Hours of Service of Drivers, 81134-81188 [2011-32696]

Agencies

• Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 248 (Tuesday, December 27, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 81134-81188]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-32696]



[[Page 81133]]

Vol. 76

Tuesday,

No. 248

December 27, 2011

Part IV





Department of Transportation





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Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration





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49 CFR Parts 385, 386, 390, et al.





Hours of Service of Drivers; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 248 / Tuesday, December 27, 2011 / 
Rules and Regulations

[[Page 81134]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 385, 386, 390, and 395

[Docket No. FMCSA-2004-19608]
RIN 2126-AB26


Hours of Service of Drivers

AGENCY: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: FMCSA revises the hours of service (HOS) regulations to limit 
the use of the 34-hour restart provision to once every 168 hours and to 
require that anyone using the 34-hour restart provision have as part of 
the restart two periods that include 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. It also includes 
a provision that allows truckers to drive if they have had a break of 
at least 30 minutes, at a time of their choosing, sometime within the 
previous 8 hours. This rule does not include a change to the daily 
driving limit because the Agency is unable to definitively demonstrate 
that a 10-hour limit--which it favored in the notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM)--would have higher net benefits than an 11-hour 
limit. The current 11-hour limit is therefore unchanged at this time. 
The 60- and 70-hour limits are also unchanged. The purpose of the rule 
is to limit the ability of drivers to work the maximum number of hours 
currently allowed, or close to the maximum, on a continuing basis to 
reduce the possibility of driver fatigue. Long daily and weekly hours 
are associated with an increased risk of crashes and with the chronic 
health conditions associated with lack of sleep. These changes will 
affect only the small minority of drivers who regularly work the longer 
hours.

DATES: Effective date: February 27, 2012.
    Compliance date: The rule changes that affect Appendix B to Part 
386--Penalty Schedule; Violations and Monetary Penalties; the oilfield 
exemption in Sec.  395.1(d)(2); and the definition of on-duty time in 
Sec.  395.2 must be complied with on the effective date. Compliance for 
all the other rule changes is not required until July 1, 2013.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Thomas Yager, Chief, Driver and 
Carrier Operations Division, Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey 
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (202) 366-4325.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents

I. Summary
    A. Overview
    B. Proposed Rule
    C. Final Rule
    D. Summary of Economic Impacts
    E. Overview of Major Comments and Agency Responses
II. Legal Basis
III. Background and Description of the Trucking Industry
IV. Discussion of All Comments
    A. Safety
    B. Economic Impacts
    C. Sleep Loss and Chronic Fatigue
    D. New Research Studies
    E. Driving Time Limits
    F. 30-Minute Break Provision
    G. Restart
    H. Duty Period/Driving Window
    I. Paragraphs 395.1(e)(2) and (o)
    J. On-Duty Definition
    K. Penalties
    L. Compliance Dates
    M. Other Comments
    N. Beyond the Scope
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
VI. Required Analyses
    A. Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. National Environmental Policy Act
    E. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
    F. Privacy Impact Assessment
    G. Executive Order 12630 (Taking of Private Property)
    H. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)
    I. Executive Order 13045 (Protection of Children)
    J. Executive Order 13211 (Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use)
    K. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)
    L. Unfunded Mandate Reform Act
VII. Bibliography

I. Summary

A. Overview

    The goal of this rulemaking is to reduce excessively long work 
hours that increase both the risk of fatigue-related crashes and long-
term health problems for drivers. A rule cannot ensure that drivers 
will be rested, but it can ensure that they have enough time off to 
obtain adequate rest on a daily and weekly basis. The objective of the 
rule, therefore, is to reduce both acute and chronic fatigue by 
limiting the maximum number of hours per day and week that the drivers 
can work.
    The 2003 hours-of-service (HOS) rule shortened the driving window 
to 14 consecutive hours and increased the off-duty period from 8 to 10 
hours, but increased driving time from 10 to 11 hours and allowed 
drivers to restart their duty time calculations whenever they took at 
least 34 consecutive hours off. Limiting the driving window and 
increasing the daily off-duty period reduced the risk that a driver 
would be driving so long after the start of the duty day that acute 
fatigue would be extreme. It also moved drivers toward a 24-hour daily 
clock, which is people's normal pattern, reducing the risk of fatigue 
caused from continually changing sleep periods. The 2003 rule, however, 
allowed drivers to work 14 hours without a break and to work 80 or more 
hours a week, a substantial increase from the previous rule, which 
allowed about 60 hours in 7 days.
    Since the 2003 rule was promulgated, new research studies have 
demonstrated that long work hours, both daily and weekly, lead to 
reduced sleep and, in the absence of sufficient recovery time, chronic 
fatigue. Fatigued drivers have slowed reaction times and a reduced 
ability to assess situations quickly. The research has also shown that 
commercial motor vehicle (CMV) drivers (like most other people) are 
unable to assess their own fatigue levels accurately and are, 
therefore, often unaware that their performance has degraded. When 
driving an 80,000-pound CMV at highway speeds, any delay in reacting to 
a potentially dangerous situation can be deadly. In addition to the 
safety concerns, recent research has linked long work hours and the 
resulting curtailment of sleep to a range of serious health effects, 
particularly when combined with a job that is basically sedentary, like 
truck driving. These health conditions--including obesity, high blood 
pressure, other cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, and sleep apnea--not 
only shorten drivers' lives, but also can result in substantial ongoing 
medical costs and put drivers' medical certifications at risk. CMV 
drivers suffer from these conditions at a higher rate than the 
population as a whole.
    Today's rule will reduce the risk of fatigue and fatigue-related 
crashes and the harm to driver health in several ways. While the rule 
allows a driver flexibility in when to take a mandatory 30 minute 
break, it prohibits a driver from driving if more than 8 hours have 
passed since the driver's last off-duty or sleeper berth break of at 
least 30 minutes; research indicates that such breaks alleviate fatigue 
and fatigue-related performance degradation. Because research has shown 
that long weekly work hours are associated with a higher risk of 
crashes, sleep loss, and negative health effects, the rule also limits 
the use of the restart to once a week, which, on average, will cut the 
maximum work week from 82 to 70 hours. The provision allows drivers to 
work intensely for one week, but will

[[Page 81135]]

require them to compensate by taking more time off in the following 
week. Research has long demonstrated that daytime sleep is shorter in 
duration and lower in quality than nighttime sleep. The rule requires 
any driver working long enough to need a restart to take off at least 
34 consecutive hours that include 2 periods between 1 a.m. and 5 a.m., 
the window of circadian low. This provision will give those drivers who 
both routinely work at night and put in very long work weeks an 
opportunity to overcome the chronic fatigue that can build up when 
working nights.
    FMCSA has been engaged in long-term rulemaking related to its hours 
of service regulations for commercial truck drivers. Like the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), FMCSA is working to address the 
universality of factors that lead to fatigue. However, the FAA has 
taken a different approach in addressing fatigue risk among pilots than 
FMCSA has with respect to commercial truck drivers. This is because the 
two industries operate differently both in terms of the likely number 
of days the affected individuals work per month and the respective 
operating environments. For example, pilots regularly cross multiple 
time zones in a very short period time--something that is simply not 
possible in other modes of transportation. Additionally, pilots may 
work several days that are very long, but then be off for an extended 
period of time, a practice that naturally imposes a non-regulatory 
restorative rest opportunity. Finally, the nature of commercial flying 
is such that under typical conditions, the actual operation is likely 
to require intense concentration primarily during take-offs and 
landings, with a constant, but generally predictable level of 
concentration required for other phases of flight.
    In contrast, commercial truck drivers face an environment where 
they are required to share the highways with drivers who have not 
received specialized training nor are they subject to the same 
regulatory constraints that pilots are subject to. This environment 
could logically lead to a regulatory approach with different fatigue 
mitigators for daytime operations on congested highways, compared to 
nighttime operations, where the roads are less crowded but the risk of 
fatigue is greater.
    In summary, the final rule will reduce the likelihood of driver 
fatigue, fatigue-related crashes, and fatigue-related health effects. 
Although crash rates have been falling, thousands of people are still 
injured and killed in truck crashes each year, including hundreds of 
truck drivers. This rule will address one of the causes of those 
crashes. The Agency estimates that the benefits of the rule (reduction 
in crashes and improved driver health) will outweigh the costs. The 
cost of the rule represents a small fraction of one percent of trucking 
industry revenues and is the cost-equivalent of less than a 3 cent-a-
gallon increase in the price of diesel fuel to the long-haul industry.

B. Proposed Rule

    On December 29, 2010, FMCSA published a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM) to revise the HOS rules (75 FR 82170). The Agency 
sought comment on both a 10- and an 11-hour daily driving limit. The 
NPRM proposed to retain the 34-hour restart, but with two 
qualifications: The restart must include two consecutive periods 
between midnight and 6 a.m. and could be used only once every 168 hours 
(7 days). It also proposed that drivers be limited to 13 hours on duty 
in each 14-hour driving window. Many drivers would be required to take 
at least one half-hour break during their work shift. FMCSA also 
proposed that twice a week, drivers would be allowed to extend the 
driving window to 16 hours, but could not work more than a maximum of 
13 hours in that time. FMCSA also proposed changing the definition of 
on-duty time to allow team drivers to log 2 hours in the passenger seat 
before or after an 8-hour period in the sleeper berth as off-duty time 
and to allow drivers resting in a parked CMV to count that time as off 
duty. FMCSA would also have clarified the oilfield exemption and 
proposed a provision to allow, but not require, FMCSA to impose maximum 
penalties if the driving-time limit was exceeded by 3 hours. The NPRM 
included a long discussion of the research on fatigue and on issues 
related to long hours, fatigue, and health.
    On May 9, 2011, FMCSA reopened the comment period to accept 
comments on four studies related to the HOS proposal (76 FR 26681).

C. Final Rule

    Although the NPRM proposed both a 10- and an 11-hour daily driving 
limit, the Agency stated that it favored a 10-hour limit. However, this 
final rule does not adopt any change in the limit on daily driving 
time; the current 11-hour limit therefore remains unchanged.
    In the course of this rulemaking, FMCSA examined many studies on 
the relationship between work hours and health and safety, both in 
trucking and other industries; reviewed the comments and information 
submitted to the docket, mostly in opposition to a 10-hour driving 
limit; and completed elaborate analyses in accordance with Presidential 
Executive Order 13563, issued January 18, 2011, '' Improving Regulation 
and Regulatory Review,'' [76 FR 3821, January 21, 2011] of the costs 
and benefits to health and safety of 9-, 10-, and 11-hour driving 
limits.
    1. 9-Hour Driving Limit. The Agency found that a 9-hour driving 
limit generally has negative net benefits (i.e., its costs exceed its 
benefits). In most cases the 11-hour limit has positive net benefits. 
For these reasons, the Agency has not adopted a 9-hour driving limit.
    2. 10-Hour Driving Limit. The 10-hour limit has positive benefits 
in approximately half the cases, with the 11-hour limit having 
substantially higher net benefits than the 10-hour limit in most cases. 
A 10-hour limit, on the other hand, might save more lives and prevent 
more crashes than an 11-hour limit, but at a higher cost.
    The research literature on fatigue in the motor carrier industry 
generally shows that crash risk increases with work hours, both daily 
and weekly. The available data, however, are not sufficiently robust to 
yield a statistically significant distinction between the crash risk 
associated with any two adjacent hours of work.
    In the absence of compelling scientific evidence demonstrating the 
safety benefits of a 10-hour driving limit, as opposed to an 11-hour 
limit, and confronted with strong evidence that an 11-hour limit could 
well provide higher net benefits, the Agency has concluded that 
adequate and reasonable grounds under the Administrative Procedure Act 
for adopting a new regulation on this issue do not yet exist and that 
the current driving limit should therefore be allowed to stand for now. 
This is not to say that FMCSA is foreclosing the possibility of action 
on this subject; future research may provide a basis for reconsidering 
the daily driving limit. Consistent with Executive Order 13563, which 
directs agencies to ``measure, and seek to improve, the actual results 
of regulatory requirements,'' FMCSA is committed to conducting a 
comprehensive analysis of the relative crash risk by driving hour and 
the impact of the changes in the HOS provisions in today's final rule. 
The Agency plans to match data collected from driver logs with crash 
information to determine the level of crash risk by hours of driving. 
The Agency also plans to estimate, for similarly situated drivers, the 
difference between crash risk after restarts that include two nights 
and those that do not. Additionally, the Agency is committed to 
conducting

[[Page 81136]]

periodic driver surveys to longitudinally track how the changes in the 
HOS provisions, such as the two-night restart, have impacted sleep 
patterns and aspects of driver fatigue and performance. FMCSA will work 
with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on the methodologies of 
these new statistical data collections. These efforts will build on 
several planned and ongoing FMCSA driver fatigue-related studies such 
as the on-board monitoring field test/naturalistic data collection, 
split sleep study, driver recovery and napping study, and the planned 
new large truck crash causation study.
    This decision also is consistent with the President's E.O. 13563 
and his concurrent memorandum for the heads of executive departments 
and agencies entitled ``Regulatory Flexibility, Small Business, and Job 
Creation'' [76 FR 3827, January 21, 2011]. As the President stated in 
the latter document, ``My Administration is firmly committed to 
eliminating excessive and unjustified burdens on small businesses, and 
to ensuring that regulations are designed with careful consideration of 
their effects, including their cumulative effects, on small 
businesses.'' This order is particularly important for the trucking 
industry, which has a higher percentage of small businesses than many 
other segments of the U.S. economy.
    3. Thirty-Minute Break. In response to commenters' concerns, FMCSA 
adopts a slightly modified form of the break proposed in the NPRM. 
Research with drivers and in other industrial sectors indicates that 
the risk of accidents falls substantially after a break, with off-duty 
breaks providing the greatest reduction in risk. The final rule 
requires that if more than 8 consecutive hours on duty--compared to 7 
hours in the NPRM--have passed since the last off-duty (or sleeper-
berth) period of at least half an hour, a driver must take a break of 
at least 30 minutes before driving. For example, if the driver started 
driving immediately after coming on duty, he or she could drive for 8 
consecutive hours, take a half-hour break, and then drive another 3 
hours, for a total of 11 hours. Alternatively, this driver could drive 
for 3 hours, take a half-hour break, and then drive another 8 hours, 
for a total of 11 hours. In other words, this driver could take the 
required break anywhere between the 3rd and 8th hour after coming on 
duty. A driver who plans to drive until the end of the 14th hour and 
wants to take only one break will need to take a break between the 6th 
and 8th hour after coming on duty. Drivers will have great flexibility 
in deciding when to take the break. By postponing the latest point at 
which the break can be taken from the 7th to the 8th hour, the rule 
will make it significantly easier for team drivers to fit the break 
into their schedules. To address an issue raised by commenters, FMCSA 
has also added an exception for drivers of CMVs carrying Division 1.1, 
1.2, or 1.3 explosives to allow them to count on-duty time spent 
attending the CMV, but doing no other on-duty work, toward the break.
    4. 14-Hour Driving Window. The maximum driving window will continue 
to be 14 consecutive hours after coming on duty. To address commenters' 
concerns about complexity, FMCSA has dropped the proposed 13-hour limit 
for on-duty time within the 14 hours to simplify the rule. Because of 
the break provision, drivers will be able to work 13.5 hours in the 14 
hour period (if they are driving after the 8th hour on duty).
    5. Mandatory Off-Duty Requirement at the End of the Driving Window. 
FMCSA has not adopted the proposal that drivers be required to go off-
duty at the end of the 14th hour. Neither the costs nor the benefits of 
the provision could be adequately analyzed.
    6. Twice Weekly Extension of the Driving Window. FMCSA did not 
adopt the proposed extension of the duty period to 16 hours twice a 
week. The same new research on drivers since the NPRM was completed 
indicates this provision should not be adopted. (See Section IV. 
``Discussion of All Comments'' D. ``New Research Studies'' below.) 
Driving in the 16th hour after coming on duty entails a sharply higher 
risk of crashes than driving in early hours of a duty day. In addition, 
industry commenters were divided on the provision and generally 
skeptical that the provision would be useful.
    The final rule retains provisions in paragraphs (e)(2) and (o) of 
Sec.  395.1, which apply to local and regional operations. The NPRM 
sought comments on eliminating these paragraphs because they might have 
caused confusion with the proposed 16-hour provision. Because FMCSA has 
dropped the proposed 16-hour provision, the concerns about confusion 
are moot.
    7. Restart Provisions. The final rule adopts the restart provision 
with one variation. The restart must cover at least 34 consecutive 
hours and include at least two periods between 1 a.m. and 5 a.m., not 
two periods between midnight and 6 a.m. as proposed in the NPRM. 
Although both alternatives cover most estimates of when the window of 
circadian low occurs, the 4-hour period addresses concerns drivers 
raised in the comment period by giving drivers greater flexibility in 
ending and beginning the restart than the proposed 6-hour period. This 
provision does not affect day drivers, who always get two such periods 
in a 34-hour restart, but ensures that night drivers have an 
opportunity for 2 nights of restorative sleep when they are working 
longer hours. The 2-night provision does not affect drivers who are not 
using the restart to work extra hours. The Agency believes the costs 
are low compared to other provisions considered in this rulemaking. 
Only drivers who drive nights and work more than 60 or 70 hours in a 
week will be impacted. The nighttime operations of the major Less-than-
Truckload (LTL) carriers should be minimally impacted, as their drivers 
generally receive 2 days off duty a week. Drivers who will be impacted 
by this provision work heavy and irregular schedules that include some 
nighttime driving.
    FMCSA adopts the proposed provision to limit the use of the restart 
to once every 168 hours (7 days); this allows drivers to work long 
hours (81 hours) in 1 week but requires them to compensate in the 
subsequent week by taking extra time off. The limitation reduces 
maximum time during which a driver may drive up to an average of 70 
hours in 7 days, a decrease from the 82-hour average allowed under the 
2003 rule. The purpose of the rule change is to limit work to no more 
than 70 hours a week on average. Working long daily and weekly hours on 
a continuing basis is associated with chronic fatigue, a high risk of 
crashes, and a number of serious chronic health conditions.
    This final rule adopts the definition of on-duty time as proposed 
except to add a reference to Sec.  397.5. The final rule also adopts 
the clarification of the oilfield exemption and penalty provisions.
    A more in-depth rationale for each of these provisions is presented 
in the responses to comments in Section IV ``Discussion of All 
Comments'' of this preamble.

D. Summary of Economic Impacts

    The Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) analyzed three options beyond 
the baseline (no change) option. Option 3 has an 11-hour driving-time 
limit; it would require the driver to take a rest break during the day 
and reduce the weekly maximum driving and on-duty time theoretically 
achievable. Options 2 and 4 are identical to Option 3 in all respects 
except for the amount of driving time allowed. Option 2 has an 10-hour 
driving-time limit, while Option 4 has a 9-hour driving-time limit. 
Option 2 (10 hours) would have a productivity impact of approximately

[[Page 81137]]

2.7 percent. That is, we estimate that productivity in the industry 
would be reduced by 2.7 percent due to adoption of this option. Option 
3 (11 hours) would have a productivity impact of 1.2 percent. The 
Agency's cost estimate for Option 3 is less than one third of one 
percent of industry revenues. Option 4 (9 hours) would involve much 
higher costs. Tables 1 and 2 provide a summary of the estimated costs, 
benefits, and net benefits at 3 and 7 percent discount rates. The RIA 
is discussed in Section VI ``Required Analyses'' A. ``Executive Order 
12866 and Executive Order 13563'' of this preamble and is available in 
the docket.
    The RIA also estimated the impacts of the HOS rule components 
individually. To estimate the impacts of the rule provisions, we 
consider the overlapping effects of the individual rule components to 
ensure that the impacts of one provision are not also attributed to a 
second provision. Because this analysis accounts for the individual 
impact of the rule provisions, the sum of the individual provisions is 
greater than the combined impact of the rule provisions. Table 3 
summarizes these differences, rounded to the nearest million to 
demonstrate the similarity in net benefits for some of these 
alternatives. Option 3, with all three provisions analyzed as a 
package, is shown to have net benefits of $205 million. This 
calculation does not include the $40 million FMCSA has estimated for 
reprogramming costs. That package with the 2 night provision removed 
(that is, including only the 7 day restart provision and the 30 minute 
break) appears to have marginally greater net benefits, at $206 
million. Not shown in the table, however, are the substantial 
unmonetized benefits the 2 night provision is expected to have due to 
the circadian advantages of nighttime sleep. As noted in Section 6.4 of 
the RIA, these additional benefits were too complex to be quantified 
and monetized reliably, but could only be beneficial both to driver 
health and to highway safety. They would almost certainly be large 
enough, though, to ensure that the net benefits of the rule are 
improved by the inclusion of the 2 night provision. Similarly, the net 
benefits of a package that excluded the 30 minute break provision 
appears to be slightly greater than the net benefits of the Option 3 
package, at $206 million. Again, the 30 minute break provision is 
expected to provide very substantial crash reduction benefits that 
could not be included in the analysis. These benefits, as noted in 
Section 6.4, are related to the short-term reductions in crashes 
provided by the break's restorative effects on alertness. If these 
short-term benefits could be monetized and added to the break's effects 
on cumulative fatigue, they would almost certainly show it to be a 
cost-beneficial addition to the rule. Table 3 also presents the 
difference for each option when the provisions are considered 
separately or as a package.
    These tables also make clear that under most assumptions about 
current sleep levels, moving to 10-hour driving time would result in 
lower net benefits, relative to an 11-hour driving time. Comparing 
Option 2 to Option 3, allowing only 10 hours of driving would increase 
costs substantially, without a commensurate increase in benefits.

          Table 1--Summary of Annualized Costs and Benefits for Rule Options (7 Percent Discount Rate)
                                                [Millions 2008$]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Option 2: 10      Option 3: 11       Option 4: 9
                                                            hours of driving  hours of driving  hours of driving
                                                                 allowed           allowed           allowed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Costs...............................................            $1,000              $470            $2,290
Benefits with Low Sleep...................................             1,410               910             2,240
Benefits with Medium Sleep................................               980               630             1,500
Benefits with High Sleep..................................               550               350               770
Net Benefits with Low Sleep...............................               400               440               -50
Net Benefits with Medium Sleep............................               -20               160              -790
Net Benefits with High Sleep..............................              -450              -120            -1,520
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals do not add due to rounding.


          Table 2--Summary of Annualized Costs and Benefits for Rule Options (3 Percent Discount Rate)
                                                [Millions 2008$]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   Option 2: 10    Option 3: 11     Option 4: 9
                                                                     hours of        hours of        hours of
                                                                      driving         driving         driving
                                                                      allowed         allowed         allowed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Costs.....................................................          $1,000            $470          $2,290
Benefits with Low Sleep.........................................           1,690           1,130           2,620
Benefits with Medium Sleep......................................           1,110             750           1,630
Benefits with High Sleep........................................             530             370             630
Net Benefits with Low Sleep.....................................             690             660             340
Net Benefits with Medium Sleep..................................             110             280             660
Net Benefits with High Sleep....................................            -470             -90          -1,650
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals do not add due to rounding.


[[Page 81138]]


   Table 3--Component and Interaction Costs, Benefits and Net Benefits For Option 3 (11-Hour Driving Allowed)
                                                [Millions 2008$]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                      Health
                                                                      Safety         benefits
                                                                   benefits (13    (medium sleep
        Change from current rule baseline             Costs *         percent        level, 7     Net benefits *
                                                                     fatigue)         percent
                                                                                   discounting)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7-day restart alone.............................            $342            $227            $318            $204
2-night restart alone...........................              51              35              38              22
30-minute break alone...........................              94              72              94              72
Sum of Option 3 provisions, taken separately....             487             334             450             297
Option 3 analyzed as a package..................             426             282             349             205
Overlap among Option 3 provisions (difference                 62              52             102              92
 between sum of separate provisions and package)
Sum of 7 day and 2 night provisions, taken                   393             262             356             225
 separately.....................................
7 day and 2 night provisions, analyzed as a                  393             260             340             206
 package........................................
Overlap between 7 day and 2 night provisions                   0               2              17              19
 (difference between sum of separate provisions
 and package)...................................
Sum of 7 day and 30 minute provisions, taken                 436             299             412             276
 separately.....................................
7 day and 30 minute provisions, analyzed as a                374             253             328             206
 package........................................
Overlap between 7 day and 30 minute provisions                62              47              84              69
 (difference between sum of separate provisions
 and package)...................................
Sum of 2 night and 30 minute provisions, taken               145             107             132              94
 separately.....................................
2 night and 30 minute provisions, analyzed as a              145              95             127              76
 package........................................
Overlap between 2 night and 30 minute provisions               0              12               5              17
 (difference between sum of separate provisions
 and package)...................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Does not include the $40 million in reprogramming costs.
Note: Totals do not add due to rounding.

E. Overview of Major Comments and Agency Responses

    FMCSA held a public listening session and an online comment and 
question forum from noon to midnight on February 17, 2011, and accepted 
comments, until June 8, 2011, on the NPRM and on four studies later 
posted to the docket. The Agency received about 21,100 unique comments, 
mostly from drivers, carriers, and industry associations. After FMCSA 
reopened the comment period on May 9, 2011, it received 14 comments on 
the four studies discussed in that notice. A summary of the comments 
and the Agency's responses are presented in Section IV ``Discussion of 
All Comments'' of this preamble. Table 4 presents the data on the 
number and type of commenters. Table 5 presents the number of comments 
on each issue. As indicated in the table, no single rule provision drew 
comments from a majority of commenters.

                                 Table 4--Analyzed Submissions by Commenter Type
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     Number of
                         Commenter type                               unique      Number of form   Total number
                                                                    submissions    letter copies  of submissions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Drivers.........................................................          18,875           2,209          21,084
Owner-Operators.................................................             273               3             276
Carriers........................................................             846             238           1,084
Individual Citizens.............................................             740             334           1,074
Other Industry..................................................              65               6              71
Trucking Associations...........................................              59               1              60
Other Trade Associations........................................              62               1              63
Federal Agency..................................................               5               0               5
Federal Elected Official........................................              21               2              23
State Government................................................               4               0               4
Law Enforcement.................................................               5               0               5
Safety Advocacy Group...........................................              10               0              10
Other Advocacy Group............................................               3               0               3
Anonymous.......................................................             113              10             123
Other...........................................................              25               2              27
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................          21,106           2,806          23,912
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals do not include 546 non-germane, non-responsive, or duplicate submissions.


[[Page 81139]]


                 Table 5--Issues Addressed by Commenters
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Number of unique
                         Issue                             submissions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Generally agree or disagree with the proposed rule:
    Agree (w/o substantive comment)...................               601
    Disagree (w/o substantive comment)................             8,028
Driving time..........................................             4,633
Breaks................................................             2,569
Duty time.............................................             3,112
Driving window........................................               598
Restart...............................................             4,776
On-duty definition:
    Support change to definition......................               109
    Oppose change to definition.......................                23
    Other comments on definition of on-duty...........                30
Sleeper berth:
    Oppose current rule (want shorter splits).........               594
    Oppose current rule (oppose any splits)...........                14
    Other comments on sleeper berth use...............               186
Penalties.............................................                66
Changes in Sec.   395.1(e)(2) and (o):
    Sec.   395.1(e)(2)................................                13
    Sec.   395(o).....................................                 4
Compliance dates......................................                 9
Cost-benefit analyses.................................               388
Impacts on the economy................................            10,343
Comments on fatigue research presented................                84
    Comments on additional fatigue studies posted on                  14
     May 6, 2011......................................
Comments on health research presented.................                24
Comments beyond the scope of the rule:
    Parking...........................................             1,028
    Payment by mile...................................               184
    Shippers..........................................               550
    Electronic On-Board Recorders (EOBRs).............               499
    Other out-of-scope issues.........................               785
Other comments........................................               679
    Request extension of comment period...............                 2
    Request public meetings/outreach..................                 3
    Oilfield exemption................................                44
    10-hour off-duty time (shorter, longer)...........               205
    One-size-fits-all (different rules for teams,                    442
     locals, etc.)....................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the National 
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), and safety 
advocacy groups generally supported the rule, as did many of the 
citizens who commented. The industry, however, almost uniformly opposed 
the proposed changes. The industry commenters made two overarching 
arguments in opposing the provisions. First, they argued that the 
industry has never been safer, as indicated by the declines in crashes 
and crash rates and, therefore, that the 2003 rule has at least not 
made the industry less safe. Second, they stated that the rule changes 
would impose substantial costs on the industry, make night deliveries 
difficult, increase congestion, and lower driver incomes.
    The industry also took the position that the 11th hour of driving 
time is used far less than FMCSA assumed in its economic analysis, that 
most drivers use the 34-hour restart provision to make recordkeeping 
easier and for flexibility, not to work the maximum number of hours, 
and that drivers already take breaks. The industry stated that the data 
do not support the claim that the 11th hour of driving represents a 
higher risk than the 10th.
    FMCSA acknowledged the decline in crashes and crash rates in the 
NPRM, but stated then, and reiterates now, that the decline in crashes 
and crash rates for both trucks and cars started in the late 1970s and 
has continued for both types of vehicles. The declines tend to be 
sharper during periods of economic recession, but other factors, such 
as improved vehicle and road design, are generally considered to have 
contributed to reductions. Furthermore, the significant decrease in 
truck crashes may not necessarily translate into significant decreases 
in fatigue-related crashes. FMCSA believes that the 2003 rule, which 
limited the duty period and lengthened the off-duty period, has 
certainly not diminished safety, but the recent declines in crashes 
cannot be specifically attributed to that rule. More importantly, 
despite the improvement, 3,380 people were killed in truck crashes in 
2009 (including 503 CMV drivers) and 74,000 were injured. Based on 
preliminary reports from the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), the number of fatalities for truck-related 
crashes in 2010 rose by 8.7 percent to 3,675. Although historically 
low, the numbers are still far too high.
    On the economic impact of the rule, industry comments and claims 
were internally contradictory (see Section IV. ``Discussion of All 
Comments,'' B. ``Economic Impacts'' of this preamble for a detailed 
discussion). The American Trucking Associations (ATA), other industry 
associations, carriers, and the economic analysis commissioned by ATA 
(Edgeworth) \1\ argued that

[[Page 81140]]

FMCSA's economic analysis had overstated the use of the 11th hour and 
restart provisions. ATA and other industry commenters argued that the 
low use of the provisions meant that fatigue was not a problem, but 
that changing the provisions would impose high costs. The Edgeworth 
study submitted by ATA, however, recognized that if the use of the 
provisions was less than FMCSA had estimated, both the costs and 
benefits of the rule would also be lower than FMCSA had estimated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ References to studies, reports, or other publications 
mentioned in this final rule use only the lead author's last name or 
another short descriptive reference that may be used by the reader 
to reference the material in the ``Bibliography'' in Section VII at 
the end of this preamble. The lead author's professional titles or 
degrees are not shown. For example, Edgeworth references a data 
source described fully in the bibliography section later in this 
final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In September 2010, ATA submitted data to the HOS docket based on 
analyses of duty time for drivers. In the first sample, ATA looked at 
records for 3 months for over 118,000 drivers, mostly from the 
truckload sector; the data indicated that drivers were averaging 43.6 
hours on duty in 7 days. In a smaller data set (149 drivers and records 
for 1 month), ATA reported that the drivers averaged 57.5 hours on duty 
in 8 days (which is the equivalent to 50.3 hours in 7 days). ATA 
concluded that drivers were using the restart not to maximize hours, 
but rather to take extended off-duty periods.\2\ If drivers are working 
as little as the ATA data and other comments indicate, the changes to 
the restart provision will have little impact because the provision 
only affects drivers who are working longer hours week after week. The 
restart does not simplify bookkeeping. Unless a driver knows that he is 
working less than 60 hours a week (e.g., a regular 10-hour day, 5 days 
a week), he must keep a running 7- or 8-day total of on-duty hours to 
be sure he is within the limits regardless of the restart provision or 
the changes this rule makes to it. If a driver takes 34 hours or more 
off, he simply has a new point from which to keep the total, but he 
still needs to keep track of his total hours if he could be pressing 
the limits. Many drivers do these calculations in their heads without 
needing to write them down. FMCSA believes that this provision will not 
result in a paperwork burden increase. If drivers are not using the 
restart to gain hours of work, their productivity will not be affected 
by today's rule. No one needs the restart to take the ``extended off-
duty period'' cited by ATA; the restart is only useful for drivers who 
are trying to minimize their off-duty time. Even those drivers will not 
have their work seriously curtailed in a single week. Under today's 
rule, a driver will still be able to work up to 81 hours in a single 
week and will be able to average 70 hours of work a week over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Stephenson, B., ATA, email to Tom Yager, FMCSA, September 8, 
2010. FMCSA-2004-19608-4026.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Industry claims that the 2-night requirement for drivers would 
affect nighttime deliveries and increase congestion are also 
unsupported. Given ATA's data, the substantial majority of drivers do 
not need the restart and would not be subject to the requirement. These 
drivers can continue to work their usual schedules, including making 
deliveries at night 7 days a week. Even drivers who are working maximum 
schedules will still be able to drive and make deliveries at night 5 
days a week.
    In general, although many industry commenters stated that they 
would suffer substantial economic impacts, they submitted no data or 
explanations. The rule will reduce maximum weekly driving time by no 
more than 5 percent for the few drivers who drive longer hours. It is 
difficult to see how these provisions, if they are used as little as 
industry stated, could produce reductions in revenues of 10 to 40 
percent as some commenters claimed, particularly given that drivers who 
do work the longest hours rarely are able to do so on a continuing 
basis. On the issue of driver incomes, only those drivers working the 
longest hours will lose income and then only if they have been able to 
drive long hours in consecutive weeks.
    On the health benefits of the rule, ATA submitted the opinion of 
one researcher who disputed the Agency's use of data in a study that 
the researcher co-authored dealing with the effect on mortality of 
improvements in sleep (Cappuccio). The lead author of the same study, 
however, supported FMCSA's analysis and considered it conservative 
(Ferrie). Industry commenters did not otherwise attempt to address the 
issue of the health impacts of long work hours and sleep loss. FMCSA 
notes that the industry chose to ignore an ever increasing body of 
research that links long hours of work to sleep loss and an increased 
risk of obesity, diabetes, and cardiovascular diseases.
    Similarly, on the risk of long hours in general, the industry 
dismissed the many studies, including the new research discussed below, 
that have found that risk increases with hours worked. Industry did not 
submit any statistically usable data on their own crash rates. NIOSH 
drew attention to the considerable body of research in other sectors 
that has also found that risk increases with hours worked. Like workers 
in other sectors, drivers are susceptible to fatigue, and, therefore, 
these other studies should be considered in weighing the evidence for 
increasing risk.
    In summary, the motor carrier industry did not provide evidence to 
support the dire economic consequences it claimed would flow from the 
Agency's HOS proposal. FMCSA believes that the changes adopted today 
are clearly supported by the evidence on the risk of fatigue and 
fatigue-related crashes associated with long daily and weekly hours, on 
the loss of sleep associated with long work hours, and the health 
effects associated with sleep loss.

II. Legal Basis

    This rule is based on the authority of the Motor Carrier Act of 
1935 and the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (1984 Act). The Motor 
Carrier Act of 1935 provides that ``The Secretary of Transportation may 
prescribe requirements for (1) qualifications and maximum hours of 
service of employees of, and safety of operation and equipment of, a 
motor carrier; and, (2) qualifications and maximum hours of service of 
employees of, and standards of equipment of, a motor private carrier, 
when needed to promote safety of operation'' (section 31502(b) of Title 
49 of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.)).
    The HOS regulations promulgated today concern the ``maximum hours 
of service of employees of * * * a motor carrier'' (49 U.S.C. 
31502(b)(1)) and the ``maximum hours of service of employees of * * * a 
motor private carrier'' (49 U.S.C. 31502(b)(2)). The adoption and 
enforcement of such rules were specifically authorized by the Motor 
Carrier Act of 1935. This rule rests on that authority.
    The 1984 Act provides concurrent authority to regulate drivers, 
motor carriers, and vehicle equipment. It requires the Secretary of 
Transportation to ``prescribe regulations on commercial motor vehicle 
safety. The regulations shall prescribe minimum safety standards for 
commercial motor vehicles.'' Although this authority is very broad, the 
1984 Act also includes specific requirements: ``At a minimum, the 
regulations shall ensure that (1) commercial motor vehicles are 
maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safely; (2) the 
responsibilities imposed on operators of commercial motor vehicles do 
not impair their ability to operate the vehicles safely; (3) the 
physical condition of operators of commercial motor vehicles is 
adequate to enable them to operate the vehicles

[[Page 81141]]

safely; and (4) the operation of commercial motor vehicles does not 
have a deleterious effect on the physical condition of the operators'' 
(49 U.S.C. 31136(a)). This rule would improve both highway safety and 
the health of CMV drivers.
    This rule is also based on the authority of the 1984 Act and 
addresses the specific mandates of 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(2), (3), and (4). 
Section 31136(a)(1) mainly addresses the mechanical condition of CMVs, 
a subject not included in this rulemaking. To the extent that the 
phrase ``operated safely'' in paragraph (a)(1) encompasses safe 
driving, this rule also addresses that mandate.
    Before prescribing any regulations, FMCSA must also consider their 
``costs and benefits'' (49 U.S.C. 31136(c)(2)(A) and 31502(d)). Those 
factors are also discussed in this rule.

III. Background and Description of the Trucking Industry

    The history of the HOS regulations has been discussed at length in 
previous rulemakings and will not be repeated here. See the May 2, 
2000, NPRM for a detailed history of the earlier provisions (65 FR 
25540) and the December 29, 2010, NPRM of this final rule for the more 
recent history (75 FR 82170).
    FMCSA held a total of five public listening sessions prior to 
publishing the NPRM as well as one session after publication to gather 
information and opinions. These listening sessions were webcast, the 
Agency accepted calls during the sessions, and the Agency held an 
online comment and question forum on February 17, 2011, from noon to 
midnight to give more people a chance to participate. Transcripts of 
the listening sessions and the online comment and question forum are in 
the docket.\3\ As noted above, more than 21,000 comments were submitted 
to the docket. Each comment was read and the positions of commenters on 
each issue they addressed were logged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Transcripts of the listening sessions and the online comment 
and question forum may be found in the online docket on 
www.regulations.gov at:
    a. January 19, 2010 Listening Session--FMCSA-2004-19608-3854.
    b. January 22, 2010 Listening Session--FMCSA-2004-19608-3860.
    c. January 25, 2010 Listening Session--FMCSA-2004-19608-3855.
    d. January 28, 2010 Listening Session--FMCSA-2004-19608-3856.
    e. March 26, 2010 Listening Session--FMCSA-2004-19608-3904.
    f. February 17, 2011 Listening Session and Online Comment and 
Question Forum--FMCSA-2004-19608-9393.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Trucking Industry

    The trucking industry is comprised of hundreds of thousands of 
carriers and millions of drivers moving goods locally or in long hauls 
between cities. The industry is diverse, and different sectors have 
different operational characteristics. The industry can be divided in a 
number of ways: Private versus for-hire; truckload versus less than 
truckload (LTL); long-haul versus short-haul. Private carriers are not 
trucking firms; they are manufacturers, distributors, or retailers that 
move their own goods among factories, distribution centers 
(warehouses), and retail outlets. Their drivers generally operate on a 
regular basis over routes set by the locations of their own facilities 
and those of their customers. For-hire carriers are in the transport 
business; they move goods for their customers. An LTL carrier usually 
picks up and delivers small shipments in a local area served by one of 
its terminals. Shipments are consolidated into loads for large trucks 
that make long (line-haul) runs to the firm's terminals in other areas. 
Moves between terminals are almost always overnight on regular routes. 
The goods moved overnight are delivered the next day by the local 
drivers at the destination terminal. The dominant pattern for line-haul 
drivers in LTL operations is driving five nights a week with the 
weekend (or at least 2 consecutive days) at home. Some firms will have 
one group of drivers working Monday through Friday nights and another 
group working Sunday through Thursday nights. Daytime driving sometimes 
occurs when, for example, a trailer is to be moved to a terminal that 
cannot be reached in a single, overnight run.
    The truckload carriers typically pick up a full load from a shipper 
and move it directly to the receiver of the goods. Some of their 
business is regular and predictable under contracts or less formal 
agreements. Much of their business is almost random in nature, 
transportation from one place to another being booked and sold on a 
daily basis. Drivers in random service may not know where they will be 
at the end of each day. Their runs are often made by day, but many also 
require nighttime driving. Short-haul drivers operate within a local 
area; most are not exclusively nighttime drivers. Their routes may vary 
day by day, but they are always in the same general area. They may 
spend a good part of each day loading and unloading at multiple 
locations. Although there are exceptions, most long-haul drivers do not 
load or unload the cargo.
    The various sectors are affected by different parts of the HOS 
rules. Most short-haul carriers do not use all of the allowable driving 
hours because they spend a good part of each day loading and unloading 
the truck to make local deliveries. These drivers also generally work 5 
days per week and less than 12 hours a day, which makes the restart 
unnecessary. The local part of LTL operations has a similar work 
pattern. The line-haul LTL runs are between terminals located at the 
outer edges of metropolitan areas or in smaller cities. Like local 
drivers, except in peak season, they usually work 5 days a week. 
Private carriage is almost always limited to trips of less than 500 
miles or 10 hours of driving. There are far more long runs in the 
truckload sector, but even this sector moves much of its cargo less 
than 500 miles. The carriers most affected by the HOS rules are the 
truckload carriers that operate most or all of the time on a random 
basis, picking up a load for delivery without knowing where the next 
load will be.

IV. Discussion of All Comments

    FMCSA received more than 20,000 comments, but no single provision 
of the NPRM drew responses from a majority of the commenters. About 
4,000 commenters addressed driving time and the restart; about 3,000 
addressed breaks and duty time limits (most of these wanted a return to 
the pre-2003 cumulative duty time); approximately 200 commented on the 
on-duty definition, and about 100 commented on the penalty provision. 
Most people who took the time to comment opposed some part of the 
proposal. About 8,000 comments expressed general opposition to the 
rule.
    The primary arguments made by the commenters were limited and 
applied to the three main provisions of the NPRM--driving time, the 
restart, and breaks. To avoid redundancy, in this section the 
overarching arguments will be discussed first, incorporating specific 
points related to the provisions. The arguments that apply to a single 
provision will then be presented. Comments on the economic analysis are 
addressed in Section VI ``Required Analyses'' of this preamble.
    The motor carrier industry argued that the declining fatality rate 
for truck-involved crashes since 2004 demonstrates that the current HOS 
rule is safe and should not be changed. The main industry argument, 
however, was that changing the rule would produce serious economic 
consequences for carriers, drivers, shippers, receivers, and consumers. 
On other issues, the industry generally disagreed with the

[[Page 81142]]

notion that drivers are not getting sufficient sleep and that chronic 
fatigue is a problem. The industry's only argument on driver health 
benefits was to claim that the study used to estimate increased 
mortality had been misapplied, a claim that the study's lead author 
refuted in a comment to the docket. NTSB, NIOSH, and safety advocacy 
groups, all submitted comments to support the proposal in general, 
contradict industry arguments, and provide additional research. FMCSA 
asked for data on crash experience under the current rule, costs of the 
proposed rule, and related matters, but no carrier or association 
submitted information that proved to be useful.

A. Safety

    Industry commenters made two principal arguments on safety. The 
first was a general statement on the improving crash rates of CMVs; the 
second was specific to the 11-hour driving limit. This section presents 
the comments and response to improving the crash rates. Section 
IV.''Discussion of All Comments'' E. ``Driving Time Limit'' discusses 
the 11-hour issue.
    Comments. Many industry associations, carriers, and drivers stated 
that the 2003 rule has improved (or at least not reduced) safety and 
pointed, as proof, to the decline in truck crash rates that occurred 
from 2004 to 2009. ATA stated that truck vehicle miles traveled (VMT) 
increased during that period, countering any argument that the economy 
was the cause of the decline in crashes. Some carriers stated that 
their crash rates (variously reported as preventable, recordable, 
injury, or all crash rates) declined over similar periods. Two 
commenters noted that HOS compliance has improved as seen in roadside 
inspection data.
    Advocates et al., \4\ the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 
(IIHS), and another commenter pointed out that the crash rates began 
falling well before 2004 and that the passenger vehicle fatality rate 
has fallen faster than the truck fatality rate in recent years. IIHS 
stated that there was no apparent change in the long-term trend 
coincident with the 2003 rule change. IIHS also noted that there had 
been a general downward trend in CMV driver deaths, but that the number 
rose between 2003 and 2006, before dropping in 2007 and 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Comments for Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, Public 
Citizen, Truck Safety Coalition, and the International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, filed jointly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FMCSA Response. Crash rates for trucks and passenger vehicles have 
been falling since the late 1970s. The reasons for the decline are 
complex and cannot be attributed to any single factor. It is very 
likely that improved vehicle safety design for cars and improved road 
design have contributed to the reduction. Injuries and fatalities have 
also decreased with greater use of seat belts by car and truck drivers. 
The rates have been steadily declining over a long period, well before 
the HOS rules changed.
    Economic conditions do play a part in the number of crashes. The 
large decrease in truck-related fatality rates from 2007 to 2009 is not 
unprecedented; similar year-to-year percentage decreases in fatal crash 
rates occurred in 1980, 1982, 1991, 1992, and other periods of 
recession. ATA argued that the recent recession could not explain the 
decline in fatality rates because truck VMT actually increased despite 
the recession. The increase in truck VMT cited by ATA and others, 
however, is an artifact of a change in the definition \5\ of ``truck'' 
used by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in estimating VMT, 
which resulted in an addition of almost 1.9 million vehicles (about 
370,000 combination vehicles and 1.5 million straight trucks) and their 
associated VMT to the ``truck'' population. In estimating the number of 
trucks, FHWA has defined that term to mean any vehicle other than a bus 
with a gross vehicle weight rating greater than 10,000 pounds. The 
population of ``trucks,'' therefore, now includes mobile homes, large 
pickups, cab chassis, and various other larger vehicles, most of which 
are not used by motor carriers, except for short-haul pickups and 
deliveries.\6\ The changed definition increased the number of 
combination trucks by 17 percent and the number of single-unit trucks 
by about 22 percent (for 2008). The change increased 2008 VMT for 
combination trucks by about 28 percent and VMT for single-unit trucks 
by about 50 percent. FHWA revised VMT estimates for previous years to 
reflect its new methodology and allow year-to-year comparisons. These 
revised VMT numbers show that combination truck VMT peaked in 2007, 
fell slightly in 2008, and fell sharply in 2009. This pattern obviously 
reflects the decline in demand for transportation associated with the 
recent recession.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ The FHWA 2009 VMT estimates and its revision of the 
estimates for 2000-2008 were posted in April 2011 in Table VM-1 of 
Highway Statistics (annual editions) (https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics.cfm).
    \6\ A combination vehicle is any vehicle towing a trailer. Semi-
trailers are combination trucks as are pick-ups, cars, or straight 
trucks towing a trailer; for example, a sport utility vehicle towing 
a boat is considered a combination vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These drops in VMT are consistent with other data that reflect VMT 
for trucks. Diesel fuel sales for over-the-road-vehicles, which are 
primarily for trucks, dropped 14 percent from 2007 to 2009, according 
to data from the Energy Information Administration. The Census Bureau's 
Annual Survey of the Service sector indicated that the trucking 
industry revenues dropped by about 19 percent from 2008 to 2009 and VMT 
for for-hire carriers by 15 percent.\7\ ATA's own trucking activity 
index (year 2000=100) lists the mileage index for truckload carriers in 
December 2003 as 100.4 seasona