Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Theft Protection and Rollaway Prevention, 77183-77200 [2011-31441]

Agencies

• National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 238 (Monday, December 12, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 77183-77200]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-31441]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. NHTSA-2011-0174]
RIN 2127-AK88


Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Theft Protection and 
Rollaway Prevention

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: In this NPRM, we (NHTSA) address safety issues arising from 
increasing variations of keyless ignition controls, and the operation 
of those controls. At issue are drivers' inability to stop a moving 
vehicle in a panic situation, and drivers who unintentionally leave the 
vehicle without the vehicle transmission's being ``locked in park,'' or 
with the engine still running, increasing the chances of vehicle 
rollaway or carbon monoxide poisoning in an enclosed area.
    Therefore in this NPRM, among other matters, we propose to 
standardize the operation of controls that are used to stop the vehicle 
engine or other propulsion system and that do not involve the use of a 
physical key. We are also proposing to require that an audible warning 
be given to any driver who: Attempts to shut down the propulsion system 
without first moving the gear selection control to the ``park'' 
position (for vehicles with a ``park'' position); exits a vehicle 
without having first moved the gear selection control to ``park'' (for 
vehicles with a ``park'' position), or exits a vehicle without first 
turning off the propulsion system.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before March 12, 2012.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments to the docket number identified in 
the heading of this document by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting 
comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, M-30, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, West Building, Ground Floor, Rm. W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE. Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: West Building Ground Floor, Room 
W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Eastern 
Time, Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
    Regardless of how you submit your comments, you should mention the 
docket number of this document.
    You may call the Docket at (202) 366-9324.
    Instructions: For detailed instructions on submitting comments and 
additional information on the rulemaking process, see the Public 
Participation heading of the Supplementary Information section of this 
document. Note that all comments received will be posted without change 
to https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information 
provided.
    Privacy Act: Please see the Privacy Act heading under Rulemaking 
Analyses and Notices.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For non-legal issues, Ms. Gayle 
Dalrymple, Office of Crash Avoidance Standards (telephone: 202-366-
5559) (fax: (202) 493-2990). Ms. Dalrymple's mailing address is 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NVS-112, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
    For legal issues, Ms. Dorothy Nakama, Office of the Chief Counsel 
(telephone: (202) 366-2992) (fax: (202) 366-3820). Ms. Nakama's mailing 
address is National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NCC-112, 
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Background
III. Safety Need for Proposed Changes to FMVSS No. 114
    A. Inability To Stop a Moving Vehicle in a Panic Situation
    B. Rollaway--Leaving a Vehicle Not in ``Park''
    C. Leaving the Vehicle With the Vehicle Propulsion System 
Unintentionally Left Active
IV. Society of Automotive Engineers Effort in This Area
V. NHTSA's Proposal
    A. New Definitions
    B. Standardizing Shutting Down a Moving Vehicle's Propulsion 
System
    C. Audible Warning When Key Is in the Starting System and the 
Driver Opens the Door
    D. Audible Warning To Prevent Rollaways
    E. Audible Warning To Reduce Chances of Drivers' Leaving a 
Vehicle With the Propulsion System Active
    F. Owners' Manual Required Language
VI. Other Issues Considered by NHTSA
    A. Propulsion System Kill Switch in Plain View of the Driver
    B. Stepping on Brake Before Starting the Propulsion System

[[Page 77184]]

    C. Specified Actuation Time for the Propulsion System Start 
Control
    D. Automatic Timed Shut-Off of Propulsion System for a 
Stationary Vehicle
    E. Preventing Shut-Off of Propulsion System for a Stationary 
Vehicle Not in ``Park''
VII. Additional Questions
VIII. Benefits, Costs and Lead Time
IX. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
X. Public Participation

I. Executive Summary

    In this notice, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) addresses safety issues arising from increased availability of 
ignition systems that do not use physical keys to start and stop 
passenger motor vehicles' engines or other propulsion systems. At issue 
are drivers' inability to stop a moving vehicle in a panic situation, 
and drivers who unintentionally leave the vehicle without the vehicle 
transmission's being locked in ``park,'' or with the engine still 
running, increasing the chances of vehicle rollaway or carbon monoxide 
poisoning in an enclosed area.
    Therefore in this NPRM, among other matters, we propose to 
standardize the length of time it is necessary to push a control to 
stop the vehicle engine or other propulsion system. We are also 
proposing to require that an audible warning be given to any driver 
who: (1) Attempts to shut down the propulsion system without first 
moving the gear selection control to the ``park'' position (for 
vehicles with a ``park'' position); (2) exits a vehicle without having 
first moved the gear selection control to ``park'' (for vehicles with a 
``park'' position), or (3) exits a vehicle without first turning off 
the propulsion system.
    This rulemaking action is undertaken in response to our review of 
complaints from consumers to our Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) 
reporting incidents such as those described above and investigations of 
crashes and complaints regarding unintended acceleration.\1\ While we 
recognize that this is not the traditional data base upon which our 
agency typically bases a rulemaking, we believe that, in this instance, 
we are addressing an emerging safety issue with non-standardized new 
technology in way that imposes minimal cost on vehicle manufacturers, 
especially given that the proposed two-year lead time of the new 
requirements, and that many vehicles already have some form of the 
features we are proposing today.
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    \1\ We also note the recommendation of the National Aeronautic 
and Space Administration's (NASA) Engineering and Safety Center 
(NESC) that NHTSA consider regulation of ``controls for managing 
safety critical functions'' and that we noted that ``Keyless 
ignition systems can exacerbate UA incidents (particularly prolonged 
incidents involving a stuck accelerator pedal) if the driver cannot 
determine how to shut off the engine quickly.'' ``Technical 
Assessment of Toyota Electronic Throttle Control (ETC) Systems,'' 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, February 2011, page 
65.
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    Today's proposal would, if finalized:
     Clarify that definitions for ``key'' and ``starting 
system'' currently in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 
114 apply to all propulsion systems.
     Propose a new definition for ``key code carrying device.''
     Propose to revise the definition of ``starting system.''
     Propose a new definition for ``stop control.''
     Delete the door opening alert exclusion currently in FMVSS 
No. 114 for a running vehicle (only for vehicles equipped with keyless 
ignition).
     Add requirements for the operation of a pushed stop 
control: The driver must hold the control for a minimum of 500 
milliseconds to shut down the propulsion system, whether the vehicle is 
moving or stationary, and the propulsion system must shut down within 1 
second of the initial push of the stop control.
     Add a requirement for an internal alert to the driver when 
s/he requests propulsion system shut down without first placing the 
gear selection control in ``park.''
     Add a requirement for an external alert that the driver 
and bystanders can hear when the vehicle is not in ``park'' and the 
driver exits the vehicle.
     Add a requirement for an external alert that sounds when 
the driver leaves a keyless ignition vehicle with the propulsion system 
active.
     Add new test procedures for the new requirements.
    We believe that the benefits of the new requirements proposed 
today, while not yet quantifiable on a national level, will reduce the 
risk that drivers will misuse these new keyless ignition systems and 
therefore also reduce:
     Crashes, injuries and deaths resulting from a driver's 
inability to shut down a moving vehicle;
     Rollaway incidents due to drivers failing to place the 
gear shift control in ``park'' before shutting down the propulsion 
system, and leaving the vehicle; and
     Incidents of carbon monoxide poisoning due to drivers 
inadvertently leaving a vehicle running or with its propulsion system 
active in an enclosed space, such as a garage adjoining a home.
    We believe that taking precautionary action now, before these non-
standardized systems become more widely available, will be beneficial 
to highway safety. Production of vehicles with these systems has grown 
from about 5,000 vehicles in model year 2002 to over 1,2 million in 
model year 2008. We believe we will accrue benefits by establishing a 
consistent experience for the users across all vehicles and a 
consistent way to turn off the propulsion system whether the vehicle is 
moving or not. This not only simplifies training new drivers, but also 
training drivers new to keyless ignition vehicles, and reduces the 
stress and confusion relating to fundamental differences in how one 
operates a vehicle. This is especially important in vehicles that 
provide less obvious cues as to the state of the engine and the 
starting system. If the measures we propose in this notice prevent just 
one serious injury over three years, the rule will be cost beneficial. 
We believe the countermeasures we have proposed can reasonably be 
expected to have their intended effect based on similar requirements 
already in place in FMVSS No. 114 and other standards and in common 
automotive practice. For example, the warning to drivers to take their 
keys with them when they leave their vehicles (currently in FMVSS No. 
114) and the threshold warning device for platform lifts (currently in 
FMVSS No. 403) are effective alerts, and we see no reason the new 
alerts proposed here should be less effective. The common automotive 
practice of the rotating ignition switch, combined with a physical key, 
has standardized the engine shut down procedure before the advent of 
the new electronic convenience controls. We believe standardizing the 
operation of these new controls, combined with the new alerts, will 
have the same effect. We believe these new requirements are especially 
worthwhile considering what we believe to be minimal costs to implement 
them.
    Today, in the vehicles with keyless ignition systems, the great 
majority use push-button type switches. Some require a momentary tap, 
some require longer hold times, and some use different hold times to 
affect different functions. The countermeasure for driver confusion 
over shutting down a moving vehicle is to require that the switch that 
turns off the propulsion system work consistently, whether the vehicle 
is moving or not. From our knowledge of the operation of current 
designs, we believe that our proposed 500 millisecond hold time is well 
within the functional range of the switches currently in use. The only

[[Page 77185]]

change necessary, in most cases, will be in the additional software 
coding. Thus, we believe there will be little incremental cost for 
changing the behavior of the keyless ignition control. There will be 
costs associated with testing the new software for correct operation.
    We are proposing to require one new internal driver alert and two 
new external driver alerts. Some models already use some version of 
these alerts and other alerts are already required by FMVSS No. 114. In 
most cases, manufacturers need only reconfigure existing sound 
generating systems to engage under the right circumstances. For this 
reason, we believe the warning cues proposed here have little cost 
associated with their implementation.
    Because the incremental cost for equipping every vehicle in the 
fleet would be very small, it follows that regardless of the number of 
vehicles needing a countermeasure, the cost to equip the entire fleet 
of keyless ignition vehicles would be similarly small.
    If the proposed changes in this NPRM are made final, NHTSA proposes 
a lead time of two years from the next September 1 after a final rule 
is published in the Federal Register. We believe that this lead time 
gives vehicle manufacturers ample time to implement the new 
requirements in the normal course of vehicle model updating at minimal 
cost.

II. Background

    Under 49 U.S.C. Section 30111(a), NHTSA (by delegation from the 
Secretary of Transportation) is directed to prescribe Federal motor 
vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs). Section 30111(a) also states that 
``Each standard shall be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle 
safety, and be stated in objective terms.'' This subsection was the 
statutory basis for the original promulgation of FMVSS No. 114, Theft 
protection and rollaway prevention (49 CFR Section 571.114) and is also 
the basis for this proposal.
    Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 114, specifies vehicle 
performance requirements intended to reduce the incidence of crashes, 
injuries and fatalities resulting from theft and accidental rollaway of 
motor vehicles. The purpose of this standard is to decrease the 
likelihood that a vehicle is in a crash as a result of theft, or 
accidentally set in motion. FMVSS No. 114 applies to all passenger 
cars, and to trucks and multipurpose passenger vehicles with a gross 
vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or 
less. However, it does not apply to walk-in vans.\2\
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    \2\ In addition, FMVSS No. 114 specifies requirements for a 
brake transmission shift interlock (BTSI) at S5.3. S5.3 applies to 
all motor vehicles (except trailers and motorcycles) with a GVWR of 
4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less.
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    To minimize crashes involving stolen vehicles, FMVSS No. 114 
specifies at S5.1.1 that each vehicle must have a starting system 
which, whenever the key is removed from the starting system prevents: 
(a) The normal activation of the vehicle's engine or motor and; (b) 
either steering, or forward self-mobility, of the vehicle, or both. To 
deter theft, Section 5.1.3 requires an audible alert to the driver if 
the driver's door is opened and the key left in the starting system. 
This serves as a reminder to the driver to always take the key. It is 
further specified at S5.1.4 that if a vehicle is equipped with a 
transmission with a ``park'' position, the means for deactivating the 
vehicle's engine or motor must not activate any device installed to 
prevent steering or forward self-mobility, unless the transmission is 
locked in the ``park'' position.
    To minimize rollaway in vehicles equipped with transmissions with a 
``park'' position, the standard specifies in S5.2.1 that the starting 
system must prevent key removal unless the transmission or gear 
selection control is locked in ``park'' or becomes locked in ``park'' 
as a direct result of key removal. The standard further specifies at 
S5.2.2 that the vehicle must be designed such that the transmission or 
gear selection control cannot move from the ``park'' position, unless 
the key is in the starting system.\3\
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    \3\ Exceptions (not relevant to this rulemaking) to these 
requirements are specified at S5.2.3 Key removal override option and 
S5.2.4 Gear selection control override option.
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    FMVSS No. 114 includes a specific definition of ``key'': ``means a 
physical device or an electronic code which, when inserted into the 
starting system (by physical or electronic means), enables the vehicle 
operator to activate the engine or motor.'' For purposes of FMVSS No. 
114, ``key'' means both the traditional physical key and codes that are 
electronically transmitted by a fob, plastic card, or a similar device. 
The electronic code also includes numeric codes entered onto a keypad 
inside the vehicle by the driver. The standard also includes a 
definition of ``starting system'': ``means the vehicle system used in 
conjunction with the key to activate the engine or motor.''
    While the new electronic keyless ignitions systems are currently 
subject to FMVSS No. 114, NHTSA is aware of emerging safety issues that 
we believe should be addressed by new requirements specific to these 
systems.
    Keyless ignition systems, as they are commonly called, usually 
consist of a device carried by the driver, which contains an electronic 
code that grants access to the vehicle (allows the doors to unlock) and 
the ignition system. The electronic code is transmitted to the 
vehicle's starting system without physical contact with the vehicle, 
other than its presence in the vehicle, and the driver is granted 
access to start the vehicle's propulsion system, usually by pushing a 
button or turning a rotary switch. Keyless ignition systems first 
became available in luxury models but are now migrating to more popular 
vehicles (for example, the 2011 Kia Sedona minivan has keyless entry 
and ignition standard on the base model, with a manufacturer's 
suggested retail price of $24,595). Implementation of keyless ignition 
differs across models. Circular push buttons are most common, but there 
are also rocker switches and rotary switches (similar to the familiar 
ignition switch that is turned with a key). Among the push button 
keyless ignition systems, there are differences in how these systems 
turn on and shut off the propulsion system, both while the vehicle is 
stationary (normal usage) and while moving (emergency situations). 
There are also differences in alerts given to the driver by different 
models if the driver does something unsafe while using the system, such 
as not putting the transmission in ``park'' before shutting down the 
engine, or leaving the vehicle while the propulsion system is still 
active.

III. Safety Need for Proposed Changes to FMVSS No. 114

    In this section, we describe alleged incidents, and those that we 
have investigated, resulting in crashes, injuries and fatalities, 
involving vehicles with electronic keyless ignition systems. We also 
describe how we believe such incidents may have occurred.
    The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is the office within 
NHTSA responsible for conducting defect investigations and 
administering safety recalls in support of NHTSA's mission to improve 
safety on our nation's roadways. One important means by which ODI 
discovers vehicle safety-related defects is self-reporting by vehicle 
owners. By relating the information over a toll-free hotline number (1-
(888) 327-4236, TTY for the hearing impaired: 1-(800) 423-9153) or 
filling out an on-line or paper questionnaire, the Vehicle Owner's

[[Page 77186]]

Questionnaire (VOQ), vehicle owners can provide complaint information 
that is entered into NHTSA's ODI vehicle owner's complaint database. 
This information is used with other complaints and information to 
determine if a safety-related defect trend exists.
    Traditionally, the data NHTSA uses for rulemakings are from data 
bases of police- or NHTSA-investigated crashes: the Fatality Analysis 
Reporting System (FARS), the National Automotive Sampling System 
Crashworthiness Data System (NASS-CDS) and the National Automotive 
Sampling System General Estimates System (NASS-GES). Today's discussion 
is based on driver complaints to ODI through the VOQ because in this 
case the crashes or incidents of interest either cannot be identified 
from data elements available in those data bases (crashes involving a 
vehicle speeding out of control, such as with a stuck accelerator 
pedal) or they will not be present in those data bases in the first 
place because they do not involve a motor vehicle in transport 
(rollaways and carbon monoxide poisoning). The relatively new ``Not-In-
Traffic Surveillance'' (NiTS) data base was searched for these 
incidents, but no keyless ignition vehicles were found. Keyless 
ignition is an item of equipment that is still not widely used on 
vehicles, constituting less than 10 percent of vehicles sold, so it is 
not surprising that none of these vehicles are in the relatively new 
NiTS.
    We recognize that there are many caveats to using VOQs as a data 
source, among them are:
     The crashes are not randomly selected.
     VOQs are self-reported and for most there is no follow up 
investigation as to what actually happened in the incident.
     There is no analysis of the root cause of the crash so we 
cannot confirm if the type of ignition switch contributed to crash 
causation.
     We have no information on other possible contributing 
factors in these crashes.
     There may be many more incidents that were not reported to 
NHTSA because the driver did not know how or where to make the 
complaint.\4\
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    \4\ NASA ESC also observed this quality regarding the VOQ data, 
``The available incident reporting databases are valuable for 
identifying potential vehicle symptoms related to UA events. 
However, voluntary reporting systems may not allow for accurate 
quantitative estimates of incident rates or statistical trends. 
``Technical Assessment of Toyota Electronic Throttle Control (ETC) 
Systems,'' National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, February 
2011, page 61.
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    However, an accumulation of VOQs from drivers stating a similar 
problem with a particular vehicle system points to emerging safety 
issues with new systems, which is what we are trying to document and 
correct with this precautionary proposal in a manner that has very 
little cost. We request comment on the use of vehicle owners complaints 
as a basis of this proposal.

A. Inability To Stop a Moving Vehicle in a Panic Situation

    On August 28, 2009, there was a passenger car crash near San Diego, 
California that resulted in the deaths of four people. The vehicle at 
issue had a keyless electronic starting system, including a start/stop 
control (a push button) on the front dashboard. This control would stop 
the engine immediately when the vehicle was stationary, but the driver 
needed to depress the ``stop'' control for as long as three seconds to 
stop the engine when the vehicle was moving. NHTSA's Office of Defects 
Investigation inspected this vehicle and crash site on September 3, 
2009 and a report was filed on September 30, 2009.\5\ The investigator 
noted the following:
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    \5\ Memorandum from Bill Collins (Investigator and Interviewer, 
Vehicle Research and Test Center) to Kathleen DeMeter (Director, 
Office of Defects Investigation), September 30, 2009, available at 
https://www.odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/docservlet/Artemis/Public/Pursuits/2009/DP/INME-DP09001-37211P.pdf.
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     The vehicle was a loaned Lexus ES-350 traveling at a very 
high rate of speed that did not stop at the end of Highway 125.
     The driver was a 19 year veteran of the California Highway 
Patrol.
     The cause of the crash was ``very excessive speed.''
     The accelerator pedal had apparently been entrapped by the 
all-weather floor mat that was not the correct mat for the vehicle.
     Among the ``other significant factors'' was:

    Push Button Ignition Start with no Emergency Instantaneous Shut 
off Device--In the event that this vehicle was producing unwanted 
power, there was no ignition key that could be mechanically actuated 
to instantaneously disconnect electrical power to the engine. In 
place of the key is a software push button that delays engine 
shutdown for three seconds once depressed. This instruction is not 
indicated on the dashboard.

    In July of 2007, another fatal crash occurred in California 
involving a 2007 Toyota Camry equipped with keyless ignition 
experiencing an unwanted acceleration which hit a Honda Accord, killing 
its driver. This crash was investigated by Dynamic Science, Inc., under 
contract to NHTSA's Special Crash Investigation Division. The report on 
this crash notes,

    The driver reported that he attempted to turn off the vehicle by 
pushing the power button several times. The vehicle was equipped 
with a Smart Key system. In order to turn off the power while moving 
at speed requires the driver to press and hold the power button down 
for three seconds. The driver was unaware of this feature.\6\ \7\

    \6\ ``ODI Unintended Acceleration Investigation/Vehicle to 
Vehicle'', Dynamic Science, Inc. Case Number: DS07035, 2007 Toyota 
Camry, California, July 2007 available at https://www-nass.nhtsa.dot.gov/BIN/logon.exe/airmislogon by entering case number 
DS07035.
    \7\ Reviewers of UA complaints during NHTSA's investigation of 
Toyota UA incidents also noted the necessity of learning this new 
procedure for shutting down the propulsion system with a keyless 
ignition system. ``Technical Assessment of Toyota Electronic 
Throttle Control (ETC) Systems,'' National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, February 2011, page 51, section 2.7.7.
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    NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation has received complaints, 
through the submission of Vehicle Owner's Questionnaires (VOQ) \8\ 
submitted to the agency, of similar situations in which the driver 
attempted to shut down the propulsion system in a runaway vehicle with 
keyless ignition. Two examples are:
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    \8\ To see the questionnaire form, go to https://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ivoq/online.cfm.

    While driving the car on the Falmouth connector with the toll 
booth in sight, I lifted my foot from the accelerator to decelerate 
and suddenly the accelerator just took off. I immediately applied 
the brake, but the car continued to try to accelerate, I then 
applied both feet to the brake as I tried desperately to stop the 
car while the front wheels were spinning and burning rubber. I tried 
to shut down the ignition with the pushbutton on the gear shifter 
and also desperately tried to move the gear shifter from drive but 
could not. Neither the ignition button nor the gear shifter would 
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respond.

and

    The critical safety concern is noted as follows: * * *, I was 
traveling with the cruise control active at 55 miles per hour. Upon 
approaching a slower vehicle and checking traffic, I proceeded to 
accelerate the vehicle in an attempt to quickly pass the vehicle 
driving before me. Upon successful passage of the vehicle, I let off 
the accelerator and pressed the brakes several times, but the 
vehicle continued to accelerate under full power. Under the 
conditions, I tried to quickly disrupt this safety critical issue. 
To the best of my recollection I tried to slow the vehicle by 
pushing the power button, manipulating the cruise control lever, and 
putting the vehicle in neutral. All attempts were unsuccessful.

    We can conclude from these VOQs and others like them that:
     Drivers will attempt to stop a vehicle in a wide open 
throttle event by using the engine stop control.
     Drivers expect the engine stop control to function the 
same way every time it is used, regardless of the vehicle state, 
stationary or moving.

[[Page 77187]]

     It is reasonable to link the driver's inability to shut 
down the moving vehicle to the difference between the expectation of 
how the control would work in this situation and the reality of how it 
actually does function.\9\
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    \9\ This difference in function was also noted by NASA NESC, 
``The keyless (push-button) ignition design can likewise have an 
unintended consequence. Here, the concern was that the driver (or 
passenger) might inadvertently turn off it the vehicle when it is in 
motion. To prevent such an error, the safeguard was added that the 
button must be held for three seconds to turn off the vehicle when 
the vehicle is in motion. However, this procedure is certainly not 
well practiced by drivers. Indeed, many owners are not even aware of 
this `hold the button' requirement. In any case, the most common 
behavior in an emergency situation is to revert to the well-learned, 
oft-practiced, always-successful procedure: push the button briefly 
to turn off the vehicle. However, this procedure fails in the off-
nominal situation, no matter how many times the driver executes it 
in rapid succession.'' NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical 
Assessment Report, ``Technical Support to the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) on the Reported Toyota Motor 
Corporation (TMC) Unintended Acceleration (UA) Investigation,'' page 
44.
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B. Rollaway--Leaving a Vehicle Not in ``Park''

    When shutting down a stationary vehicle (with a transmission with a 
``park'' position) to leave it parked, the driver should first move the 
gear selection control to ``park'' and then request propulsion system 
shut down. Performing these actions in this order will ensure that the 
vehicle is in ``park'' before the driver leaves the vehicle. In a 
vehicle fitted with a traditional key and starting system, this 
involves moving to ``park,'' turning the ignition switch to ``off'' and 
removing the key. Due to a requirement in FMVSS No. 114, the driver 
will not be able to remove the key if the gear selection control is not 
in ``park'' unless it becomes locked in ``park'' as a direct result of 
key removal. To prevent rollaway in the keyless ignition vehicle, the 
gear selection control should be moved to ``park'' and then propulsion 
system shut down should be requested via whatever type of switch is 
used in the vehicle, most typically a push button. What we find drivers 
are reporting is that they occasionally (often while distracted) push 
the switch to shut down the engine without first moving the gear 
selection control into ``park.'' \10\ If they then leave the vehicle in 
this condition and it is on any kind of incline it can rollaway, 
possibly causing injury or fatality to the driver or bystanders or 
damage to surrounding property. In ODI's VOQ data base, we found six 
complaints of rollaway and another three complaints in which the 
drivers realized that the vehicle could have rolled in this condition, 
but it did not. Below are two examples of rollaway incidents (quoted 
exactly from the VOQ statement):
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    \10\ The vehicle complies with S5.2.1 of FMVSS No.114 because 
the key is the electronic code and that code can remain in the 
vehicle even if the physical device the driver carries is taken 
outside the vehicle.

    I bought a used 2006 Audi A6 two months before the accident. I 
had been using the ``keyless'' option when starting and stopping the 
vehicle. I stopped at a library, pushed the button twice to turn off 
the ignition and the vehicle's electrical system. I got out of the 
vehicle and noticed that it was rolling forward. I attempted to stop 
it; I opened the driver's door and as I was getting in the door 
struck a trash can in the parking lot, knocking me down. The 
vehicle's rear wheel caught my left heel and drug me across a curb 
before stopping on my left foot. Several men in the parking lot 
lifted the vehicle off my foot. I was transported to the hospital 
and kept for injuries to my left leg. Evidently I failed to put the 
vehicle's transmission in ``p'' and had left it in ``d''. Cars that 
use a physical key to start and stop the vehicle will not allow a 
driver to remove the key unless the vehicle's transmission has been 
shifted to ``park.'' A vehicle that does not utilize a physical key, 
does not have that built-in safety feature. Five weeks later I am in 
physical therapy and am grateful I did not sustain more serious 
injuries, or that an innocent bystander was not killed by a 
driverless car rolling through a parking lot at a library that is 
frequented by children. Now I am adamant about always setting the 
emergency brake. My concern is real: as more and more vehicles are 
manufactured with ``keyless'' ignition systems that contain no fail-
safe feature to prevent ``inadvertent rolling'' as explained in the 
Audi's owner's manual, I believe more injuries and deaths will be 
realized. In speaking with the regional representative at Audi, he 
explained that Audi publishes a ``book'' explaining the vehicle and 
what happened was totally my fault. My Audi has a sensor in the 
passenger seat that prevents an expensive airbag from deploying 
unnecessarily; how about a sensor in the driver's seat that prevents 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a vehicle from rolling when there is no driver?

and

    The contact owns a 2007 Toyota Avalon. The contact stated that 
when the vehicle is shut off, there is no way to determine if the 
vehicle is in park due to the keyless entry. She is able to exit the 
vehicle with the gear shift indicator in the drive position. This 
failure has caused the vehicle to roll away after she exits. The 
dealer stated that the failure was dangerous and was unable to 
perform the repair because the vehicle was designed in that manner. 
The manufacturer also stated that there was nothing they could do 
about the design.

C. Leaving the Vehicle With the Vehicle Propulsion System 
Unintentionally Left Active

    There were four VOQs regarding carbon monoxide incidents with 
keyless ignition vehicles in the past 10 years. Reviewing complaints 
involving vehicles without a physical key for the propulsion system, we 
note that drivers occasionally do not turn off the propulsion systems 
on their vehicles after parking them. One possibility for this behavior 
is that the driver may not immediately know that the propulsion system 
has not been turned off. In the following self-reported cases (quoted 
directly from the VOQs), the drivers only found that they did not turn 
off the propulsion system because their in-house carbon monoxide 
detectors were activated after an extended period of the vehicle 
running in an attached garage:

    I arrived home after dinner, drove my 2007 Lexus LS460 (equipped 
with keyless ignition) into my attached garage, closed the garage 
door and, leaving the key fob inside the vehicle, I entered my home 
and eventually went to sleep. I was awoken at approx. 2:15 a.m. by a 
carbon monoxide alarm located in the foyer inside my home adjacent 
to the entrance to the garage. I entered the garage to discover that 
the car's engine was still running, the garage filled with noxious 
fumes, and the entire vehicle extremely hot to touch, inside and 
out. I opened the garage door and was eventually able to shut down 
the engine and clear out the fumes. As I see it, the failure here 
was two-fold: (1) When I opened my door to exit the car, no alarm or 
other sound alerted me that the engine was still running, as is the 
case with ignitions requiring keys.\11\ This is particularly 
problematic because the car's engine runs in virtual silence; and 
(2) even after the car was unwittingly left idling while in park, 
the engine did not cut off after some predetermined period of time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ This statement by the vehicle owner is not correct for all 
vehicles. As previously discussed, FMVSS No. 114 excludes the 
situation of the running vehicle from the requirement to sound the 
alert to the driver when the door has opened and the key is in the 
ignition. However, some manufacturers do sound the alert when the 
engine is running, so this driver's experience may have been with 
those vehicles.

    The following incident was reported by the owner of another motor 
vehicle manufacturer's product which happens to have a hybrid 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
propulsion system:

    Our garage is attached to our house with our bedroom above the 
garage. With 3 kids, both my wife and I have been distracted leaving 
the car in the garage to unload groceries or help the children. When 
on electric power we have neglected to turn off the ignition since 
the car is silent. Only when the carbon-monoxide detector sounded in 
our garage did we realize the engine had started while we were in 
the house. We think this could be deadly to other families without 
carbon monoxide alarms who may also forget to turn off the engine 
when parked in an attached garage while on electric power.

    Because the above two owners had carbon monoxide detectors in their 
homes, they were alerted of the problem

[[Page 77188]]

in time to be able to shut down their vehicle propulsion systems. 
Others, not as fortunate, may have died because of carbon monoxide 
poisoning from their vehicles. For example, a September 1, 2010 article 
in the South Florida Sun-Sentinel.com, reported that Palm Beach County 
detectives were investigating whether a keyless ignition system on a 
vehicle that was left running in a garage attached to a house could 
have led to the death of a 29 year-old woman from carbon monoxide 
poisoning. (A copy of this article taken from www.sun-sentinel.com is 
placed in the docket cited in the heading of this notice.)

IV. Society of Automotive Engineers Effort in This Area

    In response to the above areas of safety concern and concern 
regarding the myriad different ways manufacturers are implementing 
keyless ignition features, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) 
created the Keyless Ignition Subcommittee as a subcommittee of the 
Controls and Displays Committee, which has worked since early 2009 to 
develop an SAE Recommended Practice (RP) to standardize the operation 
of keyless ignition systems.\12\ The committee consisted of experts in 
the study of how humans interact with machines (human factors experts) 
and designers of keyless ignition systems from auto manufacturers and 
suppliers. A NHTSA staff person attended the subcommittee meetings, but 
did not participate in decision making. The resulting RP is based on 
the subcommittee members' experience with their company's vehicles and 
systems, knowledge of consumers' comments about the operation of the 
systems, knowledge of human factors engineering and, in some cases, 
knowledge of proprietary studies done during the development of their 
products (actual data was not shared with the group). The RP applies to 
all passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs), and trucks 
of 10,000 pounds GVWR and under, with automatic and manual 
transmissions (some provisions apply only to vehicles with automatic 
transmissions with a ``park'' position). The RP sets control actuation 
requirements for starting and stopping stationary and moving vehicles, 
and requirements in the form of visual or audible alerts to the driver 
to address leaving the vehicle without putting it in ``park'' and 
inadvertently leaving the engine running. NHTSA has used portions of 
the SAE RP as a foundation for the requirements proposed and explained 
in the next section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ SAE J2948-201101 ``Keyless Ignition Control Design,'' 
January 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to better address specific safety issues and to be more 
enforceable, our proposal today differs from the SAE RP on several 
points:
     The SAE RP has a range of 500msec-2sec for control 
actuation to stop a moving vehicle, while we propose a 500 millisecond 
control actuation for all stops regardless of whether the vehicle is 
moving or stationary.
     The SAE RP has requirements for control actuation to start 
the propulsion system, while we tentatively conclude that there is, at 
this time, no safety benefit upon which this agency can regulate 
propulsion system starting.
     The ``Not in Park'' alert required by the SAE RP sounds 
upon door opening, but has no measureable attributes. The internal 
audible alert we are proposing today sounds at 85dBA (500-3000 Hz) the 
instant the driver requests engine shut down (in a stationary vehicle) 
without the transmission in ``park'' and continues until the gear 
selection control is moved to ``park''.
     The SAE RP requires an unspecified audible or visual 
external alert if the vehicle is not in ``park'' and the key code 
carrying device is not in the vehicle, while we are proposing an 
external audible alert that sounds at 85dBA, 1 meter from the vehicle, 
for 1 minute when the vehicle is stationary, the key code carrying 
device leaves the vehicle, and the vehicle is not in ``park''.
     The SAE RP requires an unspecified audible alert if the 
propulsion system is active and the driver's door is opened, while our 
proposal is for an external audible alert at 85dBA, 1 meter from the 
vehicle, for 1 second when the vehicle is stationary, the key code 
carrying device leaves the vehicle, and the propulsion system is active 
(either an internal combustion engine is running, or in the case of a 
hybrid vehicle the propulsion system is in a state that the internal 
combustion engine could engage when the electric power became depleted 
over time).
    We seek comment on whether our deviations from the SAE RP are 
appropriate for an FMVSS.
    NHTSA requested that human factors experts at the John A. Volpe 
National Transportation Systems Center review the SAE RP to help us 
make our proposal more specific in addressing the safety issues we have 
noted in our VOQs. Their report has been placed in the docket for this 
notice.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ ``Review of SAE RP J2948 JAN2011: Keyless Ignition Control 
Design,'' John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 
March 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. NHTSA Proposal

    In this section, we will describe how we propose to amend FMVSS No. 
114 so that the safety issues described in Section III. Safety Need for 
Proposed Changes to FMVSS No. 114 may be mitigated.
    Based in part on NHTSA's ODI VOQ data, we are proposing regulatory 
text for addressing the following three types of safety related 
problems: (1) The driver's inability to shut down a moving vehicle in 
an emergency because the driver may be unfamiliar with the fact that 
the shut-down process is different in a moving vehicle than in a 
stopped vehicle. This situation may lead to a crash. (2) The 
possibility that the driver will walk away from a vehicle which is not 
locked in ``park'' because the driver is able to shut off the vehicle 
propulsion system without first putting the transmission in ``park.'' 
This results in a greater likelihood that the vehicle will roll away on 
its own. (3) The possibility that the driver will walk away from a 
vehicle whose propulsion system has been unintentionally left active 
(even though the driver may have placed the transmission in ``park.''). 
If the vehicle is in an enclosed garage connected to living quarters, 
this situation may result in carbon monoxide poisoning of persons in 
the dwelling; if outdoors, this increases the possibility of vehicle 
theft and a subsequent crash.
    As the earlier incidents related from the VOQs have shown, in many 
ignition systems that don't use physical keys, the driver may not know 
whether s/he has turned off the vehicle propulsion system.
    In this NPRM, NHTSA proposes additional requirements for vehicles 
using keyless ignition systems because, unlike systems which use the 
traditional physical key, the start/stop process on vehicles that use 
electronic codes as keys are not standardized across manufacturers. In 
particular, if a push-button type control is used, the amount of time 
the start/stop control must be pressed differs not only among 
manufacturers, but also on the same vehicle, depending on whether the 
vehicle is started from a stopped position, stopped while the vehicle 
is in motion, or whether the vehicle propulsion system is being turned 
off while the vehicle is stopped. Standardization of controls teaches 
drivers how the controls will operate and ensures that drivers' 
expectations about those operations are met.
    The problem presented by the lack of standardization is exacerbated 
by the fact that electronic keys lack many of the visual and tactile 
cues about the

[[Page 77189]]

status of the vehicle's propulsion system that are available to drivers 
when using traditional physical keys. In a system using the physical 
key, the driver knows from the angle of the key in the ignition whether 
the vehicle is in ``lock,'' ``accessory,'' ``start,'' or ``run.'' Also, 
the key will not release from the ignition switch unless the 
transmission is in ``park.'' The keyless ignition system provides no 
such physical cues to the driver.
    The requirement for a visible indication of transmission position 
comes from FMVSS No. 102, Transmission shift position sequence, starter 
interlock, and transmission braking effect. S3.1.4.1 requires that if 
the transmission shift position sequence includes a ``park'' position, 
identification of shift positions, including the positions in relation 
to each other and the position selected, shall be displayed in view of 
the driver whenever: (a) The ignition is in a position where 
transmission can be shifted; or (b) the transmission is not in 
``park.'' Despite this visual cue that the transmission is not in 
``park'', some drivers of vehicles equipped with keyless ignition 
systems, especially when distracted or unfamiliar with the operation of 
the vehicle they are driving, leave their vehicles without ensuring the 
transmission is in the ``park'' position. They do so because they do 
not have the tactile cue of being unable to remove the key unless the 
transmission or gear selection control is locked in ``park.'' \14\ Such 
actions result in a risk that the vehicle will roll away of its own 
accord.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ In keyless ignition vehicles, the ``key'' is the electronic 
code transmitted from a device carried by the driver to the 
vehicle's starting system. When the vehicle is not in ``park,'' this 
key code remains in the vehicle, thus the vehicle conforms to the 
requirement at 49 CFR 571.114 S5.2.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We note that the current title of Standard No. 114, ``Theft 
protection and rollaway prevention,'' may be made outdated and not 
inclusive if the proposals described in this notice were made final. 
However, a title that is fully descriptive of all the purposes served 
by the standard may be unwieldy. We seek comment on the need to update 
the title and ask commenters to suggest a new title if they believe a 
change would be necessary or beneficial.

A. New Definitions

    As mentioned in the Background section of this NPRM, FMVSS No. 114 
already contains definitions for ``key'' and ``starting system'' which 
are inclusive of systems that use electronic codes without a physical 
key to allow the driver to start the vehicle. However, we are proposing 
the addition of one definition specific to keyless ignition systems:

    Key code carrying device means a physical device which is 
capable of electronically transmitting a key code to the vehicle 
starting system without physical connection (other than its presence 
in the vehicle) between the device and the vehicle.

    This key code carrying device is typically called a ``key fob'' by 
consumers. It carries and transmits the electronic code to the vehicle 
that gives the driver permission to start the vehicle. The electronic 
code carried in the device is the ``key.'' The device is not the 
``key.'' This new definition for key code carrying device is based on 
that used in the SAE Recommended Practice discussed in Section IV 
above.\15\ We propose adding ``without physical connection (other than 
its presence in the vehicle) between the device and the vehicle,'' to 
SAE's RP language to differentiate these devices from physical keys 
which also carry a chip containing an electronic code as part of a 
theft deterrent system. These physical keys must be inserted into the 
ignition switch of the vehicle and the key is used to turn the switch. 
Our proposed definition is intended to specifically exclude any key 
which must be physically inserted into any part of the vehicle each 
time the driver desires to start the propulsion system. If a key must 
be inserted into the vehicle we consider it to be a physical key, 
regardless of whether or not it also contains electronic components 
which communicate with the vehicle intended to identify this particular 
key as belonging to this particular vehicle (i.e., for theft prevention 
purposes). Further, our proposed definition of key code carrying device 
(KCCD) is not intended to exclude a device which otherwise would be a 
KCCD simply because it occasionally must have physical contact with the 
vehicle to recharge the battery in the KCCD or because the vehicle 
manufacturer provides a place where the driver may insert the KCCD if 
s/he chooses for the convenience of providing a place to keep the 
device while driving. We note that the primary attraction of these 
keyless systems appears to be that the driver need not handle a key to 
access and start the vehicle. We seek comment on whether our proposed 
definition is specific enough to (a) Exclude devices that we would 
consider physical keys--they must be inserted to start the vehicle, and 
(b) include devices which may be inserted to charge a battery or for 
driver convenience, but do not need to be inserted for normal vehicle 
operation. We request comment on how the definition of KCCD could be 
improved to clarify these points.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ SAE J2948-201101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At this time, we are not proposing to change our definition of 
``key,'' which provides that for keyless ignition systems, the 
electronic code, not the physical device carried by the driver, is the 
key. We note that NHTSA's definition of the code as the key is long-
standing. It was first articulated in a letter to Mr. Stephen Selander 
of General Motors in May of 1992.\16\ Further, in August of 2005 we 
published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which, among other things, 
proposed the current definition of ``key.'' There were no comments 
which disagreed with our definition of ``key'' with regard to keyless 
ignition systems at that time and we finalized that rulemaking in April 
of 2006.\17\ However, we acknowledge that consumers may think of the 
key code carrying device as the key and that some manufacturers do 
refer to this device as a key in their consumer literature, so there 
may be some confusion on the part of consumers as to what is actually 
the key. Therefore, we seek comment on whether we should revise our 
definition of ``key'' and if so, what that definition should be and how 
we should differentiate between the device the driver carries and the 
code that actually allows the vehicle to start. Changing the definition 
of ``key'' may change the interpretation of what it means for the key 
to be removed from (S5.1.1) or inserted into the starting system 
(S5.1.3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ Letter from Paul Jackson Rice, Chief Counsel to Stephen E. 
Selander, General Motors Corp, May 22, 1992.
    \17\ 71 FR 17752, April 7, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, we are proposing to amend the definition of ``starting 
system.'' At present, ``starting system'' is defined as: ``means the 
vehicle system used in conjunction with the key to activate the engine 
or motor.'' In this NPRM, we propose to amend the end of the ``starting 
system'' definition to state: ``* * * activate the engine, motor, or 
other system which provides propulsion to the motor vehicle.'' We are 
proposing this clarification so that it is explicit that FMVSS No. 114 
applies to any propulsion ``starting system'' available in motor 
vehicles today, or at some point in the future.
    We are proposing to add a second definition, ``stop control means 
the device used by the driver to deactivate the engine, motor, or other 
system which provides propulsion to the motor

[[Page 77190]]

vehicle.'' In most vehicles available today, this control is a push 
button switch, but this definition is not limited to push button 
switches.

B. Standardizing Shutting Down a Moving Vehicle's Propulsion System

    As we have seen in the quoted VOQs, drivers recognize the need and 
desirability of shutting down the engine in a moving vehicle when they 
experience an event in which the acceleration of the vehicle does not 
seem to be under their control. The VOQs also point out that drivers 
are stymied in their efforts to shut down the engine in a moving 
vehicle by the fact that when the vehicle is moving the shut down 
procedure they are used to in every day operation does not work. To 
remedy this safety issue, NHTSA proposes to standardize the length of 
time the driver must press on a ``stop'' control in order to stop a 
vehicle, whether moving or stationary. At S5.4.2.1(a), we propose that 
for vehicles equipped with propulsion system stop controls that are 
activated by the driver pressing on the control, the vehicle's 
propulsion system must stop only after the control has been depressed 
for more than 500 milliseconds. The 500 milliseconds time is based on 
SAE Recommended Practice J2948 Keyless Ignition Control Design (January 
2011). Five hundred milliseconds is the lowest time specified by the 
Recommended Practice for engine shut down in a moving vehicle (the RP 
has a range of 500 milliseconds to 2 seconds, NHTSA believes that 
standardization is not achieved by allowing a window of operation).
    We are proposing to regulate only the operation of controls that 
are pushed because we believe that this covers the great majority of 
stop controls manufactured today (a circular push button) or 
contemplated for the future (pressing or touching a portion of a 
display screen). However, we note that other controls, such as rotary 
knobs and rocker switches \18\ have been used in keyless ignition 
systems in the past. We seek comment on what other controls are used or 
contemplated and whether there is a safety need to regulate the 
actuation of all types of stop controls (not just those that are 
pushed) and how that might be accomplished. NHTSA seeks comment on 
whether the language of S5.4 needs to be more specific as to the point 
at which the 500 msec time begins and what that more specific language 
would be. When offering suggestions, commenters should keep in mind 
that there are several different types of switch designs currently 
available and that could become available that would be subject to this 
standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ We noted that a rocker switch must be pressed and therefore 
would be subject to the regulatory text proposed in this notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA understands manufacturers implemented the practice of 
designing keyless ignition systems to shut down differently while the 
vehicle is moving than while stationary to help prevent inadvertent 
propulsion system shut down, i.e. a situation in which the driver 
reaches for a different control, accidentally bumps the engine off 
control and as a result experiences an unintended, unexpected engine 
shut down, which can create a hazardous situation. However, different 
times for different modes of operation (for example, a light tap to 
start or stop a parked vehicle and several seconds to turn the 
propulsion system off while the vehicle is in motion) result in the 
driver experiencing an unexpected result when using his accustomed tap 
motion to request engine shut off (in a stationary vehicle). The 
drivers' accustomed tap motion does not have the expected effect in a 
moving vehicle in a panic situation. As previously discussed, this 
safety issue was identified in the VOQs by and NASA NESC in its review 
of UA incidents. NHTSA believes that requiring the driver to use the 
same action to request engine shut down in all cases should result in 
the safety benefit of drivers' ability to shut down a moving vehicle 
without the necessity of knowing or remembering a separate motion. We 
have chosen to propose the 500 millisecond control actuation time 
believing it will be long enough to guard against inadvertent shut 
down, while also short enough for drivers to tolerate for everyday 
normal stationary shut down. We ask for comment on whether this time is 
too long or too short and whether the danger of inadvertent shut down 
is that much greater than that of an inability to shut the propulsion 
system off in the event of a stuck throttle, engine fire, or other 
emergency situation. Please provide data on this risk comparison. We 
also believe that the instances of inadvertent shut down can be 
mitigated by other means, such as better control or switch location, 
which will not inadvertently get in the way of the driver's wrist, arm, 
bracelet, or other foreseeable obstruction and ask for comment on this 
facet of vehicle design.
    In our proposal, the time between when the control actuation starts 
the shut down process (500 milliseconds) and the time the engine must 
be stopped (1 second) allows for the signals to be sent and acted upon 
by the vehicle to bring the engine to a stop. We seek comment on this 
length of time and the problem of engine inertia working to keep the 
engine running when the vehicle is moving. We propose that the test 
procedures for compliance with this standard will be conducted on a 
level surface.
    We have proposed a requirement that once the propulsion system of a 
moving vehicle is shut down, any restart of the system must be 
initiated by the driver by actuation of the engine start control. This 
is to prevent automatic restart by any vehicle system, such as idle-
stop technology, when the driver has shut down the engine in an 
emergency situation.
    In developing this NPRM, we considered whether to make all control 
actuations the same, 500 millisecond hold for starting and stopping the 
engine under any condition, to emphasize to the driver that this 
control functions the same under all conditions. However, we understand 
that drivers are so anxious to get started as soon as possible that 
they would not tolerate a wait time as long as 500 milliseconds to 
start the engine. We have seen examples of vehicles in which the 
manufacturers have designed their systems such that if the driver 
``taps'' the start control (as little as 60 milliseconds) the vehicle 
will start. After careful consideration, we have tentatively decided 
that requiring all stops to be the same accomplishes the goal of 
standardizing the propulsion stop function without inconveniencing 
drivers in the start mode and that there is little additional safety 
benefit to be gained by regulating the starting of the propulsion 
system. However we note that more time spent in the starting up process 
would provide more time for systems like a rearview camera system to 
boot up and begin functioning before rearward movement begins. We ask 
for comment on this tentative decision.
    In S5.4.1.2(b), we are not proposing to allow auto-shift to 
``neutral'' in lieu of engine shut down because we believe, based on 
the VOQ data, that when drivers actuate the engine ``off'' control or 
switch, they expect the engine to shut off. An engine which continues 
to run could confuse the driver and cause unwanted actions by the 
driver. We are aware that some manufacturers currently do shift the 
transmission to ``neutral'' when the driver requests engine shut down 
while the vehicle is moving. These manufacturers believe that if the 
engine is shut down while the vehicle is moving, the driver's ability 
to control the vehicle will be hampered by the resulting loss of power 
steering and power braking. In the same vein, we are

[[Page 77191]]

not requiring auto-shift to ``neutral'' because, in addition to the 
issue of driver expectation, we know requiring this feature would 
require all vehicles to be fitted with electronic transmissions and 
this would be extremely costly. We note that drivers have dealt with 
this loss of control when shutting down conventionally keyed vehicles 
for many years. If we were to determine that loss of power control when 
shutting down the propulsion system of a moving vehicle is a safety 
concern, we believe we would need to address that safety issue for all 
vehicles, not just those fitted with keyless ignitions.
    We ask for comment on whether the safety problem associated with 
loss of power assist to braking and steering is greater than the safety 
risk of the driver believing that s/he has requested the engine to shut 
down and has instead experienced an unexpected action by the vehicle. 
If we were persuaded by comments to the NPRM on this issue that 
allowing auto-shift to ``neutral'' is a countermeasure that meets the 
need for safety, the regulatory language proposed today would be 
altered so that S5.4.1.1(b) would read ``The propulsion system must 
shut off, or remove motive power from the drive wheels, within 1 second 
after the control has been depressed for more than 500 milliseconds.'' 
The phrase ``or remove motive power from the drive wheels,'' is not 
part of the current proposal. We also note that we have seen examples 
where the manufacturer has chosen not to allow the vehicle's propulsion 
system to shut down at all while the vehicle is moving. If today's 
proposal is made final, these systems would not be allowed. We note 
that as early as 1997 we voiced our concern about the fact that such 
systems would not meet driver's expectations.\19\