Impact of Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Commercial Activities Involving “Schedule 1” Chemicals Through Calendar Year 2011; Impact of Adding Salts of CWC “Schedule 1” Chemicals to “Schedule 1;” Impact of Declaring Production of “Schedule 1” Chemicals as Intermediates, 76935-76937 [2011-31690]
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 237 / Friday, December 9, 2011 / Notices
Bureau of Industry and Security
[Docket No. 111130706–1686–01]
Impact of Implementing the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) on
Commercial Activities Involving
‘‘Schedule 1’’ Chemicals Through
Calendar Year 2011; Impact of Adding
Salts of CWC ‘‘Schedule 1’’ Chemicals
to ‘‘Schedule 1;’’ Impact of Declaring
Production of ‘‘Schedule 1’’ Chemicals
as Intermediates
Bureau of Industry and
Security, Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of inquiry.
AGENCY:
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Background
The Bureau of Industry and
Security (BIS) is seeking public
comments on the impact that
implementation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), through
the Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act (CWCIA), and the
Chemical Weapons Convention
Regulations (CWCR), has had on
commercial activities involving
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals during calendar
year 2011. Additionally, BIS seeks
public comments on whether the
addition of salts of certain CWC
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals (e.g., saxitoxin
or nitrogen mustards) to the list of
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals in the CWC
Annex on Chemicals would impact any
commercial activities. Finally, BIS is
seeking public comments on whether
any commercial chemical production
activities in the U.S. could possibly
involve the production of a ‘‘Schedule
1’’ chemical as an intermediate in the
synthesis of other chemicals. In this
regard, note that the CWC, CWCIA, and
CWCR have the potential to impact
commercial activities, not only when
the ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals are end
products, but whenever ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemicals (e.g., nitrogen mustards) are
produced as intermediates in the
synthesis of other chemicals.
DATES: Comments must be received by
January 9, 2012.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
by any of the following methods:
• Email: wfisher@bis.doc.gov. Include
the phrase ‘‘Schedule 1 Notice of
Inquiry’’ in the subject line;
• Fax: (202) 482–3355 (Attn: Willard
Fisher);
• Mail or Hand Delivery/Courier:
Willard Fisher, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Industry and
Security, Regulatory Policy Division,
14th Street & Pennsylvania Avenue
NW., Room 2705, Washington, DC
20230.
SUMMARY:
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For
questions on the Chemical Weapons
Convention requirements for ‘‘Schedule
1’’ chemicals, contact Douglas Brown,
Treaty Compliance Division, Office of
Nonproliferation and Treaty
Compliance, Bureau of Industry and
Security, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Phone: (202) 482–1001. For questions
on the submission of comments, contact
Willard Fisher, Regulatory Policy
Division, Office of Exporter Services,
Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Phone: (202)
482–2440.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
The purpose of this notice of inquiry
is threefold: (1) To collect information
to assist BIS in its preparation of the
annual certification to the Congress that
is required under Condition 9 of Senate
Resolution 75, April 24, 1997, in which
the Senate gave its advice and consent
to the ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention; (2) to collect
information that would assist BIS to
evaluate whether salts of certain
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals should be
added to the list of ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemicals; and (3) to collect information
that would indicate to BIS whether any
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals, or salts
thereof, are produced as intermediates
in the commercial production of some
other chemical.
Request for Comments Concerning the
Impact of Implementing the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) on
Commercial Activities Involving
‘‘Schedule 1’’ Chemicals Through
Calendar Year 2011
In providing its advice and consent to
the ratification of the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling, and Use of
Chemical Weapons and Their
Destruction, commonly called the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
(the Convention), the Senate included,
in Senate Resolution 75 (S. Res. 75,
April 24, 1997), several conditions to its
ratification. Condition 9, titled
‘‘Protection of Advanced
Biotechnology,’’ calls for the President
to certify to Congress on an annual basis
that ‘‘the legitimate commercial
activities and interests of chemical,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
firms in the United States are not being
significantly harmed by the limitations
of the Convention on access to, and
production of, those chemicals and
toxins listed in Schedule 1.’’ On July 8,
2004, President Bush, by Executive
Order 13346, delegated his authority to
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76935
make the annual certification to the
Secretary of Commerce.
The CWC is an international arms
control treaty that contains certain
verification provisions. In order to
implement these verification provisions,
the CWC established the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW). The CWC imposes
certain obligations on countries that
have ratified the Convention (i.e., States
Parties), among which are the enactment
of legislation to prohibit the production,
storage, and use of chemical weapons,
and the establishment of a National
Authority to serve as the national focal
point for effective liaison with the
OPCW and other States Parties for the
purpose of achieving the object and
purpose of the Convention and the
implementation of its provisions. The
CWC also requires each State Party to
implement a comprehensive data
declaration and inspection regime to
provide transparency and to verify that
both the public and private sectors of
the State Party are not engaged in
activities prohibited under the CWC.
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals consist of
those toxic chemicals and precursors set
forth in the CWC ‘‘Annex on
Chemicals’’ and in Supplement No. 1 to
part 712 of the Chemical Weapons
Convention Regulations (CWCR)
(15 CFR parts 710–722). The CWC
identified these toxic chemicals and
precursors as posing a high risk to the
object and purpose of the Convention.
The CWC restricts the production of
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals for protective
purposes to two facilities per State
Party. The CWC Article-by-Article
Analysis submitted to the Senate in
Treaty Doc. 103–21 defined the term
‘‘protective purposes’’ to mean ‘‘used for
determining the adequacy of defense
equipment and measures.’’ Consistent
with this definition, U.S.
implementation, as authorized via
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)
70, December 17, 1999, assigned the
responsibility to operate these two
facilities to the Department of Defense
(DOD), thereby precluding commercial
production of ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals
for protective purposes in the United
States. The Department of Defense
maintains strict controls on ‘‘Schedule
1’’ chemicals produced at its facilities in
order to ensure the accountability and
proper use of such chemicals, consistent
with the object and purpose of the
Convention. These actions did not
establish any limitations on ‘‘Schedule
1’’ chemical activities that are not
prohibited by the CWC. However, the
CWC stipulates a one metric ton limit
for ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals in a State
Party.
E:\FR\FM\09DEN1.SGM
09DEN1
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
76936
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 237 / Friday, December 9, 2011 / Notices
The provisions of the CWC that affect
commercial activities involving
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals are
implemented in the CWCR (see 15 CFR
712) and in the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR) (see 15 CFR 742.18
and 15 CFR 745), both of which are
administered by the Bureau of Industry
and Security (BIS). Pursuant to CWC
requirements, the CWCR restrict
commercial production of ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemicals to research, medical, or
pharmaceutical purposes. Other
industrial uses are prohibited. The
CWCR also contain other requirements
and prohibitions that apply to
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals and/or
‘‘Schedule 1’’ facilities. Specifically, the
CWCR:
(1) Prohibit the import of ‘‘Schedule
1’’ chemicals from States not Party to
the Convention (15 CFR 712.2(b));
(2) Require annual declarations by
certain facilities engaged in the
production of ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals
in excess of 100 grams aggregate per
calendar year (i.e., declared ‘‘Schedule
1’’ facilities) for purposes not prohibited
by the Convention (15 CFR 712.5(a)(1)
and (a)(2));
(3) Require government approval of
‘‘declared Schedule 1’’ facilities (15 CFR
712.5(f));
(4) Provide that ‘‘declared Schedule
1’’ facilities are subject to initial and
routine inspection by the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (15 CFR 712.5(e) and
716.1(b)(1));
(5) Require 200 days advance
notification of establishment of new
‘‘Schedule 1’’ production facilities
producing greater than 100 grams
aggregate of ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals per
calendar year (15 CFR 712.4);
(6) Require advance notification and
annual reporting of all imports and
exports of ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals to, or
from, other States Parties to the
Convention (15 CFR 712.6, 742.18(a)(1)
and 745.1); and
(7) Prohibit the export of ‘‘Schedule
1’’ chemicals to States not Party to the
Convention (15 CFR 742.18(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(ii)).
In order to assist in determining
whether the legitimate commercial
activities and interests of chemical,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
firms in the United States are
significantly harmed by the limitations
of the Convention on access to, and
production of, ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals
as described in this notice, BIS is
seeking public comments on any effects
that implementation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, through the
Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act and the Chemical
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18:35 Dec 08, 2011
Jkt 226001
Weapons Convention Regulations, has
had on commercial activities involving
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals during calendar
year 2011. To allow BIS to properly
evaluate the significance of any harm to
commercial activities involving
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals, public
comments submitted in response to this
notice of inquiry should include both a
quantitative and qualitative assessment
of the impact of the CWC on such
activities.
Request for Comments Concerning the
Impact of Adding Salts of Certain CWC
‘‘Schedule 1’’ Chemicals to the List of
‘‘Schedule 1’’ Chemicals in the CWC
Annex on Chemicals
The OPCW has recently been
considering whether to add salts of
certain ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals,
specifically of saxitoxin and nitrogen
mustards, to the list of ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemicals in the CWC Annex on
Chemicals. This would mean that the
salts of these ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals
would likely be identified as ‘‘Schedule
1’’ chemicals, themselves. As a result,
they too would become subject to any
impact that implementation of the CWC,
through the CWCIA and the CWCR, has
on commercial activities involving
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals.
BIS seeks comments as to whether
salts of any ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemical,
which are not currently listed as
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals in the CWC
Annex on Chemicals, are produced (as
an end product or in a captive use
situation), consumed, transferred, or
stored in the United States. Note that, if
the CWC were to add any of these salts
to the list of ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals in
the CWC Annex on Chemicals, this
could impact commercial activities in
the event that these new ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemicals were produced as
intermediates in the synthesis of other
chemicals. For example, such
production or captive use by a facility,
following a decision by the OPCW to
add any of these salts to the list of
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals in the CWC
Annex on Chemicals, could subject that
facility to the CWC requirements for
destruction of ‘‘chemical weapons
production facilities.’’
Request for Comments on Whether Any
‘‘Schedule 1’’ Chemicals, or Salts
Thereof, Are Produced as Intermediates
in the Commercial Production of Some
Other Chemical
As defined in 15 CFR 710.1,
production of a ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemical
means formation through chemical
synthesis as well as processing to
extract and isolate ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemicals. On November 10, 2005, the
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Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) decided,
‘‘that the production of a ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemical is understood, for declaration
purposes, to include intermediates, byproducts, or waste products that are
produced and consumed within a
defined chemical manufacturing
sequence, where such intermediates, byproducts, or waste products are
chemically stable and therefore exist for
a sufficient time to make isolation from
the manufacturing stream possible, but
where, under normal or design
operating conditions, isolation does not
occur’’ (C–10/DEC.12). At the time of
this decision, there were no known
examples of so-called captive use of
‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemicals. This is no
longer the case. Based on new
information provided by Denmark to the
Executive Council of the OPCW, the
United States is aware that a
commercial pharmaceutical facility in
Denmark produced a ‘‘Schedule 1’’
chemical (a nitrogen mustard), as an
intermediate in the production of
another chemical, which, arguably,
would cause the facility to meet the
definition of a Chemical Weapons
Production Facility.
While it appears unlikely that the
pharmaceutical facility will be
determined to be a Chemical Weapons
Production Facility, Denmark has
ordered the facility to halt future
production of the pharmaceutical
product and sought resolution through
the OPCW Executive Council.
In view of this development, BIS is
seeking public comments as to whether
any similar situations of so-called
captive use of a ‘‘Schedule 1’’ chemical
may exist in the United States.
Submission of Comments
All comments must be submitted to
one of the addresses indicated in this
notice. The Department requires that all
comments be submitted in written form.
The Department encourages interested
persons who wish to comment to do so
at the earliest possible time. The period
for submission of comments will close
on January 9, 2012. The Department will
consider all comments received before
the close of the comment period.
Comments received after the end of the
comment period will be considered if
possible, but their consideration cannot
be assured. The Department will not
accept comments accompanied by a
request that a part or all of the material
be treated confidentially because of its
business proprietary nature or for any
other reason. The Department will
return such comments and materials to
the persons submitting the comments
and will not consider them. All
E:\FR\FM\09DEN1.SGM
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 237 / Friday, December 9, 2011 / Notices
comments submitted in response to this
notice will be a matter of public record
and will be available for public
inspection and copying.
The Office of Administration, Bureau
of Industry and Security, U.S.
Department of Commerce, displays
public comments on the BIS Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) Web site at
https://www.bis.doc.gov/foia. This office
does not maintain a separate public
inspection facility. If you have technical
difficulties accessing this Web site,
please call BIS’s Office of
Administration, at (202) 482–1093, for
assistance.
Dated: December 5, 2011.
Kevin J. Wolf,
Assistant Secretary for Export
Administration.
[FR Doc. 2011–31690 Filed 12–8–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–33–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Emerging Technology and Research
Advisory Committee; Notice of
Partially Closed Meeting—Room
Change
The Emerging Technology and
Research Advisory Committee (ETRAC)
will meet on December 14, 8:30 a.m.,
Room 3884 and December 15, 2011, 8:30
a.m., Room 6087B, at the Herbert C.
Hoover Building, 14th Street between
Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues
NW., Washington, DC. The Committee
advises the Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Export Administration on
emerging technology and research
activities, including those related to
deemed exports.
Agenda
Wednesday, December 14
Closed Session: 8:30 a.m.–5 p.m.
1. Discussion of matters determined to
be exempt from the provisions relating
to public meetings found in 5 U.S.C.
app. 2 10(a)(1) and l0(a)(3).
srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Thursday, December 15
Open Session: 8:30 a.m.–3:30 p.m.
1. ETRAC Member Discussion
Emerging Technology Analysis; and
Impact of Export Controls on the
conduct of U.S. science and technology
activities in the United States.
2. Public Comments.
The open sessions will be accessible
via teleconference to 20 participants on
a first come, first serve basis. To join the
conference, submit inquiries to Ms.
Yvette Springer at
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18:35 Dec 08, 2011
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Yvette.Springer@bis.doc.gov no later
than December 7, 2011.
A limited number of seats will be
available for the public session.
Reservations are not accepted. To the
extent that time permits, members of the
public may present oral statements to
the Committee. The public may submit
written statements at any time before or
after the meeting. However, to facilitate
the distribution of public presentation
materials to the Committee members,
the Committee suggests that presenters
forward the public presentation
materials prior to the meeting to Ms.
Springer via email.
The Assistant Secretary for
Administration, with the concurrence of
the delegate of the General Counsel,
formally determined on November 21,
2011, pursuant to Section 10(d) of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, as
amended, that the portion of the
meeting dealing with matters which
would be likely to frustrate significantly
implementation of a proposed agency
action as described in 5 U.S.C.
552b(c)(9)(B) shall be exempt from the
provisions relating to public meetings
found in 5 U.S.C. app. 2 10(a)1 and
10(a)(3). The remaining portions of the
meeting will be open to the public.
For more information, call Yvette
Springer at (202) 482–2813.
Dated: December 5, 2011.
Yvette Springer,
Committee Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 2011–31585 Filed 12–8–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–JT–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration
[A–475–818]
Certain Pasta From Italy: Notice of
Final Results of the Fourteenth
Antidumping Duty Administrative
Review
Import Administration,
International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
SUMMARY: On August 8, 2011, the
Department of Commerce (the
Department) published the preliminary
results of the fourteenth administrative
review for the antidumping duty order
on certain pasta from Italy.1 The review
covers two manufacturers/exporters and
11 non-selected companies. Pastificio
Lucio Garofalo S.p.A. (‘‘Garofalo’’) and
Molino e Pastificio Tomasello S.p.A.
76937
(‘‘Tomasello’’) were selected as
mandatory respondents.2 The period of
review (‘‘POR’’) is July 1, 2009, through
June 30, 2010.
As a result of our analysis of the
comments received, the final results
remain unchanged from the preliminary
results for Garofalo and Tomasello. The
final weighted-average dumping
margins for these companies are listed
below in the ‘‘Final Results of Review’’
section of this notice.
DATES: Effective Date: December 9, 2011.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joy
Zhang (Tomasello) or George McMahon
(Garofalo) AD/CVD Operations, Office 3,
Import Administration, International
Trade Administration, U.S. Department
of Commerce, 14th Street and
Constitution Avenue NW., Washington,
DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482–1168 or
(202) 482–1167, respectively.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On August 8, 2011, the Department
published the preliminary results of the
fourteenth administrative review of the
antidumping duty order on certain pasta
from Italy. On September 7, 2011,
Petitioners 3 and Garofalo submitted a
case brief. On September 12, 2011,
Petitioners submitted a rebuttal brief.
On September 14, 2011, Tomasello
submitted a rebuttal brief.4
Scope of the Order
Imports covered by this order are
shipments of certain non-egg dry pasta
in packages of five pounds four ounces
or less, whether or not enriched or
fortified or containing milk or other
optional ingredients such as chopped
vegetables, vegetable purees, milk,
gluten, diastasis, vitamins, coloring and
flavorings, and up to two percent egg
white. The pasta covered by this scope
is typically sold in the retail market, in
fiberboard or cardboard cartons, or
polyethylene or polypropylene bags of
varying dimensions.
AGENCY:
1 See Certain Pasta from Italy: Notice of
Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Review, 76 FR 48125 (August 8,
2011) (‘‘Preliminary Results’’).
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2 As a result of withdrawals of request for review,
we rescinded this review, in part, with respect to
Pastificio Di Martino Gaetano & F.lli SpA (‘‘Di
Martino’’), Pastificio Felicetti SrL (‘‘Felicetti’’), and
Pasta Zara SpA (‘‘Zara’’). See Certain Pasta from
Italy: Notice of Partial Rescission of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Review, 76 FR 23973 (April 29,
2011).
3 Petitioners are New World Pasta Company,
Dakota Growers Pasta Company, and American
Italian Pasta Company.
4 Tomasello submitted an untimely rebuttal brief.
Based on Tomasello’s explanation of the
circumstances regarding its late filing and its
request for acceptance of this brief, the Department
extended the deadline and accepted Tomasello’s
rebuttal brief for these final results. See Letter from
Melissa G. Skinner, Director, Office 3, to David L.
Simon, counsel for Tomasello, dated September 16,
2011.
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 237 (Friday, December 9, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 76935-76937]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-31690]
[[Page 76935]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
[Docket No. 111130706-1686-01]
Impact of Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on
Commercial Activities Involving ``Schedule 1'' Chemicals Through
Calendar Year 2011; Impact of Adding Salts of CWC ``Schedule 1''
Chemicals to ``Schedule 1;'' Impact of Declaring Production of
``Schedule 1'' Chemicals as Intermediates
AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of inquiry.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is seeking public
comments on the impact that implementation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), through the Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act (CWCIA), and the Chemical Weapons Convention
Regulations (CWCR), has had on commercial activities involving
``Schedule 1'' chemicals during calendar year 2011. Additionally, BIS
seeks public comments on whether the addition of salts of certain CWC
``Schedule 1'' chemicals (e.g., saxitoxin or nitrogen mustards) to the
list of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals in the CWC Annex on Chemicals would
impact any commercial activities. Finally, BIS is seeking public
comments on whether any commercial chemical production activities in
the U.S. could possibly involve the production of a ``Schedule 1''
chemical as an intermediate in the synthesis of other chemicals. In
this regard, note that the CWC, CWCIA, and CWCR have the potential to
impact commercial activities, not only when the ``Schedule 1''
chemicals are end products, but whenever ``Schedule 1'' chemicals
(e.g., nitrogen mustards) are produced as intermediates in the
synthesis of other chemicals.
DATES: Comments must be received by January 9, 2012.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods:
Email: wfisher@bis.doc.gov. Include the phrase ``Schedule
1 Notice of Inquiry'' in the subject line;
Fax: (202) 482-3355 (Attn: Willard Fisher);
Mail or Hand Delivery/Courier: Willard Fisher, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Regulatory
Policy Division, 14th Street & Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Room 2705,
Washington, DC 20230.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions on the Chemical Weapons
Convention requirements for ``Schedule 1'' chemicals, contact Douglas
Brown, Treaty Compliance Division, Office of Nonproliferation and
Treaty Compliance, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Phone: (202) 482-1001. For questions on the submission of
comments, contact Willard Fisher, Regulatory Policy Division, Office of
Exporter Services, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Phone: (202) 482-2440.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The purpose of this notice of inquiry is threefold: (1) To collect
information to assist BIS in its preparation of the annual
certification to the Congress that is required under Condition 9 of
Senate Resolution 75, April 24, 1997, in which the Senate gave its
advice and consent to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention; (2) to collect information that would assist BIS to
evaluate whether salts of certain ``Schedule 1'' chemicals should be
added to the list of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals; and (3) to collect
information that would indicate to BIS whether any ``Schedule 1''
chemicals, or salts thereof, are produced as intermediates in the
commercial production of some other chemical.
Request for Comments Concerning the Impact of Implementing the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) on Commercial Activities Involving ``Schedule
1'' Chemicals Through Calendar Year 2011
In providing its advice and consent to the ratification of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction,
commonly called the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (the Convention),
the Senate included, in Senate Resolution 75 (S. Res. 75, April 24,
1997), several conditions to its ratification. Condition 9, titled
``Protection of Advanced Biotechnology,'' calls for the President to
certify to Congress on an annual basis that ``the legitimate commercial
activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
firms in the United States are not being significantly harmed by the
limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of, those
chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1.'' On July 8, 2004, President
Bush, by Executive Order 13346, delegated his authority to make the
annual certification to the Secretary of Commerce.
The CWC is an international arms control treaty that contains
certain verification provisions. In order to implement these
verification provisions, the CWC established the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The CWC imposes certain
obligations on countries that have ratified the Convention (i.e.,
States Parties), among which are the enactment of legislation to
prohibit the production, storage, and use of chemical weapons, and the
establishment of a National Authority to serve as the national focal
point for effective liaison with the OPCW and other States Parties for
the purpose of achieving the object and purpose of the Convention and
the implementation of its provisions. The CWC also requires each State
Party to implement a comprehensive data declaration and inspection
regime to provide transparency and to verify that both the public and
private sectors of the State Party are not engaged in activities
prohibited under the CWC.
``Schedule 1'' chemicals consist of those toxic chemicals and
precursors set forth in the CWC ``Annex on Chemicals'' and in
Supplement No. 1 to part 712 of the Chemical Weapons Convention
Regulations (CWCR) (15 CFR parts 710-722). The CWC identified these
toxic chemicals and precursors as posing a high risk to the object and
purpose of the Convention.
The CWC restricts the production of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals for
protective purposes to two facilities per State Party. The CWC Article-
by-Article Analysis submitted to the Senate in Treaty Doc. 103-21
defined the term ``protective purposes'' to mean ``used for determining
the adequacy of defense equipment and measures.'' Consistent with this
definition, U.S. implementation, as authorized via Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD) 70, December 17, 1999, assigned the
responsibility to operate these two facilities to the Department of
Defense (DOD), thereby precluding commercial production of ``Schedule
1'' chemicals for protective purposes in the United States. The
Department of Defense maintains strict controls on ``Schedule 1''
chemicals produced at its facilities in order to ensure the
accountability and proper use of such chemicals, consistent with the
object and purpose of the Convention. These actions did not establish
any limitations on ``Schedule 1'' chemical activities that are not
prohibited by the CWC. However, the CWC stipulates a one metric ton
limit for ``Schedule 1'' chemicals in a State Party.
[[Page 76936]]
The provisions of the CWC that affect commercial activities
involving ``Schedule 1'' chemicals are implemented in the CWCR (see 15
CFR 712) and in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (see 15 CFR
742.18 and 15 CFR 745), both of which are administered by the Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS). Pursuant to CWC requirements, the CWCR
restrict commercial production of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals to research,
medical, or pharmaceutical purposes. Other industrial uses are
prohibited. The CWCR also contain other requirements and prohibitions
that apply to ``Schedule 1'' chemicals and/or ``Schedule 1''
facilities. Specifically, the CWCR:
(1) Prohibit the import of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals from States not
Party to the Convention (15 CFR 712.2(b));
(2) Require annual declarations by certain facilities engaged in
the production of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals in excess of 100 grams
aggregate per calendar year (i.e., declared ``Schedule 1'' facilities)
for purposes not prohibited by the Convention (15 CFR 712.5(a)(1) and
(a)(2));
(3) Require government approval of ``declared Schedule 1''
facilities (15 CFR 712.5(f));
(4) Provide that ``declared Schedule 1'' facilities are subject to
initial and routine inspection by the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (15 CFR 712.5(e) and 716.1(b)(1));
(5) Require 200 days advance notification of establishment of new
``Schedule 1'' production facilities producing greater than 100 grams
aggregate of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals per calendar year (15 CFR 712.4);
(6) Require advance notification and annual reporting of all
imports and exports of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals to, or from, other
States Parties to the Convention (15 CFR 712.6, 742.18(a)(1) and
745.1); and
(7) Prohibit the export of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals to States not
Party to the Convention (15 CFR 742.18(a)(1) and (b)(1)(ii)).
In order to assist in determining whether the legitimate commercial
activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
firms in the United States are significantly harmed by the limitations
of the Convention on access to, and production of, ``Schedule 1''
chemicals as described in this notice, BIS is seeking public comments
on any effects that implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention,
through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act and the
Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations, has had on commercial
activities involving ``Schedule 1'' chemicals during calendar year
2011. To allow BIS to properly evaluate the significance of any harm to
commercial activities involving ``Schedule 1'' chemicals, public
comments submitted in response to this notice of inquiry should include
both a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the impact of the CWC
on such activities.
Request for Comments Concerning the Impact of Adding Salts of Certain
CWC ``Schedule 1'' Chemicals to the List of ``Schedule 1'' Chemicals in
the CWC Annex on Chemicals
The OPCW has recently been considering whether to add salts of
certain ``Schedule 1'' chemicals, specifically of saxitoxin and
nitrogen mustards, to the list of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals in the CWC
Annex on Chemicals. This would mean that the salts of these ``Schedule
1'' chemicals would likely be identified as ``Schedule 1'' chemicals,
themselves. As a result, they too would become subject to any impact
that implementation of the CWC, through the CWCIA and the CWCR, has on
commercial activities involving ``Schedule 1'' chemicals.
BIS seeks comments as to whether salts of any ``Schedule 1''
chemical, which are not currently listed as ``Schedule 1'' chemicals in
the CWC Annex on Chemicals, are produced (as an end product or in a
captive use situation), consumed, transferred, or stored in the United
States. Note that, if the CWC were to add any of these salts to the
list of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals in the CWC Annex on Chemicals, this
could impact commercial activities in the event that these new
``Schedule 1'' chemicals were produced as intermediates in the
synthesis of other chemicals. For example, such production or captive
use by a facility, following a decision by the OPCW to add any of these
salts to the list of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals in the CWC Annex on
Chemicals, could subject that facility to the CWC requirements for
destruction of ``chemical weapons production facilities.''
Request for Comments on Whether Any ``Schedule 1'' Chemicals, or Salts
Thereof, Are Produced as Intermediates in the Commercial Production of
Some Other Chemical
As defined in 15 CFR 710.1, production of a ``Schedule 1'' chemical
means formation through chemical synthesis as well as processing to
extract and isolate ``Schedule 1'' chemicals. On November 10, 2005, the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) decided,
``that the production of a ``Schedule 1'' chemical is understood, for
declaration purposes, to include intermediates, by-products, or waste
products that are produced and consumed within a defined chemical
manufacturing sequence, where such intermediates, by-products, or waste
products are chemically stable and therefore exist for a sufficient
time to make isolation from the manufacturing stream possible, but
where, under normal or design operating conditions, isolation does not
occur'' (C-10/DEC.12). At the time of this decision, there were no
known examples of so-called captive use of ``Schedule 1'' chemicals.
This is no longer the case. Based on new information provided by
Denmark to the Executive Council of the OPCW, the United States is
aware that a commercial pharmaceutical facility in Denmark produced a
``Schedule 1'' chemical (a nitrogen mustard), as an intermediate in the
production of another chemical, which, arguably, would cause the
facility to meet the definition of a Chemical Weapons Production
Facility.
While it appears unlikely that the pharmaceutical facility will be
determined to be a Chemical Weapons Production Facility, Denmark has
ordered the facility to halt future production of the pharmaceutical
product and sought resolution through the OPCW Executive Council.
In view of this development, BIS is seeking public comments as to
whether any similar situations of so-called captive use of a ``Schedule
1'' chemical may exist in the United States.
Submission of Comments
All comments must be submitted to one of the addresses indicated in
this notice. The Department requires that all comments be submitted in
written form.
The Department encourages interested persons who wish to comment to
do so at the earliest possible time. The period for submission of
comments will close on January 9, 2012. The Department will consider
all comments received before the close of the comment period. Comments
received after the end of the comment period will be considered if
possible, but their consideration cannot be assured. The Department
will not accept comments accompanied by a request that a part or all of
the material be treated confidentially because of its business
proprietary nature or for any other reason. The Department will return
such comments and materials to the persons submitting the comments and
will not consider them. All
[[Page 76937]]
comments submitted in response to this notice will be a matter of
public record and will be available for public inspection and copying.
The Office of Administration, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S.
Department of Commerce, displays public comments on the BIS Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) Web site at https://www.bis.doc.gov/foia. This
office does not maintain a separate public inspection facility. If you
have technical difficulties accessing this Web site, please call BIS's
Office of Administration, at (202) 482-1093, for assistance.
Dated: December 5, 2011.
Kevin J. Wolf,
Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.
[FR Doc. 2011-31690 Filed 12-8-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-33-P
