Representation-Case Procedures, 80138-80189 [2011-32642]
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 246 / Thursday, December 22, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD
29 CFR Parts 101 and 102
RIN 3142–AA08
Representation—Case Procedures
AGENCY:
National Labor Relations
Board.
ACTION:
Final rule.
On June 22, 2011, the
National Labor Relations Board (the
Board) issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking proposing various
amendments of its rules and regulations
governing the filing and processing of
petitions relating to the representation
of employees for purposes of collective
bargaining with their employer. This
document explains which of the
proposed amendments the Board is
adopting at this time in the final rule
and sets forth the Board’s responses to
comments concerning those proposals.
The Board believes that the final rule
will reduce unnecessary litigation in
representation cases and thereby enable
the Board to better fulfill its duty to
expeditiously resolve questions
concerning representation. The final
rule will also save time and resources
for the parties and the agency. The final
rule will focus pre-election hearings on
those issues relevant to determining if
there is a question concerning
representation, provide for pre-election
briefing only when it will assist the
decision makers, reduce piecemeal
appeals to the Board, consolidate
requests for Board review of regional
directors’ pre- and post-election
determinations into a single, postelection request, make Board review of
post-election regional determinations
discretionary, and eliminate duplicative
regulations. The final rule will allow the
Board to more promptly determine if
there is a question concerning
representation and, if so, to resolve it by
conducting a secret-ballot election and
certifying the results.
DATES: This rule will be effective on
April 30, 2012.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Lester A. Heltzer, Executive Secretary,
National Labor Relations Board, 1099
14th Street NW., Washington, DC 20570,
(202) 273–1067 (this is not a toll-free
number), 1–(866) 315–6572 (TTY/TDD).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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SUMMARY:
I. Background on the Rulemaking
The National Labor Relations Board
administers the National Labor
Relations Act, which, among other
things, governs the formation of
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collective-bargaining relationships
between employers and groups of
employees in the private sector. Section
7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 157, gives
employees the right ‘‘to bargain
collectively through representatives of
their own choosing * * * and to refrain
from * * * such activity.’’
When employees and their employer
are unable to agree whether the
employees should be represented for
purposes of collective bargaining,
Section 9 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 159,
gives the Board authority to resolve the
question of representation.
The Act itself sets forth only the basic
steps for resolving a question of
representation. First, a petition is filed
by an employee, a labor organization, or
an employer. Second, if there is
reasonable cause, a hearing is held to
determine whether a question of
representation exists, unless the parties
agree that an election should be
conducted and agree concerning
election details. Third, if there is such
a question, an election by secret ballot
is conducted. Fourth, the results of the
election are certified.
Aside from these general
requirements, however, the statute says
very little about representation case
procedures. Instead, Congress left these
procedures within the broad discretion
of the Board.
The Board has exercised this
discretion through two mechanisms.
First, the Board has promulgated
binding rules of procedure, most of
which are found in 29 CFR part 102,
subpart C. Second, the Board has
interpreted and occasionally altered or
created its representation case
procedures through adjudication.1 In
addition, the Board’s General Counsel
has prepared a non-binding
Casehandling Manual describing
representation case procedures in detail.
The relevant sections of the
Casehandling Manual are Sections
11000 through 11886.2
Within the framework of the current
rules, the Board, the General Counsel
and the agency’s regional directors 3
have sought to achieve efficient, fair,
uniform, and timely resolution of
representation cases. But under the
current rules, inefficiency, abuse of the
process, and delay still hamper
1 See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S.
759, 764, 770, 777, 779 (1969).
2 NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part Two)
Representation Proceedings.
3 Pursuant to Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated to its regional directors the authority
to conduct pre-election hearings, to determine
whether questions of representation exist, to direct
elections, and to certify election results. 29 U.S.C.
153(b). The General Counsel administratively
oversees the regions. 29 U.S.C. 153(d).
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resolution of many questions of
representation.
In this final rule, the Board makes
eight amendments to its regulations
governing representation case
procedures. The amendments are
intended to eliminate unnecessary
litigation, delay, and duplicative
regulations. The final rule follows an
extensive consultation with the public
initiated by the Board’s Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on June
22, 2011. 76 FR 36812. As explained
below, the final rule adopts some of the
proposed amendments and leaves the
remainder for further deliberation.
A. Summary of Current Procedures 4
When an employee, union, employer,
individual, or organization wants the
Board to determine whether employees
wish to bargain collectively through a
union, that party must file, in the
Board’s regional office, a petition, which
the regional director then serves on
other interested parties. An employee or
union petitioner must also, ordinarily,
provide evidence that a substantial
number of employees support the
petition. Board agents then conduct an
ex parte investigation to determine if
there is enough interest to justify further
processing of the petition.
In further processing, three general
types of disputes can arise among the
parties. First are pre-election disputes.
These may concern whether the
employees at issue may be represented
as a group—that is, whether they are
‘‘an appropriate unit.’’ At this stage, the
parties may also disagree about the
Board’s jurisdiction, whether an
election is barred by the Act or Board
law, and the time, place, and other
details of the election itself.
Second, disputes can also arise during
the election about whether particular
persons are eligible to vote. These
disputes arise through ‘‘challenges’’ to
the disputed individuals’ ballots. When
this occurs, the ballots of challenged
voters are segregated from the other
ballots in a manner that will not
disclose the voters’ identity.
Third, disputes can arise after the
election about whether actions of the
parties or the Board agents—or some
other circumstance—made the election
unfair. These disputes are brought
before the Board by the filing of
‘‘objections.’’
In the vast majority of cases, the
parties, often with Board agent
assistance, are able to resolve preelection disputes without litigation. In
these cases, either a ‘‘consent’’
4 For a more complete discussion and citations,
see the NPRM. 76 FR 36812.
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agreement or a ‘‘stipulation’’ agreement
is entered into. Both kinds of
agreements fully resolve pre-election
disputes, but in a consent agreement the
parties also waive the right to Board
review of the regional director’s
disposition of any challenges or
objections, while in a stipulation
agreement the parties provide for Board
disposition of such disputes.5
If no agreement on pre-election issues
can be reached, a hearing must be held.
The hearing officer, the Board agent in
charge of the hearing, takes evidence
relevant to the issues in dispute, and the
parties often file briefs. The regional
director then issues a decision, either
dismissing the petition or directing an
election. The regional director does not
have to resolve all voter eligibility
questions before the election, but can
defer those questions by permitting
employees whose eligibility is disputed
to vote subject to challenge.
If an election is directed, the regional
director typically schedules it no sooner
than 25 days after the decision, so that
the Board can rule on any interlocutory
request for review that might be filed.
Such interlocutory requests are rarely
granted, still more rarely result in the
regional director’s decision being
reversed, and virtually never result in
elections being stayed. If the Board does
not rule on the request before the
election date, the election is held, and
the ballots are impounded pending a
Board ruling.
After the regional director’s decision
directing an election, the employer must
provide the regional office a list of
eligible voters and their home
addresses. The regional office gives the
list to the parties. The parties use the
list for two purposes: To communicate
with eligible voters about the election,
and to determine whether to challenge
a particular voter.
Elections are decided by a majority of
the valid votes cast. As mentioned,
during the election, the parties may
challenge ballots cast by voters. A tally
of ballots generally takes place shortly
after the polls close. If the challenged
ballots are too few in number to change
the outcome of the election, the
challenges will not be litigated or
resolved.
Within one week after the tally,
parties may file objections with the
regional director. Within one additional
5 In the alternative, a third type of agreement,
called a ‘‘full consent’’ agreement, may also be
entered into. This occurs when the parties disagree
about pre-election issues but are willing to permit
the regional director to resolve them as well as any
post-election disputes with finality. Full consent
agreements are rare.
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purpose of this brief summary is to
introduce the more complete discussion
of the final rule. The proposed
amendments are presented in the
chronological order of a typical
representation case.
First, under current procedures, the
petitioner must file the petition in hard
copy. The Board proposed to also
permit electronic filing of the petition.
Second, under current procedures, the
petition is filed by the petitioner and
then served by the regional office on the
other interested parties. The Board
proposed that the petitioner would
directly serve a copy of the petition.
Third, under current procedures, the
petitioner may wait 48 hours before
providing evidence that the employees
support the petition (the ‘‘showing of
interest’’). The Board proposed that the
petitioner be required to file the petition
and the showing of interest
simultaneously. The Board also asked
for comments concerning whether
electronic signatures should be accepted
in support of the showing of interest.
Fourth, under current procedures,
after a petition is filed, the regional
director asks the employer to
voluntarily post a generic notice of
employee rights. The Board proposed
that the notice describe the type of
petition that has been filed, the name of
the petitioner, the petitioned-for unit,
and the procedures that will follow, and
that the employer be required to post
the notice.
Fifth, under current procedures, some
regional offices routinely schedule preelection hearings to commence seven
days after the petition is filed, while
other regions wait longer. The Board
proposed that the regional director set
the hearing to commence seven days
after the filing of the petition absent
‘‘special circumstances.’’ The Board also
proposed that the hearing be continued
from day to day absent extraordinary
circumstances.
Sixth, under current procedures, prior
to or at the opening of the pre-election
hearing, regional personnel typically ask
the parties what position they will take
on the common subjects of pre-election
disputes, such as jurisdiction, the
appropriateness of the proposed unit,
and any bars to an election. The Board
proposed that non-petitioning parties be
required to file, no later than the
opening of the hearing, a statement of
position setting forth their position on
B. Problems Identified and Amendments these issues. The Board also proposed
Proposed
that the employer’s statement include a
The Board published an NPRM on
list of employees in the petitioned-for
June 22, 2011, 76 FR 36812, proposing
unit.
Seventh, under current procedures,
a number of changes to these
the hearing officer may ask the parties
procedures. These proposals are set
to clarify their positions on issues
forth at length in the NPRM. The
week, the objecting party must furnish
evidence in support of its objections.
The regional director has discretion to
investigate any potentially
determinative challenges or objections
or to immediately direct a hearing. If the
director conducts an investigation, he
will set a hearing only if the challenges
or objections raise substantial and
material questions of fact. If no hearing
is held, the regional director will issue
a supplemental decision or a report
disposing of the challenges or
objections.
If a post-election hearing is held, the
parties have the opportunity to present
evidence to a hearing officer. The
hearing officer will issue a report
resolving any credibility issues and
containing findings of fact and
recommendations.
In cases involving consent elections,
the regional director’s rulings on
challenges and objections are final. In
cases involving stipulated elections or
elections directed by a regional director,
the parties generally have the right to
obtain review by the Board, by filing
exceptions to the report disposing of the
objections and/or challenges. If a
regional director directs an election and
subsequently determines that the
challenges or objections warrant a
hearing, the regional director may direct
that the hearing officer’s
recommendation be made directly to the
Board, in which case a party has the
right to Board review. On the other
hand, if the regional director orders that
the hearing officer’s recommendations
be made directly to him or her, parties
can file exceptions to the hearing
officer’s report to the regional director,
but thereafter can seek Board review of
the regional director’s determination
only through the discretionary requestfor-review procedure. Similarly, if the
regional director decides to resolve the
challenges and objections without
directing a hearing, he or she can choose
to issue a report, in which case parties
have a right to Board review, or the
regional director can choose to issue a
supplemental decision, in which case
parties may only request Board review.
By contrast, if the parties enter into a
stipulated election agreement, the
parties are entitled to Board review of
the regional director’s or hearing
officer’s disposition of the post-election
matters.
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potentially in dispute. Although the
hearing officer can prohibit a party from
introducing evidence when it refuses to
take a position on an issue, hearing
officers’ practice is not uniform. The
Board proposed that the hearing process
be made uniform through use of the
following procedures at the
commencement of the pre-election
hearing. First, the petitioner would have
to respond to (or ‘‘join’’) the issues
raised by the other parties in their
statements of position. Second, if there
is a dispute between the parties, each
would describe what evidence they
would introduce in support of their
position. The hearing officer would not
permit a party to present evidence
related to an issue concerning which the
party had failed to take a position or
concerning which there was no genuine
dispute of material fact. However,
parties could contest individual
employees’ eligibility or inclusion for
the first time through a challenge during
the election. In addition, the petitioner
would be permitted to present evidence
relevant to the appropriateness of the
unit even if the non-petitioning parties
declined to take a position on that issue.
Finally, any party could contest the
Board’s jurisdiction at any time.
Eighth, under current procedures, the
hearing officer takes evidence at the preelection hearing on any individual
eligibility issue raised, even though
these issues need not be decided preelection, and the regional director and
Board commonly defer resolution of the
issues until after the election via the
challenge procedure. The Board
proposed that the hearing officer
exclude evidence relevant only to
individual employees’ voting eligibility
or inclusion in the unit, subject to an
exception where the dispute involves a
total of more than 20 percent of the unit
employees.
Ninth, under the current procedures,
the parties have a right in most kinds of
cases to file post-hearing briefs at any
time up to seven days after the close of
the hearing. The Board proposed to vest
the hearing officer with discretion
concerning whether to permit posthearing briefs and, if permitted, over
their contents and timing.
Tenth, under current procedures, after
the pre-election hearing the regional
director can choose to transfer the case
to the Board without deciding it. The
Board proposed to eliminate the transfer
procedure.
Eleventh, under current procedures, if
the regional director directs an election,
the parties are required to request Board
review within 14 days or they waive the
right to later raise any issues that could
have been raised at that time. The Board
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proposed to eliminate the requirement
to request review before the election,
instead permitting the request to be filed
after the election and consolidated with
any request for review of the regional
director’s disposition of post-election
challenges and objections.
Twelfth, under current procedures,
parties can request special permission to
appeal both from a ruling of the hearing
officer to the regional director and from
a ruling of the hearing officer or the
regional director to the Board, but the
regulations establish no standard for the
grant of such requests. The Board
proposed a strict standard for the grant
of such requests.
Thirteenth, under current procedures,
the regional director is instructed not to
schedule an election sooner than 25
days after his or her decision, so that the
Board can rule on any interlocutory
request for review that might be filed.
The Board proposed to eliminate the 25day waiting period.
Fourteenth, under current procedures,
the employer must give the region a list
of eligible voters within seven days of
the regional director’s decision, and the
region then gives the list to the other
parties. The Board proposed to codify
this requirement, to shorten the time to
two days, and to provide for direct
service by the employer on the other
parties.
Fifteenth, under current procedures,
the eligibility list contains only names
and home addresses. The Board
proposed that the list should also
include available telephone numbers
and email addresses, as well as the work
location, shift, and classification for
each employee.
Sixteenth, under current procedures,
when a charge is filed alleging the
commission of unfair labor practices
that could compromise the fairness of
the election, the regional director has
discretion to delay (or ‘‘block’’) the
election until the issue can be resolved.
In the NPRM, the Board asked for
comments on whether the Board should
change its blocking charge policy.
Seventeenth, under current
procedures, after the tally of ballots
from the election, the parties have seven
days to file a pleading with the regional
director specifying any objections.
Objecting parties then have an
additional seven days to describe the
evidence supporting their objections.
The Board proposed that the offer of
proof be filed simultaneously with the
objections.
Eighteenth, under current procedures,
regional directors have discretion over
the scheduling of a hearing concerning
challenges or objections. The Board
proposed that the hearing be held
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fourteen days after the tally of ballots,
or as soon as practicable thereafter.
Nineteenth, under current procedures,
in most instances, parties have a right to
appeal a regional director’s or hearing
officer’s disposition of challenges or
objections to the Board. The Board
proposed to make Board review of postelection regional dispositions
discretionary, as is the case with preelection rulings.
Twentieth, the current regulations are
redundant in a number of places and
located in various parts of Title 29 of the
Code of Federal Regulations. The Board
proposed to eliminate redundant
regulations and consolidate and
reorganize the regulations so that they
may be more easily understood.
C. The Final Rule and a Concise,
General Statement of Its Basis and
Purpose
As explained in the NPRM, the Board
proposed various revisions to its rules
and regulations to further ‘‘the Act’s
policy of expeditiously resolving
questions concerning representation’’ 6
and to better ensure ‘‘that employees’
votes may be recorded accurately,
efficiently and speedily.’’ 7 Over 65,000
public comments were filed in response
to the NPRM. Many of the comments
focused primarily on a few of the
proposed amendments, most notably the
proposed changes concerning the
scheduling of the pre-election hearing,
the requirement of a statement of
position, and the content and timing of
eligibility lists. In light of this
commentary, further Board deliberation
concerning those proposals (and some
others) is necessary at this time.
However, a number of the proposals
were less controversial. The Board has
had the opportunity to fully consider all
the comments and to deliberate
concerning the proposed amendments
and believes it is appropriate to adopt
some of the proposals in this final rule
and leave the others for further
consideration. The Board considers the
amendments adopted in this final rule
to be severable from the remainder of
the proposals, and from each other.8
6 Northeastern University, 261 NLRB 1001, 1002
(1982), enforced, 707 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1983).
7 NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 331
(1946).
8 Each of the major changes adopted in this final
rule is independently justified, and thus the Board
has decided to adopt each of them, while also
deciding to deliberate further on the remaining
proposals. Although, at a very high level of
generality, the various proposals in the NPRM
shared a common purpose to improve ‘‘efficiency,’’
in fact, each of the proposals addressed discrete
sources of inefficiency in the rules, and it is clear
that the amendments will serve their functions
whether adopted in whole or in part, together or
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For the reasons explained below, the
Board has decided to adopt the
following eight proposals at this time.
First, the Board has decided to amend
§ 102.64 in order to expressly construe
Section 9(c) of the Act and to state that
the statutory purpose of a pre-election
hearing is to determine if a question of
representation exists. Second, the Board
has decided to amend § 102.66(a) and
eliminate § 101.20(c) (along with all of
Part 101, Subpart C) in order to ensure
that hearing officers presiding over preelection hearings have the authority to
limit the presentation of evidence to
that which supports a party’s
contentions and which is relevant to the
existence of a question concerning
representation. Third, the Board has
decided to amend § 102.66(d) to afford
hearing officers presiding over preelection hearings discretion over the
filing of post-hearing briefs, including
over the subjects to be addressed and
the time for filing. Fourth, the Board has
decided to amend §§ 102.67 and 102.69
to eliminate the parties’ right to file a
pre-election request for review of a
regional director’s decision and
direction of election, and instead to
defer all requests for Board review until
after the election, when any such
request can be consolidated with a
request for review of any post-election
rulings. Fifth, the Board has decided to
eliminate the recommendation in
§ 101.21(d) (as stated, along with all of
Part 101, Subpart C) that the regional
director should ordinarily not schedule
an election sooner than 25 days after the
decision and direction of election in
order to give the Board an opportunity
to rule on a pre-election request for
review. Sixth, the Board has decided to
amend § 102.65 to make explicit and
narrow the circumstances under which
a request for special permission to
appeal to the Board will be granted.
Seventh, the Board has decided to
amend §§ 102.62(b) and 102.69 to create
a uniform procedure for resolving
election objections and potentially
outcome-determinative challenges in
stipulated and directed election cases
and to provide that Board review of
regional directors’ resolution of such
disputes is discretionary. Eighth, as
mentioned, the Board has decided to
eliminate part 101, subpart C of its
regulations, which is redundant. The
remainder of the amendments merely
conform other sections of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations to the eight
amendments described above. The
Board has concluded, after careful
one at a time. For this reason as well, each of the
amendments in this final rule would be adopted by
the Board independently of the others.
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review of all public comments and after
deliberation, that adopting those eight
proposals in a final rule will eliminate
wholly unnecessary litigation and delay
in the processing of petitions filed
under Section 9 of the Act and thus in
the resolution of questions of
representation.9
The current rules have been
interpreted to give parties a right to
present evidence at a pre-election
hearing relating to matters that need not
be addressed in order for the hearing to
fulfill its statutory function of creating
a record based on which the regional
director can determine if there is a
question of representation that should
be answered via an election.
Furthermore, the current rules have
been understood to give parties a right
to present evidence at a pre-election
hearing concerning such matters even
though neither the regional director nor
the Board must address those matters
prior to the election, and a decision on
such matters is commonly deferred until
after the election. In other words, such
litigation is wholly unnecessary prior to
an election. Moreover, the issues in
dispute in such litigation are often
rendered moot by the election results or
resolved by the parties post-election,
thus eliminating the need for litigation
of the issues. Therefore, the Board has
determined that amending § 102.64(a) to
expressly construe the statutory purpose
of the hearing and amending § 102.66(a)
to vest hearing officers with authority to
limit the presentation of evidence to
that supporting a party’s contentions
and relevant to the existence of a
question concerning representation will
eliminate unnecessary litigation and
delay.
After the pre-election hearing, the
filing of post-hearing briefs often delays
issuance of the regional director’s
decision and direction of election,
thereby delaying resolution of the
question of representation even when
the issue or issues in dispute can be
accurately and fairly resolved without
briefing. Given the recurring and often
familiar and uncomplicated legal and
factual issues arising in pre-election
hearings, the filing of briefs, which also
imposes financial costs on the parties, is
not necessary in every case to permit the
parties to fully and fairly present their
positions or to facilitate prompt and
accurate decisions. Therefore, the Board
has decided to amend § 102.66(d) to vest
hearing officers presiding over preelection hearings with authority to
9 The Board has not, in each instance, adopted the
precise rule language proposed in the NPRM. To the
extent alternative language has been adopted in the
final rule, the Board sets forth its rationale in Part
IV below.
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provide for the filing of post-hearing
briefs only in those instances when they
would be of assistance to the decisionmaker and to control the subjects
addressed in, and the time for filing of,
any such briefs. The Board has
determined that amending the rules to
give the hearing officer discretion to
permit the filing of post-hearing briefs
will eliminate unnecessary expense and
delay.
The Board’s current rules require
parties to file a request for review of the
regional director’s decision and
direction of election before the election
is held in order to preserve their right
to raise disputed issues in post-election
proceedings, even though the issues in
dispute are often rendered moot by the
election results or resolved by the
parties post-election thus eliminating
the need for litigation of the issues at
any time. The pre-election request for
review procedure is inconsistent with
judicial procedures, which limit
interlocutory appeals in order to avoid
unnecessary litigation and delay. In
addition, § 101.21(d) of the Board’s
current Statements of Procedure
provides that elections ‘‘normally’’ are
delayed for a period of at least 25 days
after the regional director directs that an
election should be conducted, ‘‘to
permit the Board to rule on any request
for review which may be filed.’’ This
provision effectively stays the conduct
of all elections for at least 25 days
despite Congress’s instruction in
Section 3(b) of the Act that even the
grant of review by the Board ‘‘shall not,
unless specifically ordered by the
Board, operate as a stay of any action
taken by the regional director.’’
Furthermore, even in the cases in which
a request for review is filed, review is
granted only rarely and the Board
almost never stays the conduct of the
election either before or after granting
review, instead permitting employees to
vote and then impounding the ballots.
For these reasons, the waiting period
unnecessarily delays the resolution of
questions of representation in all cases,
and the delay is not justified by the only
purpose articulated in the Board’s
Statements of Procedure. Therefore, the
Board has determined that amending
the rules to defer the right to file
requests for review of the direction of
the election until after the election and
to eliminate the mandatory waiting
period will eliminate unnecessary
litigation and delay.
Consistent with the effort to avoid
piecemeal appeals to the Board, the
Board has also decided to amend
§ 102.65 to provide that a request for
special permission to appeal to the
Board will only be granted under
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extraordinary circumstances, when it
appears that the issue will otherwise
evade review. To further discourage
piecemeal appeals, the amendments
provide that a party need not seek
special permission to appeal in order to
preserve an issue for review postelection. Consistent with current
practice, the amendments provide that
neither the filing of a request for special
permission to appeal nor the grant of
such a request will stay an election or
any other action or require impounding
of ballots unless specifically ordered by
the Board. The Board has determined
that narrowing the circumstances under
which a request for special permission
to appeal will be granted will eliminate
unnecessary litigation and delay.
Under the current rules, the nature of
Board review of a regional director’s
disposition of pre- and post-election
disputes varies, but for no articulated
reason. Pre-election review is
discretionary, while post-election
review is ordinarily mandatory. This is
the case even though many post-election
disputes raise no question of policy and
often turn on the application of wellestablished principles of law to
particular facts. In addition, the
procedures for post-election review vary
from case to case even though the nature
of the issues is the same. Therefore, the
Board has decided to amend
§§ 102.62(b) and 102.69 to create a
uniform procedure in both stipulated
and directed election cases, whereby
parties may file exceptions to any
hearing officer’s report with the regional
director, and file a request for review of
the regional director’s disposition of the
post-election matters with the Board.
That request may be consolidated with
a request for review of the regional
director’s decision and direction of
election, if any. Permitting the Board to
deny review when a party’s request
raises no compelling grounds for review
will eliminate the most significant
source of administrative delay in
achieving finality of election results.
The Board has determined that
amending the rules to create this
uniform procedure for handling preand post-election disputes will
eliminate unnecessary litigation and
delay.
Finally, the Board currently has two
sets of regulations describing its
procedures in representation cases, one
in Part 102, Subpart C of its Rules and
Regulations and the other in Part 101,
Subpart C of its Statements of
Procedure. 29 CFR Part 102, Subpart C;
29 CFR Part 101, Subpart C. The two
sets of regulations are almost entirely
redundant. This redundancy is a
potential source of confusion. The
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Board has determined that eliminating
Part 101, Subpart C will reduce such
confusion.
II. The Rulemaking Process
A. A Brief History of Board Rulemaking
As the NPRM explains, the Board has
amended its representation case
procedures repeatedly over the years as
part of a continuing effort to improve
the process and eliminate unnecessary
delays. Indeed, the Board has amended
its representation case procedures more
than three dozen times since they were
published in the very first volume of the
Federal Register, 1 FR 207 (April 18,
1936), and has only rarely utilized the
Administrative Procedures Act’s noticeand-comment rulemaking procedures;
most often the Board simply
implemented the changes without prior
notice or request for public comment.
In fact, the Board has seldom acted
through notice-and-comment
rulemaking on any subject. The Board
typically makes substantive policy
determinations in the course of
adjudication rather than through
rulemaking, a practice that has
occasionally drawn the ire of academic
commentators and the courts.10
10 See R. Alexander Acosta, Rebuilding the Board:
An Argument for Structural Change, over Policy
Prescriptions, at the NLRB, 5 FIU L. Rev. 347, 351–
52 (2010); Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB’s
Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 79 Yale L.J. 571
(1970); Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the
Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 Admin. L.
Rev. 163 (1985); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Potential of
Rulemaking by the NLRB, 5 FIU L. Rev. 411, 414–
17, 435 (Spring 2010); Kenneth Kahn, The NLRB
and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking
Through Adjudication, 21 UCLA L. Rev. 63 (1973);
Charles J. Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House—Can
an Old Board Learn New Tricks?, 24 San Diego L.
Rev. 9 (1987); Cornelius Peck, The Atrophied
Rulemaking Powers of the National Labor Relations
Board, 70 Yale L.J. 729 (1961); Cornelius J. Peck, A
Critique of the National Labor Relations Board’s
Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication
and Rule-Making, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 254 (1968);
David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921 (1965); Carl S.
Silverman, The Case for the National Labor
Relations Board’s Use of Rulemaking in Asserting
Jurisdiction, 25 Lab. L.J. 607 (1974); and Berton B.
Subrin, Conserving Energy at the Labor Board: The
Case for Making Rules on Collective Bargaining
Units, 32 Lab. L.J. 105 (1981); see also NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974); NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764, 770, 777,
779, 783 n.2 (1969). The Portland Cement
Association (PCA) contends, as it did in another
recent Board rulemaking, that the Board should
place these and other law review articles discussed
in the NPRM online for the public to read for free
on regulations.gov. Just as the Board replied in that
prior rulemaking, 76 FR 54014, the Board has
placed these articles in the hard copy docket, but
has not uploaded these articles to the electronic
docket because such an action could violate
copyright laws. It should also be noted that these
materials are generally available in libraries.
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The Board has thus asked for public
comments on few proposed rules of any
kind. A review of prior Board
rulemaking procedures reveals that the
Board has not held a public hearing
attended by all Board Members for at
least half a century. In the rulemaking
proceedings that resulted in adoption of
rules defining appropriate units in acute
care hospitals, the Board directed an
administrative law judge to hold a series
of public hearings to take evidence
concerning the proposed rules, but no
Board Members participated in the
hearings. In fact, even in the course of
adjudication, the Board has not held
oral argument since 2007 and has held
only two oral arguments in the last
decade. The last open meeting of the
Board, prior to the open meeting on
November 30, 2011, to discuss and vote
on whether to adopt any of the proposed
amendments in a final rule in this
proceeding, was held in 1989 and also
concerned the acute care hospital
bargaining-unit rule.
B. The Process of This Rulemaking
On June 22, 2011, the Board issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The
Notice provided 60 days for comments
and 14 additional days for reply
comments, and announced a public
hearing to be held on July 18 and 19,
2011. The Board issued press releases
about the proposals and hearings, and
placed summaries, answers to
frequently asked questions, and other
more detailed information on its Web
site (www.nlrb.gov).
The Board Members also held two
days of hearings in Washington, DC, on
July 18 and 19, 2011, where 66
individuals representing diverse
organizations and groups gave oral
statements and answered questions
asked by the Board Members. The
purpose of all of these procedures was
to give the Board the benefit of the
views of the public. In this the Board
was quite successful, receiving 65,958
written comments and taking 438
transcript pages of oral testimony.
Nonetheless, a number of comments
criticize the Board’s process: Some
claim there should have been some prenotice-and-comment notice and
opportunity to comment; some criticize
the length of the hearing (2 full days),
the location of the hearing (Washington,
DC), or the timing of the hearing
(halfway through the comment period);
some criticize the length of the
comment periods (60 days plus 14
days).
1. The Pre-NPRM Process
The comment of the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of
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America (the Chamber) provides a
representative example of criticism of
the pre-NPRM process. The Chamber
believes that the Board missed ‘‘an
opportunity to explore whether a
consensus could have been reached’’ on
the rule among stakeholder groups
through forums such as the American
Bar Association’s Labor and
Employment Law Section. The Chamber
concedes that stakeholders ‘‘have
widely divergent views,’’ but argues that
a consensus on at least some changes
might have been reached. The Chamber
suggests that the Board should
withdraw the NPRM and publish a more
open-ended Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking.
The Chamber cites Executive Order
13563 Section 2(c) (‘‘Improving
Regulation and Regulatory Review’’), 76
FR 51735, as support. Section 2(c) of the
Executive Order states that ‘‘[b]efore
issuing a proposed regulation, each
agency, where feasible and appropriate,
shall seek the views of those who are
likely to be affected * * *.’’ Id. In the
NPRM, the Board explained the
decision to issue a set of specific
proposals, rather than a more openended Advanced NPRM, by stating that
‘‘public participation would be more
orderly and meaningful if it was based
on * * * specific proposals.’’ 76 FR
36829. The Chamber incorrectly
suggests the Board conceded that it
violated the Executive Order, and
questions whether the comment process
actually was more orderly or
meaningful. Some other comments
suggest that the Board should have
engaged in negotiated rulemaking, or
that the pre-NPRM process was
insufficiently transparent.11
The Board continues to believe that it
has followed a lawful, fair, and open
process that succeeded in eliciting
broad and informed public participation
to a greater extent than ever before in
connection with the Board’s
representation (or unfair labor practice)
case procedures.
An agency generally has discretion
over its pre-NPRM procedures,
including whether to use advanced
NPRMs, negotiated rulemaking, or other
pre-NPRM consultation. See Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 543–44 (1978). Moreover, as
recognized by the American Hospital
Association (AHA), the Board is not
directly subject to E.O. 13563, nor is its
language pertaining to pre-NPRM
11 See, e.g., joint comment of HR Policy
Association and Society for Human Resource
Management (collectively, SHRM); Greater Easley
Chamber of Commerce; Georgia Association of
Manufacturers (GAM).
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procedures mandatory in any event. As
explained in the NPRM, in this instance,
the Board concluded that beginning the
process of public comment by issuing a
NPRM would be the most effective
method of proceeding.
The course of proceedings since
issuance of the NPRM has confirmed the
Board’s initial judgment. The notice of
the two-day public hearing published in
the Federal Register on June 27, 2011,
specifically invited interested members
of the public to appear and comment on
the proposals set forth in the NPRM and
to ‘‘make other proposals for improving
representation case procedures.’’ 76 FR
37291. Yet at the public hearing, while
the Board heard a considerable amount
of valuable testimony concerning the
specific proposals in the NPRM, it
received almost no suggestions
unrelated to those proposals. Similarly,
in the NPRM, while the Board proposed
specific rule language related to most of
the problems it identified, in several
areas the Board identified a problem or
question and invited comment without
proposing specific rule language. For
example, the Board specifically invited
comments on whether the Board should
take any action related to the use of
electronic signatures in relation to the
showing of interest supporting certain
forms of petitions. 76 FR 36812, 36819.
The Board also specifically invited
comments ‘‘on whether any final
amendments should include changes in
the current blocking charge policy.’’ 76
FR 36812, 36827. The NPRM
specifically invited comments on
whether the Board should change that
policy in several respects or leave the
policy unchanged. Id. While the Board
received many meaningful comments on
the specific proposals in the NPRM, it
received very few comments in response
to the more open-ended inquiries, and
the comments that were received were
less specific and less helpful in
analyzing the procedural questions at
stake.
The Board also is doubtful about the
Chamber’s suggestion that a broad
consensus might have been reached
through a different process. As the
Chamber concedes, the labormanagement bar is polarized on many of
the relevant issues. Given the degree of
polarization reflected both at the public
hearing and in the comments, the Board
continues to believe that following the
notice-and-comment procedures set
forth in the APA—and thereby giving
formal notice of specific proposals to all
members of the public at the same time
in the Federal Register and permitting
all members of the public to comment
on those proposals through the same
procedures and during the same time
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80143
periods—was the fairest and soundest
method of proceeding.
In sum, the Board’s pre-NPRM
process was lawful and appropriate.
2. The Length, Timing, and Location of
the Hearing
The Board Members held a two-day
public hearing in Washington, DC,
approximately halfway through the
initial comment period, i.e., about one
month after publication of the NPRM
and one month before the initial
comment period closed. All Board
Members heard five-minute statements
from 66 individuals, representing
diverse organizations and groups, and
then actively questioned the speakers
for an additional period of time.12 This
hearing was not legally required.
Some comments compare this
proceeding to the hospital unit
rulemaking and essentially argue that
the Board should have held 14 days of
hearings around the country over the
course of years.13 For example, the
National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM)—and many nearly identical form
comments by member companies—
claim that the ‘‘relative rush’’ of these
hearings ‘‘is a departure from past Board
practice that will result in both an
inadequate opportunity for stakeholders
to address the merits of the rules and
inadequate information and data for the
Board to make a prudential judgment
regarding the rules.’’
Agencies are not bound to use the
same procedures in every rulemaking
proceeding. Otherwise, agencies could
neither learn from experience, e.g., what
rulemaking procedures are helpful and
what procedures are simply wasteful,
nor adopt procedures suited to the
precise question at stake. The
procedures the Board has employed in
order to obtain public input on
proposed rules have, in fact, varied
considerably, and the Board has
substantial discretion to use procedures
suited to the matter under
consideration. Indeed, the Board has
adopted amendments to its
representation case procedures without
any notice or opportunity for comment
or with opportunities considerably more
12 After the public hearing, the transcript of each
speaker’s testimony along with any Board
questioning of the speaker was made part of the
record of the rulemaking as a separate comment.
Any such testimony discussed in this final rule is
cited as follows: ‘‘Testimony of [name of speaker].’’
13 See, e.g., Coalition for a Democratic Workplace
(CDW); Council on Labor Law Equality (COLLE);
SHRM. By contrast, scholars have described the
Board’s procedures in the earlier rulemaking as
‘‘procedural overkill.’’ See Mark H. Grunewald, The
NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in
Pragmatism, 41 Duke L. J. 274, 319 (1991).
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limited than in the instant matter.14 In
contrast to the subject matter of the
acute care hospital unit proceeding, the
proposals at issue in this proceeding
involve a matter uniquely within the
Board’s own expertise: the operation of
the Board’s own procedural rules.
The Board believes that the hearing
not only exceeded the requirements of
the APA, it was fair, appropriate, and
useful. Holding the hearing in
Washington, DC was appropriate
because many of the Board’s major
stakeholders are either headquartered in
DC or are represented by counsel in the
city or who frequently appear in the
city.15
The hearing was also properly noticed
and appropriately timed during the
initial comment period. The NPRM was
published on June 22, 2011, and
informed the public that the Board
intended to hold a public hearing on
July 18 and 19. A subsequent notice
published in the Federal Register on
June 27, 2011 informed the public of the
details of the hearing. 76 FR 37291. In
fact, the Board accommodated all
parties who wished to appear at the
hearing, even those whose requests to
appear were made after the deadline.16
That the public notice was sufficient to
permit interested parties to appear is
evidenced by the fact that 66
individuals appeared at the hearing,
representing many major management
and labor organizations as well as many
other groups. No individual or
organization informed the Board that it
was unable to participate due to the
shortness of time between the June 22
and June 27 notices and the hearing.
The two-day hearing was held about a
month after the NPRM was published,
giving participants adequate time to
carefully read the proposal, consult with
each other and with clients, and
develop detailed positions. And the five
minutes that speakers were given was
supplemented by substantial time for
questioning and the opportunity for
written comments. Some speakers gave
2,000 words or more of well-informed
testimony during their allotted time. In
total, the hearings resulted in more than
400 pages of transcript (promptly made
available to the public on the Board’s
Web site 17). The Board found that the
14 In its run-off election rulemaking proceedings,
for example, the Board provided only two weeks for
comments, with a short hearing on the final day of
the comment period. 8 FR 10031–32 (1943).
15 No party informed the Board that it wished to
appear at the hearing but was unable to send a
representative to Washington, DC.
16 The Board did, however, limit organizations to
presenting one speaker at the hearing.
17 The hearing was also streamed live on the
Board’s Web site.
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speakers provided informed, thorough,
and thoughtful analysis, and the backand-forth dialogue with the Board
Members demonstrated the wideranging familiarity of the speakers with
the proposals.
Some comments suggest that the
hearing should have been held after the
comment period closed so that the
speakers could address arguments
presented in the written comments. But
holding the hearing first made the
subsequent written comments more
informed, thoughtful, and technically
sophisticated, and many commenters,
such as the Chamber, took the
opportunity to cite extensively from the
hearing transcripts for support and to
respond to arguments made at the
hearing. The Board believes the chosen
sequence—the hearing followed by the
close of the initial comment period and
then the reply period—produced more
meaningful public comments than the
proposed alternative because written
comments are better suited to the
technical issues at stake and thus
appropriately came after the public
hearing.
In sum, the Board believes that the
two-day public hearing attended by all
Board Members was highly valuable,
was of an appropriate length, and was
held at an appropriate time and in an
appropriate location.
3. The Length and Timing of the
Comment Periods
The Board provided an initial
comment period of 60 days beginning
June 22, followed by a reply comment
period of 14 days that ended on
September 6, 2011. No late comments
were accepted.
COLLE describes the NLRB’s
comment period as ‘‘the bare-minimum
60-day[s],’’ but the APA provides no
minimum comment period, and many
agencies, including the Board in some
recent rulemaking proceedings, have
afforded comment periods of only 30
days. The agency has discretion to
provide still shorter periods, and is
simply ‘‘encouraged to provide an
appropriate explanation for doing so.’’
Administrative Conference of the
United States (ACUS), Recommendation
2011–2 at 3 (June 16, 2011). Indeed, for
procedural rules, such as the final rule
here, no comment period at all is
required.
Sixty days has become the benchmark
period for comments on significant
substantive rules. Id. Countless NPRMs
provide 60 days for comments.
Nevertheless, a number of comments
opposing the rule assert that the
comment period was inadequate. For
example, SHRM characterized the
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comment period as ‘‘hurried, abridged
and clandestine.’’ But the Montana
Chamber of Commerce—though
opposing the rule—states that ‘‘[t]his 60day window seems like a very
reasonable timeframe to allow ample
comments and statements from all
interested parties, whether they are
supportive of these sweeping changes or
not.’’
In practice, the Montana Chamber of
Commerce proved correct on this point:
60 days was quite ample. The Board
received hundreds of detailed,
informed, and thoughtful comments.
Many were submitted by the very same
parties that asserted the comment
period should have been longer, such as
the 88-page comment—and hundreds of
accompanying nearly identical form
comments—submitted by SHRM and its
members. The U.S. Chamber states that
it needed more time to ‘‘study Board
data’’ and conduct ‘‘rigorous’’ economic
analysis. But the Chamber did provide
detailed discussions of data and many
studies in its comment. Although the
desire for additional time to gather
additional support and develop
arguments is understandable, agencies
must set some end to the comment
period: ‘‘Agencies should set comment
periods that consider the competing
interests of promoting optimal public
participation while ensuring that the
rulemaking is conducted efficiently.’’
ACUS 2011–2 at 3.
Fourteen days were given for reply
comments. The Chamber suggested that
14 days was insufficient time to review
tens of thousands of comments, and
noted that some of the comments
submitted were not available to the
public until some time after the close of
the initial comment period. Neither the
APA nor any other law requires an
opportunity to reply to initial public
comments. Moreover, while some
comments were not available to the
public immediately upon the close of
the initial comment period, the
comments that were unavailable were
largely identical ‘‘postcard comments,’’
tens of thousands supporting the
proposal in general terms, and tens of
thousands opposing the proposal in
general terms.18 And the purpose of the
reply period was not to afford interested
18 By August 24, 2011, the day after the close of
the initial comment period, 29,236 timely filed
initial comments were available electronically for
review. The Board believes, based on its staff’s
investigation, that initial comments that were not
available at that time fall into one of three
categories: (1) Timely filed form letters submitted
by the AFL–CIO, (2) timely filed form letters
submitted by Americans for Prosperity or CDW or
mailed by individual businesses using a common
form, and (3) late-filed comments submitted
electronically.
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parties an opportunity to read and reply
to all of the comments submitted, but to
provide an opportunity to read the most
significant comments and respond to
the arguments raised in them.
This the Chamber and others did
quite successfully within the 14 days
provided. For example, the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU)
cited and replied to over twenty unique,
detailed, and lengthy comments
submitted by other parties. Others, such
as the Association of Corporate Counsel
(ACC), took the opportunity to focus on
elaborating one particular issue of
special importance. Both approaches
were quite helpful, and served the
purpose for which the Board afforded
the reply period.
The over 65,000 comments submitted
and the depth of analysis they provided
are ample testament to the adequacy of
the opportunities for public
participation in the rulemaking process.
4. The Final Rule
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In light of the procedural concerns
voiced in some of the comments, it
seems likely that some stakeholders will
believe that the period of time between
the close of the reply comment period
and the issuance of the final rule was
too short, and that the Board was
required to spend additional time
considering the comments. This concern
is suggested by NAM in its reply
comment, stating that ‘‘failure to give
due consideration to the public
comments would nonetheless render
* * * the rules * * * arbitrary and
capricious * * *. Absent due
consideration of all the comments, the
Board would be unable to certify that it
has examined and considered all
relevant arguments and data.’’
In order to allay this concern, the
Board assures all those who provided
comments that the Board, through its
Members personally or staff acting at the
Members’ direction, read every nonduplicative comment.19 The comments
were coded so that all comments
addressing specific issues could be
electronically identified. All specific
arguments raised in the comments were
identified, grouped by subject matter,
and analyzed. Through this process, the
Board has read and carefully considered
19 Using electronic means, the Board identified all
identical comments and read only one of each
group of identical comments. More than 90 percent
of the over 65,000 comments were duplicates, near
duplicates, devoid of analysis, or irrelevant. In this
connection, see ACUS 2011–1 ¶ 1(a)(1): While
5 U.S.C. 553 requires agencies to consider all
comments received, it does not require agencies to
ensure that a person reads each one of multiple
identical or nearly identical comments.
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every relevant argument, datum, or
suggestion in the comments.
Finally, the Board has decided to take
additional time to deliberate concerning
the majority of the proposals in the
NPRM, including many of those that
generated the most comments and
controversy.
The Board thoroughly considered and
deliberated about all substantive
comments relevant to the final rule.
Some comments expressed the view
that the rulemaking procedure suggested
a fait accompli, or created an
appearance of favoritism.20 Any sense of
a fait accompli could have mistakenly
arisen only from the detailed specificity
of most of the proposed amendments, as
compared with the open-ended queries
concerning several subjects. However,
as explained above, the comments
addressing the proposals accompanied
by proposed rule text and detailed
explanation far exceeded in number and
quality those addressing the open-ended
questions unaccompanied by such
specifics, bearing out the Board’s
judgment that a more specific proposal
would promote more useful public
participation in the process. And
contrary to any suggestion of favoritism,
the process was completely transparent
and provided multiple opportunities for
any member of the public to participate.
The process resulted in significant
changes to the proposed rule as well as
a decision not to proceed with all the
proposals at this time. In short, the
process was fair, open, and successful.
80145
three members of the Board shall, at all
times, constitute a quorum of the Board
* * *.
Some comments question whether a
divided three-member Board can or
should issue a final rule, arguing that
the Board lacks the authority to do so
or that such action would be contrary to
the Board’s traditions or otherwise
imprudent.21 Certain comments contend
that a Board Member serving a recess
appointment may not, or should not,
participate in any action that represents
a change in Board law or practice.22
After careful consideration, the Board
rejects these arguments.
Under the National Labor Relations
Act, a lawful quorum of the Board
consists of three Members (out of the
five Members provided for by the
statute). Section 3(b) of the Act
expressly provides that:
29 U.S.C. 153(b). See generally New
Process Steel L.P. v. NLRB, __ U.S. __,
130 S.Ct. 2635, 2639–42 (2010)
(analyzing quorum requirement).
Rulemaking is one of the ‘‘powers of the
Board,’’ as Section 6 of the Act provides.
See 29 U.S.C. 156. Adoption of the final
rule, then, reflects the proper exercise of
the Board’s powers by the majority of a
lawful quorum of three Members.
Nothing in the text of the Act or its
legislative history suggests that, even if
the Board has a lawful quorum, certain
Board powers may be exercised only if
approved by at least three Members. Put
somewhat differently, there is no
statutory basis to argue that a threeMember quorum of the Board must act
unanimously—as opposed to acting by
majority vote as is typical—in order
properly to exercise the Board’s powers.
During the many periods in which the
Board consisted of only three Members,
including the period since August 27,
2011, it routinely has issued nonunanimous decisions in adjudicated
cases. See, e.g. Arkema, Inc., 357 NLRB
No. 103 (Oct. 31, 2011); Allied
Mechanical Services, Inc., 357 NLRB
No. 101 (Oct. 25, 2011).
The Board does have a tradition of not
overruling its own prior decisions
through adjudication with fewer than
three votes to do so. See Hacienda
Resort Hotel & Casino, 355 NLRB No.
154, slip op. at 2, 2 n.1 (2010)
(concurring opinion of Chairman
Liebman and Member Pearce) (listing
cases dating to 1985). This tradition—
which is not unbroken 23—is not based
on the Act itself, nor has it been
codified in a Board rule or statement of
procedure.
While the rationale for this tradition
does not appear to have been clearly set
forth in any Board decision, it was
recently articulated by a Federal
appellate court. In Hacienda Resort,
supra—where the Board had deadlocked
2–2 and thus decided the case under
existing law, despite a prior court
remand directing reconsideration—the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the Board’s decision,
while acknowledging the Board’s
traditional approach to overruling
precedent in adjudication:
A vacancy in the Board shall not impair
the right of the remaining members to
exercise all of the powers of the Board, and
We recognize the Board’s interest in
protecting the stability of its legal precedent.
Unlike other federal agencies, the NLRB
5. Board Membership
20 See,
e.g., CDW; Indiana Chamber of Commerce.
e.g., Chamber; SHRM; Associated Builders
& Contractors (ABC).
22 See, e.g., National Grocers Association (NGA);
Testimony of Harold Weinrich.
21 See,
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23 See Mathews Readymix, Inc., 324 NLRB 1005,
1008 n. 14 (1997), enforced, 165 F.3d 74 (DC Cir.
1999) (two-member majority overrules precedent);
Service Employees Local 87 (Cresleigh Mgmt.), 324
NLRB 774, 775 n.3 (1997) (same).
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jlentini on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with RULES4
promulgates nearly all of its legal rules
through adjudication rather than rulemaking
* * *. Under such a scheme, the Board’s
rules would be of little assistance to
employers and unions in following the NLRA
if the Board’s rules interpreting the Act were
subject to routine, frequent change. The
Board reasonably has decided that requiring
a three-member majority to overturn
precedent provides for the necessary stability
of its rules, and we defer to that judgment.
Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas
v. NLRB, 657 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir.
2011).
The Ninth Circuit’s statement
underscores a critical aspect of the
Board’s tradition: It has been followed
in the Board’s adjudication of cases, as
opposed to in notice-and-comment
rulemaking. The notice-and-comment
process of rulemaking does not
implicate the same concerns about the
stability of legal rules that adjudication
does, because it does not permit
‘‘routine, frequent change’’ in the words
of the court. The greater stability
inherent in notice-and-comment
rulemaking has been cited by ACUS in
recommending increased use of
rulemaking by the Board. See ACUS,
Recommendation 91–5, Facilitating the
Use of Rulemaking by the National
Labor Relations Board (adopted June 14,
1991), 56 FR 33851 (July 24, 1991).
Whatever its limited legal weight may
be, the Board’s traditional practice with
respect to overruling precedent through
adjudication is simply not implicated
here for several reasons. The final rule
is the product of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, not adjudication. Moreover,
the final rule reverses no prior Board
decisions. It amends rules that
themselves are not the product of
adjudication, and, indeed, were in large
measure adopted without notice-andcomment rulemaking. Finally, the final
rule is purely procedural. Procedural
rules, governing such subjects as
whether parties have a right to file a
post-hearing brief, do not implicate the
sorts of reliance interests that underlie
the Board’s tradition. Under all these
circumstances, the Board construes its
unwritten tradition of not overruling
precedent in adjudication absent three
votes to not apply here.
In addition, the Board rejects the
argument that the presence of a Member
serving on the Board under a recess
appointment has any bearing on the
adoption of the final rule. There is no
basis in the Act, in administrative law,
or in the Constitution for distinguishing
between Members of the Board serving
under a recess appointment and
Members confirmed by the Senate. The
Board itself has no rule, statement of
procedure, or tradition that would bar a
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recess appointee from participating in
an adjudication or a rulemaking or that
requires some minimum number of
Senate-confirmed Members to exercise
the Board’s powers. Notably, the Board
has overruled precedent in cases where
the majority consisted entirely of recess
appointees. See MV Transportation, 337
NLRB 770 (2002). Recess appointees
have been essential to a majority vote to
overrule precedent in many decisions
issued by prior Boards. See, e.g.,
Randall Warehouse of Arizona, 347
NLRB 591 (2006) (two recess appointees
among three-member majority); Dana
Corp., 351 NLRB 434 (2007) (one recess
appointee). If effective administration of
the Act is the goal, treating recess
appointees as lesser Members of the
Board or deferring action until the
Board has some particular number of
Senate-confirmed Members is
untenable.
In sum, the present Board has full
authority to adopt the final rule.
6. The Dissent
The final rule has been approved by
a two-Member majority of the Board.
The Board currently has three Members,
a lawful quorum under Section 3(b) of
the Act, as explained above.
Member Hayes has effectively
indicated his opposition to the final rule
by voting against publication of the
NPRM and voting against proceeding
with the drafting of the final rule at the
Board’s public meeting on November
30, 2011. Although Member Hayes has
not yet supplied a dissent or similar
statement in connection with the final
rule itself, the Board has authorized the
publication of such a document in the
Federal Register, together with any
separate concurring opinion, when they
are made available. The Board has
delayed the effective date of the final
rule so that Member Hayes will have
over 90 days after he received a final
draft of this final rule to write a dissent
and have it published prior to the
effective date of the rule. The Board
believes that this procedure will provide
Member Hayes with a reasonable period
of time to express his views in a timely,
formal, and public manner.
The Board has no desire to prevent
Member Hayes from expressing his
views in any manner he deems
appropriate. Indeed, the Board has
facilitated Member Hayes’ expression of
a dissenting view in earlier instances of
rulemaking, including the initial stage
of this proceeding.24 The Board has also
24 Member Hayes dissented from the Board’s
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in this
proceeding, and his dissent was published as part
of the NPRM. 76 FR 36812, 36829 (June 22, 2001)
(dissenting view of Member Brian E. Hayes).
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invited and attempted to facilitate
Member Hayes’ expression of his views
to his fellow Board Members through all
appropriate means, including at the
public meeting on November 30. At the
same time, under the circumstances
involved in this rulemaking, the Board
does not believe that it is required,
either by law or agency practice, to
delay the adoption and publication of a
final rule in order to accommodate a
dissenting Member.25 Nothing in the
APA compels that course of action, nor
does the National Labor Relations Act
demand it.26
Neither do the Board’s rules,
statements of procedure, internal
operating procedures, or traditional
practices, which do not address the
internal process of rulemaking, compel
such action. In its 76-year history, the
Board—which has interpreted and
administered the National Labor
Relations Act primarily through
adjudication—has engaged in noticeand-comment rulemaking only rarely.27
The rarity of Board rulemaking explains
why the sole internal Board rule
establishing a timetable for decisionmaking addresses only the adjudication
of cases. Executive Secretary’s
Memorandum No. 01–1 (‘‘Timely
Circulation of Dissenting/Concurring
Opinions’’), issued to Board staff on
January 19, 2001, provides that a Board
decision in an adjudicated case may
issue without a dissent if 90 days have
passed following the circulation of a
majority-approved draft without action
by the remaining Board Member or
Members. Notably, the Memorandum
provides that ‘‘[f]or good cause, the
Board has the discretion to allow
departure from these procedures on a
case-by-case basis.’’ Like Memorandum
Member Hayes also dissented from the Board’s
final rule regarding notification of employee rights
under the National Labor Relations Act, and his
dissent was published with the final rule. 76 FR
54006, 54037 (Aug. 30, 2011) (dissenting view of
Member Brian E. Hayes). Member Hayes had earlier
dissented from the NPRM in that proceeding. 75 FR
80410, 80415 (Dec. 22, 2010) (dissenting view of
Member Brian E. Hayes).
25 The Board’s decision in this regard is informed
by the possibility that after Member Becker’s service
ends at the end of the current congressional session,
no later than January 3, 2012, the Board will be
reduced to two Members, and under the Supreme
Court’s recent New Process decision, supra, may be
unable to act on the proposed rule for a
considerable period of time.
26 See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Potential of
Rulemaking by the NLRB, 5 FIU L. Rev. 411, 431
n.102 (2010) (‘‘[T]he APA does not address the
possibility of dissents in agency rulemakings, and
agencies seem to have widely different practices in
this regard.’’).
27 See generally Administrative Conference of the
United States, Recommendation 91–5, Facilitating
the Use of Rulemaking by the National Labor
Relations Board (adopted June 14, 1991), 56 FR
33851 (July 24, 1991).
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 246 / Thursday, December 22, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
No. 01–1, which superseded them, prior
memoranda from the Executive
Secretary addressing the circulation of
individual opinions by Board Members
refer only to the adjudication of cases
and make no mention of rulemaking.
Rather, the Board has treated each
rulemaking proceeding as unique and
adopted internal procedures suited to
the particular matter. In any event, to
the extent that the 90-day period for
dissents reflected in Memorandum 01–
1 could be regarded as establishing a
traditional norm that applies not only to
routine adjudication, but also to the rare
rulemaking proceedings at the Board,
the Board has honored that norm by
authorizing a dissent to be submitted
and published during the more than 90day period between publication of the
final rule and its effective date.28
The notice-and-comment rulemaking
process, which the Board has followed
in this proceeding, is distinct from
adjudication in its iterative nature (a
proposed rule, followed by a final rule)
and the high degree of public
participation it involves. The focus of
the process is, in effect, a dialogue
between the administrative agency and
the public—not an intramural debate
between or among agency officials. As
explained, the final rule adopted today
has been approved by a majority of a
lawful quorum of the Board, in full
compliance with the APA and other
applicable statutes. That action follows
both full public participation and
extensive internal deliberations by the
Members of the Board.
Member Hayes has in no respect been
excluded from the rulemaking process.
Rather, Member Hayes has had every
opportunity to participate in the Board’s
extensive internal deliberations
concerning the final rule and to express
his views to the other Members of the
Board and to the public. To a highly
unusual, indeed, unprecedented and
unfortunate, degree, the Board’s internal
deliberations have become public,
although not disclosed by the Board
itself. Those communications have
already revealed that Member Hayes has
been kept fully informed at every
significant stage in the conception and
development of the final rule (an
undertaking of more than one year) and
that he has been repeatedly invited to
share his views with his fellow Board
Members over the course of that
process. Member Hayes was briefed on
internal proposals to revise the Board’s
28 While the Board construes its Memorandum
governing its own internal, operating procedures
not to apply to rulemaking, it also finds good cause
to depart from those procedures in this proceeding
in the manner and for the reasons explained in the
text.
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representation case procedures. He was
provided with a draft NPRM and was
offered a briefing before the NPRM was
published (along with his dissent) on
June 22, 2011.29 When the Board held
a public hearing on the proposed rule
on July 18–19, 2011, Member Hayes
attended and actively participated in
questioning witnesses. Following the
close of the initial public comment
period (August 22, 2011) and of the
period for reply comments (September
6, 2011), Member Hayes and his staff
(which comprises more than 25
attorneys) had access to all public
comments filed with the Board as soon
as they were filed. When the Board’s
review and coding of comments began,
Member Hayes was invited to have his
staff participate. He did not respond to
that invitation, and no member of his
staff participated in the laborious
comment-review process. Nevertheless,
Member Hayes was specially provided
with copies of those comments
considered by the other Members and
their senior staff to be the most
extensive, detailed, and useful; with
computer-generated reports identifying
particular issues raised in the comments
that had been coded ‘‘most significant’’
or ‘‘significant’’ by Board staff; with
instructions on how to locate any of the
more than 65,000 comments on the
Board’s shared computer system; and
with lists of issues raised in the
comments grouped by subject matter.
On November 30, 2011, the Board held
a public meeting to discuss the
rulemaking, at which a majority voted to
proceed to a final rule. Member Hayes
attended, participated fully, and voted
against proceeding.
In sum, Member Hayes has been
afforded a full opportunity to participate
in the deliberative process by which this
final rule was developed. While the
Board respects any Member’s right to
disagree and to express that
disagreement at appropriate times and
in an appropriate form, the Board
perceives no basis—in law, in policy, or
in tradition—for indefinitely postponing
adoption of the final rule and for, in
essence, permitting one Member to
exercise what would amount to a
minority veto over a proper exercise of
the Board’s rulemaking authority. Such
a course of action would be plainly
inconsistent with the operation of a
multi-member independent agency that
is, and always has been, governed by
majority vote.
29 76 FR 36812, 36829 (June 22, 2001) (dissenting
view of Member Brian E. Hayes).
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80147
III. Comments on General Issues
Before turning to comments on
specific provisions of the final rule, the
Board addresses a number of general
issues: (a) The Board’s rulemaking
authority; (b) the procedural nature of
the final rule; (c) the justification for any
changes to the rules; (d) employers’
opportunity to campaign; and (e) effects
on employee representation and the
economy.
A. Board Authority To Promulgate
Election Rules
The Board’s rulemaking authority is
well established, as recognized by
comments both opposing and
supporting the proposed rule. For
example, NAM states that ‘‘it is
undisputed that the Board has the
authority to promulgate rules and
regulations,’’ and the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO)
states that ‘‘[t]he NLRB has specific and
express statutory authority to engage in
rule-making to regulate its election
process.’’
Congress delegated both general and
specific rulemaking authority to the
Board. Generally, Section 6 of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
156, provides that the Board ‘‘shall have
authority from time to time to make,
amend, and rescind, in the manner
prescribed by the Administrative
Procedure Act * * * such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act.’’ In
addition, Section 9(c), 29 U.S.C. 159
(c)(1), specifically contemplates election
procedure rules, stating that elections
will be held ‘‘in accordance with such
regulations as may be prescribed by the
Board.’’
As the Supreme Court unanimously
held in American Hospital Association
v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 609–10 (1991),
the Act authorizes the Board to adopt
both substantive and procedural rules
governing representation case
proceedings. The Board’s rules are
entitled to deference. See Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984); NLRB
v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330
(1946). Representation case procedures
are uniquely within the Board’s
expertise and discretion, and Congress
has made clear that the Board’s control
of those procedures is exclusive and
complete. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290 n.21 (1974); AFL
v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 409 (1940). ‘‘The
control of the election proceeding, and
the determination of the steps necessary
to conduct that election fairly were
matters which Congress entrusted to the
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Board alone.’’ NLRB v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 226 (1940); see also
Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 401
U.S. 137 (1971).
In A.J. Tower, 329 U.S. at 330, the
Supreme Court noted that ‘‘Congress has
entrusted the Board with a wide degree
of discretion in establishing the
procedure and safeguards necessary to
insure the fair and free choice of
bargaining representative by
employees.’’ The Act enshrines a
democratic framework for employee
choice and, within that framework,
charges the Board to ‘‘promulgate rules
and regulations in order that employees’
votes may be recorded accurately,
efficiently and speedily.’’ Id. at 331
(emphasis added). ‘‘[T]he determination
of whether a majority in fact voted for
the union must be made in accordance
with such formal rules of procedure as
the Board may find necessary to adopt
in the sound exercise of its discretion.’’
Id. at 333. As the Eleventh Circuit
stated:
We draw two lessons from A.J. Tower: (1)
the Board, as an administrative agency, has
general administrative concerns that
transcend those of the litigants in a specific
proceeding; and, (2) the Board can, indeed
must, weigh these other interests in
formulating its election standards designed to
effectuate majority rule. In A.J. Tower, the
Court recognized ballot secrecy, certainty and
finality of election results, and minimizing
dilatory claims as three such competing
interests.
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Certainteed Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d
1042, 1053 (11th Cir. 1983). As
explained above, the final rule is based
upon just such concerns, specifically
finality and the minimizing of dilatory
claims.
Some comments allege that the Board
lacks authority to issue these rules.30 As
discussed, the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Section 6 clearly
forecloses this argument.
In sum, the Board clearly has
authority to amend its election rules.
B. The Final Rule Is Procedural
Rules of procedure are exempt from
the requirement of notice and comment
under the APA. See 5 U.S.C.
553(b)(3)(A). In the NPRM, the Board
stated that the ‘‘vast majority of the
amendments proposed * * * are
procedural in nature, and the Board was
not required to proceed by notice and
comment with respect to them.’’ 76 FR
36812, 36828 (proposed June 22, 2011).
But see id. at 36830 n. 63 (Member
Hayes, dissenting). The final rule is
wholly procedural. It does not change
any substantive law and does not
30 See,
e.g., Testimony of Harold Weinrich; ACC.
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impose any new substantive rules of
conduct on parties.
Moreover, the final rule amends rules
of procedure applicable only in
representation proceedings that are
themselves exempt from the
requirements of the APA. See 5 U.S.C.
554(a)(6). For both of these reasons,
when the Board promulgated the
regulations delegating authority under
Section 9 of the Act to its regional
directors in 1961, it concluded that the
rulemaking provisions of the APA did
not apply. See Wallace Shops, Inc., 133
NLRB 36, 38–39 (1961).
C. Purpose of the Final Rule
Some comments received in response
to the Board’s NPRM argue that the
Board failed to present sufficient
justification for the proposed
amendments. For example, SHRM
asserts that the Board ‘‘failed to
articulate a legitimate justification for
the significant changes set forth in the
NPRM’’ and that the proposed
amendments are therefore arbitrary and
capricious.31 As discussed above,
however, the amendments the Board has
decided to adopt at this time are
designed to streamline Board
procedures in order to eliminate wholly
unnecessary barriers to the expeditious
resolution of questions concerning
representation. They thus effectuate
employee free choice and safeguard
commerce from industrial strife.
Furthering these statutory goals
constitutes a legitimate and substantial
justification for the Board’s amendments
of its representation case procedures. In
addition, the amendments will reduce
unnecessary litigation and thus the
burdens of litigation both on parties and
the Board. Finally, the amendments
eliminate duplicative regulations.
Furtherance of all of these objectives
supports issuance of the final rule.
Numerous comments contend more
generally that there is no need for
revision of the Board’s representation
procedures because, as argued by NAM,
there is no evidence contradicting the
Board’s own data showing that the
present timeframes for processing
representation cases are among the most
expeditious in the Board’s history, and
further that the Board currently meets
its own internal time targets for
31 Many comments additionally charge that the
Board’s motives for issuing the rule are improper
in that the Board seeks to act as an advocate for
unions (rather than as a neutral overseer of the
process), to drive up the rates of union
representation, and to ‘‘stack the deck’’ against
employers in union organizing campaigns. Similar
concerns were raised by Member Hayes in his
dissent to the NPRM. The Board responds that its
reasons for issuing the rule are fully set forth in the
NPRM and in this preamble.
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processing representation cases.32 Both
Congress and the Board have sought to
improve the efficiency of representation
case procedures over time, as discussed
in detail in the NPRM. The amendments
the Board has chosen to adopt represent
a continuation of this incremental
process, rather than a radical departure
from Board practice as asserted by, for
example, the CDW and Associated
Builders and Contractors (ABC). Past
improvements do not and should not
preclude the Board’s consideration and
adoption of further improvements.
Likewise, the current time targets set by
the Board’s General Counsel for the
processing of representation petitions
reflect the provisions of the Board’s
current rules. That the Board seeks to,
and does, meet those targets in most
instances is irrelevant to whether
additional improvements may be made
by amending the rules.
Many of these same comments, for
example, those of Delhaize America,
Associated General Contractors of
America (AGCA), Society of
Independent Gasoline Marketers of
America, Indiana Chamber of
Commerce, ABC, and Permanent
Solutions Labor Consultants, also cite
the rate of union success in elections as
evidence that the current procedures are
fair and not in need of revision. While
the Board has considered these
comments, so long as election results
accurately reflect employees’ free
choice, the Board views the results as
irrelevant to the question of whether its
representation case procedures are
fulfilling their statutory purpose as fully
and efficiently as possible.
Contrasted with the comments
endorsing the current system, primarily
from employers and associated groups,
comments from various labor
organizations, including the AFL–CIO,
SEIU, Laborers International Union of
North America (LIUNA), and the
International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers (IBEW), argue that the current
system is subject to manipulation,
causing significant pre-election delay
and leading to petitions being
withdrawn prior to an election in over
35 percent of cases, frustration of
employee free choice, and avoidance of
Board processes altogether. Many labor
organizations cited research finding that
a longer period between the filing of a
petition and an election permits
commission of more unfair labor
practices with corresponding
infringement upon employee free
32 This point was also advanced by the AHA;
American Council on Education (ACE); COLLE;
CDW; Associated Oregon Industries; National
Marine Manufacturers Association; The Bluegrass
Institute; and the Chamber.
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choice, while a shorter period leads to
fewer unfair labor practices.33 The
National Employment Law Project
(NELP) asserts that low-wage workers
are particularly susceptible to preelection misconduct.
These comments reveal that the
stakeholders in the Board’s
representation process have starkly
divergent views of its efficiency and
fairness. Labor organizations and
employee advocacy groups view
significant elements of the
representation procedure as largely
unsatisfactory, while the comments of
individual employers and associated
groups such as the GAM, the National
Mining Association (NMA), and the
PCA consistently assert that the current
procedures work well.34
The Board, having carefully
considered these pointedly contrasting
comments, adopts neither position. The
final rule is intended to continue the
Board’s course of incrementally
improving its procedures in order to
better perform its statutory functions
within the framework established by
Congress. The final rule is not intended
to, and does not, alter the basic
representation case procedures. Rather,
as explained more fully below, each
element of the final rule is intended to
correct a specific, identified problem in
the current procedures. Indeed, it is the
Board’s statutory duty to adapt and
improve its processes based on
experience and that is what the final
rule accomplishes.
Other comments acknowledge that the
Board’s procedures have been subject to
misuse in some cases, but suggest that
such cases were rare and do not form an
adequate basis for the Board’s proposals.
The National Retail Federation (NRF)
and Printing Industries of America, Inc.
(PIA), for example, suggest that the rules
should be amended only to address the
33 John Logan, Erin Johansson, & Ryan Lamare,
‘‘New Data: NLRB Process Fails to Ensure A Fair
Vote’’ (2011), https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/
laborlaw/NLRB_Process_June2011.pdf.; Kate
Bronfenbrenner & Dorian Warren, ‘‘The Empirical
Case for Streamlining the NLRB Certification
Process: The Role of Date of Unfair Labor Practice
Occurrence’’ (2011), https://iserp.columbia.edu/
sites/default/files/working_papers/
working_paper_cover_2011-01-final.pdf.; Kate
Bronfenbrenner, ‘‘No Holds Barred: The
Intensification of Employer Opposition to
Organizing’’ (2009), https://www.epi.org/page/-/pdf/
bp235.pdf?nocdn=1; Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations, ‘‘The Dunlop
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management
Relations: Final Report’’ (1994), available at
https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/
key_workplace/2/(‘‘Dunlop Commission Final
Report’’). Some comments, for example, from the
Chamber and ABC, question the validity of such
studies.
34 Comments received from individuals largely
reflect this divide.
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80149
more egregious cases. Relatedly, many
comments cite the high rate of voluntary
election agreements (reached in over
90 percent of cases), which obviate the
need for pre-election hearings, as
evidence that the representation case
procedures are working well in the
overwhelming majority of cases. The
Board has considered this view, but has
concluded that the eight amendments
adopted in the final rule address
systemic problems in the representation
case procedures, which affect not only
contested cases that proceed to a preelection hearing, but also those cases in
which the parties enter into election
agreements.
For example, without clear regulatory
language giving the hearing officer
authority to limit the presentation of
evidence to that relevant to the
existence of a question of
representation, the possibility of using
unnecessary litigation to gain strategic
advantage exists in every case. That
specter, sometimes articulated as an
express threat according to some
comments,35 hangs over all negotiations
of pre-election agreements. In other
words, bargaining takes place in the
shadow of the law, and so long as the
law, as embodied in the Board’s
regulations, does not limit parties to
presenting evidence relevant to the
existence of a question of
representation, some parties will use the
threat of protracted litigation to extract
concessions concerning the election
details, such as the date, time, and type
of election, as well as the definition of
the unit itself. Comments by the United
Food and Commercial Workers
International Union (UFCW), LIUNA,
AFT, NELP, and Retired Field Examiner
Michael D. Pearson all point to the
impact of that specter of unnecessary
litigation on negotiations of pre-election
agreements. The temptation to use the
threat of unnecessary litigation to gain
such strategic advantage is heightened
by both the right to take up to seven
days to file a post-hearing brief and the
25-day waiting period. Every
experienced participant in the Board’s
representation proceedings who wishes
to delay the conduct of an election in
order to gain strategic advantage knows
that once the hearing opens, at least 32
days (seven days after the close of the
hearing and 25 days after a decision and
direction of election) will pass before
the election can be conducted. The
incentive to insist on presenting
evidence, even though there are no
disputes as to facts relevant to the
existence of a question of
representation, is thus not simply the
delay occasioned by the hearing
process, but also the additional
mandatory 32-day delay, not to mention
the amount of time it will take the
regional director to review the hearing
transcript and write a decision—a task
that has added a median of 21 days to
the process over the past decade.
Many comments acknowledge that the
expeditious resolution of questions
concerning representation is a central
purpose of the Act, but argue that the
Board did not consider other statutory
policies in proposing the
amendments.36 In fact, the Board did do
so, both in proposing amendments to its
rules in the NPRM and in deciding to
proceed at this time with the eight
amendments in the final rule. The Board
considered the statute as a whole, as
well as the various policies underlying
its enactment and amendment. Most
centrally, the Board considered the
statutory requirement that the preelection hearing be an ‘‘appropriate
hearing’’ and the parties’ constitutional,
statutory, and regulatory rights in
relation to the hearing. As explained in
detail below, the final rule makes the
hearing more, not less, ‘‘appropriate’’ to
its statutory purpose. The final rule also
fully respects the procedural rights of
the parties. In fact, it permits the parties
to fully exercise their procedural rights
more efficiently and with less burden
and expense. Similarly, the Board
considered employees’ statutory right
under Section 7 to ‘‘bargain collectively
through representatives of their own
choosing’’ and ‘‘to refrain from any or
all such activities.’’ 29 U.S.C. 157. As
explained in detail below, the eight
amendments adopted in the final rule
do not establish inflexible time
deadlines or mandate that elections be
conducted in a set number of days after
the filing of a petition. The time
between petition and election will
continue to be determined by whether
the parties can reach a pre-election
agreement, the scheduling of a hearing,
the amount of evidence that must be
received in order for the regional
director to determine if a question of
representation exists, the complexity of
the issues and extent of the record the
regional director must consider in
reaching a decision, and the sound
discretion of the regional director in
setting an election date. Further, the
amendments do not in any manner alter
existing regulation of parties’ campaign
conduct or restrict freedom of speech.
The amendments apply with equal force
to both union-certification proceedings
35 See American Federation of Teachers (AFT);
IBEW; LIUNA.
36 See, e.g., Assisted Living Foundation of
America (ALFA); COLLE; SHRM; Seyfarth Shaw.
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and union-decertification proceedings.
The Board has also carefully considered
the possibility that the amendments
might somehow reduce the time
between the filing of the petition and
the election so drastically as to threaten
the communication, association, and
deliberation needed by employees in
order to truly exercise freedom of
choice. It has concluded the
amendments pose no such risk, as more
fully explained below.
Finally, many comments argue that
the proposed amendments did not
address the most serious causes of delay
in Board proceedings. Some comments
point to delay in the Board’s own
adjudication of cases.37 Other comments
point to the Board’s blocking charge
policy.38 Of course, an administrative
agency, like a legislative body, is not
required to address all procedural or
substantive problems at the same time.
It need not ‘‘choose between attacking
every aspect of a problem or not
attacking the problem at all.’’ Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486–487
(1970). Rather, the Board ‘‘may select
one phase of one field and apply a
remedy there, neglecting the others.’’
FCC v. Beach Communications, 508
U.S. 307, 316 (1993) (quoting
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)). ‘‘[T]he reform
may take one step at a time.’’ Id.39
The Board is aware that, in too many
instances, it has taken too long to decide
both representation and unfair labor
practice cases. The final rule takes steps
to address those delays at the Board
level by eliminating pre-election
requests for review by the Board and
making Board review of all regional
directors’ post-election dispositions
discretionary. The first of the
amendments will lead to fewer disputes
coming before the Board, because many
pre-election disputes will be rendered
moot by the election or will be resolved
by the parties post-election. It will also
often permit the remaining pre-election
disputes to be presented to the Board
together with any post-election disputes
and thus to be disposed of more
efficiently. Similarly, making Board
review of post-election dispositions
discretionary will permit the Board to
more promptly, and with less
expenditure of time and other resources,
e.g., NAM; PIA.
e.g., AHA; PIA; SHRM; Chamber; CDW;
Professor Samuel Estreicher.
39 These same principles have been applied to
administrative action. See, e.g., United Hosp. v.
Thompson, 383 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2008) (the
equal protection clause does not require the
government to attack every aspect of the problem
or refrain from regulating at all); Great American
Houseboat Co. v. U.S., 780 F.2d 741, 749 (9th Cir.
1986) (same).
dispose of post-election requests for
review that do not raise substantial
issues meriting Board review. The
amendments will thus both directly
speed Board processing of
representation cases and, by reducing
the number of such cases coming before
the Board for full review, free Board
resources to more promptly decide all
cases.
The NPRM specifically asked for
comments on various proposed
revisions of the Board’s blocking charge
policy. While the Board received some
comments relevant to the matter, it has
decided to deliberate further before
deciding what, if any, changes should
be made in the policy, just as it has
decided to deliberate further on many of
the other proposals contained in the
NPRM. As explained in the NPRM, the
blocking charge policy is not codified in
the current regulations. Rather, it is the
product of adjudication and is described
in the non-binding Casehandling
Manual. See Casehandling Manual
Sections 11730 to 11734.
As explained in section 11730 of the
Casehandling Manual, ‘‘The Agency has
a general policy of holding in abeyance
the processing of a petition where a
concurrent unfair labor practice charge
is filed by a party to the petition and the
charge alleges conduct that, if proven,
would interfere with employee free
choice in an election, were one to be
conducted.’’ There are significant
exceptions to the general policy of
having a charge ‘‘block’’ a petition. See
Casehandling Manual Section 11731.
Accordingly, the filing of an unfair labor
practice charge does not automatically
cause a petition to be held in abeyance.
Furthermore, ‘‘the policy is not
intended to be misused by a party as a
tactic to delay the resolution of a
question concerning representation
raised by a petition.’’ Id. at Section
11730.
Some of the comments that point to
blocking charges as a serious source of
delay argue that incumbent unions file
such charges in order to delay
decertification elections.40 The General
Counsel has in place procedures
requiring the expedited investigation of
blocking charges in an effort to ensure
that non-meritorious charges do not
delay elections. Under the agency’s
Impact Analysis system for prioritizing
37 See,
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38 See,
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40 National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation (NRTWLDF); Chamber. Between 2001
and 2010, the number of decertification elections
conducted annually by the Board has ranged from
246 to 488 while the number of certification
elections has ranged from 1,335 to 2,645. Of course,
when a union files a petition seeking to be certified
as the employees’ representative, it can simply
withdraw the petition if it does not want the
election to take place.
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the processing of cases, blocking charge
cases are designated as Category III
(Exceptional) cases, which have the
highest priority and the shortest time
goals for disposition. See Casehandling
Manual Section 11740. Recent
improvement in case processing
procedures in some regional offices
appears to have contributed, at least in
part, to a significant reduction in the
number of decertification elections
blocked by the filing of unfair labor
practice charges. Thus, there were 112
decertification elections blocked by
unfair labor practice charges in Fiscal
Year (FY) 2007, 100 in 2008, 71 in 2009,
64 in 2010, and just 31 to date in 2011.
The Board anticipates that there will be
a further reduction in the number of
decertification elections blocked by
unfair labor practice charges, as well as
a more expeditious processing of all
blocking charges, as these best practices
are adopted more uniformly.
Nevertheless, the Board intends to
continue to deliberate concerning the
proposal to revise the blocking charge
policy via rulemaking.
D. The Employer’s Opportunity To
Campaign
Many comments filed by employers
and employer organizations argue that
the proposed rule changes in the NPRM
would drastically shorten the time
between the filing of petitions and
elections and thereby effectively reduce
employers’ opportunity to communicate
with their employees concerning
whether they should choose to be
represented for purposes of collective
bargaining. These comments make both
legal and policy arguments based on
that claim.
But many of these comments address
the proposed adoption of amendments
that have not been adopted as part of
this final rule. For instance, most
comments raising these arguments focus
on the Board’s proposals to: (1) Set preelection hearings to open seven days
from the notice of hearing absent special
circumstances; (2) shorten the time
period for production of a final voter list
from seven days to two days following
a regional director’s approval of an
election agreement or direction of an
election; and (3) shorten the time period
during which the Board’s final notice of
election must be posted prior to the
election. None of the cited proposals is
included in the final rule.
However, to the extent that the
concerns about the employer’s
opportunity to campaign are relevant to
the rule changes adopted today, the
Board has concluded that the final rule
will advance the statutory objective of
promptly resolving questions of
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representation without in any way
compromising employee free choice or
any other statutory mandate or policy.
The final rule simply removes
unnecessary barriers to prompt
resolution of questions of representation
by reducing needless litigation. It does
not establish any rigid timelines for the
conduct of elections. Under the final
rule, how fast an election will occur will
vary from case to case, just as it did
under the prior rules. Variables affecting
the timing will include (as in the past)
whether the parties are able to reach a
pre-election agreement; the scheduling
of the pre-election hearing; the length of
the hearing; the number and complexity
of the issues the regional director must
address in order to determine if there is
a question of representation; and the
regional director’s exercise of discretion,
considering the preferences of the
parties, in setting the election date.
Moreover, the final rule will apply to
petitions seeking certification of a new
representative, petitions seeking
decertification of an existing
representative, and employer petitions
filed after a union requests recognition.
1. NLRA Section 8(c) and the First
Amendment
Many employer comments contend
that the rule changes reflected in the
NPRM would be inconsistent with
Section 8(c) of the Act 41 and the First
Amendment.42 But neither the proposed
rule nor the more limited final rule in
any way restricts the speech of any
party.
Section 8(c) of the Act provides:
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The expressing of any views, argument, or
opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or
visual form, shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice under
any of the provisions of this Act, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit.
29 U.S.C. 158(c). On its face, Section
8(c)’s only purpose is to prevent speech
from ‘‘constitut[ing] or be[ing] evidence
of an unfair labor practice.’’
Accordingly, the Board has repeatedly
held that Section 8(c) applies only in
unfair labor practice and not in
representation proceedings. See, e.g.,
Hahn Property Management Corp., 263
NLRB 586, 586 (1982); Rosewood Mfg.
Co., Inc., 263 NLRB 420, 420 (1982);
Dal-Tex Optical Co., Inc., 137 NLRB
1782, 1787 fn. 11 (1962). Because the
final rule, which addresses
representation case procedures, does not
41 See,
e.g., SHRM; Sheppard, Mullin, Richter &
Hampton LLP (Sheppard Mullin); and the National
Retail Federation (NRF).
42 See, e.g., NGA; Waste Connections; ALFA.
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in any way permit the use of speech as
evidence of an unfair labor practice,
Section 8(c) is not implicated.
Nor does the final rule implicate
concerns grounded in the First
Amendment. Aside from the accurate
statement that speech about unions is
protected by the First Amendment,43 the
comments do not appear to argue that
the proposed amendments would
violate the First Amendment. In any
event, neither the proposed nor the final
rule restricts speech in any manner. The
rule does not eliminate the opportunity
for the parties to campaign before an
election, nor does it impose any
restrictions on campaign speech. As
under the current rules, employers
remain free to express their views on
unionization whenever and as often as
they desire, both before and after the
petition is filed, so long as they refrain
from threats or coercion. As the
Supreme Court stated in 1941, ‘‘The
employer * * * is as free now as ever
to take any side it may choose on this
controversial issue.’’ NLRB v. Virginia
Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477
(1941). Likewise, the rule does not
impose any new limitations on union
speech. Accordingly, the Board’s effort
to simplify and streamline the
representation case process does not
infringe the speech rights of any party.
The comments do not contend that
employers will be prevented from
expressing their opinions on
unionization, but only that, because
there may be less time between petition
and election in some cases, employers
will have fewer opportunities to express
their opinions before the Board
concludes its investigation under
Section 9. 29 U.S.C. 159. This does not
rise to the level of an unconstitutional
restriction on speech.
2. Congressional Inaction in 1959
ACC points out that Congress, in
enacting the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)
in 1959, rejected a proposal that would
have permitted an election to take place
before a hearing when there were no
issues warranting adjudication, so long
as the election was not held sooner than
30 days after the petition was filed. The
proposal, contained in the Senate
version of the bill, would have
permitted a so-called ‘‘pre-hearing
election,’’ barred by the 1947 TaftHartley amendments to the Act. S. 1555,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 705 (as passed by
Senate, Apr. 25, 1959). The Senate
Report on the bill in the prior session
suggested that a 30-day period would
43 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537–38
(1945).
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80151
provide a ‘‘safeguard against rushing
employees into an election where they
are unfamiliar with the issues.’’ S. Rep.
No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 27–28
(1958). The House bill, however, never
contained a parallel provision, and it
was not enacted into law.
Nevertheless, ACC argues that the
proposed amendments described in the
NPRM are inconsistent with
congressional intent because they do not
guarantee a minimum of 30 days
between petition and election. To the
extent that ACC’s argument bears on the
final rule, the Board rejects it. Report
language and statements of individual
legislators on a provision that was not
enacted in 1959 are entitled to little if
any weight in assessing the meaning of
legislation adopted in 1935 and
amended in 1947. In fact, the Supreme
Court has clearly stated that ‘‘failed
legislative proposals are a particularly
dangerous ground on which to rest an
interpretation of a prior statute’’ because
a bill can be proposed or rejected for
any number of reasons.44 Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159,
169–70 (2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994).
Indeed, the rejection of the proposed
amendment would more reasonably be
understood as an indication that
Congress did not believe a minimum
time between petition and election is
necessary. However, the legislative
history of the LMRDA offers no
guidance on why the provision was
rejected, and Congress imposed no
requirements in the LMRDA or at any
other time concerning the length of time
that must elapse between petition and
election. Accordingly, the Board finds
no indication in this legislative history
that the final rule is in any way contrary
to Congress’s intent.
3. The Statutory Policy in Favor of Free
Debate
Although it is clear that the proposed
amendments implicate neither the First
Amendment nor Section 8(c) of the Act,
many comments nevertheless suggest
that the amendments would leave
employers with too little time to
effectively inform their employees about
the choice whether to be represented by
44 For this reason, the Board declines COLLE’s
similar suggestion to find relevant Congress’ failure
to pass the 1978 Labor Law Reform Act, versions
of which provided for varying time frames for
representation elections.
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a union.45 They contend that the
consequences of a union vote are
longlasting and could significantly
affect employees’ livelihoods and
careers, and therefore that ensuring that
employees have sufficient time to hear
from all sides is critical to the statutory
objective of ensuring employee free
choice.46 Comments in favor of the
amendments contend, on the other
hand, that employers can and do
communicate their views on unions to
employees even before a petition has
been filed and will continue to have
sufficient time to do so after filing under
the proposed amendment. Some of these
comments also argue that a lengthy
election campaign harms the prospects
for successful collective bargaining.47
a. NLRB v. Gissel Packing
The Supreme Court’s decision in
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575 (1969), which upheld the Board’s
authority to order an employer to
bargain with a union that had not been
certified as the result of an election, is
relevant to this issue. In Gissel, the
employers argued that the Board could
not order an employer to bargain with
the union, even when the union’s
majority support was demonstrated
through employees’ authorization cards
and the employer’s unfair labor
practices had rendered a free and fair
election impossible, because a union
could solicit such cards before the
employer had an adequate opportunity
to communicate with employees. The
Court rejected this argument:
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The employers argue that their employees
cannot make an informed choice because the
card drive will be over before the employer
has had a chance to present his side of the
unionization issues. Normally, however, the
union will inform the employer of its
organization drive early in order to subject
the employer to the unfair labor practice
provisions of the Act; the union must be able
to show the employer’s awareness of the
drive in order to prove that his
contemporaneous conduct constituted unfair
labor practices on which a bargaining order
can be based if the drive is ultimately
successful. See, e. g., Hunt Oil Co., 157 NLRB
282 (1966); Don Swart Trucking Co., 154
NLRB 1345 (1965). Thus, in all of the cases
here but [one,] the employer, whether
informed by the union or not, was aware of
the union’s organizing drive almost at the
outset and began its antiunion campaign at
45 See Chamber; COLLE; SHRM; Seyfarth Shaw;
Sheppard Mullin; Baker & McKenzie; John Deere
Water; and PIA.
46 See NGA; Retail Industry Leaders Association
(RILA); Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers
of America (SIGMA); Ranking Member Michael B.
Enzi of the U.S. Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor & Pensions, and Republican
Senators; National Meat Association (NMA).
47 See AFL–CIO and SEIU.
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that time; and even in the [one] case, where
the recognition demand came about a week
after the solicitation began, the employer was
able to deliver a speech before the union
obtained a majority.
Id. at 603. The Supreme Court has thus
recognized that the concern expressed
in the comments ‘‘normally’’ does not
arise even when there is no election and
the organizing effort does not proceed
beyond the signing of authorization
cards.
b. Chamber of Commerce v. Brown
The Supreme Court recognized in
Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554
U.S. 60 (2008), that the Act embodies a
general ‘‘congressional intent to
encourage free debate on issues dividing
labor and management.’’ 48 Id. at 68
(quoting Linn v. Plant Guard Workers,
383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966) (a defamation
case)). Some comments contend that
this case demonstrates that the Board
must now provide a definite period of
time after the petition in which parties
can campaign prior to the election. In
fact, however, Chamber of Commerce v.
Brown held only that the Act preempted
a state law that prohibited the use of
state funds to encourage or discourage
employees from seeking representation.
What the Court suggested in the quoted
language is that Congress intended to
leave speech concerning labor relations
unregulated; in the Court’s words, to
‘‘shield a zone of activity from
regulation.’’ Id. The Court concluded
that the California law at issue in Brown
‘‘indirectly regulate[d] such conduct by
imposing spending restrictions on the
use of state funds.’’ Id. at 69. In short,
the Court held the state law regulated
speech and was thus preempted. The
final rule in no way regulates speech. It
is fully consistent with congressional
intent as articulated in Brown.
Even adopting the more expansive
view of the statutory policy articulated
in Brown urged by some comments—
that Congress intended not only to
insulate and protect speech concerning
labor relations, but to affirmatively
facilitate such speech—the final rule is
fully consistent with that objective as
explained below.
c. Employer Pre-Petition Knowledge
Numerous comments contend that
any shortening of the time period
between the petition and election will
be detrimental to employers because
employers are often unaware that an
organizing campaign is underway until
the petition is filed.49 These comments
48 554
U.S. 60, 68 (2008).
e.g., Chamber; CDW; National ReadyMixed Concrete Association (NRMCA); Greater
49 See,
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contend that the union will have had a
head start in the campaign because it
will, necessarily, have already obtained
authorization cards from at least 30
percent of employees in the petitionedfor unit, and will have been able to
delay filing the petition for whatever
amount of time it believed was
advantageous in order to communicate
with employees.50 For example, the
Chamber comments that union petitions
‘‘catch[] many if not most employers off
guard and ill-prepared to immediately
respond * * * ’’ The Board was
presented with no reliable empirical
evidence, however, suggesting that
employers are frequently unaware of an
organizing drive before the filing of a
petition,51 and the Board’s experience
and recent scholarly research suggest
the opposite.
First, Board precedent is replete with
cases in which there was clear evidence
that the employer was aware of the
organizing campaign well before the
petition was filed. For example, unions
often give the employer formal notice of
the campaign before filing the petition,
either by demanding recognition or by
providing the employer with a list of
employees on the organizing
committee.52 In other cases, the
employer’s knowledge of the campaign
is apparent from the fact that the
employer committed unfair labor
practices targeting employees’
organizing activity before the filing of
the petition.53
Raleigh Chamber of Commerce; Landmark Legal
Foundation; and Vigilant.
50 NGA; NMA. See also Spartan Motors, Inc.;
Cook Illinois Corporation; Arizona Hospital and
Healthcare Association; Constangy, Brooks & Smith,
LLP; Sheppard Mullin; Ranking Member Michael B.
Enzi of the U.S. Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor & Pensions, and Republican
Senators; Specialty Steel Industry of North
America; International Foodservice Distributors
Association; NAM; Chamber; NRTWLDF.
51 COLLE acknowledges this in its comment.
52 See, e.g., Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 324 NLRB
72, 76 (1997) (union informed employer of
campaign and committee members on January 26
and filed petition on March 26), enf. granted in part,
denied in part 148 F.3d 1166 (DC Cir. 1998); Keco
Industries, 306 NLRB 15, 16 (1992) (union informed
employer of campaign in January and filed petition
on October 31); Mariposa Press, 273 NLRB 528, 533
(1984) (union informed employer of campaign on
September 25 and filed petition on October 6);
Comet Corp., 261 NLRB 1414, 1418, 1422 (1982)
(union informed employer of campaign and
committee members on July 23 and filed petition
on August 23); Quebecor Group, Inc., 258 NLRB
961, 964 (1981) (union informed employer of
campaign on November 17 and filed petition on
November 28).
53 See, e.g., Ryder Truck Rental, 341 NLRB 761,
765 fn. 9, 766–67 (2004) (petition filed in December;
in November, employer invited employees to report
any harassment by union), enfd. 401 F.3d 815 (7th
Cir. 2005); Dlubak Corp., 307 NLRB 1138, 1141,
1147 (1992) (threats and discriminatory discharges
occurred October 5–13; petition filed October 24),
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An empirical study conducted by
Professors Kate Bronfenbrenner and
Dorian Warren (and submitted with
their comment) casts further doubt on
the contention that employers are
frequently unaware of a union campaign
until the petition is filed.54 The study
concluded that in 47 percent of cases
involving serious unfair labor practice
allegations against employers that
resulted in a settlement or a Board
finding that the law was violated, the
alleged unlawful conduct occurred
before the petition was filed; in 60
percent of cases involving allegations of
interrogation and harassment, the
conduct occurred before the petition;
and in 54 percent of cases involving
allegations of threats and other coercive
statements, the conduct occurred before
the petition. Professor Warren testified
at the public hearing that the
researchers’ review of the files in these
cases indicated that the conduct
resulting in the charge, whether it was
actually unlawful or not, evidenced the
employer’s knowledge of the organizing
campaign. Critics of the study contend
that it inappropriately focuses on mere
allegations of misconduct and that the
category of ‘‘charges won’’
inappropriately includes settlements.
The importance of the study’s findings
for present purposes, however, does not
rest on whether or not the charges had
merit, but rather on the fact that they
were filed based on pre-petition conduct
and that available information in the
case files suggests the employer had prepetition knowledge of the organizing
campaign. The study’s findings in that
regard are consistent with the Board’s
experience, and no contrary study
relying on empirical evidence was
presented to the Board.
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d. Employer Communications in the
Absence of a Campaign
The foregoing authority casts doubt
on the contention that ‘‘many if not
most’’ employers are unaware of an
organizing drive prior to the filing of a
enfd. mem. 5 F.3d 1488 (3d Cir. 1993); Spring City
Knitting Co., 285 NLRB 426, 432, 449, 450, 456
(1987) (unfair labor practices occurred March 1, 14,
and 29; petition filed May 3); Well-Bred Loaf, Inc.,
280 NLRB 306, 308, 317 (1986) (threats,
interrogation, and unlawful discharges occurred
August 22 and 23, at a time when union activity
was already common knowledge; petition filed
October 6); Dilling Mechanical Contractors, 318
NLRB 1140, 1143, 1156 (1995) (union informed
employer of campaign on January 4, but employer
had threatened employees with discharge in
December if they engaged in union activity), enfd.
107 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S.
862 (1997).
54 The study was based on a random sample of
1,000 elections during the period 1999 through
2003 and a survey of 562 campaigns from that
sample. See Bronfenbrenner & Warren, supra at 2.
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petition. But even in the absence of an
active organizing campaign, employers
in nonunionized workplaces may and
often do communicate their general
views about unionization to both new
hires and existing employees.55 Some
comments suggest that, prior to
receiving a petition, employers pay little
attention to the issue of union
representation, and that general efforts
to inform and persuade employees
about unionization in the absence of a
petition would be time-consuming and
expensive.56 Although some employers
may choose not to discuss unionization
until a petition is filed, the Board’s
experience suggests that other
employers do discuss unionization with
their employees beforehand, often as
soon as they are hired.57 For example,
some employers distribute employee
handbooks or show orientation videos
to all new employees that express the
employer’s view on unions or its desire
that employees remain unrepresented.58
55 See comments of John Logan, Ph.D., Erin
Johansson, M.P.P., and Ryan Lamare, Ph.D.; Center
for American Progress Action Fund.
56 Fox Rothschild LLP; NMA; NRF.
57 SHRM suggests that the proposed rule will
cause more employers to express their views on
employee representation prior to active campaigns.
Given the number of petitions filed each year, the
Board does not view this as likely. In any event,
such expressive activity is consistent with the Act
so long as it does not convey a threat or promise
of benefit.
58 See, e.g., U-Haul Co. of California, 347 NLRB
375, 378 (2006) (employee handbook, distributed to
all new employees, included a section entitled,
‘‘What about Unions?’’; the section stated the
employer’s preference to be union-free and asserted
that employees do not need a union or outside third
party to resolve workplace issues); SNE Enterprises,
347 NLRB 472, 473 (2006) (employee handbook
stated, ‘‘The Company believes a union is not
necessary and not in the best interest of either the
Company or its Team Members.’’), enfd. 257 Fed.
Appx. 642 (4th Cir. 2007); Overnite Transportation
Co., 343 NLRB 1431, 1455 (2004) (employee
handbook stated: ‘‘It is important for you to know
that the Company values union-free working
conditions. We believe that true job security can
come only from you and the management of this
company working together in harmony to produce
a quality product. A union-free environment allows
this kind of teamwork to develop.’’); MEMC
Electronic Materials, Inc., 342 NLRB 1172, 1188
(2004) (employee handbook stated that remaining
‘‘union-free’’ is an objective of the company);
Noah’s New York Bagels, 324 NLRB 266, 272 (1997)
(section of employee handbook entitled ‘‘Unions’’
states: ‘‘At Noah’s Bagels we believe that unions are
not necessary. We believe this for many reasons[.]
First, there is no reason why you should have to
pay union initiation fees, union dues, and union
assessments for what you already have * * *
Second, there is no reason why you or your family
should fear loss of income or job because of strikes
or other union-dictated activity. Third, we believe
that the best way to achieve results is to work and
communicate directly with each other without the
interference of third parties or unions * * * The
Federal government gives employees the right to
organize and join unions. It also gives employees
the right to say ‘no’ to union organizers and not join
unions. Remember, a union authorization card is a
power of attorney which gives a union the right to
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Several comments contend that an
employer’s general ability to
communicate with employees regarding
unions is not a complete substitute for
the ability to communicate regarding a
specific petition and a known
petitioner.59 The Board concludes that
the opportunity for generalized
communications together with the
opportunities that will continue to exist
post-petition under the final rule will
ensure employee free choice even in
those cases where employers are
unaware of the organizing drive until
the petition is filed.
Finally, even in the absence of any
pre-petition campaign, employees have
experience with the existing labormanagement regime in their workplace,
which informs their choice of whether
to alter it. In unionized workplaces in
which the incumbent union faces a
decertification petition or a rival union
petition, the incumbent union will be
appropriately judged by its performance
to date. Thus, eligible voters have a
preexisting base of knowledge and
experience with which to evaluate the
incumbent. The same is true in
workplaces where employees are
unrepresented. Employees there have
experience with labor-management
relations in the absence of union
representation. In both cases, employees
base their choice, at least in part, on the
relationship they are being asked to
change.
e. Post-Petition Communication
Although the Board has concluded
that the record does not establish that
pre-petition employer ignorance of an
organizing campaign is the norm, the
Board accepts that, in at least some
cases, employers may, in fact, be
unaware of an organizing campaign
until a petition is filed. For example,
COLLE cites union campaign strategy
speak and act for you. If you should be asked to sign
a union authorization card, we are asking you to say
‘no.’ ’’); American Wire Products, 313 NLRB 989,
994 (1994) (employee handbook states, ‘‘Our
Company is a non-union organization and it is our
desire that we always will be’’; the same section
also requests employees to direct union-related
questions to a supervisor); Heck’s, Inc., 293 NLRB
1111, 1119 (1989) (employee handbook’s ‘‘Union
Policy’’ read: ‘‘As a Company, we recognize the
right of each individual Employee, their freedom of
choice, their individuality and their needs as a
worker and a fellow human being. For these reasons
and others, we do not want any of our Employees
to be represented by a Union * * * When you
thoroughly understand Heck’s liberal benefit
programs, the desire to assist you in your job
progress and willingness to discuss your job-related
problems, you surely will agree there is no need for
a union or any other paid intermediary to stand
between you and your company.’’) Thus, employees
may be well aware of their employer’s opposition
to unions even before any campaign begins.
59 See SHRM; COLLE; NAM; Seyfarth Shaw; and
ALFA.
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documents that allegedly call for
‘‘stealth’’ campaigns. In such cases, the
union may indeed have a ‘‘head start’’
in the campaign, in the sense that it
begins communicating its specific
message to the unit employees before
the employer does so.60
In relation to the opportunities for
post-petition communication, the Board
notes initially that the final rule will
apply to decertification elections as well
as certification elections, and therefore
that incumbent unions will suffer the
same disadvantages in relation to a
petitioner as will employers.61 In fact,
because unions typically do not have
any on-going presence in the workplace,
incumbent unions are much less likely
to know about the circulation of a
decertification petition than employers
are to know about a union organizing
drive.62
The Board finds, moreover, that as a
general matter, employers are able to
communicate their message to
employees quickly and effectively. The
median bargaining unit size from 2001
to 2010 was 23 to 26 employees. Given
this relatively small size, effective
communication with all voters can be
accomplished in a short period of
time.63 In addition, some provisions of
60 See also comment of RILA, contending that
‘‘stealth campaigns’’ are common in the retail
industry.
61 SEIU argues that the time frames in the
proposed amendments should not apply in cases
involving decertification petitions, because
employers can withdraw recognition in certain
circumstances without having to go through the
election process. To the extent that SEIU’s comment
is still relevant to the limited changes implemented
by the final rule, the Board disagrees. Employers
can also voluntarily recognize unions as the
collective-bargaining representatives of their
employees without going through the election
process, yet the Board has a duty to expeditiously
resolve questions concerning representation when
employers will not voluntarily recognize unions.
Thus, the NLRA provides a means for employees to
engage in collective bargaining with their employer
even if their employer would prefer not to do so.
Similarly, the NLRA does not require employees to
depend on their employer to end unwanted
representation. The Board takes seriously its
responsibility to expeditiously resolve questions
concerning representation in the decertification
context just as in an initial organizing context.
62 Cf. United Kiser Services, 355 NLRB No. 55,
slip op. at 1 (2010) (union representative only
visited the represented shop four times over 17month period); Moeller Bros. Body Shop, 306 NLRB
191, 191 (1992) (union official ‘‘rarely’’ visited
respondent’s body shop, including every three years
for contract renewal negotiations); Pullman Bldg.
Co., 251 NLRB 1048, 1051–52 (1980) (union official
visited worksite to commence investigation only
after receiving complaint that employer was
violating labor agreement), enfd. 691 F.2d 507 (9th
Cir. 1982).
63 RILA and NRF argue that sufficient time to
campaign is particularly critical in the retail
industry, where employees work on different shifts,
often are seasonal or part-time, are less accessible
during the workday because they are on the sales
floor, and often are unavailable outside normal
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the Board’s rules give a ‘‘head start’’ to
the employer that, in the Board’s view,
more than counterbalances any
perceived union advantage. For
instance, under extant precedent, not
altered by the final rule, the employer
is not required to provide the union
with the names and addresses of eligible
voters until seven days after the
Regional Director approves the parties’
election agreement or issues a Decision
and Direction of Election. After the
filing of the petition and until that
time—which, in contested cases over
the last decade, is often at least six
weeks—the employer is in many cases
the only party that knows who all the
eligible voters are likely to be and how
to contact them. In addition to having a
record of eligible employees’ names,
phone numbers, and email addresses,
the employer knows their work
locations and work schedules. Even
after it provides the eligibility list to the
other parties, the employer often
remains the only party with access to all
employees’ contact information other
than their home addresses.
Moreover, as noted in the testimony
of Professor Joseph McCartin, the
employer has unlimited access to
employees during every workday and
has the ability to compel employees to
attend meetings on working time at the
employer’s convenience.64 The
employer can also communicate its
working hours due to other commitments. NRF
contends, however, that more than 98 percent of all
retailers employ fewer than 100 workers, and RILA
contends that most petitions seek elections in
single-store units and that front-line managers
typically constitute 10 to 20 percent of the
workforce in each store.
NRMCA makes a similar argument that its
industry has unique features such as isolated plant
locations, unpredictable delivery hours, and
dispersed employees. But it, too, states that the vast
majority of employers in the industry are small
businesses. Therefore, most bargaining units in the
retail and ready-mixed concrete industries are
likely to be quite small, which should enable
employer communication to take place in a
relatively short period of time and, certainly, much
more easily than union communication because
unions often lack knowledge of all work locations,
employee shifts and hours, and even the identity of
all employees. In addition, as explained in the text,
under extant precedent, these employers (and
others) can require all employees to attend a
meeting or multiple meetings outside their normal
work hours, in a central location, in order to ensure
they receive the employer’s message prior to the
election.
64 A 1990 study of over 200 representation
elections found that employers conducted
mandatory meetings prior to 67 percent of the
elections. John J. Lawler, Unionization and
Deunionization: Strategy, Tactics, and Outcomes
145 (1990). A more recent study found that in 89
percent of campaigns surveyed, employers required
employees to attend so-called ‘‘captive audience’’
meetings during work time and that the majority of
employees attended at least five such meetings
during the course of the campaign. Bronfenbrenner
& Warren, supra at 6.
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views to employees while they are
working, even in settings where the
employees have no choice but to listen.
See, e.g., Frito Lay, Inc., 341 NLRB 515,
515 (2004) (‘‘In the 2 months between
the filing of the petition and the
election, the Employer wanted to
provide an opportunity for the
employees to obtain information
relevant to the drivers’ upcoming voting
decision. Because the Employer’s ability
to communicate with its drivers at the
facility was constrained, the Employer
sent ‘guests’ along on their runs to
provide information and answer any
questions the drivers might have. These
‘ride-alongs’ averaged approximately
10–12 hours, due to the length of the
drivers’ day runs, and each truckdriver
averaged approximately 3 ride-alongs in
the 2 months before the election.’’). In
fact, the employer can even compel
such attendance outside employees’
normal work hours and locations. See,
e.g., Curtin Matheson Scientific, 310
NLRB 1090, 1090 (1993) (employer
required employees to attend campaign
meeting in hotel); Ideal Elevator Corp.,
295 NLRB 347, 351 (1989) (employer
required all employees to attend
meeting after working hours to listen to
its president’s speech).65 Under current
law, such compelled attendance at
meetings at which employees are often
expressly urged to vote against
representation is generally neither
objectionable nor an unfair labor
practice.66 The employer may require
individual employees or small groups to
attend such meetings at any time up
until employees enter the polling area or
65 The Board found the conduct at issue in these
cases unlawful or objectionable for reasons
unrelated to the time or location of the required
meetings. Requiring employees to attend such
campaign meetings outside their normal work hours
without full compensation may constitute
objectionable conduct. See Comet Electric, 314
NLRB 1215, 1216 (1994).
66 See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co., 251 NLRB 1111,
1113 (1980) (employer’s attempt to further its
campaign by conducting a mandatory meeting and
by declaring that no questions would be answered
in the course thereof was not unlawful), enfd. 655
F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989
(1982); Litton Systems, Inc., 173 NLRB 1024, 1030
(1968) (adopting the decision of the administrative
law judge, who concluded: ‘‘An employee has no
statutorily protected right to leave a meeting which
the employees were required by management to
attend on company time and property to listen to
management’s noncoercive antiunion speech
designed to influence the outcome of a union
election.’’); S & S Corrugated Paper Machinery Co.,
Inc., 89 NLRB 1363, 1364 (1950) (‘‘the ‘captive
audience’ aspect of the Employer’s speeches,
otherwise protected by Section 8(c) of the amended
Act, cannot form the basis for a finding that the
Employer * * * has interfered with the employees’
free choice of a bargaining representative’’);
Fontaine Converting Works Inc., 77 NLRB 1386,
1387 (1948) (employer did not violate the Act by
‘‘compelling its employees to attend and listen to
speeches on company time and property’’).
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are waiting in line to vote.67 Thus, for
example, the Board has held that it is
not objectionable for an employer’s
highest ranking officials to proceed
systematically through the workplace
less than 24 hours before a vote, urging
each individual employee at his or her
work station to vote against
representation. See Electro-Wire
Products, Inc. 242 NLRB 960, 960
(1979); Associated Milk Producers, Inc.,
237 NLRB 879, 880 (1978). Modern
communications technology available in
many workplaces permits employers to
communicate instantly and on an ongoing, even continuous basis with all
employees in the voting unit. See, e.g.,
Virginia Concrete Corp., 338 NLRB
1182, 1182 (2003) (employer sent ‘‘Vote
No’’ message to ‘‘mobile data units’’ in
employees’ trucks in the final 24 hours
before an election).68 One classic
empirical study of representation
elections found that ‘‘the employer who
uses working time or premises to
campaign against the union and denies
those facilities to the union effectively
communicates with a substantially
greater proportion of the employees
than does the union.’’ Julius G. Getman
et al., ‘‘Union Representation Elections:
Law and Reality’’ 156 (1976). Because
those who attend union meetings tend
to already be union supporters, the
employer, which can convene meetings
of all employees on working time, ‘‘has
a great advantage in communicating
with the undecided and those not
already committed to it.’’ Id. at 156–57.
In addition to the employer’s earlier,
more complete knowledge of voters’
identity and whereabouts and ability to
convene employees inside and outside
the workplace during work and nonwork time to campaign, the Board’s
usual practice is to hold the election
itself ‘‘somewhere on the employer’s
premises,’’ unless there is ‘‘good cause’’
to do otherwise.69 Because employers
can ordinarily bar union representatives
from their property,70 this practice
permits employers to campaign actively
among employees on election day while
barring the union from doing the same.
Thus, the employer not only has greater
access to employees throughout the
representation process, but also
67 An exception exists for ‘‘massed assemblies,’’
which are prohibited during the 24 hours before the
election under Peerless Plywood, 107 NLRB 427,
429 (1953).
68 As described in the NPRM, the Board’s
experience suggests employers are also increasingly
using email to send campaign communications to
their employees. 76 FR 36812, 36820 (June 22,
2011).
69 See Casehandling Manual Section 11302.2.
70 See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538
(1992); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S.
105, 112 (1956).
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ordinarily has the ‘‘last word’’ on
election day. The Board has recognized
that having the ‘‘last, most telling word’’
is a significant advantage in elections.
Peerless Plywood, 107 NLRB at 429.
For these reasons, the Board does not
believe that any reduction of the time
between petition and election that
results from the final rule will be unfair
to any party or infringe on employee
free choice.71
f. The Current Median Time of 38 Days
Many comments contend that there is
no reason to adopt the proposed
amendments because the current
median time period between petition
and election is 38 days. That time
period, however, is simply a historical
fact, and does not represent a
considered judgment on the optimal
duration of a campaign. It is not the
result of a deliberate choice by Congress
or any prior Board.
Moreover, because the 38 days is a
median, the actual time from petition to
election varies greatly from one case to
another. By definition, a median of 38
days means that, in half of all cases, the
time between petition and election is
longer than 38 days. Most importantly
for present purposes, the median time
between petition and election in cases
that proceed to hearing (the only cases
directly affected by the final rule) has
varied between 64 and 70 days over the
past five years.
As explained in the NPRM, the
current median reflects prior reforms
enacted by Congress and adopted by the
Board altering the procedures for
resolving questions of representation.
See 76 FR at 36813–14. Each of those
changes had the effect of shortening the
time period between the filing of the
petition and the holding of an election.
Thus, the length of the so-called
‘‘critical period’’ has never been static,
and prior changes have not proven to be
detrimental to employee free choice.
In other words, the current median
period between petition and election is
tied to factors having nothing to do with
informing employees about
unionization. To the extent current
procedures impair the Board’s ability to
expeditiously resolve questions of
representation and are not necessary to
the fair and accurate performance of the
Board’s statutory duties to determine if
71 The bipartisan Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations, U.S., concluded as
follows after extensive study in 1994: ‘‘The
Commission believes the NLRB should conduct
representation elections as promptly as
administratively feasible. * * * Each side would
continue to have ample time to express its views
if the process were much shorter.’’ Dunlop
Commission Final Report, supra at 41.
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a question of representation exists and,
if so, to direct an election in order to
answer the question, the Board has
concluded that the procedures should
be amended.
g. Other Issues Affecting the
Appropriate Time Period between
Petition and Election
Some comments, including that of
Professor Samuel Estreicher, suggest
that the employer needs sufficient time
not only to campaign, but to retain
counsel so that the employer
understands the legal constraints on its
campaign activity and does not violate
the law or engage in objectionable
conduct.72 A number of comments
specifically argue that any compression
of the time period between the petition
and election will be particularly
difficult for small businesses, which do
not have in-house legal departments and
may not have ready access to either inhouse or outside labor attorneys or
consultants to counsel them on how to
handle the campaign.73 Similarly, some
comments suggest that, to the extent the
amendments result in a shorter period
of time between the petition and the
election, they will increase objections
and unfair labor practice litigation,
because employers will not have an
opportunity to train managers on how to
avoid objectionable and unlawful
conduct. See Con-way Inc.; Bluegrass
Institute; ATA.74
The Board believes that most of the
rules governing campaign conduct are
matters of common sense that are
intuitively understood by employers
and employees—the prohibition of
threats and bribes, for example.
Moreover, when the petition is served
on the employer by the regional office,
it is accompanied by a Notice to
Employees, Form NLRB 666, which sets
forth in understandable terms the
central rules governing campaign
conduct. In any event, the Board does
not believe that any shortening of the
72 See also testimony of former Board Member
Marshall Babson (emphasizing that the rules must
balance the various competing interests).
73 NRMCA; Indiana Chamber of Commerce;
National Automobile Dealers Association; T&W
Block Company; York Society for Human Resource
Management; National Marine Manufacturers
Association; Council of Smaller Enterprises;
Bluegrass Institute; Landmark Legal Foundation;
American Trucking Associations; testimony of
Steve Jones; American Fire Sprinkler Association.
74 Other comments, however, cite evidence
indicating a positive correlation between the length
of a campaign and unfair labor practice allegations.
See SEIU; NELP; Ranking Member George Miller
and Democratic Members of the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Education and the
Workforce; John Logan, Ph.D., Erin Johansson,
M.P.P., and Ryan Lamare, Ph.D. See also testimony
of Professor Ethan Daniel Kaplan (citing similar
results from a study in Canada).
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time between petition and election that
results from the final rule will impair
employers’ ability to retain counsel in a
timely manner.75 In this regard, Russ
Brown, an experienced labor-relations
consultant, testified at the public
hearing that his firm routinely monitors
petitions filed in the regional offices and
promptly offers its services to employers
named in those petitions. In general, the
well-documented growth of the laborrelations consulting industry
undermines the contention that small
businesses are unable to obtain advice
quickly. Comments, such as the one
cited above, indicate that it is a routine
practice for labor-relations consultants
to monitor petitions filed with the
regional offices, so that the consultants
may then approach the employers to
offer their services.76
Other comments propose that the
Board set a minimum number of days
between the petition and the election.
Cook-Illinois Corporation suggests a
minimum of 21 days, subject to
expansion or contraction by agreement
of the parties. The Heritage Foundation
proposes a minimum of 40 days.77 In
contrast, Professor Samuel Estreicher
75 Ranking Member Michael B. Enzi of the U.S.
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions and Republican Senators assert that
employers will significantly limit their use of legal
counsel during organizing campaigns due to the
Department of Labor’s recent NPRM interpreting the
advice exemption to the ‘‘persuader’’ disclosure
requirement under the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act. See 76 FR 36178
(proposed June 21, 2011). However, the DOL’s
stated goal is publicizing the interactions between
employers and covered entities, not stopping those
interactions from taking place. See id. at 36182,
36190. In any event, the Board views such concerns
as more properly directed to the DOL. The Board
also wishes to make clear that—contrary to COLLE’s
suggestion—its actions have been in no way
influenced by any actions of the DOL.
76 See testimony of Russ Brown of the Labor
Relations Institute (LRI), noting that the Labor
Relations Institute’s Web site ‘‘is probably one of
the leading sources of keeping up with just about
every scrap of paper you guys push.’’ The Web site,
www.lrionline.com, includes a section entitled
‘‘union avoidance’’ and advertises online libraries
that include a ‘‘daily petition library’’ with
‘‘supplemental petition information available daily’’
and an ‘‘organizing library’’ tracking ‘‘union
organizing activity.’’ See also testimony of Michael
D. Pearson, former field examiner (noting that
consultants check the public filings of RC petitions
on a daily basis to solicit business from employers);
testimony of Professor Joseph McCartin (noting that
a ‘‘thriving industry of consultants has emerged’’).
77 CDW draws an analogy to the Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. 626, which
provides 45 days for employees to sign releases
regarding age discrimination claims. CDW argues
that this provision demonstrates the impropriety of
forcing employees to make a decision on
representation in less time than the current 38-day
median. The Board does not find it instructive to
compare an individual employee’s permanent
waiver of rights under a completely different
statutory scheme with the election procedures at
issue here involving groups of employees and,
typically, an active campaign by several parties.
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stated that he would not favor
specifying a particular time period
within which the election must be held.
No such minimum exists in the Act or
under the current rules.
For the same reasons that the Board
has not set a maximum number of days
between the petition and the election, it
has declined to set a minimum.
Congress provided that the Board
should conduct ‘‘an appropriate hearing
upon due notice’’ and determine if a
question of representation exists prior to
directing an election, but did not
otherwise specify when the Board
should conduct the election. Under the
amended rules, as under the existing
rules, the time it will take for the Board
to perform that statutory function will
vary. The Board believes that its duty is
to perform its statutory functions as
promptly as possible consistent with
employee free choice. The Board has
amended its rules in order to facilitate
that objective, but even under the
amended rules, which leave the
ultimate decision about the setting of
the election date within the sound
discretion of the regional director after
consultation with the parties, the Board
does not believe it is likely or even
feasible that it could perform its
statutory functions in such a short
period, and a regional director would
set an election so promptly, that
employee free choice would be
undermined. The Board has thus
decided to maintain the current practice
of not setting either a maximum or a
minimum number of days between
petition and election via its rules.
Citing Member Hayes’s dissent from
the NPRM, some comments suggest that
the amendments will provide for
elections in as little as 10 days after the
filing of the petition.78 But neither the
proposed amendments nor the more
limited final rule contains any such
requirement and, in practice, the final
rule cannot lead to elections taking
place within 10 days of the petition in
a contested case. Moreover, the Board
believes it is highly unlikely that, in any
significant number of cases, the required
procedural steps will be taken so
quickly that a regional director could
even have discretion to schedule an
election close to 10 days after the filing
of the petition.79
78 See
Chamber; COLLE.
assuming that an election were to occur
close to 10 days after the petition, under existing
precedent, the union is only entitled to obtain the
Excelsior list 10 days before the election. See Mod
Interiors, 324 NLRB 164, 164 (1997); Casehandling
Manual Section 11302.1. Thus, existing Board
precedent contemplates that a union may only have
the ability to contact all eligible voters for 10 days.
79 Even
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The Board discounts the argument
made in some comments that the
proposed rule improperly fails to give
the employer sufficient time to refute
unrealistic promises or ‘‘correct any
mischaracterizations or errors’’ by union
organizers.80 For three decades, Board
law has been settled that campaign
misstatements—regardless of their
timing—are generally insufficient to
interfere with an election, unless they
involve forged documents that render
employees unable to evaluate the
statements as propaganda. See Midland
National Life Insurance Co., 263 NLRB
127, 132 (1982) (noting that employees
are capable of ‘‘recognizing campaign
propaganda for what it is and
discounting it’’). The Midland rule
applies even if the misrepresentation
takes place only a few days before the
election. See, e.g., U-Haul Co. of
Nevada, Inc., 341 NLRB 195, 195 (2004)
(document circulated by union two days
before election did not amount to
objectionable misrepresentation under
Midland).
The Board also rejects the argument of
Vigilant that a shorter period between
petition and election will result in a
greater number of mail-ballot elections
and an accompanying increase in the
potential for fraud and coercion.
Nothing in the proposed or adopted
rules alters the standard for determining
when an election should be conducted
by mail ballot. A regional director’s
determination of whether an election
should be held manually or by mail is
not informed by the number of days
between the petition and the election.
Rather, it is based on factors such as the
desires of the parties and whether
employees are ‘‘scattered’’ due to their
geographic locations or work hours and
whether there is a strike, lockout, or
picketing in progress. See San Diego Gas
& Electric, 325 NLRB 1143, 1145 (1998);
Casehandling Manual Section 11301.2.
Baker & McKenzie contends that, to
the extent the amendments will result in
elections being held within 10 to 25
days after the petition, they are
inconsistent with the Board’s other
notice provisions, which provide longer
periods. For example, Baker &
McKenzie notes that a respondent must
post a remedial notice in an unfair labor
practice case for 60 days or longer, and
that the Board recently promulgated a
80 Vigilant; Indiana Chamber of Commerce; John
Deere Water; PIA; Greater Raleigh Chamber of
Commerce; NMMA; Associated Oregon Industries;
NAM; testimony of Michael Prendergast. T&W
Block Company makes a related argument,
contending that the failure to allow sufficient time
would destabilize labor relations because
employees would enter bargaining with unrealistic
expectations.
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rule requiring employers to
continuously post in the workplace a
notice of employee rights under the Act.
The Board does not agree that these
other posting requirements are in any
way inconsistent with the final rule.
The notice postings required by the
Board serve different purposes in
different contexts—to inform employees
of their general rights or to alleviate the
impact of unlawful acts by an employer
or union, rather than to communicate
about a specific petition in a specific
unit. Moreover, the time reasonably
necessary for employees to obtain the
message from a posted notice, and for
that message to dissipate the effects of
unfair labor practices, is different from
the time needed for employees to
receive information from employers and
unions actively campaigning for their
support. Finally, the existing noticeposting provision for elections, which is
not altered by the final rule, requires
that the notice be posted for only three
days before the election. See NLRB
Rules and Regulations Section
103.20(a). The Board thus rejects the
‘‘one size fits all’’ suggestion for time
periods under the Act.
In addition to arguing that the rule
fails to give employers sufficient time to
deliver their campaign message, some
comments contend that the rules do not
give employees sufficient time to
receive and evaluate that message and,
if they so choose, to organize themselves
to oppose union representation.81 The
comments argue that the final rule
therefore runs afoul of the Act’s policies
of protecting employees’ right to ‘‘full
freedom of association’’ and
‘‘encourag[ing] free debate’’ on labor
issues. 29 U.S.C. 151; Chamber of
Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. at 68.
They further argue that the final rule
violates employees’ Section 7 right to
refrain from union activity, because this
right ‘‘implies an underlying right to
receive information opposing
unionization.’’ Chamber of Commerce v.
Brown, 554 U.S. at 68.
As explained above in the discussion
of Section 8(c) and the First
Amendment, Chamber of Commerce v.
Brown did not involve the question of
81 See NRTWLDF; Seyfarth Shaw; ALFA;
American Council on Education; CDW; NRMCA;
Indiana Chamber of Commerce; Con-way; Specialty
Steel; Americans for Limited Government;
International Foodservice; testimony of Steve Jones;
testimony of Charles I. Cohen; testimony of David
Kadela; testimony of Harold Weinrich; testimony of
Brett McMahon.
Some comments include a related argument that
employees who are considered likely to oppose the
union, and therefore were not involved in the prepetition organizing campaign, may not know about
the organizing drive until the petition is filed. See
Seyfarth Shaw; ALFA.
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the appropriate time period between a
petition and election, nor did the
Court’s general observations regarding
speech indicate that any particular
period of time is necessary for
employees to receive information about
the union. And the procedural rule
adopted here does not police speech or
limit employees’ freedom of association.
It also will not, as explained above,
cause such a significant reduction in the
time employers have to campaign or
employees have to process campaign
messages and organize for or against
representation as to interfere with
employees’ freedom of choice or
association.
A number of comments asserted that
a lengthy election campaign tends to
disserve the interests of both employees
and employers. AFT cites anecdotal
evidence from a lengthy campaign that
demoralized workers and resulted in
significant expenditures by the
employer.82 Several comments also note
a correlation between the length of the
campaign and the number of unfair
labor practice complaints issued against
the employer.83 Another study
indicated that protracted campaigns
lead to a more conflict-ridden,
adversarial work environment.84 SEIU
argues that the contentious pre-election
environment often associated with long
campaigns harms the prospects for
future bargaining. NELP argues that lowwage workers stand to make significant
improvements in their working
conditions through unionization, yet
these same workers are particularly
vulnerable to retaliation for union
activity, rendered more likely by long
campaigns, and are also likely to
become discouraged by complex
bureaucratic processes.85 The Board did
not rely on any such assertions in
82 See also comment of Professor Paula Voos,
contending, based on her 2010 study, that
campaigns longer than 60 days resulted in a decline
in shareholder wealth (as measured by changes in
stock prices plus disbursement of dividends), but
campaigns of 60 days or fewer did not.
83 See John Logan, Ph.D., Erin Johansson, M.P.P.,
and Ryan Lamare, Ph.D. (summarizing their study,
‘‘New Data: NLRB Process Fails to Ensure a Fair
Vote,’’ supra). See also SEIU; NELP; and Ranking
Member George Miller and Democratic Members of
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Education and the Workforce (citing Logan,
Johanson, and Lamare study).
84 See Dunlop Commission Final Report, supra at
38–41, cited in comment of SEIU. Another
comment contends, but offers no supporting
argument or empirical evidence, that elections on
short notice will foster bad feelings between proand anti-union employees and between the union
and management. See Norman Owen.
85 See testimony of Professor Paul F. Clark (noting
that employee organizing has become a ‘‘minefield
and a marathon’’ due to sophisticated anti-union
campaigns and delays).
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80157
proposing the amendments and does not
do so in adopting the final rule.
Other comments suggest that the
amendments will generate litigation
because, if a party has less time to
campaign between the petition and
election, the party will ‘‘assert as many
defenses as possible’’ or try to obtain a
hearing simply to ‘‘buy * * * more
time’’ before the election. AHA. SEIU’s
reply comment notes that there was no
significant drop in the consent or
stipulation rate following former
General Counsel Fred Feinstein’s
initiative aimed at commencing all preelection hearings between 10 and 14
days after the filing of the petition.
Rather than undermining the rationale
for the proposals, the suggestion that
parties might use the pre-election
hearing to delay the conduct of an
election reinforces the need for the final
rule. Both the ability and incentive for
parties to attempt to raise issues and
engage in litigation in order to delay the
conduct of an election are reduced by
the final rule.
E. Effects on Employee Representation
and the Economy
Many comments do not address the
substance of the proposed amendments,
but instead speak generally in favor of,
or in opposition to, labor unions and the
process of collective bargaining. The
Board observes that, by passing and
amending the NLRA, Congress has
already made the policy judgment
concerning the value of the collectivebargaining process; the Board is not free
to ignore or revisit that judgment.
Rather, as explained in the NPRM, the
amendments are intended to carry out
the Board’s statutory mandate to
establish fair and efficient procedures
for determining if a question of
representation exists and for conducting
secret-ballot elections. Accordingly, the
Board will not engage in an analysis,
invited by these comments, concerning
the general utility of labor unions and
the collective-bargaining process.
Other comments assert that the
proposed amendments would lead to
increased union representation and
question the wisdom of adopting rules
that would have such an effect in the
middle of an economic recession. Again,
the Board views these comments as
questioning policy decisions already
made by Congress.86 Neither the
86 To the extent that comments suggest that the
Board failed to consider the proposed rule’s
potential to increase the costs on small employers
associated with increased unionization as part of its
obligations under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5
U.S.C. 601 et seq., those comments are addressed
in the Regulatory Flexibility Act section below.
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proposed amendments nor the final rule
reflects a judgment concerning whether
increased employee representation
would benefit or harm the national
economy. As explained in the NPRM
and above, increasing the rate of
employee representation is not the goal
of the Board’s proposed or final rule.
IV. Comments on Particular Sections
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Part 101, Subpart C—Representation
Cases Under Sec. 9(c) of the Act and
Petitions for Clarification of Bargaining
Units and for Amendment of
Certifications Under Sec. 9(b) of the Act
In the NPRM, the Board proposed to
eliminate redundant sections of its
regulations contained in Subpart C of
Part 101 describing representation case
procedures. The relevant sections of
Subpart C of Part 101 currently include
an essentially complete restatement of
the representation case procedure
established in Subpart C of Part 102. As
the Board noted in the NPRM,
‘‘Describing the same representation
procedures in two separate parts of the
regulations may create confusion.’’ 76
FR at 36819.
The final rule eliminates Subpart C of
Part 101. A few, non-redundant portions
are moved into Part 102. For example,
the description of the pre-election
conference is moved to § 102.69(a).
The Board received no significant
comments opposing this proposal.
Comments from a variety of viewpoints
supported the Board’s effort to eliminate
redundant regulations.
As noted in the NPRM, § 101.1 states
that the purpose of Part 101 is to
provide the public with a statement of
‘‘the general course and method by
which the Board’s functions are
channeled and determined.’’ 87 The
purpose of a separate statement of the
general course ‘‘is to assist the public in
dealing with administrative agencies,’’
but should not be ‘‘carried to so logical
an extreme as to inconvenience the
public.’’ 88 The NPRM stated that
codifying this statement in the Code of
Federal Regulations risked confusing
the public. Instead, the Board proposed
to publish the statement in the Federal
Register without codification. This
accords with general administrative
practice.89 The NPRM contained an
87 See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1)(B). The original language
of this provision stated that the section would
‘‘amplify and supplement the[] rules of procedure.’’
12 FR 5651 (August 22, 1947).
88 Tom C. Clark, Attorney General’s Manual on
the Administrative Procedure Act, 17, 19 (August
27, 1947).
89 See, e.g., 26 CFR 601.702(a)(1)(ii) (‘‘[T]he
Commissioner publishes in the Federal Register
from time to time a statement, which is not codified
in this chapter, on the organization and functions
of the IRS.’’).
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uncodified statement of the general
course, 76 FR at 36817–18, and
proposed that any final rule that might
issue would also include an uncodified
statement of the general course. A
Statement of the General Course of
Proceedings Under Section 9(c) of the
Act is provided below.90
Prior § 101.18 provided, ‘‘The
evidence of representation submitted by
the petitioning labor organization or by
the person seeking decertification is
ordinarily checked to determine the
number or proportion of employees who
have designated the petitioner, it being
the Board’s administrative experience
that in the absence of special factors the
conduct of an election serves no
purpose under the statute unless the
petitioner has been designated by at
least 30 percent of the employees.’’
ALFA submits that revised § 102.61
should explicitly state that a proper
showing of interest must include
authorization cards or signatures from
30 percent of the employees in an
appropriate unit. The final rule,
however, does not revise § 102.61 as
proposed or in any respect. To the
extent that ALFA would still have the
Board amend § 102.61 to specify the 30
percent figure, the Board declines to
adopt this proposal. The Board’s current
rules and regulations set forth in Part
102 do not specify a precise threshold
for the administratively required
showing of interest. As explained in
former § 101.18, the purpose of the
showing of interest on the part of labor
organizations and individual petitioners
that initiate or seek to participate in a
representation case is merely to
determine whether there is sufficient
employee interest in selecting, changing
or decertifying a representative to
warrant the expenditure of the agency’s
time, effort, and resources in conducting
an election. See also Casehandling
Manual Section 11020. As such, the
purpose of the showing of interest is
purely an administrative one; the size of
the showing of interest in support of
certification and decertification
petitions that the Board currently
requires is not compelled by the Act. As
an administrative matter it is not
litigable. The Borden Co., 101 NLRB
203, 203 n.3 (1952); Casehandling
Manual Section 11028.3. However, at
this time, the Board has no intention of
changing the size of the required
showing of interest and the uncodified
statement of the general course that
90 The Board will also continue to publish,
update, and make available on its Web site the
detailed statement of representation case
procedures set forth in its Casehandling Manual.
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follows states that the required showing
remains 30 percent.91
Part 101, Subparts D and E—Unfair
Labor Practice and Representation
Cases Under Secs. 8(b)(7) and 9(c) of the
Act and Referendum Cases Under Sec.
9(e)(1) and (2) of the Act
In the NPRM, the Board also proposed
to eliminate its statement of procedures
contained in Subparts D and E of Part
101 regarding unfair labor practice and
representation cases arising under
Sections 8(b)(7) and 9(c) of the Act and
referendum cases arising under Section
9(e)(1) and (2) of the Act. The Board has
decided to deliberate further regarding
its proposal to eliminate these subparts
that describe procedures for two
specialized types of representation
cases. Instead of eliminating these two
subparts entirely, the final rule
conforms the procedures described
therein to the amendments set forth
below.
Part 102, Subpart C—Procedure Under
Sec. 9(c) of the Act for the
Determination of Questions Concerning
Representation of Employees and for
Clarification of Bargaining Units and for
Amendment of Certifications Under Sec.
9(b) of the Act
Sec. 102.62
Election Agreements
In the NPRM, the Board proposed a
number of amendments to § 102.62. The
amendments were intended to clarify
the terms used to describe the three
types of pre-election agreements, to
eliminate mandatory Board resolution of
post-election disputes under a
stipulated election agreement, to codify
the requirement of the Excelsior list and
to alter the content and timing of its
provision to the petitioner,92 and to alter
the means of transmittal of the final
notice of election. The Board has
decided at this time to adopt only the
proposed amendments to § 102.62
clarifying the terms used to describe
pre-election agreements and eliminating
mandatory Board resolution of post91 The Board’s form petition, Form NLRB 502 also
states, and will continue to state, that the required
showing of interest is 30 percent (see Form section
6(b)).
In response to comments that erroneously suggest
that 30 percent is the threshold for resolving a
question of representation, the Board reiterates here
that if a question of representation exists, it is
resolved by a majority of valid votes cast in an
election.
92 See Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 NLRB 1236
(1966) (establishing requirement that employers
must file a list of the names and addresses of all
eligible voters with the regional director within
seven days after a Board election has been agreed
to or directed; the regional director then makes the
information available to all parties in the case).
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election disputes under a stipulated
election agreement.
The final rule’s amendments to
§ 102.62(b) revise the contents of the
stipulated election agreement. The
revision eliminates parties’ ability to
agree to have post-election disputes
resolved by the Board. The amendments
provide instead that, if the parties enter
into what is commonly referred to as a
‘‘stipulated election agreement,’’ 93 the
regional director will resolve any postelection disputes subject to
discretionary Board review. This
procedure is consistent with the
changes to § 102.69 described below
making all Board review of regional
directors’ dispositions of post-election
disputes discretionary in cases where
parties have not addressed the matter in
a pre-election agreement.94
As explained in the NPRM, the
amendment makes the process for
obtaining Board review of regional
directors’ dispositions of post-election
disputes fully parallel to that for
obtaining Board review of regional
directors’ dispositions of pre-election
disputes. The Board perceived no
reason why pre- and post-election
dispositions should be treated
differently in this regard, and the
comments on this proposal offered no
convincing reason.
The Board affirms the vast majority of
post-election decisions made at the
regional level, and many present no
issue meriting full consideration by the
Board. In some cases, for example,
parties seek review of post-election
decisions based on mere formulaic
assertions of error below and without
pointing to any facts or law in dispute.95
Review as of right should not be granted
in those situations. Others cases present
only circumscribed, purely factual
issues concerning which the Board is in
no better position to reach a correct
finding than the hearing officer (who
heard the evidence) or the regional
director.96 Given the highly deferential
standard that the Board employs in
reviewing a hearing officer’s postelection factual findings,97 it is
93 Casehandling
Manual Section 11084.
current rules governing Board review of
regional directors’ dispositions of post-election
disputes appear on their face to provide for both
mandatory and discretionary review depending on
how the regional office processes the case. See 29
CFR 102.69(c)(3) and (4).
95 See, e.g., C&G Heating, 356 NLRB No. 133, slip
op. at 1 (2011).
96 See, e.g., Ruan Transport Corp., 13–RC–21909
(Nov. 30, 2010) (resolving intent of voter who
marked an X in two boxes on ballot but ‘‘nearly
obliterated’’ one of them with pen markings in lieu
of erasure); Multiband, Inc., 2011 WL 5101459, slip
op. at n.2 (Oct. 26, 2011) (credibility).
97 See Stretch-Tex Co., 118 NLRB 1359, 1361
(1957).
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94 The
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reasonable for the Board to require the
party seeking review of such a finding
to justify that review by showing that
the standard for obtaining discretionary
review is satisfied. There are other cases
in which the regional director assumes
the facts asserted by the objecting party
but finds that no objectionable conduct
occurred,98 or where there is no dispute
about the facts at all.99 A discretionary
system of review will provide parties
with a full opportunity to contest those
determinations. Another group of cases
represent parties’ efforts to seek
reconsideration, extension, or novel
application of existing Board law,100
and there is equally no reason why a
discretionary system of review will not
fully provide that opportunity. Still
other cases simply involve the
application of well-settled law to very
specific facts.101 In short, for a variety
of reasons, a substantial percentage of
Board decisions in post-election
proceedings are unlikely to be of
precedential value because no
significant question of policy is at issue.
The final rule requires the party seeking
review to identify a significant,
prejudicial error by the regional director
or some other compelling reason for
Board review, just as the current rules
require a party to do when seeking
Board review of a regional director’s
pre-election decision.102 The final rule
will enable the Board to separate the
wheat from the chaff, and to devote its
limited time to cases of particular
importance. Based on those
98 See, e.g., Care Enterprises, 306 NLRB 491 n.2
(1992).
99 See, e.g., CEVA Logistics U.S., Inc., 357 NLRB
No. 60 (2011) (consequences of regional delay in
forwarding Excelsior list).
100 See, e.g., 1621 Route 22 West Operating Co.,
LLC d/b/a Somerset Valley Rehabilitation & Nursing
Ctr., 357 NLRB No. 71 (2011); Ace Car & Limousine
Service, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 43 (2011).
101 Mental Health Ass’n, Inc., 356 NLRB No. 151
(2011) (whether employer’s particular statements
about bonuses constituted objectionable promise of
benefit); G&K Services, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 109
(2011) (whether employer’s letter about health
coverage constituted objectionable promise of
benefit).
102 See § 102.67(c), providing:
The Board will grant a request for review only
where compelling reasons exist therefor.
Accordingly, a request for review may be granted
only upon one or more of the following grounds:
(1) That a substantial question of law or policy
is raised because of (i) the absence of, or (ii) a
departure from, officially reported Board precedent.
(2) That the regional director’s decision on a
substantial factual issue is clearly erroneous on the
record and such error prejudicially affects the rights
of a party.
(3) That the conduct of the hearing or any ruling
made in connection with the proceeding has
resulted in prejudicial error.
(4) That there are compelling reasons for
reconsideration of an important Board rule or
policy.
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80159
considerations, the Board concludes
that making review of regional directors’
post-election decisions available on a
discretionary basis, as is currently the
case with pre-election review and some
post-election review, will assist the
Board in fulfilling its statutory mandate
to promptly resolve questions
concerning representation.
Several comments argue that if the
Board were to adopt these amendments,
it would be abdicating its statutory
responsibility and function.103 For
example, SHRM argues that only Board
Members, because they are appointed by
the President and confirmed by the
Senate, can make final decisions about
these matters and that the regional
directors, who are career civil servants,
lack comparable authority and political
legitimacy. Others state that denying
aggrieved parties the right to appeal
adverse determinations to the Board
undermines due process protections.
NAM contends that the Board is
required to review conduct affecting
election outcomes in order to safeguard
employees’ Section 7 rights. Similarly,
other comments argue that conduct that
could be the basis for setting aside an
election goes to the essence of employee
free choice and deserves de novo Board
review.104 Still other comments contend
that, although Section 3(b) of the Act
permits Board delegation to the regional
directors of decisions pertaining to
representation issues, those decisions
must be reviewed by the Board upon
request.
The Board is not persuaded by these
comments. The arguments they advance
apply equally to pre-election disputes,
and yet the Board has since 1961
afforded only discretionary review of
regional directors’ dispositions of preelection disputes even though a failure
to request review pre-election or a
denial of review precludes a party from
raising the matter with the Board postelection. 29 CFR 102.67(f). Moreover,
even under the current rules,
specifically § 102.69(c)(4), if the regional
director issues a decision concerning
challenges or objections instead of a
report in cases involving directed
elections, an aggrieved party’s only
recourse is a request for review. Thus,
the comments’ objections apply to the
current regulations as well as to the
final rule.
Moreover, Section 3(b) of the NLRA
does not support the conclusion
expressed in those comments. Section
3(b) provides in part:
103 See Chamber; SHRM; CDW; COLLE; NACCO
Materials Handling Group; Dassault Falcon Jet;
Bluegrass Institute; John Deere Water.
104 See, e.g., Dassault Falcon Jet.
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The Board is * * * authorized to delegate
to its regional directors its powers * * * to
determine [issues arising in representation
proceedings], except that upon the filing of
a request therefore with the Board by any
interested person, the Board may review any
action of a regional director delegated to him
* * *, but such review shall not, unless
specifically ordered by the Board, operate as
a stay of any action taken by the regional
director.
29 U.S.C. 153(b).
Since Congress adopted this provision
in 1959 and the Board exercised its
authority to delegate these functions to
its regional directors in 1961, the
Board’s rules have provided that
regional directors’ dispositions of preelection disputes are subject only to
discretionary Board review. None of the
comments suggest that the current rule
as to pre-election disputes violates
Section 3(b) or is otherwise improper.
In fact, the Supreme Court has upheld
the Board’s decision not to provide
parties with a right to Board review of
regional director’s pre-election
determinations, in a holding that clearly
permits the Board to adopt the final
rule’s amendments concerning postelection review. In Magnesium Casting
Co. v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137 (1971), the
employer filed a request for review of
the regional director’s decision and
direction of election holding that certain
individuals were properly included in
the unit. The Board denied the petition
on the ground that it did not raise
substantial issues. In the subsequent
‘‘technical 8(a)(5)’’ unfair labor practice
proceeding, the employer asserted that
‘‘plenary review by the Board of the
regional director’s unit determination is
necessary at some point,’’ i.e., before the
Board finds that the employer
committed an unfair labor practice
based on the employer’s refusal to
bargain with the union certified as the
employees’ representative in the
representation proceeding. 401 U.S. at
140–41. However, the Court rejected the
contention that Section 3(b) requires the
Board to review regional directors’
determinations before they become final
and binding. Citing Congress’s
authorization of the Board to delegate
decision-making in this area to its
regional directors and the use of the
clearly permissive word ‘‘may’’ in the
clause describing the possibility of
Board review, the Court held, ‘‘Congress
has made a clear choice; and the fact
that the Board has only discretionary
review of the determination of the
regional director creates no possible
infirmity within the range of our
imagination.’’ Id. at 142. Consistent with
the purpose of the final rule here, the
Supreme Court quoted Senator
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Goldwater, a Conference Committee
member, explaining that Section 3(b)’s
authorization of the Board’s delegation
of its decision-making authority to the
regional directors was to ‘‘expedite final
disposition of cases by the Board, by
turning over part of its caseload to its
regional directors for final
determination.’’ Id. at 141 (citing 105
Cong. Rec. 19770). And undermining
the comments’ suggestion that regional
directors lack authority, status, or
expertise to render final decisions in
this area, the Court further explained
that the enactment of section 3(b)
‘‘reflect[s] the considered judgment of
Congress that the regional directors have
an expertise concerning unit
determinations.’’ Id. 105
The Board concludes that the
language of Section 3(b), its legislative
history, and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Magnesium Casting are
dispositive of the statutory objections to
the proposed amendment.
Some comments suggest that
providing only discretionary review of
regional directors’ decisions will
undermine the uniformity of election
jurisprudence, with different regional
directors issuing divergent opinions in
similar cases and under similar
circumstances. The comments contend
that if those decisions are not reviewed
by the Board as a matter of right, there
is a risk that the regional office in which
the employer’s operations reside, rather
than the merits of the parties’ positions,
will govern how the dispute is resolved.
For example, Bluegrass Institute
contends that discretionary Board
review will result in less uniformity, the
denial of due process, and diminished
legitimacy in election processes. The
Board disagrees.
Constitutional due process requires
only one fair hearing and does not
require an opportunity to appeal. The
Supreme Court has so held even with
respect to criminal cases. See Evitts v.
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985)
(‘‘Almost a century ago, the Court held
that the Constitution does not require
States to grant appeals as of right to
criminal defendants seeking to review
alleged trial court errors. McKane v.
Durston, 153 U.S. 684 * * * (1894).’’).
Since 1961, regional directors have
made pre-election determinations, and
105 See also St. Margaret Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB,
991 F.2d 1146, 1154 (3d Cir. 1993); Beth Israel
Hosp. and Geriatric Ctr. v. NLRB, 688 F.2d 697,
700–01 (10th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Transportation
Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 630 F.2d 421, 426 (5th
Cir. 1980) (finding that ‘‘decisions rendered by the
regional offices of the NLRB which are not reviewed
by the Board, for whatever reasons, are entitled to
the same weight and deference as Board decisions,
and will be given such unless and until the Board
acts in a dispositive manner.’’).
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their decisions have been subject to only
discretionary review through the request
for review procedure. The same has
been true of post-election
determinations processed under
§ 102.69(c)(3)(ii). There is no indication
that the quality of decision-making has
been compromised by this procedure or
that regional directors have reached
inconsistent conclusions. Under the
final rule, the same review process will
apply to all cases involving postelection objections and challenges
except where they are consolidated with
unfair labor practice allegations before
an administrative law judge. As it has
done for over 50 years in respect to preelection disputes, the Board will
scrutinize regional directors’ postelection decisions where proper
requests for review are filed. One
purpose of that review will be to
determine if there is an ‘‘absence of’’ or
‘‘a departure from, officially reported
Board precedent,’’ i.e., to ensure
uniformity via adherence to Board
precedent. See 29 CFR 102.67(c)(1).
Thus, the discretionary review provided
for in the final rule parallels that used
by the Supreme Court to ensure
uniformity among the circuit courts of
appeals. See Supreme Court Rule 10.
For these reasons, the Board does not
believe that the final rule will lead to a
lack of uniformity.
A few comments question the
competence of regional personnel. For
example, COLLE argues that ‘‘Regional
Directors can be dictatorial and
imprudent to the rights of private
parties in disputes before them’’ and
‘‘can exhibit irrational and unfair
behavior and deprive parties of their
rights to go to hearing and litigate
legitimate issues under the Act.’’ GM
Life suggests that regional directors are
unfamiliar with the legal process and
will not follow proper procedures.
Other comments contend that because
hearing officers report directly to
regional directors, appeal to the regional
directors does not constitute meaningful
review.
The Board’s experience in reviewing
the work of and supervising its regional
directors gives no credence to these
comments. Moreover, Congress
expressed confidence in the regional
directors’ abilities when it enacted
Section 3(b). As one comment in favor
of the rule (Professor Joel CutcherGershenfeld) noted, empowering
regional directors to make final postelection rulings, as they now do in
respect to pre-election matters, locates
decisions with the individuals who
have the greatest knowledge about and
experience with representation case
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procedures.106 Similarly, the Chamber,
although it generally opposes the
proposals, notes the ‘‘professionalism,
experience and integrity’’ of the regional
directors and their staffs. Rather than
detracting from their authority and
legitimacy, the Board concludes that the
regional directors’ career status
guarantees their neutrality and, in
almost all cases, their extended service
at the Board and thus extensive
experience with and knowledge about
representation case procedures and
rules.
ALFA argues specifically that regional
directors tend to uphold election
results, and therefore a right to Board
review should be retained if the Board
wishes to discourage litigation via
refusals to bargain. As noted above, the
Board rejects the suggestions that
regional directors are systematically
biased in this or any other way, and
repeats that it will scrutinize regional
decisions’ decisions when proper
requests for review are filed.
Some comments contend that, if the
proposals are adopted, employers will
increasingly refuse to bargain with
newly certified representatives in order
to obtain judicial review of regional
directors’ determinations.107 This
argument is, at best, highly speculative.
There is no evidence that this happened
after the Board delegated adjudication of
pre-election disputes to its regional
directors in 1961 subject to only
discretionary review by the Board, and
the Board can see no reason why an
increase in refusals to bargain would be
more likely if Board review of postelection decisions is similarly made
discretionary. The Board does not
believe that judicial review through
technical refusal to bargain will be more
frequent when the Board denies review
of a regional director’s post-election
decision than it is when the Board
summarily affirms the same regional
decision, as it often does now. See, e.g.,
The Geist Co., 8–RC–17056 (Dec. 1,
2011); The Memorial Hospital of Salem
County, 4–RC–21697 (Aug. 3, 2011);
Ashland Nursing & Rehabilitation
Center, 5–RC–16580 (May 31, 2011);
106 The Board also notes that regional directors
make decisions concerning whether to prosecute
charges of unfair labor practices under the Act, and
those prosecutorial decisions often involve
questions of employee status and questions of
whether certain conduct is unlawful, both of which
often parallel questions that arise in post-election
representation proceedings. The courts have
recognized that regional directors have expertise in
determining what constitutes objectionable
conduct. See, e.g., NLRB v. Chicago Tribune Co.,
943 F.2d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504
U.S. 955 (1992).
107 See Chamber; AHA; CDW; Baker & McKenzie.
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Banner Services Corp., 13–RC–21983
(May 25, 2011).
Several comments argue that the rule
is contrary to the preferences of both
employers and unions, as shown by the
high rate of stipulated election
agreements—providing for adjudication
of post-election disputes by the Board—
and the comparative rarity of consent
election agreements—providing for a
final decision by the regional director.
AHA, SHRM, and ACE contend that
parties prefer this form of pre-election
agreement because it provides for Board
disposition of post-election issues. As a
corollary to this argument, some
comments argue that eliminating
automatic Board review will result in
fewer pre-election agreements and thus
more litigation.108
The Board believes for several reasons
that the final rule will not create a
disincentive for parties to enter into
consent or stipulated election
agreements. The final rule makes postelection Board review discretionary
whether the parties enter into a
stipulated election agreement or
proceed to a hearing resulting in a
decision and direction of election. Thus,
parties who prefer Board review of postelection disputes will have no incentive
to litigate concerning pre-election issues
in order to gain such review. The Board
believes that if parties genuinely prefer
agreements that permit Board review,
they will continue to enter into
stipulated rather than consent election
agreements in order to preserve their
right to seek such review. Whether
parties enter into any pre-election
agreement or litigate disputes at a preelection hearing under the final rule
will depend on the same calculus of the
likelihood of success, the importance of
the issue, and the cost of litigation, that
it does at present. In addition to
avoiding the time and expense
associated with a pre-election hearing,
parties also gain certainty with respect
to the unit description and the election
date by entering into a stipulated
election agreement. In short, parties will
continue to have ample reason to enter
into stipulated election agreements
under the final rule, even though the
final rule makes Board review of
108 See, e.g., ALFA; SHRM. Constangy, Brooks &
Smith (Constangy) contends that an employer
entering into a stipulation will lose any rights to
appeal pre-election unit issues and that this will
have a negative effect on the Board’s stipulation
rate. The Board notes, however, that under current
procedures, parties who enter into stipulated
election agreements, by definition, agree about preelection issues, and therefore waive any right to
bring pre-election issues to the Board. Thus, the
final rule does not change that aspect of stipulated
election agreements.
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regional directors’ dispositions of postelection disputes discretionary.
Some comments, such as that of
Sheppard Mullin, express confusion
about the rule and the request-forreview procedure. The grounds for
granting a request for review under
§ 102.69(d)(3) of the final rule are
identical to the grounds set forth in
§ 102.67(c) of the existing rules. The
Board will continue to review cases
involving issues of ‘‘first impression’’ or
where there is ‘‘conflicting or unsettled’’
law in the same manner that it currently
does under the pre-election request-forreview procedure. The Board is not
aware of any concerns about the way it
has evaluated requests for review in
representation proceedings, and does
not anticipate any in the future.
One comment questions whether ‘‘the
denial of review’’ is subject to appeal to
the federal courts. The Board’s denial of
review of a post-election request for
review will be the final order in a
representation proceeding under the
final rule, as it is currently. However,
orders in representation cases are not
final orders for purposes of judicial
review. Rather, an employer must refuse
to bargain and commit a ‘‘technical
8(a)(5)’’ violation to secure court review
of the Board’s representation decisions.
See 29 U.S.C. 159(d); Boire v.
Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 476–79
(1964). Under the current rules, if an
employer refuses to bargain, it may
obtain review of a regional director’s
pre-election rulings even if the Board
denied review thereof, and the same
will be true of post-election rulings
under the final rule. Thus, there are no
open questions about the Board’s
discretionary review process that will
undermine confidence in its decisional
processes.
Similarly, comments misinterpret the
rule with respect to how regional
decisions will be reviewed and how that
review will affect the law. The final rule
simply makes post-election dispositions
reviewable under a discretionary
standard, rather than as of right. The
Board’s rulings on post-election requests
for review will be public and will be
published on the Board’s Web site, as
will the underlying regional directors’
decisions, just as rulings on pre-election
requests for review are now. Thus, the
public and labor law community will
have full access to the Board’s rulings.
In sum, the amendments to
§ 102.62(b) conform the review
provisions of the stipulated election
agreement to the amended review
provisions for directed elections. Parties
should not be able to get greater postelection Board review simply by virtue
of the fact that there are no pre-election
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disputes. Under the final rule, all Board
review of regional directors’
dispositions of challenges and
objections will be discretionary under
the existing request-for-review
procedure.
Sec. 102.63 Investigation of Petition by
Regional Director; Notice of Hearing;
Service of Notice; Withdrawal of Notice
In the NPRM, the Board proposed a
number of amendments to § 102.63. The
Board proposed that absent special
circumstances, the regional director
would set the pre-election hearing to
begin seven days after service of the
notice of hearing. The Board also
proposed to require the employer to
post an initial election notice to
employees. The Board further proposed
to require non-petitioning parties to
complete Statements of Position. The
Board has decided to take no action at
this time on those proposals in order to
permit more time for deliberation.
The amendments to § 102.63 conform
this section to the remainder of the
amendments.
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Sec. 102.64 Conduct of Hearing
As explained in the NPRM, the
proposed amendments to § 102.64 were
intended to ensure that the pre-election
hearing is conducted efficiently and is
no longer than necessary to serve the
statutory purpose of determining if there
is a question of representation. The final
rule largely embodies the proposed
amendment to § 102.64(a).
In amended § 102.64(a), the Board
expressly construes Section 9(c) of the
Act, which specifies the purpose of the
pre-election hearing. The statutory
purpose of the pre-election hearing is to
determine if there is a question of
representation. A question of
representation exists if a petition has
been filed, as described in Section
9(c)(1) of the Act and § 102.60 of the
Board’s rules, concerning a unit
appropriate for the purpose of collective
bargaining or, in the case of a petition
filed under Section 9(c)(1)(A)(ii),
concerning a unit in which an
individual or labor organization has
been certified or is being currently
recognized by the employer as the
bargaining representative.109 If the
109 A proper petition cannot be filed under
Section 9(c)(1) and a question of representation
cannot arise under the Act unless the employees in
the unit are employed by an employer covered by
the Act. Thus, if any party contests the Board’s
statutory jurisdiction or contends that the Board has
declined to exercise its full, statutory jurisdiction
over the employer, the regional director must
resolve the resulting dispute based on the record of
the pre-election hearing. Similarly, a proper
petition under Section 9(c)(1)(A) can be filed by ‘‘an
employee or group of employees or any individual
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regional director concludes, based on
the record created at the hearing, that
such a question of representation exists,
the regional director should direct an
election in order to resolve the question.
If any party contends that an election is
barred, under the terms of the Act or
Board precedent, and that contention is
contested, the regional director must
also rule on the existence of such a bar
prior to directing an election. 110
Amended § 102.64(a) makes clear that
disputes concerning individual
employees’ eligibility to vote and
inclusion in the unit ordinarily need not
be litigated or resolved before an
election is conducted. Such disputes
can be raised through challenges
interposed during the election, if the
disputed individuals attempt to cast a
ballot, and both litigated and resolved,
if necessary, post-election. The
proposed rule provided:
If, upon the record of the hearing, the
regional director finds that such a question
of representation exists and there is no bar
to an election, he shall direct an election to
resolve the question and, subsequent to that
election, unless specifically provided
otherwise in these rules, resolve any disputes
concerning the eligibility or inclusion of
voters that might affect the results of the
election.
The final rule provides:
Disputes concerning individuals’ eligibility
to vote or inclusion in an appropriate unit
ordinarily need not be litigated or resolved
before an election is conducted. If, upon the
record of the hearing, the regional director
finds that a question of representation exists
and there is no bar to an election, he shall
direct an election to resolve the question.
The change in language is due to the
final rule not adopting the ‘‘20-percent
rule’’ as discussed below in relation to
§ 102.66. For that reason, the language,
‘‘unless specifically provided otherwise
in these rules,’’ has been removed. As
more fully explained in relation to
§ 102.66 below, the amendment
expressly preserves the regional
director’s discretion to resolve or not to
resolve disputes concerning individuals’
eligibility to vote or inclusion in the
unit until after the election. It also
grants the hearing officer authority to
exclude evidence concerning such
disputes on the grounds that such
or labor organization.’’ Thus, if a petition is filed
by an entity and any party contends that the entity
is not a labor organization, the regional director
must resolve the resulting dispute based on the
record of the pre-election hearing.
110 The hearing officer will retain authority to
develop the record relevant to any such contention
using the ordinary procedures already in use, which
are designed to avoid burdening the record with
unnecessary evidence. For example, current rules
give the hearing officer discretion to require a party
to make an offer of proof before admitting evidence.
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evidence is not relevant to the existence
of a question of representation.
The final rule defers, in order to
permit further deliberation, a final
decision concerning the proposed
amendments to subsections (b) and (c)
of § 102.64. Therefore, amended
§ 102.64(b) will provide, as is now
provided in § 102.64(a), ‘‘It shall be the
duty of the hearing officer to inquire
fully into all matters and issues
necessary to obtain a full and complete
record upon which the Board or the
regional director may discharge their
duties under Section 9(c) of the Act.’’
However, amended § 102.64(a) more
clearly specifies the Board’s or regional
director’s ‘‘duties under Section 9(c) of
the Act’’ and thus gives clear guidance
to hearing officers concerning what
evidence is and is not necessary to
develop a ‘‘full and complete record’’
upon which the Board or regional
director can discharge those duties.
Few comments address the proposed
amendment of § 102.64(a). Those that do
question the construction of Section 9(c)
of the Act on the grounds that litigation
of disputes concerning individual
employees’ eligibility to vote and
inclusion in the unit should be
permitted pre-election. These comments
are addressed below in relation to
§ 102.66.
Sec. 102.65 Motions; Interventions
The final rule adopts the proposed
amendments of § 102.65(c) specifying
the grounds for a request for special
permission to appeal a ruling of the
hearing officer or regional director to the
Board. However, the final rule does not
apply the new, narrower standard to
requests for special permission to
appeal a ruling of the hearing officer to
the regional director.
The existing rules set forth no
standard for the grant of a request for
special permission to appeal. Consistent
with the effort to avoid piecemeal
appeal to the Board, as discussed above
in relation to § 102.62 and below in
relation to § 102.67, the amendments to
§ 102.65(c) specify narrow
circumstances under which a request for
special permission to appeal to the
Board will be granted. The final rule
specifies that special permission to
appeal will be granted only under
‘‘extraordinary circumstances where it
appears that the issue will otherwise
evade review.’’ To further discourage
piecemeal appeal, the final rule makes
clear that a party need not seek special
permission to appeal in order to
preserve an issue for review postelection.
Consistent with Congress’s intent as
evidenced in Section 3(b) as well as
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ordinary practice in the courts and
before administrative agencies, the final
rule further specifies that neither the
filing of a request for nor the grant of
special permission to appeal will
automatically stay proceedings or
require the impounding of ballots unless
specifically ordered by the regional
director or the Board.
Few comments were submitted on
this proposal. The American Health
Care Association and the National
Center for Assisted Living (jointly,
AHCA) contend that the Board provides
no examples of issues that would meet
the standard for ‘‘otherwise evades
review.’’ Constangy argues that limiting
appeals to extraordinary circumstances,
combined with preventing regional
directors from staying proceedings to
consider motions for reconsideration,
will effectively result in the total
preclusion of review of pre-election
rulings, preventing appeal of legitimate
disputes.
The Board disagrees with these
concerns. ‘‘Extraordinary
circumstances’’ is not the same as ‘‘no
circumstances.’’ Cf. § 103.30(b) (‘‘Where
extraordinary circumstances exist, the
Board shall determine appropriate units
by adjudication.’’). The general rule in
adjudication before both courts and
agencies is that interlocutory appeals
are not favored, and should be
permitted only when the issues raised
would evade review if not resolved
before review of a final judgment. See
28 U.S.C. 1291, 1292(b) (2006); Mohawk
Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct.
599, 604–605 (2009); Coopers & Lybrand
v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468–469
(1978).
As discussed above, Section 3(b) of
the Act authorizes the Board to delegate
to its regional directors power to resolve
issues arising in representation
proceedings, and the final rule is
intended to further that delegation
while maintaining appropriate
procedures for those unusual cases that
require interlocutory intervention.
AHCA and ALFA argue that special
permission to appeal serves little
purpose because it will not stay
proceedings. But the final rule does not
preclude a stay. Rather, it merely
provides that neither the filing nor grant
of a request for special permission to
appeal shall result in an automatic stay.
The regional director and Board remain
free to grant a stay, either on their own
or on request, under appropriate
circumstances.
After deliberation, the Board has
decided not to approve the application
of this new, narrow standard for special
permission to appeal to requests to
appeal rulings of a hearing officer to the
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regional director. In the pre-election
hearing, the hearing officer is
developing a record upon which the
regional director can make a decision.
Moreover, the relation between hearing
officers and regional director is, in
practice, more informal than that
between a trial and appellate court or
between a regional director and the
Board, with hearing officers not
infrequently seeking advice from the
regional director during a hearing. For
these reasons, the final rule does not
apply the new, narrow standard to
requests for special permission to
appeal rulings of hearing officers to the
regional director.
The final rule also adopts the
proposed amendment to § 102.65(e)(3).
The Casehandling Manual provides in
Section 11338.7 that a Board agent
should exercise discretion in deciding
whether to allow a vote under challenge
when a party claims that changed
circumstances justify a challenge to
voters specifically excluded, or
included, by the decision and direction
of election. Accordingly, the final rule
adopts the proposal in the NPRM that if
a motion for reconsideration based on
changed circumstances or to reopen the
record based on newly discovered
evidence states with particularity that
the granting thereof will affect the
eligibility to vote of specific employees,
the Board agent shall have discretion to
allow such employees to vote subject to
challenge even if they are specifically
excluded in the direction of election
and to permit the moving party to
challenge the ballots of such employees
even if they are specifically included in
the direction of election in any election
conducted while such motion is
pending.
Sec. 102.66 Introduction of Evidence:
Rights of Parties at Hearing; Subpoenas
In the NPRM, the Board proposed a
number of amendments to § 102.66. The
proposed amendments were designed to
ensure that issues in dispute would be
more promptly and clearly identified
and that hearing officers could limit the
evidence offered at the pre-election
hearing to that which is necessary for
the regional director to determine
whether a question of representation
exists. The NPRM proposed that hearing
officers would follow a specified
process to identify relevant issues in
dispute. Thus, the NPRM provided that
the hearing officer would open the
hearing by reviewing, or assisting nonpetitioning parties to complete,
statements of position, and then would
require the petitioner to respond to any
issues raised in the statements of
positions, thereby joining the issues.
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The NPRM further proposed that after
the issues were joined, the hearing
officer would require the parties to
make offers of proof concerning any
relevant issues in dispute, and would
not proceed to take evidence unless the
parties’ offers created a genuine dispute
concerning a material fact.
The Board also proposed that a party
would be precluded from raising any
issue that it failed to raise in its timely
statement of position or to place in
dispute in response to another party’s
statement, subject to specified
exceptions.
The proposed amendments further
provided that if, at any time during the
hearing, the hearing officer determined
that the only genuine issue remaining in
dispute concerned the eligibility or
inclusion of individuals who would
constitute less than 20 percent of the
unit if they were found to be eligible to
vote, the hearing officer would close the
hearing, and the director would permit
those individuals to vote subject to
challenge.
The Board also proposed in the NPRM
that parties be permitted to file posthearing briefs only with the permission
of the hearing officer.
Finally, the NPRM proposed,
consistent with existing practice, that a
party that has been served with a
subpoena may be required to file or
orally present a motion to quash prior
to the five days provided in Section
11(1) of the Act.
The Board received a great number of
comments about the proposed
amendments to § 102.66, particularly
with respect to the statement of position
form and the consequences of failing to
complete it, the joinder and offer-ofproof procedure, and the so-called ‘‘20percent rule.’’ The Board has decided to
take no action at this time on those
proposals or the proposal regarding
subpoenas in order to permit more time
for deliberation. The final rule adopts
the proposals to amend § 102.66(a) and
(d) to ensure that hearing officers
presiding over pre-election hearings
have authority to limit the presentation
of evidence to that which is relevant to
the existence of a question of
representation and to give the hearing
officer discretion in regard to the filing
of post-hearing briefs.
Subsec. 102.66(a)
The proposed rule provided:
Rights of parties at hearing. Any party shall
have the right to appear at any hearing in
person, by counsel, or by other
representative, and any party and the hearing
officer shall have power to call, examine, and
cross-examine witnesses and to introduce
into the record documentary and other
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evidence relevant to any genuine dispute as
to a material fact. The hearing officer shall
identify such disputes as follows: * * *
The final rule provides:
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Rights of parties at hearing. Any party shall
have the right to appear at any hearing in
person, by counsel, or by other
representative, to call, examine, and crossexamine witnesses and to introduce into the
record documentary and other evidence so
long as such examination, cross-examination,
and other evidence supports its contentions
and is relevant to the existence of a question
of representation or a bar to an election. The
hearing officer shall also have power to call,
examine, and cross-examine witnesses and to
introduce into the record documentary and
other evidence. Witnesses shall be examined
orally under oath. The rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not
be controlling. Stipulations of fact may be
introduced in evidence with respect to any
issue.111
The Board removed the language
drawn from Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 in order to avoid the
confusion evident in some comments
concerning the role of the hearing
officer. The substitute language makes
clear that the hearing officer’s role is the
traditional one of admitting only
evidence relevant to the matter at issue.
The last sentence as well as the
subsections of proposed § 102.66(a) and
subsections (b), (c), and (d) are deleted
because the final rule does not adopt the
offer-of-proof, joinder, statement of
position, or 20 percent rule provisions.
As explained in the NPRM, the final
rule’s amendment of § 102.66(a) together
with the elimination of § 101.20(c)
removes the basis of the Board’s holding
in Barre National, Inc., 316 NLRB 877
(1995), that a hearing officer must
permit full litigation of all eligibility
issues in dispute prior to a direction of
an election, even though the regional
director and the Board need not resolve
the issues prior to the election. Together
with the amendment of § 102.64(a), the
amendment of § 102.66(a) makes clear
that, while the regional director must
determine that a proper petition has
been filed in an appropriate unit in
order to find that a question of
representation exists, the regional
director need not decide all individual
eligibility and inclusion questions (so
long as they do not affect the type of
election that must be conducted) and
the hearing officer need not permit
introduction of evidence relevant only
to disputes concerning the eligibility
and inclusion of individuals.
In its comment, Baker & McKenzie
questioned how a hearing officer would
determine whether proffered evidence
111 In the proposed rule, the last two sentences
were in a separate subsection (e).
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was relevant to voter eligibility or voter
inclusion as opposed to unit
appropriateness. The same question
arises under current procedures when
both the regional director and the Board
defer ruling on eligibility or inclusion
questions until after the election. Thus,
existing case law in which both regional
directors and the Board have deferred
deciding individual eligibility and
inclusion questions until after an
election will provide considerable
guidance to hearing officers. Generally,
individual eligibility and inclusion
issues concern: (1) Whether individuals
or groups of individuals, otherwise
falling within the terms used to describe
an appropriate unit, are nevertheless
ineligible because they are excluded
from the Act’s definition of employee
and (2) whether individuals or groups of
individuals fall within the terms used to
describe the unit. For example, if the
petition calls for a unit including
‘‘production employees’’ and excluding
the typical ‘‘professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act,’’ then the following would all be
eligibility or inclusion questions: (1)
Whether production foremen are
supervisors, see, e.g., United States
Gypsum Co., 111 NLRB 551, 552 (1955);
(2) whether production employee Jane
Doe is a supervisor, see, e.g., PECO
Energy Co.,322 NLRB 1074, 1083 (1997);
(3) whether workers who perform
quality control functions are production
employees, see, e.g., Lundy Packing Co.,
314 NLRB 1042 (1994); and (4) whether
Joe Smith is a production employee, see,
e.g., Allegany Aggregates, Inc., 327
NLRB 658 (1999).
For different reasons, the hearing
officer must take evidence and the
regional director must determine, prior
to the election, whether any employees
in an otherwise appropriate unit
containing nonprofessionals are
professionals. Under Section 9(b)(1) of
the Act, any professionals in a unit
containing both professional and
nonprofessional employees must be
given the choice of whether they wish
to be represented in such a mixed unit.
Because this requires special balloting
procedures, see Sonotone Corp., 90
NLRB 1236 (1950), the question of
whether any employees included in the
otherwise appropriate unit are
professionals must be answered prior to
the election.112 Similarly, if a party
112 Although some comments argue the same
would be true of the question of whether any
employees in a unit containing non-guards are
guards, the Board disagrees. The Act does not
require any special election procedures for guards
equivalent to what Section 9(b)(1) requires for
professionals. While Section 9(b)(3) precludes the
Board from finding that a ‘‘mixed unit,’’ i.e., one
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contends that, under Board precedent,
an eligibility standard different than the
Board’s ordinary standard should be
used, the hearing officer may take such
evidence as may be necessary to resolve
that question since its resolution is a
prerequisite to the conduct of the
election.
Some comments on the proposed
amendments argue that limiting
evidence to that which is relevant to
whether a question of representation
exists is inconsistent with the statute’s
requirement that, absent an election
agreement, the Board must hold an
‘‘appropriate hearing’’ prior to
conducting an election.113 The Board
disagrees. Section 9(c)(1) of the Act
provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed,
* * * the Board shall investigate such
petition and if it has reasonable cause to
believe that a question of representation
affecting commerce exists shall provide for
an appropriate hearing upon due notice.
Such hearing may be conducted by an officer
or employee of the regional office, who shall
not make any recommendations with respect
thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of
such hearing that such a question of
representation exists, it shall direct an
election by secret ballot and shall certify the
results thereof.
Thus, as explained above in relation to
§ 102.64, the statutory purpose of the
pre-election hearing is to determine
whether a question of representation
exists. The amendments to §§ 102.64(a)
and 102.66(a) are entirely consistent
with Section 9(c)’s requirement that ‘‘an
appropriate hearing’’ be held before the
election is conducted. The two
amendments are consistent with Section
9(c) because both permit parties to
introduce all evidence at the preelection hearing that is relevant to
whether a question of representation
exists. Indeed, the amendment to
§ 102.66(a) expressly vests parties with
a right to present evidence ‘‘so long as
such examination, cross-examination,
and other evidence supports its
contentions and is relevant to the
existence of a question of representation
or a bar to an election.’’ Nothing in
Section 9(c) or any other section of the
Act requires the Board to permit parties
containing both guards and nonguards, is
appropriate, if any party contends that an
individual in an otherwise appropriate unit of
nonguards is a guard, the regional director can find
the unit excluding guards appropriate and, if the
individual attempts to cast a ballot, he or she can
be permitted to vote subject to challenge and the
question can be resolved after the election.
113 See Americans for Limited Government;
Constangy. Other comments argue generally that
Section 9(c) requires the Board to conduct a preelection hearing on issues concerning eligibility and
inclusion. See GAM; AHA; ALFA; COLLE; CDW;
NMA.
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to introduce evidence at a pre-election
hearing that is not relevant to whether
a question of representation exists.
The final rule’s amendment of
§§ 102.64(a) and 102.66(a) is also
consistent with the final sentence of
current § 102.64(a), which the final rule
does not amend, though the sentence
will now appear in § 102.64(b). That
sentence provides that the hearing
officer’s duty is ‘‘to inquire fully into all
matters and issues necessary to obtain a
full and complete record upon which
the Board or the regional director may
discharge their duties under section 9(c)
of the Act.’’ (Emphasis added.) A
hearing officer ensures ‘‘a full and
complete record upon which the Board
or the regional director may discharge
their duties under Section 9(c) of the
Act’’ when he or she permits parties to
present evidence which is relevant to
the existence of a question of
representation. The Board’s duty under
Section 9(c) is to conduct a hearing to
determine if a question of representation
exists and, if such a question exists, to
direct an election to answer the question
and to certify the results. The final rule
expressly allows the hearing officer to
create a record permitting the regional
director to do precisely that.
In short, the effect of the amendments
is simply to permit the hearing officer
to prevent the introduction of evidence
that is not needed in order to determine
if a question of representation exists. By
definition, if the hearing officer
excludes evidence that is not relevant to
whether a question of representation
exists, the hearing officer is not
impeding the ability of the regional
director or the Board to discharge their
respective duties under Section 9(c) of
the Act.
SHRM argues that ‘‘[u]nder current
NLRB procedural rules, a party is
guaranteed the right to submit evidence
in support of its position at the
hearing.’’ The Board acknowledges that
the current language in §§ 102.66(a) and
101.20(c), when read in isolation, could
have been construed to mean that
parties have a right to present evidence
regarding issues that do not relate to
whether a question of representation
exists. But that is why the Board is
amending § 102.66(a) and eliminating
§ 101.20(c). Put simply, it is
administratively irrational to require the
hearing officer at a pre-election hearing
to permit parties to present evidence
that relates to matters that need not be
addressed in order for the hearing to
fulfill its statutory function of creating
a record upon which the regional
director can determine if a question of
representation exists. In other words, it
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is administratively irrational to require
the hearing officer to permit the
introduction of irrelevant evidence.
SHRM cites Barre-National, Inc., 316
NLRB 877 (1995), in which the Board
relied on §§ 102.66(a) and 101.20(c) in
holding that the hearing officer erred by
preventing an employer from presenting
evidence at a pre-election hearing
regarding the eligibility of 24 line and
group leaders to vote in an election
directed in a unit of production,
maintenance, and warehouse
employees.114 The employer sought to
present evidence that the line and group
leaders were supervisors. In support of
its conclusions that the hearing officer
erred by excluding the evidence and the
regional director erred by permitting the
disputed employees to vote subject to
challenge, the Board quoted the portion
of § 102.66(a), which then read:
Any party shall have the right to appear at
any hearing in person, by counsel, or by
other representative, and any party and the
hearing officer shall have power to call,
examine, and cross examine witnesses and to
introduce into the record documentary and
other evidence.
The Board also quoted the portion of
§ 101.20(c), which then read:
The parties are afforded full opportunity to
present their respective positions and to
produce the significant facts in support of
their contentions.
Based on its reading of these two
provisions, the Board concluded,
‘‘Section 102.66(a) of the Board’s Rules
and Section 101.20(c) of the Board’s
Statements of Procedure entitle parties
at such hearings to present witnesses
and documentary evidence in support of
their positions.’’ 316 NLRB at 878.115
The Board held in Barre-National,
‘‘Under all the circumstances, the preelection hearing held in this case did
not meet the requirements of the Act
and the Board’s rules and Statements of
Procedures.’’ Id. Because of the use of
the conjunctive ‘‘and’’ rather than the
disjunctive ‘‘or’’ and the fact that
nothing in Section 9(c) of the Act can
possibly be understood to give parties a
right to litigate questions of individual
eligibility or inclusion prior to an
election,116 Barre-National cannot be
114 The 24 disputed individuals would have
constituted 8–9 percent of the unit if included. 316
NLRB at 878.
115 The Board also cited the second sentence of
§ 102.64(a), but, as explained above, that sentence
provides no support for the holding in BarreNational.
116 After the vote on the Taft-Hartley amendments
in 1947, Senator Taft placed in the record a
‘‘Supplementary Analysis of the Labor Bill as
Passed.’’ 93 Cong. Rec. 7000 (June, 12, 1947). In that
analysis, Senator Taft explained that the Conference
Committee had revised the amendments of Section
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80165
read to rest on a construction of the Act,
but only on the Board’s reading of
§§ 102.66(a) and 101.20(c). The final
rule’s amendment of § 102.66(a) and
elimination of § 101.20(c) make clear
that parties are entitled to present
evidence in support of their contentions
only if the evidence is relevant to the
existence of a question of
representation, which it was not in
Barre-National. The Board will no
longer follow Barre-National under the
amended rules.
Moreover, as explained in the NPRM,
the result in Barre-National is even less
administratively rational given the
Board’s acknowledgement in that case
that an entitlement to litigate issues at
the pre-election hearing is distinct from
any claim of entitlement to a decision
on all issues litigated at the hearing, and
that ‘‘reviewing courts have held that
there is no general requirement that the
Board decide all voter eligibility issues
prior to an election.’’ Id. at 879 n.9. The
United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit similarly held that ‘‘the
determination of a unit’s composition
need not be made before the election.’’
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d
52, 55 (2d Cir. 1992). As stated in the
NPRM, the Board has consistently
sustained regional directors’ decisions
to defer resolution of individual
employees’ eligibility to vote until after
an election (in which the disputed
employees may cast challenged ballots).
See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck, 957 F.2d at
54–55. The Second Circuit has
explained that the regional director has
‘‘the prerogative of withholding a
determination of the unit placement of
[a classification] of employees until after
the election.’’ Id. at 56. In Northeast
Iowa Telephone Co., 341 NLRB 670, 671
9(c)(4) of the Act to eliminate a provision
permitting ‘‘pre-hearing elections.’’ Id. at 7002. The
Supplementary Analysis then stated, ‘‘That
omission has brought forth the charge that we have
thereby greatly impeded the Board in its disposition
of representation matters. We have not changed the
words of existing law providing a hearing in every
case unless waived by stipulation of the parties. It
is the function of hearings in representation cases
to determine whether an election may properly be
held at the time, and if so, to decide questions of
unit and eligibility to vote.’’ Id. The Board does not
believe that Senator Taft’s vague reference to
‘‘eligibility to vote’’ was intended to encompass the
types of questions concerning individual eligibility
or inclusion discussed above as opposed, for
example, to the general eligibility formula to be
used in an election. See, e.g., Alaska Salmon
Industry, 61 NLRB 1508, 1511–12 (1945) (changing
eligibility formula for seasonal industries). In any
event, the statement of a single legislator, even the
Act’s principal sponsor, made after the dispositive
vote, cannot alter the plain meaning of the language
in Section 9(c)(1), particularly in light of the
Board’s longstanding construction of the Act not to
require that it ‘‘decide’’ such individual eligibility
questions prior to an election. See Barre-National,
316 NLRB at 878 n. 9.
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(2004), the Board characterized this
procedure as the ‘‘tried-and-true ‘vote
under challenge procedure.’ ’’ See also
HeartShare Human Services of New
York, Inc., 320 NLRB 1 (1995), enforced,
108 F.3d 467 (2d Cir. 1997). The Eighth
Circuit has stated that ‘‘deferring the
question of voter eligibility until after an
election is an accepted NLRB practice.’’
Bituma Corp. v. NLRB, 23 F.3d 1432,
1436 (8th Cir. 1994). Even when a
regional director resolves such a dispute
pre-election, the Board, when a request
for review is filed, often defers review
of the resolution, permitting the
disputed individuals to vote subject to
challenge. See, e.g., Silver Cross
Hospital, 350 NLRB 114, 116 n.10
(2007); Medlar Elec., Inc., 337 NLRB
796, 796 (2002); Interstate Warehousing
of Ohio, LLC, 333 NLRB 682, 682–83
(2001); Orson E. Coe Pontiac-GMC
Truck, Inc., 328 NLRB 688, 688 n.1
(1999); American Standard, Inc., 237
NLRB 45, 45 (1978). In short, the Board
has concluded that it serves no statutory
or administrative purpose to require the
hearing officer to permit pre-election
litigation of issues that both the regional
director and the Board are entitled to,
and often do, defer deciding until after
the election and that are often rendered
moot by the election results. The final
rule thus eliminates wholly unnecessary
litigation that serves as a barrier to the
expeditious resolution of questions of
representation.
Some comments argue that permitting
the hearing officer to exclude evidence
related to individual eligibility and
inclusion issues will deprive the
decision-makers of an adequate
record.117 The Board does not believe
that the final rule will deprive the
regional director, the Board, or the
courts of appeals of an adequate record
to review. It is true that the record will
not include evidence that the hearing
officer found was not relevant, but that
is the case now and is the case with
respect to any hearing or trial court
record developed in front of an officer
or judge who applies ordinary rules of
relevance. The final rule does not
amend Section 102.68 of the Board’s
Rules and regulations, which provides
that:
The record in a proceeding conducted
pursuant to the foregoing section shall
consist of: the petition, notice of hearing with
affidavit of service thereof, motions, rulings,
orders, the stenographic report of the hearing
and of any oral argument before the regional
director, stipulations, exhibits, affidavits of
service, and any briefs or other legal
memoranda submitted by the parties to the
117 See,
e.g., AHA.
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regional director or to the Board, and the
decision of the regional director, if any.
Moreover, if the regional director finds
that the record is not sufficient to
determine whether a question of
representation exists or any other matter
that must be addressed prior to directing
an election, the regional director can
reopen the record and remand the
proceeding to the hearing officer.
Some comments make a more specific
point concerning the need for an
adequate record upon which the
regional director can determine whether
the petitioned-for unit is an appropriate
unit as required by the Act.118 These
comments suggest that if an employer
declines to take a position on the
appropriateness of the petitioned-for
unit and the hearing officer exercises
the authority to limit the employer’s
examination, cross-examination, and
introduction of evidence to that which
‘‘supports its contentions’’ under
§ 102.66(a), the regional director and
Board may be deprived of an adequate
record upon which to fulfill their
statutory duty to determine if the
proposed unit is appropriate. The Board
believes that these comments
misunderstand the effect of the
amendment. First, as explained in the
NPRM, hearing officers have this same
authority to limit parties’ participation
in the hearing under the current rules.
See 76 FR 36823; Bennett Industries
Inc., 313 NLRB 1363 (1994); Allen
Health Care Services, 332 NLRB 1308
(2000); Casehandling Manual Section
11217. Second, even if the hearing
officer exercises the authority to limit an
employer’s presentation of evidence
under these circumstances, both the
petitioner and the hearing officer will
retain the right to introduce the
evidence needed to make the required
determination concerning the unit. That
evidence may include testimony
adduced from the employer’s owners,
managers, or supervisors as witnesses,
called under subpoena or otherwise,
and documents obtained from the
employer. Third, the final rule, like the
current rules, merely vests the hearing
officer with discretion to limit a party’s
participation in the hearing as it relates
to issues concerning which the party
has not taken a position. The hearing
officer remains free to permit such
participation if the officer concludes it
is necessary to develop a complete
record. The Board has concluded that
employers who are unable or unwilling
to take a position concerning the
118 AHA argues that it would be unfair to
preclude employers from introducing evidence
given that some evidence must be accepted
concerning this issue.
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appropriateness of a proposed unit of
their own employees are unlikely to
provide assistance to the hearing officer
in the development of an adequate
record upon which to address that
question. The Board has further
concluded that not vesting hearing
officers with clear authority to limit
such employers’ participation in the
hearing under those circumstances
threatens the hearing officer’s ability to
control the proceedings and avoid
burdening the record.
Some comments criticize the Board’s
statement of position, joinder, offer-ofproof, preclusion, and 20-percent
proposals on the ground that assigning
the hearing officer to manage the revised
process would be inconsistent with the
limits on the role of the hearing officer
contained in Section 9(c)(1) of the Act
or beyond the capacity of the Board’s
current hearing officers.119 The Board
does not respond to these comments at
length because the Board is taking no
action on those proposals at this time.
To the extent the authors of the
comments would criticize the final rule
on the same grounds, the Board would
find them to be unpersuasive. The
hearing officer’s role under the
amendments is limited to the traditional
one of controlling the hearing and
preventing the record from being
burdened by irrelevant evidence. See
Mariah, Inc., 322 NLRB 586, 586 n.1
(1996) (hearing officer acted consistent
with his role of ensuring that the record
is both complete and concise in refusing
to permit the introduction of irrelevant
evidence at the pre-election hearing).
The hearing officer may limit the
presentation of evidence based on
relevance but cannot render a decision
or make any form of recommendation.
Thus, the final rule is fully consistent
with Section 9(c)(1). Moreover, if upon
transmission of the record to the
regional director, the director believes
the record is insufficient to render a
decision on a particular issue relevant to
determining whether a question of
representation exists or in any other
respect, the director may reopen the
record for presentation of additional
evidence before the hearing officer
relevant to that issue.120
The Board is also confident that its
hearing officers can fully and
competently perform their role under
the final rule. Currently, the regional
119 ALFA; SHRM; Bluegrass Institute; NMA; ACE;
AHCA; NAM; Center on National Labor Policy
(CNLP).
120 The Board also notes in this regard that, as
explained in relation to § 102.65(c), the final rule
does not adopt the narrowed standard for special
permission to appeal rulings of the hearing officer
to the regional director.
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directors assign either field attorneys or
field examiners as hearing officers. Field
attorneys must possess a J.D. degree and
be an active member of a bar. Field
examiners must possess a B.A. degree.
The Board has traditionally provided
written guidance to hearing officers as
well as periodic training. Hearing
officers also participate in a video
training program that covers the subject
of conducting a hearing as well as
relevant professional development
programs. There is also an almost 500page publication entitled Guide for
Hearing Officers in NLRB
Representation and Section 10(K)
Proceedings,121 which is periodically
updated and made available to hearing
officers (and the public on the Board’s
Web site). Hearing officers are also
routinely given feedback on their
conduct of hearings by the staff
members assigned to assist the regional
director in drafting the resulting
decision as well as by the regional
director. The Board intends to continue
to provide these types of assistance,
feedback, and training. Finally, the
qualifications of hearings officers are
not set by statute or regulation. To the
extent the regional directors or the
Board find that the existing hearing
officers cannot competently perform the
role assigned them under the final rule,
the Board will provide necessary
training or alter the qualifications for
service as a hearing officer.
Some comments criticize the Board’s
statement of position, joinder, offer-ofproof, preclusion, and 20-percent
proposals on the ground that the
proposals would violate the parties’
rights to due process of law by limiting
the evidence they could introduce at the
pre-election hearing.122 The Board does
not respond to these comments at length
because the Board is taking no action on
those proposals at this time.
To the extent the authors of the
comments would criticize the final rule
on the same grounds, the Board would
find them to be unpersuasive. Most
importantly, the final rule does not limit
any party’s right to present evidence,
but merely gives the hearing officer and
regional director discretion to defer
introduction of such evidence until after
the election. Moreover, a party has no
right to present irrelevant evidence
under the Act, the APA, or the
Constitution. See Mariah, Inc., 322
NLRB at 586 n.1 (hearing officer acted
consistent with his role in ensuring that
121 Office of the General Counsel, National Labor
Relations Board, Guide for Hearing Officers in
NLRB Representation and Section 10(K)
Proceedings (Sept. 2003).
122 Constangy; SHRM; Sheppard Mullins; NRF;
Kuryakyn Holding LLC (Kuryakyn); NMMA; CNLP.
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the record is both complete and concise
in refusing to permit the introduction of
irrelevant evidence at the pre-election
hearing); National Mining Ass’n v. DOL,
292 F.3d 849, 873–74 (DC Cir. 2002) (the
APA ‘‘empowers agencies to ‘exclu[de]
* * * irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly
repetitive evidence’ as ‘a matter of
policy’ ’’) (citation omitted); U.S. v.
Maxwell, 254 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2001)
(although a criminal defendant ‘‘has a
wide-ranging right to present a defense,
* * * this does not give him a right to
present irrelevant evidence’’); U.S. v.
Vazquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 37, 51 (1st Cir.
2008) (same). Accordingly, parties have
no right to present irrelevant evidence at
a pre-election hearing, which is not
governed by the APA’s formal
adjudication provisions. See 5 U.S.C.
554 (a)(6); In re Bel Air Chateau
Hospital, Inc., 611 F.2d 1248, 1252–
1253 (9th Cir. 1979) (representation case
proceedings exempt from APA formal
adjudication requirements); NLRB v.
Champa Linen Service Co., 437 F.2d
1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1971) (same). The
Board believes that the final rule merely
codifies evidentiary limits that trial
court judges routinely apply and thus is
fully consistent with the requirement of
an ‘‘appropriate hearing,’’ the APA, and
the due process clause.
A number of comments suggest that
Section 9(c) requires a hearing
regardless of whether material facts are
in dispute.123 But, as under the current
rules, the final rule provides for a preelection hearing in all cases where the
parties have not entered into an election
agreement resolving all possible preelection disputes. Section 9(c) does not
require an evidentiary hearing in every
case. Rather, it requires ‘‘an appropriate
hearing.’’ If the parties come to the
hearing and the hearing officer
determines that there are no disputes
that must be resolved prior to the
election (because, for example, all
parties agree on the record that the
Board has jurisdiction and that the only
dispute concerns the supervisory status
of one individual in a unit that all
parties agree on the record is
appropriate), an appropriate hearing
does not require introduction of further
evidence. See United States v. Storer
Broadcasting, 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956);
accord American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil
Aeronautics Board, 359 F.2d 624, 628
(en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843
(1966). In fact, the Board concludes that
a hearing where irrelevant evidence is
introduced is an inappropriate hearing.
Several comments criticize the
proposed 20-percent rule on policy
grounds. For example, some comments
123 See
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80167
argue that it is unfair to defer resolution
of supervisory status questions, because
employers need to know who their
supervisors are so they know who they
can require to campaign against
employee representation.124 Similarly,
comments argue that employers need to
know which employees are eligible to
vote so they know whom to address
concerning the question of
representation.125 Numerous comments
additionally express the position that
deferral of eligibility questions under
the 20-percent rule would impair
employee rights. More specifically,
many comments assert that deferral
would deprive employees of knowledge
about the precise parameters of the
bargaining unit, thereby depriving them
of the right to cast an informed ballot,126
or impeding their ability to determine
whether they share a community of
interest with the other voters.127
Similarly, a number of comments
express the view that deferral of
eligibility issues would engender
confusion among the voting
employees.128 Other comments
generally suggest that the deferral of
eligibility issues would increase the
likelihood that disputed individuals
would refrain from voting in an
election. For example, a number of
comments express the position that
employees, faced with the prospect of
having their votes challenged, might
simply refrain from voting,129 some as a
result of a concern that—particularly in
smaller units—they could be easily
identified as the individuals whose
votes determined the outcome of the
124 Seyfarth Shaw; Council of Smaller Enterprises
(COSE); Constangy; Indiana Chamber of Commerce;
COLLE; RILA. SHRM also suggests that deferring
resolution of supervisory status questions might
somehow threaten attorney-client communications
if counsel communicates with an individual the
employer believes is a supervisor who is later held
not to be a supervisor. This same concern exists
under the current procedures as explained above.
Moreover, the test the Board uses to determine who
is a supervisor under the Act is not and need not
be the same as the various tests used to determine
if attorney communications to an individual
employed by the attorney’s client are privileged.
125 See, e.g., PIA.
126 See, e.g., Testimony of Eric Schweitzer;
Testimony of David Burton; GAM; Constangy; ACC;
Anchor Planning Group; Kruchko & Fries; NRF;
Baker & McKenzie; COLLE; Indiana Chamber of
Commerce. IBEW, in contrast, states that, in its
experience, employee voters are motivated
primarily by whether they desire representation and
not by precisely which employees will be in the
unit.
127 See, e.g., Associated Oregon Industries; COSE;
Seyfarth Shaw; Kuryakyn; NMMA; John Deere
Water; NACCO Materials Handling Group; Graphtec
America; Baker & McKenzie.
128 See, e.g., SHRM; Seyfarth Shaw; ACE; AHA;
ALFA; Spartan Motors.
129 See, e.g., Pinnacle Health Systems; PIA;
Arizona Hospital and Healthcare Association.
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election.130 Finally, with respect
specifically to the deferral of
supervisory status questions, several
comments generally express concern
that employees with disputed
supervisory status would not know
whether they could appropriately speak
in favor of or against union
representation, attend union meetings,
or sign authorization cards,131 and
SHRM asserts that employees would be
chilled in the exercise of their Section
7 and First Amendment rights.
However, in this final rule the Board
has determined not to adopt the 20percent rule at this time, or make any
change to the status quo concerning the
regional director’s or Board’s discretion
to defer deciding or the parties’ right to
agree to defer litigation concerning such
questions until after the election. Prior
to the amendments, regional directors
were free to decide individual eligibility
questions if they wished to do so or to
defer such decisions until after the
election and direct that disputed
individuals vote subject to challenge.
The same is true under the final rule.
Although the amendments permit the
hearing officer to exclude evidence that
is not relevant to determining whether
a question of representation exists–and
thereby permit the hearing officer to
exclude evidence regarding individual
eligibility questions–the hearing officer
is free to permit the introduction of such
evidence and the regional director is
free to direct that such evidence be
admitted if he or she resolves to decide
the individual eligibility questions at
issue.
In any event, the Board is not
persuaded by the policy argument that
it should permit litigation of all
individual supervisory status
questions—even though such questions
are ordinarily irrelevant to the statutory
purpose of the hearing—on the grounds
that resolution of such questions is
necessary for an employer effectively to
campaign against union representation.
Most fundamentally, while the question
of whether particular individuals are
supervisors as defined in the Act has
generated considerable litigation, the
question exists only at the margin. In
the Board’s experience, in virtually
every case, even where there is
uncertainty concerning the supervisory
status of individual employees, the
employer nevertheless has in its employ
managers and supervisors whose status
is not disputed and is undisputable.132
130 See, e.g., LRI; Anchor Planning Group;
Bluegrass Institute.
131 See, e.g., Seyfarth Shaw; ACE; Sheppard
Mullin.
132 See, e.g., McAlester General Hospital, 233
NLRB 589, 589–90 (1977) (noting that even without
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The policy argument contained in
these comments is also based on a set
of faulty premises. First, as explained
above and in the NPRM, employers have
no right to a pre-election decision
concerning individual eligibility under
the current rules. Second, even under
the current rules, a regional director
cannot issue a decision on any
eligibility question until well after the
filing of the petition because a hearing
must be noticed (no sooner than five
business days after the notice), the
hearing must be completed, and the
regional director must issue a decision.
Thus, for a substantial part of any
campaign, including a substantial part
of the ‘‘critical period’’ between the
filing of the petition and the election,
employers will not yet have a regional
director’s decision even in those cases
where one issues pre-election. Third,
again under the current rules, even if
the regional director makes a decision
concerning an individual eligibility
question, it is subject to a request for
review by the Board. The Board rarely
rules on such requests until shortly
before the election and, sometimes, not
until after the election. See, e.g.,
Mercedes-Benz of Anaheim, Case 21–
RC–21275 (May 18, 2011) (day before
the election); Caritas Carney Hospital,
Case 1–RC–22525 (May 18, 2011) (after
the election); Columbus Symphony
Orchestra, Inc., 350 NLRB 523, 523 n.1
(2007) (same); Harbor City Volunteer
Ambulance Squad, Inc., 318 NLRB 764,
764 (1995) (same); Heatcraft, Div. of
Lennox Indus., Inc., 250 NLRB 58, 58
n.1 (1980) (same). Fourth, the problem
identified by the employer comments is
even more acute for unions, which must
obtain a showing of interest prior to
filing a petition. If the union asks
employees to help gather a showing of
interest and the employees are later
determined to be supervisors, the Board
may hold the showing of interest to be
tainted and overturn election results
favoring union representation on that
ground. See Harborside Healthcare Inc.,
343 NLRB 906 (2004). That problem
cannot possibly be solved through any
form of post-petition, pre-election
hearing. Fifth, under the Act itself, even
if a regional director’s decision and final
Board decision are rendered prior to an
election, the Board decision is
potentially subject to review in the
courts of appeals and the court of
appeals’ decision cannot be rendered
pre-election. See 29 U.S.C. 159(d) and
considering employees whose supervisory status
was in dispute, employer employed one supervisor
for every eight unit employees and, if the employer
filled open supervisory positions, it would employ
one supervisor for every three unit employees).
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160(e); Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376
U.S. 473, 476–79 (1964).133 Thus, the
uncertainty with which the comments
are concerned exists under the current
rules and cannot be fully eliminated.
Nor does the Board agree that the
proposed amendments improperly
deprive employees of the ability to make
an informed choice in the election. As
explained above, under the
amendments, as under the current rules,
the regional director must determine the
unit’s scope and appropriateness prior
to the direction of the election.
Accordingly, at the time they cast their
ballots, the voting employees will be
fully informed as to the scope of the
unit, and will be able to fully assess the
extent to which their interests may align
with, or diverge from, other unit
employees. Although the employees
may not know whether particular
individuals ultimately will be deemed
eligible or included and therefore a part
of the bargaining unit, that is also the
case under the Board’s current rules, as
explained above, and when the parties
agree to permit disputed employees to
vote subject to challenge. In addition, as
pointed out by SEIU in its comments, a
similar choice has confronted voters in
mixed professional/non-professional
units since 1947, when Congress
amended the Act to provide that a
majority of the professional employees
must vote separately to be part of such
a mixed unit and the results of that
separate vote, which takes place
simultaneously with the vote in the
entire unit, are not known when
employees cast their ballots. See Section
9(b)(1); Sonotone Corp., 90 NLRB at
1241–42. In that context, the Board has
held, ‘‘Such a procedure * * * presents
the employees with an informed
choice.’’ Pratt & Whitney, 327 NLRB
1213, 1218 (1999).
Many comments cite the courts of
appeals’ decisions in NLRB v. Beverly
Health and Rehabilitation Services, 120
F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished
per curiam opinion), and NLRB v.
Parsons School of Design, 793 F.2d 503
(2d Cir. 1986). As explained in the
NPRM, those two decisions represent
the minority view in the courts. The
133 ALFA expressed concern that if an alleged
supervisor is permitted to vote subject to challenge,
the results of the election might be set aside
pursuant to an objection citing the presence of a
supervisor in the polling area if the individual is
found to be a supervisor after a post-election
hearing. As explained above, this scenario can arise
under the current procedures. See, e.g., Sorenson
Lighted Controls, 286 NLRB 969, 989 (1987). The
Board is not aware of any case holding such
conduct per se objectionable under these
circumstances and the existence of the new rules
would be a factor the Board would consider if such
an objection arises in the future.
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majority of the courts of appeals have
upheld the Board’s vote-and-impound
procedures and upheld election results
even when the eligibility or inclusion of
certain employees was not resolved
until after the election.134 Moreover,
under the final rule, the hearing officer
and regional director have discretion to
permit litigation and to resolve
eligibility and inclusion questions that
might significantly change the size or
character of the unit, thus addressing
the courts’ concerns in both Beverly and
Parsons. In addition, as explained in the
NPRM, the courts’ concern in both of
those cases was that voters were
somehow misled when the regional
director defined the unit in one way
prior to the election and the Board
revised the definition after the election.
The final rule would actually prevent
exactly that form of change in unit
definition from occurring, by deferring
both a regional director’s decision, in
most instances, and a Board decision
until after the election and permitting
disputed employees to vote subject to
challenge. Thus, employees will not in
any manner be misled about the unit.
Rather, they will cast their ballots
understanding that the eligibility or
inclusion of a small number of
individuals in the unit has not yet been
determined. Finally, as proposed in the
NPRM, the Board could, even prior to or
without adopting the relevant proposed
rule, revise its final notice of election to
inform employees that specified
employees are voting subject to
challenge, what that means, and how
their status will be resolved. See Sears,
Roebuck, 957 F.2d at 55 (regional
director permitted employees in one
classification to vote subject to
challenge and included section in notice
which ‘‘detailed the special voting
posture of the automotive floor sales
employees and the circumstances for
including their votes’’).
PIA and Bluegrass Institute suggest
that deferring resolution of individual
eligibility questions until after the
election threatens the secrecy of the
ballot and that employees who are
permitted to vote subject to challenge
are less likely to vote because they fear
that the parties will learn how they
voted. However, even if the
amendments to §§ 102.64(a) and
102.66(a) and the elimination of
§ 101.20(c) lead to more disputes
concerning individual eligibility being
deferred until after the election, the
Board is not persuaded that the final
rule threatens the secrecy of the ballot
or voter turnout. The courts have
upheld the Board’s current practice of
deferring individual eligibility questions
under most circumstances. Moreover,
the ballots cast by the employees
directed to vote subject to challenge are
not counted if they are not
determinative. Accordingly, ballot
secrecy is preserved in those cases. Even
if challenged ballots are determinative,
the ballots are not counted if the
employees who cast them are ultimately
found to be ineligible after the postelection hearing. And, even if the ballots
cast by such individuals are
determinative and a post-election
hearing results in the individuals who
cast them being found eligible, the
ballots are not opened and counted one
by one, but rather the ballots of all
individuals found to be eligible are
‘‘thoroughly mixed’’ before being
opened and counted. See Casehandling
Manual Section 11378. Accordingly, the
Board believes that it is only in cases
where there is just one determinative
challenge or where all of the potentially
determinative challenged ballots are
marked in the same way that the parties
will learn how the employees voted.
However, that is both rare and inherent
in any system that permits challenges,
including the current system. Thus,
even if regional directors were
prohibited from deferring individual
eligibility issues, which is not the case
currently, parties would still have a
right to challenge voters for good cause
at the polls and the commenters’
concern would remain.135
Finally, the Board is unaware of any
significant differences between the
turnout of employees whose eligibility
to vote has not been disputed or has
been resolved prior to the election and
employees permitted to vote subject to
challenge. The case law demonstrates
that even in cases where only a single
individual is permitted to vote subject
to challenge, the individual is not
necessarily deterred from voting. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Cal-Western Transport,
870 F.2d 1481, 1483, 1486 (9th Cir.
1989) (regional director permitted single
employee to vote subject to challenge
and he did so); NLRB v. Staiman
Brothers, 466 F.2d 564, 565 (3d Cir.
1972) (deciding vote cast by single
employee permitted to vote subject to
challenge by agreement of the parties).
134 See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 957
F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1992); Nightingale Oil Co. v. NLRB,
905 F.2d 528, 533–34 (1st Cir. 1990); NLRB v. Clark
Distributing, 917 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1990)
(unpublished); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v.
NLRB, 832 F.2d 857, 861 (4th Cir. 1987).
135 The Board also notes that to the extent the
amendments do result in more individuals casting
challenged ballots than under the current rules, the
amendments may well have the effect of making it
less likely that parties will be able to discover how
particular individuals voted.
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80169
Finally, balanced against any asserted
employer or employee interests in preelection litigation of individual
eligibility or inclusion questions is the
statutory interest in prompt resolution
of questions of representation. As
explained above and in the NPRM,
permitting the litigation of such matters
imposes serious costs, and no comments
on the NPRM convinced the Board
otherwise. It plainly frustrates the
statutory goal of expeditiously resolving
questions of representation, and it
frequently imposes unnecessary costs
on the parties and the government. As
explained in the NPRM, it often results
in unnecessary litigation and a waste of
administrative resources as the
eligibility of potential voters is litigated
(and in some cases decided), even when
their votes end up not affecting the
outcome of the election. If a majority of
employees votes against representation,
even assuming all the disputed votes
were cast in favor of representation, the
disputed eligibility questions become
moot. If, on the other hand, a majority
of employees chooses to be represented,
even assuming all the disputed votes
were cast against representation, the
Board’s experience suggests that the
parties are often able to resolve the
resulting unit placement questions in
the course of bargaining once they are
free of the tactical considerations that
exist pre-election and, if they cannot do
so, either party may file a unit
clarification petition to bring the issue
back before the Board. See New York
Law Publishing Co., 336 NLRB No. 93,
slip op. at 2 (2001) (‘‘The parties may
agree through the course of collective
bargaining on whether the classification
should be included or excluded.
Alternatively, in the absence of such an
agreement, the matter can be resolved in
a timely invoked unit clarification
petition.’’). As the Eighth Circuit
observed, ‘‘The NLRB’s practice of
deferring the eligibility decision saves
agency resources for those cases in
which eligibility actually becomes an
issue.’’ Bituma Corp. v. NLRB, 23 F.3d
1432, 1436 (8th Cir. 1994). The Sixth
Circuit similarly found that ‘‘[s]uch a
practice enables the Board to conduct an
immediate election.’’ Medical Center at
Bowling Green v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 1091,
1093 (6th Cir. 1983).
NRTWLDF argues that application of
the 20-percent rule at the hearing might
cast into question the regional office’s
earlier, administrative determination
that the petition was accompanied by an
adequate showing of interest. Whether
or not that is the case, the final rule does
not adopt the 20-percent rule. Moreover,
the concern expressed in the comment
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could equally be expressed about the
current procedures under which
regional directors and the Board
routinely defer ruling on eligibility
questions without revisiting the
adequacy of the showing of interest. In
addition, the final rule leaves the
hearing officer and regional director
with discretion, respectively, to permit
introduction of evidence and to rule
pre-election if the eligibility questions
involve a large percentage of the unit.
When the deferred questions concern
only a small percentage of the unit, the
concern expressed by NRTWLDF is
unlikely to arise. Furthermore, the
required showing of interest is purely an
internal administrative matter, as
explained in current § 102.18(a): ‘‘it
being the Board’s experience that in the
absence of special factors the conduct of
an election serves no purpose under the
statute unless the petitioner has been
designated by at least 30 percent of the
employees.’’ The adequacy of the
showing is non-litigable. The Borden
Co., 101 NLRB 203, 203 n. 3 (1952) (‘‘the
question of the sufficiency of the
showing of interest * * * [is a matter]
for administrative determination and
not subject to litigation by the parties);
Casehandling Manual Section 11028.3.
Finally, given that the only consequence
of the possible scenario envisioned by
NRTWLDF is, in rare cases, the conduct
of an election which would not
otherwise have been conducted, the
Board does not believe that that
possibility weighs heavily against the
efficiencies gained by affording the
hearing officer discretion not to take
evidence concerning individual
eligibility and inclusion questions.
Some comments criticize the 20percent rule on the grounds that it will
lead to more post-election litigation and
result in more overturned elections as a
result of post-election rulings
concerning the eligibility of
employees.136 Similarly, two comments
raise the concern that because the
bargaining obligation attaches at the
time of the tally, employers will be
required to invest time and money in
bargaining with a union that has
questionable representative status.137
These comments misunderstand the
proposals. As under the current rules, if
decisions concerning individuals’
eligibility or inclusion are deferred until
after the election, the individuals will
vote subject to challenge. If their votes
are not potentially outcome
determinative, the matter will not be
litigated, thus decreasing the total
136 See Associated Oregon Industries; Kuryakyn;
Bluegrass Institute; NMMA.
137 See COSE; Constangy.
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amount of litigation. If their votes are
potentially outcome determinative, the
matter will be litigated and the
resolution may affect the results of the
election, but it will not lead to the
results of the election being overturned.
As under the current procedures, postelection proceedings concerning
challenged ballots will proceed and
conclude promptly at the regional level.
As explained above and below in
relation to §§ 102.62(b) and 102.69, any
Board review of the disposition will be
expedited by the final rule.
Finally, a few comments argue that
deferral of voter eligibility questions
will create more issues for the parties to
address during first contract
negotiations. As explained above, this
already happens under the current
rules, when the regional director or the
Board defers decision on the questions
and does not decide them post-election
because the votes of the disputed
individuals were not potentially
outcome determinative. The Board does
not believe addressing such questions
will complicate bargaining, particularly
when the parties can file a timely unit
clarification petition if they are
unwilling or unable to resolve the
matter.
Subsection 102.66(d)
The NPRM proposed amending
§§ 102.67 and 102.66(d) to vest the
hearing officer with discretion to control
the filing, subjects, and timing of any
post-hearing briefs. The final rule
adopts this proposal.
The NPRM explained that, given the
often recurring and uncomplicated legal
and factual issues arising in pre-election
hearings, briefs are not necessary in
every case to permit the parties to fully
and fairly present their positions or to
facilitate prompt and accurate decisions.
Yet under existing §§ 102.67(a) and
101.21(b), in nearly all cases parties are
afforded a right to file briefs at any time
up to seven days after the close of the
hearing.138 By exercising that right or
even by simply declining to expressly
waive that right until after the running
of the seven-day period, parties can
potentially delay the issuance of a
decision and direction of election and
the conduct of an election for purely
tactical reasons.
Various comments, including those of
SHRM, AHA, AHCA and ALFA, oppose
138 Despite the current regulations, the Board has
denied review of a direction of election when one
argument made by the party requesting review was
that the hearing officer had refused to permit posthearing briefs. Unifirst Corp., Case 5–RC–15052
(Aug. 16, 2000). The Board reasoned that the party
had showed no prejudice and was able to fully
present its substantive argument in the request for
review. Id. at n.1.
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the proposed amendment on the ground
that briefs are needed to sum up the
evidence presented at the pre-election
hearing. SHRM and ACE point out that
this cannot be done as effectively in oral
argument at the close of the hearing
because the full transcript is ordinarily
not yet available. Bruce E. Buchanan
argued that briefs serve to narrow the
issues in dispute and identify relevant
case law. The AFL–CIO points out that
the current Casehandling Manual
recognizes that briefs are not necessary
or even of assistance in every case.
Section 11242 provides, ‘‘Before the
close of the hearing, the hearing officer
should encourage the parties to argue
orally on the record rather than to file
briefs.’’ 139
Having considered these comments,
the Board has concluded that posthearing briefing is not required or even
helpful in every case. In this regard, it
is important to note that amended
§ 102.66(d) does not prevent parties
from filing post-hearing briefs. Rather, it
simply vests the hearing officer with
discretion to permit or not permit such
filings and to otherwise control the
content and timing of any post-hearing
briefs. Moreover, in every case, parties
aggrieved by a decision of the regional
director will have a right to file a brief
in support of their request for review.
Thus, in every representation case that
proceeds to a pre-election hearing, a
party aggrieved by a ruling of a hearing
officer or decision of the regional
director will have had the opportunity
to file at least one and sometimes two
briefs before the close of the case.
Finally, in relation to the need for a
transcript before parties can adequately
sum up the evidence, the Board notes
that the average pre-election hearing
lasts for less than one day.
It also bears mentioning that, even
under the current rules, parties do not
enjoy a right to file post-hearing briefs
in certain kinds of representation cases.
For example, the Board’s current rules
do not permit the filing of briefs absent
‘‘special permission’’ after a pre-election
hearing conducted under Sections
8(b)(7) and 9 of the Act. See 29 CFR
101.23(c). Similarly, there is no right to
file post-hearing briefs after a hearing on
challenges or objections. See
Casehandling Manual Section 11430;
139 The AFL–CIO also points out that a preference
for oral argument in lieu of briefing was among the
‘‘best practices’’ identified by the Board’s General
Counsel in a 1997 report. See G.C. Memo. 98–1,
‘‘Report of Best Practices Committee—
Representation Cases December 1997,’’ at 10, 28 (‘‘It
is considered a best practice that the hearing officer
should solicit oral argument in lieu of briefs in
appropriate cases since in some cases briefs are
little, if any, assistance to the Regions and may
delay issuance of the decision.’’).
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Guide for Hearing Officers in NLRB
Representation and Section 10(K)
Proceedings at 167 (‘‘In a hearing on
objections/challenges, the parties do not
have a right to file briefs. To the extent
that briefs are not necessary and would
interfere with the prompt issuance of a
decision, they should not be
permitted.’’).
GAM argues that the proposal denies
due process. In response, the Board
points out that the final rule does not
deny any party’s right to file at least one
post-hearing brief with the Board before
the close of the representation
proceeding. Moreover, the rule permits
the filing of a post-hearing brief with the
regional director with leave of the
hearing officer. Combined with the right
to file a pre-hearing brief or to file a
hearing brief before the close of the
hearing and to present closing, oral
argument in every case, the
opportunities for the filing of posthearing briefs provided in the final rule
do not deprive any party of due process
nor are they inconsistent with the
statutory requirement of an ‘‘appropriate
hearing.’’ In Morgan v. United States,
298 U.S. 468 (1936), the Supreme Court
considered the essential element of the
‘‘full hearing’’ required by the Packers
and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. 310. The
Court held that the requirement of a full
hearing was not met if the decisionmaker was an individual ‘‘who has not
considered evidence or argument.’’ Id.
at 481. However, the Court also made
clear that the ‘‘requirements are not
technical,’’ that ‘‘[e]vidence may be
taken by an examiner,’’ and that
[a]rgument may be oral or written.’’ Id.
See also Abbott Laboratories v. NLRB,
540 F.2d 662, 665 n.1 (4th Cir. 1976)
(‘‘With respect to proceedings before the
hearing officer, the Board ruled that its
hearing officer was not required, either
by statute or the due process clause, to
accept posthearing briefs since the
parties had the opportunity to express
their views in writing both before and
after the case was referred to the hearing
officer * * * We see no error of fact or
law in these rulings.’’); Lim v. District of
Columbia Taxicab Commission, 564
A.2d 720, 726 (DC App. 1989) (‘‘there
exists no due process right * * * to file
a brief’’).
The APA and its legislative history
contain evidence of Congress’s intent
not to require that the Board permit
post-hearing briefing after every preelection hearing. Enacted in 1946,
Section 8 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 557(c),
provides that in formal agency
adjudication:
Before a recommended, initial, or tentative
decision, or a decision on agency review of
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the decision of subordinate employees, the
parties are entitled to a reasonable
opportunity to submit for the consideration
of the employees participating in the
decisions—
(1) proposed findings and conclusions; or
(2) exceptions to the decisions or
recommended decisions of subordinate
employees or to tentative agency decisions;
and
(3) supporting reasons for the exceptions or
proposed findings or conclusions.
But Section 5(6) of the APA, 5 U.S.C.
554(a)(6), specifically exempts from the
category of formal adjudication those
cases involving ‘‘the certification of
worker representatives.’’ The courts
have held that this exemption applies to
both pre- and post-election hearings.
See In re Bel Air Chateau Hospital, Inc.,
611 F.2d 1248, 1252–1253 (9th Cir.
1979); NLRB v. Champa Linen Service
Co., 437 F.2d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir.
1971). The Senate Committee Report
explained that the exemption was
inserted into the APA because the
Board’s ‘‘determinations rest so largely
upon an election or the availability of an
election.’’ S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 16 (1945). The committee also
pointed to ‘‘the simplicity of the issues,
the great number of cases, and the
exceptional need for expedition.’’
Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Comparative Print on Revision of S. 7,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1945).
While Section 9 of the NLRA was
amended in 1947 to adopt the current
version of Section 9(c), the APA was not
amended and continues to exempt
representation cases from its formal
adjudication requirements. In fact,
between 1964 and 1966, Congress
considered removing all the exceptions
contained in Section 5 from the APA,
but decided not to do so. In 1965, the
Board’s Solicitor wrote to the Chairman
of the Senate Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure
objecting strenuously to removal of the
exemption for representation cases. The
Solicitor specifically objected that
‘‘election case handling would be newly
freighted and greatly retarded by * * *
[s]ubmission to the hearing officer of
proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law.’’ Administrative
Procedure Act: Hearings on S. 1663
Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Practice and Procedure of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 532
(1964) (letter submitted by William
Feldesman, NLRB Solicitor, May 11,
1965). The Solicitor concluded, ‘‘After
Congress has done so much to help
speed the processing of election cases to
avoid the dangers of delay, this would
hardly be the time to inaugurate
procedural changes which serve dilatory
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ends and have the potential to cause
that bottleneck the Board has for years
been attempting to prevent.’’ Id. at 534.
In 1966, the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary reported out a bill containing
a provision, not ultimately enacted, that
would have removed all the
exemptions. But the Committee Report
carefully explained, ‘‘It should be noted,
however, that nonadversary
investigative proceedings which
Congress may have specified must be
conducted with a hearing, are not to be
construed as coming within the
provisions of section 5(a) because of the
deletion of the exemptions. An example
of such a proceeding would be
certification of employee representatives
proceedings conducted by the National
Labor Relations Board.’’ S. Rep. No.
1234, 89 Cong., 2d Sess. 12–13 (1966).
SEIU suggests amending the proposed
rule to require that any briefing be
completed within 14 days of the close
of the hearing. The Board has
considered this suggestion and decided
that the hearing officer who has heard
the evidence introduced at the hearing
and considered the parties’ request to
file a post-hearing brief is in the best
position to determine if briefing should
be permitted, what subjects any briefing
should address, and when briefs should
be filed.
Sec. 102.67 Proceedings Before the
Regional Director; Further Hearing;
Action by the Regional Director; Review
of Action by the Regional Director;
Statement in Opposition; Transfer of
Case to the Board; Board Action
In the NPRM, the Board proposed a
number of amendments to § 102.67. The
Board proposed that the regional
director defer deciding eligibility
questions involving less than 20 percent
of the unit and instead permit the
disputed individuals to vote subject to
challenge. The Board also proposed to
give the regional director discretion to
issue a direction of election with
findings and a statement of reasons to
follow no later than the tally of the
ballots. The Board further proposed to
make changes with respect to the
Excelsior list and the final notice of the
election, and to eliminate the regional
director’s authority to transfer a case to
the Board for decision at any time. The
Board has decided to take no action at
this time on those proposals in order to
permit more time for deliberation.
In the NPRM, the Board also proposed
amendments to the current pre-election
request-for-review procedure and the
accompanying 25-day waiting period.
Under the current rules, the parties are
required to request Board review within
14 days of a regional director’s decision
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and direction of election or be deemed
to have waived any arguments that were
or could have been made concerning
rulings at the pre-election hearing or the
decision and direction of election.
§ 102.67(f); see, e.g., A.S. Horner, Inc.,
246 NLRB 393, 394–95 (1979). In
addition, the regional director generally
schedules the election no sooner than
25 days after the direction of election so
that the Board has an opportunity to
rule on any request for review that may
be filed. § 101.21(d). But a request does
not automatically stay the election,
which proceeds as scheduled in almost
all cases. If the Board has not yet ruled
on the request at the time of the
election, as is not infrequently the case,
the election is held and the ballots
impounded until the Board can rule.
Even if the Board grants the request, the
Board almost never stays the election
and the same vote-and-impound
procedure is used.
The Board proposed to eliminate the
pre-election request-for-review
procedure in the NPRM and instead
permit parties to file any such request
after the election, when it could be
consolidated with any request for
review of the director’s disposition of
post-election disputes arising out of
challenges or objections. In the NPRM,
the Board explained that the
amendment would eliminate
unnecessary litigation because many
issues raised through pre-election
requests for review are either rendered
moot by the election results or are
resolved by agreement of the parties
post-election. In addition, the Board
explained, permitting parties to
consolidate, in a single filing, requests
that the Board review pre- and postelection rulings will result in
efficiencies for the parties and the
Board.
The Board also proposed eliminating
the 25-day waiting period because, even
under the current rules, it serves little
purpose in light of the vote-andimpound procedure, and its stated
purpose is eliminated by the
elimination of the pre-election request
for review.
The final rule adopts both these
proposals.
The final rule’s elimination of the preelection request for review and
consolidation of all Board review
(except via a request for special
permission to appeal) post-election
conforms Board procedures with the
ordinary rules in both federal and state
courts. As the Supreme Court has
explained, consolidating appellate
review in a single proceeding
subsequent to a final order avoids
unnecessary litigation and expense.
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‘‘Trial court errors become moot if the
aggrieved party nonetheless obtains a
final judgment in his favor, and
appellate courts need not waste time
familiarizing themselves anew with a
case each time a partial appeal is
taken.’’ Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 544 (1985). In contrast, the Court
explained in a later decision, ‘‘An
interlocutory appeal * * * risks
additional, and unnecessary, appellate
court work either when it presents
appellate courts with less developed
records or when it brings them appeals
that, had the trial simply proceeded,
would have turned out to be
unnecessary.’’ Johnson v. Jones, 515
U.S. 304, 309 (1995). Countless court of
appeals decisions contain the same
reasoning for limiting interlocutory
appeal. See, e.g., Armendariz v.
Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.
1996) (‘‘[P]iecemeal litigation * * *
risks the creation of unnecessary
appellate work by presenting issues for
review which could have been avoided
entirely if trial had proceeded.’’).
Relatively few comments took issue
with the proposed elimination of the
pre-election request for review, as noted
by SEIU in its reply comment. Those
that did—for example, SHRM, AHA,
and ACE—generally commented that in
cases where review would otherwise
have been granted, the proposed rule
would result in elections being run
unnecessarily, causing both the Board
and the parties to incur unnecessary
expense. The comments pose the
example of a regional director failing to
find a bar to the conduct of an election,
and thereby erroneously directing an
election. But this example aptly
illustrates the flaw in the argument.
Even under the current rules, if a
regional director finds no contract bar
and directs an election, and a party files
a request for review that the Board
grants, the election will typically be
held and the ballots impounded prior to
Board resolution of the issue. See, e.g.,
VFL Technology Corp., 329 NLRB 458,
458 (1999); Western Pipeline, Inc., 328
NLRB 925, 925 n.1 (1999). Thus, the
same expenses may be unnecessarily
incurred under current procedures. See,
e.g., Mercy General Health Partners
Amicare Homecare, 331 NLRB 783,
785–86 (2000) (Board directed that
impounded ballots not be counted and
that second election be held after ruling
on pre-election request for review postelection). Moreover, given the small
number of requests for review filed each
year, and the extraordinarily small
percentage of regional directors’
decisions that are ultimately
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reversed,140 the number of cases of the
type described in these comments is
likely to be insignificant. Finally, under
the final rule a party may file a request
for special permission to appeal and
request a stay under appropriate
circumstances.
Some comments argue that deferring
review of issues that were previously
raised in a pre-election request for
review until after the election will result
in the Board addressing more issues
subsequent to the opening of the
ballots.141 However, this is no different
from current practice when the regional
director and the Board rule on
challenged ballots or objections.
Moreover, it is a necessary correlate of
waiting to see if the dispute is rendered
moot by the election results. Thus, it is
parallel to the situation in appellate
courts that consider evidentiary and
other interlocutory rulings only as part
of an appeal from a final order, i.e.,
knowing how the case was decided.
Some comments contend that the
proposed rule will not expedite
commencement of bargaining but will
simply shift review until after the
election.142 The Board disagrees. In the
Board’s experience, many pre-election
disputes are either rendered moot by the
election results or can be resolved by
the parties after the election and
without litigation once the strategic
considerations related to the impending
election are removed from
consideration. Accordingly, the Board
believes that the current system is
inefficient and imposes unnecessary
costs on the parties and the government
by requiring parties to litigate, and the
Board to rule on, issues that are
frequently rendered moot by the
election results. In sum, the Board
believes that the final rule will not
simply shift litigation from before
elections to after, but rather will
significantly reduce the total amount of
litigation.
AHA comments that the Board’s own
failings in timely processing requests is
not a basis for eliminating the right of
parties to review. But the final rule does
not eliminate any party’s right to request
review. The rule simply eliminates the
obligation to request review pre-election
in order to preserve an issue, and
permits any issue that would previously
have been raised pre-election to be
raised through a single, more efficient,
post-election request for review.
140 From 2004 to 2009, review was granted
pursuant to less than 12 percent of requests, and
less than 5 percent of regional directors’ decisions
were reversed.
141 See, e.g., PIA; COLLE; ACE.
142 See, e.g., Testimony of Michael Prendergast;
AHA; Seyfarth Shaw.
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Moreover, if a party believes that preelection review is essential to preserve
an issue for review, it can file a request
for special permission to appeal.
Finally, the Board is entitled to and
must consider its own adjudicative and
administrative capacities and past
performance in evaluating its
procedural rules. The elimination of
pre-election request for review will, as
explained above, reduce the number of
disputes reaching the Board. The Board
will, therefore, be able to dispose of
those disputes that do reach it more
promptly.
Others suggest that limiting preelection review will mean that the
parties will be unsure who is a
supervisor during the pre-election
campaign.143 This objection is
addressed at length above in relation to
§ 102.66. But the current pre-election
review procedures do not entitle the
parties to a final Board determination on
such matters prior to the election and
rarely result in such a determination.
Even in the very rare cases where the
Board both grants review and rules on
the merits prior to the election, as
explained above, the ruling typically is
issued only days before the election, i.e.,
well into the critical period between
petition and election, and thus does not
serve the purpose the comments suggest
will be thwarted if the pre-election
request for review is eliminated.
Very few comments specifically object
to the elimination of the 25-day waiting
period. Indeed, there is near consensus
that this period serves little purpose.144
In support of the proposed rule, several
comments observe that parties typically
do not use the waiting period to request
review and that a single post-election
review process eliminates use of the
Board’s processes to achieve tactical
delays.145
Some comments, such as the hearing
testimony of Jay P. Krupin, maintain
that the 25-day period serves an
important purpose because the ‘‘rules of
the game’’ are not set until the decision
and direction of election, so the parties
are not sure which voters they need to
persuade or which employees can speak
on behalf of the employer until the
decision issues. However, the stated
purpose of the 25-day period is not to
give parties an opportunity to campaign.
Section 101.21(d) states only that the
25-day waiting period is ‘‘to permit the
143 See,
e.g., Testimony of Harold Weinrich.
Testimony of Professor Samuel Estreicher;
SEIU reply.
145 See Professor Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld;
Ranking Member George Miller and Democratic
Members of the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Education and Workforce; IBEW;
Thomas Meiklejohn.
144 See
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Board to rule on any request for review
which may be filed.’’ Moreover, the
concern raised in this comment is
addressed at length above in § 102.66.
Finally, the regional director retains
discretion to consider any significant
changes in the scope of the unit that
result from the decision and direction of
election in setting the election date.
A few comments observe that the
waiting period serves a purpose in the
small minority of cases where the Board
finds that a request for review has merit.
These comments suggest that a waiting
period would be appropriate where a
pre-election request for review is
actually filed. AHCA and ALFA suggest
an alternative to the proposed rule,
whereby the Board would ask parties
whether they intend to file a request for
review. If they answer affirmatively,
then and only then would the regional
director wait at least 25 days to hold the
election. If adopted, however, that
proposal would give parties the ability
to delay elections for tactical purposes.
Moreover, in many cases, the delay
would still be wholly unnecessary when
the issue raised in the pre-election
request for review is rendered moot by
the election results. Finally, even where
a request for review is granted and
eventually found to have merit, there is
little reason that the request should be
filed pre-election or that the election
should be delayed so that the Board can
consider it, because the election almost
always proceeds using the vote-andimpound procedures before the Board’s
decision on the merits issues.
Some comments argue that the
elimination of the 25-day waiting
period, combined with other proposed
amendments, interferes with employers’
right to free speech under Section 8(c)
of the Act and the First Amendment and
undermines the free discussion of the
question of representation essential to
employee free choice. As explained
above, these objections have little
continuing relevance now that the
Board has determined to deliberate
further about several of the other
proposed amendments. To the extent
the objections still have force, they are
addressed at length above in Section III,
D.
Sec. 102.69 Election Procedure; Tally
of Ballots; Objections; Certification by
the Regional Director; Requests for
Review of Directions of Elections;
Hearings; Hearing Officer Reports on
Objections and Challenges; Exceptions
to Hearing Officer Reports; Requests for
Review of Regional Director Decisions
in Stipulated or Directed Elections
In the NPRM, the Board proposed to
amend § 102.69 to (1) require that a
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80173
party filing objections simultaneously
file a description of the evidence
supporting its objections, (2) require
that the regional director set any hearing
on determinative challenged ballots or
objections to begin 14 days after the
tally or as soon thereafter as practicable,
(3) codify the regional director’s
discretion to dispose of both
determinative challenges and objections
through an investigation without a
hearing when they raise no substantial
and material factual issues, (4) establish
a uniform procedure when a hearing is
conducted, and (5) make Board review
of regional directors’ post-election
dispositions discretionary. The final
rule adopts proposals (3), (4), and (5).
The final rule codifies existing
practice permitting the regional director
to investigate determinative challenges
and objections by examining evidence
offered in support thereof to determine
if a hearing is warranted.146 The final
rule also creates a uniform procedure in
those cases in which there are
potentially outcome-determinative
challenges or objections which the
regional director determines raise
substantial and material factual issues
that require a hearing. Adopting the
procedure currently contained in
§ 102.69(d) and (e), the final rule
provides that, in such cases, the regional
director shall provide for a hearing
before a hearing officer who shall, after
such hearing, issue a report containing
recommendations as to the disposition
of the issues. Within 14 days after
issuance of such a report, any party may
file exceptions with the regional
director and the regional director will
dispose of the exceptions. If no
exceptions are filed to such report, the
146 At least one comment argues that the
amendments improperly permit regional directors
to administratively dismiss objections without a
hearing, thereby denying parties the right to a
hearing and the ability to create a record for
subsequent review. However, regional directors
may administratively dismiss objections and
challenges without a hearing under the current
rules where they do not raise substantial and
material issues that would warrant setting aside the
election. 29 CFR 102.69(d). This well-settled
practice avoids wasteful litigation, is no different
from a trial court granting a motion to dismiss, and
has been approved by the courts of appeals. See
NLRB v. Bata Shoe Co., 377 F.2d 821, 826 (4th Cir.
1967); NLRB v. Air Control Products of St.
Petersburg, Inc., 335 F.2d 245, 249 (5th Cir. 1964);
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. EPA, 35 F.
3d 600, 605–06 (1st Cir. 1994) (‘‘To force an agency
fully to adjudicate a dispute that is patently
frivolous, or that can be resolved in only one way,
or that can have no bearing on the disposition of
the case, would be mindless * * *.’’); Fenn C.
Horton III, The Requirements of Due Process in the
Resolution of Objections to NLRB Representation
Elections, 10 J. Corp. L. 493, 495–509 (1985). The
amendments specify in § 102.69(e) what constitutes
the record in such no-hearing cases, just as they
specify what constitutes the record in cases that
proceed to a hearing.
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regional director decides the matter
upon the expiration of the period for
filing such exceptions. Consistent with
the changes described above in relation
to § 102.62(b), the final rule makes
Board review of regional directors’
resolutions of post-election disputes
discretionary in cases involving directed
elections as well as those involving
stipulated elections, unless challenges
and objections are consolidated with
unfair labor practice charges for hearing
before an administrative law judge.147
The Board anticipates that this change
will leave a higher percentage of final
decisions concerning disputes arising
out of representation proceedings with
the Board’s regional directors, who are
members of the career civil service.
Finally, the amendments clarify in
§ 102.69(e)(1)(ii) that in a proceeding
conducted pursuant to § 102.69 in
which no hearing is held, the record
will include any decision and direction
of election and the record previously
made as defined in § 102.68. As
discussed above, pursuant to the
amendments to § 102.69, parties may
file requests for review of the regional
director’s decision and direction of
election after the election, but the
timing depends on whether there are
also objections and challenges. In a case
involving objections or determinative
challenges, the request for review is due
14 days after the regional director issues
his decision resolving them. Section
102.69(g)(1)(i) currently provides that in
cases where a hearing is held on
objections and challenges, the record
includes the record previously made as
defined in § 102.68. Absent objections
and challenges, the amendments
provide that the request for review of
the decision and direction of election is
due 14 days after the tally of ballots is
prepared. Because there may be no post-
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147 The
final rule clarifies that when objections
and challenges have been consolidated with an
unfair labor practice proceeding for purposes of
hearing and the election was conducted pursuant to
a stipulated election agreement or a direction of
election, (1) any request for review of the regional
director’s decision and direction of election is due
within 14 days after issuance of the administrative
law judge’s decision; and (2) the provisions of
§ 102.46 shall govern with respect to the filing of
exceptions or an answering brief to the exceptions
to the administrative law judge’s decision. The final
rule also clarifies that if the election was conducted
pursuant to a consent or full consent agreement,
and the objections and challenges have been
consolidated with an unfair labor practice
proceeding for purposes of hearing, the
administrative law judge shall, after issuing his
decision, sever the representation case and transfer
it to the regional director for further processing, as
is done currently.
The final rule uses the single term, ‘‘decision,’’
to describe the regional director’s disposition of
challenges and/or objections in place of the two
terms, ‘‘report’’ and ‘‘decision,’’ used in the current
rules.
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election hearing, either because there
were no objections or determinative
challenges or because the director
disposed of them without a hearing, the
amendments clarify in § 102.69(e)(1)(ii)
that if a party files a request for review
of the decision and direction of election
but no post-election hearing on
objections and challenges is held, the
record will similarly include the
decision and direction of election and
the record made at the pre-election
hearing as defined in § 102.68.
Some comments question whether the
Board will resolve nondeterminative
challenges post-election. The final rule
maintains the status quo in this regard:
the Board will not address
nondeterminative challenge ballots at a
post-election hearing, though parties
may bring the matter to the Board by
filing a timely unit clarification petition
if they are unable to resolve the
resulting question of whether particular
employees are in the bargaining unit
(‘‘unit placement’’ questions) by
agreement. See, e.g., Orson E. Coe
Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 328 NLRB
688, 688 n.1 (1999):
AHA argues that permitting parties to
resolve such issues in bargaining is
‘‘disrespectful’’ of employee Section 7
rights because it makes eligibility a
‘‘bargaining chip.’’ Yet, as many of the
comments in support of the
amendments indicate, parties currently
engage in precisely such bargaining
regarding the inclusion or exclusion of
particular individuals and
classifications before the election, when
they negotiate an election agreement
defining the appropriate unit, and after
the election, when they often resolve
both determinative and
nondeterminative challenges by
agreement.148 In relation to AHA’s
concern that deferring such matters to
bargaining runs counter to the goal of
promoting labor peace, the Board
believes that labor peace is more likely
to be promoted if parties are permitted
to voluntarily resolve their differences,
particularly when the parties remain
free to bring a timely unit clarification
petition before the Board if they do not
reach agreement.
Many comments criticize the proposal
to make Board review of regional
directors’ post-election determinations
discretionary in cases involving directed
elections. These comments are fully
addressed above in relation to § 102.62.
Bluegrass Institute suggests, however,
that the 20-percent rule renders
discretionary Board review of the
regional directors’ post-election
determinations inappropriate. It argues
that the Board’s current rules guarantee
parties Board review of eligibility
questions deferred in the pre-election
decision, and therefore the provision
making Board review of the director’s
post-election determinations
discretionary constitutes a material
change. The Board disagrees. Under the
final rule, if eligibility disputes are
deferred using the vote-and-challenge
procedures, the hearing officer’s
recommendations on determinative
challenges will in all cases be subject to
exceptions to the director, and a party
may thereafter file a request for review
with the Board. This parallels how such
matters are handled under the current
rules when a hearing officer’s
recommendations go to the director.
Thus, Section 11366.2 of the Board’s
Casehandling Manual provides with
respect to challenges to voters in the
context of a directed election, ‘‘If the
Regional Director directs that the
hearing officer’s recommendations be
made to the Regional Director, then
exceptions to the hearing officer’s report
will be filed with him/her * * *. The
Regional Director must thereafter rule in
a supplemental decision upon the
hearing officer’s report and such
exceptions as may be filed. The
Regional Director’s supplemental
decision is subject to a request for
review to the Board.’’ 149 Moreover,
under the current rules, if a regional
director resolves eligibility questions on
the merits in his or her decision and
direction of election, the parties are able
to challenge the decision only by filing
a request for review with the Board. The
comment does not explain why a party
should have a greater right to Board
review if the regional director decides
148 Even after certification, the scope of the
bargaining unit remains a permissible subject of
bargaining. See The Idaho Statesman v. NLRB, 836
F.2d 1396, 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
149 It is only when regional directors direct that
hearing officer reports go to the Board that parties
currently have the right to Board review. See
Casehandling Manual Section 11366.2.
Under standard Board practice, when a
classification of employees votes under
challenge and their challenged ballots would
not be determinative of the election results,
the ensuing certification contains a footnote
to the effect that they are neither included
nor excluded. Casehandling Manual section
11474. Even though there was no occasion to
resolve the issue in a ballot challenge
hearing, the issue need not stay unresolved.
If the parties do not subsequently agree on
whether to add the car prep/finisher
technician to the unit, the matter can be
resolved in a timely invoked unit
clarification proceeding. See Kirkhill Rubber
Co., 306 NLRB 559 (1992); NLRB v.
Dickerson-Chapman, Inc., 964 F.2d 493, 496–
497, 500 fn. 7 (5th Cir. 1992).
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eligibility questions after the election
than if the regional director decides
them prior to the election, and the final
rule corrects this anomaly.
Citing Member Hayes’ dissent to the
NPRM, PIA and others argue that the
deferral of litigation from the preelection phase to the post-election phase
is likely to lengthen the period between
the election and final certification,
which will lengthen the period during
which the employer is uncertain
whether it can unilaterally change its
employees’ working conditions. See
Mike O’Connor Chevrolet, 209 NLRB
701, 703 (1974). As shown, however, the
Board believes that the final rule will
not simply shift litigation from before
the election to after the election. Rather,
the Board believes that the amendments
will significantly reduce the total
amount of litigation, because the current
rules require parties to litigate issues
that are often rendered moot by the
election results. Moreover, the Board
anticipates that permitting it to deny
review of regional directors’ resolution
of post-election disputes, i.e., when a
party’s request raises no compelling
grounds for granting such review, will
eliminate the most significant source of
administrative delay in the finality of
election results. The Board anticipates
that the final rule will thus reduce the
period of time between the tally of votes
and certification of the results and thus
the period during which employers are
uncertain about their duty to bargain.
Subparts D and E, §§ 102.73 Through
102.88, Procedures for Unfair Labor
Practice and Representation Cases
Under Sec. 8(b)(7) and 9(c) of the Act
and Procedures for Referendum Under
Sec. 9(e) of the Act
The amendments in these two
subparts merely conform their
provisions to the amendments in
Subpart C described above.
V. Comments on Other Statutory
Requirements
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A. The Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980
(‘‘RFA’’), 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., requires
agencies promulgating proposed rules to
prepare an initial and final regulatory
flexibility analysis and to develop
alternatives, wherever possible, when
the regulations will have a significant
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The purpose of the RFA is to
ensure that agencies ‘‘review rules to
assess and take appropriate account of
the potential impact on small
businesses, small governmental
jurisdictions, and small organizations,
as provided by the [RFA].’’ E.O. 13272,
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67 FR 53461 (‘‘Proper Consideration of
Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking’’).
An agency is not required to prepare an
initial regulatory flexibility analysis or a
final regulatory flexibility analysis for a
proposed rule if the agency head
certifies that the rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
5 U.S.C. 605(b).150 To so certify, the
agency must publish the certification in
the Federal Register and include ‘‘a
statement providing the factual basis for
such certification.’’ Id. Based on the
factual statement and analysis below,
the Board concludes that the final rule
will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. Accordingly, the Board’s
Chairman has certified to the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration (‘‘SBA’’) that
the proposed amendments will not have
a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
The RFA does not define either
‘‘significant economic impact’’ or
‘‘substantial’’ as it relates to the number
of regulated entities. 5 U.S.C. 601. In the
absence of specific definitions, ‘‘what is
‘significant’ or ‘substantial’ will vary
depending on the problem that needs to
be addressed, the rule’s requirements,
and the preliminary assessment of the
rule’s impact. The agency is in the best
position to gauge the small entity
impacts of its regulation.’’ SBA Office of
Advocacy, ‘‘A Guide for Government
Agencies: How to Comply with the
Regulatory Flexibility Act’’ at 17
(available at https://www.sba.gov/sites/
default/files/rfaguide.pdf) (‘‘SBA
Guide’’).
The Board determined that the
proposed rule would not have an impact
on a substantial number of small entities
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
76 FR 36833–34. The same is true for
the final rule. According to the United
States Census Bureau, there were
approximately 6 million businesses in
the United States with employees in
2007. Of those, the Small Business
Administration’s Office of Advocacy
estimates that all but some 18,300 were
small businesses with fewer than 500
employees.151 Nearly all of those
150 The RFA requires analysis of a final agency
rule only where notice and comment rulemaking
was required. 5 U.S.C. 604(a). As explained above,
the final rule is a procedural rule for which notice
and comment rulemaking was not required under
the APA, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A). Therefore, no
analysis under the RFA need be performed.
Nevertheless, the Board chose to undertake the
threshold analysis contemplated by Section 605 of
the RFA.
151 U.S. Small Business Administration, FAQs,
https://web.sba.gov/faqs (select ‘‘Advocacy Small
Business Statistics and Research’’) (SBA Office of
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5,981,700 small employers are subject to
the Board’s jurisdiction.152 However,
the Board concludes that the final rule
will not have an impact on the vast
majority of the small employers because
only entities that are actually parties to
representation proceedings under the
NLRA are subject to the rule. Fewer
than 4,000 representation proceedings
were initiated during each of the past
five years, and the Board has conducted
fewer than 2,500 elections during each
of those years.153 Thus, between 2006
and 2010, the final rule would have
applied to fewer than 4,000 small
entities per year.154 The Board believes
that this pattern will continue into the
foreseeable future. The final rule is thus
likely to have an impact on fewer than
4,000 small entities per year, which is
less than one-tenth of one percent of the
small employers in the country.155
Moreover, the affected entities are not
concentrated in one or a few sectors, but
are distributed among every sector and
industry subject to the Board’s
jurisdiction.156 Because one-tenth of one
Advocacy estimates based on data from the U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
and trends from the U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Business Employment
Dynamics).
152 The principal private sector employers exempt
from the Board’s jurisdiction are employers of
agricultural laborers and firms covered by the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151. See 29 U.S.C.
152(2) & (3). Employers whose connection to
interstate commerce is so slight that they do not
satisfy the Board’s discretionary jurisdictional
standards are also treated as exempt. See 29 U.S.C.
164(c); NLRB, An Outline of Law and Procedure in
Representation Cases, https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/44/rc_outline_2008_full.
pdf.
153 See NLRB Graphs & Data, Petitions and
Elections, https://www.nlrb.gov/graphs-data
(including charts documenting that the total
number of election petitions filed between the years
of 2006 and 2010 is 3359, 3064, 3170, 2725, and
2977 and the total number of elections is 2159,
1913, 1938, 1621, and 1817).
154 Although the number of petitions has
fluctuated over the last 10 years, rising to as many
as 5,347 in 2002, even that number constitutes only
a very small percentage of the total number of small
entities, and so would also fail to reach the
significant number threshold in the statute. See id.
155 CNLP comments that the Board failed to
properly define small entities. It argues that the
median size of petitioned-for units is 23–26
employees, and therefore half of the Board’s
elections involve employers with 25 or fewer
employees. But a unit does not necessarily and does
not typically include all the employees of the
employer. Moreover, CNLP misunderstands the
proper inquiry for certification under the RFA. The
question is whether the rule has a significant
impact on a substantial number of small entities,
not whether most of the entities so affected (no
matter how few in number) are small entities.
Finally, the Board has used an extremely inclusive
definition of small entity, including all employers
not excluded by the Small Business
Administration’s definition.
156 Following the recommendation of the SBA
Office of Advocacy, the Board identified the total
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percent of small entities is not a
substantial number of small entities, the
Board concludes that the final rule will
not impact a substantial number of
small entities within the meaning of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act.
In response to the Board’s proposed
rule, some of the comments argue that
the rule would affect many more than
the approximately 4,000 small entities
estimated by the Board. The comments
argue that the rule imposes burdens on
all employers, because each must, for
example, read and understand the rules,
train human resources and management
staff concerning the rules, educate their
employees about the rules, and find or
hire labor counsel to provide advice
concerning the rules. Comments of this
type were submitted by the Chamber,
NAM, and NRF, among others. NAM
also opined that the rule will lead to
increased numbers of election petitions,
and NRF posited that the rule would
change employers’ typical reactive
approach to election petitions to
proactive employee education about
unionization.
The Board disagrees with these
comments. First, the comments are
based primarily on elements of the
proposed rule not adopted in the final
rule. Thus, the final rule does not
impose any reporting or recordkeeping
requirements on employers. Second, the
RFA does not require an agency to
consider these types of speculative and
wholly discretionary employer
expenditures. Rather, the RFA requires
an agency to consider the direct burden
that compliance with a new regulation
will likely impose on small entities. See
Mid-Tex Elec. Co-op v. FERC, 773 F.2d
327, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (‘‘[I]t is clear
that Congress envisioned that the
relevant ‘economic impact’ as the
impact of compliance with the proposed
rule on regulated small entities’’);
accord White Eagle Co-op. Ass’n v.
Conner, 553 F.3d 467, 478 (7th Cir.
2009); Colorado State Banking Bd. v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 926 F.2d 931,
948 (10th Cir. 1991). This construction
of the RFA is supported by Section 603
of the RFA, which lists the items to be
included in an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis (if one is required).
number of affected employers within each industry
using the NAICS categories. In no category did the
percentage of affected employers rise above half of
one percent. In the largest category, utilities, only
0.28 percent of all employers were parties to a
representation proceeding. See Seventy Fourth
Annual Report of the NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/119/nlrb2009.pdf
(NLRB data); U.S. Census Bureau, North American
Industry Classification System. https://
censtats.census.gov/cbpnaic/cbpnaic.shtml (select
‘‘United States’’ in the first drop down box for
national data).
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Section 603 states that such an analysis
‘‘shall describe the impact of the
proposed rule on small entities.’’
5 U.S.C. 603(a). And Section 603(b)
describes the ‘‘impact’’ by stating that
‘‘[e]ach initial regulatory flexibility
analysis * * * shall contain * * * a
description of the projected reporting,
recordkeeping and other compliance
requirements of the proposed rule,
including an estimate of the classes of
small entities which will be subject to
the requirement and the type of
professional skills necessary for
preparation of the report or record[.]’’
5 U.S.C. 603(b)(4) (emphasis added).
Section 604 further corroborates the
Board’s conclusion, as it contains an
identical list of requirements for a final
regulatory analysis (if one is required).
5 U.S.C. 604(a)(4). Guidance from the
Small Business Administration also
supports this construction of the RFA
because it cites only direct, compliancebased costs as examples of financial
burdens that agencies must consider:
(a) Capital costs for equipment needed to
meet the regulatory requirements; (b) costs of
modifying existing processes and procedures
to comply with the proposed rule; (c) lost
sales and profits resulting from the proposed
rule; (d) changes in market competition as a
result of the proposed rule and its impact on
small entities or specific submarkets of small
entities; (e) extra costs associated with the
payment of taxes or fees associated with the
proposed rule; and (f) hiring employees
dedicated to compliance with regulatory
requirements.
SBA Guide at 34.
Thus, nothing in the RFA, its prior
construction, or SBA guidance suggests
that the Board must consider the
speculative and wholly discretionary
expenditures that an employer which is
not party to a representation proceeding
may choose to incur. Instead, the
‘‘impact’’ analysis required under the
RFA must consider only direct
compliance costs. The final rule
imposes no such costs on small entities
not party to a representation proceeding.
There will be no ‘‘reporting,
recordkeeping and other compliance
requirements’’ for these small entities.
See 5 U.S.C. 603(b)(4) & 604(a)(4). And
the final rule imposes on them no
mandatory capital costs, mandatory
costs of modifying existing processes,
no costs of lost sales or profits, and no
costs of changed market competition.
SBA Guide at 34. For small entities not
party to representation proceedings,
there are no costs associated with taxes
or fees and no costs for additional
employees dedicated to compliance, as
no compliance requirements exist. Id.
Finally, there is no reason why a small
entity not party to a representation
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proceeding would hire or otherwise
retain employees dedicated to
compliance with the final rule any more
than it would have done so under the
prior rules. Of course, employers may
train their managerial and supervisory
staff and educate their employees as
they wish, but compliance with the final
rule does not require such action.157 For
all of these reasons, the Board reaffirms
its certification on the grounds that the
final rule will not have an impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
Moreover, even if the Board assumed
that the final rule would have an impact
on a substantial number of small
entities, the final rule will not have a
significant economic impact within the
meaning of 5 U.S.C. 605(b). 76 FR
36833–34.
In the NPRM, the Board explained,
‘‘the Board estimates that the net effect
of the proposed amendments could be
to decrease costs for small entities.
While certain of the proposed
amendments—when viewed in
isolation—could result in small cost
increases, those costs should be more
than offset by the many efficiencies in
the Board’s representation procedures
created by the proposed amendments.’’
76 FR 36833. The final rule adopts none
of the proposed amendments that could
have resulted in small cost increases for
parties to representation proceedings.
Therefore, as shown below, each of the
amendments adopted in the final rule
will either reduce the cost of being a
party to a representation proceeding or
have no economic impact on such
parties.
First, the final rule amends § 102.64
in order to expressly construe Section
9(c) of the NLRA and state that the
statutory purpose of a pre-election
hearing is to determine if a question of
representation exists. That amendment
has no economic impact except in
relation to the amendment of
§ 102.66(a), infra.
Second, the final rule amends
§ 102.66(a) and eliminates § 101.20(c)
(along with all of Part 101, Subpart C)
in order to ensure that hearing officers
presiding over pre-election hearings
have the authority to limit the
presentation of evidence to that
supporting a party’s contentions and
relevant to the existence of a question
157 The Chamber states that it does ‘‘not know
how many employers would undertake such
[education] efforts.’’ Other similar comments also
lack factual support, including NRF’s assertion that
this rule will require employers to preemptively
educate their employees. Similarly, the suggestion
of COLLE, that the Board must prove that
employers will not engage in additional training in
response to the final rule, is misguided, because any
such activity would be undertaken voluntarily and
is not required by the final rule.
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concerning representation. These
amendments will lower the cost of
participating in representation
proceedings by reducing litigation at the
pre-election hearing. While some
disputes that would have been litigated
at the pre-election hearing will still be
litigated at the post-election hearing,
many will be rendered moot by the
results of the election or resolved by the
parties once they are free of the tactical
consideration of the impending election.
Third, the final rule amends
§ 102.66(d) to afford hearing officers
presiding over pre-election hearings
discretion over the filing of post-hearing
briefs, including over the subjects
addressed and the time for filing.
Presenting oral argument in lieu of a
post-hearing brief will reduce the cost of
participating in representation
proceedings.
Fourth, the final rule amends
§§ 102.67 and 102.69 to eliminate the
requirement that parties’ file a preelection request for review of a regional
director’s decision and direction of
election in order to preserve issues for
review, and defer all requests for Board
review until after the election, when any
such request can be consolidated with a
request for review of any post-election
rulings. Because many issues
concerning which parties would
previously have filed a pre-election
request for review are rendered moot by
the election results and because, even
when they are not, filing a single
consolidated request for review when a
party wishes to seek review concerning
both pre- and post-election rulings
results in efficiencies, eliminating the
pre-election request for review will
reduce the cost of participating in
representation proceedings.
Fifth, the final rule eliminates the
regulatory direction in § 101.21(d)
(again, along with all of Part 101,
Subpart C) that the regional director
should ordinarily not schedule an
election sooner than 25 days after the
decision and direction of election in
order to give the Board an opportunity
to rule on a pre-election request for
review. This will have no direct impact
on the cost of participating in
representation proceedings.
Sixth, the final rule amends § 102.65
to make explicit and to narrow the
circumstances under which a request for
special permission to appeal to the
Board will be granted. For the same
reasons explained above in relation to
eliminating the pre-election request for
review, limiting this form of
interlocutory appeal will reduce the cost
of participating in representation
proceedings.
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Seventh, the final rule amends
§§ 102.62(b) and 102.69 to create a
uniform procedure for resolving
potentially outcome-determinative
challenges and election objections in
stipulated and directed election cases
and to provide that Board review of
regional directors’ resolution of such
disputes is discretionary. This will have
no direct impact on the cost of
participating in representation
proceedings.
Eighth, the final rule eliminates
redundant part 101, subpart C of its
regulations. This will have no direct
impact on the cost of participating in
representation proceedings.
The remainder of the final rule’s
amendments conform other sections of
the Board’s Rules and Regulations to the
eight amendments described above.
This will have no direct impact on the
cost of participating in representation
proceedings.
The Chamber asserts that the Board
failed to calculate the costs of
compliance with the proposed rule with
sufficient particularity. The Chamber’s
comment focuses on the costs of the
proposed notice posting, completion of
the statement-of-position form, and the
shortening of certain deadlines within
the representation case process. It
suggests that these costs would
constitute a significant economic
impact. The comment does not include
numerical estimates of such costs, and,
in any event, the final rule largely does
not adopt the proposals pointed to in
the Chamber’s comment. Moreover,
under the RFA Section 607, ‘‘an agency
may provide * * * more general
descriptive statements if quantification
is not practicable or reliable.’’ 158
Administrative guidance explains that,
‘‘[s]uch a standard is not required for
section 605 certifications, but some
agencies use section 607 as a model for
preparing certifications.’’ 159 Because
quantification was not practical or
reliable in relation to most of the
proposed amendments, the Board
followed § 607 and provided a general
descriptive statement in the NPRM and
has done the same here.
For the two separate reasons
explained above, the Board concludes
the final rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
In the NPRM, the Board explained
that the ‘‘proposed amendments would
158 5 U.S.C. 607; see also Alenco
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608, 625
(5th Cir. 2000).
159 SBA Guide, supra, at 10 n. 34.
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80177
not impose any information collection
requirements’’ and, accordingly, the
proposed amendments ‘‘are not subject
to the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA),
44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.’’ No substantive
comments were received relevant to the
Board’s analysis of its obligations under
the PRA.
The final rule does not adopt any of
the proposed amendments regarding the
contents of petitions, notice postings,
the statement of position, or employee
or eligibility lists, and so there are no
longer any even arguable information
collection requirements in the final rule.
The Board therefore concludes that the
final rule is not subject to the PRA.
C. Congressional Review Act
This rule is not a major rule as
defined by Section 804 of the Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996 (Congressional
Review Act). This rule will not result in
an annual effect on the economy of $100
million or more, a major increase in
costs or prices, or significant adverse
effects on competition, employment,
investment, productivity, innovation, or
on the ability of United States-based
companies to compete with foreignbased companies in domestic and
export markets. The Board has, in any
event, determined that the effective date
of the rule will be 120 days after the rule
is published in the Federal Register.
VI. Statement of the General Course of
Proceedings Under Section 9(c) of the
Act
A. Representation Case Petitions
Petitions may be filed in
representation cases for many different
reasons. For example, a union may file
a petition for certification because it
seeks to become the collectivebargaining representative of an
employer’s employees. An employer
may file a petition to determine the
majority status of the union demanding
recognition as the representative of the
employer’s employees. If there is
already a certified or currently
recognized representative, an employee
may file a decertification petition to
oust the incumbent representative. Or, a
party may file a petition for clarification
of the bargaining unit or for amendment
to reflect changed circumstances, such
as changes in the incumbent
representative’s name or affiliation.
Petition forms are available on the
Board’s Web site and in the Board’s
regional offices. The petition must be in
writing and signed, and must either be
notarized or contain a declaration by the
person signing it, under the penalties of
the Criminal Code, that its contents are
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true and correct to the best of his or her
knowledge and belief. The petition is
filed with the regional director for the
regional office in which the proposed or
actual bargaining unit exists. Petition
forms provide, among other things, for
a description of the contemplated or
existing appropriate bargaining unit, the
approximate number of employees
involved, and the names of all labor
organizations that claim to represent the
employees. A petitioner seeking
certification as the collective-bargaining
representative or seeking to decertify an
incumbent representative must supply,
within 48 hours after filing but in no
event later than the last day on which
the petition might timely be filed,
evidence of employee interest in an
election. Such evidence is usually in the
form of cards, which must be dated,
authorizing the labor organization to
represent the employees or authorizing
the petitioner to file a decertification
petition. If a petition is filed by an
employer, the petitioner must supply,
within 48 hours after filing, proof of a
demand for recognition by the labor
organization named in the petition and,
in the event the labor organization
named is the incumbent representative
of the unit involved, a statement of the
objective considerations demonstrating
reasonable grounds for believing that
the labor organization has lost its
majority status.
The petitioner may file the petition by
fax, by mail, or in person at one of the
NLRB’s regional offices.
B. Pre-Hearing Withdrawals and
Dismissals; Notice of Hearing
Upon receipt of the petition in the
Regional Office, it is docketed and
assigned to a Board agent to investigate
(1) whether the employer’s operations
affect commerce within the meaning of
the Act, (2) the existence of a bona fide
question concerning representation in a
unit of employees appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of the Act, (3) whether the
election would effectuate the policies of
the Act and reflect the free choice of
employees in the appropriate unit, and
(4) whether, if the petitioner is a labor
organization seeking recognition or an
employee seeking decertification of an
incumbent representative, there is
sufficient evidence of employee interest
in an election. The evidence of interest
submitted by the petitioning labor
organization or by the person seeking
decertification is ordinarily checked to
determine the number or proportion of
employees who have demonstrated
interest, it being the Board’s
administrative experience that in the
absence of special factors the conduct of
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an election serves no purpose under the
statute unless the petitioner has
demonstrated interest among at least 30
percent of the employees. However, in
the case of a petition by an employer,
no proof of representation on the part of
the labor organization claiming a
majority is required, and the regional
director proceeds with the case if other
factors require it unless the labor
organization withdraws its claim to
majority representation. The Board
agent attempts to ascertain from all
interested parties whether the grouping
or unit of employees described in the
petition constitutes an appropriate
bargaining unit. The petition may be
amended at any time prior to hearing
and may be amended during the hearing
in the discretion of the hearing officer
upon such terms as he or she deems
just.
The petitioner may request to
withdraw its petition if the investigation
discloses, for example, that the
petitioner lacks an adequate showing of
interest. The regional director may
request that the petitioner withdraw the
petition if further processing at that time
is inappropriate because, for example, a
written contract covering the petitionedfor unit is currently in effect. If, despite
the regional director’s
recommendations, the petitioner refuses
to withdraw the petition, the regional
director may dismiss it. The petitioner
may within 14 days request review of
the regional director’s dismissal by
filing such request with the Board in
Washington, DC; if it accepts review, the
Board may sustain the dismissal, stating
the grounds of its affirmance, or may
direct the regional director to take
further action.
If, however, the regional director
determines that the petition and
supporting documentation establish
reasonable cause to believe that a
question of representation affecting
commerce exists and that the policies of
the Act will be effectuated, then the
regional director issues a notice of a preelection hearing at a time and place
fixed therein to the parties named in the
petition. Along with the notice of
hearing, the regional director serves a
copy of the petition on the unions and
employer filing or named in the petition
and on other known persons or labor
organizations claiming to have been
designated by employees involved in
the proceeding.
C. Voluntary Election Agreements
Elections can occur either by
agreement of the parties or by direction
of the regional director or the Board. In
many cases, the parties, with Board
agent assistance, are able to reach
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agreement regarding the election details,
thereby eliminating the need for the
regional director or the Board to issue a
formal decision and direction of
election. By entering into an election
agreement, the parties may, depending
upon when the agreement is reached,
avoid the time and expense of
participating in a hearing.
The Board has devised and makes
available to the parties three types of
informal voluntary procedures through
which representation issues can be
resolved without recourse to formal
procedures. Forms for use in these
informal procedures are available in the
regional offices. One type of informal
procedure is the consent election
agreement with final regional
determination of post-election disputes.
Here, the parties agree with respect to
the appropriate unit, the payroll period
to be used in determining which
employees in the appropriate unit shall
be eligible to vote in the election, and
the type, place, date, and hours of
balloting. The consent election is
conducted under the direction and
supervision of the regional director.
This form of agreement provides that
the rulings of the regional director on all
questions relating to the election, such
as the validity of challenges and
objections, are final and binding. The
regional director issues to the parties a
certification of the results of the
election, including a certification of
representative where appropriate, with
the same force and effect as if issued by
the Board.
A second type of informal procedure
is commonly referred to as the
stipulated election agreement with
discretionary Board review. Like the
consent agreement above, the parties
agree on the unit, payroll period to be
used in determining voter eligibility,
and election details, but provide that
they may request Board review of the
regional director’s resolution of postelection disputes. The stipulated
election is conducted under the
direction and supervision of the
regional director.
The third type of informal procedure
is referred to as the full consent-election
agreement with final regional director
determination of pre- and post-election
disputes. Here, the parties agree that all
pre-election and post-election disputes
will be resolved with finality by the
regional director. For example, the
parties agree that if they are unable to
informally resolve disputes arising with
respect to the appropriate unit or other
election details, those issues will be
presented to, and decided with finality
by, the regional director after a hearing.
Upon the close of the hearing, the entire
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record in the case is forwarded to the
regional director. After review of the
record, the regional director issues a
final decision, either dismissing the
petition or directing that an election be
held. In the latter event, the election is
conducted under the supervision of the
regional director. Similarly, all matters
arising after the election, including
determinative challenged ballots and
objections to the conduct of the election,
are decided with finality by the regional
director. The regional director issues to
the parties a certification of the results
of the election, including certifications
of representative where appropriate,
with the same force and effect as if
issued by the Board.
D. Formal hearing
If the parties have not entered into a
voluntary election agreement, a hearing
must be held to determine if a question
of representation affecting commerce
exists before a regional director or the
Board may direct an election to resolve
that question. The regional director may
at any time transfer the case to the
Board for decision, but until such action
is taken, it will be presumed that the
regional director will decide the case. In
the event the regional director decides
the issues in a case, the decision is final
subject to the review procedure set forth
in the Board’s Rules and Regulations.
The hearing, usually open to the
public, is held before a hearing officer
who normally is an attorney or field
examiner attached to the regional office
but may be another qualified agency
employee. The hearing, which is
nonadversary in character, is part of the
investigation in which the primary
interest of the hearing officer is to
ensure that the record contains as full a
statement of the pertinent facts as may
be necessary for determination of
whether a question of representation
exists. A question of representation
exists if a petition as described in
Section 9(c) of the Act has been filed
concerning a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining or, in
the case of a petition filed under Section
9(c)(1)(A)(ii), concerning a unit in
which an individual or labor
organization has been certified or is
being currently recognized by the
employer as the bargaining
representative. Disputes concerning
individuals’ eligibility to vote or
inclusion in an appropriate unit
ordinarily need not be litigated or
resolved before an election is
conducted. Each party is afforded full
opportunity to present its respective
positions and to prove the significant
facts supporting its positions, so long as
the evidence a party seeks to introduce
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supports its contentions and is relevant
to the existence of a question of
representation or a bar to an election. In
most cases a substantial number of the
relevant facts are undisputed and
stipulated.
Any objection with respect to the
conduct of the hearing, including any
objection to the introduction of
evidence, may be stated orally or in
writing, accompanied by a short
statement of the grounds of such
objection, and included in the record.
No such objection is waived by further
participation in the hearing. A party
need not seek special permission to
appeal a hearing officer’s ruling to
preserve an issue for review after the
election. The filing of a request for
special permission to appeal does not
stay an election and does not result in
impounding of ballots unless
specifically ordered by the Board.
At the close of the hearing, parties are
permitted to make oral arguments on the
record. Parties are permitted to file posthearing briefs only with special
permission of the hearing officer. The
hearing officer specifies the time for
filing such briefs, and may limit the
subjects to be addressed in post-hearing
briefs. If the regional director transfers
the case to the Board for decision,
parties may file post-hearing briefs with
the permission of the Board.
Upon the close of the hearing, the
entire record in the case is forwarded to
the regional director or, upon issuance
by the regional director of an order
transferring the case, to the Board in
Washington, DC. The hearing officer
also transmits an analysis of the issues
and the evidence, but makes no
recommendations in regard to
resolution of the issues.
E. Regional Director Pre-Election
Determinations; Requests for Review
After the pre-election hearing closes,
the regional director may proceed to
review the record of the hearing and any
post-hearing briefs to determine
whether a question of representation
affecting commerce exists concerning a
unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining or, in the
decertification context, concerning a
unit with an incumbent representative.
The regional director may decide either
to direct an election, dismiss the
petition, or reopen the hearing. Or, in
cases involving novel or complex issues,
the regional director may transfer the
case to the Board for decision. In that
event, the record is forwarded to the
Board, and if the Board directs an
election, the election is held under the
supervision of the regional director in
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the same manner as if the regional
director had directed the election.
If the regional director directs an
election, a party may request review of
the direction after the election in the
manner described below. If the regional
director dismisses a petition, a party
may file a request for review with the
Board within 14 days after service of the
decision dismissing the petition in the
manner specified in the Board’s Rules
and Regulations. Any party may file
with the Board a statement in
opposition to a request for review,
within the time periods and in manner
specified in the Board’s Rules and
Regulations. The Board will grant a
request for review only where there are
compelling reasons to do so. The parties
may, at any time, waive their right to
request review. Failure to request
review precludes such parties from
relitigating, in any subsequent related
unfair labor practice proceeding, any
issue that was, or could have been,
raised in the representation proceeding.
Denial of a request for review
constitutes an affirmance of the regional
director’s action, which also precludes
relitigating any such issues in any
subsequent related unfair labor practice
proceeding.
F. Election Procedure; Challenges and
Election Objections; Requests for Review
of Directions of Elections; Requests for
Review of Regional Director Dispositions
of Challenges and Objections
1. Election Procedure; Challenges; and
Objections
Unless otherwise directed by the
Board, all elections are conducted under
the supervision of the regional director
in whose region the proceeding is
pending. All elections shall be by secret
ballot. The regional director determines
the details incident to the conduct of the
election. A Board agent usually arranges
a pre-election conference at which the
parties check the list of voters and
attempt to resolve any questions of
eligibility. Also, prior to the date of
election, the holding of such election is
publicized by the posting of official
notices in the employer’s facility
whenever possible or in other places, or
by the use of other means considered
appropriate and effective. These notices
reproduce a sample ballot and outline
such election details as the date of the
election, location of polls, time of
voting, and eligibility rules. When an
election is conducted manually, any
party may be represented by observers
of its own selection, subject to such
limitations as the regional director may
prescribe, and the ballots are marked in
the secrecy of a voting booth. The
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parties’ authorized observers and Board
agents may challenge, for good cause,
the eligibility of any person to
participate in the election. If such a
person is permitted to vote, his or her
ballot is segregated, and, if the challenge
is not resolved before the tally,
impounded. Board agents, in the
presence and with the assistance of the
parties’ authorized representatives,
count and tabulate the ballots promptly
after the closing of the polls. Elections
are decided by a majority of the valid
votes cast. Voter challenges may be
resolved by agreement before the tally.
A complete tally of the ballots is made
available to the parties upon the
conclusion of the count. If the number
of unresolved challenged ballots is
insufficient to affect the results of an
election in which an individual or labor
organization is certified, the unit
placement of any such individuals may
be resolved by the parties in the course
of collective bargaining or may be
determined by the Board if a timely unit
clarification petition is filed.
Within seven days after the tally of
ballots has been prepared, a party may
file objections to the conduct of the
election or to conduct affecting the
results of the election. Parties have an
additional seven days to file their
evidence in support of objections. A
party must timely file objections and the
supporting evidence even if there are
determinative challenges.
2. Requests for Review of Decisions and
Directions of Elections
If the election has been conducted
pursuant to a regional director’s
decision and direction of election, any
party may file a request for review of
that decision with the Board in the
manner specified in the Board’s Rules
and Regulations. In the absence of
election objections or potentially
determinative challenges, the request for
review of the decision and direction of
election must be filed within 14 days
after the tally of ballots has been
prepared. In a case involving election
objections or potentially determinative
challenges, the request for review must
be filed within 14 days after the regional
director’s decision on challenged ballots
and/or objections, and may be combined
with a request for review of that
decision as described below, unless the
hearing on objections and determinative
challenges has been consolidated with
an unfair labor practice proceeding
before an administrative law judge. In
such cases, the request for review of the
decision and direction of election must
be filed within 14 days after issuance of
the administrative law judge’s decision.
Any party may file with the Board a
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statement in opposition to the request
for review within the time periods and
in the manner specified in the Board’s
Rules and Regulations. The Board will
grant a request for review only where
there are compelling reasons to do so. If
no request for review is filed, the
decision and direction of election is
final and shall have the same effect as
if issued by the Board. A party may, at
any time, waive its right to request
review. Failure to request review
precludes such a party from relitigating,
in any subsequent related unfair labor
practice proceeding, any issue which
was, or could have been, raised in the
representation proceeding. Denial of a
request for review constitutes an
affirmance of the regional director’s
action, which also precludes relitigating
any such issues in any subsequent
related unfair labor practice proceeding.
3. Certification in Absence of
Objections, Determinative Challenges
and Requests for Review
If no timely objections are filed, if the
challenged ballots are insufficient in
number to affect the results of the
election, if no runoff election is to be
held, and if no request for review of any
decision and direction of election is
filed, the regional director issues to the
parties a certification of the results of
the election, including certification of
representative where appropriate, with
the same force and effect as if issued by
the Board, and the proceeding is closed.
4. Disposition of Objections and
Determinative Challenges
The initial procedures for handling
objections to the conduct of the election
or to conduct affecting the results of the
election, as well as determinative
challenges, are the same regardless of
whether the election was directed by a
regional director or held pursuant to the
parties’ agreement. The regional director
has discretion to conduct an
investigation or set the matters for a
hearing without an investigation.
If timely objections are filed and the
regional director determines that the
party’s supporting evidence would not
constitute grounds for overturning the
election if introduced at a hearing, and
the regional director determines that
any determinative challenges do not
raise substantial and material factual
issues, the regional director issues a
decision disposing of the objections and
challenges and a certification of the
results of the election, including
certification of representative where
appropriate.
If timely objections are filed to the
conduct of the election or to conduct
affecting the results of the election and
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the regional director determines that the
party’s supporting evidence could be
grounds for overturning the election if
introduced at a hearing, or if the
challenged ballots are sufficient in
number to affect the results of the
election and raise substantial and
material factual issues, the regional
director issues a notice of hearing before
a hearing officer, unless the regional
director consolidates the hearing
concerning objections and
determinative challenges with an unfair
labor practice proceeding before an
administrative law judge.
If the regional director issues a notice
of hearing before a hearing officer, the
hearing officer issues a report resolving
questions of credibility and containing
findings of fact and recommendations as
to the disposition of the issues following
the hearing. Within 14 days after
issuance of the hearing officer’s report,
any party may file exceptions to it with
the regional director. A party opposing
the exceptions may file an answering
brief within the time periods and in the
manner specified in the Board’s Rules
and Regulations.
The regional director then decides the
matter and issues a certification of the
results of the election, including
certification of representatives where
appropriate. The parties’ appeal rights
with respect to the regional director’s
decision on challenged ballots or
objections depend upon whether the
parties agreed to waive any appeal prior
to the election. If the election has been
held pursuant to a stipulated election
agreement or a direction of election, a
party may, within 14 days from the date
of issuance of the regional director’s
decision, file with the Board a request
for review of such decision, which may
be combined with a request for review
of the regional director’s decision to
direct the election. Any party may file
with the Board a statement in
opposition to the request for review.
The procedures for filing such requests
for review and any statements in
opposition thereto are contained in the
Board’s Rules and Regulations. If no
request for review is filed, the decision
is final and has the same effect as if
issued by the Board. The parties may, at
any time, waive their right to request
review. Failure to request review
precludes such parties from relitigating,
in any subsequent related unfair labor
practice proceeding, any issue that was,
or could have been, raised in the
representation proceeding. Denial of a
request for review constitutes an
affirmance of the regional director’s
action that also precludes relitigating
any such issues in any subsequent
related unfair labor practice proceeding.
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In cases where the election was
conducted pursuant to either of the two
types of consent election agreements,
the regional director’s decision
regarding the election objections and
determinative challenges is final, and
includes a certification of the results of
the election, including certification of
representative where appropriate.
If the regional director consolidates
the hearing concerning objections and
determinative challenges with an unfair
labor practice proceeding before an
administrative law judge and the
election was conducted pursuant to one
of the two types of consent agreements,
the administrative law judge, upon
issuing his decision, severs the
representation case and transfers it to
the regional director for further
processing. If, however, the regional
director consolidates the hearing
concerning objections and
determinative challenges with an unfair
labor practice proceeding before an
administrative law judge and the
election was conducted pursuant to a
stipulated election agreement or a
decision and direction of election, the
provisions of § 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations govern with
respect to the filing of exceptions or an
answering brief to the exceptions to the
administrative law judge’s decision.
G. Runoff Elections
If the election involves two or more
labor organizations and if the election
results are inconclusive because no
choice on the ballot received the
majority of valid votes cast, a runoff
election is held as provided in the
Board’s Rules and Regulations.
List of Subjects
29 CFR Part 101
Administrative practice and
procedure, Labor management relations.
29 CFR Part 102
Administrative practice and
procedure, Labor management relations.
In consideration of the foregoing, the
National Labor Relations Board amends
Chapter I of title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:
PART 101—STATEMENTS OF
PROCEDURES
1. The authority citation for part 101
continues to read as follows:
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■
Authority: Sec. 6 of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. 151,
156), and sec. 552(a) of the Administrative
Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 552(a)). Section
101.14 also issued under sec. 2112(a)(1) of
Pub. L. 100–236, 28 U.S.C. 2112(a)(1).
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Subpart C— [Removed and Reserved]
2. Remove and reserve subpart C,
consisting of §§ 101.17 through 101.21.
■
Subpart D—Unfair Labor Practice and
Representation Cases Under Sections
8(b)(7) and 9(c) of the Act
■
3. Revise § 101.23 to read as follows:
§ 101.23 Initiation and investigation of a
petition in connection with a case under
section 8(b)(7).
(a) A representation petition 1
involving the employees of the
employer named in the charge is
handled under an expedited procedure
when the investigation of the charge has
revealed that:
(1) The employer’s operations affect
commerce within the meaning of the
Act;
(2) Picketing of the employer is being
conducted for an object proscribed by
section 8(b)(7) of the Act;
(3) Subparagraph (C) of that section of
the Act is applicable to the picketing;
and
(4) The petition has been filed within
a reasonable period of time not to
exceed 30 days from the commencement
of the picketing. In these circumstances,
the member of the Regional Director’s
staff to whom the matter has been
assigned investigates the petition to
ascertain further: the unit appropriate
for collective bargaining; and whether
an election in that unit would effectuate
the policies of the Act.
(b) If, based on such investigation, the
Regional Director determines that an
election is warranted, the Director may,
without a prior hearing, direct that an
election be held in an appropriate unit
of employees. Any party aggrieved may,
after the election, file a request for
review of a regional director’s decision
to direct the election within the time
periods specified and as described in 29
CFR 102.69. If it is determined that an
election is not warranted, the Director
dismisses the petition or makes other
disposition of the matter. Should the
Regional Director conclude that an
election is warranted, the Director fixes
the basis of eligibility of voters and the
place, date, and hours of balloting. The
mechanics of arranging the balloting,
the other procedures for the conduct of
the election, and the postelection
1 The manner of filing of such petition and the
contents thereof are the same as described in 29
CFR 102.60 and 102.61 and the statement of the
general course of proceedings under Section 9(c) of
the Act published in the Federal Register, except
that the petitioner is not required to allege that a
claim was made on the employer for recognition or
that the union represents a substantial number of
employees.
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80181
proceedings are the same, insofar as
appropriate, as those described in 29
CFR102.69.
(c) If the Regional Director believes,
after preliminary investigation of the
petition, that there are substantial issues
which require determination before an
election may be held, the Director may
order a hearing on the issues. This
hearing is followed by Regional Director
or Board decision and direction of
election, or other disposition. The
procedures to be used in connection
with such hearing and posthearing
proceedings are the same, insofar as
they are applicable, as those described
in 29 CFR 102.64, 102.65, 102.66,
102.67, 102.68, and 102.69, and the
statement of the general course.
(d) Should the parties so desire, they
may, with the approval of the Regional
Director, resolve the issues as to the
unit, the conduct of the balloting, and
related matters pursuant to informal
consent procedures, as described in 29
CFR 102.62(a) and the statement of the
general course.
(e) If a petition has been filed which
does not meet the requirements for
processing under the expedited
procedures, the Regional Director may
process it under the procedures set forth
in subpart C of 29 CFR Part 102 and the
statement of the general course.
■ 4. Revise § 101.25 to read as follows:
§ 101.25 Appeal from the dismissal of a
petition, or from the refusal to process it
under the expedited procedure
If it is determined after investigation
of the representation petition that
further proceedings based thereon are
not warranted, the Regional Director,
absent withdrawal of the petition,
dismisses it, stating the grounds
therefor. If it is determined that the
petition does not meet the requirements
for processing under the expedited
procedure, the Regional Director advises
the petitioner of the determination to
process the petition under the
procedures described in subpart C of 29
CFR Part 102 and the statement of the
general course. In either event, the
Regional Director informs all the parties
of such action, and such action is final,
although the Board may grant an
aggrieved party permission to appeal
from the Regional Director’s action.
Such party must request such review
promptly, in writing, and state briefly
the grounds relied on. Such party must
also immediately serve a copy on the
other parties, including the Regional
Director. Neither the request for review
by the Board, nor the Board’s grant of
such review, operates as a stay of the
action taken by the Regional Director,
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unless specifically so ordered by the
Board.
Subpart E—Referendum Cases Under
Section 9(e) (1) and (2) of the Act
■
5. Revise § 101.28 to read as follows:
§ 101.28 Consent agreements providing
for election.
(a) The Board makes available to the
parties three types of informal consent
procedures through which authorization
issues can be resolved without resort to
formal procedures. These informal
agreements are commonly referred to as
consent-election agreement with final
regional director determinations of postelection disputes, stipulated election
agreement with discretionary Board
review, and full consent-election
agreement with final regional director
determinations of pre- and post-election
disputes. Forms for use in these
informal procedures are available in the
Regional Offices.
(b) The procedures to be used in
connection with a consent-election
agreement with final regional director
determinations of post-election
disputes, a stipulated election
agreement with discretionary Board
review, and a full consent-election
agreement with final regional director
determinations of pre- and post-election
disputes are the same as those described
in subpart C of 29 CFR part 102 and the
statement of the general course in
connection with similar agreements in
representation cases under section 9(c)
of the Act, except that no provision is
made for runoff elections.
■ 6. Revise § 101.29 to read as follows:
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§ 101.29 Procedure respecting election
conducted without hearing.
If the Regional Director determines
that the case is an appropriate one for
election without formal hearing, an
election is conducted as quickly as
possible among the employees and upon
the conclusion of the election the
Regional Director makes available to the
parties a tally of ballots. The parties,
however, have an opportunity to make
appropriate challenges and objections to
the conduct of the election and they
have the same rights, and the same
procedure is followed, with respect to
objections to the conduct of the election
and challenged ballots, as is described
in subpart C of 29 CFR Part 102 and the
statement of the general course in
connection with the postelection
procedures in representation cases
under section 9(c) of the Act, except that
no provision is made for a runoff
election. If no such objections are filed
within 7 days and if the challenged
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ballots are insufficient in number to
affect the results of the election, the
Regional Director issues to the parties a
certification of the results of the
election, with the same force and effect
as if issued by the Board.
■ 7. Revise § 101.30 to read as follows:
§ 101.30 Formal hearing and procedure
respecting election conducted after
hearing.
(a) The procedures are the same as
those described in subpart C of 29 CFR
Part 102 and the statement of the
general course respecting representation
cases arising under section 9(c) of the
Act. If the preliminary investigation
indicates that there are substantial
issues which require determination
before an appropriate election may be
held, the Regional Director will institute
formal proceedings by issuance of a
notice of hearing on the issues which,
after hearing, is followed by Regional
Director or Board decision and direction
of election or dismissal. The notice of
hearing together with a copy of the
petition is served on the petitioner, the
employer, and any other known persons
or labor organizations claiming to have
been designated by employees involved
in the proceeding.
(b) The hearing, usually open to the
public, is held before a hearing officer
who normally is an attorney or field
examiner attached to the Regional Office
but may be another qualified Agency
official. The hearing, which is
nonadversary in character, is part of the
investigation in which the primary
interest of the Board’s agents is to insure
that the record contains as full a
statement of the pertinent facts as may
be necessary for determination of the
case. The parties are afforded full
opportunity to present their respective
positions and to produce the significant
facts in support of their contentions that
are relevant to the issue of whether the
Board should conduct an election to
determine whether the employees in a
bargaining unit covered by an agreement
between their employer and a labor
organization made pursuant to section
8(a)(3) of the Act, desire that such
authority be rescinded. In most cases a
substantial number of the relevant facts
are undisputed and stipulated. The
parties are permitted to argue orally on
the record before the hearing officer.
(c) Upon the close of the hearing, the
entire record in the case is then
forwarded to the Regional Director or
the Board, together with an informal
analysis by the hearing officer of the
issues and the evidence but without
recommendations. Post-hearing briefs
are filed only upon special permission
of the hearing officer and within the
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time and addressing the subjects
permitted by the hearing officer. If the
case is transferred to the Board after the
close of the hearing, the parties may,
within such time after service of the
order transferring the case as is fixed by
the regional director, file with the Board
any post-hearing brief previously filed
with the regional director. The parties
may also request to be heard orally.
Because of the nature of the proceeding,
however, permission to argue orally is
rarely granted. After review of the entire
case, the Board issues a decision either
dismissing the petition or directing that
an election be held. In the latter event,
the election is conducted under the
supervision of the Regional Director in
the manner described in 29 CFR 102.69
and the statement of the general course.
(d) The parties have the same rights,
and the same procedure is followed,
with respect to objections to the conduct
of the election and challenged ballots as
is described in connection with the
postelection procedures in
representation cases under section 9(c)
of the Act.
PART 102—RULES AND
REGULATIONS, SERIES 8
8. The authority citation for part 102
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: Secs. 1, 6, National Labor
Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 151, 156). Section
102.117 also issued under section
552(a)(4)(A) of the Freedom of Information
Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(A)), and
Section 102.117a also issued under sec.
552a(j) and (k) of the Privacy Act of 1974 (5
U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k)). Sections 102.143
through 102.155 also issued under sec.
504(c)(1) of the Equal Access to Justice Act,
as amended (5 U.S.C. 504(c)(1)).
Subpart C—Procedure Under Section
9(c) of the Act for the Determination of
Questions Concerning Representation
of Employees and for Clarification of
Bargaining Units and for Amendment
of Certifications Under Section 9(b) of
the Act
■
9. Revise § 102.62 to read as follows:
§ 102.62
Election agreements.
(a) Consent election agreements with
final regional director determinations of
post-election disputes. Where a petition
has been duly filed, the employer and
any individual or labor organizations
representing a substantial number of
employees involved may, with the
approval of the regional director, enter
into an agreement providing for the
waiver of a hearing and for an election
and further providing that post-election
disputes will be resolved by the regional
director. Such agreement, referred to as
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a consent election agreement, shall
include a description of the appropriate
unit, the time and place of holding the
election, and the payroll period to be
used in determining what employees
within the appropriate unit shall be
eligible to vote. Such election shall be
conducted under the direction and
supervision of the regional director. The
method of conducting such election
shall be consistent with the method
followed by the regional director in
conducting elections pursuant to
§§ 102.69 and 102.70 except that the
rulings and determinations by the
regional director of the results thereof
shall be final, and the regional director
shall issue to the parties a certification
of the results of the election, including
certifications of representative where
appropriate, with the same force and
effect, in that case, as if issued by the
Board, provided further that rulings or
determinations by the regional director
in respect to any amendment of such
certification shall also be final.
(b) Stipulated election agreements
with discretionary board review. Where
a petition has been duly filed, the
employer and any individuals or labor
organizations representing a substantial
number of the employees involved may,
with the approval of the regional
director, enter into an agreement
providing for the waiver of a hearing
and for an election as described in
paragraph (a) of this section and further
providing that the parties may request
Board review of the regional director’s
resolution of post-election disputes.
Such agreement, referred to as a
stipulated election agreement, shall also
include a description of the appropriate
bargaining unit, the time and place of
holding the election, and the payroll
period to be used in determining which
employees within the appropriate unit
shall be eligible to vote. Such election
shall be conducted under the direction
and supervision of the regional director.
The method of conducting such election
and the post-election procedure shall be
consistent with that followed by the
regional director in conducting elections
pursuant to §§ 102.69 and 102.70.
(c) Full consent election agreements
with final regional director
determinations of pre- and post-election
disputes. Where a petition has been
duly filed, the employer and any
individual or labor organizations
representing a substantial number of the
employees involved may, with the
approval of the regional director, enter
into an agreement, referred to as a full
consent election agreement, providing
that pre- and post-election disputes will
be resolved by the regional director.
Such agreement provides for a hearing
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pursuant to §§ 102.63, 102.64, 102.65,
102.66 and 102.67 to determine if a
question concerning representation
exists. Upon the conclusion of such a
hearing, the regional director shall issue
a decision. The rulings and
determinations by the regional director
thereunder shall be final, with the same
force and effect, in that case, as if issued
by the Board. Any election ordered by
the regional director shall be conducted
under the direction and supervision of
the regional director. The method of
conducting such election shall be
consistent with the method followed by
the regional director in conducting
elections pursuant to §§ 102.69 and
102.70, except that the rulings and
determinations by the regional director
of the results thereof shall be final, and
the regional director shall issue to the
parties a certification of the results of
the election, including certifications of
representative where appropriate, with
the same force and effect, in that case,
as if issued by the Board, provided
further that rulings or determinations by
the regional director in respect to any
amendment of such certification shall
also be final.
■ 10. Revise § 102.63 to read as follows:
§ 102.63 Investigation of petition by
regional director; notice of hearing; service
of notice; withdrawal of notice.
(a) After a petition has been filed
under § 102.61(a), (b), or (c), if no
agreement such as that provided in
§ 102.62 is entered into and if it appears
to the regional director that there is
reasonable cause to believe that a
question of representation affecting
commerce exists, that the policies of the
act will be effectuated, and that an
election will reflect the free choice of
employees in an appropriate unit, the
Regional Director shall prepare and
cause to be served upon the parties and
upon any known individuals or labor
organizations purporting to act as
representatives of any employees
directly affected by such investigation, a
notice of hearing before a hearing officer
at a time and place fixed therein. A copy
of the petition shall be served with such
notice of hearing. Any such notice of
hearing may be amended or withdrawn
before the close of the hearing by the
regional director on his own motion.
(b) After a petition has been filed
under § 102.61(d) or (e), the regional
director shall conduct an investigation
and, as appropriate, he may issue a
decision without a hearing; or prepare
and cause to be served upon the parties
and upon any known individuals or
labor organizations purporting to act as
representatives of any employees
directly affected by such investigation, a
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notice of hearing before a hearing officer
at a time and place fixed therein; or take
other appropriate action. If a notice of
hearing is served, it shall be
accompanied by a copy of the petition.
Any such notice of hearing may be
amended or withdrawn before the close
of the hearing by the regional director
on his own motion. All hearing and
posthearing procedure under this
paragraph (b) shall be in conformance
with §§ 102.64 through 102.69
whenever applicable, except where the
unit or certification involved arises out
of an agreement as provided in
§ 102.62(a), the regional director’s action
shall be final, and the provisions for
review of regional director’s decisions
by the Board shall not apply. Dismissals
of petitions without a hearing shall not
be governed by § 102.71. The regional
director’s dismissal shall be by decision,
and a request for review therefrom may
be obtained under § 102.67, except
where an agreement under § 102.62(a) is
involved.
■ 11. Revise § 102.64 to read as follows:
§ 102.64
Conduct of hearing.
(a) The purpose of a hearing
conducted under section 9(c) of the Act
is to determine if a question of
representation exists. A question of
representation exists if a petition as
described in section 9(c) of the Act has
been filed concerning a unit appropriate
for the purpose of collective bargaining
or, in the case of a petition filed under
section 9(c)(1)(A)(ii), concerning a unit
in which an individual or labor
organization has been certified or is
being currently recognized by the
employer as the bargaining
representative. Disputes concerning
individuals’ eligibility to vote or
inclusion in an appropriate unit
ordinarily need not be litigated or
resolved before an election is
conducted. If, upon the record of the
hearing, the regional director finds that
a question of representation exists and
there is no bar to an election, he shall
direct an election to resolve the
question.
(b) Hearings shall be conducted by a
hearing officer and shall be open to the
public unless otherwise ordered by the
hearing officer. At any time, a hearing
officer may be substituted for the
hearing officer previously presiding. It
shall be the duty of the hearing officer
to inquire fully into all matters and
issues necessary to obtain a full and
complete record upon which the Board
or the regional director may discharge
their duties under section 9(c) of the
Act.
(c) The hearing officer may, in his
discretion, continue the hearing from
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day to day, or adjourn it to a later date
or to a different place, by announcement
thereof at the hearing or by other
appropriate notice.
■ 12. Revise § 102.65 to read as follows:
jlentini on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with RULES4
§ 102.65
Motions; interventions.
(a) All motions, including motions for
intervention pursuant to paragraphs (b)
and (e) of this section, shall be in
writing or, if made at the hearing, may
be stated orally on the record and shall
briefly state the order or relief sought
and the grounds for such motion. An
original and two copies of written
motions shall be filed and a copy
thereof immediately shall be served on
the other parties to the proceeding.
Motions made prior to the transfer of the
case to the Board shall be filed with the
regional director, except that motions
made during the hearing shall be filed
with the hearing officer. After the
transfer of the case to the Board, all
motions shall be filed with the Board.
Such motions shall be printed or
otherwise legibly duplicated. Provided,
however, That carbon copies of
typewritten matter shall not be filed and
if submitted will not be accepted. Eight
copies of such motions shall be filed
with the Board. The regional director
may rule upon all motions filed with
him, causing a copy of said ruling to be
served on the parties, or he may refer
the motion to the hearing officer:
Provided, That if the regional director
prior to the close of the hearing grants
a motion to dismiss the petition, the
petitioner may obtain a review of such
ruling in the manner prescribed in
§ 102.71. The hearing officer shall rule,
either orally on the record or in writing,
upon all motions filed at the hearing or
referred to him as hereinabove
provided, except that all motions to
dismiss petitions shall be referred for
appropriate action at such time as the
entire record is considered by the
regional director or the Board, as the
case may be.
(b) Any person desiring to intervene
in any proceeding shall make a motion
for intervention, stating the grounds
upon which such person claims to have
an interest in the proceeding. The
regional director or the hearing officer,
as the case may be, may by order permit
intervention in person or by counsel or
other representative to such extent and
upon such terms as he may deem
proper, and such intervenor shall
thereupon become a party to the
proceeding.
(c) All motions, rulings, and orders
shall become a part of the record, except
that rulings on motions to revoke
subpoenas shall become a part of the
record only upon the request of the
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party aggrieved thereby as provided in
§ 102.66(c). Unless expressly authorized
by the Rules and Regulations, rulings by
the regional director or by the hearing
officer shall not be appealed directly to
the Board, but shall be considered by
the Board on appropriate request for
review pursuant to §§ 102.67 (b), (c), (d),
and 102.69 or whenever the case is
transferred to it for decision: Provided,
however, That if the regional director
has issued an order transferring the case
to the Board for decision such rulings
may be appealed directly to the Board
by special permission of the Board. Nor
shall rulings by the hearing officer be
appealed directly to the regional
director unless expressly authorized by
the Rules and Regulations, except by
special permission of the regional
director, but shall be considered by the
regional director when he reviews the
entire record. Requests to the regional
director, or to the Board in appropriate
cases, for special permission to appeal
from a ruling of the hearing officer or
the regional director, together with the
appeal from such ruling, shall be filed
promptly, in writing, and shall briefly
state the reasons special permission
should be granted and the grounds
relied on for the appeal. The moving
party shall immediately serve a copy of
the request for special permission and of
the appeal on the other parties and on
the regional director. Any statement in
opposition or other response to the
request and/or to the appeal shall be
filed promptly, in writing, and shall be
served immediately on the other parties
and on the regional director. The Board
will not grant a request for special
permission to appeal except in
extraordinary circumstances where it
appears that the issue will otherwise
evade review. No party shall be
precluded from raising an issue at a
later time based on its failure to seek
special permission to appeal. If the
Board or the regional director, as the
case may be, grants the request for
special permission to appeal, the Board
or the regional director may proceed
forthwith to rule on the appeal. Neither
the filing nor the grant of such a request
shall, unless otherwise ordered by the
Board, operate as a stay of an election
or any action taken or directed by the
regional director or require the
impounding of ballots.
(d) The right to make motions or to
make objections to rulings on motions
shall not be deemed waived by
participation in the proceeding.
(e)(1) A party to a proceeding may,
because of extraordinary circumstances,
move after the close of the hearing for
reopening of the record, or move after
the decision or report for
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reconsideration, for rehearing, or to
reopen the record, but no such motion
shall stay the time for filing a request for
review of a decision or exceptions to a
report. No motion for reconsideration,
for rehearing, or to reopen the record
will be entertained by the Board or by
any regional director or hearing officer
with respect to any matter which could
have been but was not raised pursuant
to any other section of these rules:
Provided, however, That the regional
director may treat a request for review
of a decision or exceptions to a report
as a motion for reconsideration. A
motion for reconsideration shall state
with particularity the material error
claimed and with respect to any finding
of material fact shall specify the page of
the record relied on for the motion. A
motion for rehearing or to reopen the
record shall specify briefly the error
alleged to require a rehearing or hearing
de novo, the prejudice to the movant
alleged to result from such error, the
additional evidence sought to be
adduced, why it was not presented
previously, and what result it would
require if adduced and credited. Only
newly discovered evidence—evidence
which has become available only since
the close of the hearing—or evidence
which the regional director or the Board
believes should have been taken at the
hearing will be taken at any further
hearing.
(2) Any motion for reconsideration or
for rehearing pursuant to this paragraph
(e) shall be filed within 14 days, or such
further period as may be allowed, after
the service of the decision or report.
Any request for an extension of time to
file such a motion shall be served
promptly on the other parties. A motion
to reopen the record shall be filed
promptly on discovery of the evidence
sought to be adduced.
(3) The filing and pendency of a
motion under this provision shall not
unless so ordered operate to stay the
effectiveness of any action taken or
directed to be taken nor will a regional
director or the Board delay any decision
or action during the period specified in
paragraph (e)(2) of this section, except
that, if a motion for reconsideration
based on changed circumstances or to
reopen the record based on newly
discovered evidence states with
particularity that the granting thereof
will affect the eligibility to vote of
specific employees, the Board agent
shall have discretion to allow such
employees to vote subject to challenge
even if they are specifically excluded in
the direction of election and to permit
the moving party to challenge the
ballots of such employees even if they
are specifically included in the
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direction of election in any election
conducted while such motion is
pending. A motion for reconsideration,
for rehearing, or to reopen the record
need not be filed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
■ 13. Revise § 102.66 to read as follows:
jlentini on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with RULES4
§ 102.66 Introduction of evidence: Rights
of parties at hearing; subpoenas.
(a) Rights of parties at hearing. Any
party shall have the right to appear at
any hearing in person, by counsel, or by
other representative, to call, examine,
and cross-examine witnesses, and to
introduce into the record documentary
and other evidence so long as such
examination, cross-examination, and
other evidence supports its contentions
and is relevant to the existence of a
question of representation or a bar to an
election. The hearing officer shall also
have power to call, examine, and crossexamine witnesses and to introduce into
the record documentary and other
evidence. Witnesses shall be examined
orally under oath. The rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity
shall not be controlling. Stipulations of
fact may be introduced in evidence with
respect to any issue.
(b) Objections. Any objection with
respect to the conduct of the hearing,
including any objection to the
introduction of evidence, may be stated
orally or in writing, accompanied by a
short statement of the grounds of such
objection, and included in the record.
No such objection shall be deemed
waived by further participation in the
hearing.
(c) Subpoenas. The Board, or any
Member thereof, shall, on the written
application of any party, forthwith issue
subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and the
production of any evidence, including
books, records, correspondence, or
documents, in their possession or under
their control. The Executive Secretary
shall have the authority to sign and
issue any such subpoenas on behalf of
the Board or any Member thereof. Any
party may file applications for
subpoenas in writing with the Regional
Director if made prior to hearing, or
with the hearing officer if made at the
hearing. Applications for subpoenas
may be made ex parte. The Regional
Director or the hearing officer, as the
case may be, shall forthwith grant the
subpoenas requested. Any person
served with a subpoena, whether ad
testificandum or duces tecum, if he or
she does not intend to comply with the
subpoena, shall, within 5 days after the
date of service of the subpoena, petition
in writing to revoke the subpoena. The
date of service for purposes of
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computing the time for filing a petition
to revoke shall be the date the subpoena
is received. Such petition shall be filed
with the regional director who may
either rule upon it or refer it for ruling
to the hearing officer: Provided,
however, That if the evidence called for
is to be produced at a hearing and the
hearing has opened, the petition to
revoke shall be filed with the hearing
officer. Notice of the filing of petitions
to revoke shall be promptly given by the
regional director or hearing officer, as
the case may be, to the party at whose
request the subpoena was issued. The
regional director or the hearing officer,
as the case may be, shall revoke the
subpoena if, in his opinion, the
evidence whose production is required
does not relate to any matter under
investigation or in question in the
proceedings or the subpoena does not
describe with sufficient particularity the
evidence whose production is required,
or if for any other reason sufficient in
law the subpoena is otherwise invalid.
The regional director or the hearing
officer, as the case may be, shall make
a simple statement of procedural or
other grounds for his ruling. The
petition to revoke, any answer filed
thereto, and any ruling thereon shall not
become part of the record except upon
the request of the party aggrieved by the
ruling. Persons compelled to submit
data or evidence are entitled to retain or,
on payment of lawfully prescribed costs,
to procure copies or transcripts of the
data or evidence submitted by them.
(d) Oral argument and briefs. Any
party shall be entitled, upon request, to
a reasonable period at the close of the
hearing for oral argument, which shall
be included in the stenographic report
of the hearing. Post-hearing briefs shall
be filed only upon special permission of
the hearing officer and within the time
and addressing the subjects permitted
by the hearing officer. Copies of the
brief shall be served on all other parties
to the proceeding and a statement of
such service shall be filed with the
regional director together with the brief.
No reply brief may be filed except upon
special leave of the regional director.
(e) Hearing officer analysis. The
hearing officer may submit an analysis
of the record to the regional director or
the Board but he shall make no
recommendations.
(f) Witness fees. Witness fees and
mileage shall be paid by the party at
whose instance the witness appears.
■
14. Revise § 102.67 to read as follows:
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§ 102.67 Proceedings before the regional
director; further hearing; action by the
regional director; review of action by the
regional director; statement in opposition;
transfer of case to the Board; Board action.
(a) Proceedings before regional
director. The regional director may
proceed, either forthwith upon the
record or after oral argument, the
submission of briefs, or further hearing,
as he may deem proper, to determine
whether a question concerning
representation exists in a unit
appropriate for purposes of collective
bargaining, and to direct an election,
dismiss the petition, or make other
disposition of the matter.
(b) Directions of elections; dismissals;
requests for review. A decision by the
regional director upon the record shall
set forth his findings, conclusions, and
order or direction. The decision of the
regional director shall be final:
Provided, however, That within 14 days
after service of a decision dismissing a
petition any party may file a request for
review of such a dismissal with the
Board in Washington, DC: Provided,
further, That any party may, after the
election, file a request for review of a
regional director’s decision to direct an
election within the time periods
specified and as described in § 102.69.
(c) Grounds for review. The Board will
grant a request for review only where
compelling reasons exist therefor.
Accordingly, a request for review may
be granted only upon one or more of the
following grounds:
(1) That a substantial question of law
or policy is raised because of:
(i) The absence of; or
(ii) A departure from, officially
reported Board precedent.
(2) That the regional director’s
decision on a substantial factual issue is
clearly erroneous on the record and
such error prejudicially affects the rights
of a party.
(3) That the conduct of the hearing or
any ruling made in connection with the
proceeding has resulted in prejudicial
error.
(4) That there are compelling reasons
for reconsideration of an important
Board rule or policy.
(d) Contents of request. Any request
for review must be a self-contained
document enabling the Board to rule on
the basis of its contents without the
necessity or recourse to the record;
however, the Board may, in its
discretion, examine the record in
evaluating the request. With respect to
the ground listed in paragraph (c)(2) of
this section, and other grounds where
appropriate, said request must contain a
summary of all evidence or rulings
bearing on the issues together with page
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citations from the transcript and a
summary of argument. But such request
may not raise any issue or allege any
facts not timely presented to the
regional director.
(e) Opposition to request. Any party
may, within 7 days after the last day on
which the request for review must be
filed, file with the Board a statement in
opposition thereto, which shall be
served in accordance with the
requirements of paragraph (k) of this
section. A statement of such service of
opposition shall be filed simultaneously
with the Board. The Board may deny the
request for review without awaiting a
statement in opposition thereto.
(f) Waiver; denial of request. The
parties may, at any time, waive their
right to request review. Failure to
request review shall preclude such
parties from relitigating, in any related
subsequent unfair labor practice
proceeding, any issue which was, or
could have been, raised in the
representation proceeding. Denial of a
request for review shall constitute an
affirmance of the regional director’s
action which shall also preclude
relitigating any such issues in any
related subsequent unfair labor practice
proceeding.
(g) Grant of review; briefs. The
granting of a request for review shall not
stay the regional director’s decision
unless otherwise ordered by the Board.
Except where the Board rules upon the
issues on review in the order granting
review, the appellants and other parties
may, within 14 days after issuance of an
order granting review, file briefs with
the Board. Such briefs may be
reproductions of those previously filed
with the regional director and/or other
briefs which shall be limited to the
issues raised in the request for review.
Where review has been granted, the
Board will consider the entire record in
the light of the grounds relied on for
review. Any request for review may be
withdrawn with the permission of the
Board at any time prior to the issuance
of the decision of the Board thereon.
(h) Transfer. In any case in which it
appears to the regional director that the
proceeding raises questions which
should be decided by the Board, he
may, at any time, issue an order, to be
effective after the close of the hearing
and before decision, transferring the
case to the Board for decision. Such an
order may be served on the parties upon
the record of the hearing.
(i) Briefs. If any case is transferred to
the Board for decision after the parties
have filed briefs with the regional
director, the parties may, within such
time after service of the order
transferring the case as is fixed by the
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regional director, file with the Board the
brief previously filed with the regional
director. No further briefs shall be
permitted except by special permission
of the Board.
(j) Board action. Upon transfer of the
case to the Board, the Board shall
proceed, either forthwith upon the
record, or after oral argument or the
submission of briefs, or further hearing,
as it may determine, to decide the issues
referred to it or to review the decision
of the regional director and shall direct
a secret ballot of the employees or the
appropriate action to be taken on
impounded ballots of an election
already conducted, dismiss the petition,
affirm or reverse the regional director’s
order in whole or in part, or make such
other disposition of the matter as it
deems appropriate.
(k)(1) Format of request. All
documents filed with the Board under
the provisions of this section shall be
filed in eight copies, double spaced, on
81/2- by 11-inch paper, and shall be
printed or otherwise legibly duplicated.
Carbon copies of typewritten materials
will not be accepted. Requests for
review, including briefs in support
thereof; statements in opposition
thereto; and briefs on review shall not
exceed 50 pages in length, exclusive of
subject index and table of cases and
other authorities cited, unless
permission to exceed that limit is
obtained from the Board by motion,
setting forth the reasons therefor, filed
not less than 5 days, including
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, prior
to the date the document is due. Where
any brief filed pursuant to this section
exceeds 20 pages, it shall contain a
subject index with page authorities
cited.
(2) Service of copies of request. The
party filing with the Board a request for
review, a statement in opposition to a
request for review, or a brief on review
shall serve a copy thereof on the other
parties and shall file a copy with the
regional director. A statement of such
service shall be filed with the Board
together with the document.
(3) Extensions. Requests for
extensions of time to file requests for
review, statements in opposition to a
request for review, or briefs, as
permitted by this section, shall be filed
with the Board or the regional director,
as the case may be. The party filing the
request for an extension of time shall
serve a copy thereof on the other parties
and, if filed with the Board, on the
regional director. A statement of such
service shall be filed with the
document.
■ 15. Revise § 102.69 to read as follows:
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§ 102.69 Election procedure; tally of
ballots; objections; certification by the
regional director; requests for review of
directions of elections; hearings; hearing
officer reports on objections and
challenges; exceptions to hearing officer
reports; requests for review of regional
director decisions in stipulated or directed
elections.
(a) Election procedure; tally;
objections. Unless otherwise directed by
the Board, all elections shall be
conducted under the supervision of the
regional director in whose Region the
proceeding is pending. All elections
shall be by secret ballot. Whenever two
or more labor organizations are included
as choices in an election, either
participant may, upon its prompt
request to and approval thereof by the
regional director, whose decision shall
be final, have its name removed from
the ballot: Provided, however, That in a
proceeding involving an employer-filed
petition or a petition for decertification
the labor organization certified,
currently recognized, or found to be
seeking recognition may not have its
name removed from the ballot without
giving timely notice in writing to all
parties and the regional director,
disclaiming any representation interest
among the employees in the unit. A preelection conference may be held at
which the parties may check the list of
voters and attempt to resolve any
questions of eligibility or inclusions in
the unit. When the election is
conducted manually, any party may be
represented by observers of its own
selection, subject to such limitations as
the regional director may prescribe. Any
party and Board agents may challenge,
for good cause, the eligibility of any
person to participate in the election.
The ballots of such challenged persons
shall be impounded. Upon the
conclusion of the election the ballots
will be counted and a tally of ballots
prepared and immediately made
available to the parties. Within 7 days
after the tally of ballots has been
prepared, any party may file with the
regional director an original and five
copies of objections to the conduct of
the election or to conduct affecting the
results of the election which shall
contain a short statement of the reasons
therefor. Such filing must be timely
whether or not the challenged ballots
are sufficient in number to affect the
results of the election. A person filing
objections by facsimile pursuant to
§ 102.114(f) shall also file an original for
the Agency’s records, but failure to do
so shall not affect the validity of the
filing if otherwise proper. In addition,
extra copies need not be filed if the
filing is by facsimile pursuant to
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§ 102.114(f). The Regional Director will
cause a copy of the objections to be
served on each of the other parties to the
proceeding. Within 7 days after the
filing of objections, or such additional
time as the Regional Director may allow,
the party filing objections shall furnish
to the Regional Director the evidence
available to it to support the objections.
(b) Requests for review of directions of
elections. If the election has been
conducted pursuant to § 102.67, any
party may file a request for review of the
decision and direction of election with
the Board in Washington, DC. In the
absence of election objections or
potentially determinative challenges,
the request for review of the decision
and direction of election shall be filed
within 14 days after the tally of ballots
has been prepared. In a case involving
election objections or potentially
determinative challenges, the request for
review shall be filed within 14 days
after the regional director’s decision on
challenged ballots, on objections, or on
both, and may be combined with a
request for review of that decision as
provided in paragraph (d)(3) of this
section. Provided, however, That if the
hearing on objections and determinative
challenges has been consolidated with
an unfair labor practice proceeding
before an administrative law judge, the
request for review of the decision and
direction of election shall be filed
within 14 days after issuance of the
administrative law judge’s decision. The
procedures for such request for review
shall be the same as set forth in
§ 102.67(c) through (g), and (k), insofar
as applicable. If no request for review is
filed, the decision and direction of
election is final and shall have the same
effect as if issued by the Board. The
parties may, at any time, waive their
right to request review. Failure to
request review shall preclude such
parties from relitigating, in any related
subsequent unfair labor practice
proceeding, any issue which was, or
could have been, raised in the
representation proceeding. Denial of a
request for review shall constitute an
affirmance of the regional director’s
action which shall also preclude
relitigating any such issues in any
related subsequent unfair labor practice
proceeding.
(c) Certification in the absence of
objections, determinative challenges
and requests for review. If no objections
are filed within the time set forth in
paragraph (a) of this section, if the
challenged ballots are insufficient in
number to affect the results of the
election, if no runoff election is to be
held pursuant to § 102.70, and if no
request for review is filed pursuant to
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paragraph (b) of this section, the
regional director shall forthwith issue to
the parties a certification of the results
of the election, including certification of
representative where appropriate, with
the same force and effect as if issued by
the Board, and the proceeding will
thereupon be closed.
(d)(1)(i) Decisions without a hearing.
If timely objections are filed to the
conduct of an election or to conduct
affecting the results of the election, and
the regional director determines that the
party’s supporting evidence would not
constitute grounds for overturning the
election if introduced at a hearing, and
the regional director determines that
any determinative challenges do not
raise substantial and material factual
issues, the regional director shall issue
a decision disposing of objections and
determinative challenges, and a
certification of the results of the
election, including certification of
representative where appropriate.
(ii) Notices of hearing. If timely
objections are filed to the conduct of the
election or to conduct affecting the
results of the election, and the regional
director determines that the party’s
supporting evidence could be grounds
for overturning the election if
introduced at a hearing, or if the
challenged ballots are sufficient in
number to affect the results of the
election and raise substantial and
material factual issues, the regional
director shall prepare and caused to be
served on the parties a notice of hearing
at a place and time fixed therein:
Provided, however, that the regional
director may consolidate the hearing
concerning objections and
determinative challenges with an unfair
labor practice proceeding before an
administrative law judge. In any
proceeding wherein the election has
been held pursuant to § 102.62(a) or (c)
and the representation case has been
consolidated with an unfair labor
practice proceeding for purposes of
hearing, the administrative law judge
shall, after issuing his decision, sever
the representation case and transfer it to
the regional director for further
processing.
(iii) Hearings; hearing officer reports;
exceptions to regional director. Any
hearing pursuant to this section shall be
conducted in accordance with the
provisions of §§ 102.64, 102.65, and
102.66, insofar as applicable, except
that, upon the close of such hearing, the
hearing officer shall prepare and cause
to be served on the parties a report
resolving questions of credibility and
containing findings of fact and
recommendations as to the disposition
of the issues. Any party may, within 14
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80187
days from the date of issuance of such
report, file with the regional director an
original and one copy of exceptions to
such report, with supporting brief if
desired. A copy of such exceptions,
together with a copy of any brief filed,
shall immediately be served on the
other parties and a statement of service
filed with the regional director. Within
7 days from the last date on which
exceptions and any supporting brief
may be filed, or such further time as the
regional director may allow, a party
opposing the exceptions may file an
answering brief with the regional
director. An original and one copy shall
be submitted. A copy of such answering
brief shall immediately be served on the
other parties and a statement of service
filed with the regional director. The
regional director shall thereupon decide
the matter upon the record or make
other disposition of the case. If no
exceptions are filed to such report, the
regional director, upon the expiration of
the period for filing such exceptions,
may decide the matter forthwith upon
the record or may make other
disposition of the case.
(2) Regional director decisions in
consent or full consent elections. If the
election has been held pursuant to
§ 102.62(a) or (c), the decision of the
regional director shall be final and shall
include a certification of the results of
the election, including certification of
representative where appropriate.
(3) Requests for review of regional
director decisions in stipulated or
directed elections. If the election has
been held pursuant to §§ 102.62(b) or
102.67, the decision of the regional
director shall include a certification of
the results of the election, including
certification of representative where
appropriate. Within 14 days from the
date of issuance of the regional
director’s decision on challenged ballots
or on objections, or on both, any party
may file with the Board in Washington,
DC, a request for review of such
decision which may be combined with
a request for review of the regional
director’s decision to direct an election
as provided in §§ 102.67(b) and
102.69(b). The procedures for postelection requests for review shall be the
same as set forth in § 102.67(c) through
(g), and (k), insofar as applicable. If no
request for review is filed, the decision
is final and shall have the same effect
as if issued by the Board. The parties
may, at any time, waive their right to
request review. Failure to request
review shall preclude such parties from
relitigating, in any related subsequent
unfair labor practice proceeding, any
issue which was, or could have been,
raised in the representation proceeding.
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Denial of a request for review shall
constitute an affirmance of the regional
director’s action which shall also
preclude relitigating any such issues in
any related subsequent unfair labor
practice proceeding. Provided, however,
That in any proceeding wherein a
representation case has been
consolidated with an unfair labor
practice proceeding for purposes of
hearing and the election was conducted
pursuant to § 102.62(b) or § 102.67, the
provisions of § 102.46 shall govern with
respect to the filing of exceptions or an
answering brief to the exceptions to the
administrative law judge’s decision.
(e)(1)(i) Record in case with hearing.
In a proceeding pursuant to this section
in which a hearing is held, the record
in the case shall consist of the notice of
hearing, motions, rulings, orders,
stenographic report of the hearing,
stipulations, exhibits, together with the
objections to the conduct of the election
or to conduct affecting the results of the
election, any briefs or other legal
memoranda submitted by the parties,
any report on such objections and/or on
challenged ballots, exceptions, the
decision of the regional director, any
requests for review, and the record
previously made as defined in § 102.68.
Materials other than those set out above
shall not be a part of the record.
(ii) Record in case with no hearing. In
a proceeding pursuant to this section in
which no hearing is held, the record
shall consist of the objections to the
conduct of the election or to conduct
affecting the results of the election, any
decision on objections or on challenged
ballots and any request for review of
such a decision, any documentary
evidence, excluding statements of
witnesses, relied upon by the regional
director in his decision, any briefs or
other legal memoranda submitted by the
parties, any other motions, rulings or
orders of the regional director, as well
as any decision and direction of election
and the record previously made as
defined in § 102.68 Materials other than
those set out above shall not be a part
of the record, except as provided in
paragraph (e)(3) of this section.
(2) Immediately upon issuance of an
order transferring the case to the Board,
or upon issuance of an order granting a
request for review by the Board, the
regional director shall transmit to the
Board the record of the proceeding as
defined in paragraph (e)(1) of this
section.
(3) In a proceeding pursuant to this
section in which no hearing is held, a
party filing a request for review of a
regional director’s decision on
objections or challenges, or any
opposition thereto, may support its
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submission to the Board by appending
thereto copies of documentary evidence,
including copies of any affidavits it has
timely submitted to the regional director
and which were not included in the
decision. Documentary evidence so
appended shall thereupon become part
of the record in the proceeding. Failure
to append that evidence to its
submission to the Board in the
representation proceeding as provided
above, shall preclude a party from
relying on such evidence in any
subsequent unfair labor proceeding.
(f) Revised tally of ballots. In any case
under this section in which the regional
director or the Board, upon a ruling on
challenged ballots, has directed that
such ballots be opened and counted and
a revised tally of ballots issued, and no
objection to such revised tally is filed by
any party within 7 days after the revised
tally of ballots has been made available,
the regional director shall forthwith
issue to the parties certification of the
results of the election, including
certifications of representative where
appropriate, with the same force and
effect as if issued by the Board. The
proceeding shall thereupon be closed.
(g) Format of filings with regional
director. All documents filed with the
regional director under the provisions of
this section shall be filed double spaced,
on 81⁄2 by 11-inch paper, and shall be
printed or otherwise legibly duplicated.
Briefs in support of exceptions or
answering briefs shall not exceed 50
pages in length, exclusive of subject
index and table of cases and other
authorities cited, unless permission to
exceed that limit is obtained from the
regional director by motion, setting forth
the reasons therefor, filed not less than
5 days, including Saturdays, Sundays,
and holidays, prior to the date the brief
is due. Where any brief filed pursuant
to this section exceeds 20 pages, it shall
contain a subject index with page
references and an alphabetical table of
cases and other authorities cited.
(h) Extensions of time. Requests for
extensions of time to file exceptions,
requests for review, supporting briefs, or
answering briefs, as permitted by this
section, shall be filed with the Board or
the regional director, as the case may be.
The party filing the request for an
extension of time shall serve a copy
thereof on the other parties and, if filed
with the Board, on the regional director.
A statement of such service shall be
filed with the document.
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Subpart D—Procedure for Unfair Labor
Practice and Representation Cases
Under Sections 8(b)(7) and 9(c) of the
Act
16. Amend § 102.77 by revising
paragraph (b) to read as follows:
■
§ 102.77 Investigation of petition by
regional director; directed election.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) If after the investigation of such
petition or any petition filed under
subpart C of this part, and after the
investigation of the charge filed
pursuant to § 102.73, it appears to the
regional director that an expedited
election under section 8(b)(7)(C) of the
Act is warranted, and that the policies
of the Act would be effectuated thereby,
he shall forthwith proceed to conduct
an election by secret ballot of the
employees in an appropriate unit, or
make other disposition of the matter:
Provided, however, That in any case in
which it appears to the regional director
that the proceeding raises questions
which cannot be decided without a
hearing, he may issue and cause to be
served on the parties, individuals, and
labor organizations involved a notice of
hearing before a hearing officer at a time
and place fixed therein. In this event,
the method of conducting the hearing
and the procedure following, including
transfer of the case to the Board, shall
be governed insofar as applicable by
§§ 102.63 through 102.69 inclusive.
Subpart E—Procedure for Referendum
Under Section 9(e) of the Act
■
17. Revise § 102.85 to read as follows:
§ 102.85 Investigation of petition by
regional director; consent referendum;
directed referendum.
Where a petition has been filed
pursuant to § 102.83 and it appears to
the regional director that the petitioner
has made an appropriate showing, in
such form as the regional director may
determine, that 30 percent or more of
the employees within a unit covered by
an agreement between their employer
and a labor organization requiring
membership in such labor organization
desire to rescind the authority of such
labor organization to make such an
agreement, he shall proceed to conduct
a secret ballot of the employees
involved on the question whether they
desire to rescind the authority of the
labor organization to make such an
agreement with their employer:
Provided, however, That in any case in
which it appears to the regional director
that the proceeding raises questions
which cannot be decided without a
hearing, he may issue and cause to be
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served on the parties a notice of hearing
before a hearing officer at a time and
place fixed therein. The regional
director shall fix the time and place of
the election, eligibility requirements for
voting, and other arrangements of the
balloting, but the parties may enter into
an agreement, subject to the approval of
the regional director, fixing such
arrangements. In any such consent
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agreements, provision may be made for
final determination of all questions
arising with respect to the balloting by
the regional director or, upon grant of a
request for review, by the Board.
■
18. Revise § 102.86 to read as follows:
§ 102.86
Hearing; posthearing procedure.
The method of conducting the hearing
and the procedure following the
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hearing, including transfer of the case to
the Board, shall be governed, insofar as
applicable, by §§ 102.63 through 102.69
inclusive.
Signed in Washington, DC on December
16, 2011.
Mark Gaston Pearce,
Chairman.
[FR Doc. 2011–32642 Filed 12–21–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7545–01–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 246 (Thursday, December 22, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 80138-80189]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-32642]
[[Page 80137]]
Vol. 76
Thursday,
No. 246
December 22, 2011
Part IV
National Labor Relations Board
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29 CFR Parts 101 and 102
Representation--Case Procedures; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 246 / Thursday, December 22, 2011 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 80138]]
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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
29 CFR Parts 101 and 102
RIN 3142-AA08
Representation--Case Procedures
AGENCY: National Labor Relations Board.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: On June 22, 2011, the National Labor Relations Board (the
Board) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposing various
amendments of its rules and regulations governing the filing and
processing of petitions relating to the representation of employees for
purposes of collective bargaining with their employer. This document
explains which of the proposed amendments the Board is adopting at this
time in the final rule and sets forth the Board's responses to comments
concerning those proposals.
The Board believes that the final rule will reduce unnecessary
litigation in representation cases and thereby enable the Board to
better fulfill its duty to expeditiously resolve questions concerning
representation. The final rule will also save time and resources for
the parties and the agency. The final rule will focus pre-election
hearings on those issues relevant to determining if there is a question
concerning representation, provide for pre-election briefing only when
it will assist the decision makers, reduce piecemeal appeals to the
Board, consolidate requests for Board review of regional directors'
pre- and post-election determinations into a single, post-election
request, make Board review of post-election regional determinations
discretionary, and eliminate duplicative regulations. The final rule
will allow the Board to more promptly determine if there is a question
concerning representation and, if so, to resolve it by conducting a
secret-ballot election and certifying the results.
DATES: This rule will be effective on April 30, 2012.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lester A. Heltzer, Executive
Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1099 14th Street NW.,
Washington, DC 20570, (202) 273-1067 (this is not a toll-free number),
1-(866) 315-6572 (TTY/TDD).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background on the Rulemaking
The National Labor Relations Board administers the National Labor
Relations Act, which, among other things, governs the formation of
collective-bargaining relationships between employers and groups of
employees in the private sector. Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 157,
gives employees the right ``to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing * * * and to refrain from * * *
such activity.''
When employees and their employer are unable to agree whether the
employees should be represented for purposes of collective bargaining,
Section 9 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 159, gives the Board authority to
resolve the question of representation.
The Act itself sets forth only the basic steps for resolving a
question of representation. First, a petition is filed by an employee,
a labor organization, or an employer. Second, if there is reasonable
cause, a hearing is held to determine whether a question of
representation exists, unless the parties agree that an election should
be conducted and agree concerning election details. Third, if there is
such a question, an election by secret ballot is conducted. Fourth, the
results of the election are certified.
Aside from these general requirements, however, the statute says
very little about representation case procedures. Instead, Congress
left these procedures within the broad discretion of the Board.
The Board has exercised this discretion through two mechanisms.
First, the Board has promulgated binding rules of procedure, most of
which are found in 29 CFR part 102, subpart C. Second, the Board has
interpreted and occasionally altered or created its representation case
procedures through adjudication.\1\ In addition, the Board's General
Counsel has prepared a non-binding Casehandling Manual describing
representation case procedures in detail. The relevant sections of the
Casehandling Manual are Sections 11000 through 11886.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764, 770,
777, 779 (1969).
\2\ NLRB Casehandling Manual (Part Two) Representation
Proceedings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within the framework of the current rules, the Board, the General
Counsel and the agency's regional directors \3\ have sought to achieve
efficient, fair, uniform, and timely resolution of representation
cases. But under the current rules, inefficiency, abuse of the process,
and delay still hamper resolution of many questions of representation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Pursuant to Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated
to its regional directors the authority to conduct pre-election
hearings, to determine whether questions of representation exist, to
direct elections, and to certify election results. 29 U.S.C. 153(b).
The General Counsel administratively oversees the regions. 29 U.S.C.
153(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In this final rule, the Board makes eight amendments to its
regulations governing representation case procedures. The amendments
are intended to eliminate unnecessary litigation, delay, and
duplicative regulations. The final rule follows an extensive
consultation with the public initiated by the Board's Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on June 22, 2011. 76 FR 36812. As explained
below, the final rule adopts some of the proposed amendments and leaves
the remainder for further deliberation.
A. Summary of Current Procedures \4\
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\4\ For a more complete discussion and citations, see the NPRM.
76 FR 36812.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When an employee, union, employer, individual, or organization
wants the Board to determine whether employees wish to bargain
collectively through a union, that party must file, in the Board's
regional office, a petition, which the regional director then serves on
other interested parties. An employee or union petitioner must also,
ordinarily, provide evidence that a substantial number of employees
support the petition. Board agents then conduct an ex parte
investigation to determine if there is enough interest to justify
further processing of the petition.
In further processing, three general types of disputes can arise
among the parties. First are pre-election disputes. These may concern
whether the employees at issue may be represented as a group--that is,
whether they are ``an appropriate unit.'' At this stage, the parties
may also disagree about the Board's jurisdiction, whether an election
is barred by the Act or Board law, and the time, place, and other
details of the election itself.
Second, disputes can also arise during the election about whether
particular persons are eligible to vote. These disputes arise through
``challenges'' to the disputed individuals' ballots. When this occurs,
the ballots of challenged voters are segregated from the other ballots
in a manner that will not disclose the voters' identity.
Third, disputes can arise after the election about whether actions
of the parties or the Board agents--or some other circumstance--made
the election unfair. These disputes are brought before the Board by the
filing of ``objections.''
In the vast majority of cases, the parties, often with Board agent
assistance, are able to resolve pre-election disputes without
litigation. In these cases, either a ``consent''
[[Page 80139]]
agreement or a ``stipulation'' agreement is entered into. Both kinds of
agreements fully resolve pre-election disputes, but in a consent
agreement the parties also waive the right to Board review of the
regional director's disposition of any challenges or objections, while
in a stipulation agreement the parties provide for Board disposition of
such disputes.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ In the alternative, a third type of agreement, called a
``full consent'' agreement, may also be entered into. This occurs
when the parties disagree about pre-election issues but are willing
to permit the regional director to resolve them as well as any post-
election disputes with finality. Full consent agreements are rare.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If no agreement on pre-election issues can be reached, a hearing
must be held. The hearing officer, the Board agent in charge of the
hearing, takes evidence relevant to the issues in dispute, and the
parties often file briefs. The regional director then issues a
decision, either dismissing the petition or directing an election. The
regional director does not have to resolve all voter eligibility
questions before the election, but can defer those questions by
permitting employees whose eligibility is disputed to vote subject to
challenge.
If an election is directed, the regional director typically
schedules it no sooner than 25 days after the decision, so that the
Board can rule on any interlocutory request for review that might be
filed. Such interlocutory requests are rarely granted, still more
rarely result in the regional director's decision being reversed, and
virtually never result in elections being stayed. If the Board does not
rule on the request before the election date, the election is held, and
the ballots are impounded pending a Board ruling.
After the regional director's decision directing an election, the
employer must provide the regional office a list of eligible voters and
their home addresses. The regional office gives the list to the
parties. The parties use the list for two purposes: To communicate with
eligible voters about the election, and to determine whether to
challenge a particular voter.
Elections are decided by a majority of the valid votes cast. As
mentioned, during the election, the parties may challenge ballots cast
by voters. A tally of ballots generally takes place shortly after the
polls close. If the challenged ballots are too few in number to change
the outcome of the election, the challenges will not be litigated or
resolved.
Within one week after the tally, parties may file objections with
the regional director. Within one additional week, the objecting party
must furnish evidence in support of its objections.
The regional director has discretion to investigate any potentially
determinative challenges or objections or to immediately direct a
hearing. If the director conducts an investigation, he will set a
hearing only if the challenges or objections raise substantial and
material questions of fact. If no hearing is held, the regional
director will issue a supplemental decision or a report disposing of
the challenges or objections.
If a post-election hearing is held, the parties have the
opportunity to present evidence to a hearing officer. The hearing
officer will issue a report resolving any credibility issues and
containing findings of fact and recommendations.
In cases involving consent elections, the regional director's
rulings on challenges and objections are final. In cases involving
stipulated elections or elections directed by a regional director, the
parties generally have the right to obtain review by the Board, by
filing exceptions to the report disposing of the objections and/or
challenges. If a regional director directs an election and subsequently
determines that the challenges or objections warrant a hearing, the
regional director may direct that the hearing officer's recommendation
be made directly to the Board, in which case a party has the right to
Board review. On the other hand, if the regional director orders that
the hearing officer's recommendations be made directly to him or her,
parties can file exceptions to the hearing officer's report to the
regional director, but thereafter can seek Board review of the regional
director's determination only through the discretionary request-for-
review procedure. Similarly, if the regional director decides to
resolve the challenges and objections without directing a hearing, he
or she can choose to issue a report, in which case parties have a right
to Board review, or the regional director can choose to issue a
supplemental decision, in which case parties may only request Board
review. By contrast, if the parties enter into a stipulated election
agreement, the parties are entitled to Board review of the regional
director's or hearing officer's disposition of the post-election
matters.
B. Problems Identified and Amendments Proposed
The Board published an NPRM on June 22, 2011, 76 FR 36812,
proposing a number of changes to these procedures. These proposals are
set forth at length in the NPRM. The purpose of this brief summary is
to introduce the more complete discussion of the final rule. The
proposed amendments are presented in the chronological order of a
typical representation case.
First, under current procedures, the petitioner must file the
petition in hard copy. The Board proposed to also permit electronic
filing of the petition.
Second, under current procedures, the petition is filed by the
petitioner and then served by the regional office on the other
interested parties. The Board proposed that the petitioner would
directly serve a copy of the petition.
Third, under current procedures, the petitioner may wait 48 hours
before providing evidence that the employees support the petition (the
``showing of interest''). The Board proposed that the petitioner be
required to file the petition and the showing of interest
simultaneously. The Board also asked for comments concerning whether
electronic signatures should be accepted in support of the showing of
interest.
Fourth, under current procedures, after a petition is filed, the
regional director asks the employer to voluntarily post a generic
notice of employee rights. The Board proposed that the notice describe
the type of petition that has been filed, the name of the petitioner,
the petitioned-for unit, and the procedures that will follow, and that
the employer be required to post the notice.
Fifth, under current procedures, some regional offices routinely
schedule pre-election hearings to commence seven days after the
petition is filed, while other regions wait longer. The Board proposed
that the regional director set the hearing to commence seven days after
the filing of the petition absent ``special circumstances.'' The Board
also proposed that the hearing be continued from day to day absent
extraordinary circumstances.
Sixth, under current procedures, prior to or at the opening of the
pre-election hearing, regional personnel typically ask the parties what
position they will take on the common subjects of pre-election
disputes, such as jurisdiction, the appropriateness of the proposed
unit, and any bars to an election. The Board proposed that non-
petitioning parties be required to file, no later than the opening of
the hearing, a statement of position setting forth their position on
these issues. The Board also proposed that the employer's statement
include a list of employees in the petitioned-for unit.
Seventh, under current procedures, the hearing officer may ask the
parties to clarify their positions on issues
[[Page 80140]]
potentially in dispute. Although the hearing officer can prohibit a
party from introducing evidence when it refuses to take a position on
an issue, hearing officers' practice is not uniform. The Board proposed
that the hearing process be made uniform through use of the following
procedures at the commencement of the pre-election hearing. First, the
petitioner would have to respond to (or ``join'') the issues raised by
the other parties in their statements of position. Second, if there is
a dispute between the parties, each would describe what evidence they
would introduce in support of their position. The hearing officer would
not permit a party to present evidence related to an issue concerning
which the party had failed to take a position or concerning which there
was no genuine dispute of material fact. However, parties could contest
individual employees' eligibility or inclusion for the first time
through a challenge during the election. In addition, the petitioner
would be permitted to present evidence relevant to the appropriateness
of the unit even if the non-petitioning parties declined to take a
position on that issue. Finally, any party could contest the Board's
jurisdiction at any time.
Eighth, under current procedures, the hearing officer takes
evidence at the pre-election hearing on any individual eligibility
issue raised, even though these issues need not be decided pre-
election, and the regional director and Board commonly defer resolution
of the issues until after the election via the challenge procedure. The
Board proposed that the hearing officer exclude evidence relevant only
to individual employees' voting eligibility or inclusion in the unit,
subject to an exception where the dispute involves a total of more than
20 percent of the unit employees.
Ninth, under the current procedures, the parties have a right in
most kinds of cases to file post-hearing briefs at any time up to seven
days after the close of the hearing. The Board proposed to vest the
hearing officer with discretion concerning whether to permit post-
hearing briefs and, if permitted, over their contents and timing.
Tenth, under current procedures, after the pre-election hearing the
regional director can choose to transfer the case to the Board without
deciding it. The Board proposed to eliminate the transfer procedure.
Eleventh, under current procedures, if the regional director
directs an election, the parties are required to request Board review
within 14 days or they waive the right to later raise any issues that
could have been raised at that time. The Board proposed to eliminate
the requirement to request review before the election, instead
permitting the request to be filed after the election and consolidated
with any request for review of the regional director's disposition of
post-election challenges and objections.
Twelfth, under current procedures, parties can request special
permission to appeal both from a ruling of the hearing officer to the
regional director and from a ruling of the hearing officer or the
regional director to the Board, but the regulations establish no
standard for the grant of such requests. The Board proposed a strict
standard for the grant of such requests.
Thirteenth, under current procedures, the regional director is
instructed not to schedule an election sooner than 25 days after his or
her decision, so that the Board can rule on any interlocutory request
for review that might be filed. The Board proposed to eliminate the 25-
day waiting period.
Fourteenth, under current procedures, the employer must give the
region a list of eligible voters within seven days of the regional
director's decision, and the region then gives the list to the other
parties. The Board proposed to codify this requirement, to shorten the
time to two days, and to provide for direct service by the employer on
the other parties.
Fifteenth, under current procedures, the eligibility list contains
only names and home addresses. The Board proposed that the list should
also include available telephone numbers and email addresses, as well
as the work location, shift, and classification for each employee.
Sixteenth, under current procedures, when a charge is filed
alleging the commission of unfair labor practices that could compromise
the fairness of the election, the regional director has discretion to
delay (or ``block'') the election until the issue can be resolved. In
the NPRM, the Board asked for comments on whether the Board should
change its blocking charge policy.
Seventeenth, under current procedures, after the tally of ballots
from the election, the parties have seven days to file a pleading with
the regional director specifying any objections. Objecting parties then
have an additional seven days to describe the evidence supporting their
objections. The Board proposed that the offer of proof be filed
simultaneously with the objections.
Eighteenth, under current procedures, regional directors have
discretion over the scheduling of a hearing concerning challenges or
objections. The Board proposed that the hearing be held fourteen days
after the tally of ballots, or as soon as practicable thereafter.
Nineteenth, under current procedures, in most instances, parties
have a right to appeal a regional director's or hearing officer's
disposition of challenges or objections to the Board. The Board
proposed to make Board review of post-election regional dispositions
discretionary, as is the case with pre-election rulings.
Twentieth, the current regulations are redundant in a number of
places and located in various parts of Title 29 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. The Board proposed to eliminate redundant regulations and
consolidate and reorganize the regulations so that they may be more
easily understood.
C. The Final Rule and a Concise, General Statement of Its Basis and
Purpose
As explained in the NPRM, the Board proposed various revisions to
its rules and regulations to further ``the Act's policy of
expeditiously resolving questions concerning representation'' \6\ and
to better ensure ``that employees' votes may be recorded accurately,
efficiently and speedily.'' \7\ Over 65,000 public comments were filed
in response to the NPRM. Many of the comments focused primarily on a
few of the proposed amendments, most notably the proposed changes
concerning the scheduling of the pre-election hearing, the requirement
of a statement of position, and the content and timing of eligibility
lists. In light of this commentary, further Board deliberation
concerning those proposals (and some others) is necessary at this time.
However, a number of the proposals were less controversial. The Board
has had the opportunity to fully consider all the comments and to
deliberate concerning the proposed amendments and believes it is
appropriate to adopt some of the proposals in this final rule and leave
the others for further consideration. The Board considers the
amendments adopted in this final rule to be severable from the
remainder of the proposals, and from each other.\8\
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\6\ Northeastern University, 261 NLRB 1001, 1002 (1982),
enforced, 707 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1983).
\7\ NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 331 (1946).
\8\ Each of the major changes adopted in this final rule is
independently justified, and thus the Board has decided to adopt
each of them, while also deciding to deliberate further on the
remaining proposals. Although, at a very high level of generality,
the various proposals in the NPRM shared a common purpose to improve
``efficiency,'' in fact, each of the proposals addressed discrete
sources of inefficiency in the rules, and it is clear that the
amendments will serve their functions whether adopted in whole or in
part, together or one at a time. For this reason as well, each of
the amendments in this final rule would be adopted by the Board
independently of the others.
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[[Page 80141]]
For the reasons explained below, the Board has decided to adopt the
following eight proposals at this time.
First, the Board has decided to amend Sec. 102.64 in order to
expressly construe Section 9(c) of the Act and to state that the
statutory purpose of a pre-election hearing is to determine if a
question of representation exists. Second, the Board has decided to
amend Sec. 102.66(a) and eliminate Sec. 101.20(c) (along with all of
Part 101, Subpart C) in order to ensure that hearing officers presiding
over pre-election hearings have the authority to limit the presentation
of evidence to that which supports a party's contentions and which is
relevant to the existence of a question concerning representation.
Third, the Board has decided to amend Sec. 102.66(d) to afford hearing
officers presiding over pre-election hearings discretion over the
filing of post-hearing briefs, including over the subjects to be
addressed and the time for filing. Fourth, the Board has decided to
amend Sec. Sec. 102.67 and 102.69 to eliminate the parties' right to
file a pre-election request for review of a regional director's
decision and direction of election, and instead to defer all requests
for Board review until after the election, when any such request can be
consolidated with a request for review of any post-election rulings.
Fifth, the Board has decided to eliminate the recommendation in Sec.
101.21(d) (as stated, along with all of Part 101, Subpart C) that the
regional director should ordinarily not schedule an election sooner
than 25 days after the decision and direction of election in order to
give the Board an opportunity to rule on a pre-election request for
review. Sixth, the Board has decided to amend Sec. 102.65 to make
explicit and narrow the circumstances under which a request for special
permission to appeal to the Board will be granted. Seventh, the Board
has decided to amend Sec. Sec. 102.62(b) and 102.69 to create a
uniform procedure for resolving election objections and potentially
outcome-determinative challenges in stipulated and directed election
cases and to provide that Board review of regional directors'
resolution of such disputes is discretionary. Eighth, as mentioned, the
Board has decided to eliminate part 101, subpart C of its regulations,
which is redundant. The remainder of the amendments merely conform
other sections of the Board's Rules and Regulations to the eight
amendments described above. The Board has concluded, after careful
review of all public comments and after deliberation, that adopting
those eight proposals in a final rule will eliminate wholly unnecessary
litigation and delay in the processing of petitions filed under Section
9 of the Act and thus in the resolution of questions of
representation.\9\
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\9\ The Board has not, in each instance, adopted the precise
rule language proposed in the NPRM. To the extent alternative
language has been adopted in the final rule, the Board sets forth
its rationale in Part IV below.
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The current rules have been interpreted to give parties a right to
present evidence at a pre-election hearing relating to matters that
need not be addressed in order for the hearing to fulfill its statutory
function of creating a record based on which the regional director can
determine if there is a question of representation that should be
answered via an election. Furthermore, the current rules have been
understood to give parties a right to present evidence at a pre-
election hearing concerning such matters even though neither the
regional director nor the Board must address those matters prior to the
election, and a decision on such matters is commonly deferred until
after the election. In other words, such litigation is wholly
unnecessary prior to an election. Moreover, the issues in dispute in
such litigation are often rendered moot by the election results or
resolved by the parties post-election, thus eliminating the need for
litigation of the issues. Therefore, the Board has determined that
amending Sec. 102.64(a) to expressly construe the statutory purpose of
the hearing and amending Sec. 102.66(a) to vest hearing officers with
authority to limit the presentation of evidence to that supporting a
party's contentions and relevant to the existence of a question
concerning representation will eliminate unnecessary litigation and
delay.
After the pre-election hearing, the filing of post-hearing briefs
often delays issuance of the regional director's decision and direction
of election, thereby delaying resolution of the question of
representation even when the issue or issues in dispute can be
accurately and fairly resolved without briefing. Given the recurring
and often familiar and uncomplicated legal and factual issues arising
in pre-election hearings, the filing of briefs, which also imposes
financial costs on the parties, is not necessary in every case to
permit the parties to fully and fairly present their positions or to
facilitate prompt and accurate decisions. Therefore, the Board has
decided to amend Sec. 102.66(d) to vest hearing officers presiding
over pre-election hearings with authority to provide for the filing of
post-hearing briefs only in those instances when they would be of
assistance to the decision-maker and to control the subjects addressed
in, and the time for filing of, any such briefs. The Board has
determined that amending the rules to give the hearing officer
discretion to permit the filing of post-hearing briefs will eliminate
unnecessary expense and delay.
The Board's current rules require parties to file a request for
review of the regional director's decision and direction of election
before the election is held in order to preserve their right to raise
disputed issues in post-election proceedings, even though the issues in
dispute are often rendered moot by the election results or resolved by
the parties post-election thus eliminating the need for litigation of
the issues at any time. The pre-election request for review procedure
is inconsistent with judicial procedures, which limit interlocutory
appeals in order to avoid unnecessary litigation and delay. In
addition, Sec. 101.21(d) of the Board's current Statements of
Procedure provides that elections ``normally'' are delayed for a period
of at least 25 days after the regional director directs that an
election should be conducted, ``to permit the Board to rule on any
request for review which may be filed.'' This provision effectively
stays the conduct of all elections for at least 25 days despite
Congress's instruction in Section 3(b) of the Act that even the grant
of review by the Board ``shall not, unless specifically ordered by the
Board, operate as a stay of any action taken by the regional
director.'' Furthermore, even in the cases in which a request for
review is filed, review is granted only rarely and the Board almost
never stays the conduct of the election either before or after granting
review, instead permitting employees to vote and then impounding the
ballots. For these reasons, the waiting period unnecessarily delays the
resolution of questions of representation in all cases, and the delay
is not justified by the only purpose articulated in the Board's
Statements of Procedure. Therefore, the Board has determined that
amending the rules to defer the right to file requests for review of
the direction of the election until after the election and to eliminate
the mandatory waiting period will eliminate unnecessary litigation and
delay.
Consistent with the effort to avoid piecemeal appeals to the Board,
the Board has also decided to amend Sec. 102.65 to provide that a
request for special permission to appeal to the Board will only be
granted under
[[Page 80142]]
extraordinary circumstances, when it appears that the issue will
otherwise evade review. To further discourage piecemeal appeals, the
amendments provide that a party need not seek special permission to
appeal in order to preserve an issue for review post-election.
Consistent with current practice, the amendments provide that neither
the filing of a request for special permission to appeal nor the grant
of such a request will stay an election or any other action or require
impounding of ballots unless specifically ordered by the Board. The
Board has determined that narrowing the circumstances under which a
request for special permission to appeal will be granted will eliminate
unnecessary litigation and delay.
Under the current rules, the nature of Board review of a regional
director's disposition of pre- and post-election disputes varies, but
for no articulated reason. Pre-election review is discretionary, while
post-election review is ordinarily mandatory. This is the case even
though many post-election disputes raise no question of policy and
often turn on the application of well-established principles of law to
particular facts. In addition, the procedures for post-election review
vary from case to case even though the nature of the issues is the
same. Therefore, the Board has decided to amend Sec. Sec. 102.62(b)
and 102.69 to create a uniform procedure in both stipulated and
directed election cases, whereby parties may file exceptions to any
hearing officer's report with the regional director, and file a request
for review of the regional director's disposition of the post-election
matters with the Board. That request may be consolidated with a request
for review of the regional director's decision and direction of
election, if any. Permitting the Board to deny review when a party's
request raises no compelling grounds for review will eliminate the most
significant source of administrative delay in achieving finality of
election results. The Board has determined that amending the rules to
create this uniform procedure for handling pre- and post-election
disputes will eliminate unnecessary litigation and delay.
Finally, the Board currently has two sets of regulations describing
its procedures in representation cases, one in Part 102, Subpart C of
its Rules and Regulations and the other in Part 101, Subpart C of its
Statements of Procedure. 29 CFR Part 102, Subpart C; 29 CFR Part 101,
Subpart C. The two sets of regulations are almost entirely redundant.
This redundancy is a potential source of confusion. The Board has
determined that eliminating Part 101, Subpart C will reduce such
confusion.
II. The Rulemaking Process
A. A Brief History of Board Rulemaking
As the NPRM explains, the Board has amended its representation case
procedures repeatedly over the years as part of a continuing effort to
improve the process and eliminate unnecessary delays. Indeed, the Board
has amended its representation case procedures more than three dozen
times since they were published in the very first volume of the Federal
Register, 1 FR 207 (April 18, 1936), and has only rarely utilized the
Administrative Procedures Act's notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures; most often the Board simply implemented the changes without
prior notice or request for public comment.
In fact, the Board has seldom acted through notice-and-comment
rulemaking on any subject. The Board typically makes substantive policy
determinations in the course of adjudication rather than through
rulemaking, a practice that has occasionally drawn the ire of academic
commentators and the courts.\10\
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\10\ See R. Alexander Acosta, Rebuilding the Board: An Argument
for Structural Change, over Policy Prescriptions, at the NLRB, 5 FIU
L. Rev. 347, 351-52 (2010); Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB's
Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 79 Yale L.J. 571 (1970); Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation
at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 Admin. L. Rev. 163
(1985); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Potential of Rulemaking by the NLRB,
5 FIU L. Rev. 411, 414-17, 435 (Spring 2010); Kenneth Kahn, The NLRB
and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through
Adjudication, 21 UCLA L. Rev. 63 (1973); Charles J. Morris, The NLRB
in the Dog House--Can an Old Board Learn New Tricks?, 24 San Diego
L. Rev. 9 (1987); Cornelius Peck, The Atrophied Rulemaking Powers of
the National Labor Relations Board, 70 Yale L.J. 729 (1961);
Cornelius J. Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations
Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-
Making, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 254 (1968); David L. Shapiro, The Choice
of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921 (1965); Carl S. Silverman, The Case for
the National Labor Relations Board's Use of Rulemaking in Asserting
Jurisdiction, 25 Lab. L.J. 607 (1974); and Berton B. Subrin,
Conserving Energy at the Labor Board: The Case for Making Rules on
Collective Bargaining Units, 32 Lab. L.J. 105 (1981); see also NLRB
v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764, 770, 777, 779, 783 n.2 (1969). The
Portland Cement Association (PCA) contends, as it did in another
recent Board rulemaking, that the Board should place these and other
law review articles discussed in the NPRM online for the public to
read for free on regulations.gov. Just as the Board replied in that
prior rulemaking, 76 FR 54014, the Board has placed these articles
in the hard copy docket, but has not uploaded these articles to the
electronic docket because such an action could violate copyright
laws. It should also be noted that these materials are generally
available in libraries.
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The Board has thus asked for public comments on few proposed rules
of any kind. A review of prior Board rulemaking procedures reveals that
the Board has not held a public hearing attended by all Board Members
for at least half a century. In the rulemaking proceedings that
resulted in adoption of rules defining appropriate units in acute care
hospitals, the Board directed an administrative law judge to hold a
series of public hearings to take evidence concerning the proposed
rules, but no Board Members participated in the hearings. In fact, even
in the course of adjudication, the Board has not held oral argument
since 2007 and has held only two oral arguments in the last decade. The
last open meeting of the Board, prior to the open meeting on November
30, 2011, to discuss and vote on whether to adopt any of the proposed
amendments in a final rule in this proceeding, was held in 1989 and
also concerned the acute care hospital bargaining-unit rule.
B. The Process of This Rulemaking
On June 22, 2011, the Board issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
The Notice provided 60 days for comments and 14 additional days for
reply comments, and announced a public hearing to be held on July 18
and 19, 2011. The Board issued press releases about the proposals and
hearings, and placed summaries, answers to frequently asked questions,
and other more detailed information on its Web site (www.nlrb.gov).
The Board Members also held two days of hearings in Washington, DC,
on July 18 and 19, 2011, where 66 individuals representing diverse
organizations and groups gave oral statements and answered questions
asked by the Board Members. The purpose of all of these procedures was
to give the Board the benefit of the views of the public. In this the
Board was quite successful, receiving 65,958 written comments and
taking 438 transcript pages of oral testimony.
Nonetheless, a number of comments criticize the Board's process:
Some claim there should have been some pre-notice-and-comment notice
and opportunity to comment; some criticize the length of the hearing (2
full days), the location of the hearing (Washington, DC), or the timing
of the hearing (halfway through the comment period); some criticize the
length of the comment periods (60 days plus 14 days).
1. The Pre-NPRM Process
The comment of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
[[Page 80143]]
America (the Chamber) provides a representative example of criticism of
the pre-NPRM process. The Chamber believes that the Board missed ``an
opportunity to explore whether a consensus could have been reached'' on
the rule among stakeholder groups through forums such as the American
Bar Association's Labor and Employment Law Section. The Chamber
concedes that stakeholders ``have widely divergent views,'' but argues
that a consensus on at least some changes might have been reached. The
Chamber suggests that the Board should withdraw the NPRM and publish a
more open-ended Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
The Chamber cites Executive Order 13563 Section 2(c) (``Improving
Regulation and Regulatory Review''), 76 FR 51735, as support. Section
2(c) of the Executive Order states that ``[b]efore issuing a proposed
regulation, each agency, where feasible and appropriate, shall seek the
views of those who are likely to be affected * * *.'' Id. In the NPRM,
the Board explained the decision to issue a set of specific proposals,
rather than a more open-ended Advanced NPRM, by stating that ``public
participation would be more orderly and meaningful if it was based on *
* * specific proposals.'' 76 FR 36829. The Chamber incorrectly suggests
the Board conceded that it violated the Executive Order, and questions
whether the comment process actually was more orderly or meaningful.
Some other comments suggest that the Board should have engaged in
negotiated rulemaking, or that the pre-NPRM process was insufficiently
transparent.\11\
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\11\ See, e.g., joint comment of HR Policy Association and
Society for Human Resource Management (collectively, SHRM); Greater
Easley Chamber of Commerce; Georgia Association of Manufacturers
(GAM).
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The Board continues to believe that it has followed a lawful, fair,
and open process that succeeded in eliciting broad and informed public
participation to a greater extent than ever before in connection with
the Board's representation (or unfair labor practice) case procedures.
An agency generally has discretion over its pre-NPRM procedures,
including whether to use advanced NPRMs, negotiated rulemaking, or
other pre-NPRM consultation. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 543-44 (1978).
Moreover, as recognized by the American Hospital Association (AHA), the
Board is not directly subject to E.O. 13563, nor is its language
pertaining to pre-NPRM procedures mandatory in any event. As explained
in the NPRM, in this instance, the Board concluded that beginning the
process of public comment by issuing a NPRM would be the most effective
method of proceeding.
The course of proceedings since issuance of the NPRM has confirmed
the Board's initial judgment. The notice of the two-day public hearing
published in the Federal Register on June 27, 2011, specifically
invited interested members of the public to appear and comment on the
proposals set forth in the NPRM and to ``make other proposals for
improving representation case procedures.'' 76 FR 37291. Yet at the
public hearing, while the Board heard a considerable amount of valuable
testimony concerning the specific proposals in the NPRM, it received
almost no suggestions unrelated to those proposals. Similarly, in the
NPRM, while the Board proposed specific rule language related to most
of the problems it identified, in several areas the Board identified a
problem or question and invited comment without proposing specific rule
language. For example, the Board specifically invited comments on
whether the Board should take any action related to the use of
electronic signatures in relation to the showing of interest supporting
certain forms of petitions. 76 FR 36812, 36819. The Board also
specifically invited comments ``on whether any final amendments should
include changes in the current blocking charge policy.'' 76 FR 36812,
36827. The NPRM specifically invited comments on whether the Board
should change that policy in several respects or leave the policy
unchanged. Id. While the Board received many meaningful comments on the
specific proposals in the NPRM, it received very few comments in
response to the more open-ended inquiries, and the comments that were
received were less specific and less helpful in analyzing the
procedural questions at stake.
The Board also is doubtful about the Chamber's suggestion that a
broad consensus might have been reached through a different process. As
the Chamber concedes, the labor-management bar is polarized on many of
the relevant issues. Given the degree of polarization reflected both at
the public hearing and in the comments, the Board continues to believe
that following the notice-and-comment procedures set forth in the APA--
and thereby giving formal notice of specific proposals to all members
of the public at the same time in the Federal Register and permitting
all members of the public to comment on those proposals through the
same procedures and during the same time periods--was the fairest and
soundest method of proceeding.
In sum, the Board's pre-NPRM process was lawful and appropriate.
2. The Length, Timing, and Location of the Hearing
The Board Members held a two-day public hearing in Washington, DC,
approximately halfway through the initial comment period, i.e., about
one month after publication of the NPRM and one month before the
initial comment period closed. All Board Members heard five-minute
statements from 66 individuals, representing diverse organizations and
groups, and then actively questioned the speakers for an additional
period of time.\12\ This hearing was not legally required.
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\12\ After the public hearing, the transcript of each speaker's
testimony along with any Board questioning of the speaker was made
part of the record of the rulemaking as a separate comment. Any such
testimony discussed in this final rule is cited as follows:
``Testimony of [name of speaker].''
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Some comments compare this proceeding to the hospital unit
rulemaking and essentially argue that the Board should have held 14
days of hearings around the country over the course of years.\13\ For
example, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)--and many
nearly identical form comments by member companies--claim that the
``relative rush'' of these hearings ``is a departure from past Board
practice that will result in both an inadequate opportunity for
stakeholders to address the merits of the rules and inadequate
information and data for the Board to make a prudential judgment
regarding the rules.''
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\13\ See, e.g., Coalition for a Democratic Workplace (CDW);
Council on Labor Law Equality (COLLE); SHRM. By contrast, scholars
have described the Board's procedures in the earlier rulemaking as
``procedural overkill.'' See Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB's First
Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 Duke L. J. 274, 319
(1991).
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Agencies are not bound to use the same procedures in every
rulemaking proceeding. Otherwise, agencies could neither learn from
experience, e.g., what rulemaking procedures are helpful and what
procedures are simply wasteful, nor adopt procedures suited to the
precise question at stake. The procedures the Board has employed in
order to obtain public input on proposed rules have, in fact, varied
considerably, and the Board has substantial discretion to use
procedures suited to the matter under consideration. Indeed, the Board
has adopted amendments to its representation case procedures without
any notice or opportunity for comment or with opportunities
considerably more
[[Page 80144]]
limited than in the instant matter.\14\ In contrast to the subject
matter of the acute care hospital unit proceeding, the proposals at
issue in this proceeding involve a matter uniquely within the Board's
own expertise: the operation of the Board's own procedural rules.
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\14\ In its run-off election rulemaking proceedings, for
example, the Board provided only two weeks for comments, with a
short hearing on the final day of the comment period. 8 FR 10031-32
(1943).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Board believes that the hearing not only exceeded the
requirements of the APA, it was fair, appropriate, and useful. Holding
the hearing in Washington, DC was appropriate because many of the
Board's major stakeholders are either headquartered in DC or are
represented by counsel in the city or who frequently appear in the
city.\15\
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\15\ No party informed the Board that it wished to appear at the
hearing but was unable to send a representative to Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The hearing was also properly noticed and appropriately timed
during the initial comment period. The NPRM was published on June 22,
2011, and informed the public that the Board intended to hold a public
hearing on July 18 and 19. A subsequent notice published in the Federal
Register on June 27, 2011 informed the public of the details of the
hearing. 76 FR 37291. In fact, the Board accommodated all parties who
wished to appear at the hearing, even those whose requests to appear
were made after the deadline.\16\ That the public notice was sufficient
to permit interested parties to appear is evidenced by the fact that 66
individuals appeared at the hearing, representing many major management
and labor organizations as well as many other groups. No individual or
organization informed the Board that it was unable to participate due
to the shortness of time between the June 22 and June 27 notices and
the hearing. The two-day hearing was held about a month after the NPRM
was published, giving participants adequate time to carefully read the
proposal, consult with each other and with clients, and develop
detailed positions. And the five minutes that speakers were given was
supplemented by substantial time for questioning and the opportunity
for written comments. Some speakers gave 2,000 words or more of well-
informed testimony during their allotted time. In total, the hearings
resulted in more than 400 pages of transcript (promptly made available
to the public on the Board's Web site \17\). The Board found that the
speakers provided informed, thorough, and thoughtful analysis, and the
back-and-forth dialogue with the Board Members demonstrated the wide-
ranging familiarity of the speakers with the proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ The Board did, however, limit organizations to presenting
one speaker at the hearing.
\17\ The hearing was also streamed live on the Board's Web site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some comments suggest that the hearing should have been held after
the comment period closed so that the speakers could address arguments
presented in the written comments. But holding the hearing first made
the subsequent written comments more informed, thoughtful, and
technically sophisticated, and many commenters, such as the Chamber,
took the opportunity to cite extensively from the hearing transcripts
for support and to respond to arguments made at the hearing. The Board
believes the chosen sequence--the hearing followed by the close of the
initial comment period and then the reply period--produced more
meaningful public comments than the proposed alternative because
written comments are better suited to the technical issues at stake and
thus appropriately came after the public hearing.
In sum, the Board believes that the two-day public hearing attended
by all Board Members was highly valuable, was of an appropriate length,
and was held at an appropriate time and in an appropriate location.
3. The Length and Timing of the Comment Periods
The Board provided an initial comment period of 60 days beginning
June 22, followed by a reply comment period of 14 days that ended on
September 6, 2011. No late comments were accepted.
COLLE describes the NLRB's comment period as ``the bare-minimum 60-
day[s],'' but the APA provides no minimum comment period, and many
agencies, including the Board in some recent rulemaking proceedings,
have afforded comment periods of only 30 days. The agency has
discretion to provide still shorter periods, and is simply ``encouraged
to provide an appropriate explanation for doing so.'' Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS), Recommendation 2011-2 at 3
(June 16, 2011). Indeed, for procedural rules, such as the final rule
here, no comment period at all is required.
Sixty days has become the benchmark period for comments on
significant substantive rules. Id. Countless NPRMs provide 60 days for
comments.
Nevertheless, a number of comments opposing the rule assert that
the comment period was inadequate. For example, SHRM characterized the
comment period as ``hurried, abridged and clandestine.'' But the
Montana Chamber of Commerce--though opposing the rule--states that
``[t]his 60-day window seems like a very reasonable timeframe to allow
ample comments and statements from all interested parties, whether they
are supportive of these sweeping changes or not.''
In practice, the Montana Chamber of Commerce proved correct on this
point: 60 days was quite ample. The Board received hundreds of
detailed, informed, and thoughtful comments. Many were submitted by the
very same parties that asserted the comment period should have been
longer, such as the 88-page comment--and hundreds of accompanying
nearly identical form comments--submitted by SHRM and its members. The
U.S. Chamber states that it needed more time to ``study Board data''
and conduct ``rigorous'' economic analysis. But the Chamber did provide
detailed discussions of data and many studies in its comment. Although
the desire for additional time to gather additional support and develop
arguments is understandable, agencies must set some end to the comment
period: ``Agencies should set comment periods that consider the
competing interests of promoting optimal public participation while
ensuring that the rulemaking is conducted efficiently.'' ACUS 2011-2 at
3.
Fourteen days were given for reply comments. The Chamber suggested
that 14 days was insufficient time to review tens of thousands of
comments, and noted that some of the comments submitted were not
available to the public until some time after the close of the initial
comment period. Neither the APA nor any other law requires an
opportunity to reply to initial public comments. Moreover, while some
comments were not available to the public immediately upon the close of
the initial comment period, the comments that were unavailable were
largely identical ``postcard comments,'' tens of thousands supporting
the proposal in general terms, and tens of thousands opposing the
proposal in general terms.\18\ And the purpose of the reply period was
not to afford interested
[[Page 80145]]
parties an opportunity to read and reply to all of the comments
submitted, but to provide an opportunity to read the most significant
comments and respond to the arguments raised in them.
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\18\ By August 24, 2011, the day after the close of the initial
comment period, 29,236 timely filed initial comments were available
electronically for review. The Board believes, based on its staff's
investigation, that initial comments that were not available at that
time fall into one of three categories: (1) Timely filed form
letters submitted by the AFL-CIO, (2) timely filed form letters
submitted by Americans for Prosperity or CDW or mailed by individual
businesses using a common form, and (3) late-filed comments
submitted electronically.
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This the Chamber and others did quite successfully within the 14
days provided. For example, the Service Employees International Union
(SEIU) cited and replied to over twenty unique, detailed, and lengthy
comments submitted by other parties. Others, such as the Association of
Corporate Counsel (ACC), took the opportunity to focus on elaborating
one particular issue of special importance. Both approaches were quite
helpful, and served the purpose for which the Board afforded the reply
period.
The over 65,000 comments submitted and the depth of analysis they
provided are ample testament to the adequacy of the opportunities for
public participation in the rulemaking process.
4. The Final Rule
In light of the procedural concerns voiced in some of the comments,
it seems likely that some stakeholders will believe that the period of
time between the close of the reply comment period and the issuance of
the final rule was too short, and that the Board was required to spend
additional time considering the comments. This concern is suggested by
NAM in its reply comment, stating that ``failure to give due
consideration to the public comments would nonetheless render * * * the
rules * * * arbitrary and capricious * * *. Absent due consideration of
all the comments, the Board would be unable to certify that it has
examined and considered all relevant arguments and data.''
In order to allay this concern, the Board assures all those who
provided comments that the Board, through its Members personally or
staff acting at the Members' direction, read every non-duplicative
comment.\19\ The comments were coded so that all comments addressing
specific issues could be electronically identified. All specific
arguments raised in the comments were identified, grouped by subject
matter, and analyzed. Through this process, the Board has read and
carefully considered every relevant argument, datum, or suggestion in
the comments.
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\19\ Using electronic means, the Board identified all identical
comments and read only one of each group of identical comments. More
than 90 percent of the over 65,000 comments were duplicates, near
duplicates, devoid of analysis, or irrelevant. In this connection,
see ACUS 2011-1 ] 1(a)(1): While 5 U.S.C. 553 requires agencies to
consider all comments received, it does not require agencies to
ensure that a person reads each one of multiple identical or nearly
identical comments.
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Finally, the Board has decided to take additional time to
deliberate concerning the majority of the proposals in the NPRM,
including many of those that generated the most comments and
controversy.
The Board thoroughly considered and deliberated about all
substantive comments relevant to the final rule.
Some comments expressed the view that the rulemaking procedure
suggested a fait accompli, or created an appearance of favoritism.\20\
Any sense of a fait accompli could have mistakenly arisen only from the
detailed specificity of most of the proposed amendments, as compared
with the open-ended queries concerning several subjects. However, as
explained above, the comments addressing the proposals accompanied by
proposed rule text and detailed explanation far exceeded in number and
quality those addressing the open-ended questions unaccompanied by such
specifics, bearing out the Board's judgment that a more specific
proposal would promote more useful public participation in the process.
And contrary to any suggestion of favoritism, the process was
completely transparent and provided multiple opportunities for any
member of the public to participate. The process resulted in
significant changes to the proposed rule as well as a decision not to
proceed with all the proposals at this time. In short, the process was
fair, open, and successful.
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\20\ See, e.g., CDW; Indiana Chamber of Commerce.
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5. Board Membership
Some comments question whether a divided three-member Board can or
should issue a final rule, arguing that the Board lacks the authority
to do so or that such action would be contrary to the Board's
traditions or otherwise imprudent.\21\ Certain comments contend that a
Board Member serving a recess appointment may not, or should not,
participate in any action that represents a change in Board law or
practice.\22\ After careful consideration, the Board rejects these
arguments.
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\21\ See, e.g., Chamber; SHRM; Associated Builders & Contractors
(ABC).
\22\ See, e.g., National Grocers Association (NGA); Testimony of
Harold Weinrich.
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Under the National Labor Relations Act, a lawful quorum of the
Board consists of three Members (out of the five Members provided for
by the statute). Section 3(b) of the Act expressly provides that:
A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the
remaining members to exercise all of the powers of the Board, and
three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum
of the Board * * *.
29 U.S.C. 153(b). See generally New Process Steel L.P. v. NLRB, ----
U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 2635, 2639-42 (2010) (analyzing quorum
requirement). Rulemaking is one of the ``powers of the Board,'' as
Section 6 of the Act provides. See 29 U.S.C. 156. Adoption of the final
rule, then, reflects the proper exercise of the Board's powers by the
majority of a lawful quorum of three Members.
Nothing in the text of the Act or its legislative history suggests
that, even if the Board has a lawful quorum, certain Board powers may
be exercised only if approved by at least three Members. Put somewhat
differently, there is no statutory basis to argue that a three-Member
quorum of the Board must act unanimously--as opposed to acting by
majority vote as is typical--in order properly to exercise the Board's
powers. During the many periods in which the Board consisted of only
three Members, including the period since August 27, 2011, it routinely
has issued non-unanimous decisions in adjudicated cases. See, e.g.
Arkema, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 103 (Oct. 31, 2011); Allied Mechanical
Services, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 101 (Oct. 25, 2011).
The Board does have a tradition of not overruling its own prior
decisions through adjudication with fewer than three votes to do so.
See Hacienda Resort Hotel & Casino, 355 NLRB No. 154, slip op. at 2, 2
n.1 (2010) (concurring opinion of Chairman Liebman and Member Pearce)
(listing cases dating to 1985). This tradition--which is not unbroken
\23\--is not based on the Act itself, nor has it been codified in a
Board rule or statement of procedure.
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\23\ See Mathews Readymix, Inc., 324 NLRB 1005, 1008 n. 14
(1997), enforced, 165 F.3d 74 (DC Cir. 1999) (two-member majority
overrules precedent); Service Employees Local 87 (Cresleigh Mgmt.),
324 NLRB 774, 775 n.3 (19