systems and will ensure that
information identifying the calling party
is included in call signaling information
for all calls. Moreover, this requirement
responds to the concerns expressed in
the record that MF signaling can be used
by ‘‘unscrupulous providers’’ to engage
in phantom traffic practices. The
previous record concerning the
technical limitations of MF ANI appears
to be mixed. In balancing the need for
a rule that covers all traffic with the
technical limitations asserted in the
record, the Commission concludes that
the approach most consistent with its
policy objective is not to exclude the
entire category of MF traffic. Such a
categorical exclusion could create a
disincentive to invest in IP technologies
and invite additional opportunities for
arbitrage. Although the rules will apply
to carriers that use or pass MF signaling,
the Commission does not mandate any
specific method of compliance. Carriers
will have flexibility to devise their own
means to pass this information in their
MF signaling. Nevertheless, to the
extent that a party is unable to comply
with the rule as a result of technical
limitations related to MF signaling in its
network, it can seek a waiver for good
cause shown, pursuant to section 1.3 of
the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 1.3.
484. IP Signaling. Consistent with the
proposal in the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM, the rules the
Commission adopts also apply to
interconnected VoIP traffic. Failure to
include interconnected VoIP traffic in
the signaling rules would create a large
and growing loophole as the number of
interconnected VoIP lines in service
continues to grow. Therefore, VoIP
service providers will be required to
transmit the telephone number of the
calling party for all traffic destined for
the PSTN that they originate. If they are
intermediate providers in a call path,
they must pass, unaltered, signaling
information they receive indicating the
telephone number, or billing number if
different, of the calling party. Because IP
transmission standards and practices are
rapidly changing, the Commission
refrains from mandating a specific
compliance method and instead leaves
to service providers using different IP
technologies the flexibility to determine
how best to comply with this
requirement.
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81622
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
485. In extending its call signaling
rules to interconnected VoIP service
providers, the Commission
acknowledges that it has not classified
interconnected VoIP services as
‘‘telecommunications services’’ or
‘‘information services.’’ The
Commission needs not resolve this issue
here, for the Commission would have
authority to impose call signaling on
interconnected VoIP providers even
under an information service
classification. Additionally, as the
Commission has previously found,
section 706, 47 U.S.C. 1302, provides
authority applicable in this context.
2. Prohibition of Altering or Stripping
Call Information
486. In the USF/ICC Transformation
NPRM, the Commission also sought
comment on a proposed rule that would
prohibit service providers from altering
or stripping relevant call information.
More specifically, the Commission
proposed to require all
telecommunications providers and
entities providing interconnected VoIP
service to pass the calling party’s
telephone number (or, if different, the
financially responsible party’s number),
unaltered, to subsequent carriers in the
call path. Commenters overwhelmingly
supported this proposal. The
Commission believes that a prohibition
on stripping or altering information in
the call signaling stream serves the
public interest. The prohibition should
help ensure that the signaling
information required by its rules reaches
terminating carriers. Therefore, the
Commission adopts its proposal to
prohibit stripping or altering call
signaling information with the
modifications discussed below.
487. In response to comments in the
record, the Commission makes several
clarifying changes to the text of the
proposed rules in this section. First,
commenters objected to the use of the
undefined term ‘‘financially responsible
party’’ in the proposed rules. The
Commission agrees with the concerns
and clarify that providers are required to
pass the billing number (e.g., CN in SS7)
if different from the calling party’s
number. For similar reasons, for
purposes of this rule, the Commission
adds the following definition of the term
‘‘intermediate provider’’ to the rules:
‘‘any entity that carries or processes
traffic that traverses or will traverse the
PSTN at any point insofar as that entity
neither originates nor terminates that
traffic.’’ The Commission finds that
adding this definition will eliminate
potential ambiguity in the revised rule.
As provided in Appendix A, the
Commission also makes modest
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
adjustments to the rules proposed in the
USF/ICC Transformation NPRM.
Specifically, the Commission clarifies
that the obligation to pass signaling
information applies to the telephone
number or billing number, and the
Commission clarifies that the revised
rules apply to telecommunications
carriers and providers of interconnected
VoIP services. Finally, because, as
discussed below, the waiver process is
available to parties seeking exceptions
to the revised rule, the Commission
removes the proposed rule language
limiting applicability in relation to
industry standards. With these minor
changes, the Commission adopts the
proposed prohibition on stripping or
altering information regarding the
calling party number.
3. Exceptions
488. The Commission declines to
adopt any general exceptions to its new
call signaling rules at this time. Parties
seeking limited exceptions or relief in
connection with the call signaling rules
the Commission adopts can avail
themselves of established waiver
procedures at the Commission. To that
end, the Commission delegates
authority to the Wireline Competition
Bureau to act upon requests for a waiver
of the rules adopted herein in
accordance with existing Commission
rules.
4. Signaling/Billing Record
Requirements
a. Discussion
489. After considering the substantial
record received in response to the USF/
ICC Transformation NPRM, the
Commission determines that limiting
the scope of the rules it adopts to
address phantom traffic to CPN and CN
signaling is consistent with the goal of
helping to ensure complete and accurate
passing of call signaling information,
while minimizing disruption to industry
practices or existing carrier agreements.
The revised and expanded requirements
with regard to CPN and CN will ensure
that terminating carriers will receive,
via SS7, MF, or IP signaling,
information helpful in identifying
carriers sending terminating traffic to
their networks. This information, in
combination with billing records
provided to terminating carriers in
accordance with industry standards,
should significantly reduce the amount
of unbillable traffic that terminating
carriers receive.
b. Enforcement
490. Commenters to the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM urged the
Commission to consider a number of
PO 00000
Frm 00062
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
measures to ensure compliance with the
Commission’s new rules. As explained
below, however, there is no persuasive
evidence that existing enforcement
mechanisms and complaint processes
are inadequate. The Commission
therefore declines to adopt these
enforcement proposals. Parties
aggrieved by violations of the phantom
traffic rules have a number of options,
such as filing an informal or formal
complaint. In addition, the Commission
has broad authority to initiate
proceedings on its own motion to
investigate and enforce its phantom
traffic rules.
IX. Comprehensive Intercarrier
Compensation Reform
491. Consistent with the National
Broadband Plan’s recommendation to
phase out regulated per-minute
intercarrier compensation charges, in
this section the Commission adopts billand-keep as the default methodology for
all intercarrier compensation traffic. The
Commission believes that setting an end
state for all traffic will promote the
transition to IP networks, provide a
more predictable path for the industry
and investors, and anchor the reform
process that will ultimately free
consumers from shouldering the hidden
multi-billion dollar subsidies embedded
in the current system.
492. Under bill-and-keep
arrangements, a carrier generally looks
to its end-users—which are the entities
and individuals making the choice to
subscribe to that network—rather than
looking to other carriers and their
customers to pay for the costs of its
network. To the extent additional
subsidies are necessary, such subsidies
will come from the CAF, and/or state
universal service funds. Wireless
providers have long been operating
pursuant to what are essentially billand-keep arrangements, and this
framework has proven to be successful
for that industry. Bill-and-keep
arrangements are also akin to the model
generally used to determine who bears
the cost for the exchange of IP traffic,
where providers bear the cost of getting
their traffic to a mutually agreeable
exchange point with other providers.
493. Bill-and-keep has significant
policy advantages over other proposals
in the record. A bill-and-keep
methodology will ensure that
consumers pay only for services that
they choose and receive, eliminating the
existing opaque implicit subsidy system
under which consumers pay to support
other carriers’ network costs. This
subsidy system shields subsidy
recipients and their customers from
price signals associated with network
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
deployment choices. A bill-and-keep
methodology also imposes fewer
regulatory burdens and reduces
arbitrage and competitive distortions
inherent in the current system,
eliminating carriers’ ability to shift
network costs to competitors and their
customers. The Commission has legal
authority to adopt a bill-and-keep
methodology as the end point for reform
pursuant to its rulemaking authority to
implement sections 251(b)(5), 47 U.S.C.
251(b)(5), and 252(d)(2), 47 U.S.C.
252(d)(2), in addition to authority under
other provisions of the Act, including 47
U.S.C. 201 and 332.
494. The Commission also adopts in
this section a gradual transition for
terminating access, providing price cap
carriers, and competitive LECs that
benchmark to price cap carrier rates, six
years and rate-of-return carriers, and
competitive LECs that benchmark to
rate-of-return carrier rates, nine years to
reach the end state. The Commission
believes that initially focusing the billand-keep transition on terminating
access rates will allow a more
manageable process and will focus
reform where some of the most pressing
problems, such as access charge
arbitrage, currently arise. Additionally,
the Commission believes that limiting
reform to terminating access charges at
this time minimizes the burden
intercarrier compensation reform will
place on consumers and will help
manage the size of the access
replacement mechanism adopted
herein. The Commission recognizes,
however, that it needs to further
evaluate the timing, transition, and
possible need for a recovery mechanism
for those rate elements—including
originating access, common transport
elements not reduced, and dedicated
transport—that are not immediately
transitioned; the Commission addresses
those elements in the USF/ICC
Transformation FNPRM. The transition
the Commission adopts sets a default
framework, leaving carriers free to enter
into negotiated agreements that allow
for different terms.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
A. Bill-and-Keep as the End Point for
Reform
1. Bill-and-Keep Best Advances the
Goals of Reform
495. The Commission adopts a billand-keep methodology as a default
framework and end state for all
intercarrier compensation traffic. The
Commission finds that a bill-and-keep
framework for intercarrier compensation
best advances the Commission’s policy
goals and the public interest, driving
greater efficiency in the operation of
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
telecommunications networks and
promoting the deployment of IP-based
networks.
496. Bill-and-Keep Is Market-Based
and Less Burdensome than the
Proposed Alternatives. Bill-and-keep
brings market discipline to intercarrier
compensation because it ensures that
the customer who chooses a network
pays the network for the services the
subscriber receives. Specifically, a billand-keep methodology requires carriers
to recover the cost of their network
through end-user charges, which are
potentially subject to competition.
Under the existing approach, carriers
recover the cost of their network from
competing carriers through intercarrier
charges, which may not be subject to
competitive discipline. Thus, bill-andkeep gives carriers appropriate
incentives to serve their customers
efficiently.
497. Bill-and-keep is also less
burdensome than approaches that
would require the Commission and/or
state regulators to set a uniform positive
intercarrier compensation rate, such as
$0.0007. In particular, bill-and-keep
reduces the significant regulatory costs
and uncertainty associated with
choosing such a rate, which would
require complicated, time consuming
regulatory proceedings, based on factors
such as demand elasticities for
subscription and usage as well as the
nature and extent of competition. As the
Commission has recognized with
respect to the existing reciprocal
compensation rate methodology, ‘‘[s]tate
pricing proceedings under the TELRIC
[Total Element Long Run Incremental
Cost] regime have been extremely
complicated and often last for two or
three years at a time. * * * The drain
on resources for the state commissions
and interested parties can be
tremendous.’’ Indeed, the cost of
implementing such a framework
potentially could outweigh the resulting
intercarrier compensation revenues for
many carriers. Moreover, in setting any
new intercarrier rate, it would be
necessary to rely on information from
carriers who would have incentives to
maximize their own revenues, rather
than ensure socially optimal intercarrier
compensation charges. Thus, the costs
of choosing a new positive intercarrier
compensation rate would be significant,
and a reasonable outcome would be
highly uncertain.
498. Bill-and-Keep Is Consistent with
Cost Causation Principles. As the USF/
ICC Transformation NPRM observed,
‘‘[u]nderlying historical pricing policies
for termination of traffic was the
assumption that the calling party was
the sole beneficiary and sole cost-causer
PO 00000
Frm 00063
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81623
of a call.’’ However, as one regulatory
group has observed, if the called party
did not benefit from incoming calls,
‘‘users would either turn off their phone
or not pick up calls.’’ This is
particularly true given the prevalence of
caller ID, the availability of the national
do-not-call registry, and the option of
having unlisted telephone numbers.
More recent analyses have recognized
that both parties generally benefit from
participating in a call, and therefore,
that both parties should split the cost of
the call. That line of economic research
finds that the most efficient termination
charge is less than incremental cost, and
could be negative.
499. Moreover, the subscription
decisions of the called party play a
significant role in determining the cost
of terminating calls to that party. A
consequent effect of the existing
intercarrier compensation regime is that
it allows carriers to shift recovery of the
costs of their local networks to other
providers because subscribers do not
have accurate pricing signals to allow
them to identify lower-cost or more
efficient providers. By contrast, a billand-keep framework helps reveal the
true cost of the network to potential
subscribers by limiting carriers’ ability
to recover their own costs from other
carriers and their customers, even as the
Commission retains beneficial policies
regarding interconnection, call blocking,
and geographic rate averaging.
500. The Commission rejects claims
that bill-and-keep does not allow for
sufficient cost recovery. In the past,
parties have argued that a bill-and-keep
approach somehow results in ‘‘free’’
termination. But bill-and-keep merely
shifts the responsibility for recovery
from other carrier’s customers to the
customers that chose to purchase
service from that network plus explicit
universal service support where
necessary. Such an approach provides
better incentives for carriers to operate
efficiently by better reflecting those
efficiencies (or inefficiencies) in pricing
signals to end-user customers.
501. To the extent carriers in costlyto-serve areas are unable to recover their
costs from their end users while
maintaining service and rates that are
reasonably comparable to those in urban
areas, universal service support, rather
than intercarrier compensation should
make up the difference. In this respect,
bill-and-keep helps fulfill the direction
from Congress in the 1996 Act that the
Commission should make support
explicit rather than implicit.
502. Consumer Benefits of Bill-andKeep. Economic theory suggests that
carriers will reduce consumers’ effective
price of calling, through reduced
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81624
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
charges and/or improved service
quality. The Commission predicts that
reduced quality-adjusted prices will
lead to substantial savings on calls
made, and to increased calling.
Economic theory suggests that qualityadjusted prices will be reduced
regardless of the extent of competition
in any given market, but will be reduced
most where competition is strongest.
These price reductions will be most
significant among carriers who, by and
large, incur but do not collect
termination charges, notably CMRS and
long-distance carriers. The potential for
benefits to wireless customers is
particularly important, as today there
are approximately 300 million wireless
devices, compared to approximately 117
million fixed lines, in the United States.
Lower termination charges for wireless
carriers could allow lower prepaid
calling charges and larger bundles of
free calls for the same monthly price.
For example, carriers presently offer free
‘‘in-network’’ wireless calls at least in
part because they do not have to pay to
terminate calls on their own network.
Lower termination charges could also
enable more investment in wireless
networks, resulting in higher quality
service—e.g., fewer dropped calls and
higher quality calls—as well as
accelerated deployment of 4G service.
Similarly, IXCs, calling card providers,
and VoIP providers will be able to offer
cheaper long-distance rates and
unlimited minutes at a lower price.
503. Moreover, as carriers face
intercarrier compensation charges that
more accurately reflect the incremental
cost of making a call, consumers will
see at least three mutually reinforcing
types of benefits. First, carriers
operations will become more efficient as
they are able to better allocate resources
for delivering and marketing existing
communications services. Specifically,
as described below, bill-and-keep will
over time eliminate wasteful arbitrage
schemes and other behaviors designed
to take advantage of or avoid above-cost
interconnection rates, as well as
reducing ongoing call monitoring,
intercarrier billing disputes, and
contract enforcement efforts. Second,
carrier decisions to invest in, develop,
and market communications services
will increasingly be based on efficient
price signals.
504. Third, and perhaps most
importantly, the Commission expects
carriers will engage in substantial
innovation to attract and retain
consumers. New services that are
presently offered on a limited basis will
be expanded, and innovative services
and complementary products will be
developed. For example, with the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
substantial elimination of termination
charges under a bill-and-keep
methodology, a wide range of IP-calling
services are likely to be developed and
extended, a process that may ultimately
result in the sale of broadband services
that incorporate voice at a zero or
nominal charge. All these changes will
bring substantial benefits to consumers.
505. The impact of the Commission’s
last substantial intercarrier
compensation reform supports its view
that consumers will benefit significantly
from the R&O’s reforms. In 2000, the
CALLS Order, Access Charge Reform,
Price Cap Performance Review for Local
Exchange Carriers, CC Docket Nos. 96–
262 and 94–1, Sixth Report and Order,
Low-Volume Long-Distance Users, CC
Docket No. 99–249, Report and Order,
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal
Service, CC Docket No. 96–45, Eleventh
Report and Order, 65 FR 57739, Sept.
26, 2000 (CALLS Order), reduced
interstate access charges. At the same
time, in ways similar to the present
reforms, we imposed modest increases
in the fixed charges faced by end users.
In the CALLS Order, the Commission
forecasted that reduced interstate access
rates would bring a range of efficiency
benefits. Although some of these
forecasts were met with initial
skepticism, end-users in fact realized
benefits that exceeded most
expectations. In particular, the CALLS
Order resulted in substantial decreases
in calling prices, but in largely
unexpected ways. As a result of the
CALLS Order, retail toll charges fell
sharply, bringing average customer
expenditures per minute of interstate
toll calling down 18 percent during the
year 2000. However, rather than merely
reducing per-minute rates, wireless
carriers started offering a new form of
pricing, a fixed fee for a ‘‘bucket’’ of
minutes, and ended distance-based
pricing. As a result of these price
declines, the gains in consumer surplus
for wireless users in the United States
from the CALLS Order were estimated to
be about $115 billion per year.
Competitive pressure from wireless
providers brought similar changes to
fixed line carriers, who began offering
unlimited domestic calls. These price
declines and innovations also had
important indirect effects, allowing endusers to fundamentally change the way
they used telephony services. For
example, lower calling charges enabled
a substantial and ongoing shift from
landlines to wireless. In short, the
Commission’s prior intercarrier
compensation reform led to more
convenient access to telecommunication
PO 00000
Frm 00064
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
services and substantially lower costs
for long-distance calls.
506. Bill-and-Keep Eliminates
Arbitrage and Marketplace Distortions.
Bill-and-keep will address arbitrage and
marketplace distortions arising from the
current intercarrier compensation
regimes, and therefore will promote
competition in the telecommunications
marketplace. Intercarrier compensation
rates above incremental cost have
enabled much of the arbitrage that
occurs today, and to the extent that such
rates apply differently across providers,
have led to significant marketplace
distortions. Rates today are determined
by looking at the average cost of the
entire network, whereas a bill-and-keep
approach better reflects the incremental
cost of termination, reducing arbitrage
incentives. For example, based on a
hypothetical calculation of the cost of
voice service on a next generation
network providing a full range of voice,
video, and data services, one study
estimated that the incremental cost of
delivering an average customer’s total
volume of voice service could be as low
as $0.000256 per month; on a per
minute basis, this incremental cost
would translate to a cost of $0.0000001
per minute. Moreover, non-voice traffic
on next generation networks (NGNs) is
growing much more rapidly than voice
traffic, and under any reasonable
methods of cost allocation, the share of
voice cost to total cost will continue to
be small in an NGN. Record evidence
indicates that the incremental cost of
termination for circuit-switched
networks is likewise extremely small.
507. The conclusion that the
incremental cost of call termination is
very nearly zero, coupled with the
difficulty of appropriately setting an
efficient, positive intercarrier
compensation charge, further supports
the adoption of bill-and-keep. The
Commission notes that the statutory text
of 47 U.S.C. 252(d)(2) provides that the
methodology for reciprocal
compensation should allow for the
recovery of the ‘‘additional costs’’ of a
call which equals incremental cost, not
the average or total cost of transporting
or terminating a call. Exact
identification of efficient termination
charges would be extremely complex,
and considering the costs of metering,
billing, and contract enforcement that
come with a non-zero termination
charge, the Commission finds that the
benefits obtained from imposing even a
very careful estimate of the efficient
interconnection charge would be more
than offset by the considerable costs of
doing so. The Commission
acknowledges that it is also possible
that, in some instances, the efficient
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
termination rates of preceding models
would not allow overall cost recovery.
In that case, while the efficient costcovering termination rate could lie
above incremental cost, the Commission
also concludes that it is more efficient
to ensure cost recovery via direct
subsidies, such as the CAF, than by
distorting usage prices.
508. Some parties have expressed
concerns that bill-and-keep
arrangements will encourage carriers to
‘‘dump’’ traffic on other providers’
terminating network, because the cost of
termination to the carrier delivering the
traffic will be zero. Such concerns,
however, appear to be largely
speculative; no commenter has
identified a concrete reason why any
carrier would engage in such
‘‘dumping’’ or how it would do so.
Indeed, there has been no evidence that
any such ‘‘dumping’’ has occurred in
the wireless industry, which has
operated under a similar framework.
Even so, if a long distance carrier
decided to deliver all of its traffic to a
terminating LECs’ tandem switch, that
practice could result in tandem exhaust,
requiring the terminating LEC to invest
in additional switching capacity. To
help address this concern, the
Commission confirms that a LEC may
include traffic grooming requirements in
its tariffs. These traffic grooming
requirements specify when a long
distance carrier must purchase
dedicated DS1 or DS3 trunks to deliver
traffic rather than pay per-minute
transport charges, a determination based
on the amount of traffic going to a
particular end office. The Commission
believes this accountability and
additional information will deter
concerns regarding traffic dumping.
509. Bill-and-Keep Is Appropriate
Even If Traffic Is Imbalanced. The
Commission initially permitted states to
impose bill-and-keep arrangements on
providers, but did so with the caveat
that traffic should be roughly in balance.
At the time, the Commission reasoned
that carriers incur costs for terminating
traffic, and bill-and-keep may not enable
the recovery of such costs from other
carriers. The Commission also
expressed concern that, in a reciprocal
compensation arrangement, bill-andkeep may ‘‘distort carriers’ incentives,
encouraging them to overuse competing
carriers’ termination facilities by
seeking customers that primarily
originate traffic.’’
510. In light of technological
advancements and the rejection of the
calling party network pays model in
favor of a model that better tracks cost
causation principles, the Commission
revisits its prior concerns and
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
conclusions supporting the ‘‘balanced
traffic limitation.’’ First, the
Commission rejects claims that, as a
policy matter, bill-and-keep is only
appropriate in the case of roughly
balanced traffic. Concerns about the
balance of traffic exchanged reflect the
view that the calling party’s network
should bear all the costs of a call. Given
the understanding that both the calling
and called party benefit from a call, the
‘‘direction’’ of the traffic—i.e., which
network is originating or terminating the
call—is no longer as relevant. Under
bill-and-keep, ‘‘success in the
marketplace will reflect a carrier’s
ability to serve customers efficiently,
rather than its ability to extract
payments from other carriers.’’
Additionally, bill-and-keep is most
consistent with the models used for
wireless and IP networks, models that
have flourished and promoted
innovation and investment without any
symmetry or balanced traffic
requirement.
511. Second, as already explained, the
Commission rejects the assertion that
bill-and-keep does not enable cost
recovery. Although a bill-and-keep
approach will not provide for the
recovery of certain costs via intercarrier
compensation, it will still allow for cost
recovery via end-user compensation
and, where necessary, explicit universal
service support. The Commission finds
that although the statute provides that
each carrier will have the opportunity to
recover its costs, it does not entitle each
carrier to recover those costs from
another carrier, so long as it can recover
those costs from its own end users and
explicit universal service support where
necessary.
512. As a result, the Commission
departs from the Commission’s earlier
articulated concern that bill-and-keep
distorts carriers incentives. To the
contrary, the Commission concludes,
based on policy and economic theory,
that bill-and-keep best addresses the
significant arbitrage incentives inherent
in today’s system.
513. These conclusions are consistent
with the Commission’s more recent
consideration of bill-and-keep
arrangements in the context of ISPbound traffic. Specifically, in the 2001
ISP Remand Order, Intercarrier
Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, CC
Docket Nos. 96–98, 99–68, Order on
Remand and Report and Order, 66 FR
26800, May 15, 2001 (2001 ISP Remand
Order), the Commission stated that its
initial ‘‘concerns about economic
inefficiencies associated with bill and
keep missed the mark’’ because they
incorrectly assumed that the ‘‘calling
party was the sole cost causer of the
PO 00000
Frm 00065
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81625
call.’’ The Commission tentatively
concluded that bill-and-keep would
provide a viable solution to the market
distortions caused by ISP-bound traffic.
Indeed, the Commission’s experience
with ISP-bound traffic suggests that a
bill-and-keep approach may be most
efficient where the traffic is not
balanced because the obligation to pay
reciprocal compensation in such
situations may give rise to uneconomic
incentives. The Commission therefore
concludes it is appropriate to repeal
section 51.713 of its rules, 47 CFR
51.713.
2. Legal Authority
514. The Commission’s statutory
authority to implement bill-and-keep as
the default framework for the exchange
of traffic with LECs flows directly from
sections 251(b)(5) and 201(b) of the Act,
47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5), 201(b). The
Commission has additional statutory
authority under 47 U.S.C. 332 to
regulate interconnection arrangements
involving CMRS providers. Section
251(b)(5), 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5), states that
LECs have a ‘‘duty to establish
reciprocal compensation arrangements
for the transport and termination of
telecommunications.’’ Section 201(b),
47 U.S.C. 201(b), grants the Commission
authority to ‘‘prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary in the
public interest to carry out the
provisions of this Act.’’ In AT&T Corp.
v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366,
378 (1999), the Supreme Court held that
‘‘the grant in § 201(b) means what it
says: The FCC has rulemaking authority
to carry out the ‘provisions of this Act,’
which include §§ 251 and 252.’’ As
discussed below, the Commission may
exercise this rulemaking authority to
define the types of traffic that will be
subject to 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5)’s
reciprocal compensation framework and
to adopt a default compensation
mechanism that will apply to such
traffic in the absence of an agreement
between the carriers involved.
515. The Scope of 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5).
Section 251(b)(5), 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5)
imposes on all LECs the ‘‘duty to
establish reciprocal compensation
arrangements for the transport and
termination of telecommunications.’’
The Commission initially interpreted
this provision to ‘‘apply only to traffic
that originates and terminates within a
local area.’’ In the 2001 ISP Remand
Order, however, the Commission noted
that its initial reading is inconsistent
with the statutory terms. The
Commission explained that 47 U.S.C.
251(b)(5) does not use the term ‘‘local,’’
but instead speaks more broadly of the
transport and termination of
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81626
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
‘‘telecommunications.’’ As defined in
the Act, the term ‘‘telecommunications’’
means the ‘‘transmission, between or
among points specified by the user, of
information of the user’s choosing,
without change in the form or content
of the information as sent and received’’
and thus encompasses communications
traffic of any geographic scope (e.g.,
‘‘local,’’ ‘‘intrastate,’’ or ‘‘interstate’’) or
regulatory classification (e.g.,
‘‘telephone exchange service,’’
‘‘telephone toll service,’’ or ‘‘exchange
access’’). The Commission reiterated
this interpretation of 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5)
in its 2008 Order and ICC/USF FNPRM,
High-Cost Universal Service Support,
WC Docket No. 05–337, 03–109, 06–122,
04–36, CC Docket No. 96–45, 99–200,
96–98, 01–92, 99–68, Order on Remand
and Report and Order and Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 FR
66821, Dec. 12, 2008 (2008 Order and
ICC/USF FNPRM), and the Commission
proposed in the ICC/USF
Transformation NPRM to make clear
that 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5) applies to ‘‘all
telecommunications, including access
traffic.’’
516. After reviewing the record, the
Commission adopts its proposal and
concludes that 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5)
applies to traffic that traditionally has
been classified as access traffic. Nothing
in the record seriously calls into
question the Commission’s conclusion
that access traffic is one form of
‘‘telecommunications.’’ By the express
terms of 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5), therefore,
when a LEC is a party to the transport
and termination of access traffic, the
exchange of traffic is subject to
regulation under the reciprocal
compensation framework.
517. The Commission recognizes that
the Commission has not previously
regulated access traffic under 47 U.S.C.
251(b)(5). The reason, as the
Commission has previously explained,
is section 251(g), 47 U.S.C. 251(g).
Section 251(g), 47 U.S.C. 251(g), is a
‘‘transitional device’’ that requires LECs
to continue ‘‘provid[ing] exchange
access, information access, and
exchange services for such access to
interexchange carriers and information
service providers in accordance with the
same equal access and
nondiscriminatory interconnection
restrictions and obligations (including
receipt of compensation)’’ previously in
effect ‘‘until such restrictions and
obligations are explicitly superseded by
regulations prescribed by the
Commission.’’ Section 251(g), 47 U.S.C.
251(g), thus preserved the pre-1996 Act
regulatory regime that applies to access
traffic, including rules governing
‘‘receipt of compensation,’’ and thereby
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
precluded the application of 47 U.S.C.
251(b)(5) to such traffic ‘‘unless and
until the Commission by regulation
should determine otherwise.’’
518. In this R&O, the Commission
explicitly supersedes the traditional
access charge regime and, subject to the
transition mechanism outlined below,
regulates terminating access traffic in
accordance with the 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5)
framework. Consistent with its approach
to comprehensive reform generally and
the desire for a more unified approach,
the Commission finds it appropriate to
bring all traffic within the 47 U.S.C.
251(b)(5) regime at this time, and
commenters generally agree. Doing so is
key to advancing the Commission’s
goals of encouraging migration to
modern, all IP networks; eliminating
arbitrage and competitive distortions;
and eliminating the thicket of disparate
intercarrier compensation rates and
payments that are ultimately borne by
consumers. Even though the transition
process detailed below is limited to
terminating switched access traffic and
certain transport traffic, the Commission
makes clear that the legal authority to
adopt the bill-and-keep methodology
described herein applies to all
intercarrier compensation traffic. As
noted below, the Commission seeks
comment on the transition and recovery
for originating access and transport in
the USF/ICC Transformation FNPRM.
519. The Commission rejects
arguments that 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5) does
not apply to intrastate access traffic.
Like other forms of carrier traffic,
intrastate access traffic falls within the
scope of the broad term
‘‘telecommunications’’ used in 47 U.S.C.
251(b)(5). ‘‘Had Congress intended to
exclude certain types of
telecommunications traffic,’’ such as
‘‘local’’ or ‘‘intrastate’’ traffic, ‘‘from the
reciprocal compensation framework, it
could have easily done so by using more
restrictive terms to define the traffic
subject to 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5).’’ Nor does
the Commission believe that section 2(b)
of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 152(b), which
generally preserves state authority over
intrastate communications, bears on its
interpretation of 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5). As
the Supreme Court noted, ‘‘[s]uch an
interpretation [of 47 U.S.C. 152(b)]
would utterly nullify the 1996
amendments, which clearly ‘apply’ to
intrastate services, and clearly confer
‘Commission jurisdiction’ over some
matters.’’ Indeed, if 47 U.S.C. 152(b)
limited the scope of 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5),
the Commission could not apply the
reciprocal compensation framework
even to local traffic between a CLEC and
an ILEC—the type of traffic that has
been subject to the reciprocal
PO 00000
Frm 00066
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
compensation rules since the
Commission implemented the 1996 Act.
The Commission sees no reason to
adopt such an absurd reading of the
statute.
520. The Commission also rejects
arguments that 47 U.S.C. 251(g) and
251(d)(3) somehow limit the scope of
the ‘‘telecommunications’’ covered by
47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5). Whatever
protections these provisions provide to
state access regulations, it is clear that
those protections are not absolute. As
noted above, 47 U.S.C. 251(g) preserves
access charge rules only during a
transitional period, which ends when
the Commission adopts superseding
regulations. Accordingly, to the extent
47 U.S.C. 251(g) has preserved state
intrastate access rules against the
operation of 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5) until
now, this rulemaking R&O supersedes
that provision.
521. Section 251(d)(3), 47 U.S.C.
251(d)(3), states that ‘‘[i]n prescribing
and enforcing regulations to implement
the requirements of this section, the
Commission shall not preclude the
enforcement of any regulation, order, or
policy of a State commission that—(A)
establishes access and interconnection
obligations of local exchange carriers;
(B) is consistent with the requirements
of this section; and (C) does not
substantially prevent implementation of
the requirements of this section and the
purposes of this part.’’ As the
Commission has previously observed,
‘‘section 251(d)(3) of the Act
independently establishes a standard
very similar to the judicial conflict
preemption doctrine,’’ and ‘‘[i]ts
protections do not apply when the state
regulation is inconsistent with the
requirements of section 251, or when
the state regulation substantially
prevents implementation of the
requirements of section 251 or the
purposes of sections 251 through 261 of
the Act.’’ Moreover, ‘‘in order to be
consistent with the requirements of
section 251 and not ‘substantially
prevent’ implementation of section 251
or Part II of Title II, state requirements
must be consistent with the FCC’s
implementing regulations.’’ In other
words, 47 U.S.C. 251(d)(3) instructs the
Commission not to preempt state
regulations that are consistent with and
promote federal rules and policies, but
it does not protect state regulations that
frustrate the Act’s policies or the
Commission’s implementation of the
statute’s requirements. As discussed in
this R&O, the Commission is bringing
all telecommunications traffic
terminated on LECs, including intrastate
switched access traffic, into the 47
U.S.C. 251(b)(5) framework to fulfill the
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
objectives of 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5) and
other provisions of the Act.
Consequently, the Commission finds
that, to the extent 47 U.S.C. 251(d)(3)
applies in this context, it does not
prevent us from adopting rules to
implement the provisions of 47 U.S.C.
251(b)(5) and applying those rules to
traffic traditionally classified as
intrastate access.
522. Finally, the Commission rejects
the view of some commenters that the
pricing standard set forth in 47 U.S.C.
252(d)(2)(A) limits the scope of 47
U.S.C. 251(b)(5). As the Commission
explained in the 2008 Order and ICC/
USF FNPRM, 47 U.S.C. 252(d)(2)(A)(i)
‘‘deals with the mechanics of who owes
what to whom, it does not define the
scope of traffic to which section
251(b)(5) applies.’’ The Commission
noted that construing ‘‘the pricing
standards in section 252(d)(2) to limit
the otherwise broad scope of section
251(b)(5)’’ would nonsensically suggest
that ‘‘Congress intended the tail to wag
the dog.’’ The Commission reaffirms
that conclusion here.
523. Authority To Adopt Bill-andKeep as a Default Compensation
Standard. The Commission concludes
that it has the statutory authority to
establish bill-and-keep as the default
compensation arrangement for all traffic
subject to 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5). That
includes traffic that, prior to this R&O,
was subject to the interstate and
intrastate access regimes, as well as
traffic exchanged between two LECs or
a LEC and a CMRS carrier.
524. Section 201(b), 47 U.S.C. 201(b)
states that ‘‘[t]he Commission may
prescribe such rules and regulations as
may be necessary in the public interest
to carry out the provisions of this Act.’’
As the Supreme Court held in Iowa
Utilities Board, section 201(b) of the
Act, 47 U.S.C. 201(b), ‘‘means what it
says: The FCC has rulemaking authority
to carry out the ‘provisions of this Act,’
which include §§ 251 and 252.’’
Moreover, section 251(i) of the Act, 47
U.S.C. 251(i), states that ‘‘[n]othing in
this section [section 251] shall be
construed to limit or otherwise affect
the Commission’s authority under
section 201.’’ Section 251(i), 47 U.S.C.
251(i), ‘‘fortifies [our] position’’ that the
Commission has the authority to
regulate the default compensation
arrangement applicable to traffic subject
to 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5).
525. The Commission concludes that
it has the statutory authority to establish
bill-and-keep as a default compensation
mechanism with respect to interstate
traffic subject to 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5).
Section 201, 47 U.S.C. 201, has long
conferred authority on the Commission
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
to regulate interstate communications to
ensure that ‘‘charges, practices,
classifications, and regulations’’ are
‘‘just and reasonable’’ and not
unreasonably discriminatory. Indeed,
the D.C. Circuit recently upheld the
Commission’s authority under 47 U.S.C.
201 to establish interim rates for ISPbound traffic, which the Commission
had found to also be subject to 47 U.S.C.
251(b)(5).
526. In any event, the Commission
concludes that it has authority,
independent of its traditional interstate
rate-setting authority in 47 U.S.C. 201,
to establish bill-and-keep as the default
compensation arrangement for all traffic
subject to 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5), including
intrastate traffic. Although section 2(b),
47 U.S.C. 152(b) has traditionally
preserved the states’ authority to
regulate intrastate communications,
after the 1996 Act section 2(b) has ‘‘less
practical effect’’ because ‘‘Congress, by
extending the Communications Act into
local competition, has removed a
significant area from the States’
exclusive control.’’ Thus, ‘‘[w]ith regard
to the matters addressed by the 1996
Act,’’ Congress ‘‘unquestionably’’ ‘‘has
taken the regulation of local
telecommunications competition away
from the States,’’ and, as the Supreme
Court has held, ‘‘the administration of
the new federal regime is to be guided
by federal-agency regulations.’’ The
rulemaking authority in section 201(b),
47 U.S.C. 152(b) ‘‘explicitly gives the
FCC jurisdiction to make rules
governing matters to which the 1996 Act
applies’’ and thereby authorizes the
Commission’s adoption of rules to
implement 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5)’s
directive that LECs have a ‘‘duty to
establish reciprocal compensation
arrangements for the transport and
termination of telecommunications.’’
527. The Commission rejects the
argument of some commenters that 47
U.S.C. 252(c) and 252(d)(2) limit its
authority to adopt bill-and-keep. Section
252(c), 47 U.S.C. 252(c), provides that
states conducting arbitration
proceedings under section 252 shall
‘‘establish any rates for interconnection,
services, or network elements according
to’’ section 252(d), 47 U.S.C. 252(d).
Section 252(d)(2), 47 U.S.C. 252(d), in
turn, states in relevant part that ‘‘[f]or
the purposes of compliance by an
incumbent local exchange carrier with
section 251(b)(5), a State commission
shall not consider the terms and
conditions for reciprocal compensation
to be just and reasonable’’ unless they:
(i) ‘‘provide for the mutual and
reciprocal recovery by each carrier of
costs associated with the transport and
termination on each carrier’s network
PO 00000
Frm 00067
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81627
facilities of calls that originate on the
network facilities of the other carrier;’’
and (ii) determine such costs through a
‘‘reasonable approximation of the
additional costs of terminating such
calls.’’ Section 252(d)(2), 47 U.S.C.
252(d)(2), also states that the pricing
standard it sets forth ‘‘shall not be
construed * * * to preclude
arrangements * * * that waive mutual
recovery (such as bill-and-keep
arrangements).’’ Although the Supreme
Court made clear that the Commission
may, through rulemaking, establish a
‘‘pricing methodology’’ under 47 U.S.C.
252(d) for states to apply in arbitration
proceedings, the Eighth Circuit has held
that ‘‘[s]etting specific [reciprocal
compensation] prices goes beyond the
FCC’s authority to design a pricing
methodology and intrudes on the states’
right to set the actual rates pursuant to
§ 252(c)(2).’’ Commenters who cite 47
U.S.C. 252(d) as a limitation on the
Commission’s authority to adopt billand-keep argue that bill-and-keep
intrudes on states’ rate-setting authority
by effectively setting a compensation
rate of zero.
528. The Commission disagrees for
two reasons. First, the pricing standard
in 47 U.S.C. 252(d) simply does not
apply to most of the traffic that is the
focus of this R&O—traffic exchanged
between LECs and IXCs. Section 252(d),
47 U.S.C. 252(d), applies only to traffic
exchanged with an ILEC, so CLEC–IXC
traffic is categorically beyond its scope.
Even with respect to traffic exchanged
with an ILEC, 47 U.S.C. 252(d) applies
only to arrangements between carriers
where the traffic ‘‘originate[s] on the
network facilities of the other carrier,’’
i.e., the carrier sending the traffic for
transport and termination. IXCs,
however, typically do not originate (or
terminate) calls on their own network
facilities but instead transmit calls that
originate and terminate on distant LECs.
Accordingly, to the extent the bill-andkeep rules apply to LEC–IXC traffic, the
rules do not implicate any question of
the states’ authority under 47 U.S.C.
252(c) or (d) or the Eighth Circuit’s
interpretation of those provisions.
529. Second, and in any event, billand-keep is consistent with section
252(d)’s pricing standard. Section
252(d)(2)(B), 47 U.S.C. 252(d)(2)(B)
makes clear that ‘‘arrangements that
waive mutual recovery (such as billand-keep arrangements)’’ are consistent
with section 252(d)’s pricing standard.
Although bill-and-keep by definition
‘‘waive[s] mutual recovery’’ 47 U.S.C.
252(d)(2)(B)(i), in that carriers do not
pay each other for transporting and
terminating calls, a bill-and-keep
framework provides for ‘‘reciprocal’’
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81628
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
recovery because each carrier
exchanging traffic is entitled to recover
their costs through the same
mechanism, i.e., through the rates they
charge their own customers. As
explained in the Local Competition First
Report and Order, Implementation of
the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC
Docket Nos. 96–98, 95–185, First Report
and Order, 61 FR 45476, Aug. 29, 1996
(Local Competition First Report and
Order), this provision precludes any
argument that ‘‘the Commission and
states do not have the authority to
mandate bill-and-keep arrangements’’ or
that bill-and-keep is permissible only if
it is voluntarily agreed to by the carriers
involved. Bill-and-keep also ensures
‘‘recovery of each carrier of costs’’
associated with transport and
termination. The Act does not specify
from whom each carrier may (or must)
recover those costs and, under the
approach the Commission adopts, each
carrier will ‘‘recover’’ its costs from its
own end users or from explicit support
mechanisms such as the federal
universal service fund. The economic
premise of a bill-and-keep regime differs
from the calling party network pays
(CPNP) philosophy of cost causation.
Under CPNP thinking, the party that
initiated the call is receiving the most
benefit from that call. Under the billand-keep methodology the economic
premise is that both the calling and the
called party benefit from the ability to
exchange traffic, i.e., being
interconnected. This is consistent with
policy justifications for bill-and-keep
described in the Intercarrier
Compensation NPRM in which the
Commission said ‘‘there may be no
reason why both LECs should not
recover the costs of providing these
benefits directly from their end users.
Bill-and-keep provides a mechanism
whereby end users pay for the benefit of
making and receiving calls.’’ Thus, billand-keep will not limit the amount of a
carrier’s cost recovery, but instead will
alter the source of the cost recovery—
network costs would be recovered from
carriers’ customers supplemented as
necessary by explicit universal service
support, rather than from other carriers.
530. Finally, even assuming 47 U.S.C.
252(d) applies, adoption of bill-andkeep as a default compensation
mechanism would not intrude on the
states’ role to set rates as interpreted by
the Eighth Circuit. To the extent the
traffic at issue is intrastate in nature and
subject to 47 U.S.C. 252(d)’s pricing
standard, states retain the authority to
regulate the rates that the carriers will
charge their end users to recover the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
costs of transport and termination to
ensure that such rates are ‘‘just and
reasonable.’’ Moreover, states will retain
important responsibilities in the
implementation of a bill-and-keep
framework. An inherent part of any rate
setting process is not only the
establishment of the rate level and rate
structure, but the definition of the
service or functionality to which the
rate will apply. Under a bill-and-keep
framework, the determination of points
on a network at which a carrier must
deliver terminating traffic to avail itself
of bill-and-keep (sometimes known as
the ‘‘edge’’) serves this function, and
will be addressed by states through the
arbitration process where parties cannot
agree on a negotiated outcome.
Depending upon how the ‘‘edge’’ is
defined in particular circumstances, in
conjunction with how the carriers
physically interconnect their networks,
payments still could change hands as
reciprocal compensation even under a
bill-and-keep regime where, for
instance, an IXC pays a terminating LEC
to transport traffic from the IXC to the
edge of the LEC’s network. This
statement does not suggest any
particular outcome with respect to the
definition of the ‘‘edge,’’ which is an
issue the Commission seeks comment
on in the USF/ICC Transformation
FNPRM. Consistent with their existing
role under 47 U.S.C. 251 and 252, which
the Commission does not expand or
contract, states will continue to have the
responsibility to address these issues in
state arbitration proceedings, which the
Commission believes is sufficient to
satisfy any statutory role that the states
have under 47 U.S.C. 252(d) to
‘‘determin[e] the concrete result in
particular circumstances’’ of the billand-keep framework the Commission
adopts.
531. Originating Access. Some parties
contend that the Commission lacks
authority over originating access charges
under 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5) because that
section refers only to transport and
termination. Other commenters urge the
Commission to act swiftly to eliminate
originating access charges. Although the
Commission concludes that the
originating access regime should be
reformed, at this time the Commission
establishes a transition to bill-and-keep
only with respect to terminating access
charge rates. The concerns the
Commission has with respect to
network inefficiencies, arbitrage, and
costly litigation are less pressing with
respect to originating access, primarily
because many carriers now have
wholesale partners or have integrated
local and long distance operations.
PO 00000
Frm 00068
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
532. As discussed above, 47 U.S.C.
251(g) provides for the continued
enforcement of certain pre-1996 Act
obligations pertaining to ‘‘exchange
access’’ until ‘‘such restrictions and
obligations are explicitly superseded by
regulations prescribed by the
Commission.’’ Exchange access is
defined to mean ‘‘the offering of access
to telephone exchange services or
facilities for the purpose of the
origination or termination of telephone
toll services.’’ Thus, 47 U.S.C. 251(g)
continues to preserve originating access
until the Commission adopts rules to
transition away from that system. At
this time, the Commission adopts
transition rules only with respect to
terminating access and seeks comment
in the USF/ICC Transformation FNPRM
on the ultimate transition away from
such charges as part of the transition of
all access charge rates to bill-and-keep.
In the meantime, the Commission will
cap interstate originating access rates at
their current level, pending resolution
of the issues raised in the USF/ICC
Transformation FNPRM.
533. Section 332 and Wireless Traffic.
With respect to wireless traffic
exchanged with a LEC, the Commission
has independent authority under
section 332 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 332, to
establish a default bill-and-keep
methodology that will apply in the
absence of an interconnection
agreement. Although the Commission
has not previously exercised its
authority under 47 U.S.C. 332 to reform
intercarrier compensation charges paid
by or to wireless providers, the
Commission has clear authority to do
so, and this authority extends to both
interstate and intrastate traffic. The
Eighth Circuit has construed the Act to
authorize the Commission to set
reciprocal compensation rates for CMRS
providers. In reaching that decision, the
court relied on: (a) 47 U.S.C.
332(c)(1)(B), which obligates LECs to
interconnect with wireless providers
‘‘pursuant to the provisions of section
201;’’ (b) section 2(b), 47 U.S.C. 152(b),
which provides that the Act should not
be construed to apply or to give the
Commission jurisdiction with respect to
charges in connection with intrastate
communication service by radio
‘‘[e]xcept as provided in * * * section
332;’’ and (c) the preemptive language
in 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(3)(A), which
prohibits states from regulating the
entry of or the rates charged by CMRS
providers. The DC Circuit likewise
recently acknowledged the
Commission’s authority in this regard,
observing that the Commission
historically had elected to leave
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
intrastate access rates imposed on
CMRS providers to state regulation, and
recognizing: ‘‘That the FCC can issue
guidance does not mean it must do so.’’
Accordingly, the Commission concludes
that it has separate authority under 47
U.S.C. 201 and 332(c) to establish rules
governing the exchange of both
intrastate and interstate traffic between
LECs and CMRS carriers.
534. Section 254(k). The Commission
also rejects the claims of some
commenters that a bill-and-keep
approach would violate 47 U.S.C. 254(k)
of the Act. Section 254(k) of the Act, 47
U.S.C. 254(k), states that a
telecommunications carrier ‘‘may not
use services that are not competitive to
subsidize services that are subject to
competition,’’ and that the Commission
‘‘shall establish any necessary cost
allocation rules, accounting safeguards,
and guidelines to ensure that services
included in universal service bear no
more than a reasonable share of the joint
and common costs of facilities used to
provide those services.’’ Some parties
express concern that, under a bill-andkeep regime, retail voice telephone
services subject to universal service
support would bear more than ‘‘a
reasonable share of the joint and
common costs.’’
535. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
previously considered and rejected
similar arguments concerning the
reallocation of loop costs between end
users and IXCs. Specifically, the court
considered whether the recovery of joint
and common costs must be borne
mutually by end-users and by IXCs, and
whether a shift in cost recovery from
IXCs to end-users violated 47 U.S.C.
254(k) of the Act. As to the first
provision of 47 U.S.C. 254(k), the court
found that ‘‘[s]ection 254(k) was not
designed to regulate the apportionment
of loop costs between end-users and
IXCs because this allocation does not
involve improperly shifting costs from a
competitive to a non-competitive
service,’’ even if ‘‘a LEC allocates all of
its local loop costs to the end-user.’’
Further, the court disagreed that an
increase in the SLC price cap violates
the second part of 254(k) by causing
services included in the definition of
universal service to bear more than a
reasonable share of the joint and
common costs of facilities used to
provide those services. The court
explained that the ‘‘SLC is a method of
recovering loop costs, not an allocation
of costs between supported and
unsupported services’’ in violation of 47
U.S.C. 254(k). The Commission concurs
with the Eighth Circuit’s analysis and
concludes that it applies equally in this
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
context. A bill-and-keep framework
resolves whether a carrier will recover
its costs from its end users or from other
carriers; the underlying service whose
costs are being recovered is the same,
however, so no costs are being
improperly shifted between competitive
and non-competitive services for
purposes of 47 U.S.C. 254(k).
B. Federal/State Roles in Implementing
Bill-and-Keep
536. The Commission now concludes
that a uniform, national framework for
the transition of intercarrier
compensation to bill-and-keep, with an
accompanying federal recovery
mechanism, best advances the
Commission’s policy goals of
accelerating the migration to all IP
networks, facilitating IP-to-IP
interconnection, and promoting
deployment of new broadband networks
by providing certainty and
predictability to carriers and investors.
Although states will not set the
transition for intrastate rates under this
approach, the Commission does follow
the State Member’s proposal regarding
recovery coming from the federal
jurisdiction. Doing so takes a potentially
large financial burden away from states.
States will also help implement the billand-keep methodology: They will
continue to oversee the tariffing of
intrastate rate reductions during the
transition period as well as
interconnection negotiations and
arbitrations pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 251
and 252, and will have responsibility for
determining the network ‘‘edge’’ for
purposes of bill-and-keep.
537. Today, intrastate access rates
vary widely. In many states, intrastate
rates are significantly higher than
interstate rates; in others, intrastate and
interstate rates are at parity; and in still
other states, intrastate access rates are
below interstate levels. The varying
rates have created incentives for
arbitrage and pervasive competitive
distortions within the industry. Equally
important, consumers may not receive
adequate price signals to make
economically efficient choices because
local and long-distance rates do not
necessarily reflect the underlying costs
of their calls. Depending on their
regulatory classification, some carriers
charge and collect intercarrier
compensation charges, while other
carriers do not. A bill-and-keep system
will ultimately eliminate the
competitive distortions and consumer
inequities that arise today when
different carriers that use differing
technologies (wireline, wireless, VoIP)
to perform the same function—complete
PO 00000
Frm 00069
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81629
a call—are subject to different regulatory
classifications and requirements.
538. Providing a uniform national
transition and recovery framework, to be
implemented in partnership with the
states, will achieve the benefits of a
uniform system and realize the goals of
reducing arbitrage and promoting
investment in IP networks as quickly as
possible. By transitioning all traffic in a
coordinated manner, the Commission
will minimize opportunities for
arbitrage that could be presented by
disparate intrastate rates. For example,
the Commission’s approach will reduce
the potential for arbitrage that could
result from a widening gap between
intrastate and interstate rates if the
Commission were to initially reduce
interstate rates only. In addition, a
coordinated transition involving both
intrastate and interstate traffic will help
to align principles of cost causation and
provide appropriate pricing signals to
end users. Whether completing an
interstate or intrastate call, consumers
will benefit from a unified system in
which arbitrage opportunities that
inequitably shift costs among consumers
are reduced.
539. By moving in a coordinated
manner to address the intercarrier
compensation system for all traffic, the
Commission will also help to ensure
that there is no disruption in the
transition to more efficient forms of all
IP networks. The record suggests that a
‘‘federally managed, geographically
neutral’’ intercarrier compensation
regime that eliminates incentives for
arbitrage will allow service providers to
deploy resources in more productive
ways. In addition, a unified approach
for all ICC traffic will help remove
obstacles to progress toward all-IP
networks where jurisdictional
boundaries become less relevant. In
sum, the Commission’s approach helps
to ensure that the intercarrier
compensation modernization effort will
continue apace without unnecessary
delays needed to harmonize disparate
state actions.
540. Although several states have
sought to reform intrastate access rates,
significant challenges remain that could
impede the comprehensive reform
efforts absent a uniform, national
transition. Under the direction of both
state commissions and legislatures,
states have taken a variety of approaches
to reform. In some states, these efforts
have resulted in intrastate access rate
levels coming to parity with interstate
levels. In other states, reform has led to
reductions in intrastate rate levels, but
rates remain above interstate levels.
Although many states may genuinely
desire to advance additional reforms,
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81630
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
the challenges posed by a state-by-state
process would likely result in
significant variability and
unpredictability of outcomes. Moreover,
some state commissions lack authority
to address intrastate access reform, and
the Commission is concerned that many
states will be unable to complete
reforms in a timely manner or will
otherwise decline to act. Indeed, the
Missouri Commission endorsed a 47
U.S.C. 251(b)(5) approach because
‘‘states should not be allowed to delay
access reform.’’ The lack of certainty
and predictability for the industry
without a uniform framework is a
significant concern. Carriers and
investors need predictability to make
investment and deployment decisions
and lack of certainty regarding intrastate
access rates or recovery hampers these
efforts. In addition some parties warned
that it would be ‘‘extremely costly’’ to
participate in ‘‘the multitude’’ of state
commission proceedings that would
follow from an approach relying on
dozens of different state transitions and
recovery frameworks.
541. In addition, as noted above,
adopting a uniform federal transition
and recovery mechanism will free states
from potentially significant financial
burdens. The recovery mechanism will
provide carriers with recovery for
reductions to eligible interstate and
intrastate revenue. As a result, states
will not be required to bear the burden
of establishing and funding state
recovery mechanisms for intrastate
access reductions, while states will
continue to play a role in
implementation. Furthermore, the
Residential Rate Ceiling adopted as part
of the recovery mechanism will help
ensure that consumer telephone rates
remain affordable, and will also
recognize so-called ‘‘early adopter’’
states that have already undertaken
reform of intrastate access charges and
rebalanced rates.
542. Some commenters argued that
the uniform approach the Commission
takes is inappropriate because states
should be allowed to pursue tailored
intrastate access reforms. The
Commission appreciates and respects
the expertise and on-the-ground
knowledge of its state partners
concerning intrastate
telecommunications. Indeed, as the
Commission has said, states will have
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
responsibility for implementing the billand-keep methodology adopted herein
and will continue to oversee the
tariffing of intrastate rates during the
transition period and interconnection
negotiations and arbitrations pursuant
to 47 U.S.C. 252, as well as determine
the network ‘‘edge’’ for purposes of billand-keep. With respect to the ultimate
ICC framework and the intervening
transition, however, the Commission
finds that a uniform national approach
will best create predictability for
carriers and promote efficient pricing
and new investment to the benefit of
consumers.
C. Transition
543. In light of the decision to adopt
a uniform federal transition to bill-andkeep, in this section the Commission
sets out a default transition path for
terminating end office switching and
certain transport rate elements to begin
that process. The Commission also
begins the process of reforming other
rate elements by capping all interstate
rate elements as of the effective date of
the rules adopted pursuant to this R&O,
and capping terminating intrastate rates
for all carriers. Doing so ensures that no
rates increase during reform, and that
carriers do not shift costs between or
among other rate elements, which
would be counter to the principles the
Commission adopts. And, this transition
will help minimize disruption to
consumers and service providers by
giving parties time, certainty, and
stability as they adjust to an IP world
and a new compensation regime.
544. The Commission sets forth a
transition path for terminating end
office switching and certain transport
rate elements and reciprocal
compensation charges in Figure 9. In
brief, the transition plan first focuses on
the transition for terminating traffic,
which is where the most acute
intercarrier compensation problems,
such as arbitrage, currently arise. The
Commission believes that limiting
reductions at this time to terminating
access rates will help address the
majority of arbitrage and manage the
size of the access replacement
mechanism. The Commission also takes
measures to start reforming other
elements as well by capping all
interstate switched access rates in effect
as of the effective date of the rules,
PO 00000
Frm 00070
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
including originating access and all
transport rates. Absent such action, rateof-return carriers could shift costs
between or among other rate elements
and rates to interconnecting carriers
could continue to increase as they have
been in the past years, which is counter
to the reform the Commission adopts.
Even so, the Commission does not
specify the transition to reduce these
rates further at this time. Instead, the
Commission seeks comment regarding
the transition and recovery for such
other rate elements in the USF/ICC
Transformation FNPRM.
545. Thus, at the outset of the
transition, all interstate switched access
and reciprocal compensation rates will
be capped at rates in effect as of the
effective date of the rules. This will
ensure that carriers do not seek to
inflate their access charges in advance
of the Commission’s reforms.
Specifically, the Commission caps all
rate elements in the ‘‘traffic sensitive
basket’’ and the ‘‘trunking basket’’ as
described in 47 CFR 61.42(d)(2)–(3)
unless a price cap carrier made a tariff
filing increasing any such rate element
prior to the effective date of the rules
and such change was not yet in effect.
The Commission caps these rates as of
the effective date of the R&O, as
opposed to a future date such as January
1, 2012, to ensure that carriers cannot
make changes to rates or rate structures
to their benefit in light of the reforms
adopted in this R&O. For price cap
carriers, all intrastate rates will also be
capped, and, for rate-of-return carriers,
all terminating intrastate access rates
will also be capped. Consistent with
many proposals in the record, the
transition plan provides rate-of-return
carriers, whose rates typically are
higher, additional time to transition as
appropriate. Specifically, the
Commission concludes that a six-year
transition for price cap carriers and
competitive LECs that benchmark to
price cap carrier rates and a nine-year
transition for rate-of-return carriers and
competitive LECs that benchmark to
rate-of-return carrier rates to transition
rates to bill-and-keep strikes an
appropriate balance that will moderate
potential adverse effects on consumers
and carriers of moving too quickly from
the existing intercarrier compensation
regimes.
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
81631
INTERCARRIER COMPENSATION REFORM TIMELINE
Effective date
For price cap carriers and CLECs that benchmark access rates to price cap carriers
For rate-of-return carriers and CLECs that benchmark
access rates to rate-of-return carriers
Effective Date of the rules ...
All intercarrier switched access rate elements, including
interstate and intrastate originating and terminating
rates and reciprocal compensation rates are capped.
July 1, 2012 .........................
July 1, 2019 .........................
Intrastate terminating switched end office and transport
rates, originating and terminating dedicated transport,
and reciprocal compensation rates, if above the carrier’s interstate access rate, are reduced by 50 percent of the differential between the rate and the carrier’s interstate access rate.
Intrastate terminating switched end office and transport
rates and reciprocal compensation, if above the carrier’s interstate access rate, are reduced to parity
with interstate access rate.
Terminating switched end office and reciprocal compensation rates are reduced by one-third of the differential between end office rates and $0.0007.*
Terminating switched end office and reciprocal compensation rates are reduced by an additional onethird of the original differential to $0.0007.*
Terminating switched end office and reciprocal compensation rates are reduced to $0.0007.*
Terminating switched end office and reciprocal compensation rates are reduced to bill-and-keep. Terminating switched end office and transport are reduced
to $0.0007 for all terminating traffic within the tandem
serving area when the terminating carrier owns the
serving tandem switch.
Terminating switched end office and transport are reduced to bill-and-keep for all terminating traffic within
the tandem serving area when the terminating carrier
owns the serving tandem switch.
..........................................................................................
All interstate switched access rate elements, including
all originating and terminating rates and reciprocal
compensation rates are capped. Intrastate terminating rates are also capped.
Intrastate terminating switched end office and transport
rates, originating and terminating dedicated transport,
and reciprocal compensation rates, if above the carrier’s interstate access rate, are reduced by 50 percent of the differential between the rate and the carrier’s interstate access rate.
Intrastate terminating switched end office and transport
rates and reciprocal compensation, if above the carrier’s interstate access rate, are reduced to parity
with interstate access rate.
Terminating switched end office and reciprocal compensation rates are reduced by one-third of the differential between end office rates and $0.005.*
Terminating switched end office and reciprocal compensation rates are reduced by an additional onethird of the original differential to $0.005.*
Terminating switched end office and reciprocal compensation rates are reduced to $0.005.*
Terminating end office and reciprocal compensation
rates are reduced by one-third of the differential between its end office rates ($0.005) and $0.0007.*
July 1, 2020 .........................
..........................................................................................
July 1, 2013 .........................
July 1, 2014 .........................
July 1, 2015 .........................
July 1, 2016 .........................
July 1, 2017 .........................
July 1, 2018 .........................
Terminating switched end office and reciprocal compensation rates are reduced by an additional onethird of the differential between its end office rates as
of July 1, 2016 and $0.0007.*
Terminating switched end office and reciprocal compensation rates are reduced to $0.0007.*
Terminating switched end office and reciprocal compensation rates are reduced to bill-and-keep.*
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Figure 9
* Transport rates remain unchanged from the previous step.
546. The Commission notes that
CMRS providers are subject to
mandatory detariffing. Nonetheless,
CMRS providers are included in the
transition to the extent their reciprocal
compensation rates are inconsistent
with the reforms the Commission adopts
here. The Commission also notes that
carriers remain free to make elections
regarding participation in the NECA
pool and tariffing processes during the
transition. See 47 CFR 69.601 et seq.
547. The Commission believes that
these transition periods strike the right
balance between its commitment to
avoid flash cuts and enabling carriers
sufficient time to adjust to marketplace
changes and technological
advancements, while furthering the
Commission’s overall goal of promoting
a migration to modern IP networks. The
Commission finds that consumers will
benefit from this regulatory transition,
which enables their providers to adapt
to the changing regulatory and technical
landscape and will enable a faster and
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
more efficient introduction of nextgeneration services.
548. The transition the Commission
adopts is partially based on a
stakeholder proposal, with certain
modifications, including the adoption of
a bill-and-keep methodology as the end
state for all traffic. As explained further
below, states will play a key role in
implementing the framework the
Commission adopts. In particular, states
will oversee changes to intrastate access
tariffs to ensure that modifications to
intrastate tariffs are consistent with the
new framework and rules.. For example,
states will help guard against carriers
improperly moving costs between or
among different rate elements to reap a
windfall from reform.
549. Since intercarrier compensation
charges are constrained by the transition
glide path that the Commission adopts,
the Commission will be monitoring to
ensure that carriers do not shift costs to
other rate elements that are not
specifically covered, such as special
access or common line. The
PO 00000
Frm 00071
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Commission also clarifies that, in cases
where a provider’s interstate
terminating access rates are higher than
its intrastate terminating access rates,
intrastate rate reductions shall begin to
occur at the stage of the transition in
which interstate rates come to parity
with intrastate rate levels.
550. The transition imposes a cap on
originating intrastate access charges for
price cap carriers at current rates as of
the effective date of the rules. The
transition does not cap originating
intrastate access charges for rate-ofreturn carriers. Rate-of-return carriers
suggested that it would not be viable for
them to reduce terminating switched
rates, while at the same time reducing
originating rates without overburdening
the Universal Service Fund. In the
meantime, rate-of-return carriers
indicate that the wholesale long
distance market will constrain
originating rates. Given its commitment
to control the size of the CAF and
minimize burdens on consumers, the
Commission does not cap intrastate
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81632
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
originating access charges for rate-ofreturn carriers at this time. As noted
above, the Commission has placed
priority on reform of terminating access
charges and the Commission is mindful
of the compromises that must be made
to accomplish meaningful reform in a
measured and timely manner. In the
USF/ICC Transformation FNPRM, the
Commission seeks comment on the
transition of all originating access
charges to bill-and-keep, including
originating intrastate access charges for
rate-of-return carriers.
551. CMRS Providers. As noted above,
CMRS providers will be subject to the
transition applicable to price cap
carriers. Although CMRS providers are
subject to mandatory detariffing, these
providers are included to the extent
their reciprocal compensation rates are
inconsistent with the reforms the
Commission adopts here. The
Commission also addresses
compensation for non-access traffic
exchanged between LECs and CMRS
providers herein. As the Commission
details in that section, the Commission
immediately adopts bill-and-keep as the
default compensation methodology for
non-access traffic exchanged between
LECs and CMRS providers under
section 20.11 of its rules, 47 CFR 20.11,
and Part 51, 47 CFR part 51.
552. Competitive LECs. To ensure
smooth operation of the transition, the
Commission provides competitive LECs
that benchmark their rates a limited
allowance of additional time to make
tariff filings during the transition
period. Application of the access
reforms will generally apply to
competitive LECs via the CLEC
benchmarking rule. In cases where more
than one incumbent LEC operates
within a competitive LEC’s service area
and those incumbent LECs are both
price cap and rate-of-return regulated, a
question may arise as to the appropriate
transition track for the competitive LEC.
If the competitive LEC tariffs a
benchmarked or average rate in such
circumstances, that competitive LEC
shall adopt the transition path
applicable to the majority of lines
capable of being served in its territory.
For example, if price cap carriers serve
70 percent of a competitive LEC’s
service territory and rate-of-return
carriers serve 30 percent of the service
territory, then the competitive LEC
using a blended rate should follow the
price cap transition. For interstate
switched access rates, competitive LECs
are permitted to tariff interstate access
charges at a level no higher than the
tariffed rate for such services offered by
the incumbent LEC serving the same
geographic area (the benchmarking
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
rule). There are two exceptions to the
general benchmarking rule. First, rural
competitive LECs offering service in the
same areas as non-rural incumbent LECs
are permitted to ‘‘benchmark’’ to the
access rates prescribed in the NECA
access tariff, assuming the highest rate
band for local switching (the rural
exemption). Second, as explained
above, competitive LECs meeting the
access revenue sharing definition are
required to benchmark to the lowest
interstate switched access rate of a price
cap LEC in the state. Because the
Commission retains the CLEC
benchmark rule during the transition,
the Commission allows competitive
LECs an extra 15 days from the effective
date of the tariff to which a competitive
LEC is benchmarking to make its
filing(s). The Commission emphasizes
that the rates that are filed by the
competitive LEC must comply with the
applicable benchmarking rate. As is the
case now, the Commission declines to
adopt rules governing the rates that
competitive LECs may assess on their
end users.
553. The Commission also declines to
adopt a separate and longer transition
period for competitive LECs, as
suggested by some commenters. For
one, competitive LEC rates are already
at or near parity for many if not all
access rates. Due to the operation of the
Commission’s CLEC benchmark rules,
competitive LEC tariffed access rates are
largely already at parity with incumbent
LEC rates. And, in a large number of
states, competitive LEC intrastate access
rates are at or near parity to those of the
incumbent LEC, as well. Thus, the
Commission does not find a sufficient
basis for creating a separate transition
for competitive LECs. Moreover, the
transition periods of six and nine years
are sufficiently long to permit advance
planning and represent a careful balance
of the interests of all stakeholders. As a
result, the Commission concludes that a
uniform approach for all LECs is
preferable and does not find compelling
evidence to depart from the important
policy objectives underlying the CLEC
benchmarking rule. Further, new
arbitrage opportunities could arise and
increased regulatory oversight would be
necessary were the Commission to
abandon the CLEC benchmarking rule.
1. Authority To Specify the Transition
554. Specifying the timing and steps
for the transition to bill-and-keep
requires us to make a number of linedrawing decisions. Although the
Commission could avoid those
decisions by moving to bill-and-keep
immediately, such a flash cut would
entail significant market disruption to
PO 00000
Frm 00072
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
the detriment of consumers and carriers
alike. As the DC Circuit has recognized,
‘‘[w]hen necessary to avoid excessively
burdening carriers, the gradual
implementation of new rates and
policies is a standard tool of the
Commission,’’ and the transition ‘‘may
certainly be accomplished gradually to
permit the affected carriers, subscribers
and state regulators to adjust to the new
pricing system, thus preserving the
efficient operation of the interstate
telephone network during the interim.’’
Thus, ‘‘[i]t is reasonable for the FCC to
take into account the ability of the
industry to adjust financially to
changing policies,’’ and ‘‘[i]nterim
solutions may need to consider the past
expectations of parties and the
unfairness of abruptly shifting policies.’’
In such circumstances, ‘‘the FCC should
be given ‘substantial deference’ when
acting to impose interim regulations.’’
555. In the Commission’s judgment,
the framework that it adopts carefully
balances the potential industry
disruption for both payers and
recipients of intercarrier compensation
as the Commission transitions to a new
intercarrier compensation regime more
broadly. It is particularly appropriate for
the Commission to exercise its authority
to craft a transition plan in this context,
where the Commission is acting, as it
has in prior orders, to reconcile the
‘‘implicit tension between’’ the Act’s
goals of ‘‘moving toward cost-based
rates and protecting universal service.’’
2. Implementation Issues
556. Role of Tariffs. Under today’s
intercarrier compensation system,
carriers typically tariff their access
charges. To avoid disruption of these
well-established relationships, the
Commission preserves a role for tariffing
charges for toll traffic during the
transition. Pursuant to the transition set
forth above, the Commission permits
LECs to tariff the default charges for
intrastate toll traffic at the state level,
and for interstate toll traffic with the
Commission, in accordance with the
timetable and rate reductions set forth
above. At the same time, carriers remain
free to enter into negotiated agreements
that differ from the default rates
established above, consistent with the
negotiated agreement framework that
Congress envisioned for the 251(b)(5)
regime to which access traffic is
transitioned. As an interim matter, this
new regime will facilitate the benefits
that can arise from negotiated
arrangements, while also allowing for
revenue predictability that has been
associated with tariffing. In some
respects the allowance of some tariffing
may be similar to the wireless
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
termination tariffs for non-access traffic
addressed in the Commission’s 2005 TMobile Order, Developing a Unified
Intercarrier Compensation Regime; TMobile et al. Petition for Declaratory
Ruling Regarding Incumbent LEC
Wireless Termination Tariffs, CC Docket
No. 01–92, Declaratory Ruling and
Report and Order, 70 FR 49401, Mar. 30,
2005 (T-Mobile Order). In that decision,
the Commission prohibited the filing of
state tariffs governing the compensation
for terminating non-access CMRS traffic
because they were inconsistent with the
negotiated agreement framework
contemplated by Commission precedent
and by Congress when it enacted 47
U.S.C. 251. The Commission does not,
however, believe that the policies
underlying the prohibition of wireless
termination tariffs for non-access traffic
in the T-Mobile Order preclude the
allowance of certain tariffing of
intercarrier compensation for toll traffic.
Finally, during the transition, traffic that
historically has been addressed through
interconnection agreements will
continue to be so addressed.
557. Because carriers will be revising
intrastate access tariffs to reduce rates
for certain terminating switched access
rate elements, and capping other
intrastate rates, states will play a critical
role implementing and enforcing
intercarrier compensation reforms. The
Commission does not cap intrastate
originating access for rate-of-return
carriers in this R&O. The Commission
notes that states remain free to do so,
provided states support any recovery
that may be necessary, and such a result
would promote the goals of
comprehensive reform adopted in the
R&O. State oversight of the transition
process is necessary to ensure that
carriers comply with the transition
timing and intrastate access charge
reductions outlined above. Under the
Commission’s framework, rates for
intrastate access traffic will remain in
intrastate tariffs. As a result, to ensure
compliance with the framework and to
ensure carriers are not taking actions
that could enable a windfall and/or
double recovery, state commissions
should monitor compliance with the
rate transition; review how carriers
reduce rates to ensure consistency with
the uniform framework; and guard
against attempts to raise capped
intercarrier compensation rates, as well
as unanticipated types of
gamesmanship. Consistent with states’
existing authority, therefore, states
could require carriers to provide
additional information and/or refile
intrastate access tariffs that do not
follow the framework or rules adopted
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
in this R&O. Moreover, state
commissions will continue to review
and approve interconnection
agreements and associated reciprocal
compensation rates to ensure that they
are consistent with the new federal
framework and transition. Thus, the
Commission will be working in
partnership with states to monitor
carriers’ compliance with its rules,
thereby ensuring that consumers
throughout the country will realize the
tremendous benefits of ICC reform.
558. Price Cap Conversions. The
Commission has regulated the provision
of interstate access services by
incumbent LECs, pursuant to either rateof-return regulation or price cap
regulation. The Commission has
previously described the benefits that
flow from the adoption of price cap
regulation, and has allowed carriers to
convert from rate-of-return to price cap
regulation. The Commission continues
to encourage carriers to undergo such
conversions. The application of the
Commission’s reforms to proposed
conversions will be addressed in the
context of those proceedings based on
the individualized situation of the
carrier seeking to convert to price cap
regulation. Similarly, transition issues
related to rate-of-return affiliates of
price cap holding companies will be
addressed in the context of such
proceedings.
559. Existing Agreements. With
respect to the impact of the
Commission’s reforms on existing
agreements, the Commission
emphasizes that its reforms do not
abrogate existing commercial contracts
or interconnection agreements or
otherwise require an automatic ‘‘fresh
look’’ at these agreements. As the
Commission has recognized, both
telecommunications carriers and their
customers often benefit from long-term
contracts—providers gain assurance of
cost recovery, and customers (whether
wholesale or end-users) may receive
discounted and stable prices—and the
Commission tries to avoid disrupting
such contracts. Indeed, giving carriers or
customers an automatic fresh look at
existing commercial contracts or
interconnection agreements could result
in a windfall for entities that entered
long-term arrangements in exchange for
lower prices, as compared to other
entities that avoided the risk of early
termination fees by electing shorter
contract periods at higher prices.
Accordingly, the Commission declines
to require that these existing
arrangements be reopened in connection
with the reforms in this R&O, and leaves
such issues to any change-of-law
provisions in these arrangements and
PO 00000
Frm 00073
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81633
commercial negotiations among the
parties. The Commission does, however,
make clear that its actions in this R&O
constitute a change in law, and the
Commission recognizes that existing
agreements may contain change-of-law
provisions that allow for renegotiation
and/or may contain some mechanism to
resolve disputes about new agreement
language implementing new rules.
560. Dismissal as Moot of Pending
Petitions. The reforms adopted by this
R&O render moot a petition filed by
Embarq in 2008 and a petition filed by
Michigan CLECs in 2010. The actions
taken in this R&O, which set forth a
comprehensive intercarrier
compensation plan, render the Embarq
petition moot and, the Commission
further notes that CenturyLink has
subsequently filed a letter seeking to
withdraw the petition. The Michigan
CLECs filed a petition asking the
Commission to preempt Michigan’s
2009 access restructuring law, which
mandated intrastate access rate
reductions and created an access
restructuring mechanism that was
unavailable to CLECs. Here, again, the
actions the Commission takes in this
R&O, which include bringing intrastate
access traffic within 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5)
and subjecting that traffic to the above
transition, address many of the access
rates elements at issue in the Michigan
CLECs’ petition. To the extent that states
have established rate reduction
transitions for rate elements not reduced
in this R&O, nothing in this R&O
impacts such transitions. Nor does this
R&O prevent states from reducing rates
on a faster transition provided that
states provide any additional recovery
support that may be needed as a result
of a faster transition. The Commission
therefore dismisses the petition as the
reforms in this R&O and the
accompanying USF/ICC Transformation
FNPRM will render it moot.
3. Other Rate Elements
561. Originating Access. The
Commission finds that originating
charges also should ultimately be
subject to the bill-and-keep framework.
Some commenters urge that originating
charges be retained, at least on an
interim basis. Other parties express
concerns with the retention of
originating access charges. The legal
framework underpinning the
Commission’s decision is inconsistent
with the permanent retention of
originating access charges. In the Local
Competition First Report and Order, the
Commission observed that 47 U.S.C.
251(b)(5) does not address charges
payable to a carrier that originates traffic
and concluded, therefore, that such
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81634
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
charges were prohibited under that
provision of the Act. Accordingly, the
Commission finds that originating
charges for all telecommunications
traffic subject to its comprehensive
intercarrier compensation framework
should ultimately move to bill-andkeep. Notwithstanding this conclusion,
the Commission takes immediate action
to cap all interstate originating access
charges and intrastate originating access
charges for price cap carriers. Although
the Commission does not establish the
transition for rate reductions to bill-andkeep in this R&O, it seeks comment in
the USF/ICC Transformation FNPRM on
the appropriate transition and recovery
mechanism for ultimately phasing down
originating access charges. Meanwhile,
the Commission prohibits carriers from
increasing their originating interstate
access rates above those in effect as the
effective date of the rules. This
prohibition on increasing access rates
also applies to any remaining Primary
Interexchange Carrier Charge in section
69.153 of the Commission’s rules, 47
CFR 69.153, the per-minute Carrier
Common Line charge in section 69.154
of the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR
69.154, and the per-minute Residual
Interconnection Charge in section
69.155 of the Commission’s rules, 47
CFR 69.155. Price cap carriers and
CLECs that benchmark to price cap rates
are also prohibited from increasing their
originating intrastate access rates. A cap
on interstate originating access
represents a first step as part of the
measured transition toward
comprehensive reform and helps to
ensure that the initial reforms to
terminating access are not undermined.
Thus, interstate originating switched
access rates will remain capped and
may not exceed current levels until
further action by the Commission
addressing the appropriate transition
path for this traffic.
562. Transport. Similarly, the
transition path set forth above begins
the transition for transport elements,
including capping such rates, but does
not provide the transition for all
transport charges for price cap or rateof-return carriers to bill-and-keep. For
price cap carriers, in the final year of the
transition, transport and terminating
switched access shall go to bill-andkeep levels where the terminating
carrier owns the tandem. However,
transport charges in other instances, i.e.,
where the terminating carrier does not
own the tandem, are not addressed at
this time. Meanwhile, under the
transition for rate-of-return carriers,
which is consistent with the transition
path put forward by the Joint Letter,
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
interstate and intrastate transport
charges will be capped at interstate
levels in effect as of the effective date of
the rules through the transition.
563. Ultimately, the Commission
agrees with concerns raised by
commenters that the continuation of
transport charges in perpetuity would
be problematic. For example, the record
contains allegations of ‘‘mileage
pumping,’’ where service providers
designate distant points of
interconnection to inflate the mileage
used to compute the transport charges.
Further, Sprint alleges that current
incumbent LEC tariffed charges for
transport are ‘‘very high and constitute
a sizeable proportion of the total
terminating access charges ILECs
impose on carriers today.’’ More
fundamentally, if transport rates are
allowed to persist, it gives incumbent
LECs incentives to retain a TDM
network architecture and therefore
likely serves as a disincentive for
incumbent LECs to establish more
efficient interconnection arrangements
such as IP. As a result, commenters
suggest that perpetuating high transport
rates could undermine the
Commission’s reform effort and lead to
anticompetitive behavior or regulatory
arbitrage such as access stimulation.
The Commission therefore seeks
comment on the appropriate treatment
of, and transition for, all tandem
switching and transport rates in the
USF/ICC Transformation FNPRM.
564. Other Rate Elements. Finally, the
Commission notes that the transition set
forth above caps rates but does not
provide the transition path for all rate
elements or other charges, such as
dedicated transport charges. In the USF/
ICC Transformation FNPRM, the
Commission seeks comment on what
transition should be set for these other
rate elements and charges as part of
comprehensive reform, and how the
Commission should address those
elements.
4. Suspension or Modification Under
Section 251(f)(2), 47 U.S.C. 251(f)(2)
565. Section 251(f)(2), 47 U.S.C.
251(f)(2), provides that a LEC with fewer
than two percent of the country’s
subscriber lines may petition its state
commission for a suspension or
modification of the application to it of
a requirement or requirements of 47
U.S.C. 251(b) or (c), and that the state
commission shall grant such petition
where it makes certain determinations.
That provision further states that the
state commission must act on the
petition within 180 days and ‘‘may
suspend enforcement of the requirement
or requirements to which the petition
PO 00000
Frm 00074
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
applies’’ pending action on the petition.
Parties aggrieved by a state commission
decision under 47 U.S.C. 251(f) may
seek review of that decision in federal
district court—under 47 U.S.C. 252(e)(6)
of the Act, if the decision is rendered in
the course of arbitrating an
interconnection agreement, or under
general ‘‘federal question’’ jurisdiction if
the decision arises outside of the
arbitration context.
566. In Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC,
the Eighth Circuit held that state
commissions had ‘‘exclusive authority’’
to make decisions under 47 U.S.C.
251(f) and that the FCC lacked authority
to prescribe ‘‘governing standards for
such determinations.’’ On review,
however, the Supreme Court reversed
the Eighth Circuit’s decision with regard
to the Commission’s general authority to
implement Title II of the Act. The Court
stated that ‘‘the grant in section 201(b)
[of the Act] means what it says: The FCC
has rulemaking authority to carry out
the ‘provisions of this Act,’ which
include sections 251 and 252.’’
Accordingly, the Commission finds that
this general grant of rulemaking
authority recognized by the Court
includes the authority to adopt
reasonable rules construing and
implementing 47 U.S.C. 251(f).
567. In light of the Supreme Court’s
holding, the Commission may adopt
specific, binding prophylactic rules that
give content to, among other things, the
‘‘public interest, convenience, and
necessity’’ standard that governs states’
exercise of 47 U.S.C. 251(f)(2) authority
to act on suspension/modification
petitions. The Commission sought
comment on specific rules in the ICC/
USF Transformation NPRM and in the
2008 ICC NPRM. However, given the
limited record the Commission received
in response, the Commission declines to
adopt specific rules regarding 47 U.S.C.
251(f)(2) at this time. Nevertheless, the
Commission cautions states that
suspensions or modifications of the billand-keep methodology the Commission
adopts in the R&O would, among other
things, re-introduce regulatory
uncertainty, shift the costs of providing
service to a LEC’s competitors and the
competitor’s customers, increase
transaction costs for terminating calls,
and undermine the efficiencies gained
from adopting a uniform national
framework. Accordingly, the
Commission believes it highly unlikely
that any attempt by a state to modify or
suspend the federal bill-and-keep
regime would be ‘‘consistent with the
public interest, convenience and
necessity’’ as required under 47 U.S.C.
251(f)(2)(B), and the Commission urges
states not to grant any petitions seeking
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
to modify or suspend the bill-and-keep
provisions it adopts herein. The
Commission will monitor state action
regarding the reforms it adopts in the
R&O, and may provide specific
guidance for states’ review of 47 U.S.C.
251(f)(2) petitions in the future.
5. The Duty To Negotiate
Interconnection Agreements
568. Because the Commission moves
traffic from the access charge regime to
the 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5) framework,
where payment terms are agreed to
pursuant to an interconnection
agreement, incumbent LECs have asked
the Commission to make clear that they
have the ability to compel other LECs
and CMRS providers to negotiate to
reach an interconnection agreement.
This is a concern for incumbent LECs
because under sections 251 and 252 of
the Act, 47 U.S.C. 251, 252, although
LECs and CMRS providers can compel
incumbent LECs to negotiate in good
faith and invoke arbitration if
negotiations fail, incumbent LECs
generally lack the ability to compel
other LECs and CMRS providers to
negotiate for payment for traffic that is
not exchanged pursuant to a tariff. In
particular, parties have asked the
Commission to expand upon the
Commission’s findings in the T-Mobile
Order, which found that incumbent
LECs can compel CMRS providers to
negotiate to reach an interconnection
agreement.
569. After reviewing the record, the
Commission concludes it is appropriate
to clarify certain aspects of the
obligations the Commission adopted in
the T-Mobile Order. As a result, in this
section, the Commission reaffirms the
findings in the T-Mobile Order that
incumbent LECs can compel CMRS
providers to negotiate in good faith to
reach an interconnection agreement,
and makes clear the Commission’s
authority to do so pursuant to 47 U.S.C.
332, 201, 251 as well as its ancillary
authority under 4(i). The Commission
also clarifies that this requirement does
not impose any 47 U.S.C. 251(c)
obligations on CMRS providers, nor
does it extend section 252 of the Act, 47
U.S.C. 252, to CMRS providers.
570. The Commission declines, at this
time, to extend the obligation to
negotiate in good faith and the ability to
compel arbitration to other contexts. For
example, the T-Mobile Order did not
address relationships involving
competitive LECs or among other
interconnecting service providers.
Subsequently, competitive LECs have
requested that the Commission expand
the scope of the T-Mobile Order and
require CMRS providers to negotiate
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
agreements with competitive LECs
under the section 251/252 framework,
just as they do with incumbent LECs. In
addition, rural incumbent LECs urged
the Commission to ‘‘extend the TMobile Order to give ILECs the right to
demand interconnection negotiations
with all carriers.’’ The Commission does
not believe the record is currently
sufficient to justify doing so, but ask
further questions about the policy
implications as well as the
Commission’s legal authority to do so in
the USF/ICC Transformation FNPRM.
a. Petitions for Reconsideration of the TMobile Order
571. As described below, the
Commission resolves the challenges
several parties have made to the
Commission’s authority to adopt
sections 20.11(d) and (e), 47 CFR
20.11(d), (e). The Commission
concludes that the Commission has both
direct and ancillary authority to permit
incumbent LECs to request
interconnection from a CMRS provider
and invoke the negotiation and
arbitration procedures of section 252 of
the Act, 47 U.S.C. 252. Given this
clarification of the Commission’s
exercise of its authority, the
Commission finds that these
requirements, codified in section
20.11(e) of the Commission’s rules, 47
CFR 20.11(e), are consistent with the
Act. The Commission also concludes
that the adoption of those requirements
in the T-Mobile Order was procedurally
proper, and it consequently denies
requests to reconsider that rule.
i. Authority To Adopt Section 20.11(e)
of the Commission’s Rules
572. In its petition for
reconsideration, RCA claims that the
Commission lacked authority to adopt
section 20.11(e) of the Commission’s
rules, 47 CFR 20.11(e), arguing that the
Commission cannot directly apply 47
U.S.C. 251(c) of the Act to CMRS
providers by requiring them to
interconnect directly with ILECs, or
submit to compulsory arbitration
pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 252 of the Act.
RCA misinterprets the nature of the
Commission’s action in the T-Mobile
Order, however, viewing it as the direct
application of 47 U.S.C. 251(c) and 252
to CMRS providers. Properly
understood, the Commission did not
apply 47 U.S.C. 251(c) and 252 in that
manner. Rather, the T-Mobile Order
obligations imposed on CMRS
providers, codified in section 20.11(e) of
the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR
20.11(e), implement the Commission’s
authority under sections 201 and 332,
and are reasonably ancillary to the
PO 00000
Frm 00075
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81635
implementation of its statutorily
mandated responsibilities under 47
U.S.C. 201, 251(a)(1), 251(b)(5) and 332.
573. Direct Authority Under Sections
201 and 332. Sections 201 and 332 of
the Act, 47 U.S.C. 201, 332, provide a
basis for rules allowing an incumbent
LEC to request interconnection,
including associated compensation,
from a CMRS provider and invoke the
negotiation and arbitration procedures
set forth in 47 U.S.C. 252 of the Act.
Section 332(c)(1)(B), 47 U.S.C.
332(c)(1)(B), states that ‘‘[u]pon
reasonable request of any person
providing commercial mobile service,
the Commission shall order a common
carrier to establish physical connections
with such service’’ pursuant to the
provisions of section 201 of the Act, 47
U.S.C. 201. Section 201(a), 47 U.S.C.
201(a), provides that ‘‘every common
carrier engaged in interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio’’ shall:
(i) ‘‘furnish such communication service
upon reasonable request therefore;’’ and
(ii) ‘‘in accordance with the orders of
the Commission, in cases where the
Commission, after opportunity for
hearing, finds such action necessary or
desirable in the public interest, to
establish physical connections with
other carriers, to establish through
routes and charges applicable thereto
and the divisions of such charges, and
to establish and provide facilities and
regulations for operating such through
routes.’’ Although 47 U.S.C. 201(a)
requires an opportunity for hearing, the
Commission’s previous use of notice
and comment procedures to satisfy the
47 U.S.C. 201 hearing requirement was
expressly confirmed by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. As
discussed below, the Commission
provided notice and received comment
here. Consequently, the Commission
rejects arguments that the Commission
cannot rely on its 47 U.S.C. 201(a)
authority to require interconnection
through a rulemaking proceeding. The
Commission has long relied on these
provisions to regulate the terms of LEC–
CMRS interconnection, including
associated compensation.
574. Historically, interconnection
requirements imposed under these
provisions were understood to
encompass not only the technical
linking of networks, but also the
associated compensation. For example,
intercarrier compensation under the
access charge regime had, as its origin,
the need to ‘‘ensur[e] interconnection at
reasonable rates, as required under
Section 201 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 201.’’
Likewise, the Commission previously
has specified not only the intercarrier
compensation required in conjunction
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81636
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
with interconnection by, and with,
CMRS providers, but also the
mechanism for implementing those
compensation obligations. Even prior to
the adoption of section 332 of the Act,
47 U.S.C. 332, the Commission relied on
its section 201 authority to require LECs
and CMRS providers to negotiate
interconnection agreements in good
faith governing the physical
interconnections among these carriers,
as well as the associated charges.
Following the adoption of 47 U.S.C.
332, the Commission affirmed that
‘‘LECs [must] provide reasonable and
fair interconnection for all commercial
mobile radio services,’’ including
‘‘mutual compensation’’ by each
interconnected carrier for ‘‘the
reasonable costs incurred by such
providers in terminating traffic’’ that
originated on the other carrier’s
facilities. At that time the Commission
retained its then-existing
implementation framework, which
primarily relied on negotiated
agreements with only a limited role
expressly identified for tariffing, while
observing that this framework would be
subject to ‘‘review and possible
revision.’’
575. In the T-Mobile Order the
Commission built upon the existing
rules governing interconnection and
compensation for non-access traffic
exchanged between LECs and CMRS
providers, incorporating the right of
incumbent LECs to request
interconnection with a CMRS provider,
including associated compensation, and
adopting an implementation
mechanism. It established obligations
surrounding the pre-existing duty both
CMRS providers and ILECs have to
establish connections between their
respective networks, as well as
exercising the Commission’s authority
over the pre-existing tariffing regime.
The Commission finds, in light of the
analysis and precedent above, that these
actions are supported by the
Commission’s authority under sections
201 and 332 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 201,
332.
576. Ancillary Authority. Ancillary
authority also supports the T-Mobile
Order requirement that CMRS providers
comply with the negotiation and
arbitration procedures set forth in
section 252 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 252.
Ancillary jurisdiction may be employed,
at the Commission’s discretion, when
two conditions are satisfied: ‘‘(1) The
Commission’s general jurisdictional
grant under Title I of the Act covers the
regulated subject and (2) the regulations
are reasonably ancillary to the
Commission’s effective performance of
its statutorily mandated
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
responsibilities.’’ Both incumbent LECs
and CMRS providers are
telecommunications carriers, over
which the Commission has clear
jurisdiction. Further, to meaningfully
implement intercarrier compensation
requirements established pursuant to 47
U.S.C. 201, 332, and 251(b)(5) against
the backdrop of mandatory
interconnection and prohibitions on
blocking traffic under 47 U.S.C. 201 and
251(a)(1), it was appropriate for the TMobile Order to impose requirements on
CMRS providers beyond those expressly
covered by the language of 47 U.S.C.
252.
577. As discussed above, pursuant to
the authority of 47 U.S.C. 201 and 332,
the Commission required
interconnected LECs and CMRS
providers to pay mutual compensation
for the non-access traffic that they
exchange. Even if 47 U.S.C. 201 and 332
were not viewed as providing direct
authority to require that CMRS
providers negotiate interconnection
agreements with incumbents LECs for
the exchange of non-access traffic under
the 47 U.S.C. 252 framework, such
action clearly is reasonably ancillary to
the Commission’s authority under those
provisions, including the associated
requirement to pay mutual
compensation. Likewise, although 47
U.S.C. 251(b)(5) does not itself require
CMRS providers to enter reciprocal
compensation arrangements, the
Commission brought intraMTA LEC–
CMRS traffic within that framework.
CMRS providers received certain
benefits from this regime, and the
Commission likewise anticipated that
they would enter agreements under
which they would both ‘‘receive
reciprocal compensation for terminating
certain traffic that originates on the
networks of other carriers, and * * *
pay such compensation for certain
traffic that they transmit and terminate
to other carriers.’’ Further, when carriers
are indirectly interconnected pursuant
to 47 U.S.C. 251(a)(1), as is often the
case for LECs and CMRS providers, the
carriers’ interconnection arrangements
can be relevant to addressing the
appropriate reciprocal compensation, as
the Commission recently recognized.
578. Given that the Commission
prohibited tariffing of wireless
termination charges for non-access
traffic on a prospective basis, LECs
needed to enter into agreements with
CMRS providers providing for
compensation under those regimes.
Because LEC–CMRS interconnection is
compelled by section 251(a)(1) of the
Act, 47 U.S.C. 251(a)(1), and section 201
of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 201, also generally
restricts carriers from blocking traffic,
PO 00000
Frm 00076
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
experience revealed that incumbent
LECs would have limited practical
ability to ensure that CMRS providers
negotiated and entered such agreements
because they could not avoid
terminating the traffic even in the
absence of an agreement to pay
compensation. To ensure that the
balance of regulatory benefits intended
for each party under the LEC–CMRS
interconnection and compensation
regimes was not frustrated, it was
necessary for the Commission to
establish a mechanism by which
incumbent LECs could request
interconnection, and associated
compensation, from CMRS providers,
and ensure that those providers would
negotiate those agreements, subject to an
appropriate regulatory backstop. Thus,
the Commission’s 47 U.S.C. 154(i)
authority also supports the T-Mobile
Order requirement that CMRS providers
negotiate interconnection agreements
with incumbent LECs in good faith
under the 47 U.S.C. 252 framework.
ii. Consistency With the
Communications Act and the
Administrative Procedures Act
579. In response to the concerns of
some Petitioners, the Commission
clarifies that the negotiation and
arbitration requirements adopted for
CMRS providers in the T-Mobile Order
did not impose 47 U.S.C. 251(c) on
CMRS providers. As commenters
observe, with one exception, the
requirements of 47 U.S.C. 251(c)
expressly apply to incumbent LECs, and
nothing in the T-Mobile Order attempts
to extend those statutory requirements
to CMRS providers. Nor does the
reference to ‘‘interconnection’’ in
§ 20.11(e) of the Commission’s rules, 47
CFR 20.11(e), apply to CMRS providers
the statutory interconnection obligations
governing incumbent LECs under 47
U.S.C. 251(c)(2). As the T-Mobile Order
makes clear, the primary focus of that
rule is to provide a mechanism to
implement mutual compensation for
non-access traffic between incumbent
LECs and CMRS providers. However,
the Commission’s mutual compensation
rules were adopted in the context of
addressing LEC–CMRS interconnection,
against a backdrop where
‘‘interconnection’’ regulations were
understood to encompass not only the
physical connection of networks, but
also the associated intercarrier
compensation. The Commission thus
concludes that the definition of
‘‘interconnection’’ in § 51.5 of the
Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 51.5, is not
dispositive of the interpretation of that
term here. This rule was codified in part
20, not part 51. In addition, as the
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Commission recently recognized,
interconnection arrangements can bear
on the resolution of disputes regarding
reciprocal compensation under the 47
U.S.C. 252 framework. For example,
while interconnection for the exchange
of access traffic does not currently
implicate 47 U.S.C. 251(b), an
interconnection agreement for the
exchange of reciprocal compensation
traffic may contain terms relevant to
determining appropriate rates under the
statute and Commission rules.
Moreover, § 20.11(e) of the
Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 20.11(e),
does not supplant or expand the
otherwise-applicable interconnection
obligations for CMRS providers, as some
contend. Thus, in response to a request
by an incumbent LEC for
interconnection under § 20.11(e), 47
CFR 20.11(e), CMRS providers are not
required to enter into direct
interconnection, and may instead satisfy
their obligation to interconnect through
indirect arrangements.
580. Similarly, the Commission did
not interpret 47 U.S.C. 252 as binding
on CMRS providers in the same manner
as incumbent LECs. Rather, the
Commission exercised its authority
under 47 U.S.C. 201, 332, 251 and 154(i)
to apply to CMRS providers’ duties
analogous to the negotiation and
arbitration requirements expressly
imposed on incumbent LECs under 47
U.S.C. 252. Although Congress did not
expressly extend these requirements
this broadly in section 252 of the Act,
47 U.S.C. 252, the Commission’s
subsequent experience with
interconnection and intercarrier
compensation, as described above,
demonstrate the need for the duties
imposed on CMRS providers in the TMobile Order. Thus, the Commission
sensibly required CMRS providers to
negotiate interconnection agreements
with incumbent LECs in good faith,
subject to arbitration by the state or,
where the state lacks authority or
otherwise fails to act, by the
Commission. This approach also is
supported by the concept of cooperative
federalism, which is reasonably
contemplated by sections 251 and 252
of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 251, 252. Because
of the cooperative federalism embodied
by 47 U.S.C. 251 and 252, and the role
of the Commission in arbitrating
interconnection disputes under the 47
U.S.C. 252 framework when states lack
authority or otherwise fail to act, the
Commission also reject claims that the
T-Mobile Order constituted an unlawful
delegation to the states.
581. The Commission also does not
interpret silence in certain provisions of
the Act regarding the duties of CMRS
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
providers as precluding the
Commission’s action in the T-Mobile
Order. For one, the Commission rejects
requests that it ignore the Commission’s
experience with interconnection and
intercarrier compensation and treat
Congress’ silence regarding the rights of
incumbent LECs to invoke negotiation
and arbitration in section 252 of the Act
as equivalent to a statutory prohibition
on extending such rights. Nor is the
Commission persuaded that the
language of 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(1)(B)
precludes the Commission’s extension
of section 252-type procedures in this
manner. RCA observes that 47 U.S.C.
332(c)(1)(B) only expressly discusses
requests by CMRS providers for
interconnection, and contends that
precludes rules that would enable
incumbent LECs to request
interconnection from CMRS providers.
As a threshold matter, the Commission
observes that CMRS providers are
required to interconnect with other
carriers under 47 U.S.C. 251(a) of the
Act, and that 47 U.S.C. 201 also
provides the Commission authority to
require CMRS providers to interconnect.
The Commission thus disagrees with
RCA’s suggestion that 47 U.S.C. 332
should be read to preclude CMRS
providers from being subject to such
requests. With respect to the procedures
for implementing such requests,
however, it notes that the Commission
previously has suggested ‘‘that the
procedures of section 252 are not
applicable in matters involving section
251(a) alone.’’ The Commission finds it
appropriate to interpret the obligations
imposed on CMRS providers under
§ 20.11(e), 47 CFR 20.11(e), in a manner
consistent with the Commission’s
interpretation of the scope of the
comparable requirements of 47 U.S.C.
252 from which it was derived. The
Commission thus makes clear that
§ 20.11(e), 47 CFR 20.11(e), does not
apply to requests for direct or indirect
physical interconnection alone, but only
requests that also implicate the rates
and terms for exchange of non-access
traffic.
582. The Commission further finds
that the rules adopted in the T-Mobile
Order were procedurally proper,
contrary to the contentions of some
petitioners. The Commission’s 2001
Intercarrier Compensation NPRM,
Developing a Unified Intercarrier
Compensation Regime, CC Docket No.
01–92, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
66 FR 28410, May 23, 2001 (Intercarrier
Compensation NPRM), expressly sought
‘‘comment on the rules [the
Commission] should adopt to govern
LEC interconnection arrangements with
PO 00000
Frm 00077
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81637
CMRS providers, whether pursuant to
section 332, or other statutory
authority,’’ and ‘‘on the relationship
between the CMRS interconnection
authority assigned to the Commission
under sections 201 and 332, and that
granted to the states under sections 251
and 252.’’ The T-Mobile petition was
incorporated into the docket in that
proceeding, and in response to the
Commission’s request for comment on
that petition, the issue of LECs being
able to request interconnection
negotiations with CMRS carriers was
raised in the record. The Commission
thus is not persuaded that parties lacked
adequate notice and an opportunity to
comment on the requirements
ultimately imposed in § 20.11(e) of the
Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 20.11(e).
b. Requests for Clarification
583. A number of petitions seek
clarification regarding the operation of
the T-Mobile Order and/or the state of
the law that existed prior to such
decision. Except insofar as discussed
above, or in the Commission’s actions
regarding wireless intercarrier
compensation generally, the
Commission declines to provide such
clarification here. The Commission has
discretion whether to issue a declaratory
ruling, and rather than addressing these
requests here, the Commission can
address issues as they arise.
c. Extending T-Mobile to Other Contexts
584. The Commission declines, at this
time, to extend the obligations
enumerated in the T-Mobile Order to
other contexts. As discussed above, the
T-Mobile Order imposed on CMRS
providers the duty to negotiate
interconnection agreements with
incumbent LECs under the 47 U.S.C.
252 framework. However, the T-Mobile
Order did not address relationships
involving competitive LECs or among
other interconnecting service providers.
Subsequently, competitive LECs have
requested that the Commission expand
the scope of the T-Mobile Order and
require CMRS providers to negotiate
agreements with competitive LECs
under the section 251/252 framework,
just as they do with incumbent LECs. In
addition, rural incumbent LECs urged
the Commission to ‘‘give small carriers
some legal authority to demand a
negotiated interconnection agreement,’’
and argued that ‘‘the Commission
should extend the T-Mobile Order to
give ILECs the right to demand
interconnection negotiations with all
carriers.’’ Policy and legal issues
surrounding the possible extension of
the T-Mobile Order are insufficiently
addressed in the current record, and as
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81638
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
such the Commission seeks comment in
the accompanying USF/ICC
Transformation FNPRM on whether to
extend T-Mobile Order obligations to
other contexts.
585. However, this issue remains
highly relevant notwithstanding the
adoption of bill-and-keep as the default
for reciprocal compensation between
LECs and CMRS providers under 47
U.S.C. 251(b)(5). Under a bill-and-keep
methodology, carriers still will need to
address issues such as the ‘‘edge’’ for
defining the scope of bill-and-keep,
subject to arbitration where they cannot
reach agreement. These issues do not
lend themselves well to one-size-fits-all
approaches as would be required under
a tariffing regime. Imposing a duty to
negotiate, subject to arbitration, will
negate the need for Commission
intervention in this context and will
facilitate more market-based solutions.
Because the Commission also maintains
its existing requirements regarding
interconnection and prohibitions on
blocking traffic, its experience suggests
that carriers under no legal compulsion
to come to the table may have no
incentive to do so, thus frustrating the
efforts of interconnected carriers to
resolve open questions. The section 252
framework—already in place in other
contexts under the terms of the Act—
may be a reasonable mechanism to use
to address these situations.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
X. Recovery Mechanism
A. Summary
586. The recovery mechanism has two
basic components. First, the
Commission defines the revenue
incumbent LECs are eligible to recover,
which the Commission refers to as
‘‘Eligible Recovery.’’ Second, the
Commission specifies how incumbent
LECs may recover Eligible Recovery
through limited end-user charges and,
where eligible and a carrier elects to
receive it, CAF support. Competitive
LECs are free to recover reduced
revenues through end-user charges.
587. Eligible Recovery.
• Price cap incumbent LECs’ Baseline
for recovery will be 90 percent of their
Fiscal Year 2011 (FY2011) interstate and
intrastate access revenues for the rates
subject to reform and net reciprocal
compensation revenues. The
Commission defines ‘‘fiscal year’’ 2011
for these purposes as October 1, 2010
through September 30, 2011. For price
cap carriers’ study areas that
participated in the Commission’s 2000
CALLS reforms, and thus have had
interstate access rates essentially frozen
for almost a decade, Price Cap Eligible
Recovery (i.e., revenues subject to the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
recovery mechanism) will be the
difference between: (a) the Price Cap
Baseline, subject to 10 percent annual
reductions; and (b) the revenues from
the reformed intercarrier compensation
rates in that year, based on estimated
MOUs multiplied by the associated
default rate for that year. For carriers
that have more recently converted to
price cap regulation and did not
participate in the CALLS plan, the
Commission phases in the reductions
after five years, so that the initial 10
percent reduction occurs in year six.
Estimated MOUs will be calculated as
FY2011 minutes for all price cap
carriers, and will be reduced 10 percent
annually for each year of reform to
reflect MOU trends over the past several
years. Because such demand reductions
have applied equally to all price cap
carriers, the Commission does not make
any distinction among price cap carriers
for purposes of this calculation. The
Commission adopts this straight line
approach to determining MOUs, rather
than requiring carriers to report actual
minutes each year, because it will be
more predictable for carriers and less
burdensome to administer.
• Rate-of-return incumbent LECs’
Baseline for recovery, which is
somewhat more complex, will be based
on their 2011 interstate switched access
revenue requirement (which is
recovered today through interstate
access revenues and local switching
support (LSS), if applicable), plus
FY2011 intrastate terminating switched
access revenues and FY2011 net
reciprocal compensation revenue. Rateof-Return Eligible Recovery will be the
difference between: (a) the Rate-ofReturn Baseline, subject to five percent
annual reductions; and (b) the revenues
from the reformed intercarrier
compensation rates in that year, based
on actual MOUs multiplied by the
associated default rate for that year. The
annual Rate-of-Return Baseline
reduction used in the calculation of
Rate-of-Return Eligible Recovery
revenue reflects two considerations.
First, in recent years rate-of-return
carriers’ interstate switched access
revenue requirements have been
declining on average at approximately
three percent annually due to declining
regulated costs, with corresponding
declines in interstate access revenues;
such declines are projected to continue
each year for the next several years. In
addition, rate-of-return carriers’
intrastate revenues have been declining
on average at 10 percent per year as
MOU decline, with state regulatory
systems that typically do not have
annual, automatic mechanisms to
PO 00000
Frm 00078
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
increase rates to account for declining
demand. Weighing these considerations,
the Commission finds it appropriate to
reduce rate-of-return carriers’ Eligible
Recovery by five percent annually. This
approach to revenue recovery will put
most rate-of-return carriers in a better
financial position—and will provide
substantially more certainty—than the
status quo path absent reform, where
MOU declines would continue to be
large and unpredictable and would
significantly reduce intrastate revenues.
This approach also provides carriers
with the benefit of any costs savings and
efficiencies they can achieve by
enabling carriers to retain revenues even
if their switched access costs decline.
And it avoids creating misaligned
incentives for carriers to inefficiently
increase costs to grow their intercarrier
compensation revenue requirement and
thereby draw more access replacement
from the CAF.
588. Recovery from End Users.
Consistent with past ICC reforms, the
Commission permits carriers to recover
a limited portion of their Eligible
Recovery from their end users through
a monthly fixed charge called an Access
Recovery Charge or ‘‘ARC.’’ The
Commission takes measures to ensure
that any ARC increase on consumers
does not impact affordability of rates,
including by limiting the annual
increase in consumer ARCs to $0.50.
The Commission also makes clear that
carriers may not charge an ARC on any
Lifeline customers. This charge is
calculated independently from, and has
no bearing on, existing SLCs, although
for administrative and billing
efficiencies the Commission does permit
carriers to combine the charges as a
single line item on a bill.
• Recovery Fairly Balanced Across
All End Users. The Commission does
not, as some commenters urge, put the
entire burden of access recovery on
consumers. Rather, consistent with the
Commission’s approach in past reforms,
under which business customers also
contributed to offset declines in access
charges, the Order balances consumer
and single-line business recovery with
recovery from multi-line businesses.
The Commission also adopts additional
measures to protect consumers of
incumbent LECs that elect not to receive
CAF funding, by limiting the proportion
of Eligible Recovery that can come from
consumers and single-line businesses
based on a weighted share of a carrier’s
residential versus business lines. This
limitation is only necessary for carriers
that are not eligible or elect not to
receive CAF funding because carriers
recovering from CAF will have the full
ARC imputed to them.
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
• Protections for Consumers Already
Paying Rebalanced Rates. To protect
consumers, including in states that have
already rebalanced rates through prior
state intercarrier compensation reforms,
the Commission adopts a Residential
Rate Ceiling that prohibits imposing an
ARC on any consumer paying an
inclusive local monthly phone rate of
$30 or more.
• Protections for Multi-Line
Businesses. Although the Commission
does not adopt a business rate ceiling,
nor were there proposals in the record
to do so, the R&O takes measures to
ensure that multi-line businesses’ total
SLC plus ARC line items are just and
reasonable. The current multi-line
business SLC is capped at $9.20. Some
carriers, particularly smaller rate of
return and mid-size carriers, are at or
near the cap, while larger price cap
carriers may have business SLCs as low
as $5.00. To minimize the burden on
multi-line businesses, the Commission
does not permit LECs to charge a multiline business ARC where the SLC plus
ARC would exceed $12.20 per line. This
limits the ARC for multi-line businesses
for entities at the current $9.20 cap to
$3.00. The Commission finds this
limitation for multi-line businesses
consistent with the reasons the
Commission places an overall limit on
the residential ARCs discussed below.
• To recover Eligible Recovery, price
cap incumbent LECs are permitted to
implement monthly end user ARCs with
five annual increases of no more than
$0.50 for residential/single-line business
consumers, for a total monthly ARC of
no more than $2.50 in the fifth year; and
$1.00 (per month) per line for multi-line
business customers, for a total of $5.00
per line in the fifth year, provided that:
(1) Any such residential increases
would not result in regulated residential
end-user rates that exceed the $30
Residential Rate Ceiling; and (2) any
multi-line business customer’s total SLC
plus ARC does not exceed $12.20. The
monthly ARC that could be charged to
any particular consumer cannot increase
by more than $0.50 annually, and in fact
the Commission estimates that the
average increase in the monthly ARC
that would be permitted across all
consumer lines over the period of
reform, based on the amount of eligible
recovery, is approximately $0.20
annually. However, the Commission
expects that not all carriers will elect or
be able to charge the ARC due in part
to competitive pressures, and the
Commission therefore predicts the
average actual increase across all
consumers to be approximately $0.10–
$0.15 each year, peaking at
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
approximately $0.50 to $0.90 after five
or six years, and declining thereafter.
• To recover Eligible Recovery, rateof-return incumbent LECs are permitted
to implement monthly end user ARCs
with six annual increases of no more
than $0.50 (per month) for residential/
single-line business consumers, for a
total ARC of no more than $3.00 in the
sixth year; and $1.00 (per month) per
line for multi-line business customers
for a total of $6.00 per line in the sixth
year, provided that: (1) Such increases
would not result in regulated residential
end-user rates that exceed the $30
Residential Rate Ceiling; and (2) any
multi-line business customer’s total SLC
plus ARC does not exceed $12.20.
• Competitive LECs, which are not
subject to the Commission’s end-user
rate regulations today, may recover
reduced intercarrier revenues through
end-user charges.
589. Explicit Support from the CAF.
The Commission has recognized that
some areas are uneconomic to serve
absent implicit or explicit support. ICC
revenues have traditionally been a
means of having other carriers (who are
now often competitors) implicitly
support the costs of the local network.
As the Commission continues the
transition from implicit to explicit
support that the Commission began in
1997, recovery from the CAF for
incumbent LECs will be provided to the
extent their Eligible Recovery exceeds
their permitted ARCs. For price cap
carriers that elect to receive CAF
support, such support is transitional,
phasing out over three years beginning
in 2017. This phase out reflects, in part,
the fact that such carriers will be
receiving additional universal service
support from the CAF that will phase in
over time and is designed to reflect the
efficient costs of providing service over
a voice and broadband network. For
rate-of-return carriers, ICC-replacement
CAF support will phase down as
Eligible Recovery decreases over time,
but will not be subject to other
reductions.
• All incumbent LECs that elect to
receive CAF support as part of this
recovery mechanism will be subject to
the same accountability and oversight
requirements adopted above. For rate-ofreturn carriers, the obligations for
deploying broadband upon reasonable
request specified in the CAF section
above apply as a condition of receiving
ICC-replacement CAF. For price cap
carriers that elect to receive ICCreplacement CAF support, the
Commission requires such support be
used for building and operating
broadband-capable networks used to
offer their own retail service in areas
PO 00000
Frm 00079
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81639
substantially unserved by an
unsubsidized competitor of fixed voice
and broadband services. Thus, all CAF
support will directly advance
broadband deployment. This approach
is consistent with carriers’
representations that they currently use
ICC revenues for broadband
deployment.
• Competitive LECs, which have
greater freedom in setting rates and
determining which customers they wish
to serve, will not be eligible for CAF
support to replace reductions in ICC
revenues.
B. Policy Approach to Recovery
590. As discussed above, the
Commission’s reforms seek to enable
more widespread deployment of
broadband networks, to foster the
transition to IP networks, and to reduce
marketplace distortions. The
Commission recognizes that this
transition affects different—but
overlapping—segments of consumers in
different ways. The Commission
therefore seeks to adopt a balanced
approach to reform that benefits
consumers as a whole.
591. The overall reforms adopted in
this R&O will enable expanded buildout of broadband and advanced mobile
services to millions of consumers in
rural America who do not currently
have broadband service. These ICC
reforms will fuel new investment by
making incumbent LECs’ revenue more
predictable and certain. Indeed,
incumbent LECs receiving CAF support
as part of this recovery mechanism will
have broadband deployment
obligations.
592. In addition, as discussed above,
the Commission anticipates that
reductions in intercarrier compensation
charges will result in reduced prices for
network usage, thereby enabling more
customers to use unlimited all-distance
service plans or plans with a larger
volume of long distance minutes, and
also leading to increased investment
and innovation in communications
networks and services. Moreover,
consistent with previous ICC reforms,
which gave rise to substantial benefits
from lower long distance prices, the
Commission expects consumers to
realize substantial benefits from this
reform. This is especially true for
customers of carriers for which
intercarrier compensation charges
historically have been a significant cost,
such as wireless providers and long
distance carriers.
593. Today, carriers receive payments
from other carriers for carrying traffic on
their networks at rates that are based on
recovering the average cost of the
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81640
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
network, plus expenses, common costs,
overhead, and profits, which together
far exceed the incremental costs of
carrying such traffic. The excess of the
payments over the associated costs
constitutes an implicit annual subsidy
of local phone networks—a subsidy
paid by consumers and businesses
everywhere in the country. This distorts
competition, placing actual and
potential competitors that do not receive
these same subsidies at a market
disadvantage, and denying customers
the benefits of competitive entry.
594. As the Commission pursues the
benefits of reforming this system, it also
seeks to ensure that the transition to a
reformed intercarrier compensation and
universal service system does not
undermine continued network
investment—and thus harm consumers.
Consequently, the recovery mechanism
is designed to provide predictability to
incumbent carriers that had been
receiving implicit ICC subsidies, to
mitigate marketplace disruption during
the reform transition, and to ensure that
intercarrier compensation reforms do
not unintentionally undermine the
Commission’s objectives for universal
service reform. As the State Members
observe, for example, ‘‘[b]ankers and
equity investors need to be able to see
that both past and future investments
will be backed by long-term support
programs that are predictable.’’
Similarly, they note that ‘‘abrupt
changes in support levels can harm
consumers.’’ Predictable recovery
during the intercarrier compensation
reform transition is particularly
important to ensure that carriers ‘‘can
maintain/enhance their networks while
still offering service to end-users at
reasonable rates.’’ Providing this
stability does not require revenue
neutrality, however.
595. Ultimately, consumers bear the
burden of the inefficiencies and
misaligned incentives of the current ICC
system, and they are the ultimate
beneficiaries of ICC reform. In
structuring a reasonable transition path
for ICC reform, the Commission seeks to
balance fairly the burdens borne by
various categories of end users,
including consumers already paying
high residential phone rates, consumers
paying artificially low residential phone
rates, and consumers that contribute to
the universal service fund. Given
nationwide disparities in local rates, it
would be unfair to place the entire
burden of the ICC transition on USF
contributors. Just as the Commission has
undertaken some intercarrier
compensation reforms since the 1996
Act, shifting away from implicit
intercarrier subsidies to end-user
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
charges and universal service for
recovery, some states have done so, as
well. For example, Alaska has recently
reformed its intrastate access system,
establishing a Network Access Fee of
$5.75, and increasing the role of the
Alaska USF in subsidizing carriers’
intrastate revenues with a state USF
surcharge of 9.4 percent. Similarly, in
Wyoming, which has also rebalanced
rates, many rural customers face total
charges for basic residential phone
service in excess of $40 per month. The
Nebraska Companies note total out-ofpocket local residential rates in that
state already exceed $30 per month and
should not be increased under any
federal reforms contemplated by the
Commission. Were the Commission to
place the entire burden of ICC recovery
on USF contributors, not only would
consumers in each of these states be
forced to contribute more, but USF,
which is also supported through
consumer contributions, could not stay
within the budget discussed above.
Meanwhile, other states have retained
high intrastate intercarrier
compensation rates to subsidize
artificially low local rates—including
some as low as $5 per month—
effectively shifting the costs of those
local networks to long distance and
wireless customers across the country.
In this context, the Commission finds it
reasonable to allow carriers to seek
some recovery from their own
customers, subject to protection for
consumers already paying rates for local
phone service at or near $30 per month.
The Commission also prevents carriers
from charging an ARC on any Lifeline
customers. The Commission also
protects consumers by limiting any
increases in consumer ARCs based upon
actual or imputed increases in ARCs for
business customers.
596. Some commenters argued that a
variety of other regulatory
considerations should alter the
Commission’s approach to recovery. For
example, some express concerns about
the level of existing federal subscriber
line charges (SLCs) and special access
rates and the extent to which carriers
use the ratepayer- and universal servicefunded local network to provide
unregulated services. Although the
Commission addresses certain of those
issues below, the Commission is not
persuaded that it should delay
comprehensive intercarrier
compensation and universal reform
pending resolution of those outstanding
questions, given the urgency of
advancing the country’s broadband
goals. Nor does the Commission treat
those issues as a static, unchanging
PO 00000
Frm 00080
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
backdrop to the reforms the Commission
adopts in the R&O. In the USF/ICC
Transformation FNPRM, the
Commission reevaluates existing SLCs,
including by seeking comment on
whether SLCs today are set at an
excessive level and should be reduced.
To attempt to account for these concerns
through reduced recovery here,
particularly given potential changes that
the Commission might consider, would
unduly complicate—and significantly
delay—badly needed reform that the
Commission believes will result in
significant consumer benefits.
Consequently, the Commission believes
that the consumer protections
incorporated in the recovery mechanism
and the transitional nature of the
recovery strike the right balance for
consumers as a whole.
597. Although the preceding has been
focused on the substantial benefits of
the reform to consumers, in crafting
these reforms the Commission also took
account of costs and benefits to
industry. The Commission’s reforms are
minimally burdensome to carriers,
imposing only minor incremental costs
(i.e., costs that would not be otherwise
incurred without the reforms). The
incremental costs of reform arise
primarily from implementation,
meaning that they are one-time costs of
the transition that are not incurred on
an ongoing basis. Further, these costs
are heavily outweighed by efficiency
benefits that carriers, as well as other
industry participants and consumers,
will experience. For carriers as well as
end users, these benefits include
significantly more efficient
interconnection arrangements. Carriers
will provide existing services more
efficiently, make better pricing
decisions for those services, and
innovate more efficiently. Carriers’
incentives to engage in inefficient
arbitrage will also be reduced, and
carriers will face lower costs of
metering, billing, recovery, and disputes
related to intercarrier compensation.
Further, carriers, firms more generally,
and consumers, facing more efficient
prices for voice services, will make
more use of voice services to greater
effect, and more efficient innovation
will result. In contrast to the
transitional, one-time costs of reform,
these efficiency benefits are ongoing and
will compound over time.
C. Carriers Eligible To Participate in the
Recovery Mechanism
598. The Commission sought
comment in the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM on whether
recovery should be limited to certain
carriers, or whether it should extend
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
more broadly to all LECs. The
Commission extends the recovery
mechanisms adopted in this R&O to all
incumbent LECs because regulatory
constraints on their pricing and service
requirements otherwise limit their
ability to recover their costs. If an
incumbent LEC receives recovery of any
costs or revenues that are already being
recovered as Eligible Recovery through
ARCs or the CAF, that LEC’s ability to
recover reduced switched access
revenue from ARCs or the CAF shall be
reduced to the extent it receives
duplicative recovery. Incumbent LECs
seeking revenue recovery will be
required to certify as part of their tariff
filings to both the FCC and to any state
commission exercising jurisdiction over
the incumbent LEC’s intrastate costs
that the incumbent LEC is not seeking
duplicative recovery in the state
jurisdiction for any Eligible Recovery
subject to the recovery mechanism. To
monitor and ensure that this does not
occur, the Commission requires carriers
participating in the recovery
mechanism, whether ARC and/or CAF,
to file data annually. All incumbent
LECs have built out their networks
subject to COLR obligations, supported
in part by ongoing intercarrier
compensation revenues. Thus,
incumbent LECs have limited control
over the areas or customers that they
serve, having been required to deploy
their network in areas where there was
no business case to do so absent
subsidies, including the implicit
subsidies from intercarrier
compensation. At the same time,
incumbent LECs generally are subject to
more statutory and regulatory
constraints than other providers in the
retail pricing of their local telephone
service. This includes both Commission
regulation of the federal SLC and,
frequently, state regulation of retail local
telephone service rates as well. Thus,
incumbent LECs are limited in their
ability to increase rates to their local
telephone service customers as a whole
to offset reduced implicit subsidies.
599. Proposals to limit the recovery
mechanism to only some classes of
incumbent LECs, such as rate-of-return
carriers, neglect these considerations,
and in particular ignore that price cap
incumbent LECs typically are also
subject to regulatory constraints on enduser charges. The Commission does,
however, recognize the differences faced
by price cap and rate-of-return carriers
under the status quo absent reform, and
therefore adopts different recovery
mechanisms for price cap and rate-ofreturn carriers, as explained below.
600. Competitive LECs. The
Commission declines to provide an
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
explicit recovery mechanism for
competitive LECs. Unlike incumbent
LECs, because competitive carriers have
generally been found to lack market
power in the provision of
telecommunications services, their enduser charges are not subject to
comparable rate regulation, and
therefore those carriers are free to
recover reduced access revenue through
regular end-user charges. Some
competitive LECs have argued that their
rates are constrained by incumbent LEC
rates (as supplemented by regulated
end-user charges and CAF support); to
the extent this is true, the Commission
would expect this competition to
constrain incumbent LECs’ ability to
rely on end-user recovery as well.
Moreover, competitive LECs typically
have not built out their networks subject
to COLR obligations requiring the
provision of service when no other
provider will do so, and thus typically
can elect whether to enter a service area
and/or to serve particular classes of
customers (such as residential
customers) depending upon whether it
is profitable to do so without subsidy.
601. In light of those considerations,
the Commission disagrees with parties
that advocate making the recovery
mechanism the Commission adopts
today available to all carriers, both
incumbent and competitive, or to all
carriers that currently receive access
charge revenues. Competitive LECs are
free to choose where and how they
provide service, and their ability to
recover costs from their customers is
generally not as limited by statute or
regulation as it is for incumbent LECs.
602. The Commission likewise
declines to permit competitive LECs to
reduce their access rates over a longer
period of time than incumbent LECs.
Instead, the Commission believes that
the approach adopted in the CLEC
Access Charge Order, 66 FR 27892, May
21, 2001, under which competitive LECs
benchmark access rates to incumbent
LECs’ rates, is the better approach. That
benchmarking rule was designed as a
tool to constrain competitive LECs’
access rates to just and reasonable levels
without the need for extensive, ongoing
accounting oversight and detailed
evaluation of competitive LECs’ costs.
Deviating from that framework for
purposes of the access reform transition
would create new opportunities for
arbitrage and require increased
regulatory oversight, notwithstanding
the fact that competitive LECs’ access
rates under the CLEC Access Charge
Order were not based on any
demonstrated level of need associated
with those carriers’ networks or
operations. Nor has any commenter
PO 00000
Frm 00081
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81641
provided sufficient evidence to warrant
departure from the benchmarking
approach in this context. The
Commission therefore declines to adopt
a separate transition path for
competitive LECs. Rather, consistent
with the general benchmarking rule that
had been used for interstate access
service, competitive LECs will
benchmark to the default rates of the
incumbent LEC in the area they serve as
specified under this R&O.
D. Determining Eligible Recovery
603. The first step in the recovery
mechanism is defining the amount,
called ‘‘Eligible Recovery,’’ that
incumbent LECs will be given the
opportunity to recover.
1. Establishing the Price Cap Baseline
604. Costs vs. Revenues. The USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM sought comment
on whether, in adopting a recovery
mechanism, the Commission should
base recovery on carrier costs, carrier
revenues, or some combination thereof.
For the reasons set forth below, for price
cap carriers, the Commission will
provide recovery based upon Fiscal
Year 2011 (‘‘FY2011’’ or ‘‘Baseline’’)
access revenues that are reduced as part
of the reforms the Commission adopts,
plus FY2011 net reciprocal
compensation revenues. Selecting
FY2011 ensures that gaming or any
disputes or nonpayment that may occur
after the release of the R&O does not
impact carriers’ Baseline revenues. For
rate-of-return carriers, the Commission
adopts a bifurcated approach based on:
(1) Their 2011 interstate switched access
revenue requirement; and (2) their
FY2011 intrastate switched access
revenues for services with rates to be
reduced as part of the reforms the
Commission adopts today, plus FY2011
net reciprocal compensation revenues.
For a rate-of-return carrier that
participated in the NECA 2011 annual
switched access tariff filing, its 2011
interstate switched access revenue
requirement will be its projected
interstate switched access revenue
requirement associated with the NECA
2011 annual interstate switched access
tariff filing. For a rate-of-return carrier
subject to § 61.38 of the Commission’s
rules, 47 CFR 61.38, that filed its own
annual access tariff in 2010 and did not
participate in the NECA 2011 annual
switched access tariff filing, its 2011
interstate switched access revenue
requirement will be its projected
interstate switched access revenue
requirement in its 2010 annual
interstate switched access tariff filing.
For a rate-of-return carrier subject to
§ 61.39 of the Commission’s rules, 47
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81642
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
CFR 61.39, that filed its own annual
switched access tariff in 2011, its
revenue requirement will be its
historically-determined annual
interstate switched access revenue
requirement filed with its 2011 annual
interstate switched access tariff filing.
Carriers have not demonstrated here
that the existing intercarrier
compensation revenues that the
Commission uses as part of the Baseline
calculations are confiscatory or
otherwise unjustly or unreasonably low,
and the Commission thus finds them to
be an appropriate starting point for
calculations under the recovery
mechanism. To the extent that it
subsequently is determined that an
incumbent LEC’s rates during the
Baseline time period were not just and
reasonable because they were too low,
that carrier may seek additional
recovery as needed through the Total
Cost and Earnings Review Mechanism.
605. The Commission concludes that,
where it lacks data, it is preferable to
rely on revenues for determining
recovery, as most commenters suggest.
Defining carriers’ costs today would be
a burdensome undertaking that could
significantly delay implementation of
ICC reform. ‘‘Cost’’ would first have to
be defined for these purposes, which is
a difficult and time-consuming exercise.
Indeed, price cap carriers’ access
charges are not based on current costs,
and reliable cost information is not
readily available. It is not clear that a
reliable cost study based on current
network configuration could be
completed without undue delay, and
doing so could be a complicated, time
consuming, and expensive process, nor
is it clear that a regulatory proceeding
could come up with a definition of
‘‘cost’’ appropriate for recovery that is
any better than the revenues approach
the Commission adopts.
606. Moreover, the Commission has
long recognized that intercarrier
compensation rates include an implicit
subsidy because they are set to recover
the cost of the entire local network,
rather than the actual incremental cost
of terminating or originating another
call. Given the Commission’s
commitment to a gradual transition with
no flash cuts, the focus on revenues is
appropriate to ensure carriers have a
measured transition away from this
implicit support on which they have
been permitted to rely for many years.
607. For rate-of-return carriers,
however, interstate switched access
rates today are determined based on
their interstate switched access revenue
requirement, which is calculated in a
manner that includes their ‘‘regulated
interstate switched access costs’’ as the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
Commission has historically defined
them, plus a prescribed rate of return on
the net book value of their interstate
switched access investment. Although
rate-of-return carriers’ revenue
requirement might not be based on the
precise measure of cost the Commission
might otherwise adopt if it were starting
anew, the Commission believes that
using those carriers’ interstate revenue
requirement is sensible for purposes of
determining their Eligible Recovery. For
one, this information is readily available
today. The Commission will carefully
monitor material changes in cost
allocation to categories where recovery
remains based on actual cost to ensure
that carriers do not shift costs properly
associated with switched access. The
Commission relies on the revenue
requirement information available at the
time of the initial tariff filings required
to implement this recovery framework.
This not only enables implementation of
the recovery mechanism in the specified
timeframes, but also addresses possible
incentives to engage in gaming if
carriers were able to increase the Rateof-Return Baseline subsequently. If a
carrier subsequently can demonstrate
that it is materially harmed by the use
of the projected, rather than final, 2011
interstate revenue requirement, it may
seek a waiver of the rule specifying the
Rate-of-Return Baseline to allow it to
rely on an increased Rate-of-Return
Baseline amount. Any such waiver
would be subject to the Commission’s
traditional ‘‘good cause’’ waiver
standard, rather than the Total Cost and
Earnings Review specified below. In
addition, use of the revenue
requirement avoids implementation
issues surrounding disputed or
uncollectable interstate access revenues,
providing greater predictability and
substantially insulating small carriers
from the harms of arbitrage schemes
such as phantom traffic. This approach
likewise prevents carriers that may have
been earning in excess of their
permitted rate of return from locking in
those revenues and continuing such
overearnings in perpetuity.
608. The Commission’s approach is
also consistent with the reforms to local
switching support (LSS) the
Commission adopts above. Historically,
smaller carriers have received LSS as a
subsidy for certain switching costs,
effectively satisfying a portion of their
interstate switched access revenue
requirement. As discussed above,
defining Eligible Recovery based on
carriers’ interstate switched access
requirement allows the Commission to
eliminate LSS as a separate universal
service support mechanism for rate-of-
PO 00000
Frm 00082
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
return carriers. Eligible Recovery will be
calculated from carriers’ entire interstate
switched access revenue requirement—
whether it historically was recovered
through access charges or LSS. Thus, in
essence, carriers receiving LSS today
will be eligible to receive support as
part of their Eligible Recovery.
609. At the same time, although rateof-return carriers do track certain costs
to establish their interstate revenue
requirement for switched access
services, the same information is not
readily available—or necessarily
relevant—for intrastate switched access
services or net reciprocal compensation.
As a result, their Eligible Recovery will
be based on their FY2011 intrastate
switched access revenues addressed as
part of the reform adopted today plus
FY2011 net reciprocal compensation as
of April 1, 2012. Rate-of-return carriers
may elect to have NECA or another
entity perform the annual analysis. The
underlying data must be submitted to
the relevant state commissions, to the
Commission, and, for carriers that are
eligible for and elect to receive CAF, to
USAC.
610. The USF/ICC Transformation
NPRM also sought comment on
whether, under a revenues-based
approach, to base carriers’ recovery on
gross intercarrier revenue or
alternatively to use net intercarrier
compensation, defined as ‘‘a company’s
total intercarrier compensation revenue
* * * less its intercarrier compensation
expense’’ including expenses paid by
affiliates. The Commission received a
mixed record in response. For the
reasons described below, the approach
the basis for a carrier’s recovery the
Commission adopts is neither a pure net
revenue approach nor a pure gross
revenue approach.
611. Although the Commission is
sympathetic to requests to determine
recovery based on net revenues, the
Commission declines to do so for
several reasons. Most importantly, the
Commission is committed to a gradual
transition with sufficient predictability
to enable continued investment, and a
net revenue approach could reduce that
predictability, especially for nonfacilities-based providers of long
distance service who pay intercarrier
compensation expenses indirectly
through their purchase of wholesale
long distance service from third parties.
612. There also are other difficulties,
substantive and administrative,
involved in calculating net revenues,
which cannot be adequately addressed
based on the information in the record.
For example, although reductions in an
individual incumbent LEC’s ICC
revenue is tied to a particular study
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
area, its affiliated IXC or wireless carrier
may operate across multiple study areas,
and the record does not suggest an
administrable method for accurately
identifying the cost savings associated
with a particular incumbent LEC.
Moreover, determinations of which
affiliates should be counted, whether
they are fully owned by the incumbent
LEC or not, and to what extent, would
be highly company-specific and could
lead to inequitable treatment of
similarly-situated carriers.
613. Such an approach also could
create inefficient incentives during the
transition regarding the acquisition of
exchanges with ICC revenue reductions.
For example, if an incumbent LEC has
a large reduction in ICC revenue that is
offset by affiliates’ ICC cost savings,
other carriers that lack affiliates with
comparable ICC cost savings will be
deterred from acquiring such exchanges
if they would not be able to obtain
additional recovery once it acquired that
exchange. Conversely, if a carrier that
lacked affiliates with comparable ICC
cost savings would be entitled to new
recovery if it acquired that exchange, a
net revenue recovery approach could
create inefficient incentives to acquire
such exchanges given the potential for
expanded CAF support (and thus also
risk unconstrained growth in universal
service).
614. Finally, although the record does
not enable the Commission to determine
the precise extent to which savings will
be passed through from IXC to
incumbent LEC, competition in the long
distance market is likely to lead IXCs to
pass on significant savings to incumbent
LECs, rendering 100 percent gross
revenues likely more generous than
necessary for incumbent LECs. This is
further complicated by incumbent LECs
with affiliated IXCs that provide
wholesale long distance service;
counting the cost savings associated
with wholesale long distance service
against the recovery need for the
affiliated incumbent LEC could create
disincentives for the IXC to
simultaneously pass through those cost
savings in lower wholesale long
distance rates, thereby reducing the
potential for lower retail long distance
rates.
2. Calculating Eligible Recovery for
Price Cap Incumbent LECs
615. For price cap carriers, the
recovery mechanism allows them to
determine at the outset exactly how
much their Eligible Recovery will be
each year. The certainty regarding this
recovery will enable price cap carriers
to better manage the transition away
from intercarrier compensation for
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
recovery. The recovery approach will
use historical trends regarding changes
in demand to project future changes in
demand (typically MOU), in
conjunction with the default rates
specified by the Commission’s reforms,
to determine Eligible Recovery. The
Commission recognizes that its
transitional intercarrier compensation
framework sets default rates but leaves
carriers free to negotiate alternatives.
The Commission’s approach to recovery
relies on the default rates specified by
the transition and will impute those
rates for purposes of determining
recovery, even if carriers negotiate a
lower ICC rate with particular providers.
Price Cap Eligible Recovery will be
calculated from a Baseline of 90 percent
of relevant FY2011 revenues, reduced
on a straight-line basis at a rate of ten
percent annually starting in year one
(2012). This is consistent with the
historical trajectory of decreasing MOU,
with which price cap carriers’
intercarrier compensation revenues
decline today. The Commission
concludes that this approach provides
the necessary predictability for carriers
without reducing their incentives to
seek efficiencies or to maximize use of
their network. The Commission will not
annually true-up actual MOU for price
cap carriers, instead likewise using a
straight line decline of 10 percent
relative to FY2011 MOU, which is a
more predictable and administratively
less burdensome approach. If MOU
decline is less than 10 percent, carriers
will receive the benefit of additional
revenues. Conversely, if MOU decline
accelerates, the risk of decreased
revenues falls on the carriers. This
allocation of risk incents carriers to be
more efficient and retain customers.
616. Specifically, the Price Cap
Baseline for price cap incumbent LECs’
recovery will be the total switched
access revenues that: (1) Are being
reduced as part of reform adopted today;
(2) are billed for service provided in
FY2011; and (3) for which payment has
been received by March 31, 2012. In
addition, the Baseline will include net
reciprocal compensation revenues for
FY2011, based on net payments as of
March 31, 2012. Carriers will be
required to submit to the states data
regarding all FY2011 switched access
MOU and rates, broken down into
categories and subcategories
corresponding to the relevant categories
of rates being reduced. With this
information, states with authority over
intrastate access charges will be able to
monitor implementation of the recovery
mechanism and compliance with the
Commission’s rules, and help guard
PO 00000
Frm 00083
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81643
against cost-shifting or double dipping
by carriers. A price cap incumbent LEC
that is eligible to receive CAF shall also
file this information with USAC for
purposes of implementing CAF ICC
support, and the Commission delegates
to the Wireline Competition Bureau
authority to work with USAC to develop
and implement processes for
administration of CAF ICC support.
These figures will establish the Base
Minutes for each relevant category, and
shall not include disputed revenues or
revenues otherwise not recovered, for
whatever reason, or the MOU associated
with such revenues. Every carrier, in
support of its annual access tariff filing,
must also provide data necessary to
justify its ability to impose an ARC,
including the potential impact of the
ARC for residential and multi-line
business customers.
617. In determining the recovery
mechanism, the Commission declines to
provide 100 percent revenue neutrality
relative to today’s revenues. Rather, the
Commission adopts an approach that is
informed in part based on the status quo
path facing price cap carriers today,
where intercarrier compensation
revenues decline as MOU decline, but
also adopt some additional reductions
for carriers that have had the benefit of
interstate rates essentially being frozen
for almost a decade, rather than being
reduced annually as would typically
occur under price cap regulation.
Although the Commission adopts rules
to help address concerns about traffic
identification and establish a
prospective intercarrier compensation
framework for VoIP-PSTN traffic, absent
the actions in this R&O, issues regarding
compensation for that traffic would not
have been resolved. Because the
Commission is considering the status
quo path absent reform, its recovery
framework is based on historical
declining demand notwithstanding
reforms that potentially could mitigate
some of that decline. Thus, for study
areas of carriers that participated in the
CALLS plan, which is approximately 95
percent of all price cap lines, and 90
percent of all lines across the country,
the Commission adopts a 10 percent
initial reduction in price cap incumbent
LECs’ Eligible Recovery to reflect the
fact that these carriers’ productivity
gains have generally not been accounted
for in their regulated rates for many
years. Incentive regulation typically
provides a mechanism for sharing the
benefits of productivity gains with
ratepayers. Prior to the CALLS Order, 65
FR 38684, June 21, 2000, the
Commission included a productivity
adjustment to the price cap indices to
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81644
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
ensure that savings would be shared.
The CALLS Order did not include a
productivity-related adjustment,
however, providing instead a
transitional ‘‘X-factor’’ designed simply
to target the lower rates specified in that
reform plan. After the targeted rates
were achieved, which occurred by 2002
for 96 percent of study areas for carriers
participating in the CALLS plan, the Xfactor was set equal to inflation for the
carriers originally subject to the CALLS
plan and provided no additional
consumer benefit from any productivity
gains. As a result, study areas of price
cap LECs that participated in the CALLS
plan have had no X-Factor reductions to
their price cap indices (PCIs),
productivity-related or otherwise, for
any PCI at least since 2004, and some
price cap carriers’ X-Factor reductions
to their switched access-related PCIs
stopped even earlier than that. Because
price cap carriers reached their target
rates at different times, the inflationonly X-factor took effect at different
times for different price cap carriers. In
the CALLS Remand Order, 68 FR 50077,
August 20, 2003, the Commission
concluded that price cap carriers
serving 36 percent of total nationwide
price cap access lines had achieved
their target rates by their 2000 annual
access filing. By the 2001 annual
accessing filings the number grew to
carriers serving 75 percent of total
access lines, and by the 2002 annual
access filings, carriers serving 96
percent of total access lines had
achieved their target rates.
618. The record supports the use of a
productivity factor such as the X-factor
previously applied to price-cap carriers
to reduce the amount carriers are
eligible to recover through a recovery
mechanism. A productivity factor
would require recovery to decrease
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
annually by a predetermined amount
designed to capture for consumers the
efficiencies found to apply generally to
the industry. For example, if the
Commission had maintained a five
percent annual X-factor, rates for
carriers that had reached their target
rates would have been subject to caps
reduced by five percent each year, so by
today those rate caps would have been
reduced by approximately 30 percent.
Although the record does not contain
the detailed analysis required to support
a particular productivity factor that
would apply on an ongoing basis, the
Commission finds this initial 10 percent
reduction for study areas of price cap
LECs that participated in the CALLS
Plan to be a conservative approach
given the absence of any sharing of
productivity or other X-factor
reductions for a number of years,
particularly when supplemented by
other justifications for revenue
reductions that the Commission does
not otherwise account for in the
standard recovery mechanism.
619. The Commission recognizes,
however, that the industry has changed
significantly since the 2000 CALLS
Order, with some price cap CALLS
carriers merging with or acquiring
carriers that did not participate in the
CALLS plan and/or newly converted
price cap carriers acquiring study areas
that did participate in the CALLS plan.
For this reason, the Commission
concludes it is necessary to apply the 10
percent reduction on a study area basis
for CALLS participants, which the
Commission collectively defines as
‘‘CALLS study areas.’’ Thus, the
Commission will apply the 10 percent
reduction to all price cap study areas
that participated in the CALLS plan.
620. The Commission also recognizes,
however, some price cap LECs
PO 00000
Frm 00084
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
converted to price cap regulation from
rate-of-return regulation within the last
five years and therefore such carriers
did not participate in the CALLS plan.
Thus, not all price cap carriers have had
the benefit of productivity gains
associated with reaching their target
rates by 2002. Indeed, there are a few
study areas that have converted to price
cap regulation in the last two years and
are still in the process of reducing their
interstate rates to meet their CALLS
target rate. As a result, for non-price cap
study areas that were not part of the
CALLS plan, the Commission believes a
more incremental approach is
warranted. In particular, for non-CALLS
study areas, the Commission will delay
the implementation of the 10 percent
reduction to Eligible Recovery for five
years, which is approximately the
difference in time between when 96
percent of study areas of CALLS price
cap carriers reached their target rates in
2002 and when the non-CALLS price
cap carriers began converting from rateof-return in 2007. The Commission
believes doing so enables carriers that
more recently converted to price cap
regulation, carriers which are typically
smaller, to have additional time to
adjust to the intercarrier compensation
rate reductions. In year six, the 10
percent reduction to Eligible Recovery
will apply equally to all price cap
carriers.
621. In addition, as discussed in the
USF/ICC Transformation NPRM,
Commission data and the record
confirm that carriers are losing lines and
experiencing a significant and ongoing
decrease in minutes-of-use. Incumbent
LEC interstate switched access minutes
have decreased each year since 2000, as
shown in the chart below.
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
622. This represents an average
annual decrease of over 10 percent and
a total decrease of over 36 percent since
2006. Further, the percentage loss of
MOU is accelerating—it increased each
year between 2006 and 2010, and
exceeded 13 percent in 2010. Based on
the record, it is the Commission’s
predictive judgment that significant
declines in MOU will continue.
Accordingly, the Commission will
reduce Price Cap Eligible Recovery by
10 percent annually for price cap
carriers to reflect a conservative
prediction regarding the loss of MOU,
and associated loss of revenue, that
would have occurred absent reform.
623. As a result, for price cap carriers,
Base Minutes will be reduced by 10
percent annually beginning in 2012 to
reflect decline in MOU. For example,
Year One or ‘‘Y1’’ (2012) Intrastate
Minutes will be .9 × Intrastate Base
Minutes; Y2 (2013) Intrastate Minutes
will be .81 × Intrastate Base Minutes
(i.e., .9 × .9 × Intrastate Base Minutes);
etc.
624. Price Cap Eligible Recovery. Price
Cap Eligible Recovery in a given year is
the cumulative reduction in a particular
intercarrier compensation rate since the
base year multiplied by the predetermined minutes for that rate for that
year, as defined above.
Price Cap Example. A price cap carrier has
a 2011 intrastate terminating access rate for
transport and switching of $.0028, an
interstate terminating access rate for
transport and switching of $.0020, and
10,000,000 Intrastate Base Minutes. Its
Eligible Recovery for intrastate switched
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
access revenue would be determined as
follows:
Year 1. Reduce intrastate terminating
access rate for transport and switching, if
above the carrier’s interstate access rate, by
50 percent of the differential between the rate
and the carrier’s interstate access rate.
The carrier’s Year 1 (Y1) Minutes equal
9,000,000 (10,000,000 × .9). Its intrastate
terminating access rate for transport and
switching, $.0028 in 2011, is reduced by
$.0004 (($.0028–$.0020) × 50 percent)) to
$.0024. Its Y1 Eligible Recovery is $3,600
($.0004 × 9,000,000). For a CALLS study
areas, Eligible Recovery would be reduced by
an additional 10 percent to $3,240 ($3,600 ×
.9). For a non-CALLS study area, such
reductions will begin in year six.
Year 2. Reduce intrastate terminating
access rate for transport and switching, if
above the carrier’s interstate access rate, to
the carrier’s interstate access rate.
The carrier’s Year 2 (Y2) Minutes equal
8,100,000 (9,000,000 × .9). Its intrastate
terminating access rate for transport and
switching is reduced by an additional $.0004
from $.0024 to $.0020, for a cumulative
reduction of $.0008. Its Y2 Eligible Recovery
is $6,480 ($.0008 × 8,100,000). For a CALLS
study area, Eligible Recovery would be
reduced by an additional 10 percent to
$5,832 ($6,480 × .9). For a non-CALLS study
area, such reductions will begin in year six.
This is a simplified example of the
calculation of Price Cap Eligible Recovery for
a price cap carrier’s reduction in intrastate
terminating access resulting from the reforms
the Commission adopts for illustrative
purposes only. It is not intended to
encompass all necessary calculations
applicable in determining Price Cap Eligible
Recovery in the periods discussed in the
example for all possible rates addressed by
the R&O.
PO 00000
Frm 00085
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81645
625. This Approach to Recovery for
Price Cap Carriers Provides Certainty
and Encourages Efficiency. Under the
Act, the Commission has ‘‘broad
discretion in selecting regulatory tools,
[which] specifically includes ‘selecting
methods * * * to make and oversee
rates,’ ’’ and is not compelled to follow
any ‘‘particular regulatory model.’’ The
approach to defining Price Cap Eligible
Recovery continues to give those
incumbent LECs incentives for
efficiency while also providing greater
predictability for carriers and
consumers. Under price cap regulation,
incumbent LECs already have
significant incentives to control their
costs associated with services provided
to end-users, but have not had the same
incentives to limit the costs imposed on
IXCs for terminating calls on the price
cap incumbent LECs’ networks. These
costs are ultimately borne by the IXCs’
customers generally, rather than by the
price cap LECs’ customers specifically.
By phasing out those termination
charges and providing recovery in part
through limited end-user charges, the
Commission’s reform will provide price
cap LECs incentives to minimize such
costs as they transition to broadband
networks.
626. The Commission has considered
a number of alternative proposals
regarding the elimination of intercarrier
terminating switched access charges and
finds that the approach the Commission
adopts constitutes a hybrid of a variety
of proposals that best protects
consumers while facilitating the
reasonable transition to an all-
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
ER28DE11.003
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
81646
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
broadband network. Some commenters
have argued that no additional recovery
should be allowed absent a specific
showing that denying recovery would
constitute a taking. Based upon the
record in this proceeding, the
Commission concludes that such a
denial would represent a flash-cut for
price cap LECs, which is inconsistent
with the Commission’s commitment to
a gradual transition and could threaten
their ability to invest in extending
broadband networks. The Commission
also finds that denying any recovery
pending the adjudication of a request for
an exogenous low-end adjustment under
the price cap rules would be unduly
burdensome for carriers and for the
Commission because of the number of
claims the carriers would be required to
file and the Commission would be
required to adjudicate. The definition of
Price Cap Eligible Recovery for both
CALLS and non-CALLS study areas
gives predictability not only to price cap
carriers, but also to consumers and
universal service contributors, given the
fluctuations that could result from a
true-up approach for these large carriers.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
3. Calculating Eligible Recovery for
Rate-of-Return Incumbent LECs
627. For rate-of-return incumbent
LECs, the Commission adopts a recovery
mechanism that provides more certainty
and predictability than exists today,
while also rewarding carriers for
efficiencies achieved in switching costs.
Specifically, the recovery mechanism
will allow interstate rate-of-return
carriers to determine at the outset of the
transition their total ICC and recovery
revenues for all transitioned rate
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
elements, for each year of the transition:
Eligible Recovery will be adjusted as
necessary with annual true ups to
ensure that rate-of-return carriers have
the opportunity to receive their Baseline
Revenue, notwithstanding changes in
demand for their intercarrier
compensation rates being capped or
reduced under the R&O. The
Commission finds that providing this
greater degree of certainty for rate-ofreturn carriers, which are generally
smaller and less able to respond to
changes in market conditions than are
price cap carriers, is necessary to
provide a reasonable transition from the
existing intercarrier compensation
system.
628. As the starting point for
calculating the Rate-of Return-Baseline,
the Commission will use a rate of return
carrier’s 2011 interstate switched access
revenue requirement, plus FY2011
intrastate switched access revenues and
FY2011 net reciprocal compensation
revenues. Average schedule carriers will
use projected settlements associated
with 2011 annual interstate switched
access tariff filing. The Commission will
then adjust this Baseline over time to
reflect trends in the status quo absent
reform. Under the interstate regulation
that has historically applied to them,
rate-of-return carriers were able to
increase interstate access rates to offset
declining MOU, which has averaged 10
percent per year, and consequently had
insufficient incentive to reduce costs
despite rapidly decreasing demand.
However, the record indicates that, in
the aggregate, rate-of-return carriers’
interstate switched access revenue
requirement has been declining
PO 00000
Frm 00086
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
approximately three percent each year,
reflecting declines in switching costs.
As a result, interstate switched access
revenues have been declining at
approximately three percent annually.
NECA and a number of rate-of-return
carriers project that the revenue
requirement will continue to decline at
approximately three percent a year over
the next five years, because switching
costs are declining dramatically given
the availability of IP-based softswitches,
which are significantly less costly and
more efficient than the TDM-based
switches they replace. Similarly, the
record reveals that legacy LSS, which is
being incorporated in the recovery
mechanism for rate-of-return carriers, is
projected to decline approximately two
percent per year, likewise resulting in
reduced interstate revenues for carriers
receiving LSS.
629. In the intrastate jurisdiction,
moreover, the majority of states do not
have an annual true-up mechanism;
intrastate rates generally do not
automatically increase as demand
declines and as a result, most rate-ofreturn carriers have been experiencing
significant annual declines in
intercarrier compensation revenue. In
particular, aggregate data from more
than 600 rate-of-return carriers reveal an
average decline in intrastate MOUs of
approximately 11 percent, and an
average decline in intrastate access
revenues of approximately 10 percent
annually. The recovery mechanism
accounts for this existing revenue loss,
which would continue to occur under
the status quo path absent reform, as
illustrated in the figure below.
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
630. Accounting for both the
declining interstate revenue
requirement and the ongoing loss of
intrastate revenue with declining MOU,
the record establishes a range of
reasonable potential annual reductions
in the Baseline from which Rate-ofReturn Eligible Recovery is calculated;
within that range the Commission
initially adopts a five percent annual
decrease. At the lower end of the range,
an annual decrease of three percent
would represent rate-of-return carriers’
approximate annual interstate revenue
decline absent reform. Limiting the
Baseline adjustment to three percent
would make these carriers substantially
better off with respect to their intrastate
access revenues, however. As discussed
above, carriers in many states do not
have annual true-ups under state access
rate regulations so as MOU decline,
intrastate access revenues decline as
well. Data indicate that this intrastate
access revenue decline has been
approximately 10 percent. Combining
these interstate and intrastate declines
weighted by the relative portion of
aggregate rate-of-return revenues subject
to the mechanism attributable to each
category could justify a possible
Baseline reduction of approximately
seven percent annually. Because the
Commission recognizes that the
approach to recovery may require
adjustments by rate-of-return carriers,
the Commission initially adopts a
conservative approach and limit the
decline in the Baseline amount from
which Rate-of-Return Eligible Recovery
is calculated to five percent annually.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
631. Moreover, the Commission notes
that the annual five percent decline
does not include the proposal in the
USF/ICC Transformation NPRM and
from the Rural Associations to apply the
corporate operations expense limitation
to LSS. LSS offsets a portion of rate-ofreturn carriers’ interstate switched
access revenue requirement. Applying
the corporate operations expense
limitations to LSS, or more generally to
the entire switched access interstate
revenue requirement, would have
resulted in one-time reduction of almost
three percent. By foregoing this
reduction before setting the Baseline,
the R&O ensures that the five percent
decline is appropriately conservative,
while still consistent with overall goals
to encourage efficiency and cost savings.
632. Rate-of-return carriers will
receive each year’s Baseline revenue
amount from three sources. First, they
will continue to have an opportunity to
receive intercarrier compensation
revenues, pursuant to the rate reforms
described above. Second, they will have
an opportunity to collect ARC revenue
from their customers, subject to the
consumer protection limitations set
forth below. Third, they will have an
opportunity to collect any remaining
Baseline revenue from the CAF.
Together, the second and third sources
comprise the Rate-of-Return Eligible
Recovery.
633. Specifically, Rate-of-Return
Eligible Recovery will be calculated
from the Rate of Return Baseline by
subtracting an amount equal to each
carrier’s opportunity to collect ICC from
the rate elements reformed by this R&O.
PO 00000
Frm 00087
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81647
In each year, this ICC opportunity will
be calculated as actual demand for each
reformed rate element times the default
intercarrier compensation rate for that
element in that year. The intercarrier
glide path adopted above sets default
transitional ICC rates, and permits
carriers to negotiate alternatives. In
computing the opportunity to collect
ICC, the Commission will use the
default rates rather than any actual rate
to prevent carriers from negotiating low
rates simply to prematurely shift
intercarrier compensation revenues to
the CAF. Thus, in the event that a
carrier negotiates intercarrier
compensation rates lower than those
specified, the Commission will still
impute the full default rates, for the
purpose of computing the amount each
carrier has an opportunity to collect
from ICC. To do so, carriers are required
to file data annually to ensure that
carriers do not recover more than they
are entitled under the recovery
mechanism.
634. Carriers will annually estimate
their anticipated MOU for each relevant
intercarrier compensation rate capped
or reduced by this R&O. The
Commission notes that carriers already
use forecasts today in their annual
access filings to determine interstate
switched access charges and the
Commission is requiring carriers to use
similar methodology to forecast
intercarrier compensation for use in
determining Rate-of-Return Eligible
Recovery. Because estimated minutes
likely will differ from actual minutes,
there will be a true-up in two years to
adjust the carrier’s Rate-of-Return
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
ER28DE11.004
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81648
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Eligible Recovery for that year to
account for the difference between
forecast MOU and actual MOU in the
year being trued-up. These data on
MOU will establish the Base Minutes for
each relevant category, and shall not
include MOU for which revenues were
not recovered, for whatever reason.
Carriers may, however, request a waiver
of the rules defining the Baseline to
account for revenues billed for
terminating switched access service or
reciprocal compensation provided in FY
2011 but recovered after the March 31,
2012 cut-off as the result of the decision
of a court or regulatory agency of
competent jurisdiction. The adjusted
Baseline will not include settlements
regarding charges after the March 31,
2012 cut-off, and any carrier requesting
such modification to its Baseline shall,
in addition to otherwise satisfying the
waiver criteria, have the burden of
demonstrating that the revenues are not
already included in its Baseline,
including providing a certification to
the Commission to that effect. Any
request for such a waiver also should
include a copy of the decision requiring
payment of the disputed intercarrier
compensation. Any such waiver would
be subject to the Commission’s
traditional ‘‘good cause’’ waiver
standard, rather than the Total Cost and
Earnings Review specified below. See
47 CFR 1.3. Rate-of-return carriers will
be required to submit to the states the
data used in these calculations, allowing
state regulators to monitor
implementation of the recovery
mechanism. A rate-of-return incumbent
LEC that is eligible to receive CAF shall
also file this information with USAC,
and the Commission delegates to the
Wireline Competition Bureau authority
to work with USAC to develop and
implement processes for administration
of CAF ICC support. In support of the
carriers’ annual access tariff filing, each
carrier will provide the necessary data
used to justify any ARC to the
Commission.
635. Rate-of-Return Eligible Recovery.
A rate-of-return carrier’s baseline for
recovery (‘‘Rate-of-Return Baseline’’) is
its 2011 interstate switched access
revenue requirement, plus its FY 2011
intrastate switched access intercarrier
compensation revenues for rates capped
or reduced by this R&O, plus its FY
2011 net reciprocal compensation
revenues. A rate-of-return carrier’s
Eligible Recovery (‘‘Rate-of-Return
Eligible Recovery’’), in turn, is: (a) Its
Rate-of-Return Baseline reduced by five
percent each year; less (b) its ICC
recovery opportunity for that year,
defined as: (i) Its estimated MOU for
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
each rate element subject to reform
times; (ii) the default transition rate for
that rate element for that year; plus (3)
any necessary true-ups based on the
prior year’s actual MOUs.
Rate of Return Example. A rate-of-return
carrier has a 2011 interstate switched access
revenue requirement of $200,000, FY2011
intrastate switched access revenues of
$50,000, and net reciprocal compensation
revenues of $5,000. Its Eligible Recovery
would be determined as follows:
Year 1. The carrier is entitled to collect
$242,250 ($255,000 × .95). The carrier will
subtract from this total its ICC recovery
opportunity from switched access charges
capped or reduced in this R&O (both
intrastate and interstate) and net reciprocal
compensation, defined as its forecast MOU
times the default rates specified by this R&O.
The remainder is Eligible Recovery.
Year 2. Prior to adjustment for any underor over-estimation of minutes in Year 1, the
carrier is entitled to recover $230,137.50
($242,250 × .95). This figure is adjusted up
or down in the annual true-up to reflect any
difference between forecast minutes in Year
1 and actual minutes in Year 1. For example,
if the carrier had fewer minutes than
estimated in Year 1, such that its ICC
recovery opportunity was $500 less than
forecast, its recovery in Year 2 would be
adjusted upward by $500 and it would be
permitted to recover $230,637.50 in Year 2
($230,137.50 + $500). Conversely, if the
carrier had a higher number of MOU than
had been forecast and provided the carrier an
opportunity for $500 more ICC recovery, its
recovery in Year 2 would be adjusted
downward to $229,637.50 ($230,137.50 ¥
$500). The carrier will then subtract from this
total its Year 2 ICC recovery opportunity,
based on its Year 2 forecast minutes and the
Year 2 default rates specified by this R&O.
The remainder is Eligible Recovery.
This is a simplified example of the
calculation of Rate-of-Return Eligible
Recovery for a rate-of-return carrier’s
reduction in intrastate terminating access
resulting from the reforms the Commission
adopts for illustrative purposes only. It is not
intended to encompass all necessary
calculations applicable in determining Rateof-Return Eligible Recovery in the periods
discussed in the example for all possible
rates addressed by the R&O.
636. This Approach to Recovery for
Interstate Rate-of-Return Carriers
Provides Certainty, Minimizes Burdens
to Consumers, and Constrains the Size
of USF. Exercising flexibility under the
Act to design specific regulatory tools,
the R&O adopts an approach to Rate-ofReturn Eligible Recovery that takes
interstate rate-of-return carriers off of
rate-of-return based recovery
specifically for interstate switched
access revenues, but provides them
more predictable recovery than exists
under the status quo. In addition, to the
extent that any interstate rate-of-return
carriers also are subject to rate-of-return
regulation at the state level, the recovery
PO 00000
Frm 00088
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
mechanism for switched access services
replaces that, as well. The Commission
observes that the recovery mechanism
otherwise leaves unaltered the
preexisting rate regulations for these
carriers’ other services, such as common
line and special access. Nonetheless, the
Commission recognizes that this
approach represents a potentially
significant regulatory change for those
carriers and adopts a longer transition
for these carriers for this reason. In
addition to the benefits of the standard
recovery mechanism discussed below,
the Total Cost and Earnings Review
mechanism the Commission adopts will
ensure that this recovery mechanism
will not deprive any carrier of the
opportunity to earn a reasonable return.
Price cap carriers today already the bear
the risk that costs increase and have no
true up mechanism for declines in
demand. For this reason, the recovery
mechanism the Commission adopts for
rate-of-return carriers is different than
the recovery mechanism the
Commission adopts for price cap
carriers. Although rate-of-return carriers
have a true up process to the Eligible
Recovery for actual demand, this is akin
to how such carriers are regulated today.
The true-up process also protects
carriers resulting from changes with
regard to, for example, reforms related
to various arbitrage schemes. The record
does not allow us to quantify with
precision the impact of these arbitragerelated reforms on rate-of-return
carriers. At the same time, however, the
Commission declines to conduct trueups with regard to rate-of-return
carriers’ switched access costs;
accordingly, carriers will have
incentives to become more efficient and
to reduce switching costs, including by
investing in more efficient technology
and by sharing switches. Carriers that
are more efficient will be able to retain
the benefits of the cost savings. The
Commission believes the rural LEC
forecast with regard to reduced
switched access costs is conservative,
and carriers will have additional
opportunities to recognize efficiencies
with regard to these costs. The
Commission discusses these issues in
greater detail below.
637. As discussed above, incumbent
LECs are experiencing consistent,
substantial, and accelerating declines in
demand for switched access services.
The effect of current interstate rate
regulation is to insulate rate-of-return
carriers from revenue loss due to
competitive pressures that result in
declining lines and MOU, but rapidly
increasing access rates have exacerbated
these carriers’ risk of revenue
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
uncertainty due to arbitrage, and
carriers themselves project declining
costs—and thus declining revenues—
under the status quo. In the intrastate
jurisdiction, as described above, carriers
are often unable to automatically
increase rates as they experience a
decline in demand caused by
competition and changing consumer
usage, leading to declining intrastate
revenues.
638. The Commission’s framework
allows rate-of-return carriers to profit
from reduced switching costs and
increased productivity, ultimately
benefitting consumers. The Commission
notes in this regard that the transition to
broadband networks affords smaller
carriers opportunities for efficiencies
not previously available. For example,
small carriers may be able to realize
efficiencies through measures such as
sharing switches, measures that
preexisting regulations, such as the
thresholds for obtaining LSS support,
may have deterred. Under the new
recovery framework, carriers that realize
these efficiencies will not experience a
resulting reduction in support. In
addition, the new recovery framework—
in conjunction with the overall reforms
adopted in this Order—provides
revenue certainty, stability, and
predictable support, as well as
promoting continued investment,
consistent with advantages some
historically have associated with rate-ofreturn regulation.
639. Importantly, the Commission’s
approach also avoids the risk of
unconstrained escalation in the burden
on end-user customers and universal
service contributors. The Commission
agrees with commenters that, absent
incentives for efficiency, determining
recovery based on the historical
approach to these carriers’ rate
regulation could cause the CAF to grow
significantly and without constraint.
This prediction is consistent with the
Commission’s past recognition that rateof-return regulation can create
incentives for inefficient investment,
which would flow through to the
recovery mechanism. Although some
commenters contend that Commission
accounting regulations and oversight
adequately protect against inefficient
investment, the effectiveness of
Commission accounting regulations and
oversight is limited in certain respects,
as the Commission itself previously has
recognized. More broadly, as
commenters observe, retaining rate-ofreturn regulation as historically
employed by the Commission risks
‘‘perpetuat[ing the] isolated, ILEC-as-an
island operation,’’ thus increasing the
costs subject to recovery to the extent
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
that, for example, each individual
incumbent LEC purchases its own
facilities, rather than sharing
infrastructure with other carriers where
efficient. Of particular relevance here, as
one commenter observes, under the
preexisting regulatory framework ‘‘there
is little evidence of shared investment
in local switching, even though such
sharing would be engaged in by rational
carriers subject to market incentives,’’
while, ‘‘[i]n contrast, there is evidence
of at least some efforts to engage in joint
ventures to invest in transport and
tandem switching assets for which there
are fewer regulatory incentives for rateof-return carriers to invest in their own
equipment and facilities.’’ The
Commission is committed to
constraining the growth of the CAF, and
the recovery mechanism the
Commission adopts for interstate rateof-return carriers advances that goal. To
this end, states that have jurisdiction
over intrastate access rates should
monitor intrastate tariffs filed pursuant
to the rules and reforms adopted in this
Order to ensure carriers do not shift
costs from services subject to incentive
regulation to services still subject to
rate-of-return regulation.
640. The Commission declines to
adopt the recovery mechanism proposed
by associations of rate-of-return carriers.
Although these carriers contend that
their approach would allow intercarrier
compensation reform for rate-of-return
carriers that would limit the burdens
placed on the CAF, the Commission is
not persuaded by a number of the
assumptions that lead them to this
conclusion. The rate-of-return carriers
project that their revenue requirement
for switched access will decline three
percent annually for the next five years.
The Commission’s approach locks in
this historical trend, adjusted to account
for the intrastate status quo. In the
absence of locking in this historical
trend, however, the Commission has
concerns about whether such declines
in the revenue requirement actually will
occur. As commenters observe, because
ICC costs will be shifted primarily to the
CAF to make rate-of-return carriers
whole, carriers would face incentives
for inefficient investment, and such
incentives could be heightened to the
extent that carriers seek to offset the
effects of intercarrier compensation rate
reductions. A more realistic view of the
assumptions underlying the
associations’ projections suggests that
the financial impact on the CAF of the
associations’ proposal is likely far
greater than they project. Consequently,
adopting their proposal appears likely to
lead to one of two results—the CAF
PO 00000
Frm 00089
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81649
would grow significantly, or intercarrier
compensation reform would stop once
CAF demands outstripped the available
budget.
E. Recovering Eligible Recovery
641. The Commission now explains
the two-step mechanism by which
carriers will be allowed to recover their
Eligible Recovery. First, incumbent
LECs will be permitted to recover
Eligible Recovery through limited enduser charges. If these charges are
insufficient, carriers will be entitled to
CAF support equal to the remaining
Eligible Recovery. Carriers electing to
forego recovery from the ARC or the
CAF must indicate their intention to do
so in their 2012 tariff filing. Carriers
may also elect to forgo CAF reform in
any subsequent tariff filing. A carrier
cannot, however, elect to receive CAF
funding after a previous election not to
do so. Notwithstanding a carrier’s
election to forego recovery from the
ARC or the CAF, tariff filings may
require carriers to provide the
information necessary to justify the rates
and terms in the tariff. Because the
Commission views the recovery
mechanism as a transitional tool, the
Commission implements several
measures to ensure it is truly temporary
in nature. First, the Eligible Recovery
that incumbent LECs are permitted to
recover phases down over time, based
on a predetermined glide path for price
cap carriers and a more gradual
framework for rate-of-return carriers.
Second, ICC-replacement CAF support
for price cap carriers is subject to a
defined sunset date. Finally, in the USF/
ICC Transformation FNPRM, the
Commission seeks further comment on
the timing for eliminating the recovery
mechanism—including end-user
recovery— in its entirety. Carriers
recovering eligible recovery will be
required to certify annually that they are
entitled to receive the recovery they are
claiming and that they are complying
with all rules pertaining to such
recovery.
1. End User Recovery
642. The USF/ICC Transformation
NPRM sought comment on the role that
interstate SLCs should play in
intercarrier compensation reform and
the ongoing relevance of the SLC as the
marketplace moves to IP networks. The
subsequent USF/ICC Transformation
Public Notice, 76 FR 154, August 10,
2011, sought further comment on
particular alternatives for using SLCs as
part of any recovery mechanism.
Although the record reveals a wide
variety of proposals, most parties
commenting on the matter supported an
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81650
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
increase in end-user charges as a
necessary part of ICC reform. In
developing the recovery mechanism, the
Commission seeks to balance the
interests of both end-user customers and
USF contributors. The Commission thus
agrees that it is appropriate to first look
to customers paying lower rates for
some limited, reasonable recovery, and
adopt a number of safeguards to ensure
that rates remain affordable and that
consumers are not required to
contribute an inequitable share of lost
intercarrier revenues.
643. In addition to balancing the
needs of ratepayers and USF
contributors, the R&O also accounts for
differences among different ratepayers,
adopting particular protections for
consumers. For example, some
proposals in the record would require
that end-user recovery be borne in the
first instance by consumers. Instead,
acknowledging that all end users benefit
from the network, and consistent with
the Commission’s approach to end-user
recovery in prior intercarrier
compensation reform, the Commission
concludes that all end users should
contribute to reasonable end-user
recovery from the beginning of ICC
reform.
644. The Commission adopts a
transitional ARC that is subject to three
important constraints. First, in no case
will the monthly ARC increase more
than $0.50 per year for a residential or
single-line business customer, or more
than $1.00 (per line) per year for a
multi-line business customer. Price cap
incumbent LECs are allowed to increase
ARCs for no more than five years; rateof-return incumbent LECs for no more
than six years. The Commission believes
that the consumer ARC adopted here,
which, even if fully imposed, represents
a smaller percentage increase than SLC
increases adopted by the Commission in
prior reforms, strikes the proper
balance. Second, in no case will the
consumer ARC increase if that increase
would result in certain residential enduser rates exceeding the Residential
Rate Ceiling, which the Commission
discusses below. Third, ARCs can only
be charged in a particular year to
recover an incumbent LEC’s Eligible
Recovery for that year; total revenue
from ARCs cannot exceed Eligible
Recovery. Thus if a carrier’s Eligible
Recovery decreases from one year to the
next, the total amount of ARCs it may
charge its end users will also decrease.
Importantly, carriers also are not
required to charge the ARC.
645. To minimize the consumer
burden, the R&O limits increases in the
monthly consumer ARC to $0.50 per
year. The Commission also makes clear
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
that carriers may not charge any Lifeline
customers an ARC. As a result,
incumbent LECs’ calculation of ARCs
for purposes of the recovery mechanism
must identify and exclude such
customers. Given that the intercarrier
compensation reforms also do not alter
the operation of the existing SLC, these
intercarrier compensation reforms will
not affect the Lifeline universal service
support mechanism. Furthermore, while
some commenters advocate end-user
charges only for residential and singleline business customers, the
Commission rejects requests to place the
entire recovery burden on consumers.
The R&O provides for increases in the
monthly ARC for multi-line business
customers of $1.00 (per line) per year,
and the Commission will require
potential revenue from such increases to
be imputed to carriers, reducing the
total amount of consumer ARCs they
may charge. Doing so is consistent with
the Commission’s prior intercarrier
compensation reforms, which
recognized that ‘‘universal service
concerns are not as great for multi-line
business lines.’’ Consequently, in
previous reforms, the Commission has
adopted higher increases in end-user
charges for multi-line business
customers than for consumers, and on a
more accelerated timeline. For example,
in the Access Charge Reform Order, 62
FR 31868, June 11, 1997, the
Commission did not raise the SLC cap
for primary residential and single-line
business users, but concluded that
universal service concerns were not as
great for multi-line business users, for
example, and raised the SLC caps for
such users from $6.00 to $9.00 per line.
In the 2008 ICC/USF Order and NPRM,
73 FR 66821, November 12, 2008, the
Commission proposed increasing the
residential and single-line business and
the non-primary residential line SLC by
$1.50 and the multi-line business SLC
by $2.30. In the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM the Commission
sought comment on those amounts
again. Commenters supported this
increase. In fact, some commenters
advocated for a higher SLC increase.
The ARC adopted today, which is lower
on an annual basis than the annual SLC
increase proposed in 2008, balances the
burdens on consumers and businesses.
However, the Commission has taken
measures to ensure that charges for
multi-line businesses remain just and
reasonable. In particular, to ensure that
multi-line businesses’ total SLC plus
ARC line items are just and reasonable
and to minimize the burden on
businesses, the R&O limits the
maximum SLC plus ARC fee to $12.20.
PO 00000
Frm 00090
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
This limits the ARC for multi-line
businesses for entities at the current
$9.20 cap to $3.00, comparable to the
overall limit on residential ARCs.
646. The R&O permits carriers to
determine at the holding company level
how Eligible Recovery will be allocated
among their incumbent LECs’ ARCs. By
providing this flexibility, carriers will
be able to spread the recovery of Eligible
Recovery among a broader set of
customers, minimizing the increase
experienced by any one customer. This
also will enable carriers to more fully
recover Eligible Recovery from endusers with rates below the $30
Residential Rate Ceiling, limiting the
potential impact on the CAF. For
carriers that elect to receive CAF
support, the Commission will impute to
each carrier the full ARC revenues they
are permitted to collect, regardless of
whether they actually collect any or all
such revenues. If the imputed amount is
insufficient to cover all their Eligible
Recovery, they are permitted to recover
the remainder from CAF ICC support.
647. In the event a carrier elects not
to receive CAF ICC support, the
Commission takes measures to limit the
burden on residential and single-line
business customers. The decision to
elect not to receive ICC replacement
CAF support, discussed below, is
distinct from the decision to assess the
full authorized ARC. Absent doing so,
carriers potentially could use their
holding company-level flexibility to
target their ARC recovery primarily or
exclusively to residential and single-line
business customers, rather than larger
multi-line business customers. The
Commission therefore requires that a
carrier allocate its Eligible Recovery by
a proportion of a carrier’s mix of
residential versus business lines.
However, because line counts alone
would not reflect the fact that there is
a lower cap on ARC increases for
residential and single-line business
lines ($0.50 per line) than for multi-line
business lines ($1.00 per line), the
Commission adopts a double-weighting
of multi-line business lines for purposes
of this calculation. The percentage of
ARC revenues a carrier is eligible to
recover from residential and single-line
business customers cannot exceed the
percentage of total residential lines
assessed a SLC by such customers
where multi-line business lines are
given double weight. In addition, this
calculation will exclude lines for
Lifeline customers because the
Commission prevents carriers from
assessing an ARC on any Lifeline
customer. For example, if a carrier had
1000 residential and single-line
business lines and 200 multi-line
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
business lines, and Eligible Recovery of
$600 monthly, under the limitation, it
would be permitted to collect no more
than 71.43 percent of that amount—
approximately $429—from residential
and single-line business customers
based on the calculation: 1000
residential and single line business
lines/(1000 residential and single-line
business lines + 2 × 200 multi-line
business lines) = 71.43 percent.
648. The Commission declines to
implement end user recovery through
increases to the pre-existing SLC, as
some commenters suggest. SLCs today
are designed to recover common line
revenues as defined by Commission
regulation. The Commission is not
formally recategorizing any costs or
revenues to be included in that
regulatory category, and the calculation
of Eligible Recovery for purposes of the
reforms the Commission adopts is
completely independent of SLC rate
calculations. As a result, the
Commission leaves current SLCs
unmodified for now. Carriers whose
current SLCs are below the caps are not
otherwise permitted to increase their
SLCs to recover revenues reduced by
interstate and intrastate access charge
reforms, i.e., the Commission is not
permitting carriers to raise their SLCs
beyond the level they are currently
authorized to charge, even if that level
is below the relevant regulatory SLC
cap. The Commission seeks comment in
the accompanying USF/ICC
Transformation FNPRM regarding
whether existing regulation of SLCs is
appropriate, including whether SLCs
should be reduced or phased-out over
time. Instead, the new ARC will be
separately calculated, reduced over
time, and separately tariffed and
reported to the Commission to enable
monitoring to ensure carriers are not
assessing ARCs in excess of their
Eligible Recovery. The ARC can,
however, be combined in a single line
item with the SLC on the customer’s
bill. Moreover, the Commission finds
that it is appropriate to reevaluate its
SLC rules, and does so in the USF/ICC
Transformation FNPRM.
649. Residential Rate Ceiling. In the
USF/ICC Transformation Public Notice,
the Commission sought comment on the
appropriate level and operation of a
ceiling to limit rate increases in states
that already had undertaken some
intercarrier compensation reforms. To
ensure that consumer telephone rates
remain affordable and to recognize
states that have already undertaken
reform, the Commission adopts a
Residential Rate Ceiling of $30 per
month for all incumbent LECs, both
price cap and rate-of-return. Although
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
the Residential Rate Ceiling does not
generally limit rates carriers can charge,
it prevents carriers from charging an
ARC on residential consumers already
paying $30 or more.
650. For purposes of comparison with
the Residential Rate Ceiling, the
Commission considers the rate for basic
local service, including additional
charges that a consumer actually pays
each month in conjunction with that
service (referred to collectively as rate
ceiling component charges). The rate
ceiling component charges consist of the
federal SLC and the ARC; the flat rate
for residential local service, mandatory
extended area service charges, and state
subscriber line charges; per-line state
high cost and/or access replacement
universal service contributions; state
E911 charges; and state TRS charges.
Carriers are not permitted to charge
ARCs to the extent that ARCs would
result in rate ceiling component charges
exceeding the Residential Rate Ceiling
for any residential customer. For
example, a consumer in Parsons, Kansas
may have a rate of $13.90, a SLC of
$6.40, a mandatory contribution to the
Kansas Universal Service Fund of $6.75,
a mandatory EAS charge of $1.70, and
a TRS charge of $1.00—his or her
aggregate rate ceiling component
charges before the ARC would be
$29.75. Accordingly, a carrier could
only charge this consumer an ARC of
$0.25 before reaching the $30
Residential Rate Ceiling. (The carrier
could still charge multi-line business
customers a $1.00 per line ARC,
provided that any multi-line business
customer’s total SLC plus ARC does not
exceed $12.20). Consistent with the goal
of the Residential Rate Ceiling, because
non-primary residential SLC lines are
charged to residential customers the
Commission limits carriers’ ARC for
non-primary residential SLC lines to an
amount equal to the ARC charged for
such consumers’ primary residential
lines. Thus, to the extent that the
Residential Rate Ceiling limits the ARC
that can be assessed on residential
customers’ primary lines, it effectively
will limit the ARC that can be charged
on their non-primary lines, as well.
After the ARC, any additional Eligible
Recovery would have to be recovered
from the CAF rather than from endusers.
651. The Residential Rate Ceiling
particularly helps protect consumers in
states that have already begun state
intercarrier compensation reform. As
part of such reform, some states are
rebalancing rates, with local rate
increases phasing in over time,
including potentially after January 1,
2012. These local rate increases will be
PO 00000
Frm 00091
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81651
included in the calculation of end-users
rates for comparison to the Residential
Rate Ceiling . Further, as part of its
universal service reforms, the
Commission is adopting an intrastate
rate minimum benchmark designed to
avoid over-subsidizing carriers whose
intrastate rates are not minimally
reasonable. To ensure that states are not
disincented from rebalancing artificially
low local retail rates after January 1,
2012, and to ensure that the Residential
Rate Ceiling continues to protect
consumers in those states, the
Commission will use the higher of the
relevant rates in effect on January 1,
2012 or of January 1 in the year in
which the ARC is to be charged for
comparison to the Residential Rate
Ceiling, thus accounting for possible
increases in consumer rates over time.
652. The Commission finds the $30
Residential Rate Ceiling will help
ensure that consumer rates remain
affordable and set at reasonable levels
by preventing any ARC increases to
consumers who already pay $30 or
more. The Commission notes that it also
adopts a ‘‘local rate benchmark’’ as part
of universal service reform of HCLS and
HCMS. The CAF benchmark serves a
different purpose and has a different
function from the Residential Rate
Ceiling. The CAF benchmark is focused
on ensuring that universal service does
not overly subsidize carriers with
artificially low local rates. As a result,
it focuses more narrowly on the specific
rates of concern, especially flat-rated
local service charges, state SLCs, and
state USF contributions and sets a lower
bound to encourage carriers to charge
reasonably comparable local rates.
HCLS and HCMS are federal universal
service mechanisms that pick up
intrastate loop costs, and the
Commission will not use limited
universal service funding to subsidize
artificially low rates. The CAF
benchmark therefore serves as a floor.
Although some commenters propose
using a $25 (or lower) rate, the
Commission notes that several states
that have rebalanced rates already have
rates above $30, suggesting that this rate
is affordable and set at reasonable
levels. To the extent that prior surveys
of urban rates yielded an average of
approximately $25, the Commission
observes that the surveys encompassed
a more limited set of charges than the
Residential Rate Ceiling. As
demonstrated by the rates in a number
of states that have undertaken
significant intercarrier compensation
reform—which the Commission finds to
be a more relevant data set in this
context than average urban rates—rates
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81652
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
including the full ranges of charges can
be close to or more than $30. The
Commission also declines to adopt
separate rate ceilings for different
carriers, and instead agree with
commenters that it would ‘‘be
inappropriate—and inconsistent with
Section 254—for the Commission to
adopt different benchmarks for different
geographic areas or providers.’’ Such an
approach would mandate rate
disparities between geographic areas,
contrary to the Commission’s goal of
promoting reasonably comparable rates
throughout the country. The
Commission thus concludes that the $30
Residential Rate Ceiling strikes the right
balance between ensuring that
consumers pay their fair share of
recovery and protecting consumers in
states that already have undertaken
substantial reforms.
2. CAF Recovery
653. The Commission has recognized
that, as the Commission moves away
from implicit support, some high cost,
rural areas may need new explicit
support from the universal service fund.
Consequently, in the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM, the Commission
sought comment on the appropriate role
of universal service support to offset
some intercarrier revenues lost through
reform. The Commission agrees with the
many commenters advocating that
transitional recovery should, in part,
come through the CAF. In particular, the
limits on ARCs and the Residential Rate
Ceiling place important constraints on
end user recovery. Consequently, the
Commission anticipates that end user
recovery alone will not provide the full
recovery permitted by the mechanism
for many incumbent LECs, particularly
rate-of-return carriers. Given the
Commission’s desire to ensure a
measured, predictable transition, the
Commission thus finds it appropriate to
supplement end user recovery with
transitional ICC-replacement CAF
support.
654. To that end, as part of the new
CAF universal service mechanism, the
Commission permits incumbent LECs to
recover Eligible Recovery that they do
not have the opportunity to recover
through permitted ARCs. The ICCreplacement CAF support for carriers
that are eligible and elect to receive it
is the remainder of Eligible Recovery
not recovered through ARCs. As a
result, those same data will enable
USAC to calculate CAF support as well.
Thus, the Commission directs carriers to
file those same data with USAC for
purposes of CAF distribution under the
recovery mechanism. The Commission
notes that although incumbent LECs
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
will experience intercarrier
compensation reductions on a study
area-by-study area basis, they have
flexibility at the holding company level
to determine where and how to charge
ARCs. Thus, USAC needs an approach
to attributing those revenues to
particular study areas to determine the
amount of CAF funding to provide to
each such area. In this regard, the
Commission notes that one benefit of its
universal service reform is the greater
accountability associated with the CAF
support mechanism. Given that, the
Commission directs USAC to attribute
ARC revenue to all of the holding
company’s study areas in proportion to
the Eligible Recovery associated with
that study area. This will ensure that
some study areas are not insulated from
the CAF accountability measures by
having sufficient ARC revenue
attributed to meet their entire Eligible
Recovery need. The same oversight and
accountability obligations the
Commission adopts above apply to CAF
support received as part of the recovery
mechanism. In addition, all rate-ofreturn CAF ICC recipients, whether a
current recipient of high cost universal
service support or not, must satisfy the
same public interest obligations as
carriers receiving high-cost universal
service support. All price cap CAF ICC
recipients must use such support for
building and operating broadbandcapable networks used to offer their
own retail broadband service in areas
substantially unserved by an
unsubsidized competitor of fixed voice
and broadband services. The
Commission believes it is appropriate to
adopt slightly different obligations for
receipt of CAF ICC support for price cap
and rate-of-return carriers. For one, the
price cap CAF support is transitional,
and phasing out completely over time as
the Commission has adopted a longterm phase II CAF support for areas
served by price cap carriers. Thus, the
Commission has a mechanism to
advance its goal of universal voice and
broadband to areas served by price cap
carriers that are unserved today. For
rate-of-return carriers, however, the
Commission has not adopted a different
long-term approach for receipt of
universal service support. Therefore, the
Commission believes it is appropriate to
impose the same obligations that such
carriers have for receipt of all universal
service support that the Commission
adopts above, which requires carriers to
extend broadband upon reasonable
request. Finally, the Commission allows
a carrier to elect not to receive ICC
replacement CAF support (and therefore
to avoid the obligations that accompany
PO 00000
Frm 00092
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
support) even if it would otherwise be
entitled to do so under the Eligible
Recovery calculation. The election to
decline CAF support will be made in
the carrier’s July 1, 2012 tariff filing. A
carrier that elects not to receive CAF
cannot subsequently change this
election. A carrier can, however,
initially elect to receive CAF support
but elect to end that support at any time.
Moreover, like forgone ARC recovery,
forgone CAF will be imputed to a carrier
seeking any additional recovery under
the Total Cost and Earnings Review,
discussed below.
655. Providing CAF recovery is
consistent with the Commission’s
mandate under 47 U.S.C. 254 and the
Commission’s use of universal service
funding as a component of prior
intercarrier compensation reforms. In
light of the broadband obligations the
Commission adopts, the decision to
establish this funding mechanism is also
consistent with the Commission’s
general authority under section 4(i) of
the Act, 47 U.S.C. 154(i), and section
706 of the 1996 Act, 47 U.S.C. 1302,
because it furthers the Commission’s
universal service objectives and
promotes the deployment of advanced
services.
656. For price cap carriers that elect
to receive ICC-replacement CAF
support, such support is transitional
and phases out in three years, beginning
in 2017. Although the Commission does
not adopt a similar sunset for rate-ofreturn carriers’ ICC-replacement CAF
support in this Order, the Commission
seeks comment on alternatives in this
regard in the ICC/USF Transformation
FNPRM.
3. Monitoring Compliance With
Recovery Mechanism
657. To monitor compliance with this
R&O, the Commission requires all
incumbent LECs that participate in the
recovery mechanism, including by
charging any end user an ARC, to file
data on an annual basis regarding their
ICC rates, revenues, expenses, and
demand for the preceding fiscal year.
The Commission also encourages, but
does not require, all competitive LECs
and CMRS providers to similarly file
such data. All such information may be
filed under protective order and will be
treated as confidential.
658. These data are necessary to
monitor compliance with the provisions
of this R&O and accompanying rules,
including to ensure that carriers are not
charging ARCs that exceed their Eligible
Recovery and that ARCs are reduced as
Eligible Recovery decreases. The data
are also needed to monitor the impact
of the reforms the Commission adopts
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
and to enable the Commission to resolve
the issues teed up in the USF/ICC
Transformation FNPRM regarding the
appropriate transition to bill-and-keep
and, if necessary, the appropriate
recovery mechanism for rate elements
not reduced in this R&O, including
originating access and many transport
rates. Such data will enable the
Commission to determine the impact
that any transition would have on a
particular carrier or group of carriers,
and to evaluate the trend of ICC
revenues, expenses, and minutes and
compare such data uniformly across all
carriers.
659. To minimize any burden, filings
will be aggregated at the holding
company level, limited to the preceding
fiscal year, and will include data
carriers must monitor to comply with
the recovery mechanism rules. For
carriers eligible and electing to receive
CAF ICC support, the Commission will
ensure that the data filed with USAC are
consistent with the Commission’s
request, so that carriers can use the
same format for both filings. To ensure
consistency and further minimize any
burden on carriers, the Commission
delegates to the Wireline Competition
Bureau the authority to adopt a template
for submitting the data, which should be
done in conjunction with the
development of data necessary to be
filed with USAC for receipt of CAF ICC
support, which has also been delegated
to the Wireline Competition Bureau.
Given that carriers must be monitoring
these data to comply with the revised
tariff rules, the Commission requires
incumbent LECs to file electronically
annually at the same time as their
annual interstate access tariff filings.
F. Requests for Additional Support
660. Although the Commission
provides an opportunity for revenue
recovery to promote an orderly
transition away from terminating access
charges, the Commission declines to
adopt a revenue-neutral approach as
advocated by some commenters. Rather,
the Commission agrees with
commenters who maintain that the
Commission has no legal obligation to
ensure that carriers recover access
revenues lost as a result of reform,
absent a showing of a taking. The
Commission establishes a rebuttable
presumption that the reforms adopted in
the R&O, including the recovery of
Eligible Recovery from the ARC and
CAF, allow incumbent LECs to earn a
reasonable return on their investment.
The Commission establishes a ‘‘Total
Cost and Earnings Review,’’ through
which a carrier may petition the
Commission to rebut this presumption
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
and request additional support. The
Commission believes the Total Cost and
Earnings Review procedure alone is
sufficient to meet its legal obligations
with regard to recovery. The
Commission identifies below certain
factors in addition to switched access
costs and revenues that may affect the
analysis of requests for additional
support, including: (1) Other revenues
derived from regulated services
provided over the local network, such as
special access; (2) productivity gains; (3)
incumbent LEC ICC expense reductions
and other cost savings, and (4) other
services provided over the local
network. Particularly given these
factors, it is the Commission’s
predictive judgment that the limited
recovery permitted will be more than
sufficient to provide carriers reasonable
recovery for regulated services, both as
a matter of the constitutional obligations
underlying the Commission’s rate
regulation and as a policy matter of
providing a measured transition away
from incumbent LECs’ historical
reliance on intercarrier compensation
revenues to recovery that better reflects
today’s marketplace. Nonetheless, the
Commission also adopts a Total Cost
and Earnings Review to allow
individual carriers to demonstrate that
this rebuttable presumption is incorrect
and that additional recovery is needed
to prevent a taking.
661. To show that the standard
recovery mechanism is legally
insufficient, a carrier would face a
‘‘heavy burden,’’ and need to
demonstrate that the regime ‘‘threatens
[the carrier’s] financial integrity or
otherwise impedes [its] ability to attract
capital.’’ As the Supreme Court has long
recognized, when a regulated entity’s
rates ‘‘enable the company to operate
successfully, to maintain its financial
integrity, to attract capital, and to
compensate its investors for the risks
assumed,’’ the company has no valid
claim to compensation under the
Takings Clause, even if the current
scheme of regulated rates yields ‘‘only a
meager return’’ compared to alternative
rate-setting approaches. For the reasons
described above, the Commission
believes that its recovery mechanisms
provide recovery well beyond any
constitutionally-required minimum, and
the Commission finds no convincing
evidence in the record here that the
standard recovery mechanism will yield
confiscatory results.
662. Specifically, a carrier can
petition for a Total Cost and Earnings
Review to request additional CAF ICC
support and/or waiver of CAF ICC
support broadband obligations. In
analyzing such petitions, the
PO 00000
Frm 00093
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81653
Commission will consider the totality of
the circumstances, to the extent
permitted by law. The Commission’s
analysis will consider all factors
affecting a carrier and its ability to earn
a return on its relevant investment,
including the factors described below.
As a result of this analysis of costs and
revenues, the Commission will be able
to determine the constitutionally
required return and will not be bound
by any return historically used in ratesetting nor any specific return resulting
from the intercarrier compensation
recovery mechanism adopted in this
R&O, or possible rate represcription as
discussed in the USF/ICC
Transformation FNPRM. Given the
extensive discussion of reform
proposals over the years, a carrier could
not reasonably ‘‘rely indefinitely’’ on
the existing system of intercarrier
compensation, ‘‘but would simply have
to rely on the constitutional bar against
confiscatory rates’’ in the event the
Commission revised its compensation
rules. Verizon Communications Inc. v.
FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 528 (2002).
663. As the Commission seeks to
protect consumers from undue rate
increases or increases in contributions
to USF, the Commission will conduct
the most comprehensive review of any
requests for additional support allowed
by law. The recovery mechanism goes
beyond what might strictly be required
by the constitutional takings principles
underlying historical Commission
regulations. Therefore, although the
standard recovery mechanism does not
seek to precisely quantify and address
all considerations relevant to resolution
of a takings claim, carriers will need to
address these considerations to the
extent that they seek to avail themselves
of the Total Cost and Earnings Review
procedure based on a claim that
recovery is legally insufficient.
664. Revenues Derived from Other
Regulated Services Provided Over the
Local Network. The Commission agrees
with those who argue that it is
appropriate for the Commission to
consider the implications of services
other than switched access that are
provided using supported facilities, to
the extent constitutionally permitted.
Notwithstanding intercarrier
compensation reform, carriers will
continue to receive revenues from other
uses of the local network. For example,
although the reforms adopted in this
R&O will bring many intercarrier
compensation rates into a bill-and-keep
framework, other intercarrier
compensation rates will be subject to
minimal—or no—reforms at this time.
Consequently, incumbent LECs will
continue to collect intercarrier
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81654
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
compensation for originating access and
dedicated transport, providing
continued revenue flows—including the
underlying implicit subsidies—from
those sources during the transition
outlined in this R&O, although the
Commission has determined that such
rates ultimately will reach bill-and-keep
as well. Carriers acknowledge that the
subsidies in these remaining intercarrier
compensation rates are used for
investment in their network to provide
regulated services such as special access
service. In addition, there was debate in
the record regarding whether, and how,
to consider special access revenues in
this regard. At this time the Commission
does not prescribe general rules
considering such revenue, but, as with
other services that rely on the local
network, the Commission will consider
such earnings and may reconsider this
decision if warranted upon conclusion
of the Commission’s ongoing special
access proceeding.
665. Productivity Gains. As discussed
above, although incentive regulation
commonly involves sharing the benefits
of productivity gains between carriers
and ratepayers, such a mechanism has
not been in place for many years. The
standard recovery mechanism adopts a
10 percent reduction in CALLS price
cap incumbent LECs’ baseline revenues,
initially for CALLS price cap study
areas, and after five years for nonCALLS price cap study areas to reflect
this. However, because the Commission
believe that is a conservative approach,
the Commission finds it appropriate to
consider efficiency gains for particular
price cap carriers on an individual basis
in the Total Cost and Earnings Review,
as well.
666. LEC Cost Savings and Increased
Revenue. Currently, carriers are
frequently embroiled in costly litigation
over payment, jurisdiction, and type of
traffic. The reforms the Commission
adopts in this R&O should substantially
reduce such disputes, and the
Commission anticipates that
comprehensive intercarrier
compensation reform will further
reduce carriers’ costs of administering
intercarrier compensation. Likewise, the
Commission’s actions regarding
phantom traffic and intercarrier
compensation for VoIP traffic may
increase the proportion of traffic for
which intercarrier compensation can be
collected. Finally, the Commission
notes that the reforms should result in
expense savings in other lines of
business, such as the provision of long
distance services. Although the
Commission does not adopt a ‘‘net
revenues’’ approach as part of the
standard recovery mechanism, in
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
appropriate circumstances the
Commission believes an analysis of
intercarrier expenses could be
warranted in the examination of an
individual carrier’s claim under the
more fact- and carrier-specific Total
Costs and Earnings Review mechanism.
The Commission will consider these
factors to the extent legally permissible,
including but not limited to the
following categories:
• Revenue for Exchanging VoIP
Traffic. A number of carriers have
alleged that they are not receiving
compensation for exchanging VoIP
traffic. In this R&O the Commission
adopts rules clarifying the obligation of
VoIP traffic to pay intercarrier
compensation charges during the
transition to bill and keep. The
decisions the Commission adopts will
provide LECs, including incumbent
LECs, with more certain revenue
throughout the transition, and will also
allow them to avoid the litigation
expense associated with attempts to
collect access charges for VoIP traffic.
• Reduced Phantom Traffic.
Similarly, the rules adopted in this R&O
will enable carriers to identify and bill
for phantom traffic. These rules thus
should enable carriers to collect
intercarrier compensation charges
throughout the transition that they are
not currently able to collect. The
Commission also anticipates that
incumbent LECs will be able to reduce
administrative and litigation costs
associated with such traffic.
• Other Reduced Litigation Costs and
Administrative Expenses. In addition to
reduced litigation costs and
administrative expense associated with
VoIP and phantom traffic as a result of
the reforms the Commission adopts in
this R&O, the record indicates that
carriers will benefit more generally from
the clarity and relative simplicity of the
rules the Commission adopts. The
Commission anticipates that this will be
reflected in additional savings in
litigation and administration costs.
• Other Services Provided Over the
Local Network. In addition to regulated
services provided over the local
network, many carriers also provide
unregulated services, such as broadband
and video. Although parties have
identified some uncertainty regarding
the Commission’s ability to consider
revenues from such services in
calculating a carrier’s return on
investment in the local network, the
Commission will, at a minimum,
carefully scrutinize the allocation of
costs associated with such services. As
one commenter states, ‘‘[i]t simply no
longer makes any sense (if it ever did)
for the agency to allow rural carriers to
PO 00000
Frm 00094
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
spend as much as they can on their
networks, earning a rate of return on
these historical costs while only
considering the small sliver of regulated
local telephony revenues earned using
these USF subsidized networks.’’
667. The Commission notes that some
carriers argued that the Commission
should not rely on revenue from
unregulated services to offset a carrier’s
defined eligible revenue, but that if it
did, it should only use net unregulated
revenue, considering both the costs and
revenues from those services. In
addition, although there are a range of
possible approaches for allocating many
types of costs, a number of commenters
recognized that historical accounting
underlying intercarrier compensation
rates and other charges fail to reflect the
marketplace reality of the number and
types of services provided over the local
network. For example, the record
revealed concerns about the extent to
which loop costs have been allocated to
regulated services such as voice
telephone service versus services such
as broadband Internet access service.
Consequently, the Commission will give
appropriate consideration to these
services as part of the Total Cost and
Earnings Review, including an analysis
of both the revenue generated by such
other services and whether the cost of
such services, both regulated and
unregulated, have been properly
allocated.
668. Cost Allocation. The USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM sought comment
on the implications of the jurisdictional
separations process, including ongoing
reform efforts, on intercarrier
compensation reforms. The
jurisdictional separations process,
which has been frozen for some time, is
currently the subject of a referral to the
Separations Joint Board. Any carrier
seeking additional recovery will be
required to conduct a separations study
to demonstrate the current use of its
facilities. Although this is a burdensome
requirement, it is not unduly so given
the importance of protecting consumers
and the universal service fund.
XI. Intercarrier Compensation for VOIP
Traffic
669. Under the new intercarrier
compensation regime, all traffic—
including VoIP-PSTN traffic—ultimately
will be subject to a bill-and-keep
framework. As part of the transition to
that end point, the Commission adopts
a prospective intercarrier compensation
framework for VoIP traffic. In particular,
the Commission addresses the
prospective treatment of VoIP-PSTN
traffic by adopting a transitional
compensation framework for such traffic
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
proposed by commenters in the record.
Although the Commission adopts an
approach similar to that proposed by
some commenters, the approach to
adopting and implementing this
framework differs in certain respects.
For one, the Commission is not
persuaded on this record that all VoIPPSTN traffic must be subject exclusively
to federal regulation, and as a result, to
adopt this prospective regime the
Commission relies on its general
authority to specify a transition to billand-keep for 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5) traffic.
As a result, tariffing of charges for toll
VoIP-PSTN traffic can occur through
both federal and state tariffs. In
addition, given the recognized concerns
with the use of telephone numbers and
other call detail information to establish
the geographic end-points of a call, the
Commission declines to mandate their
use in that regard. The Commission
does, however, recognize concerns
regarding providers’ ability to
distinguish VoIP-PSTN traffic from
other traffic, and, consistent with the
recommendations of a number of
commenters, permits LECs to address
this issue through their tariffs, much as
they do with jurisdictional issues today.
670. The Commission believes that
this prospective framework best
balances the competing policy goals
during the transition to the final
intercarrier compensation regime. By
declining to apply the entire preexisting
intercarrier compensation regime to
VoIP-PSTN traffic prospectively, the
Commission recognizes the
shortcomings of that regime. At the
same time, the Commission is mindful
of the need for a measured transition for
carriers that receive substantial
revenues from intercarrier
compensation. Although the
Commission’s action clarifying the
prospective intercarrier compensation
treatment of VoIP-PSTN traffic does not
resolve the numerous existing industry
disputes, it should minimize future
uncertainty and disputes regarding VoIP
compensation, and thereby
meaningfully reduce carriers’ future
costs.
A. Widespread Uncertainty and
Disagreement Regarding Intercarrier
Compensation for VoIP Traffic
671. Against this backdrop, and the
fact that the current uncertainty and
associated disputes are likely deterring
innovation and introduction of new IP
services to consumers, the Commission
finds it appropriate to address the
prospective intercarrier compensation
obligations associated with VoIP-PSTN
traffic. Indeed, despite the varied
opinions in the record regarding the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
appropriate approach to VoIP-PSTN
intercarrier compensation, there is
widespread agreement that the
Commission needed to act to address
that issue now.
B. Prospective Intercarrier
Compensation Obligations for VoIPPSTN Traffic
1. Scope of VoIP-PSTN Traffic
672. The prospective intercarrier
compensation regime the Commission
adopts for a LEC’s exchange of VoIP
traffic with another carrier focuses on
what the Commission refers to as ‘‘VoIPPSTN’’ traffic. The Commission uses the
term ‘‘VoIP-PSTN’’ as shorthand. The
Commission recognizes that carriers
have been converting portions of their
networks to IP technology for years.
Nonetheless, many carriers today
continue to rely extensively on circuitswitched technology particularly for the
exchange of traffic subject to intercarrier
compensation rules. Likewise the
definition of ‘‘interconnected VoIP’’
uses the term ‘‘PSTN’’ as distinct from
at least certain types of VoIP services.
Thus, in the context of VoIP-PSTN
intercarrier compensation rules, the
reference to ‘‘PSTN’’ refers to the
exchange of traffic between carriers in
(Time Division Multiplexing) TDM
format. For purposes of this R&O, the
Commission adopts the definition of
traffic proposed in the Joint Letter:
‘‘VoIP-PSTN traffic’’ is ‘‘traffic
exchanged over PSTN facilities that
originates and/or terminates in IP
format.’’ Although the Commission’s
prospective VoIP-PSTN intercarrier
compensation is not circumscribed by
the definition of ‘‘interconnected VoIP
service’’ in section 3(25) of the Act, 47
U.S.C. 153(25) (referencing section 9.3
of the Commission’s rules) or the
definition of ‘‘non-interconnected VoIP
service’’ in section 3(36) of the Act, 47
U.S.C. 153(36), nonetheless, informed
by those definitions, the Commission
believes it is appropriate to focus on
traffic for services that require ‘‘Internet
protocol-compatible customer premises
equipment.’’ Sections 3(25) and 3(36) of
the Act, 47 U.S.C.153(25), (26), were
adopted in section 101 of the TwentyFirst Century Communications and
Video Accessibility Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111–260, section 103(b), 124 Stat.
2751 (2010). In this regard, the
Commission focuses specifically on
whether the exchange of traffic between
a LEC and another carrier occurs in
Time-Division Multiplexing (TDM)
format (and not in IP format), without
specifying the technology used to
perform the functions subject to the
PO 00000
Frm 00095
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81655
associated intercarrier compensation
charges.
673. Although the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM proposed
focusing specifically on interconnected
VoIP services, the Commission notes
that its existing definition of
interconnected VoIP would exclude
traffic associated with some VoIP
services that are originated or
terminated on the PSTN, such as ‘‘oneway’’ services that allow end-users
either to place calls to, or receive calls
from, the PSTN, but not both. Although
these one-way services do not meet the
definition of interconnected VoIP,
carriers are likely to be providing
origination or termination functions
with respect to this traffic comparable to
that of ‘‘two-way’’ traffic that meets the
existing definition of interconnected
VoIP. Moreover, intercarrier
compensation disputes have
encompassed all forms of what the
Commission defines as VoIP-PSTN
traffic, and addressing this traffic more
comprehensively helps guard against
new forms of arbitrage. Various
commenters recommended including
such traffic within the scope of the
intercarrier compensation framework for
VoIP or otherwise expressed support for
the approach taken in the ABC Plan and
Joint Letter. Based on the foregoing
considerations, the Commission is
persuaded to adopt that approach.
674. The Commission agrees with
concerns raised by NCTA and find it
appropriate to adopt a symmetrical
framework for VoIP-PSTN traffic, under
which providers that benefit from lower
VoIP-PSTN rates when their end-user
customers’ traffic is terminated to other
providers’ end-user customers also are
restricted to charging the lower VoIPPSTN rates when other providers’ traffic
is terminated to their end-user
customers. The Commission thus
declines to adopt an asymmetric
approach that would apply VoIPspecific rates for only IP-originated or
only IP-terminated traffic, as some
commenters propose. The Commission
has recognized concerns about
asymmetric payment associated with
VoIP traffic today, including
marketplace distortions that give one
category of providers an artificial
regulatory advantage in costs and
revenues relative to other market
participants. An approach that
addressed only IP-originated traffic
would perpetuate—and expand—such
concerns. Commenters advocating a
focus solely on IP-originated traffic
implicitly recognize as much, noting
that providers with IP networks could
benefit relative to providers with TDM
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81656
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
networks under such an intercarrier
compensation regime.
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
2. Intercarrier Compensation Charges for
VoIP-PSTN Traffic
675. The Commission adopts a
prospective intercarrier compensation
framework that brings all VoIP-PSTN
traffic within the 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5)
framework. As discussed below, the
Commission has authority to bring all
traffic within the 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5)
framework for purposes of intercarrier
compensation, including traffic that
otherwise could be encompassed by the
interstate and intrastate access charge
regimes, and the Commission exercises
that authority now for all VoIP-PSTN
traffic.
676. The Commission adopts
transitional rules specifying,
prospectively, the default compensation
for VoIP-PSTN traffic: Default charges
for ‘‘toll’’ VoIP-PSTN traffic will be
equal to interstate access rates
applicable to non-VoIP traffic, both in
terms of the rate level and rate structure;
default charges for other VoIP-PSTN
traffic will be the otherwise-applicable
reciprocal compensation rates; and LECs
are permitted to tariff these default
charges for toll VoIP-PSTN traffic in
relevant federal and state tariffs in the
absence of an agreement for different
intercarrier compensation.
677. The intercarrier compensation
framework for VoIP-PSTN traffic will
apply prospectively, during the
transition between existing intercarrier
compensation rules and the new
regulatory regime adopted in this R&O,
and is subject to the reductions in
intercarrier compensation rates required
as part of that transition. The
Commission does not address
preexisting law, including whether or
how the ESP exemption might have
applied previously, and the Commission
makes clear that, whatever its possible
relevance historically, the ESP
exemption is not relevant or applicable
prospectively in determining the
intercarrier compensation obligations
for VoIP-PSTN traffic.
a. The Prospective VoIP-PSTN
Intercarrier Compensation Framework
Best Balances the Relevant Policy
Considerations
678. The Commission believes that its
prospective, intercarrier compensation
regime for VoIP-PSTN traffic best
balances the relevant policy
considerations of providing certainty
regarding the prospective intercarrier
compensation obligations for VoIPPSTN traffic while acknowledging the
flaws with preexisting intercarrier
compensation regimes, and providing a
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
measured transition to the new
intercarrier compensation framework.
The framework for VoIP-PSTN traffic
will also reduce disputes and provide
greater certainty to the industry
regarding intercarrier compensation
revenue streams while also reflecting
the Commission’s move away from the
pre-existing, flawed intercarrier
compensation regimes that have applied
to traditional telephone service.
679. Although commenters did not all
agree on the treatment of VoIP-PSTN
traffic, there was widespread consensus
among commenters that, whatever the
outcome, it was essential that the
Commission address that issue now.
The framework seeks to facilitate
discussions among the providers
exchanging VoIP-PSTN traffic, lessening
the need for prescriptive Commission
regulations. At the same time, the USF/
ICC Transformation NPRM recognized
the disruptive nature of some providers’
unilateral actions regarding VoIP
intercarrier compensation, and we seek
to prevent such actions here going
forward.
680. The Commission is not
persuaded by the arguments of some
commenters to subject VoIP traffic to the
pre-existing intercarrier compensation
regime that applies in the context of
traditional telephone service, including
full interstate and intrastate access
charges. For one, many of the advocates
of such an approach subsequently
endorsed the ABC Plan and Joint Letter.
Further, such an outcome would require
the Commission to enunciate a policy
rationale for expressly imposing that
regime on VoIP-PSTN traffic in the face
of the known flaws of existing
intercarrier compensation rules and
notwithstanding the recognized need to
move in a different direction. Moreover,
requiring payment of all existing
intercarrier compensation rates
applicable to traditional telephone
service traffic as part of a transitional
regime for VoIP-PSTN traffic would, in
the aggregate, increase providers’
reliance on intercarrier compensation at
the same time the Commission’s broader
reform efforts seek to move providers
away from reliance on intercarrier
compensation revenues. Nor is the
Commission persuaded that such an
outcome is necessary to advance
competitive or technological neutrality.
As discussed above, the prospective
regime for VoIP-PSTN intercarrier
compensation is symmetrical, and thus
avoids the marketplace distortions that
could arise from an asymmetrical
approach to compensation. In
particular, the record does not
demonstrate that the approach
advantages in the aggregate providers
PO 00000
Frm 00096
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
relying on TDM networks relative to
VoIP providers or vice versa, nor that it
advantages in the aggregate certain IXCs
relative to others. The transitional VoIPPSTN intercarrier compensation regime
the Commission adopts here can reduce
both the intercarrier compensation
revenues and long distance and wireless
costs associated with VoIP-PSTN traffic.
Further, to the extent that particular
carriers historically have relied on
access revenues to subsidize local
services, the record is clear that many
providers did not pay the same
intercarrier compensation rates for VoIP
traffic that would have applied to
traditional telephone service traffic.
Additionally, the transitional VoIPPSTN intercarrier compensation
framework provides the opportunity for
some revenues in conjunction with
other appropriate recovery
opportunities adopted as part of
comprehensive intercarrier
compensation and universal service
reform.
681. Many of these commenters also
argue that comparable uses of the
network should be subject to
comparable intercarrier compensation
charges. The Commission agrees with
that policy principle, but observes that
the intercarrier compensation regime
applicable to traditional telephone
service—which they seek to apply to
VoIP-PSTN traffic—is at odds with that
policy. The pre-existing intercarrier
compensation regime imposes
significantly different charges for the
same use of the network depending
upon, among other things, the
jurisdiction of the traffic at issue. A
more uniform intercarrier compensation
framework for all uses of the network
will arise from the end-point of reform
adopted in this R&O. For purposes of
the transition, the Commission
concludes that its approach best
balances the relevant policy
considerations.
682. The Commission also is
unpersuaded by concerns that an
intercarrier compensation regime for
VoIP-PSTN traffic could lead to further
arbitrage or undermine the Commissionestablished transition adopted for
intercarrier compensation reform more
broadly. An underlying assumption of
those arguments is that the carriers
delivering traffic for termination will be
able to unilaterally determine the
portion of their traffic to be subject to
the VoIP-PSTN regime. As discussed in
greater detail below, the implementation
mechanisms for the Commission’s
approach protect against that outcome,
both through protections that can be
implemented in tariffs and through the
option of negotiated agreements, subject
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
applied to non-toll VoIP-PSTN traffic as
provided by the transitional intercarrier
compensation rules. The Commission
also has authority to adopt the
transitional framework for toll VoIPPSTN traffic based on its rulemaking
authority to implement 47 U.S.C.
251(b)(5). As discussed above,
interpreting the Commission’s
b. Legal Authority
rulemaking authority in this manner is
683. Authority To Address VoIP-PSTN consistent with court decisions
Traffic Under Section 251(b)(5).
recognizing that avoiding ‘‘market
Although the Commission has not
disruption pending broader reforms is,
classified interconnected VoIP services
of course, a standard and accepted
or similar one-way services as
justification for a temporary rule.’’
‘‘telecommunications services’’ or
Sections 201 and 332, 47 U.S.C. 201,
‘‘information services,’’ VoIP-PSTN
332, provide additional legal authority
traffic nevertheless can be encompassed specifically for interstate traffic and all
by 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5). As discussed in
traffic exchanged with CMRS providers.
greater detail above, 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5)
685. Application of Section 251(g).
includes ‘‘the transport and termination Additionally, as described above, 47
of all telecommunications exchanged
U.S.C. 251(g) supports the view that the
with LECs’’ with the exception of
Commission has authority to adopt
‘‘traffic encompassed by section 251(g)
transitional intercarrier compensation
* * * except to the extent that the
rules, preserving the access charge
Commission acts to bring that traffic
regimes that pre-dated the 1996 Act
within its scope.’’ The Commission
‘‘until [they] are explicitly superseded
previously has recognized that
by regulations prescribed by the
interconnected VoIP providers are
Commission.’’ The Commission rejects
providers of telecommunications.
the claims of some commenters that
Moreover, the Commission has
VoIP-PSTN traffic did not exist prior to
previously concluded that
the 1996 Act, and thus cannot be part
interconnected VoIP services involve
of the access charge regimes
‘‘transmission of [voice] by aid of wire,
‘‘grandfathered’’ by 47 U.S.C. 251(g).
cable, or other like connection’’ and/or
This argument flows from a mistaken
‘‘transmission by radio,’’ and went on to interpretation of 47 U.S.C. 251(g). The
conclude that ‘‘[t]he
essential question under 47 U.S.C.
telecommunications carriers involved in 251(g) is not whether a particular
originating or terminating a [VoIP]
service, or traffic involving a particular
communication via the PSTN are by
transmission protocol, existed prior to
definition offering
the 1996 Act. VoIP traffic existed prior
‘telecommunications.’ ’’ Further,
to the 1996 Act, although the record
although classification questions remain here does not reveal whether LECs were
regarding retail VoIP services,
exchanging IP-originated or IPcommenters observe that the exchange
terminated VoIP traffic at that time.
of VoIP-PSTN traffic that is relevant to
Because the Commission otherwise
the Commission’s intercarrier
rejects the claim that intercarrier
compensation regulations typically
compensation for VoIP-PSTN traffic is
occurs between two
categorically excluded from 47 U.S.C.
telecommunications carriers, one or
251(g), the Commission needs not, and
both of which are wholesale carrier
does not, consider further the nature
partners of retail VoIP service providers. and extent of VoIP traffic that existed
Nor does anything in the record
prior to the 1996 Act. Rather, the
persuade us that a different conclusion
question is whether there was a ‘‘preis warranted in the context of other
Act obligation relating to intercarrier
VoIP-PSTN traffic.
compensation for’’ particular traffic
684. Authority To Adopt Transitional exchanged between a LEC and
Rates for VoIP-PSTN Traffic. The legal
‘‘ ‘interexchange carriers and
authority that enables us to specify
information service providers.’’’
transitional rates for comprehensive
686. Pre-1996 Act Obligations.
intercarrier compensation reform also
Regardless of whether particular VoIP
enables the Commission to adopt its
services are telecommunications
transitional VoIP-PSTN intercarrier
services or information services, there
compensation framework pending the
are pre-1996 Act obligations regarding
transition to bill-and-keep. For one, the
LECs’ compensation for the provision of
Commission’s pre-existing regimes for
exchange access to an IXC or an
information service provider.
establishing reciprocal compensation
Interexchange VoIP-PSTN traffic is
rates for 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5) traffic have
subject to the access regime regardless
been upheld as lawful, and can be
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
to arbitration, regarding the portion of
traffic subject to the VoIP-PSTN
intercarrier compensation regime. The
Commission also permits LECs to
include language in their tariffs to
address the identification of VoIP-PSTN
traffic, much as they do to identify the
jurisdiction of traffic today.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
20:39 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
PO 00000
Frm 00097
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81657
of whether the underlying
communication contained informationservice elements. Indeed, the
Commission has already found that toll
telecommunications services
transmitted (although not originated or
terminated) in IP were subject to the
access charge regime, and the same
would be true to the extent that
telecommunications services originated
or terminated in IP. Similarly, to the
extent that interexchange VoIP services
are transmitted to the LEC directly from
an information service provider, such
traffic is subject to pre-1996 Act
obligations regarding ‘‘exchange
access,’’ although the access charges
imposed on information service
providers were different from those paid
by IXCs. Specifically, under the ESP
exemption, rather than paying
intercarrier access charges, information
service providers were permitted to
purchase access to the exchange as end
users, either by purchasing special
access services or ‘‘pay[ing] local
business rates and interstate subscriber
line charges for their switched access
connections to local exchange company
central offices.’’ But although the nature
of the charge is different from the access
charges paid by IXCs, the Commission
has always recognized that informationservice providers providing
interexchange services were obtaining
exchange access from the LECs.
Accordingly, because they were subject
to these exchange access charges,
interexchange information service traffic
was subject to the over-arching
Commission rules governing exchange
access prior to the 1996 Act, and
therefore subject to the grandfathering
provision of 47 U.S.C. 251(g).
687. The DC Circuit’s WorldCom
decision, cited by some commenters,
does not compel a different result. In
WorldCom, the court considered
whether dial-up, ISP-bound traffic was
covered by 47 U.S.C. 251(g)’s
grandfathering provision. Consistent
with the language of 47 U.S.C. 251(g),
the court focused on whether there was
a ‘‘pre-Act obligation relating to
intercarrier compensation for ISP-bound
traffic’’ and found it ‘‘uncontested—and
the Commission declared in the Initial
Order’’—that there was not. Although
the court also stated that ‘‘[t]he best the
Commission can do’’ in indentifying a
pre-1996 Act obligation ‘‘is to point to
pre-existing LEC obligations to provide
interstate access for ISPs,’’ the
discussion in the initial ISP-Bound
Traffic Order cited by the court
emphasized the uncertainty at that time
regarding the regulatory classification of
the functions provided by the carrier
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81658
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
serving the ISP—i.e., whether it was
providing local service, interexchange
service, or exchange access. As the DC
Circuit ultimately observed, the fact that
the carrier serving the ISP was acting as
a LEC—rather than an interexchange
carrier or information service provider—
would be dispositive that compensation
for that traffic exchange could not be
encompassed by 47 U.S.C. 251(g). Here,
by contrast, there is no evidence that the
exchange of toll VoIP-PSTN traffic
inherently involves the exchange of
traffic between two LECs. Moreover, the
Commission notes that to the extent
VoIP-PSTN traffic is not ‘‘toll’’ traffic, it
is subject to the preexisting reciprocal
compensation regime under 47 U.S.C.
251(b)(5) rather than the transitional
framework for toll VoIP-PSTN traffic
that the Commission adopts in this
R&O.
c. Implementation
688. Role of Tariffs. During the
transition, the Commission permits
LECs to tariff reciprocal compensation
charges for toll VoIP-PSTN traffic equal
to the level of interstate access rates.
CMRS providers currently are subject to
detariffing, and nothing in the
intercarrier compensation framework for
VoIP-PSTN traffic disrupts that
regulatory approach. Under the
permissive tariffing regime, providers
likewise are free not to file federal and/
or state tariffs for VoIP-PSTN traffic, and
instead seek compensation solely
through interconnection agreements (or,
if they wish, to forgo such
compensation). Although the
Commission is addressing intercarrier
compensation for all VoIP-PSTN traffic
under the 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5)
framework, the Commission is doing so
as part of an overall transition from
current intercarrier compensation
regimes—which rely extensively on
tariffing specifically with respect to
access charges—and a new framework
more amenable to negotiated intercarrier
compensation arrangements. The
Commission therefore permits LECs to
file tariffs that provide that, in the
absence of an interconnection
agreement, toll VoIP-PSTN traffic will
be subject to charges not more than
originating and terminating interstate
access rates. This prospective regime
thus facilitates the benefits that can
arise from negotiated arrangements
without sacrificing the revenue
predictability traditionally associated
with tariffing regimes. For interstate toll
VoIP-PSTN traffic, the relevant language
will be included in a tariff filed with the
Commission, and for intrastate toll
VoIP-PSTN traffic, the rates may be
included in a state tariff. In this regard,
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
the Commission notes that the terms of
an applicable tariff would govern the
process for disputing charges.
689. Contrary to some proposals,
however, the Commission does not
require the use of particular call detail
information to dispositively distinguish
toll VoIP-PSTN traffic from other VoIPPSTN traffic, given the recognized
limitations of such information. For
example, the Commission has
recognized that telephone numbers do
not always reflect the actual geographic
end points of a call. Further, although
the phantom traffic rules are designed to
ensure the transmission of accurate
information that can help enable proper
billing of intercarrier compensation,
standing alone, those rules do not
ensure the transmission of sufficient
information to determine the
jurisdiction of calls in all instances.
Rather, consistent with the tariffing
regime for access charges discussed
above, carriers today supplement call
detail information as appropriate with
the use of jurisdictional factors or the
like when the jurisdiction of traffic
cannot otherwise be determined. The
Commission finds this approach
appropriate here, as well.
690. The Commission does, however,
clarify the approach to identifying VoIPPSTN traffic for purposes of complying
with this transitional intercarrier
compensation regime. Although
intercarrier compensation rates for
VoIP-PSTN traffic during the transition
will differ from other rates for only a
limited time, the Commission
recognizes commenters’ concerns
regarding the mechanism to distinguish
VoIP-PSTN traffic, and thus sought
specific comment on that issue. In
response, a number of commenters
argued that the industry should be
permitted to ‘‘work cooperatively’’ to
address this issue, recognizing that
‘‘[o]ver the years, carriers have
developed reasonable methods for
distinguishing between calls for billing
purposes * * * and can be expected to
do so here.’’ The Commission agrees
that, ‘‘to help manage the transition’’
LECs should be permitted to incorporate
specific tariff provisions in their
intrastate tariffs that ‘‘could, for
example, require carriers delivering
traffic for termination to identify the
percentage of traffic that is’’ subject to
the transitional VoIP-PSTN intercarrier
compensation regime ‘‘and to support
those figures with traffic studies or other
reasonable analyses that are subject to
audit.’’ Just as such a tariffing
framework already is used to address
jurisdiction of traffic, such an approach
is a reasonable tool (in addition to
information the terminating LEC has
PO 00000
Frm 00098
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
about VoIP customers it is serving) to
identify the relevant traffic subject to
the VoIP-PSTN intercarrier
compensation regime. In addition, one
commenter noted the potential to rely
on interconnected VoIP subscriber and
wireline line count data from Form 477
to develop a safe harbor. Thus, as an
alternative, the Commission permits the
LEC instead to specify in its intrastate
tariff that the default percentage of
traffic subject to the VoIP-PSTN
framework is equal to the percentage of
VoIP subscribers in the state based on
the Local Competition Report, as
released periodically, unless rebutted by
the other carrier. In particular, under
this approach, the default percentage of
VoIP-PSTN traffic in a state would be
the total number of incumbent LEC and
non-incumbent LEC VoIP subscriptions
in a state divided by the sum of those
reported VoIP subscriptions plus
incumbent LEC and non-incumbent LEC
switched access lines. Further, although
the Commission does not mandate other
approaches as part of its tariffing
regime, individual providers remain free
to rely on signaling or call detail
information, or other measures, to the
extent that they enter alternative
compensation arrangements through
interconnection agreements. In
particular, contrary to some suggestions,
the Commission does not require filing
of certifications with the Commission
regarding carriers’ reported VoIP-PSTN
traffic. Such certifications would be
required from not only IXCs but also
originating and terminating providers
nationwide, even though these issues
may be of little or no practical concern
in states with intrastate access rates that
already are at or near interstate rates.
Given the likely significant overbreadth
in the burden that would impose, the
Commission declines to adopt such a
requirement.
691. Although the Commission will
allow tariffs during the transition to billand-keep, the Commission reaffirms its
decision in the T-Mobile Order that
good-faith negotiations generally are
preferable to tariffing as a means of
implementing carriers’ compensation
obligations. Under the circumstances
here, the Commission does not believe
that the policies underlying the
prohibition of wireless termination
tariffs for non-access traffic in the TMobile Order requires us to prohibit use
of tariffs for toll VoIP-PSTN traffic
during the transition. Although the
Commission likewise is moving to
facilitate negotiated arrangements for
intercarrier compensation more broadly,
significant portions of the legacy
intercarrier compensation regime have
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
traditionally relied on tariffs, and the
Commission believes flash cutting the
whole industry to a new regime would
be unduly disruptive. Further, in place
of tariffing, the T-Mobile Order required
CMRS providers to negotiate
interconnection agreements in good
faith subject to 47 U.S.C. 252
negotiation and arbitration processes at
the request of incumbent LECs—a set of
requirements that the Commission has
not extended more broadly. Thus,
maintaining a continuing role for tariffs
during the transition to a new
intercarrier compensation framework is
a reasonable approach. Further, CMRS
providers had expressed concerns about
potentially excessive rates in wireless
termination tariffs. Here, rates are
ultimately subject to Commission
oversight, including the mandated
reductions in those charges as part of
comprehensive intercarrier
compensation reform. The Commission
thus concludes that this approach
strikes the right balance here.
692. Reliance on Interconnection
Agreements and SGATs. As discussed
above, the transitional intercarrier
compensation framework permits
tariffing of charges for toll VoIP-PSTN
traffic, but permits carriers to negotiate
agreements that reflect alternative rates.
In the case of incumbent LECs, they
must negotiate in good faith in response
to requests for agreements addressing
reciprocal compensation for VoIP-PSTN
traffic. In this regard, the Commission
notes that reciprocal compensation
charges generally have been imposed
through interconnection agreements or
state-approved statements of generally
available terms and conditions (SGATs),
which carriers may accept in lieu of
negotiating individual interconnection
agreements. Various commenters also
describe the benefits that can arise from
an interconnection and intercarrier
compensation framework that allows
parties to negotiate mutually agreeable
outcomes, rather than all parties being
categorically bound to a single regime.
Likewise, the interconnection and
intercarrier compensation framework
adopted in sections 251 and 252 of the
1996 Act, 47 U.S.C. 251, 252, reflect a
policy favoring negotiated agreements,
where possible.
693. The Commission recognizes the
concerns of some commenters that
instances of disparate negotiating
leverage can occur and that, absent an
appropriate regulatory backstop, a
regime purely relying on commercial
negotiations could systematically
disadvantage providers with limited
negotiating leverage. These concerns
arise in part based on the variations in
size and make-up of the customers of
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
different networks, and in part based on
certain underlying legal requirements,
including the general policy against
blocking traffic and the lack of a
statutory compulsion for certain entities
to enter interconnection agreements.
694. The transitional regime for VoIPPSTN intercarrier compensation
accommodates these disparities in
several ways. For one, the ability to
tariff these charges ensures that LECs
have the opportunity to obtain the
intercarrier compensation provided for
by the rules. In addition, the section 252
framework applicable to
interconnection agreements provides
procedural protections. For example, it
provides carriers the opportunity,
outside the tariffing framework, to
specify a mutually agreeable approach
for determining the amount of traffic
that is VoIP-PSTN traffic. To this end,
carriers could include an alternative
approach in a state-approved SGAT or
negotiate such an approach as part of an
interconnection agreement. To the
extent that the parties pursue a
negotiated agreement but cannot agree
upon the particular means of
determining the amount of traffic that is
VoIP-PSTN traffic, this can be subject to
arbitration. Although most incumbent
LECs are subject to this duty by virtue
of the Act, while other carriers, such as
competitive LECs, are not, the
Commission notes that its rules already
anticipate the possibility that two nonincumbent LECs might elect to bring a
reciprocal compensation dispute before
a state for arbitration under the section
252 framework. To the extent that a
state fails to arbitrate a dispute
regarding VoIP-PSTN intercarrier
compensation, it will be subject to
Commission arbitration.
695. Scope of Charges Imposed by
Retail VoIP Providers’ LEC Partners.
Some commenters express concern that,
absent Commission clarification, certain
LECs that provide wholesale inputs to
retail VoIP services might not be able to
collect all the same intercarrier
compensation charges as LECs relying
entirely on TDM networks. In particular,
providers cite disputes arising from
their use of IP technology as well as the
structure of the relationship between
retail VoIP service providers and their
wholesale carrier partners. For the
reasons described above, the
Commission believes a symmetric
approach to VoIP-PSTN intercarrier
compensation is warranted for all LECs.
One of the goals of the Commission’s
reform is to promote investment in and
deployment of IP networks. Although
the Commission believes that its
comprehensive reforms best advance
this goal, during the transition it does
PO 00000
Frm 00099
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81659
not want to disadvantage providers that
already have made these investments.
Consequently, the Commission allows
providers that have undertaken or
choose to undertake such deployment
the same opportunity, during the
transition, to collect intercarrier
compensation under its prospective
VoIP-PSTN intercarrier compensation
regime as those providers that have not
yet undertaken that network conversion.
Further, recognizing that these specific
questions have given rise to disputes,
the Commission believes that
addressing this issue under its
transitional intercarrier compensation
framework will reduce uncertainty and
litigation, freeing up resources for
investment and innovation. The
Commission therefore adopts rules
clarifying LECs’ ability to impose
charges in such circumstances under its
transitional regime, as discussed below.
696. The transitional VoIP-PSTN
intercarrier compensation rules focus
specifically on whether the exchange of
traffic occurs in TDM format (and not in
IP format), without specifying the
technology used to perform the
functions subject to the associated
intercarrier compensation charges. The
Commission thus adopts rules making
clear that origination and termination
charges may be imposed under its
transitional intercarrier compensation
framework, including when an entity
‘‘uses Internet Protocol facilities to
transmit such traffic to [or from] the
called party’s premises.’’
697. With respect to the issue of
whether particular functions are
performed by the wholesale LEC or its
retail VoIP partner, the Commission
recognizes that under the Commission’s
historical approach in the access charge
context, when relying on tariffs, LECs
have been permitted to charge access
charges to the extent that they are
providing the functions at issue. In light
of the policy considerations implicated
here, the Commission adopts a different
approach to address concerns about
double billing. As discussed above, the
Commission brings all access traffic
within 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5). The
Commission had not previously
addressed LECs’ rights to tariff such
charges in that context. Nonetheless, for
convenience, the transitional
intercarrier compensation framework
builds upon rules, or rule language,
from the access charge context in a
number of ways, and the Commission
therefore modifies aspects of that
language in the manner discussed
above, based on the record received on
this issue.
698. The Commission believes that a
symmetrical approach to VoIP-PSTN
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81660
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
intercarrier compensation is the best
policy, and thus believe that
competitive LECs should be entitled to
charge the same intercarrier
compensation as incumbent LECs do
under comparable circumstances.
Because the Commission has not
broadly addressed the classification of
VoIP services, however, retail VoIP
providers that take the position that
they are offering unregulated services
therefore are not carriers that can tariff
intercarrier compensation charges.
Consequently, just as retail VoIP
providers rely on wholesale carrier
partners for, among other things,
interconnection, access to numbers, and
compliance with 911 obligations—a
type of arrangement the Commission
has endorsed in the past—so too do they
rely on wholesale carrier partners to
charge tariffed intercarrier
compensation charges. Given these
distinct circumstances, the Commission
adopts rules that permit a LEC to charge
the relevant intercarrier compensation
for functions performed by it and/or by
its retail VoIP partner, regardless of
whether the functions performed or the
technology used correspond precisely to
those used under a traditional TDM
architecture. The Commission notes
that, notwithstanding its rules, to the
extent that these charges are imposed
via tariff, a carrier may not impose
charges other than those provided for
under the terms of its tariff. However,
the rules include measures to protect
against double billing, and the
Commission also makes clear that its
rules do not permit a LEC to charge for
functions performed neither by itself or
its retail service provider partner.
699. This approach is supported by
the fact that the Commission is bringing
all traffic within 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5).
Under Commission precedent in that
context, to the extent that a competitive
LEC’s rates were set based on the
incumbent LEC’s reciprocal
compensation charges, the
Commission’s rules were not as limiting
regarding the scope of those reciprocal
compensation charges as historically
was the case in the access charge
context. Indeed, in addition to tariffing,
providers also remain free to negotiate
compensation arrangements for this
traffic through interconnection
agreements, and to define the scope of
charges by mutual agreement or, if
relevant, arbitration.
d. Other Issues
i. Interconnection and Traffic Exchange
700. Use of Section 251(c)(2)
Interconnection Arrangements.
Although the Commission brings all
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
VoIP-PSTN traffic within 47 U.S.C.
251(b)(5), and permit compensation for
such arrangements to be addressed
through interconnection agreements, the
Commission recognizes that there is
potential ambiguity in existing law
regarding carriers’ ability to use existing
47 U.S.C. 251(c)(2) interconnection
facilities to exchange VoIP-PSTN traffic,
including toll traffic. Consequently, the
Commission makes clear that a carrier
that otherwise has a 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(2)
interconnection arrangement with an
incumbent LEC is free to deliver toll
VoIP-PSTN traffic through that
arrangement, as well, consistent with
the provisions of its interconnection
agreement. The Commission previously
held that 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(2)
interconnection arrangements may not
be used solely for the transmission of
interexchange traffic because such
arrangements are for the exchange of
‘‘telephone exchange service’’ or
‘‘exchange access’’ traffic—and
interexchange traffic is neither.
However, as long as an interconnecting
carrier is using the 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(2)
interconnection arrangement to
exchange some telephone exchange
service and/or exchange access traffic,
47 U.S.C. 251(c)(2) does not preclude
that carrier from relying on that same
functionality to exchange other traffic
with the incumbent LEC, as well. This
interpretation of 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(2) is
consistent with the Commission’s prior
holding that carriers that otherwise have
47 U.S.C. 251(c)(2) interconnection
arrangements are free to use them to
deliver information services traffic, as
well. Likewise, it is consistent with the
Commission’s interpretation of the
unbundling obligations of 47 U.S.C.
251(c)(3), where it held that, as long as
a carrier is using an unbundled network
element (UNE) for the provision of a
telecommunications service for which
UNEs are available, it may use that UNE
to provide other services, as well. With
respect to the broader use of 47 U.S.C.
251(c)(2) interconnection arrangements,
however, it will be necessary for the
interconnection agreement to
specifically address such usage to, for
example, address the associated
compensation.
701. No Blocking. In addition to the
protections discussed above to prevent
unilateral actions disruptive to the
transitional VoIP-PSTN intercarrier
compensation regime, the Commission
also finds that carriers’ blocking of VoIP
calls is a violation of the
Communications Act and, therefore, is
prohibited just as with the blocking of
other traffic. As such, it is appropriate
to discuss the Commission’s general
PO 00000
Frm 00100
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
policy against the blocking of such
traffic. As the Commission has long
recognized, permitting blocking or the
refusal to deliver voice telephone traffic,
whether as a means of ‘‘self-help’’ to
address perceived unreasonable
intercarrier compensation charges or
otherwise, risks ‘‘degradation of the
country’s telecommunications
network.’’ Consequently, ‘‘the
Commission, except in rare
circumstances[,] * * * does not allow
carriers to engage in call blocking’’ and
‘‘previously has found that call blocking
is an unjust and unreasonable practice
under section 201(b) of the Act.’’
Although the Commission generally has
not classified VoIP services, as
discussed above, the exchange of VoIPPSTN traffic implicating intercarrier
compensation rules typically involves
two carriers. As a result, those carriers
are directly bound by the Commission’s
general prohibition on call blocking
with respect to VoIP-PSTN traffic, as
with other traffic.
702. The Commission recognizes,
however, that blocking also could be
performed by interconnected VoIP
providers, or by providers of ‘‘one-way’’
VoIP service that allows customers to
receive calls from, or place calls to the
PSTN, but not both. Just as call blocking
concerns regarding interexchange
carriers and wireless providers arose in
an effort to avoid high access charges,
VoIP providers likewise could have
incentives to avoid such rates, which
they would pay either directly or
through the rates they pay for wholesale
long distance service. If interconnected
VoIP services or one-way VoIP services
are telecommunications services, they
already are subject to restrictions on
blocking under the Act. If such services
are information services, the
Commission exercises its ancillary
authority and prohibits blocking of
voice traffic to or from the PSTN by
those providers just as the Commission
does for carriers. For example, an
interexchange carrier that is a wholesale
partner of such a VoIP provider could
evade the directly-applicable
restrictions on blocking under 47 U.S.C.
201 of the Act by having the blocking
performed by the VoIP provider instead.
An IXC generally would be prohibited
from refusing to deliver calls to
telephone numbers associated with high
intercarrier compensation charges. If
that IXC’s VoIP provider wholesale
customer were free to block calls to such
numbers, the IXC thus could evade the
directly-applicable restrictions on
blocking (and the VoIP provider would
benefit from lower wholesale long
distance costs to the extent that, for
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
example, its agreement provided for a
pass-through of the intercarrier
compensation charges paid by the IXC).
In addition, blocking or degrading of a
call from a traditional telephone
customer to a customer of a VoIP
provider, or vice-versa, would deny the
traditional telephone customer the
intended benefits of
telecommunications interconnection
under 47 U.S.C. 251(a)(1).
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
ii. Other Pending Matters
703. The conclusions in this R&O
effectively address, in whole or in part,
certain pending petitions. For one,
Global NAPS filed a petition for
declaratory ruling regarding the manner
and extent to which VoIP traffic could
be subject to access charges generally,
and intrastate access charges in
particular. AT&T also filed a petition
requesting that, on a transitional basis,
the Commission declare that interstate
and intrastate access charges may be
imposed on VoIP traffic in certain
circumstances, as well as limited
waivers that would enable it to offset
forgone revenues from voluntary
reductions in intrastate terminating
access charges. In addition, Vaya
Telecom (Vaya) filed a petition seeking
a declaration that ‘‘a LEC’s attempt to
collect intrastate access charges on LECto-LEC VoIP traffic exchanges is an
unlawful practice.’’ Because the
transitional intercarrier compensation
framework for VoIP-PSTN declines to
apply all existing intercarrier
compensation regimes as they currently
exist, Global NAPS’s and Vaya’s
petitions are granted in part and AT&T’s
is denied in part. To the extent that
AT&T proposes a specific approach for
alternative rate reforms and revenue
recovery, the Commission finds the
mechanisms adopted in this R&O to be
more appropriate for the reasons
discussed above, and thus deny its
requests in that regard. Further, Grande
filed a petition seeking a Commission
declaration that carriers categorically
may rely on a customer’s certification
that traffic originated in IP and therefore
is enhanced and not subject to access
charges. To the extent that this would
deviate from the regime the Commission
adopts, the petition is denied. The
Commission declines to address the
classification of VoIP services generally
at this time, nor does the Commission
otherwise elect to grant the other
requests for declaratory rulings raised
by the Global NAPS, Vaya, AT&T, and
Grande petitions.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
XII. Intercarrier Compensation for
Wireless Traffic
A. LEC–CMRS Non-Access Traffic
704. Given the adoption of a uniform,
federal framework for comprehensive
intercarrier compensation reform, the
Commission believes it is now
appropriate to clarify the system of
intercarrier compensation applicable to
non-access traffic exchanged between
LECs and CMRS providers. As outlined
above, two compensation regimes
currently apply to non-access LEC–
CMRS traffic, and the Commission has
not clarified the intersection between
the two. The Commission concludes,
based on the record, that it is
appropriate for the Commission to
clarify the relationship between the
obligations in 47 CFR 20.11 and 47
U.S.C. 251(b)(5).
705. To bring the 47 CFR 20.11 and
47 U.S.C. 251 obligations in line, the
Commission first harmonizes the scope
of the compensation obligations in
§ 20.11, 47 CFR 20.11 and those in part
51, 47 CFR part 51. The Commission
accordingly concludes that 47 CFR
20.11 applies only to LEC–CMRS traffic
that, since the Local Competition First
Report and Order, has been subject to
the reciprocal compensation framework
under 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5) of the Act.
Thus, 47 CFR 20.11 does not apply to
access traffic that, prior to this R&O, was
subject to 47 U.S.C. 251(g). Furthermore,
the Commission clarifies that the terms
‘‘mutual compensation’’ in § 20.11 and
‘‘reciprocal compensation’’ in 47 U.S.C.
251(b)(5) and Part 51 are synonymous
when applied to non-access LEC–CMRS
traffic.
706. Next, the Commission finds that
it is in the public interest to establish a
default federal pricing methodology for
determining reasonable compensation
under 47 CFR 20.11. Commenters urge
the Commission to address the current
absence of guidance on compensation
rates for traffic between competitive
LECs and CMRS providers and to
address the growing problem of traffic
stimulation. They argue that the
decision in the North County Order to
defer setting of reasonable
compensation under 47 CFR 20.11 for
intrastate traffic to the states without
providing any guidance has led to
CLECs seeking terminating
compensation rates far above cost and to
a dramatic increase in litigation as
CLECs seek to establish or enforce
termination rates in state administrative
and judicial forums. They recommend
that the Commission resolve this
problem by establishing a default
federal termination rate for CLEC–CMRS
PO 00000
Frm 00101
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81661
traffic of $0.0007 or by adopting a billand-keep methodology.
707. Currently, reciprocal
compensation under the part 51 rules,
47 CFR part 51, is subject to a federal
pricing methodology. Reciprocal
compensation under 47 CFR 20.11,
however, is not currently subject to a
federal pricing methodology. As the
Commission recently explained in the
North County Order, it has instead
traditionally regarded state commissions
as the ‘‘more appropriate forum for
determining the reasonable
compensation rate [under § 20.11] for
* * * termination of intrastate,
intraMTA traffic,’’ and have to date
declined to provide guidance to the
states on how to carry out that
responsibility. The Commission has
long made clear, however, that it
‘‘would not hesitate to preempt any
rates set by the states that would
undermine the federal policy that
encourages CMRS providers and LECs
to interconnect.’’ And the Commission
observed in the North County Order that
the various ‘‘policy arguments’’ in favor
of a greater federal role in implementing
47 CFR 20.11 were ‘‘better suited to a
more general rulemaking proceeding,’’
citing this proceeding in particular.
708. The Commission now concludes,
based on the record in this proceeding,
that the Commission should establish a
federal methodology for implementing
47 CFR 20.11’s reasonable
compensation mechanism. Although the
Commission believed in the North
County Order that the interconnection
process under 47 CFR 20.11 would
likely not be ‘‘procedurally onerous,’’
the record shows that the absence of a
federal methodology has been a growing
source of confusion and litigation.
MetroPCS, for example, states that it is
embroiled in disputes over traffic
stimulation schemes in a number of
jurisdictions and notes other
proceedings in New York and Michigan.
The California commission, the state
commission implicated by the North
County Order, also ‘‘recommends that
the FCC provide guidance on what
factors should be considered in setting
a ‘reasonable rate’ for such
arrangements.’’ Adoption of a federal
pricing methodology promotes the
policy goals of avoiding wasteful
arbitrage opportunities caused by
disparate intercarrier compensation
rates and modernizing and unifying the
intercarrier compensation system to
promote efficiency and network
investment. It is also necessary to
effectuate the decision to harmonize 47
CFR 20.11 with 47 U.S.C. 251(b)(5),
which, as noted, has long been governed
by a federal pricing methodology.
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
81662
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
709. The Commission has already
concluded above that a bill-and-keep
methodology for intercarrier
compensation, including reciprocal
compensation, best serves the policy
goals and requirements of the Act.
Consistent with that determination and
the clarification above that
compensation obligations under § 20.11
are coextensive with reciprocal
compensation requirements, the
Commission concludes that bill-andkeep should also be the default pricing
methodology between LECs and CMRS
providers under § 20.11 of the rules, 47
CFR 20.11. By default, the Commission
means that bill-and-keep will satisfy
terminating compensation obligations
except where carriers mutually agree to
the contrary. Thus, the Commission
concludes that bill-and-keep should be
the default applicable to LEC–CMRS
reciprocal compensation arrangements
under both 47 CFR 20.11 or part 51, 47
CFR part 51. The Commission rejects
claims that a default rate set via a billand-keep methodology under any
circumstances would be inadequate
because it would be less than the actual
cost of terminating calls that originate
with a CMRS provider. As the
Commission explains above, a bill-andkeep regime requires each carrier to
recover its costs from its own end-users.
710. The Commission further
concludes that, under either 47 CFR
20.11 or the Part 51 rules, 47 CFR part
51, for traffic to or from a CMRS
provider subject to reciprocal
compensation under either 47 CFR
20.11 or the Part 51 rules, 47 CFR part
51, the bill-and-keep default should
apply immediately. Although the
Commission has adopted a glide path to
a bill-and-keep methodology for access
charges generally and for reciprocal
compensation between two wireline
carriers, it finds that a different
approach is warranted for non-access
traffic between LECs and CMRS
providers for several reasons. First, the
Commission finds a greater need for
immediate application of a bill-andkeep methodology in this context to
address traffic stimulation. The record
demonstrates there is a significant and
growing problem of traffic stimulation
and regulatory arbitrage in LEC–CMRS
non-access traffic. In contrast, the
Commission finds little evidence of
such problems with regard to traffic
between two LECs, where traffic
stimulation appears to be occurring
largely within the access regime, rather
than for traffic currently subject to
reciprocal compensation payments. This
likely reflects in part the fact that the
applicable ‘‘local calling area’’ for CMRS
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
providers within which calls are subject
to reciprocal compensation is much
larger than it is for LECs. Thus, what
would be access stimulation if between
a LEC and an IXC will in many cases
arise under reciprocal compensation
when a CMRS provider is involved. For
similar reasons, CMRS providers are
more likely to be exposed to traffic
stimulation that is not subject to the
measures the Commission adopts above
to address this problem within the
access traffic regime. Further, although
the record reflects that LEC–CMRS
intraMTA traffic stimulation is growing
most rapidly in traffic terminated by
competitive LECs, the Commission is
concerned that absent any measures to
address traffic stimulation for intraMTA
LEC–CMRS traffic, incumbent LECs that
sought revenues from access stimulation
may quickly adapt their stimulation
efforts to wireless reciprocal
compensation. For these reasons, the
Commission finds that addressing the
traffic stimulation problem in reciprocal
compensation is more urgent for LEC–
CMRS traffic, and the bill-and-keep
default methodology the Commission
adopts should eliminate the opportunity
for parties to engage in such practices in
connection with such traffic.
711. Although, as discussed above,
the Commission finds that adopting a
gradual glide path to a bill-and-keep
methodology for intercarrier
compensation generally, including
reciprocal compensation between LECs,
will help avoid market disruption to
service providers and consumers, the
Commission concludes that an
immediate transition for reciprocal
compensation traffic exchanged
between LECs and CMRS providers
presents a far smaller risk of market
disruption than would an immediate
shift to a bill-and-keep methodology for
intercarrier compensation more
generally. First, for reciprocal
compensation between CMRS providers
and competitive LECs, the Commission
has until recently had no pricing
methodology applicable to competitive
LEC–CMRS traffic, as reflected in the
fact that the carriers in the recent North
County Order had specifically asked the
Commission to establish one for the first
time. Competitive LECs thus had no
basis for reliance on such a
methodology in their business models,
and the Commission sees no reason
why, in setting a methodology for the
first time, it should not require
competitive LECs to meet that
methodology immediately, particularly
given that competitive LECs are not
subject to retail rate regulation in the
manner of incumbents, and therefore
PO 00000
Frm 00102
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
have flexibility to adapt their businesses
more quickly.
712. Even for incumbent LECs, the
Commission is confident the impact is
not significant, particularly when
balanced against the overall benefits of
providing the clarification. For one,
incumbent LECs and CMRS providers
that fail to pursue an interconnection
agreement do not receive any
compensation for intraMTA traffic
today. For incumbent LECs that do have
agreements for compensation for
intraMTA traffic, most large incumbent
LECs have already adopted $0.0007 or
less as their reciprocal compensation
rate. For rate-of-return carriers, there is
no allegation in the record that
reforming LEC–CMRS reciprocal
compensation obligations in this
manner would have a harmful impact
on them. And, in any event, the
Commission has adopted mechanisms
that should address any such impacts.
First, the Commission adopts a new
recovery mechanism, which includes
recovery for net reciprocal
compensation revenues, to provide all
incumbent LECs with a stable,
predictable recovery for reduced
intercarrier compensation revenues.
Second, the Commission adopts an
additional measure to further ease the
move to bill-and-keep LEC–CMRS traffic
for rate-of-return carriers. Specifically,
the Commission limits rate-of-return
carriers’ responsibility for the costs of
transport involving non-access traffic
exchanged between CMRS providers
and rural, rate-of-return regulated LECs.
713. Some commenters proposed a
rule allocating the responsibility for
transport costs for non-access traffic to
the non-rural terminating provider,
stating that in the absence of such a
rule, rural LECs could be forced to incur
unrecoverable transport costs at a time
when ICC reforms may already have a
negative impact on network cost
recovery. The Commission recognizes
that immediately moving to a default
bill-and-keep methodology for
intraMTA traffic raises issues regarding
the default point at which financial
responsibility for the exchange of traffic
shifts from the originating carrier to the
terminating carrier. Therefore, in the
attached USF/ICC Transformation
FNPRM, the Commission seeks
comment on whether and how to
address this aspect of bill-and-keep
arrangements. The Commission finds it
appropriate, however, to establish an
interim default rule allocating
responsibility for transport costs
applicable to non-access traffic
exchanged between CMRS providers
and rural, rate-of-return regulated LECs
to provide a gradual transition for such
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
carriers. Given the Commission’s
commitment to providing a measured
transition, the Commission believes it is
appropriate to help ensure no flash cuts
for rate-of-return carriers. The
Commission notes that price cap
carriers did not raise concerns about
transport costs, and the Commission
concludes that no particular transition
is required or warranted for traffic
exchanged between CMRS providers
and these carriers.
714. Specifically, for such traffic, the
rural, rate-of-return LEC will be
responsible for transport to the CMRS
provider’s chosen interconnection point
when it is located within the LEC’s
service area. When the CMRS provider’s
chosen interconnection point is located
outside the LEC’s service area, the
Commission provides that the LEC’s
transport and provisioning obligation
stops at its meet point and the CMRS
provider is responsible for the
remaining transport to its
interconnection point. Although the
Commission does not prejudge its
consideration of what allocation rule
should ultimately apply to the exchange
of all telecommunications traffic,
including traffic that is considered
access traffic today, under a bill-andkeep methodology, the Commission
believes that this rule is warranted for
the interim period to help minimize
disputes and provide greater certainty
until rules are adopted to complete the
transition to a bill-and-keep
methodology for all intercarrier
compensation.
715. Beyond adopting these measures,
the Commission also emphasizes that,
although it establishes bill-and-keep as
an immediately applicable default
methodology, the Commission is not
abrogating existing commercial
contracts or interconnection agreements
or otherwise allowing for a ‘‘fresh look’’
in light of the reforms. Thus, incumbent
LECs may have an extended period of
time under existing compensation
arrangements before needing to
renegotiate subject to the new default
bill-and-keep methodology. As a result,
while the Commission is concerned that
an immediate transition from reciprocal
compensation to a bill-and-keep
methodology more generally would risk
overburdening the universal service
fund that underlies the interim recovery
mechanism, the Commission thinks that
the impact on the fund resulting from an
immediate transition for LEC–CMRS
reciprocal compensation alone will not
do so. Adoption of bill-and-keep for this
subset of traffic will also inform the
Commission’s understanding of the
potential impact that the larger
transition to bill-and-keep will have
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
and, although the Commission does not
envision any concerns arising based on
the reforms adopted in this R&O, would
enable the Commission, if necessary, to
make any adjustments as part of that
larger transition. For the reasons
discussed, the Commission finds that an
immediate transition away from
reciprocal compensation to a bill-andkeep methodology in this context is
practical.
716. As the Commission found above,
the Commission believes that 47 U.S.C.
251 and 252 affirmatively provide us
authority to establish bill-and-keep as
the default methodology applicable to
traffic within the scope of 47 U.S.C.
251(b)(5), including for traffic
exchanged between LECs and CMRS
providers. Further, as the Commission
has concluded above that it has
authority under 47 U.S.C. 332 to
regulate intrastate access traffic
exchanged between LECs and CMRS
providers and thus authority to specify
a transition to bill-and-keep for such
traffic, the Commission concludes for
similar reasons that it has the authority
to regulate intrastate reciprocal
compensation between LECs and CMRS
providers. Indeed, in Iowa Utilities
Board, the Eighth Circuit specifically
upheld Commission rules regulating
LEC–CMRS reciprocal compensation
based on these provisions.
717. In the North County Order, the
Commission found that any decision to
reverse course and regulate intrastate
rates under 47 CFR 20.11 at the federal
level was more appropriately addressed
in a general rulemaking proceeding.
Now that the Commission is considering
the issue in the context of this
rulemaking proceeding, it finds it
appropriate to take this step for the
reasons discussed above, and the
Commission concludes that its decision
to establish a federal default pricing
methodology for termination of LEC–
CMRS intraMTA traffic as part of its
broader effort in this proceeding to
reform, modernize, and unify the
intercarrier compensation system is
consistent with its authority under the
Act.
B. IntraMTA Rule
718. In the Local Competition First
Report and Order, the Commission
stated that calls between a LEC and a
CMRS provider that originate and
terminate within the same Major
Trading Area (MTA) at the time that the
call is initiated are subject to reciprocal
compensation obligations under 47
U.S.C. 251(b)(5), rather than interstate or
intrastate access charges. As noted
above, this rule, referred to as the
‘‘intraMTA rule,’’ also governs the scope
PO 00000
Frm 00103
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
81663
of traffic between LECs and CMRS
providers that is subject to
compensation under 47 CFR 20.11(b).
The USF/ICC Transformation NPRM
sought comment, inter alia, on the
proper interpretation of this rule.
719. The record presents several
issues regarding the scope and
interpretation of the intraMTA rule.
Because the changes the Commission
adopts in this R&O maintain, during the
transition, distinctions in the
compensation available under the
reciprocal compensation regime and
compensation owed under the access
regime, parties must continue to rely on
the intraMTA rule to define the scope of
LEC–CMRS traffic that falls under the
reciprocal compensation regime. The
Commission therefore takes this
opportunity to remove any ambiguity
regarding the interpretation of the
intraMTA rule.
720. The Commission first addresses
a dispute regarding the interpretation of
the intraMTA rule. Halo Wireless (Halo)
asserts that it offers ‘‘Common Carrier
wireless exchange services to ESP and
enterprise customers’’ in which the
customer ‘‘connects wirelessly to Halo
base stations in each MTA.’’ It further
asserts that its ‘‘high volume’’ service is
CMRS because ‘‘the customer connects
to Halo’s base station using wireless
equipment which is capable of
operation while in motion.’’ Halo argues
that, for purposes of applying the
intraMTA rule, ‘‘[t]he origination point
for Halo traffic is the base station to
which Halo’s customers connect
wirelessly.’’ On the other hand, ERTA
claims that Halo’s traffic is not from its
own retail customers but is instead from
a number of other LECs, CLECs, and
CMRS providers. NTCA further
submitted an analysis of call records for
calls received by some of its member
rural LECs from Halo indicating that
most of the calls either did not originate
on a CMRS line or were not intraMTA,
and that even if CMRS might be used
‘‘in the middle,’’ this does not affect the
categorization of the call for intercarrier
compensation purposes. These parties
thus assert that by characterizing access
traffic as intraMTA reciprocal
compensation traffic, Halo is failing to
pay the requisite compensation to
terminating rural LECs for a very large
amount of traffic. Responding to this
dispute, CTIA asserts that ‘‘it is unclear
whether the intraMTA rules would even
apply in that case.’’
721. The Commission clarifies that a
call is considered to be originated by a
CMRS provider for purposes of the
intraMTA rule only if the calling party
initiating the call has done so through
a CMRS provider. Where a provider is
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
81664
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with RULES2
merely providing a transiting service, it
is well established that a transiting
carrier is not considered the originating
carrier for purposes of the reciprocal
compensation rules. Thus, the
Commission agrees with NECA that the
‘‘re-origination’’ of a call over a wireless
link in the middle of the call path does
not convert a wireline-originated call
into a CMRS-originated call for
purposes of reciprocal compensation
and the Commission disagrees with
Halo’s contrary position.
722. The Commission also clarifies
that the intraMTA rule means that all
traffic exchanged between a LEC and a
CMRS provider that originates and
terminates within the same MTA, as
determined at the time the call is
initiated, is subject to reciprocal
compensation regardless of whether or
not the call is, prior to termination,
routed to a point located outside that
MTA or outside the local calling area of
the LEC. Similarly, intraMTA traffic is
subject to reciprocal compensation
regardless of whether the two end
carriers are directly connected or
exchange traffic indirectly via a transit
carrier.
723. Further, in response to the USF/
ICC Transformation NPRM, T-Mobile
proposed that the Commission expand
the scope of the intraMTA rule to reflect
the fact that CMRS licenses are now
issued for REAGs, geographic areas that
are larger than MTAs. T-Mobile notes
that the intraMTA rule was promulgated
at a time the MTA was the largest CMRS
license area. T-Mobile argues that the
REAG is currently the largest license
being used to provide CMRS and that
this change would move more
telecommunications traffic under the
reciprocal compensation umbrella
pending the unification of all
intercarrier compensation rates. The
Commission declines to adopt TMobile’s proposal. Given the long
experience of the industry dealing with
the current rule, the very broad scope of
the changes to the intercarrier
compensation rules being made in this
R&O that will, after the transition
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:54 Dec 27, 2011
Jkt 226001
period, make the rule irrelevant, and the
limited support in the record for the
suggested change even from CMRS
commenters, the Commission does not
believe it is either necessary or
appropriate to expand the scope of this
rule as proposed by T-Mobile.
XIII. Interconnection
724. The Commission anticipates that
the reforms it adopts herein will further
promote the deployment and use of IP
networks. However, IP interconnection
between providers also is critical. As
such, the Commission agrees with
commenters that, as the industry
transitions to all IP networks, carriers
should begin planning for the transition
to IP-to-IP interconnection, and that
such a transition will likely be
appropriate before the completion of the
intercarrier compensation phase down.
The Commission seeks comment in the
accompanying USF/ICC Transformation
FNPRM regarding specific elements of
the policy framework for IP-to-IP
interconnection. The Commission
makes clear, however, that its decision
to address certain issues related to IP-toIP interconnection in the USF/ICC
Transformation FNPRM should not be
misinterpreted to suggest any deviation
from the Commission’s longstanding
view regarding the essential importance
of interconnection of voice networks.
725. In particular, even while the
USF/ICC Transformation FNPRM is
pending, the Commission expects all
carriers to negotiate in good faith in
response to requests for IP-to-IP
interconnection for the exchange of
voice traffic. The duty to negotiate in
good faith has been a longstanding
element of interconnection
requirements under the
Communications Act and does not
depend upon the network technology
underlying the interconnection, whether
TDM, IP, or otherwise. Moreover, the
Commission expects such good faith
negotiations to result in interconnection
arrangements between IP networks for
the purpose of exchanging voice traffic.
As the Commission evaluates specific
PO 00000
Frm 00104
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 9990
elements of the appropriate
interconnection policy framework for
voice IP-to-IP interconnection in the
USF/ICC Transformation FNPRM, it will
be monitoring marketplace
developments, which will inform the
Commission’s actions in response to the
USF/ICC Transformation FNPRM.
XIV. Procedural Matters
A. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis
726. The Report and Order contains
new information collection
requirements subject to the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public
Law 104–13. The new requirements will
be submitted to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for
review under section 3507(d) of the
PRA. OMB, the general public, and
other Federal agencies are invited to
comment on the new information
collection requirements contained in
this proceeding. We note that pursuant
to the Small Business Paperwork Relief
Act of 2002, Public Law 107–198, see 44
U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we previously sought
specific comment on how the
Commission might ‘‘further reduce the
information collection burden for small
business concerns with fewer than 25
employees.’’ We describe impacts that
might affect small businesses, which
includes most businesses with fewer
than 25 employees, in the Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, infra.
B. Congressional Review Act
727. On Friday December 2, 2011, the
Commission sent a copy of this Report
and Order to Congress and the
Government Accountability Office
pursuant to the Congressional Review
Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
C. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
[[See 76 FR 73829, 73834 (page where
the FRFA starts)]]
Federal Communications Commission
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2011–32411 Filed 12–27–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P
E:\FR\FM\28DER2.SGM
28DER2
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 249 (Wednesday, December 28, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 81562-81664]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-32411]
[[Page 81561]]
Vol. 76
Wednesday,
No. 249
December 28, 2011
Part II
Federal Communications Commission
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
47 CFR Parts 0, 1, 20, et al.
Connect America Fund; A National Broadband Plan for Our Future;
Establishing Just and Reasonable Rates for Local Exchange Carriers;
High-Cost Universal Service Support; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 249 / Wednesday, December 28, 2011 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 81562]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 0, 1, 20, 36, 51, 54, 61, 64, and 69
[WC Docket Nos. 10-90, 07-135, 05-337, 03-109; GN Docket No. 09-51; CC
Docket Nos. 01-92, 96-45; WT Docket No. 10-208; FCC 11-161]
Connect America Fund; A National Broadband Plan for Our Future;
Establishing Just and Reasonable Rates for Local Exchange Carriers;
High-Cost Universal Service Support
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Final rule; policy statement.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: In a rule published November 29, 2011, the Federal
Communications Commission (Commission) comprehensively reformed and
modernized the universal service and intercarrier compensation systems
to ensure that robust, affordable voice and broadband service, both
fixed and mobile, are available to Americans throughout the nation. The
Commission adopted fiscally responsible, accountable, incentive-based
policies to transition these outdated systems to the Connect America
Fund, ensuring fairness for consumers and addressing the communications
infrastructure challenges of today and tomorrow. The Commission uses
measured but firm glide paths to provide industry with certainty and
sufficient time to adapt to a changed regulatory landscape, and
establish a framework to distribute universal service funding in the
most efficient and technologically neutral manner possible, through
market-based mechanisms such as competitive bidding. This document
provides additional information to the final rule document published on
November 29, 2011.
DATES: Effective December 29, 2011.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Amy Bender, Wireline Competition
Bureau, (202) 418-1469, Victoria Goldberg, Wireline Competition Bureau,
(202) 418-7353, and Margaret Wiener, Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau, (202) 418-2176 or TTY: (202) 418-0484.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report
and Order (R&O) in WC Docket Nos. 10-90, 07-135, 05-337, 03-109; GN
Docket No. 09-51; CC Docket Nos. 01-92, 96-45; WT Docket No. 10-208;
FCC 11-161, released on November 18, 2011. The executive summary of the
R&O, and the final rules adopted by the R&O were published in the
Federal Register on November 29, 2011, 76 FR 73830. The full text of
this document is available for public inspection during regular
business hours in the FCC Reference Center, Room CY-A257, 445 12th
Street SW., Washington, DC 20554. Or at the following Internet address:
https://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-161A1.pdf.
I. Adoption of a New Principle for Universal Service
1. In November 2010, the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal
Service (Joint Board) recommended that the Commission ``specifically
find that universal service support should be directed where possible
to networks that provide advanced services, as well as voice
services,'' and adopt such a principle pursuant to its 47 U.S.C.
254(b)(7) authority. The Joint Board believes that this principle is
consistent with 47 U.S.C. 254(b)(3) and would serve the public
interest. The Commission agrees. 47 U.S.C. 254(b)(3) provides that
consumers in rural, insular and high-cost areas should have access to
``advanced telecommunications and information services * * * that are
reasonably comparable to those services provided in urban areas.'' 47
U.S.C. 254(b)(2) likewise provides that ``Access to advanced
telecommunications and information services should be provided in all
regions of the Nation.'' Providing support for broadband networks will
further all of these goals.
2. Accordingly, the Commission adopts ``support for advanced
services'' as an additional principle upon which the Commission will
base policies for the preservation and advancement of universal
service, and thereby act on one of the Joint Board's 2010
recommendations. For the reasons discussed above, the Commission finds,
per 47 U.S.C. 254(b)(7), that this new principle is ``necessary and
appropriate.'' Consistent with the Joint Board's recommendation, the
Commission defines this principle as: ``Support for Advanced Services--
Universal service support should be directed where possible to networks
that provide advanced services, as well as voice services.''
II. Goals
3. Discussion. The Commission adopts five performance goals to
preserve and advance service in high cost, rural, and insular areas
through the Connect America Fund and existing support mechanisms. The
Commission also adopts performance measures for the first, second, and
fifth of these goals, and direct the Wireline Competition Bureau and
the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (Bureaus) to further develop
other measures. The Commission delegates authority to the Bureaus to
finalize performance measures as appropriate consistent with these
goals.
4. Preserve and Advance Voice Service. The first performance goal
is to preserve and advance universal availability of voice service. In
doing so, the Commission reaffirms its commitment to ensuring that all
Americans have access to voice service while recognizing that, over
time, voice service will increasingly be provided over broadband
networks.
5. As a performance measure for this goal, the Commission will use
the telephone penetration rate, which measures subscription to
telephone service. The telephone penetration rate has historically been
used by the Commission as a proxy for network deployment and, as a
result, will be a consistent measure of the universal service program's
effects. The Commission will also continue to use the Census Bureau's
Current Population Survey (CPS) to collect data regarding telephone
penetration. Although CPS data does not specifically break out
wireless, VoIP, or over-the-top voice options available to consumers, a
better data set is not currently available. In recognition of the
limitations of existing data, the Commission is considering revising
the types of data it collects, and the Commission anticipates further
Commission action in this proceeding, which may provide more complete
information that can be used to evaluate this performance goal.
6. Ensure Universal Availability of Voice and Broadband to Homes,
Businesses, and Community Anchor Institutions. The second performance
goal is to ensure the universal availability of modern networks capable
of delivering broadband and voice service to homes, businesses, and
community anchor institutions as now defined in 47 CFR 54.5. All
Americans in all parts of the nation, including those in rural,
insular, and high-cost areas, should have access to affordable modern
communications networks capable of supporting the necessary
applications that empower them to learn, work, create, and innovate.
The Commission uses the term ``modern networks'' because supported
equipment and services are expected to change over time to keep up with
technological advancements.
7. As an outcome measure for this goal, the Commission will use the
number of residential, business, and community anchor institution
locations
[[Page 81563]]
that newly gain access to broadband service. As an efficiency measure,
the Commission will use the change in the number of homes, businesses,
and community anchor institutions passed or covered per million USF
dollars spent. To collect data, the Commission will use the National
Broadband Map and/or Form 477. The Commission will also require CAF
recipients to report on the number of community anchor institutions
that newly gain access to fixed broadband service as a result of CAF
support. Although these measures are imperfect, the Commission believes
that they are the best available. Other options, such as the Mercatus
Centers' suggestion of using an assessment of what might have occurred
without the programs, are not administratively feasible at this time.
But the Bureaus are directed to revisit these measures at a later
point, and to consider refinements and alternatives.
8. Ensure Universal Availability of Mobile Voice and Broadband
Where Americans Live, Work, or Travel. The third performance goal is to
ensure the universal availability of modern networks capable of
delivering mobile broadband and voice service in areas where Americans
live, work, or travel. Like the preceding parallel goal, the third
performance goal is designed to help ensure that all Americans in all
parts of the nation, including those in rural, insular, and high-cost
areas, have access to affordable technologies that will empower them to
learn, work, create, and innovate. But the Commission believes that
ensuring universal advanced mobile coverage is an important goal on its
own, and that the Commission will be better able track program
performance if the Commission measures it separately.
9. The Commission declines to adopt performance measures for this
goal at this time but direct the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau to
develop one or more appropriate measures for this goal.
10. Ensure Reasonably Comparable Rates for Broadband and Voice
Services. The fourth performance goal is to ensure that rates are
reasonably comparable for voice as well as broadband service, between
urban and rural, insular, and high cost areas. Rates must be reasonably
comparable so that consumers in rural, insular, and high cost areas
have meaningful access to these services.
11. The Commission also declines to adopt measures for this goal at
this time. Although the Commission proposed one outcome measure and
asked about others in the USF/ICC Transformation NPRM, 75 FR 26906, May
13, 2010, the Commission received only limited input on that proposal.
The Mercatus Center agrees that ``[t]he ratio of prices to income is an
intuitively sensible way of defining `reasonably comparable''' but
cautions that, again, the real challenge is crafting measures that
distinguish how the programs affect rates apart from other factors. The
Bureaus may seek to further develop the record on the performance and
efficiency measures suggested by the Mercatus Center, the Commission's
original proposals, and any other measures commenters think would be
appropriate. In undertaking this analysis, the Commission directs the
Bureau to develop separate measures for (1) broadband services for
homes, businesses, and community anchor institutions; and (2) mobile
services.
12. Minimize Universal Service Contribution Burden on Consumers and
Businesses. The fifth performance goal is to minimize the overall
burden of universal service contributions on American consumers and
businesses. With this performance goal, the Commission seeks to balance
the various objectives of 47 U.S.C. 254(b) of the Act, including the
objective of providing support that is sufficient but not excessive so
as to not impose an excessive burden on consumers and businesses who
ultimately pay to support the Fund. As the Commission has previously
recognized, ``if the universal service fund grows too large, it will
jeopardize other statutory mandates, such as ensuring affordable rates
in all parts of the country, and ensuring that contributions from
carriers are fair and equitable.''
13. As a performance measure for this goal, the Commission will
divide the total inflation-adjusted expenditures of the existing high-
cost program and CAF (including the Mobility Fund) each year by the
number of American households and express the measure as a monthly
dollar figure. This calculation will be relatively straightforward and
rely on publicly available data. As such, the measure will be
transparent and easily verifiable. By adjusting for inflation and
looking at the universal service burden, the Commission will be able to
determine whether the overall burden of universal service contribution
costs is increasing or decreasing for the typical American household.
As an efficiency measure, the Mercatus Center suggests comparing the
estimate of economic deadweight loss associated with the contribution
mechanism to the deadweight loss associated with taxation. The
Commission anticipates that the Bureaus may seek further input on this
option and any others commenters believe would be appropriate.
14. Program Review. Using the adopted goals and measures, the
Commission will, as required by GPRA, monitor the performance of the
universal service program as the Commission modernizes the current
high-cost program and transition to the CAF. If the programs are not
meeting these performance goals, the Commission will consider
corrective actions. Likewise, to the extent that the adopted measures
do not help us assess program performance, the Commission will revisit
them as well.
III. Legal Authority
15. 47 U.S.C. 254. The principle that all Americans should have
access to communications services has been at the core of the
Commission's mandate since its founding. Congress created this
Commission in 1934 for the purpose of making ``available * * * to all
the people of the United States * * * a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide,
and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate
facilities at reasonable charges.'' In the 1996 Act, Congress built
upon that longstanding principle by enacting 47 U.S.C. 254. Section 254
of the Act sets forth six principles upon which the Commission must
``base policies for the preservation and advancement of universal
service.'' Among these principles are that ``[q]uality services should
be available at just, reasonable, and affordable rates,'' that
``[a]ccess to advanced telecommunications and information services
should be provided in all regions of the Nation,'' and that
``[c]onsumers in all regions of the Nation * * * should have access to
telecommunications and information services, including * * * advanced
telecommunications and information services, that are reasonably
comparable to those services provided in urban areas'' and at
reasonably comparable rates.
16. Under 47 U.S.C. 254, the Commission has express statutory
authority to support telecommunications services that the Commission
has designated as eligible for universal service support. Section
254(c)(1) of the Act defines ``[u]niveral service'' as ``an evolving
level of telecommunications services that the Commission shall
establish periodically under this section, taking into account advances
in telecommunications and information technologies and services.'' As
discussed more fully below, in this R&O, the Commission adopts the
proposal to simplify how the Commission describes the various
[[Page 81564]]
supported services that the Commission historically has defined in
functional terms (e.g., voice grade access to the PSTN, access to
emergency services) into a single supported service designated as
``voice telephony service.'' To the extent carriers offer traditional
voice telephony services as telecommunications services over
traditional circuit-switched networks, the authority to provide support
for such services is well established.
17. Increasingly, however, consumers are obtaining voice services
not through traditional means but instead through interconnected VoIP
providers offering service over broadband networks. As AT&T notes,
``[c]ircuit-switched networks deployed primarily for voice service are
rapidly yielding to packet-switched networks,'' which offer voice as
well as other types of services.'' The data bear this out. As the
Commission observed in the USF/ICC Transformation NPRM, ``[f]rom 2008
to 2009, interconnected VoIP subscriptions increased by 22 percent,
while switched access lines decreased by 10 percent.'' Interconnected
VoIP services, among other things, allow customers to make real-time
voice calls to, and receive calls from, the PSTN, and increasingly
appear to be viewed by consumers as substitutes for traditional voice
telephone services. Our authority to promote universal service in this
context does not depend on whether interconnected VoIP services are
telecommunications services or information services under the
Communications Act.
18. Section 254 grants the Commission the authority to support not
only voice telephony service but also the facilities over which it is
offered. Section 254(e) makes clear that ``[a] carrier that receives
such [universal service] support shall use that support only for the
provision, maintenance, and upgrading of facilities and services for
which the support is intended.'' By referring to ``facilities'' and
``services'' as distinct items for which federal universal service
funds may be used, the Commission believes Congress granted the
Commission the flexibility not only to designate the types of
telecommunications services for which support would be provided, but
also to encourage the deployment of the types of facilities that will
best achieve the principles set forth in 47 U.S.C. 254(b) and any other
universal service principle that the Commission may adopt under 47
U.S.C. 254(b)(7). For instance, under the longstanding ``no barriers''
policy, the Commission allows carriers receiving high-cost support ``to
invest in infrastructure capable of providing access to advanced
services'' as well as supported voice services. That policy furthers
the policy Congress set forth in 47 U.S.C. 254(b) of ``ensuring access
to advanced telecommunications and information services throughout the
nation.'' While this policy was enunciated in an Order adopting rule
changes for rural incumbent carriers, by its terms it is not limited to
such carriers. The ``no-barriers'' policy has applied, and will
continue to apply, to all eligible telecommunications carriers (ETCs),
and the Commission codifies it in the rules. Section 254(e) thus
contemplates that carriers may receive federal support to enable the
deployment of broadband facilities used to provide supported
telecommunications services as well as other services.
19. The Commission further concludes that the authority under 47
U.S.C. 254 allows the Commission to go beyond the ``no barriers''
policy and require carriers receiving federal universal service support
to invest in modern broadband-capable networks. Nothing in 47 U.S.C.
254 requires the Commission simply to provide federal funds to carriers
and hope that they will use such support to deploy broadband
facilities. To the contrary, the Commission has a ``mandatory duty'' to
adopt universal service policies that advance the principles outlined
in 47 U.S.C. 254(b), and the Commission has the authority to ``create
some inducement'' to ensure that those principles are achieved.
Congress made clear in 47 U.S.C. 254 that the deployment of, and access
to, information services--including ``advanced'' information services--
are important components of a robust and successful federal universal
service program. Furthermore, the Commission adopts the recommendation
of the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service to establish a
new universal service principle pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 254(b)(7) that
universal service support should be directed where possible to networks
that provide advanced services, as well as voice services.'' In today's
communications environment, achievement of these principles requires,
at a minimum, that carriers receiving universal service support invest
in and deploy networks capable of providing consumers with access to
modern broadband capabilities, as well as voice telephony services.
Accordingly, as explained in greater detail below, the Commission will
exercise the authority under 47 U.S.C. 254 to require that carriers
receiving support--both CAF support, including Mobility Fund support,
and support under the existing high-cost support mechanisms--offer
broadband capabilities to consumers. The Commission concludes that this
approach is sufficient to ensure access to voice and broadband services
and, therefore, the Commission does not, at this time, add broadband to
the list of supported services, as some have urged.
20. 47 U.S.C. 1302. The Commission also has independent authority
under 47 U.S.C. 1302 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to fund the
deployment of broadband networks. In 47 U.S.C. 1302, Congress
recognized the importance of ubiquitous broadband deployment to
Americans' civic, cultural, and economic lives and, thus, instructed
the Commission to ``encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely
basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.'' Of
particular importance, Congress adopted a definition of ``advanced
telecommunications capability'' that is not confined to a particular
technology or regulatory classification. Rather, ```advanced
telecommunications capability' is defined, without regard to any
transmission media or technology, as high-speed, switched, broadband
telecommunications capability that enables users to originate and
receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and video communications
using any technology.'' Section 1302 of the Act further requires the
Commission to ``determine whether advanced telecommunications
capability is being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and
timely fashion'' and, if the Commission concludes that it is not, to
``take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by
removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by promoting
competition in the telecommunications market.'' The Commission has
found that broadband deployment to all Americans has not been
reasonable and timely and observed in its most recent broadband
deployment report that ``too many Americans remain unable to fully
participate in our economy and society because they lack broadband.''
This finding triggers the duty under 47 U.S.C. 1302(b) to ``remov[e]
barriers to infrastructure investment'' and ``promot[e] competition in
the telecommunications market'' in order to accelerate broadband
deployment throughout the Nation.
21. Providing support for broadband networks helps achieve 47
U.S.C. 1302(b)'s objectives. First, the Commission has recognized that
one of the most significant barriers to investment in broadband
infrastructure
[[Page 81565]]
is the lack of a ``business case for operating a broadband network'' in
high-cost areas ``[i]n the absence of programs that provide additional
support.'' Extending federal support to carriers deploying broadband
networks in high-cost areas will thus eliminate a significant barrier
to infrastructure investment and accelerate broadband deployment to
unserved and underserved areas of the Nation. The deployment of
broadband infrastructure to all Americans will in turn make services
such as interconnected VoIP service accessible to more Americans.
22. Second, supporting broadband networks helps ``promot[e]
competition in the telecommunications market,'' particularly with
respect to voice services. As the Commission has long recognized,
``interconnected VoIP service `is increasingly used to replace analog
voice service.''' Thus, the Commission previously explained that
requiring interconnected VoIP providers to contribute to federal
universal service support mechanisms promoted competitive neutrality
because it ``reduces the possibility that carriers with universal
service obligations will compete directly with providers without such
obligations.'' Just as ``we do not want contribution obligations to
shape decisions regarding the technology that interconnected VoIP
providers use to offer voice services to customers or to create
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage,'' the Commission does not want
to create regulatory distinctions that serve no universal service
purpose or that unduly influence the decisions providers will make with
respect to how best to offer voice services to consumers. The
``telecommunications market''--which includes interconnected VoIP and
by statutory definition is broader than just telecommunications
services--will be more competitive, and thus will provide greater
benefits to consumers, as a result of the decision to support broadband
networks, regardless of regulatory classification.
23. By exercising the authority under 47 U.S.C. 1302 in this
manner, the Commission furthers Congress's objective of
``accelerat[ing] deployment'' of advanced telecommunications capability
``to all Americans.'' Under the approach, federal support will not turn
on whether interconnected VoIP services or the underlying broadband
service falls within traditional regulatory classifications under the
Communications Act. Rather, the approach focuses on accelerating
broadband deployment to unserved and underserved areas, and allows
providers to make their own judgments as to how best to structure their
service offerings in order to make such deployment a reality.
24. The Commission disagrees with commenters who assert that the
Commission lacks authority under 47 U.S.C. 1302(b) to support broadband
networks. While 47 U.S.C. 1302(a) imposes a general duty on the
Commission to encourage broadband deployment through the use of ``price
cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that promote
competition in the local telecommunications market, or other regulating
methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment,'' 47 U.S.C.
1302(b) is triggered by a specific finding that broadband capability is
not being ``deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely
fashion.'' Upon making that finding (which the Commission has done), 47
U.S.C. 1302(b) requires the Commission to ``take immediate action to
accelerate'' broadband deployment. Given the statutory structure, the
Commission reads 47 U.S.C. 1302(b) as conferring on the Commission the
additional authority, beyond what the Commission possesses under 47
U.S.C. 1302(a) or elsewhere in the Act, to take steps necessary to
fulfill Congress's broadband deployment objectives. Indeed, it is hard
to see what additional work 47 U.S.C. 1302(b) does if it is not an
independent source of statutory authority.
25. The Commission also rejects the view that providing support for
broadband networks under 47 U.S.C. 1302(b) conflicts with 47 U.S.C.
254, which defines universal service in terms of telecommunications
services. Information services are not excluded from 47 U.S.C. 254
because of any policy judgment made by Congress. To the contrary,
Congress contemplated that the federal universal service program would
promote consumer access to both advanced telecommunications and
advanced information services ``in all regions of the Nation.'' When
Congress enacted the 1996 Act, most consumers accessed the Internet
through dial-up connections over the PSTN, and broadband capabilities
were provided over tariffed common carrier facilities. Interconnected
VoIP services had only a nominal presence in the marketplace in 1996.
It was not until 2002 that the Commission first determined that one
form of broadband--cable modem service--was a single offering of an
information service rather than separate offerings of
telecommunications and information services, and only in 2005 did the
Commission conclude that wireline broadband service should be governed
by the same regulatory classification. Thus, marketplace and
technological developments and the Commission's determinations that
broadband services may be offered as information services have had the
effect of removing such services from the scope of the explicit
reference to ``universal service'' in 47 U.S.C. 254(c). Likewise,
Congress did not exclude interconnected VoIP services from the federal
universal service program; indeed, there is no reason to believe it
specifically anticipated the development and growth of such services in
the years following the enactment of the 1996 Act.
26. The principles upon which the Commission ``shall base policies
for the preservation and advancement of universal service'' make clear
that supporting networks used to offer services that are or may be
information services for purposes of regulatory classification is
consistent with Congress's overarching policy objectives. For example,
47 U.S.C. 254(b)(2)'s principle that ``[a]ccess to advanced
telecommunications and information services should be provided in all
regions of the Nation'' dovetails comfortably with 47 U.S.C. 1302(b)'s
policy that ``advanced telecommunications capability [be] deployed to
all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion.'' Our decision to
exercise authority under 47 U.S.C. 1302 does not undermine 47 U.S.C.
254's universal service principles, but rather ensures their
fulfillment. By contrast, limiting federal support based on the
regulatory classification of the services offered over broadband
networks as telecommunications services would exclude from the
universal service program providers who would otherwise be able to
deploy broadband infrastructure to consumers. The Commission sees no
basis in the statute, the legislative history of the 1996 Act, or the
record of this proceeding for concluding that such a constricted
outcome would promote the Congressional policy objectives underlying 47
U.S.C. 254 and 1302.
27. Finally, the Commission notes the limited extent to which the
Commission is relying on 47 U.S.C. 706(b) in this proceeding.
Consistent with the longstanding policy of minimizing regulatory
distinctions that serve no universal service purpose, the Commission is
not adopting a separate universal service framework under 47 U.S.C.
1302(b). Instead, the Commission is relying on 47 U.S.C. 1302(b) as an
alternative basis to 47 U.S.C. 254 to the extent necessary to ensure
that the
[[Page 81566]]
federal universal service program covers services and networks that
could be used to offer information services as well as
telecommunications services. Carriers seeking federal support must
still comply with the same universal service rules and obligations set
forth in 47 U.S.C. 254 and 214, including the requirement that such
providers be designated as eligible to receive support, either from
state commissions or, if the provider is beyond the jurisdiction of the
state commission, from this Commission. In this way, the Commission
ensures that exercise of 47 U.S.C. 1302(b) authority will advance,
rather than detract from, the universal service principles established
under 47 U.S.C. 254 of the Act.
IV. Public Interest Obligations
A. Voice Service
28. Discussion. The Commission determines that it is appropriate to
describe the core functionalities of the supported services as ``voice
telephony service.'' Some commenters support redefining the voice
functionalities as voice telephony services, while others oppose the
change, arguing that the current list of functionalities remains
important today, the term ``voice telephony'' is too vague, and such a
modification may result in a lower standard of voice service. Given
that consumers are increasingly obtaining voice services over broadband
networks as well as over traditional circuit switched telephone
networks, the Commission agrees with commenters that urge the
Commission to focus on the functionality offered, not the specific
technology used to provide the supported service.
29. The decision to classify the supported services as voice
telephony should not result in a lower standard of voice service: Many
of the enumerated services are universal today, and the Commission
requires eligible providers to continue to offer those particular
functionalities as part of voice telephony. Rather, the modified
definition simply shifts to a technologically neutral approach,
allowing companies to provision voice service over any platform,
including the PSTN and IP networks. This modification will benefit both
providers (as they may invest in new infrastructure and services) and
consumers (who reap the benefits of the new technology and service
offerings). Accordingly, to promote technological neutrality while
ensuring that the new approach does not result in lower quality
offerings, the Commission amends 47 CFR 54.101 of the Commission rules
to specify that the functionalities of eligible voice telephony
services include voice grade access to the public switched network or
its functional equivalent; minutes of use for local service provided at
no additional charge to end users; toll limitation to qualifying low-
income consumers; and access to the emergency services 911 and enhanced
911 services to the extent the local government in an eligible
carrier's service area has implemented 911 or enhanced 911 systems. The
Commission finds that changes in the marketplace allow for the
elimination of the requirements to provide single-party service,
operator services, and directory assistance.
30. Today, all ETCs, whether designated by a state commission or
this Commission, are required to offer the supported service--voice
telephony service--throughout their designated service area. ETCs also
must provide Lifeline service throughout their designated service area.
In the USF/ICC Transformation FNPRM, the Commission seeks comment on
modifying incumbent ETCs' obligations to provide voice service in
situations where the incumbent's high-cost universal service funding is
eliminated, for example as a result of a competitive bidding process in
which another ETC wins universal support for an area and is subject to
accompanying voice and broadband service obligations. (Throughout this
R&O, unless otherwise specified, the term ``ETC'' does not include ETCs
that are designated only for the purposes of the low income program.)
31. As a condition of receiving support, the Commission requires
ETCs to offer voice telephony as a standalone service throughout their
designated service area, meaning that consumers must not be required to
purchase any other services (e.g., broadband) in order to purchase
voice service. As indicated above, ETCs may use any technology in the
provision of voice telephony service.
32. Additionally, consistent with the 47 U.S.C. 254(b) principle
that ``[c]onsumers in all regions of the Nation * * * should have
access to telecommunications and information services * * * that are
available at rates that are reasonably comparable to rates charged for
similar services in urban areas,'' ETCs must offer voice telephony
service, including voice telephony service offered on a standalone
basis, at rates that are reasonably comparable to urban rates. The
Commission finds that these requirements are appropriate to help ensure
that consumers have access to voice telephony service that best fits
their particular needs.
33. The Commission declines to preempt state obligations regarding
voice service, including COLR obligations, at this time. Proponents of
such preemption have failed to support their assertion that state
service obligations are inconsistent with federal rules and burden the
federal universal service mechanisms, nor have they identified any
specific legacy service obligations that represent an unfunded mandate
that make it infeasible for carriers to deploy broadband in high-cost
areas. Carriers must therefore continue to satisfy state voice service
requirements.
34. That said, the Commission encourages states to review their
respective regulations and policies in light of these changes and
revisit the appropriateness of maintaining those obligations for
entities that no longer receive federal high-cost universal service
funding, just as the Commission intends to explore the necessity of
maintaining ETC obligations when ETCs no longer are receiving funding.
For example, states could consider providing state support directly to
the incumbent LEC to continue providing voice service in areas where
the incumbent is no longer receiving federal high-cost universal
service support or, alternatively, could shift COLR obligations from
the existing incumbent to another provider who is receiving federal or
state universal service support in the future.
35. Voice Rates. The Commission will consider rural rates for voice
service to be ``reasonably comparable'' to urban voice rates under 47
U.S.C. 254(b)(3) if rural rates fall within a reasonable range of urban
rates for reasonably comparable voice service. Consistent with the
existing precedent, the Commission will presume that a voice rate is
within a reasonable range if it falls within two standard deviations
above the national average.
36. Because the data used to calculate the national average price
for voice service is out of date, the Commission directs the Wireline
Competition Bureau and the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau to
develop and conduct an annual survey of voice rates in order to compare
urban voice rates to the rural voice rates that ETCs will be reporting
to us. The results of this survey will be published annually. For
purposes of conducting the survey, the Bureaus should develop a
methodology to survey a representative sample of facilities-based fixed
voice service providers taking into account the relative categories of
fixed voice providers as determined in the most recent FCC Form 477
data collection. In the USF/
[[Page 81567]]
ICC Transformation FNPRM, the Commission seeks comment on whether to
collect separate data on fixed and mobile voice rates and whether fixed
and mobile voice services should have different benchmarks for purposes
of determining reasonable comparability.
B. Broadband Service
37. As a condition of receiving federal high-cost universal service
support, all ETCs, whether designated by a state commission or the
Commission, will be required to offer broadband service in their
supported area that meets certain basic performance requirements and to
report regularly on associated performance measures. Although the
Commission does not at this time require it, the Commission expects
that ETCs that offer standalone broadband service in any portion of
their service territory will also offer such service in all areas that
receive CAF support. By standalone service, the Commission means that
consumers are not required to purchase any other service (e.g., voice
or video) in order to purchase broadband service. ETCs must make this
broadband service available at rates that are reasonably comparable to
offerings of comparable broadband services in urban areas.
38. In developing these performance requirements, the Commission
seeks to ensure that the performance of broadband available in rural
and high cost areas is ``reasonably comparable'' to that available in
urban areas. All Americans should have access to broadband that is
capable of enabling the kinds of key applications that drive efforts to
achieve universal broadband, including education (e.g., distance/online
learning), health care (e.g., remote health monitoring), and person-to-
person communications (e.g., VoIP or online video chat with loved ones
serving overseas).
1. Broadband Performance Metrics
39. Broadband services in the market today vary along several
important dimensions. As discussed more fully below, the Commission
focuses on speed, latency, and capacity as three core characteristics
that affect what consumers can do with their broadband service, and the
Commission therefore includes requirements related to these three
characteristics in defining ETCs' broadband service obligations.
40. For each of these characteristics, the Commission requires that
funding recipients offer service that is reasonably comparable to
comparable services offered in urban areas. By limiting reasonable
comparability to ``comparable services,'' the Commission is intending
to ensure that fixed broadband services in rural areas are compared to
fixed broadband services in urban areas and mobile broadband services
in rural areas are compared to mobile broadband services in rural
areas. The actual download and upload speeds, latency, and usage limits
(if any) for providers' broadband must be reasonably comparable to the
typical speeds, latency, and usage limits (if any) of comparable
broadband services in urban areas. Funding recipients may use any
wireline, wireless, terrestrial, or satellite technology, or
combination of technologies, to deliver service that satisfies this
requirement.
41. Speed. Users and providers commonly refer to the bandwidth of a
broadband connection as its ``speed.'' The bandwidth (speed) of a
connection indicates the rate at which information can be transmitted
by that connection, typically measured in bits, kilobits (kbps), or
megabits per second (Mbps). The speed of consumers' broadband
connections affects their ability to access and utilize Internet
applications and content. To ensure that consumers are getting the full
benefit of broadband, the Commission requires funding recipients to
provide broadband that meets performance metrics for actual speeds,
measured as described below, rather than ``advertised'' or ``up to''
metrics.
42. In the past two Broadband Progress Reports, the Commission
found that the availability of residential broadband connections that
actually enable an end user to download content from the Internet at 4
Mbps and to upload such content at 1 Mbps over the broadband provider's
network was a reasonable benchmark for the availability of ``advanced
telecommunications capability,'' defined by the statute as ``high-
speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability that enables
users to originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and
video telecommunications using any technology.'' This conclusion was
based on the Commission's examination of overall Internet traffic
patterns, which revealed that consumers increasingly are using their
broadband connections to view high-quality video, and want to be able
to do so while still using basic functions such as email and web
browsing. The evidence shows that streaming standard definition video
in near real-time consumes anywhere from 1-5 Mbps, depending on a
variety of factors. This conclusion also was drawn from the National
Broadband Plan, which, based on an analysis of user behavior, demands
this usage places on the network, and recent experience in network
evolution, recommended as a national broadband availability target that
every household in America have access to affordable broadband service
offering actual download speeds of at least 4 Mbps and actual upload
speeds of at least 1 Mbps.
43. Given the foregoing, other than for the Phase I Mobility Fund,
the Commission adopts an initial minimum broadband speed benchmark for
CAF recipients of 4 Mbps downstream and 1 Mbps upstream. Broadband
connections that meet this speed threshold will provide subscribers in
rural and high cost areas with the ability to use critical broadband
applications in a manner reasonably comparable to broadband subscribers
in urban areas. Requiring 4 Mbps/1 Mbps to be provided to all
locations, including the more distant locations on a landline network
and regardless of the served location's position in a wireless network,
implies that customers located closer to the wireline switch or
wireless tower will be capable of receiving service in excess of the
this minimum standard.
44. Some commenters, including DSL and mobile wireless broadband
providers, observe that the 1 Mbps upload speed requirement in
particular could impose costs well in excess of the benefits of 1 Mbps
versus 768 kilobits per second (kbps) upstream. In general, the
Commission expects new installations to provide speeds of at least 1
Mbps upstream. However, to the extent a CAF recipient can demonstrate
that support is insufficient to enable 1 Mbps upstream for all
locations, temporary waivers of the upstream requirement for some
locations will be available. The Commission delegates authority to the
Wireline Competition Bureau and Wireless Telecommunications Bureau to
address such waiver requests. The Commission expects that those
facilities that are not currently capable of providing the minimum
upstream speed will eventually be upgraded, consistent with the build-
out requirements adopted below, with scalable technology capable of
meeting future speed increases.
45. Latency. Latency is a measure of the time it takes for a packet
of data to travel from one point to another in a network. Because many
communication protocols depend on an acknowledgement that packets were
received successfully, or otherwise involve transmission of data
packets back and forth along a path in the network, latency is often
measured by round-trip time in milliseconds. Latency affects a
consumer's ability to use real-time applications, including interactive
[[Page 81568]]
voice or video communication, over the network. The Commission requires
ETCs to offer sufficiently low latency to enable use of real-time
applications, such as VoIP. The Commission's broadband measurement test
results showed that most terrestrial wireline technologies could
reliably provide latency of less than 100 milliseconds.
46. Capacity. Capacity is the total volume of data sent and/or
received by the end user over a period of time. It is often measured in
gigabytes (GB) per month. Several broadband providers have imposed
monthly data usage limits, restricting users to a predetermined
quantity of data, and these limits typically vary between fixed and
mobile services. The terms of service may include an overage fee if a
consumer exceeds the monthly limit. Some commenters recommended the
Commission specifies a minimum usage limit.
47. Although at this time the Commission declines to adopt specific
minimum capacity requirements for CAF recipients, the Commission
emphasizes that any usage limits imposed by an ETC on its USF-supported
broadband offering must be reasonably comparable to usage limits for
comparable broadband offerings in urban areas (which could include, for
instance, use of a wireless data card if it can provide the performance
characteristics described herein). In particular, ETCs whose support is
predicated on offering of a fixed broadband service--namely, all ETCs
other than recipients of the Phase I Mobility Funds--must allow usage
at levels comparable to residential terrestrial fixed broadband service
in urban areas. The Commission defines terrestrial fixed broadband
service as one that serves end users primarily at fixed endpoints using
stationary equipment, such as the modem that connects an end user's
home router, computer or other Internet access device to the network.
This term includes fixed wireless broadband services (including those
offered over unlicensed spectrum).
48. In 2009, residential broadband users who subscribed to fixed
broadband service with speeds between 3 Mbps and 5 Mbps used, on
average, 10 GB of capacity per month, and annual per-user growth was
between 30 and 35 percent. AT&T's DSL usage limit is 150 GB and its U-
Verse offering has a 250 GB limit. Since 2008, Comcast has had a 250 GB
monthly data usage threshold on residential accounts. Without endorsing
or approving of these or other usage limits, the Commission provides
guidance by noting that a usage limit significantly below these current
offerings (e.g., a 10 GB monthly data limit) would not be reasonably
comparable to residential terrestrial fixed broadband in urban areas.
(This should not be interpreted to mean that the Commission intends to
regulate usage limits.) A 250 GB monthly data limit for CAF-funded
fixed broadband offerings would likely be adequate at this time because
250 GB appears to be reasonably comparable to major current urban
broadband offerings. The Commission recognizes, however, that both
pricing and usage limitations change over time. The Commission
delegates authority to the Wireline Competition Bureau and Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau to monitor urban broadband offerings,
including by conducting an annual survey, in order to specify an
appropriate minimum for usage allowances, and to adjust such a minimum
over time.
49. Similarly, for Mobility Fund Phase I, the Commission declines
to adopt a specific minimum capacity requirement that supported
providers must offer mobile broadband users. However, the Commission
emphasizes that any usage limits imposed by a provider on its mobile
broadband offerings supported by the Mobility Fund must be reasonably
comparable to any usage limits for mobile comparable broadband
offerings in urban areas.
50. Areas with No Terrestrial Backhaul. Recognizing that satellite
backhaul may limit the performance of broadband networks as compared to
terrestrial backhaul, the Commission relaxes the broadband public
interest obligation for carriers providing fixed broadband that are
compelled to use satellite backhaul facilities. The Regulatory
Commission of Alaska reports that ``for many areas of Alaska, satellite
links may be the only viable option to deploy broadband.'' Carriers
seeking relaxed public interest obligations because they lack the
ability to obtain terrestrial backhaul--either fiber, microwave, or
other technology--and are therefore compelled to rely exclusively on
satellite backhaul in their study area, must certify annually that no
terrestrial backhaul options exist, and that they are unable to satisfy
the broadband public interest obligations adopted above due to the
limited functionality of the available satellite backhaul facilities.
Any such funding recipients must offer broadband service speeds of at
least 1 Mbps downstream and 256 kbps upstream within the supported area
served by satellite middle-mile facilities. Latency and capacity
requirements discussed above will not apply to this subset of
providers. Buildout obligations--which are dependent on the mechanism
by which a carrier receives funding--remain the same for this class of
carriers. The Commission will monitor and review the public interest
obligations for satellite backhaul areas. To the extent that new
terrestrial backhaul facilities are constructed, or existing facilities
improve sufficiently to meet the public interest obligations, the
Commission requires funding recipients to satisfy the relevant
broadband public interest obligations in full within twelve months of
the new backhaul facilities becoming commercially available. This
limited exemption is only available to providers that have no access in
their study area to any terrestrial backhaul facilities, and does not
apply to any providers that object to the cost of backhaul facilities.
Similarly, providers relying on terrestrial backhaul facilities today
will not be allowed this exemption if they elect to transition to
satellite backhaul facilities.
51. Community Anchor Institutions. The Commission expects that ETCs
will likely offer broadband at greater speeds to community anchor
institutions in rural and high cost areas, although the Commission does
not set requirements at this time, as the 4 Mbps/1 Mbps standard will
be met in the more rural areas of an ETC's service territory, and
community anchor institutions are typically located in or near small
towns and more inhabited areas of rural America. There is nothing in
this R&O that requires a carrier to provide broadband service to a
community anchor institution at a certain rate, but the Commission
acknowledges that community anchor institutions generally require more
bandwidth than a residential customer, and expect that ETCs would
provide higher bandwidth offerings to community anchor institutions in
high-cost areas at rates that are reasonably comparable to comparable
offerings to community anchor institutions in urban areas.
52. The Commission also expects ETCs to engage with community
anchor institutions in the network planning stages with respect to the
deployment of CAF-supported networks. The Commission requires ETCs to
identify and report on the community anchor institutions that newly
gain access to fixed broadband service as a result of CAF support. In
addition, the Wireline Competition Bureau will invite further input on
the unique needs of community anchor institutions as it develops a
forward-looking cost model to estimate the cost of serving locations,
including community anchor locations, in price cap territories.
[[Page 81569]]
53. Broadband Buildout Obligations. All CAF funding comes with
obligations to build out broadband within an ETC's service area,
subject to certain limitations. The timing and extent of these
obligations varies across the different CAF mechanisms. However, all
broadband buildout obligations for fixed broadband are conditioned on
not spending the funds to serve customers in areas already served by an
``unsubsidized competitor.'' The Commission defines an unsubsidized
competitor as a facilities-based provider of residential terrestrial
fixed voice and broadband service. The best data available at this time
to determine whether broadband is available from an unsubsidized
competitor at speeds at or above the 4 Mbps/1 Mbps speed threshold will
likely be data on broadband availability at 3 Mbps downstream and 768
kbps upstream, which is collected for the National Broadband Map and
through the Commission's Form 477. Such data may therefore be used as a
proxy for the availability of 4 Mbps/1 Mbps broadband. Depending on the
anticipated reform to the Form 477 data collection, the Commission may
have additional data in the future upon which the Commission may rely.
54. The Commission limits this definition to fixed, terrestrial
providers because the Commission thinks these limitations will
disqualify few, if any, broadband providers that meet CAF speed,
capacity, or latency minimums for all locations within relevant areas
of comparison, while significantly easing administration of the
definition. For example, the record suggests that satellite providers
are generally unable to provide affordable voice and broadband service
that meets the minimum capacity requirements without the aid of a
subsidy: Consumer satellite services have limited capacity allowances
today, and future satellite services appear unlikely to offer capacity
reasonably comparable to urban offerings in the absence of universal
service support. Likewise, while 4G mobile broadband services may meet
the speed requirements in many locations, meeting minimum speed and
capacity guarantees is likely to prove challenging over larger areas,
particularly indoors. And because the performance offered by mobile
services varies by location, it would be very difficult and costly for
a CAF recipient or the Commission to evaluate whether such a service
met the performance requirements at all homes and businesses within a
study area, census block, or other required area. A wireless provider
that currently offers mobile service can become an ``unsubsidized
competitor,'' however, by offering a fixed wireless service that
guarantees speed, capacity, and latency minimums will be met at all
locations with the relevant area. Taken together, these considerations
persuade us that the advantages of limiting the definition of
unsubsidized providers outweigh any potential concerns that the
Commission may unduly disqualify service providers that otherwise meet
the performance requirements. As mobile and satellite services develop
over time, the Commission will revisit the definition of ``unsubsidized
competitor'' as warranted. Recognizing the benefits of certainty,
however, the Commission does not anticipate changing the definition for
the next few years.
55. Because most of these funding mechanisms are aimed at
immediately narrowing broadband deployment gaps, both fixed and mobile,
their performance benchmarks reflect technical capabilities and user
needs that are expected at this time to be suitable for today and the
next few years. However, the Commission must also lay the groundwork
for longer-term evolution of CAF broadband obligations, as the
Commission expects technical capabilities and user needs will continue
to evolve. The Commission therefore commits to monitoring trends in the
performance of urban broadband offerings through the survey data the
Commission will collect and rural broadband offerings through the
reporting data the Commission will collect, and to initiating a
proceeding no later than the end of 2014 to review the performance
requirements and ensure that CAF continues to support broadband service
that is reasonably comparable to broadband service in urban areas.
56. In advance of that future proceeding, the Commission relies on
its predictive judgment to provide guidance to CAF recipients on
metrics that will satisfy the expectation that they invest the public's
funds in robust, scalable broadband networks. The National Broadband
Plan estimated that by 2017, average advertised speeds for residential
broadband would be approximately 5.76 Mbps downstream. Applying growth
rates measured by Akamai, one finds a projected average actual
downstream speed by 2017 of 5.2 Mbps, and a projected average actual
peak downstream speed of 6.86 Mbps.
57. Based on these projections, the Commission establishes a
benchmark of 6 Mbps downstream and 1.5 Mbps upstream for broadband
deployments in later years of CAF Phase II.
2. Measuring and Reporting Broadband
58. The Commission will require recipients of funding to test their
broadband networks for compliance with speed and latency metrics and
certify to and report the results to the Universal Service
Administrative Company (USAC) on an annual basis. These results will be
subject to audit. In addition, as part of the federal-state partnership
for universal service, the Commission expects and encourage states to
assist us in monitoring and compliance and therefore require funding
recipients to send a copy of their annual broadband performance report
to the relevant state or Tribal government.
59. Commenters generally supported testing and reporting of
broadband performance. While some preferred only certifications without
periodic testing, the Commission finds that requiring ETCs to submit
verifiable test results to USAC and the relevant state commissions will
strengthen the ability of this Commission and the states to ensure that
ETCs that receive universal service funding are providing at least the
minimum broadband speeds, and thereby using support for its intended
purpose as required by 47 U.S.C. 254(e).
60. The Commission adopts the proposal in the USF/ICC
Transformation NPRM that actual speed and latency be measured on each
ETC's access network from the end-user interface to the nearest
Internet access point. The end-user interface end-point would be the
modem, the customer premise equipment typically managed by a broadband
provider as the last connection point to the managed network, while the
nearest Internet access point end-point would be the Internet gateway,
the closest peering point between the broadband provider and the public
Internet for a given consumer connection. The results of Commission
testing of wired networks suggest that ``broadband performance that
falls short of expectations is caused primarily by the segment of an
ISP's network from the consumer gateway to the ISP's core network.''
61. In the USF/ICC Transformation FNPRM, the Commission seeks
further comment on the specific methodology ETCs should use to measure
the performance of their broadband services subject to these general
guidelines, and the format in which funding recipients should report
their results. The Commission directs the Wireline Competition Bureau,
the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, and the Office of Engineering
and Technology to work together to refine the methodology
[[Page 81570]]
for such testing, which the Commission anticipates will be implemented
in 2013.
3. Reasonably Comparable Rates for Broadband Service
62. As with voice services, for broadband services the Commission
will consider rural rates to be ``reasonably comparable'' to urban
rates under 47 U.S.C. 254(b)(3) if rural rates fall within a reasonable
range of urban rates for reasonably comparable broadband service.
However, the Commission has never compared broadband rates for purposes
of 47 U.S.C. 254(b)(3), and therefore the Commission directs the
Bureaus to develop a specific methodology for defining that reasonable
range, taking into account that retail broadband service is not rate
regulated and that retail offerings may be defined by price, speed,
usage limits, if any, and other elements. In the USF/ICC Transformation
FNPRM, the Commission seeks comment on how specifically to define a
reasonable range.
63. The Commission also delegates to the Wireline Competition
Bureau and Wireless Telecommunications Bureau the authority to conduct
an annual survey of urban broadband rates, if necessary, in order to
derive a national range of rates for broadband service. The Commission
does not currently have sufficient data to establish such a range for
broadband pricing, and are unaware of any adequate third-party sources
of data for the relevant levels of service to be compared. The
Commission therefore delegates authority to the Bureaus to determine
the appropriate components of such a survey. By conducting its own
survey, the Commission believes it will be able to tailor the data
specifically to the need to satisfy the statutory obligation. The
Commission requires recipients of funding to provide information
regarding their pricing for service offerings, as described more fully
below. The Commission also encourages input from the states and other
stakeholders as the Bureaus develop the survey.
V. Establishing the Connect America Fund
A. The Budget
64. Discussion. For the first time, the Commission now establishes
a defined budget for the high-cost component of the universal service
fund. For purposes of this budget, the term ``high-cost'' includes all
support mechanisms in place as of the date of this order, specifically,
high-cost loop support, safety net support, safety valve support, local
switching support, interstate common line support, high cost model
support, and interstate access support, as well as the new Connect
America Fund, which includes funding to support and advance networks
that provide voice and broadband services, both fixed and mobile, and
funding provided in conjunction with the recovery mechanism adopted as
part of intercarrier compensation reform.
65. The Commission believes the establishment of such a budget will
best ensure that the Commission has in place ``specific, predictable,
and sufficient'' funding mechanisms to achieve the universal service
objectives. The Commission is taking important steps to control costs
and improve accountability in USF, and the estimates of the funding
necessary for components of the CAF and legacy high-cost mechanisms
represent its predictive judgment as to how best to allocate limited
resources at this time. The Commission anticipates that it may revisit
and adjust accordingly the appropriate size of each of these programs
by the end of the six-year period the Commission budgets for today,
based on market developments, efficiencies realized, and further
evaluation of the effect of these programs in achieving the goals.
66. Importantly, establishing a CAF budget ensures that individual
consumers will not pay more in contributions due to these reforms.
Indeed, were the CAF to significantly raise the end-user cost of
services, it could undermine the broader policy objectives to promote
broadband and mobile deployment and adoption.
67. The Commission therefore establishes an annual funding target,
set at the same level as the current estimate for the size of the high-
cost program for FY 2011, of no more than $4.5 billion. The $4