Business Opportunity Rule, 76816-76865 [2011-30597]
Download as PDF
76816
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
16 CFR Part 437
RIN 3084–AB04
Business Opportunity Rule
Federal Trade Commission
(FTC or Commission).
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The Commission is adopting
final amendments to its Trade
Regulation Rule entitled ‘‘Disclosure
Requirements and Prohibitions
Concerning Business Opportunities’’
(‘‘Business Opportunity Rule’’ or
‘‘Rule’’). Among other things, the
Business Opportunity Rule has been
amended to broaden its scope to cover
business opportunity sellers not covered
by the interim Business Opportunity
Rule, such as sellers of work-at-home
opportunities, and to streamline and
simplify the disclosures that sellers
must provide to prospective purchasers.
The final Rule is based upon the
comments received in response to an
Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (‘‘ANPR’’), an Initial Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (‘‘INPR’’), a
Revised Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(‘‘RNPR’’), a public workshop, a Staff
Report, and other information discussed
herein. This document also contains the
text of the final Rule and the Rule’s
Statement of Basis and Purpose (‘‘SBP’’),
including a Regulatory Analysis.
DATES: The provisions of the final Rule
will become effective on March 1, 2012.
ADDRESSES: Requests for copies of the
final Rule and the SBP should be sent
to Public Reference Branch, Room 130,
Federal Trade Commission, 600
Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington,
DC 20580. The complete record of this
proceeding is also available at that
address. Relevant portions of the
proceeding, including the final Rule and
SBP, are available at https://www.ftc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Christine M. Todaro, (202) 326–3711,
Division of Marketing Practices, Room
H–286, Bureau of Consumer Protection,
Federal Trade Commission, 600
Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington,
DC 20580.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The final
Rule modifies the interim Business
Opportunity Rule in two significant
ways. First, the final Rule contains an
expanded definition of ‘‘business
opportunity’’ aimed at extending the
scope of the Rule to business
opportunities previously not covered,
such as work-at-home programs.
Second, although the final Rule’s scope
is broader than the interim Business
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
SUMMARY:
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
Opportunity Rule, the compliance
burden is reduced. Specifically, in
contrast to the extensive disclosures
previously required, the final Rule now
requires that business opportunity
sellers provide prospective customers
with a substantially simplified and
streamlined one-page disclosure
document. The final Rule also adds
affirmative prohibitions on
misrepresentations and omissions, as
well as disclosure requirements for sales
conducted in Spanish and other
languages besides English.
Statement of Basis and Purpose
Key Terms and Abbreviations Used
Throughout This Statement of Basis and
Purpose
‘‘Amended Franchise Rule’’ refers to the
amended Franchise Rule published at 72
FR 15444 (Mar. 30, 2007) and codified at
16 CFR 436.
‘‘ANPR’’ refers to the Trade Regulation Rule
on Franchising and Business Opportunity
Ventures: Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 62 FR 9115 (Feb. 28, 1997).
‘‘Initial Proposed Disclosure Document’’
refers to the original version of the
Disclosure Document that was proposed in
the INPR in 2006.
‘‘INPR’’ refers to the Initial Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for the Business
Opportunity Rule, 71 FR 9054 (Apr. 12,
2006).
‘‘Interim Business Opportunity Rule’’ refers
to the Business Opportunity Rule, codified
at 16 CFR 437 that is currently in effect and
is the subject of these amendment
proceedings.
‘‘IPBOR’’ refers to the Initial Proposed
Business Opportunity Rule, which was
proposed in the INPR in 2006.
‘‘Macro Report’’ refers to Macro International,
Inc.’s report to the FTC on the Disclosure
Form, available at https://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
workshops/bizopps/disclosure-formreport.pdf.
‘‘Original Franchise Rule’’ refers to the
original Franchise Rule published at 43 FR
59614 (Dec. 21, 1978).
‘‘RNPR’’ refers to the Revised Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for the Business
Opportunity Rule, 73 FR 16110 (Mar. 26,
2008).
‘‘RPBOR’’ refers to the Revised Proposed
Business Opportunity Rule, which was
proposed in the RNPR in 2008.
‘‘Staff Report’’ refers to FTC staff’s Staff
Report to the Federal Trade Commission
and Proposed Revised Trade Regulation
Rule (16 CFR Part 437). The Staff Report
is available at https://www.ftc.gov/os/fedreg
/2010/october/101028business
opportunitiesstaffreport.pdf.
‘‘Workshop’’ refers to the June 1, 2009, public
workshop held in Washington, DC, to
discuss the proposed Disclosure Document
and other aspects of the Business
Opportunity Rule.
‘‘Workshop Notice’’ refers to the Federal
Register Notice announcing the Workshop,
74 FR 18712 (Apr. 24, 2009).
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
I. Introduction
A. Overview of the Franchise Rule and
the Evolution of the Interim Business
Opportunity Rule
1. The Franchise Rule
On December 21, 1978, the
Commission promulgated a Trade
Regulation Rule entitled ‘‘Disclosure
Requirements and Prohibitions
Concerning Franchising and Business
Opportunity Ventures’’ (the ‘‘Original
Franchise Rule’’), to address deceptive
and unfair practices in the sale of
franchises and business opportunity
ventures.1 The Original Franchise Rule
covered, in a single Code of Federal
Regulations part, both franchises and
certain business opportunity ventures.
With franchises, the franchisee sells
goods or services that are associated
with the franchisor’s trademark, and the
franchisee is subject to significant
control by, or receives significant
assistance from, the franchisor. The
franchisee typically distributes goods or
services supplied by the seller or an
affiliate and receives accounts or
locations in which to conduct the
business. By contrast, business
opportunities often do not involve a
trademark. Vending machines or rack
display routes are typical examples of
business opportunities. Based upon the
original rulemaking record, the
Commission found that unfair and
deceptive practices were widespread in
the sale of franchises and business
opportunities, causing serious economic
harm to consumers.
The Commission adopted the Original
Franchise Rule to prevent unfair and
deceptive practices in the sale of
franchises and business opportunities
through pre-sale disclosure of specified
items of material information. The
purpose of the Original Franchise Rule
was neither to regulate the substantive
terms of a franchise or business
opportunity agreement nor to regulate
the relationship between the seller and
the buyer. Rather, it was to ensure that
sellers disclose material information to
prospective buyers. The Original
Franchise Rule was posited on the
notion that a fully informed prospective
buyer can determine whether a
particular offering is in his or her best
interest.
The Original Franchise Rule required
extensive disclosures on a score of
specified topics, such as, information
about the seller; the business
background of the seller’s principals
and their litigation and bankruptcy
histories; the terms and conditions of
1 43
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
FR 59614 (Dec. 21, 1978).
08DER2
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
the offer; statistical analyses of existing
franchised and company-owned outlets;
information about prior purchasers,
including the names and addresses of at
least 10 purchasers nearest the
prospective buyer; and audited financial
statements.
The Commission recognized that
requiring these extensive disclosures
would likely impose significant
compliance costs on businesses covered
by the Original Franchise Rule. It
therefore sought to strike the proper
balance between prospective
purchasers’ need for pre-sale disclosure
and the burden imposed on those
selling business ventures covered by the
Rule. To achieve this balance, the
Commission limited the scope of the
Original Franchise Rule’s coverage in
three significant ways.
First, the Original Franchise Rule
covered only those opportunities that
required a purchaser to make a payment
of at least $500 within the first six
months of operation. In transactions
where a purchaser may incur high
financial losses if the seller withholds
material information, the benefit for
prospective purchasers of the Original
Franchise Rule’s pre-sale disclosure
requirements outweighs the sellers’ cost
to make those disclosures. By contrast,
when the investment required to
purchase a business opportunity is
comparatively small, prospective
purchasers face a relatively small
financial risk. In such circumstances,
compliance costs may outweigh the
benefits of pre-sale disclosure.
Therefore, the Original Franchise Rule
did not reach opportunities that charged
lower fees.
Second, the ‘‘inventory exemption’’
excluded certain types of payments
from the Original Franchise Rule’s $500
minimum cost threshold. The
‘‘inventory exemption’’ is the franchise
industry’s shorthand term for the
Commission’s determination that, as a
matter of policy, voluntary purchases of
reasonable amounts of inventory at bona
fide wholesale prices for resale do not
count toward the required threshold
payment. An important consequence of
this policy determination was to
eliminate from Original Franchise Rule
coverage many pyramid marketing plans
because purchasers of such plans
typically do not make a required
payment of or exceeding $500, but
instead make voluntary purchases of
inventory in reasonable amounts and at
bona fide wholesale prices for resale.
Third, in addition to franchise
opportunities, the Commission focused
the Original Franchise Rule on the types
of business opportunities that the record
showed were likely to result in
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
significant consumer injury, such as
vending machines, rack displays, and
similar opportunities, which frequently
were sold through deceptive conduct. A
feature common to these types of
opportunities was the promise of
assistance in securing locations or
accounts. Thus, the Commission
incorporated this characteristic into the
Original Franchise Rule’s definitional
elements to ensure coverage of
demonstrably injurious schemes. Other
forms of assistance that business
opportunity sellers frequently offer—
such as training and the buy-back and
resale of goods assembled by the
purchaser (an element of many craft
assembly opportunities) did not bring a
business opportunity within the scope
of the Original Franchise Rule’s
coverage.
In addition to these limits on the
scope of the Original Franchise Rule’s
coverage—driven by balancing
prospective purchasers’ need for presale disclosure against the burden
imposed on business opportunity
sellers—another aspect of the Original
Franchise Rule’s language further
limited the scope of coverage.
Specifically, the Original Franchise Rule
provided that a business opportunity
was covered only if the purchaser of the
opportunity sells goods or services
directly to end-users other than the
business opportunity seller. The effect
of this limitation was to exclude many
work-at-home opportunities—such as
envelope stuffing and craft assembly
ventures—from Original Franchise Rule
coverage. In those opportunities, the
purchaser typically performs work for
the seller or produces various goods for
the seller, who then purportedly
distributes them to end-users.
In 1995, as part of its systematic
review of FTC rules, the Commission
published in the Federal Register a
request for comment on the Original
Franchise Rule to determine its
continued effectiveness and impact.2
Based upon the comments received
during the rule review, the Commission
tentatively determined to retain the
Original Franchise Rule, but sought
additional comment on possible
amendments. To that end, in February
1997, the Commission published an
ANPR, seeking comment on various
issues, including whether the
Commission should separate the
disclosure requirements for business
opportunities from those for franchises.3
Based upon comments responding to
the ANPR, the Commission found that
the Original Franchise Rule continued
2 60
3 62
PO 00000
FR 17656 (Apr. 7, 1995).
FR 9115 (Feb. 28, 1997).
Frm 00003
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76817
to serve a vital purpose and that pre-sale
disclosure was necessary to protect
purchasers of franchises and business
opportunities from fraudulent and
deceptive sales practices. At the same
time, however, the Commission agreed
with the overwhelming view of the
commenters who suggested that there
are material differences between
franchises and business opportunities
and that these two types of distinct
business arrangements require separate
disclosure approaches. For example,
many of the Original Franchise Rule’s
pre-sale disclosures, in particular those
pertaining to the structure of the parties’
relationship, do not apply to the sale of
most business opportunities because
those sales typically involve
comparatively simple contracts. In
addition, the Commission recognized
that the Original Franchise Rule’s
detailed disclosure obligations may
create barriers to entry for legitimate
business opportunity sellers.4
Accordingly, in 1999, the Commission
announced its intention to conduct a
separate rulemaking proceeding for
business opportunity sales.5
2. The Interim Business Opportunity
Rule
Much of the information revealed by
the Commission’s regulatory review of
the Original Franchise Rule highlighted
the differences between franchises and
business opportunity ventures, and the
distinct regulatory challenges presented
by these two types of offerings—that
franchises typically are expensive and
involve complex contractual licensing
relationships, while business
opportunity sales are generally less
costly and involve comparatively simple
purchase agreements that pose less of a
financial risk to purchasers. Based on
the record amassed during the review
proceeding, the Commission concluded
that the Original Franchise Rule’s
extensive disclosure requirements
imposed unnecessary compliance costs
on both business opportunity sellers
and buyers, and determined to bifurcate
the Original Franchise Rule into two
separate parts—one covering the sale of
business format franchises 6 and one to
govern the sale of business
opportunities. Accordingly, in the
ANPR, the Commission solicited
4 64
FR 57296 (Oct. 22, 1999).
5 Id.
6 The industry term ‘‘business format franchise’’
specifically refers to franchises in which
franchisees operate under a common trademark or
other commercial symbol and are required to
adhere to the specific business format or method of
doing business prescribed by the franchisor.
Business format franchises are commonly called
‘‘franchises’’ by the general public, and the two
terms are used interchangeably here.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
76818
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
comment on several proposed
regulatory modifications, including the
creation of a separate trade regulation
rule governing the sale of business
opportunities.7
Subsequently, the Commission
completed all procedural steps
prescribed by Section 18 of the FTC Act
to finalize the Amended Franchise Rule,
along with a Statement of Basis and
Purpose, in March 2007.8 At that time,
the Amended Franchise Rule—no
longer covering business
opportunities—was codified at Part 436
in Title 16 of the CFR. The Original
Franchise Rule with all definitional
elements and references regarding
business format franchising deleted, was
retained and redesignated as Part 437.
Part 437 was titled the ‘‘interim
Business Opportunity Rule.’’ 9 The
interim Business Opportunity Rule
contained no new substantive
disclosure requirements or prohibitions,
and in all material respects was
substantially identical to the Original
Franchise Rule. Until the final Rule
becomes effective, Part 437 governs
sales of non-franchise business
opportunities.10
B. Rule Amendment Proceedings
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
1. Initial Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and Initial Proposed Business
Opportunity Rule
In 2006, having determined that a
separate business opportunity rule was
necessary, the Commission published
an Initial Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (‘‘INPR’’), announcing its
intention to proceed with its proposal
for a separate Business Opportunity
Rule (the ‘‘initial proposed Business
Opportunity Rule’’ or ‘‘IPBOR’’).11 The
INPR proposed to amend the interim
Business Opportunity Rule by updating
it, streamlining it, and expanding its
scope of coverage.12 The IPBOR
7 62 FR at 9115. In response to the ANPR, the
Commission received 166 written comments. The
staff also held six public workshops on the issues
raised in the comments, three of which specifically
addressed business opportunities.
8 72 FR 15444 (Mar. 30, 2007).
9 For example, references to ‘‘franchisor’’ and
‘‘franchisee’’ used in the Original Franchise Rule
were changed in the interim Business Opportunity
Rule to ‘‘business opportunity seller’’ and ‘‘business
opportunity purchaser,’’ and the Original Franchise
Rule’s definition of ‘‘franchise’’ was changed to
‘‘business opportunity.’’ See id.
10 73 FR 16111, 16112 (Mar. 26, 2008).
11 71 FR 19054 (Apr. 12, 2006).
12 The INPR also specified the process the
Commission would follow in amending the
Business Opportunity Rule. Pursuant to the
Commission’s Rules of Practice, 16 CFR 1.20, the
Commission determined to use a modified version
of the rulemaking process set forth in section 1.13
of those Rules. Specifically, the Commission
announced that it would publish a Notice of
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
contained an expansive definition of
‘‘business opportunity’’ that
encompassed business opportunities
previously covered by the Original
Franchise Rule as well as work-at home,
medical billing, and multi-level
marketing (MLM) 13 operations. It also
eliminated the $500 threshold for Rule
coverage.14
Streamlining the interim Business
Opportunity Rule and tailoring it to fit
business opportunities (as opposed to
business format franchises) has been a
primary focus of this proceeding. Both
the Original Franchise Rule and the
interim Business Opportunity Rule
require extensive disclosures covering
over twenty specified topics. In the
INPR, the Commission recognized that
these extensive disclosure requirements
entail disproportionate compliance
costs for sellers of comparatively lowcost business opportunity ventures.15
Therefore, the Commission proposed to
mitigate the compliance burden by
simplifying and streamlining the
disclosure requirements.16
Specifically, the INPR proposed a
one-page business opportunity pre-sale
disclosure document (the ‘‘initial
proposed disclosure document’’) with
only six required material disclosures.17
The initial proposed disclosure
document was intended to provide
prospective purchasers with essential
material information they could use in
making a purchase decision. The INPR
proposed to require sellers to use the
Proposed Rulemaking, with a 60-day comment
period, followed by a 40-day rebuttal period. In
addition, pursuant to Section 18(c) of the FTC Act,
the Commission announced that it would hold
hearings with cross-examination and rebuttal
submissions only if an interested party requested a
hearing. The Commission also stated that, if
requested to do so, it would contemplate holding
one or more informal public workshops in lieu of
hearings. Finally, pursuant to 16 CFR 1.13(f), the
Commission announced that staff would issue a
Report on the Business Opportunity Rule (‘‘Staff
Report’’), which would be subject to additional
public comment. 71 FR at 19079–80.
13 Multi-level marketing is one form of direct
selling, and refers to a business model in which a
company distributes products through a network of
distributors who earn income from their own retail
sales of the product and from retail sales made by
the distributors’ direct and indirect recruits.
Because they earn a commission from the sales their
recruits make, each member in the MLM network
has an incentive to continue recruiting additional
sales representatives into their ‘‘down lines.’’ See
Peter J. Vander Nat & William W. Keep, Marketing
Fraud: An Approach to Differentiating Multilevel
Marketing from Pyramid Schemes, 21 J. Pub. Pol’y
& Marketing 140 (Spring 2002).
14 Promoters of business opportunities were able
to evade coverage under the Original Franchise
Rule and the interim Business Opportunity Rule by
pricing their offerings opportunities below $500,
the monetary threshold of coverage.
15 71 FR at 19057.
16 Id.
17 71 FR at 19091.
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
exact form and language set forth by the
Commission and to include information
regarding (1) the seller; (2) earnings
claims; (3) legal actions involving the
offered business and its key personnel;
(4) the existence of cancellation or
refund policies; (5) the number of
cancellation or refund requests; and (6)
references.18
In response to the INPR, the
Commission received more than 17,000
comments, the overwhelming majority
of which came from individuals active
in the MLM industry.19 MLM
companies, their representatives and
trade associations, as well as individual
participants in various MLM plans,
expressed grave concern about the
burdens the IPBOR would impose on
them and urged the Commission to
exclude them from the scope of the
IPBOR, to implement various safe
harbor provisions, and to reduce the
required disclosures.20 The Commission
also received approximately 187
comments, primarily from individual
consumers or consumer groups, in favor
of the IPBOR.21 Only a handful of
comments came from non-MLM
companies and industry groups,
expressing various concerns about
obligations that the IPBOR would
impose upon them.22 None of the
comments addressed the form of the
initial proposed disclosure document.
2. The Revised Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and Revised Proposed
Business Opportunity Rule
Based on an extensive review of the
comments received in response to the
INPR and the Commission’s law
enforcement history, the Commission
issued a revised Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (‘‘RNPR’’) on March 28,
2008, that set forth a revised proposed
Rule (the ‘‘Revised Proposed Business
Opportunity Rule’’ or ‘‘RPBOR’’) that
was more narrowly tailored than the
IPBOR.23
In the RNPR, the Commission
recognized that there were two main
problems with the IPBOR’s breadth of
coverage. First, the IPBOR would have
unintentionally swept in numerous
commercial arrangements, including
18 71
FR at 19068.
responding to the INPR are available
at https://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
businessopprule/index.shtm. References to INPR
comments are cited herein as: Name of the
commenter-INPR (e.g., Avon-INPR).
20 Thousands of comments were form letters
submitted by participants in various MLM
programs. 73 FR at 16113.
21 Numerous letters came from individuals having
negative experiences with various MLMs. 73 FR at
16113 n.37.
22 73 FR at 16113.
23 Id. at 16110.
19 Comments
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
retail product distribution, training and/
or educational organizations, where
there was little or no evidence that fraud
was occurring.24 Recognizing this
legitimate concern, the Commission, in
the RNPR, proposed to narrow the
definition of ‘‘business opportunity.’’
Specifically, the RPBOR provided that
the ‘‘required payment’’ prong of the
business opportunity definition would
not include payments for the purchase
of reasonable amounts of inventory at
bona fide wholesale prices; 25
eliminated as an element of the business
opportunity definition the making of an
earnings claim; 26 and narrowed the
types of ‘‘business assistance’’ that
would trigger the business opportunity
definition to just those types of
assistance that are the hallmark of
business opportunity fraud: Location,
account, and ‘‘buy-back’’ assistance.27
Second, the Commission determined
that the IPBOR was unworkable with
respect to MLMs and would have
imposed greater burdens on the MLM
industry than other types of business
opportunity sellers without sufficient
countervailing benefits to consumers.
After careful consideration of the
record, the Commission decided to
narrow the scope of the RPBOR to avoid
broadly sweeping in all sellers of MLM
opportunities. This decision was based
on the overwhelming majority of the
approximately 17,000 comments that
argued that the IPBOR failed to
differentiate between unlawful pyramid
schemes—which the Commission
intended to cover—and legitimate
companies using an MLM model.
Finally, the RPBOR eliminated two
disclosures that would have been
required by the IPBOR—information
24 Id. As one commenter described it, the IPBOR
would have swept in traditional arrangements for
distribution of ‘‘food and beverages, construction
equipment, manufactured homes, electronic
components, computer systems, medical supplies
and equipment, automotive parts, automotive tools
and other tools, petroleum products, industrial
chemicals, office supplies and equipment, and
magazines.’’ IBA–INPR at 5; see also TimberlandINPR (noting that numerous manufacturers
structure their retail distribution in this manner).
25 This amendment was based on concerns raised
by some commenters that if a ‘‘required payment’’
did not exclude the purchase of inventory, many
traditional product distribution arrangements could
be brought within the scope of the Rule. 73 FR at
16113.
26 This amendment was based on concerns raised
by some commenters that a broad range of
commercial arrangements easily would fall under
the business opportunity definition if the company
made some representation about sales or profits
sufficient to constitute an earnings claim. Id. at
16114; see also infra Section III.A.3.
27 Id. at 16123. The Commission eliminated two
additional types of assistance that would have
triggered the Rule’s strictures and disclosure
obligations—tracking payments and providing
training.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:47 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
about legal actions pertaining to a
business opportunity seller’s sales
personnel, and the number of
cancellation or refund requests the
seller received.28 Eliminating the
disclosure of legal actions involving
sales employees was based on the
Commission’s recognition that the
burden of collecting litigation histories
for every sales person was not
outweighed by the corresponding
benefit to prospective purchasers.29
With respect to the disclosure of the
number of cancellation or refund
requests received, the Commission
determined that such disclosure was not
useful, and further, may have had the
perverse effect of discouraging
legitimate businesses from offering
refunds.30
The RNPR sought public comment on
issues relevant to the Commission’s
consideration of the RPBOR, including
whether the RPBOR would adequately
accomplish the Commission’s stated
purpose of protecting consumers against
fraud and, if it did not, what alternatives
the Commission could consider.31 In
contrast to the INPR, which generated
more than 17,000 comments, the
Commission received fewer than 125
comments and rebuttal comments in
response to the RNPR.32 Again,
however, the vast majority of
commenters were from the MLM
industry, but this time they supported
the Commission’s proposal to narrow
the scope of the Business Opportunity
Rule, albeit with suggestions for finetuning.33 It is noteworthy that only one
comment came from a business
opportunity seller.34 The Commission
also received comments from two
consumer groups 35 and approximately
twelve individuals 36 who expressed
their disappointment that the FTC’s
proposed rule would exclude MLMs
from coverage.
28 Id.
at 16125.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
at 16133.
responding to the RNPR are
available at https://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
bizoprevised/index.shtm. References to RNPR
comments are cited herein as: Name of commenterRNPR.
33 Some commenters suggested changes to the
language of certain definitions proposed in the
RNPR to ensure that the multi-level marketing
industry was not inadvertently swept into the ambit
of the rule. See, e.g., DSA–RNPR; Babener-RNPR;
IBA–RNPR.
34 Planet Antares-RNPR.
35 The two consumer groups are the Consumer
Awareness Institute (‘‘CAI’’) and Pyramid Scheme
Alert (‘‘PSA’’).
36 Some letters came from individuals having
negative experiences with MLMs.
32 Comments
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76819
3. Consumer Testing of Disclosure
Document and Public Workshop
In the RNPR, the Commission
announced that it had retained a
consultant to assess the proposed
disclosure document, with the objective
of achieving the proper format and
content for communicating material
information to consumers. Following
publication of the RNPR, Macro
International, Inc. (‘‘Macro’’), the FTC’s
consultant, conducted extensive
consumer testing of the initial proposed
disclosure document that resulted in
substantial improvement to both the
layout and the wording of the form.37
The Commission made Macro’s report
as well as the revised proposed Business
Opportunity Disclosure Document
(‘‘revised proposed disclosure
document’’) 38 public in a Federal
Register Notice (‘‘Workshop Notice’’)
that also announced a one-day public
workshop in Washington, DC.39 The
Workshop Notice focused on whether
the revised proposed disclosure
document was an effective means of
conveying material information to
prospective purchasers of business
opportunities. The Workshop Notice
also sought comment to further develop
the public record on issues that had
been raised in the comments received in
response to the RNPR. Five individuals
who represented a range of interests in
the proposed Rule were chosen to
participate as panelists, including a
federal law enforcer, a state law
enforcer, a consumer advocate, the
general counsel of a national multi-level
marketing company, and a former
director of the FTC’s Bureau of
Consumer Protection.40 Staff convened
the public workshop with these five
panelists in Washington, DC, on June 1,
2009. At the conclusion of the workshop
discussion of the revised proposed
disclosure document, panelists and
audience members were invited to
express their views about other issues
related to the RPBOR.41 Following
37 A copy of the expert’s report to the FTC,
‘‘Design and Testing of Business Opportunity
Disclosures,’’ (‘‘Macro Report’’) is available at
https://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/bizopps/
disclosure-form-report.pdf.
38 The version of the revised proposed disclosure
document that was tested by Macro inadvertently
omitted the phrase ‘‘or pay any money’’ from the
conclusion of the penultimate sentence of the
revised proposed disclosure document. Macro
determined that this omission had no effect on the
results of its testing. See Macro Report at 2.
39 See 74 FR 18712 (Apr. 24, 2009).
40 Commission staff selected individuals as
panelists based upon their comments, backgrounds,
and interest in the subject matter.
41 A copy of the transcript of the June 1, 2009
workshop is available at https://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
workshops/bizopps/index.shtml. References to the
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
Continued
08DER2
76820
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
robust discussion on various topics, the
Commission received follow-up written
comment from six individuals and
entities.42
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
4. Staff Report
Pursuant to the Rule amendment
process announced in the INPR, the
Commission’s Bureau of Consumer
Protection issued a Staff Report on the
Business Opportunity Rule in November
2010.43 The Staff Report explained in
detail the history of the Rule
amendment proceeding and
summarized the issues raised during the
various notice and comment periods,
particularly those raised in response to
the RNPR. It also addressed the public
workshop discussion and subsequent
comments, as well as additional issues
that the staff raised on its own initiative,
based on the Commission’s law
enforcement experience.
Twenty-seven comments were
submitted in response to the Staff
Report,44 including eleven comments
submitted by consumer group Consumer
Awareness Institute (‘‘CAI’’). The
Commission also received comments
from the Department of Justice (‘‘DOJ’’),
the Direct Selling Association (‘‘DSA’’),
MLM companies,45 one franchise lead
generator, a consumer group named
Pyramid Scheme Alert (‘‘PSA’’), and ten
individuals. A few commenters
suggested changes to some of the Rule’s
definitions and the scope of coverage,46
while others encouraged the
Commission to adopt the Rule as
recommended in the Staff Report.47 The
majority of comments submitted by
individuals, and the comments
transcript from the June 2009 Business Opportunity
Rule public workshop are cited herein as: Name of
commenter, June 09 Tr at page no. (e.g., Jost, June
09 Tr at 12).
42 Comments received in response to the
Workshop Notice are available at https://www.ftc.
gov/os/comments/bizoprulerevwrkshp/index.shtm.
References to workshop comments are cited herein
as: Name of commenter-Workshop.
43 See Bureau of Consumer Protection, Staff
Report to the Federal Trade Commission and
Proposed Revised Trade Regulation Rule (16 CFR
Part 437) (Nov. 2010) (‘‘Staff Report’’). The Staff
Report is available at https://www.ftc.gov/os/fedreg/
2010/october/
101028businessopportunitiesstaffreport.pdf. In
November, the Commission published a notice in
the Federal Register announcing the availability of,
and seeking comment on, the Staff Report. See 75
FR 68559 (Nov. 8, 2010).
44 Comments received in response to the Staff
Report are available at https://www.ftc.gov/os/
comments/bizoppstaffreport/index.shtm.
References to Staff Report comments are cited
herein as: Name of commenter—Staff Report.
45 Comments on behalf of the MLM industry were
submitted by Tupperware and Primerica.
46 E.g., Dub-Staff Report; Tupperware-Staff
Report.
47 DOJ-Staff Report; Primerica-Staff Report; DSAStaff Report.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:47 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
submitted by CAI and PSA, opposed the
Commission’s decision to narrow the
scope of the Rule to avoid broadly
sweeping in MLMs.48 In crafting the
final Rule, the Commission has carefully
considered the comments received in
response to the Staff Report and
throughout the Rule amendment
proceeding.49
C. Overview of the Final Rule
The final Rule significantly modifies
the scope, disclosure requirements, and
prohibitions of the interim Business
Opportunity Rule. This proceeding was,
in major part, prompted by the
recognition that the interim Business
Opportunity Rule’s extensive disclosure
requirements are ill-suited to many
business opportunities and place
unnecessary compliance costs on both
business opportunity sellers and buyers.
Similarly, commenters have observed
that business opportunities and
business format franchises are distinct
business arrangements that pose very
different regulatory challenges. To
account for these differences, to avoid
unnecessary compliance burdens, and
to ensure that consumers are best
protected against deceptive practices in
the sale of business opportunities, the
Commission has amended the interim
Rule to:
(1) Expand its scope to cover many
business opportunities that were not
covered under the interim Business
Opportunity Rule;
(2) Streamline pre-sale disclosures;
(3) Prohibit various specific
misrepresentations and other
misleading practices often engaged in by
fraudulent business opportunity sellers;
and
(4) Require that for offers conducted
in Spanish or other languages besides
English, that the disclosures be
provided in the same language as the
offer is made. The sections that follow
describe these four aspects of the final
Rule.
1. Scope of the Final Rule
The definition of ‘‘business
opportunity’’ dictates the scope of
coverage under the final Rule. To ensure
appropriate coverage, this definition has
been crafted to capture the sale of
business opportunities that historically
have been associated with deceptive
48 E.g., CAI-Staff Report; PSA-Staff-Report;
O’Handley-Staff Report; Brooks-Staff Report;
Johnson-Staff Report.
49 The Staff Report comments addressing specific
provisions of the Rule are discussed within the
substantive discussions on the relevant provisions.
The comments regarding MLMs are discussed in
Subsection C.1.c below, addressing the
Commission’s decision to exclude MLMs from
coverage.
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
practices. As discussed below, the final
Rule (1) extends coverage to those types
of opportunities that previously were
not covered under the Original
Franchise Rule and the interim Business
Opportunity Rule; (2) continues to cover
business opportunities that previously
were covered under the Original
Franchise Rule and interim Business
Opportunity Rule; and (3) avoids
broadly sweeping in MLMs and certain
other types of arrangements that are not
characterized by the deceptive and
unfair practices the final Rule aims to
prevent.
a. The Final Rule Covers Many Business
Opportunities That Previously Escaped
Coverage
The final Rule includes an expansive
definition of ‘‘business opportunity’’
aimed at extending the scope of the Rule
to certain business opportunities—
namely work-at-home opportunities
such as envelope-stuffing, product
assembly, and medical billing—that
often were not covered by the interim
Business Opportunity Rule. The
Commission’s law enforcement
experience and complaint data show
that these types of business
opportunities are sources of prevalent
and persistent problems. These
opportunities, however, often escaped
coverage of the Original Franchise Rule
and the interim Business Opportunity
Rule due to the following two
limitations: (1) A minimum payment
threshold set at $500; and (2) coverage
was limited to business opportunities in
which products were sold directly to
third party end-users, rather than back
to the business opportunity seller.50
Each limitation is discussed below.
First, the Original Franchise Rule and
the interim Business Opportunity Rule
covered only business opportunity
ventures costing $500 or more. Ventures
such as product assembly, medical
billing, and envelope stuffing, however,
often require payments of less than $500
and thus were not covered by the
interim Business Opportunity Rule.51
50 73
FR at 16112.
e.g., FTC v. Med. Billers Network, Inc., No.
05 CIV 2014 (RJH) (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ($200–$295 fee);
FTC v. Sun Ray Trading, No. Civ. 05–20402–CIV–
Seitz/Bandstra (S.D. Fla. 2005) ($160 fee); FTC v.
Wholesale Mktg. Group, LLC, No. 05 CV 6485 (N.D.
Ill. 2005) ($65 to $175 registration fees); FTC v.
Vinyard Enters., Inc., No. 03–23291–CIV–
ALTONAGA (S.D. Fla. 2003) ($139 fee); FTC v.
Leading Edge Processing, Inc., 6:02–CV–681–ORL–
19 DAB (M.D. Fla. 2002) ($150 fee); FTC v.
Healthcare Claims Network, Inc., No. 2:02–CV–
4569 MMM (AMWx) (C.D. Cal. 2002) ($485 fee);
FTC v. Stuffingforcash.com, Corp., No. 92 C 5022
(N.D. Ill. 2002) ($45 fee); FTC v. Kamaco Int’l, No.
CV 02–04566 LGB (RNBx) (C.D. Cal. 2002) ($42 fee);
FTC v. Medicor LLC, No. CV01–1896 (CBM) (C.D.
Cal. 2001) ($375 fee); FTC v. SkyBiz.com, No. 01–
51 See,
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Some commenters asserted that setting
the threshold for coverage at a specific
dollar amount simply provides scam
operators a means to circumvent the
Rule, noting that sellers of business
opportunities may charge less than $500
to skirt the interim Business
Opportunity Rule’s disclosure
requirements.52 The Commission has
concluded that the scope of the final
Rule should be broad enough to reach
business opportunities that the
Commission’s law enforcement history
and consumer complaints show are a
widespread and persistent problem,
regardless of the price at which they are
offered. Accordingly, the final Rule
eliminates the monetary threshold.
A second limitation to the Original
Franchise Rule and the interim Business
Opportunity Rule’s scope of coverage
was the requirement that the purchaser
of the opportunity had to sell goods or
services directly to third party endusers—someone other than the business
opportunity seller. The effect of this
limitation was to exclude most work-athome opportunities—such as envelope
stuffing and craft assembly ventures—
from coverage. Promoters of these types
of opportunities often tell prospective
purchasers that they (1) will work
directly for the seller or a third party the
seller identifies or (2) will produce
various goods for the seller, who will
then purportedly distribute the goods to
end-users or retail markets.53 In order to
reach these types of business
opportunities, coverage of the final Rule
is not limited to transactions where the
purchaser of the opportunity sells goods
or services directly to individuals other
than the business opportunity seller.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
b. The Final Rule Continues To Cover
Those Types of Opportunities Covered
Under the Original Franchise Rule and
the Interim Business Opportunity Rule
In addition to those types of business
opportunities that often evaded
coverage under the Original Franchise
Rule and Interim Business Opportunity
Rule, the final Rule continues to cover
the types of business opportunities that
CV–0396–EA (X) (N.D. Okla. 2001) ($125 fee); FTC
v. Para-Link Int’l, No. 8:00–CV–2114–T–27E (M.D.
Fla. 2000) ($395 to $495 fee); see also Consumer
Fraud in the United States: The Second FTC Survey
(October 2007) at 48, available at https://
www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/10/fraud.pdf (indicating a
median payment for work-at-home schemes of
$200).
52 See 71 FR at 19079 (citing comments submitted
in earlier proceedings by NCL, SBA Advocacy,
Finnigan, and Purvin).
53 E.g., FTC v. Darling Angel Pin Creations, Inc.,
No. 8:10–cv–00335–JSM–TGW (M.D. Fla. Feb.
2010); FTC v. Indep. Mktg. Exch. Inc., No. 1:10–cv–
00568–NLH–KMW (D.N.J. Feb. 2010); FTC v.
Preferred Platinum Svcs. Network LLC, No. 3:10–
cv–00538–MLC–LHG (D.N.J. Feb. 2010).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
76821
previously had been covered, such as
vending machine opportunities, rack
display opportunities, and similar
arrangements. The Commission’s law
enforcement experience demonstrates
that sales of these types of opportunities
are fraught with unfair and deceptive
practices, in particular, false or
unsubstantiated earnings claims.
Indeed, such practices are widespread
in promotion and sale of such business
opportunities. Since 1995, the
Commission has brought over 80 law
enforcement actions 54 in connection
with more than ten law enforcement
sweeps 55 that targeted business
opportunity scams involving the sale of
vending machines,56 rack displays,57
public telephones,58 Internet kiosks,59
and 900-number ventures,60 among
others. These persistent scams will
continue to be covered under the final
Rule.
54 In bringing these FTC law enforcement actions,
the FTC partnered with sister federal agencies—
such as the DOJ and the United States Postal
Inspection Service—and with the various state
attorneys general, including the District of
Columbia. Thus, these ‘‘sweeps’’ entailed many
more actions besides those brought by the FTC.
55 E.g., Project Fal$e Hope$, see FTC News
Release: Federal, State Law Enforcers Complete
Bogus Business Opportunity Sweep (Dec. 12, 2006),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/
projectfalsehopes.shtm; Project Biz Opp Flop, see
FTC News Release: Criminal and Civil Enforcement
Agencies Launch Major Assault Against Promoters
of Business Opportunity and Work-at-Home
Schemes (Feb. 22, 2005), available at https://
www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/02/bizoppflop.htm; Project
Busted Opportunity, see FTC News Release: State,
Federal Law Enforcers Launch Sting on Business
Opportunity, Work-at-Home Scams (June 20, 2002),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/06/
bizopswe.shtm; Project Biz-illion$, see FTC News
Release: State-Federal Crackdown on Phony
Business Opportunities Intensifies (March 6, 2000),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/03/
biz.shtm; Operation Money Pit, see FTC News
Release: ‘‘Operation Money Pit’’ Targets Fraudulent
Business Opportunity Schemes (Feb. 20, 1998),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/02/
moneypit.shtm; Project Vend Up Broke, see FTC
News Release: FTC Announces ‘‘Operation Vend
Up Broke’’ (Sept. 3, 1998), available at https://
www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/09/vendup2.shtm; Project
Trade Name Games, see FTC News Release: Display
Racks for Trade-Named Toys and Trinkets rre
Lastest in Business Opportunity Fraud Schemes
(Aug. 5, 1997), available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/
1997/08/tradenam.shtm; Operation Missed Fortune
FTC News Release: Operation Missed Fortune (Nov.
13, 1996), available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/
1996/11/misdfort.shtm; Project Telesweep, see FTC
News Release: Major State-Fed Crackdown Targets
Business Opportunity Scam ‘‘Epidemic’’ (July 18,
1995), available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/07/
scam.shtm. Recent law enforcement sweeps
‘‘Operation Bottom Dollar’’ and ‘‘Operation Short
Change,’’ challenged, among other things, ‘‘work-athome’’ opportunities. See FTC News Release: FTC
Cracks Down on Scammers Trying to Take
Advantage of the Economic Downturn (Feb. 17,
2010), available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/02/
bottomdollar.shtm; FTC News Release: FTC Targets
Scams Spawned by Economic Downturn (July 1,
2009), available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/07/
shortchange.shtm.
56 See, e.g., United States v. Lifestyle Vending,
Inc., No. CV–06–6421 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); FTC v. Am.
Entm’t Distribs., Inc., No. 04–22431–CIV–Huck
(2004); FTC v. Inspired Ventures, Inc., No. 02–
21760–CIV–Jordan (S.D. Fla. 2002); FTC v. Essex
Mktg. Group, Inc., No. 2:02–cv–03415–TCP–AKT
(E.D.N.Y 2002); United States v. Univend, LLC, No.
02–0433–P–L (S.D. Ala. 2002); FTC v. Pathway
Merch., Inc., No. 01–CIV–8987 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
United States v. Photo Vend Int’l, Inc., No. 98–
6935–CIV–Ferguson (S.D. Fla. 1998); FTC v. Hi
Tech Mint Sys., Inc., No. 98 CIV 5881 (JES)
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); FTC v. Claude A. Blanc, Jr., No.
2:92–CV–129–WCO (N.D. Ga. 1992); see also FTC
News Release: FTC Announces ‘‘Operation Vend
Up Broke’’ (Sept. 3, 1998), available at https://
www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/09/vendup2.shtm (FTC and
10 states announce 40 enforcement actions against
fraudulent vending business opportunities).
57 See, e.g., United States v. Elite Designs, Inc.,
No. CA 05 058 (D.R.I. 2005); United States. v. QX
Int’l, No. 398–CV–0453–D (N.D. Tex. 1998); FTC v.
Carousel of Toys, No. 97–8587–CIV–UngaroBenages (S.D. Fla. 1997); FTC v. Raymond Urso, No.
97–2680–CIV–Ungaro-Benages (S.D. Fla. 1997); FTC
v. Infinity Multimedia, Inc., No. 96–6671–CIV–
Gonzalez (S.D. Fla. 1996); FTC v. O’Rourke, No. 93–
6511–CIV–Ferguson (S.D. Fla. 1993); see also FTC
News Release: Display Racks for Trade-Named Toys
and Trinkets are the Latest in Business Opportunity
Fraud Schemes (Aug. 5, 1997), available at https://
www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/08/tradenam.htm (FTC and
8 states filed 18 enforcement actions against sellers
of bogus display opportunities that use trademarks
of well-known companies).
58 See, e.g., FTC v. Advanced Pub. Commc’ns
Corp., No. 00–00515–CIV–Ungaro-Benages (S.D.
Fla. 2000); FTC v. Ameritel Payphone Distribs., Inc.,
No. 00–0514–CIV–Gold (S.D. Fla. 2000); FTC v.
ComTel Commc’ns Global Network, Inc., No. 96–
3134–CIV-Highsmith (S.D. Fla. 1996); FTC v.
Intellipay, Inc., No. H92 2325 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
59 See, e.g., FTC v. Bikini Vending Corp., No. CV–
S–05–0439–LDG–RJJ (D. Nev. 2005); FTC v.
Network Serv. Depot, Inc., No. CV–S0–05–0440–
LDG–LRL (D. Nev. 2005); United States v. Am.
Merch. Tech., No. 05–20443–CIV–Huck (S.D. Fla.
2005); FTC v. Hart Mktg. Enter. Ltd., Inc., No. 98–
222–CIV–T–23 E (M.D. Fla. 1998); see also FTC v.
FutureNet, Inc., No. CV–98–1113 GHK (BQRx) (C.D.
Cal. 1998); FTC v. TouchNet, Inc., No. C98–0176
(W.D. Wash. 1998).
60 See, e.g., FTC v. Bureau 2000 Int’l, Inc., No.
2:96–cv–01473–WMB–RC (C.D. Cal. 1996); FTC v.
Genesis One Corp., No. CV–96–1516–MRP (MCX)
(C.D. Cal. 1996); FTC v. Innovative Telemedia, Inc.,
No. 96– 8140–CIV–Ferguson (S.D. Fla. 1996); FTC
v. Ad-Com Int’l, No. 96–1472 LGB (VAP) (C.D. Cal.
1996).
61 See 73 FR at 16120.
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
c. The Final Rule Avoids Broadly
Sweeping in MLMs
The final Rule’s definition of business
opportunity avoids broadly sweeping in
all sellers of MLM opportunities.61 The
decision in the RPBOR to exclude
MLMs from the scope of the Rule’s
coverage was based on the
overwhelming majority of the
approximately 17,000 comments that
argued that the IPBOR failed to
differentiate between unlawful pyramid
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
76822
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
schemes—which the Commission
intended to cover—and legitimate
companies using an MLM model.
As detailed more fully in the RNPR,
several common themes emerged from
the numerous comments submitted by
the MLM industry. Many commenters
suggested that the low economic risks of
participating in a typical MLM do not
justify imposing burdensome
regulations that would threaten to
strangle the MLM industry.62 These
commenters focused on the low fees—
often less than $100—that top MLM
companies charge prospective
distributors for the right to sell their
products, and on the relatively low risk
that consumers would lose money on
large purchases of inventory.63 In
addition, industry commenters
contended that the various disclosure
requirements were ill-suited for the
MLM business model and that many of
the disclosure obligations would show
direct selling companies in a distorting
negative light.64 For example, according
to one commenter, the requirement to
disclose prior legal actions would cast
successful and long-established
companies in a worse light than fly-bynight frauds simply because larger
companies with more sales
representatives and more years of
operation are likely to get involved in a
larger number of lawsuits.65 Moreover,
industry commenters uniformly asserted
that the cost of compliance with the
IPBOR would be extremely high for
them—first, from the burden of
developing, providing and keeping
records of proposed disclosures, and
second, from the impaired ability to
recruit prospective distributors.66
Finally, industry commenters argued
that unlike traditional business
opportunities, the MLM industry is not
permeated with fraud.67
In contrast to the overwhelming
majority of comments that opposed
regulating MLMs through the Business
Opportunity Rule, only a small minority
of commenters were in favor of a rule
that would cover MLMs. These
commenters included two consumer
groups, CAI and PSA, a few consumer
advocates, individuals who regretted
becoming involved in MLMs, and other
MLM participants.68 Many of the
consumer advocates contended that the
MLM industry is comprised primarily of
pyramid schemes masquerading as
62 Id.
at 16114.
63 Id.
64 Id.
at 16115.
65 Id.
66 Id.
at 16116.
at 16114.
68 Id. at 16116.
67 Id.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
legitimate companies.69 The
commenters also asserted that MLMs
deceptively market their
distributorships as a low-risk
opportunity with high earnings
potential, when in fact, the costs of
participating in an MLM can be high
and the earnings comparatively small.70
In the RNPR, the Commission
concluded that although there is
significant concern that some pyramid
schemes may masquerade as legitimate
MLMs, assessing the incidence of such
practices is difficult and indeed,
determining whether an MLM is a
pyramid scheme requires a factintensive, case-by-case analysis.
Further, the record developed was
insufficient as a basis for crafting MLM
disclosures that would effectively help
consumers make an informed decision
about the risks of joining a particular
MLM.
Based on the record and the
Commission’s law enforcement
experience, the RNPR announced the
Commission’s determination that it
would not be practicable to apply the
requirements of the proposed Rule to
MLM companies. Drawing on its law
enforcement experience, the
Commission acknowledged that some
MLMs do engage in unfair or deceptive
acts or practices, including operating
pyramid schemes or making
unsubstantiated earnings claims that
cause consumer harm. The Commission,
however, was not persuaded that
workable, meaningful disclosures could
be devised that would help consumers
identify a fraudulent pyramid scheme.
This being the case, the Commission
decided that the proposed Rule was too
blunt an instrument to alleviate fraud in
the sale of MLMs. The Commission
therefore determined to continue to
challenge unfair or deceptive practices
in the MLM industry through law
enforcement actions alleging violations
of Section 5 of the FTC Act and not
through the Business Opportunity Rule.
The Staff Report’s recommendations
were consistent with this decision.71
In response to the Staff Report, the
Commission received 24 comments
addressing the Commission’s decision
to narrow the scope of the Rule to avoid
broadly sweeping in MLMs.
69 CAI–INPR at 2 (‘‘I can certify that MLM (sic) are
not direct selling programs, but chain selling
programs’’); CAI–INPR Rebuttal of DSA Comments
at 3 (‘‘The Direct Selling Association (DSA),
recently taken over by chain sellers now promotes
chain selling (pyramid marketing)—even more than
legitimate direct selling’’); see also Brooks-INPR at
2 (‘‘In my opinion, most MLM firms operate in a
deceptive or fraudulent manner’’).
70 PSA–INPR at 3–4; Brooks-INPR at 4; JohnsonINPR at 1.
71 Staff Report at 20.
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Specifically, 19 comments opposed the
Commission’s decision,72 one
commenter agreed with the decision to
narrow the scope of the Rule, but
suggested modifying the Rule to contain
bright line exemptions and to clarify the
definition of ‘‘required payment,’’ 73 and
two commenters advocated that the
Commission adopt the Rule as
recommended.74
Commenters opposing the decision to
avoid sweeping MLMs within the scope
of the Rule’s coverage set forth the same
basic premise—that MLMs frequently
misrepresent the level of earnings
achieved by their distributors and
therefore, should be subject to
regulation.75 More specifically, many of
the commenters advocated that the
MLM industry should be required to
disclose the average income of their
participants.76 The Commission has
carefully considered the comments
submitted in response to the Staff
Report on the issue of MLMs. While
some of the commenters provided an
analysis of the MLM industry with
concrete examples of the types of
problems that exist within that
industry,77 many did not. Instead, many
commenters expressed in general terms
their low opinion of MLMs and their
general opinion that MLMs should be
regulated.78 More to the point, none of
the commenters provided persuasive
arguments for why the Business
Opportunity Rule is the proper vehicle
to address the problems they identified
within the MLM industry.
Before discussing the comments in
further detail, however, one point in the
rulemaking record requires clarification.
Several comments focused on the
72 These included eleven comments submitted by
consumer group CAI, as well as comments
submitted by PSA and seven individuals. In
addition, two individuals submitted comments
supporting the statistical analysis provided by CAI
President, Jon Taylor. See McKee-Staff Report;
Ashby-Staff Report.
73 Tupperware-Staff Report.
74 DSA–Staff Report; Primerica-Staff Report.
75 See, e.g., O’Handley-Staff Report (‘‘I personally
believe that this industry is a borderline scam at
best and needs MORE oversight than everyone elseNOT LESS.’’); Welling-Staff Report (‘‘I find it
amazing that * * * the MLM industry has little or
no regulations.’’).
76 See, e.g., Barrett-Staff Report (FTC should
‘‘demand truthful disclosure of income potentials
for MLM’’); Brooks-Staff Report (MLMs should
produce ‘‘actual, verifiable data concerning the
earnings and losses of their distributors’’); CAI–Staff
Report at 7–3 (advocating for the disclosure of
‘‘information supporting earnings claims’’).
77 See, e.g., CAI-Staff Report (reporting research
on the MLM industry and quoting representations
made by various MLMs).
78 See, e.g., Craig-Staff Report (there is ‘‘ample
evidence of problems with MLM to warrant
inclusion in the rule’’); Afoa-Staff Report
(commenting on personal experience with one
MLM).
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
following language contained in the
Staff Report: ‘‘Two key problems
emerged with the IPBOR’s breadth of
coverage. First, the IPBOR would have
unintentionally swept in numerous
commercial arrangements where there is
little or no evidence that fraud is
occurring.’’ 79 The commenters suggest,
incorrectly, that the quoted language
reveals a finding by the Commission
that there is little or no evidence of
fraud occurring within the MLM
industry.80 This language, however,
referred to a passage from the RNPR that
addressed traditional product
distribution arrangements, not MLMs.81
The Commission has not made a finding
that there is little or no evidence of
fraud within the MLM industry; to the
contrary, it has specifically recognized,
through its own law enforcement
experience, that some MLMs may be
pyramid schemes in masquerade and
may make false and unsubstantiated
earnings claims.82
In any event, the comments submitted
in response to the Staff Report do not
persuade the Commission that the
Business Opportunity Rule is the proper
tool to address these problems.83 Two of
the affirmative disclosure requirements
illustrate the difficulty in applying the
Rule to MLMs: (1) The disclosure of
substantiation for earnings claims; and
(2) the disclosure of references.
First, as the Commission has
acknowledged, the varied and complex
structure of MLMs makes it exceedingly
difficult to make an accurate earnings
disclosure and likely would require
different disclosures for different levels
of participation in the company. For
instance, it would be difficult to craft an
accurate earnings disclosure that would
account for ‘‘inactive’’ participants that
use their distributorship as a ‘‘buyers
club’’ and are interested only in
purchasing goods at a wholesale price
for their own use.84 This problem
appears to be unique to MLMs and, so
79 See, e.g., CAI-Staff Report at 1, 10–41; PSA–
Staff Report.
80 CAI-Staff Report at 10–41; PSA-Staff Report
(‘‘The basis of the exclusion appears to be the
extraordinary claim that there is insufficient
evidence of widespread fraud in the multi-level
marketing field.’’).
81 Indeed, the language quoted by CAI and PSA
contains a footnote referencing the section of the
RNPR that discussed traditional product
distribution arrangements. See Staff Report at 30
(citing 73 FR at 16113).
82 See 73 FR at 16119; see also Staff Report at 20.
83 Indeed, one commenter recommended a
completely separate set of disclosures for MLM
opportunities, further suggesting that the Business
Opportunity Rule is a poor fit for the MLM
industry. See Johnson-Staff Report (recommending
that the FTC convert its consumer education on
investing with an MLM into a series of disclosures
that would be MLM-specific).
84 See 73 FR at 16120.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
far as the Commission is aware, does not
arise in other forms of business
opportunities.
Furthermore, it may be difficult to
determine retail income if the MLM is
not in a position to verify the extent to
which a distributor has resold the
product at retail, is warehousing the
product, or bought the product for his
or her own personal consumption. Even
where the MLM has policies in place
purportedly to ensure that a portion of
its distributors’ income is derived from
retail sales, these policies could go
unenforced, or even where ostensibly
enforced, could be circumvented by
distributors who may have an incentive
to ‘‘inflate’’ their retail sales by
‘‘certifying’’ that such sales occurred in
order to qualify for higher levels of
commissions. In light of these
difficulties, and because the comments
submitted in response to the Staff
Report did not refute these findings, the
Commission continues to believe that
developing a standard, useful, and
understandable earnings disclosure that
would apply to both the MLM industry
and the other business opportunities
covered by the Rule remains elusive.85
Second, the reference disclosure
required under the final Rule would
make little sense in the MLM context.
As the Commission has previously
recognized, those prior purchasers
appearing on the reference list likely
would stand to receive a financial
benefit if they could convince a
prospect to enroll into their downline.86
Under these circumstances, information
provided by such a reference might not
be a reliable indicator of the potential
risk and rewards of enrollment in the
MLM.
In response to the Staff Report, the
Commission received one comment
attempting to refute this reasoning. The
commenter argued that, contrary to the
Commission’s view, prior purchasers
would have little incentive to
misrepresent the success of the MLM
because that incentive would exist only
if the prospective purchaser would
become part of the prior purchaser’s
downline, which the commenter
implies would not always be the case.87
The commenter further argued that the
fact that the prospective purchaser had
received the disclosure document
would indicate that the prospective
purchaser had already been recruited,
85 While CAI presented its proposal for an
earnings disclosure, it is clear that the disclosure
would be specific to MLMs and would have no
application to the other types of business
opportunities addressed by the Rule. See CAI–Staff
Report at 7–33.
86 See 73 FR at 16121.
87 Brooks-Staff Report at 8.
PO 00000
Frm 00009
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76823
and therefore would be unlikely to face
further recruitment by the prior
purchaser.88
The Commission finds these
arguments unpersuasive. To the extent
there is any financial incentive for a
reference to puff or exaggerate the
benefits of buying into a business, that
reference obviously cannot provide a
disinterested opinion to the prospect.
The MLM model is inherently
structured to create financial incentives
for distributors to recruit prospects into
their downlines.89 Thus, those financial
incentives are present whenever a
potential recruit enquires into the
business. To illustrate the point, even
dissatisfied distributors have an
incentive to refrain from disparaging the
MLM because any losses they have
suffered could potentially be recouped
by the recruitment of the prospect into
their downline. Whether they are
ultimately successful in their attempt to
woo a recruit from another distributor is
immaterial; they have every incentive to
try.90
Thus, the Commission continues to
believe that the final Rule’s reference
disclosure would not provide
prospective MLM participants with an
accurate account of the MLM experience
or with information necessary to make
an informed purchasing decision.
Moreover, these challenges appear to be
unique to MLMs, and as far as the
Commission is aware, are not inherent
in the other types of business
opportunities addressed by the final
Rule.
Accordingly, while the Commission
recognizes that problems may exist
within the MLM industry, it continues
to find that the Business Opportunity
Rule is not the appropriate vehicle
through which to address them. Rather,
the Commission will continue to
challenge unfair or deceptive practices
in the MLM industry through Section 5
of the FTC Act. Thus, the final Rule has
88 Id.
89 Multi-level marketing is a business model in
which a company distributes products through a
network of distributors who earn income from their
own retail sales of the product and from retail sales
made by the distributors’ direct and indirect
recruits. Because they earn a commission from the
sales their recruits make, each member in the MLM
network has an incentive to continue recruiting
additional sales representatives into their ‘‘down
lines.’’ See Vander Nat & Keep, supra note 13.
90 Comments submitted in response to the Staff
Report did not refute these arguments, but actually
bolstered them. For instance, one commenter noted
that MLM recruiters will often pretend they are
wealthy when they are not, simply to entice others
to join the MLM. See O’Handley-Staff Report at 2;
see also CAI–Staff Report at 5 (noting that in MLMs,
‘‘every major victim is of necessity a perpetrator
(recruiter) because to have any hope of recouping
their ongoing investments * * * they must recruit
others to do what they have done’’).
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
76824
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
been crafted to avoid broadly sweeping
in MLMs.91
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
2. Streamlined Disclosure Requirements
Although the scope of coverage is
broader, the compliance burden is
lighter under the final Rule than under
the interim Business Opportunity Rule.
In contrast to the voluminous
disclosures that business opportunity
sellers are required to make under the
interim Business Opportunity Rule, the
final Rule has significantly streamlined
the disclosures to focus on the types of
information most material to business
opportunity purchasers: (1) The seller’s
identifying information; (2) whether the
seller makes an earnings claim; 92 (3)
whether the seller, its affiliates, or key
personnel, have been involved in any
legal actions; 93 (4) whether the seller
has a cancellation or refund policy; and
(5) a list of purchasers who have bought
the business opportunity within the
previous three years. The final Rule also
requires the disclosure of
supplementary information that
substantiates earnings claims, identifies
legal actions, and states the material
terms of the seller’s cancellation or
refund policy. These disclosures are
consistent with the Commission’s
experience concerning common
practices in the sale of business
opportunities, and the types of
information most meaningful to
prospective purchasers.94 For example,
the Commission’s experience
91 The final Rule, however, does not explicitly
exempt MLMs from coverage, but instead contains
a narrow definition of ‘‘business opportunity.’’ As
discussed in Section III.A.3 infra, the final Rule’s
definition of ‘‘business opportunity’’ eliminates two
types of business assistance that previously would
have triggered the Rule’s coverage of MLMs: (1)
Tracking or paying commissions or other
compensation for recruitment or sales; and (2)
providing generalized training or advice for the
business. The final Rule is thus more narrowly
tailored to those types of deceptive business
assistance representations that are the hallmark of
fraudulent business opportunity schemes: location,
account, and ‘‘buy back’’ assistance. 73 FR at 16123.
92 If the business opportunity seller indicates that
it does make earnings claims, then it must complete
a separate earnings claim statement setting forth the
earnings claim, the number and percentage of
purchasers who achieved the represented level of
earnings, the date range during which the
represented earnings were achieved, and additional
information.
93 If the business opportunity seller indicates that
it or its affiliates or key personnel have been subject
to legal actions, then it must complete a separate
attachment setting forth the full caption of each
action, and may choose to include a brief 100-word
description of the action.
94 To fully develop the rulemaking record on
business opportunities, in the ANPR, the
Commission solicited comment about what pre-sale
disclosures would ensure that business opportunity
purchasers receive material information necessary
to make an investment decision and prevent fraud
in the sale of business opportunities. 62 FR at 9121,
Questions 15 & 16.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
demonstrates that earnings claims are
highly relevant to consumers in making
their investment decisions and are often
the single most decisive factor in such
decisions. Furthermore, the presence of
a legal action against the seller or its key
personnel may warn the purchaser of
potential risk associated with the
business opportunity. Information about
the seller’s cancellation or refund policy
is relevant to consumers when weighing
their investment risks. Finally,
providing the contact information for
prior purchasers will allow prospective
purchasers to discuss the business
opportunity with other purchasers prior
to committing themselves to the
business opportunity venture.
These streamlined disclosure
requirements strike the appropriate
balance by providing consumers with
material information in a
straightforward and focused document
that will allow them to make informed
purchasing decisions. At the same time,
the streamlined form eases the
compliance burden currently imposed
on business opportunity sellers. Like the
Original Franchise Rule and the interim
Business Opportunity Rule, the final
Rule is posited on the notion that a fully
informed consumer is in a better
position to determine whether a
particular offering is in his or her best
interest when sellers are required to
disclose to them material information.
Consumers should be protected against
receiving inaccurate information and
self-serving unsubstantiated statements
from business opportunity sellers.
Accordingly, the final Rule requires that
business opportunity sellers disclose
just the types of information that the
Commission has determined are most
material to potential purchasers in
making a purchasing decision: The
seller’s identifying information; whether
the seller makes an earnings claim, and
if so, the substantiation for that claim;
whether the seller offers a refund or
cancellation policy, and if so, the
material terms of that policy; whether
the seller or its affiliates and key
personnel have been the subject of prior
legal actions; and the names and
business telephone numbers of prior
purchasers to contact. The Commission
has determined that these streamlined
disclosure requirements will provide
potential purchasers with the tools they
need to protect themselves from false
claims, while at the same time
minimizing compliance costs for
legitimate business opportunity sellers.
3. Express Prohibitions
In addition to mandating disclosures
to prospective purchasers, the final Rule
includes prohibitions on sellers from
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
engaging in a number of deceptive
practices, which were absent from the
interim Business Opportunity Rule. In
drafting the final Rule, the Commission
relied heavily on its experience in
addressing a wide array of deceptive
and unfair business opportunity
practices through law enforcement
actions under the Original Franchise
Rule, the interim Business Opportunity
Rule, and Section 5 of the FTC Act. The
Commission also relied on the staff’s
analysis of consumer complaints
submitted to the FTC. By far, the most
frequent allegations in Commission
business opportunity cases pertain to
false or unsubstantiated earnings
claims.95 False testimonials or fictitious
references and misrepresentations
concerning the profitability of locations,
availability of support and assistance,
nature of the products or services sold,
prior success of the seller or locator, full
extent of investment costs, and refund
policies are also prevalent in
Commission business opportunity
cases.96 These alleged material
misrepresentations or omissions also
were frequently mentioned in
complaints to the Commission
submitted by business opportunity
purchasers.97
95 See, e.g., FTC v. Darling Angel Pin Creations,
Inc., No. 8:10–cv–00335–JSM–TGW (M.D. Fla. Feb.
2010) (representing likely earnings of $500 per
week); FTC v. Route Wizard, Inc., No. 1:06–cv–
00815–KD–B (S.D. Ala. 2006) (representing that
purchasers could earn $3,000 a month); FTC v. Bus.
Card Experts, Inc., No. 06–CV–4671 (PJS/RLE) (D.
Minn. 2006) (claiming likely earnings of $150,000
in first year); FTC v. Richardson d/b/a Mid-South
Distribs., No. CV–06–S–4754–NW (N.D. Ala. 2006)
(representing likely earnings of over $2,000 a month
or $65,000 a year); FTC v. Accent Mktg., Inc., et al.,
No. 02–405–CB–M (S.D. Ala. 2002) (representing
likely earnings of $3,200 per month to $16,000 per
month).
96 See, e.g., FTC v. Bus. Card Experts, Inc., No.
06–CV–4671 (PJS/RLE) (D. Minn. 2006) (used paid
references); FTC v. Route Wizard, Inc., No. 1:06–cv–
00815–KD–B (S.D. Ala. 2006) (misrepresented
location assistance); FTC v. Richardson d/b/a MidSouth Distribs., No. CV–06–S–4754–NW (N.D. Ala.
2006) (promised high-traffic, high-profit locations);
FTC v. Am. Entm’t Distribs., Inc., No. 04–22431–
Civ–Martinez (S.D. Fla. 2004) (used fictitious
references, misrepesented locations); FTC v.
Fidelity ATM, Inc., No. 06–81101–Civ–Hurley/
Hopkins (S.D. Fla. 2004) (misrepresented level of
support or assistance); FTC v. Accent Mktg., Inc., et
al., No. 02–405–CB–M (S.D. Ala. 2002)
(misrepresented that references purchased the
business venture or would provide reliable
descriptions of their experience); FTC v. Associated
Record Distribs., Inc., No. 02–21754–CIV–Graham/
Garber (S.D. Fla. 2002) (misrepresented business
assistance and that references either purchased the
business venture or would provide reliable
descriptions of their experience).
97 In 2010, the Commission logged over 12,000
complaints against franchises, business
opportunities, and work-at-home schemes. See
Consumer Sentinel Network Databook (March 2011)
at 76, available at https://ftc.gov/sentinel/reports/
sentinel-annual-reports/sentinel-cy2010.pdf.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Therefore, among other things, under
the final Rule, business opportunity
sellers are prohibited from
misrepresenting: (1) Earnings; (2) the
cost, efficacy, nature, or central
characteristics of the business
opportunity or the goods or services
sold to the purchaser as part of the
business opportunity; (3) their
cancellation or refund policies; (4)
promised assistance; (5) the calculation
and distribution of commissions,
bonuses, incentives, premiums, or other
payments from the seller; (6) the
likelihood of finding locations for
equipment or accounts for services; (7)
that the business opportunity is an offer
of employment; (8) territorial
exclusivity or more limited territorial
protections; (9) endorsements; and (10)
references. The final Rule also prohibits
business opportunity sellers from failing
to make promised refunds, and from
assigning to any purchaser a purported
exclusive territory that has been sold to
another purchaser.
The final Rule prohibits entities
covered by the Rule from engaging in
the specific acts or practices identified
as deceptive or unfair through the
Commission’s law enforcement
experience, as well as the rulemaking
record. Engaging in any of those acts or
practices is a violation of both the final
Rule and Section 5 of the FTC Act.98 Of
course, the Commission, under Section
5, also may challenge any conduct that
is not enumerated in the final Rule if the
Commission determines that such
conduct constitutes an unfair or
deceptive act or practice.
4. Disclosures in Spanish or Other
Languages Besides English
The Commission’s law enforcement
history demonstrates that some business
opportunities are marketed primarily to
Spanish speaking consumers.99 Based
98 15
U.S.C. 57a(d)(3).
FTC v. Zoilo Cruz, No. 3:08–cv–01877–JP
(D. P.R. 2008) (envelope stuffing scheme marketed
in Spanish-language newspapers and on a Web site
available in Spanish and English); FTC v. Integrity
Mktg. Team, Inc., No. 07–cv–61152 (S.D. Fla. 2007)
(envelope stuffing scheme marketed in Spanishlanguage classified advertisements); FTC v.
Hispanexo, Inc., No. 1:06–cv–00424–JCC–TRJ (E.D.
Va. 2006) (assistance in starting a construction,
gardening, or cleaning business marketed through
Spanish-language television and radio stations);
FTC v. Juan Matos, No. 06–61429–CIV–Altonaga
(S.D. Fla. 2006) (craft assembly business marketed
through Spanish-language advertisements); FTC v.
Nat’l Vending Consultants, Inc., CV–S–05–0160–
RCJ (PAL) (D. Nev. 2005) (deceptively marketed
vending machine business opportunities—with
many marketing efforts specifically targeting
Spanish-speaking consumers); FTC v. Amada
Guerra, No. 6:04–CV–1395 (M.D. Fla. 2004)
(product assembly scheme telemarketed to Spanishspeaking consumers); FTC v. USS Elder Enter., Inc.,
No. SACV–04–1039 AHS (Anx) (C.D. Cal. 2004)
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
99 E.g.,
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
on this experience, the Staff Report
discussed the limited utility of Englishlanguage disclosures for business
opportunities marketed in Spanish.
Specifically, the staff questioned
whether the disclosure document could
be made more effective by translating it
into Spanish and requiring that when a
business opportunity is marketed in
Spanish, the disclosure document and
any disclosures required by the Rule be
provided in Spanish. The Staff Report
further suggested that when a business
opportunity seller purposefully reaches
out to a particular population by
marketing in the foreign language
spoken by members of that community,
all of the disclosures required by the
Rule should be accessible and
comprehensible to each of those
potential purchasers. The Staff Report
recommended, therefore, that because
the Commission has specific law
enforcement experience with business
opportunities marketed in Spanish, a
Spanish translation of the disclosure
document was necessary to attach as an
appendix to the final Rule. It further
recommended that where the business
opportunity is marketed in a language
other than Spanish, the business
opportunity seller should be required to
translate the disclosure document into
the language of the sale and provide all
the disclosures required by the Rule in
that language.
It is the long-held policy of the
Commission that disclosures required
by Commission orders, rules, or guides
should be made in the predominant
language used in the related
advertisement or sales material.100 Upon
consideration of this policy, the staff’s
recommendation, and the rationale for
the staff’s recommendation, the
Commission agrees with the staff’s
recommendation. Accordingly, the final
Rule contains a new provision, § 437.5,
which specifies the disclosure
requirements for sales conducted in
Spanish or other languages besides
English.
II. The Legal Standard for Amending
the Rule
The Commission is amending 16 CFR
Part 437 pursuant to Section 18 of the
FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 57a et seq., and Part
1, subpart B of the Commission’s Rules
(work at home assembly scheme offered through
Spanish-language newspapers and magazines); FTC
v. Esteban Barrios Vega, No. H–04–1478 (S.D. Tex.
2004) (deceptive product assembly opportunity
marketed through Spanish-language newspaper and
magazine advertisements).
100 FTC Enforcement Policy Statement
Concerning Clear and Conspicuous Disclosures in
Foreign Language Advertising and Sales Materials,
16 CFR 14.9.
PO 00000
Frm 00011
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76825
of Practice.101 This authority permits
the Commission to promulgate, modify,
and repeal trade regulation rules that
define with specificity acts or practices
that are unfair or deceptive in or
affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 5(a)(1) of the FTC Act, 15
U.S.C. 45(a)(1).
The Commission’s Rules of Practice
further provide that if the Commission
determines to promulgate a rule, it shall
adopt a Statement of Basis and Purpose
(‘‘SBP’’), which must address four
factors: (1) The prevalence of the acts or
practices addressed by the rule; (2) the
manner and context in which the acts or
practices are unfair or deceptive; (3) the
economic effect of the rule, taking into
account the effect on small businesses
and consumers; and (4) the effect of the
rule on state and local laws.102 In this
section, the Commission summarizes its
findings regarding each of these
factors.103
A. Prevalence of Acts or Practices
Addressed by the Rule
The Commission promulgated the
Original Franchise Rule in 1978 based
upon its finding of prevalent deception
in the offer and sale of franchises and
business opportunity ventures, leading
to significant consumer injury. Since
1995, when the Commission
commenced a regulatory review of the
Original Franchise Rule to ensure that
the Original Franchise Rule continued
to serve a useful purpose, the
Commission has sought comment
several times to ascertain the need for a
separate trade regulation rule to address
widespread fraud in the sale of business
opportunities.104
Throughout the Rule amendment
proceedings, the Commission has
described its experience in combating a
wide array of business opportunity
fraud through law enforcement actions.
Indeed, the Commission’s law
enforcement experience in conducting
numerous sweeps of the business
opportunity industry demonstrates that
deceptive and unfair practices in the
sale of business opportunities are not
only prevalent but persistent.105
101 16
CFR 1.7, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.
of Practice, 16 CFR 1.14(a)(1)(i)–(iv). In
addition, in accordance with 16 CFR 1.14(a)(1)(v),
the regulatory analysis is provided at Section V of
this Statement of Basis and Purpose.
103 Support in the record for each factor is set
forth in the substantive discussion of each
provision of the final Rule.
104 See 60 FR at 17657; 62 FR at 9117; 71 FR at
19084; 73 FR at 16133; 74 FR at 18172; 75 FR at
68559.
105 Since 1995, the Commission has conducted
more than 18 law enforcement sweeps to combat
deceptive business opportunity programs, many
102 Rules
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
Continued
08DER2
76826
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
The Commission has amended the
interim Rule to address the sale of
deceptive work-at-home schemes, where
unfair and deceptive practices have
been both prevalent and persistent.
These schemes prey upon stay-at-home
parents, the physically disabled, those
who do not speak English, and others
who cannot obtain employment outside
of the home. Sellers of fraudulent workat-home opportunities deceive their
victims with promises of an ongoing
relationship in which the seller will buy
the output that business opportunity
purchasers produce, often
misrepresenting to purchasers that there
is a market for the purchasers’ goods
and services. In addition, the
Commission’s law enforcement
experience demonstrates that fraudulent
work-at-home opportunity sellers
frequently invent undisclosed
conditions and limitations for rejecting
the work performed by purchasers and
refusing to buy back the goods the
purchasers produce. Similarly, these
sellers’ promises of continuing support
and assistance frequently prove empty,
leaving work-at-home opportunity
purchasers with no help in figuring out
how to assemble misshapen
components into finished products.
Finally, as the Commission’s cases and
complaint data demonstrate, con artists
who promote fraudulent work-at-home
schemes frequently dupe consumers
with false earnings claims.
with other law enforcement partners. E.g.,
Operation Bottom Dollar (2010); Operation Short
Change (2009); Project Fal$e Hope$ (2006); Project
Biz Opp Flop (2005); Project Busted Opportunity
(2002); Project Telesweep (1995); Project Biz-illion$
(1999); Operation Money Pit (1998); Project Vend
Up Broke (1998); Project Trade Name Games (1997);
and Operation Missed Fortune (1996). In addition
to joint law enforcement sweeps, the Commission
also targeted specific business opportunity ventures
such as envelope stuffing (Operation Pushing the
Envelope, see FTC News Release: Agencies
‘‘Pushing the Envelope’’ to Protect Consumers (Dec.
16, 2003), available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2003/12/pushenvelope.shtm); medical billing
(Operation Dialing for Deception, see FTC News
Release: FTC Sweep Protects Consumers from
‘‘Dialing for Deception’’ (Apr. 15, 2002), available
at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/04/dialing.shtm
and Project Housecall, see FTC News Release:
Bogus Business Opportunity Scams Targeted by
FTC (Jan. 28, 1998), available at https://www.ftc.gov/
opa/1998/01/housecal.shtm); seminars (Operation
Showtime, see Operation ‘‘Show Time’’ Targets
Seminars Selling Fraudulent Business
Opportunities and Investments (May 5, 1998),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/05/
showtime.shtm); Internet-related services (Net
Opportunities 1998); vending machines (Operation
Yankee Trader, see FTC News Release: Operation
‘‘Yankee Trader’’ Targets Bogus Vending Machine
Business Opportunities (Sept. 11, 1997), available
at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/09/still.shtm); and
900 numbers (Project Buylines, see FTC News
Release: Newest Business Opportunity Fraud Is For
900-Number Lines, Warns Federal Trade
Commission (March 7, 1996), available at https://
www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/03/buyline.shtm).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
Since 1990 the Commission has
brought over 75 work-at-home cases.106
These actions have targeted a variety of
schemes, ranging from envelope stuffing
and craft assembly programs, to
technology-driven opportunities and
medical billing plans.107
Data compiled by the Commission
demonstrate the prevalence of work-athome opportunities that do not deliver
the represented level of earnings.
Indeed, the Commission’s 2005
consumer fraud survey revealed that
work-at-home plans from which the
respondents who had purchased them
did not earn at least half the level of
promised earnings ranked fifth in terms
of the estimated number of victims and
third in terms of estimated number of
incidents reported during the year.108
According to the survey, an estimated
2.4 million individuals experienced
work-at-home fraud, and there were an
estimated 3.8 million incidents during
the one year period surveyed.109
Consumer complaints, survey data,
and the Commission’s law enforcement
experience convince the Commission
that deception is prevalent in work-athome offers. The final Rule’s disclosure
requirements and prohibitions provide
potential work-at-home purchasers with
the tools they need to protect
themselves from false claims.
In addition to work-at-home
opportunities, the final Rule also covers
the same types of business opportunities
that previously were covered under the
Original Franchise Rule and the interim
Business Opportunity Rule, such as
opportunities involving vending
machines, rack displays, Internet kiosks,
106 Many of these cases were brought in
connection with law enforcement sweeps of
fraudulent work-at-home and related employment
opportunities, including Operation Bottom Dollar
(2010); Operation Short Change (2009); Project
Fal$e Hope$ (2006); Project Biz Opp Flop (2005);
Project Homework (2001); Operation Top Ten Dot
Con, see FTC News Release: Law Enforcers Target
‘‘Top 10’’ Online Scams (Oct. 31, 2000), available
at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/10/topten.shtm;
and Operation Missed Fortune, see FTC News
Release: FTC, State Enforcers Target Get-Rich-Quick
Self-Employment Schemes (Nov. 13, 1996),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/11/
misdfort.shtm.
107 See, e.g., FTC v. Real Wealth, Inc., 10–CV–
0060–W–FJG (W.D. Mo. 2010) (envelope stuffing);
FTC v. Darling Angel Pin Creations, Inc., No. 8:10–
cv–00335–JSM–TGW (M.D. Fla. 2010) (craft
assembly); FTC v. The Results Group L.L.C, No. CV
06 2843 PHX JAT (D. Ariz. 2006) (work-at-home
involving becoming a Web-based affiliate); FTC v.
Mazzoni & Son, Inc., No.1:06CV2385 (N.D. Ohio
2006) (medical billing).
108 See Consumer Fraud in the United States: The
Second FTC Survey (October 2007) at 22, available
at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/10/fraud.pdf
(studying consumer experience with a variety of
products and services, including weight-loss
products, foreign lotteries, and prize promotions,
among others).
109 Id.
PO 00000
Frm 00012
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
and the like, which, as the
Commission’s experience demonstrates,
have been a persistently fertile ground
for fraud and deception.110 The
Commission has conducted numerous
law enforcement sweeps that targeted a
wide variety of business opportunity
scams involving the sale of vending
machines, rack displays, and other
opportunities covered by the Original
Franchise Rule and the interim Business
Opportunity Rule.111 Consumer
complaint data indicates that these
types of business opportunities continue
to be a significant source of consumer
injury.112
B. Manner and Context in Which the
Acts or Practices Are Deceptive or
Unfair
The final Rule has been carefully
crafted to address common deceptive or
unfair practices engaged in by
fraudulent business opportunity
sellers.113 By far, the most frequent
allegations in the Commission’s
business opportunity cases pertain to
inducing consumers to pay significant
amounts of money by means of false or
unsubstantiated earnings claims.114 This
is followed by inducement through false
testimonials or fictitious references and
by misrepresentations concerning: The
profitability of locations; the availability
of assistance; the nature of the products
or services being sold; the prior success
of third-party entities in finding
successful locations; the full extent of
110 See id. at 16 (reporting that an estimated
800,000 individuals were victims of business
opportunity fraud during the year surveyed).
111 E.g., Project Fal$e Hope$ (2006) (vending
machine and rack display opportunities); Project
Biz Opp Flop (2005) (vending machine
opportunities); Project Busted Opportunity (2002)
(vending machine and rack display opportunities);
Project Biz-illion$ (1999); Operation Money Pit
(1998) (rack display opportunities); Project Vend
Up Broke (1998) (vending machine opportunities);
Project Trade Name Games (1997) (rack display
opportunities); Operation Missed Fortune (1996);
Project Telesweep (1995) (vending machine and
rack display opportunities); see also supra note 55.
112 See Consumer Sentinel Network Databook
(March 2011) at p. 76, available at https://ftc.gov/
sentinel/reports/sentinel-annual-reports/sentinelcy2010.pdf (reporting that in 2010, over 12,000
complaints were filed against franchises, business
opportunities, and work-at-home schemes).
113 An act or practice is deceptive under Section
5(a) if it involves a material representation or
omission that is likely to mislead consumers, acting
reasonably under the circumstances, to their
detriment. See FTC Policy Statement on Deception,
appended to Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C.
110, 174 (1984). An act or practice is unfair under
Section 5 if: (1) It causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers; (2) the harm to
consumers is not outweighed by any countervailing
benefits; and (3) the harm is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers. See FTC Policy Statement
on Unfairness, appended to In re International
Harvester, 104 F.T.C. 949, 1062 (1984). See 15
U.S.C. 45(n).
114 See supra note 95.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
the investment costs; and refund
policies.115 The numerous business
opportunity complaints that consumers
submit to the Commission each year
consistently reference these same
concerns. The disclosure requirements
under the final Rule address each of
these deceptive or unfair practices.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
1. Earnings Claims
In the Commission’s experience,
earnings claims are highly material to
consumers in making their investment
decisions and typically are the single
most decisive factor in such decisions.
Earnings claims lie at the heart of
business opportunity fraud, and are
typically the enticement that persuades
consumers to invest their money. In the
overwhelming majority of the
Commission’s more than 245 cases
against business opportunity sellers, the
business opportunity seller has lured
unsuspecting consumers through false
or deceptive earnings representations.
These claims have taken the form of
purported historical earnings statistics
(e.g., ‘‘Our operators have earned
$100,000 a year’’), as well as wild and
unsupported earnings projections (e.g.,
‘‘You will earn $100,000 in your first
year’’). Promoters of work-at-home
opportunities frequently dupe
consumers with false earnings claims.
For example, in one recent envelopestuffing case brought under Section 5 of
the FTC Act, the defendants promised
purchasers weekly earnings ranging
from $1,200 to $4,400.116 In another
case targeting Spanish-speaking
consumers, the defendants promised
that purchasers could earn $1,400 per
week stuffing envelopes from home.117
Often earnings claims are express, but
may be implied. Sellers often convey
these false and unsubstantiated earnings
claims orally, although it is not unusual
for such claims to be in writing. Nor is
it unusual for these false earnings
claims to contradict inconspicuous
disclaimers the seller has hidden in
contracts or other printed materials. At
any rate, false or unsubstantiated
earnings claims are inherently likely to
mislead consumers. Certainly, no aspect
of the sales transaction is more material
than the level of earnings a purchaser
can reasonably expect. Moreover,
prospective purchasers reasonably
interpret earnings claims at face value.
Thus, false or unsubstantiated earnings
115 See
supra note 96.
v. Global U.S. Resources, No. 10–CV–
1457 (RNC) (D. Conn. 2010).
117 FTC v. Zoilo Cruz, No. 3:08–cv–01877–JP
(D.P.R. 2008).
116 FTC
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
claims are deceptive and unlawful
under Section 5 of the FTC Act.118
Under the Original Franchise Rule
and the interim Business Opportunity
Rule, the Commission sought to ensure
the accuracy and reliability of earnings
claims, both written and oral, express or
implied, by prohibiting sellers from
making an earnings claim, unless the
seller possessed a reasonable basis for
the claim, along with written
substantiation for the claim, at the time
the claim was made. Sellers were also
required to provide prospective
purchasers with a separate earnings
claims statement that set forth the claim
and the substantiation for that claim.
The final Rule continues to address false
and deceptive earnings claims by
requiring business opportunity sellers to
disclose whether they make an earnings
claim. Sellers who make earnings claims
must attach to the required disclosure
document an earnings claim statement
setting forth the earnings claim, the
number and percentage of purchasers
who achieved the represented level of
earnings, the date range during which
the represented earnings were achieved,
and other information. These disclosure
requirements are designed to help
consumers identify and evaluate an
earnings claim, if one is made, or to
arouse suspicion if an earnings claim is
made orally but is disclaimed in
writing. The final Rule, in § 437.6(d),
also prohibits misrepresenting ‘‘the
amount of sales, or gross or net income
or profits a prospective purchaser may
earn, or that prior purchasers have
earned.’’
2. References
The use of paid references or ‘‘shills’’
is a common practice in the sale of
fraudulent business opportunities. In
many of the Commission’s cases against
fraudulent business opportunity sellers,
the defendants had offered to provide
prospective purchasers with
purportedly independent references,
who in reality were nothing more than
paid shills—individuals who were
compensated by the defendants to claim
that they were successful operators of
defendants’ business ventures.119 The
business opportunity sellers, however,
had not disclosed to prospective
118 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception,
appended to Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C.
110, 174 (1984).
119 E.g., FTC v. Am. Entm’t Distribs., Inc., No. 04–
22431–CIV–Martinez (S.D. Fla. 2004); U.S. v.
Vaughn, No. 01–20077–01–KHV (D. Kan. 2001);
FTC v. Hart Mktg. Enter. Ltd., Inc., No. 98–222–
CIV–T–23 E (M.D. Fla. 1998); FTC v. Inetintl.com,
No. 98–2140 (C.D. Cal. 1998); FTC v. Infinity
Multimedia, Inc., No. 96–6671–CIV–Gonzalez (S.D.
Fla. 1996); FTC v. Allstate Bus. Consultants Group,
Inc., No. 95–6634–CIV–Ryskamp (S.D. Fla. 1995).
PO 00000
Frm 00013
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76827
purchasers that the references were paid
or otherwise received a benefit for
providing a favorable account of the
opportunity. The use of fictitious
references is an objectionable, but very
effective means of misleading
consumers about a highly material
fact—whether other purchasers have
actually achieved earnings as the seller
represents, and whether those
purchasers’ overall experience of
operating the business has been
positive. When the information a
reference provides on these questions is
fictitious, a prospective purchaser has
no way of knowing the information is
false and unreliable. Thus, the use of
fictitious references—shills—is a
deceptive practice.120
The Original Franchise Rule and the
interim Business Opportunity Rule
sought to remedy this deceptive practice
by requiring business opportunity
sellers to provide prospective
purchasers with the names and contact
information for at least 10 current
purchasers of the opportunity. The final
Rule continues to remedy this deceptive
practice by requiring a business
opportunity seller to disclose a list of all
prior purchasers of the business
opportunity during the previous three
years. The disclosure of prior
purchasers is instrumental in preventing
fraud because it enables prospective
purchasers to independently verify the
seller’s claims. The final Rule also, in
§ 437.6(q), prohibits misrepresenting
that any person has purchased a
business opportunity, or that any person
can provide an independent assessment
of the offering, when such is not the
case.
3. Refund Policies
Fraudulent business opportunity
sellers often offer prospective
purchasers the right to cancel or to seek
a whole or partial refund, but when a
purchaser seeks to cancel, he finds there
are hidden limitations or conditions on
the refund policy. More often, the seller
simply ignores the purchaser’s request.
Thus, refund offers are frequently just
illusory, and misleading. Cancellation
or refund offers are material to
prospective purchasers because they
purport to reflect the potential risk of
the proposed transaction, and may
create the impression that the business
opportunity offer is either risk free or a
low financial risk. Purchasers
reasonably interpret a refund policy to
be, in fact, as stated. Thus, representing
120 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception,
appended to Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C.
110, 174 (1984).
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
76828
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
an illusory refund policy is deceptive
under Section 5 of the FTC Act.
Moreover, the failure to honor refund
promises is an unfair practice in
violation of Section 5(n) of the FTC
Act.121 It often results in substantial
injury to business opportunity
purchasers that they cannot reasonably
avoid.122 Moreover, the record is devoid
of any evidence suggesting that this
harm is outweighed by any
countervailing benefits.
To remedy this practice, under the
Original Franchise Rule and the interim
Business Opportunity Rule, it was a
violation for a seller to fail to refund a
purchaser’s funds, in certain instances.
The final Rule continues to address this
practice. Under § 437.3(a)(4) of the final
Rule, a seller is not required to have a
refund or cancellation policy. The
seller, however, is required to disclose
whether it has either a refund or
cancellation policy, and if so, the seller
must disclose, in an attachment to the
disclosure document, the material terms
of the policy. Moreover, § 437.6(k)
prohibits any misrepresentation of a
seller’s refund or cancellation policies,
and § 437.6(l) prohibits failure to
provide a refund or cancellation when
the purchaser has satisfied the terms
and conditions disclosed.
4. Legal Actions
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
The Commission’s law enforcement
experience amply demonstrates that
fraudulent business opportunity sellers
often operate through multiple related
affiliates, or use, sequentially or
simultaneously, a variety of corporate
identities in order to obscure their
negative reputation or to avoid alerting
consumers of the potential for fraud.
This subterfuge is designed to mislead,
and actually does mislead prospective
business opportunity purchasers about a
crucially material fact: The reliability
and trustworthiness of the seller with
whom the consumer is transacting. It is
not unreasonable for a consumer to
believe that a seller is as represented;
the consumer is not obliged to suspect
an apparently legitimate seller has a
history of fraud hidden behind multiple
defunct or impossible to trace corporate
entities. Thus, it is a deceptive practice
and a violation of Section 5 for a seller
to obfuscate past activities that would
121 An act or practice is unfair if it ‘‘causes or is
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition.’’ 15 U.S.C.
5(n).
122 See, e.g., In re Orkin Exterminating Co., 108
F.T.C. 263 (1986), aff’d, Orkin Exterminating Co. v.
FTC, 849 F.2d 1354 (11 Cir. 1988).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
alert a prospective purchaser of a
likelihood of fraud.123
One of the key indicia of a seller’s
reliability and trustworthiness is
whether there have been law
enforcement actions or lawsuits for
fraud and similar infractions targeting
that seller. Accordingly, under the
Original Franchise Rule and the interim
Business Opportunity Rule, the
Commission required sellers to disclose
certain legal actions in which they or
their principals have been involved.
Similarly, the final Rule requires a
business opportunity seller to disclose
any legal actions that the seller, its
affiliates, and certain key personnel
have been involved in during the
previous ten years involving
misrepresentation, fraud, securities law
violations, or unfair or deceptive
practices, including violations of any
FTC Rule. Knowledge of such legal
actions against the seller and other key
persons associated with the seller is
material to a prospective purchaser’s
decision to go forward with the
transaction.
These disclosure requirements are
tailored to address common deceptive
or unfair practices in the sale of
business opportunities, as demonstrated
by the Commission’s extensive law
enforcement experience with business
opportunity fraud. In addition to these
disclosures, the final Rule requires
sellers to disclose certain identifying
information about themselves and
expressly prohibits a variety of material
misrepresentations and omissions that
the Commission’s experience
demonstrates to be most commonly
associated with deceptive and unfair
practices in the sale of business
opportunities.
C. The Economic Effect of the Rule
At every stage of the Rule amendment
proceeding, the Commission solicited
comment on the economic impact of the
Rule, as well as the costs and benefits
of each proposed Rule amendment. In
issuing the final Rule, the Commission
has carefully considered the comments
received and the costs and benefits of
each amendment. As discussed
throughout this SBP, the final Rule’s
disclosure requirements and specific
prohibitions will provide a substantial
benefit to consumers weighing the risks
of investing their money in specific
business opportunity offers. In
particular, the mandated disclosures
will help consumers evaluate the
earnings claims made by a seller,
123 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception,
appended to Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C.
110, 174 (1984).
PO 00000
Frm 00014
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
investigate the litigation history of the
seller, identify the seller’s refund or
cancellation policy, and check on the
experiences of other purchasers. By
providing consumers with access to this
information before money changes
hands, the final Rule will substantially
reduce economic harm caused by
misleading sales practices.
The Commission has attempted to
reduce sellers’ compliance costs
wherever possible. In general,
compliance with the final Rule’s
disclosure requirements is significantly
less burdensome than with the Original
Franchise Rule or the interim Business
Opportunity Rule. Most notably, the
final Rule streamlines the more than 20
separate categories of disclosures
required by the interim Business
Opportunity Rule to just five. The final
Rule also employs specific prohibitions
in place of affirmative disclosures
wherever possible in an attempt to
further reduce compliance costs.
A variety of other amendments have
been made in an attempt to reduce
compliance costs for business
opportunity sellers. For example, in the
RNPR, the Commission eliminated the
requirement that sellers disclose the
litigation histories of their sales
personnel, recognizing that such
disclosure would place a burden on
business opportunity sellers that would
not be outweighed by countervailing
benefits to prospective purchasers.124
The final Rule also does not require
sellers with prior legal actions against
them to detail the nature of the legal
action, but rather, permits sellers to
provide a brief 100-word description of
the case if they so choose. Also, in an
attempt to reduce compliance costs, the
final Rule permits sellers to comply
with the cancellation or refund
disclosure requirement by attaching to
the disclosure document a copy of a preexisting document—such as a company
brochure—that details the seller’s
cancellation or refund policy. The final
Rule also provides sellers with a less
burdensome means of complying with
the reference disclosure requirement: In
lieu of a list of the 10 prior purchasers
nearest the prospect, a seller may
provide a prospect with a national list
of all purchasers. For example, a seller
making disclosures online could simply
maintain an electronic list of purchasers
that it updates periodically. This would
enable the seller to avoid having to
tailor the disclosure to each prospective
124 73 FR at 16126. The Commission’s decision to
narrow the Rule so that MLMs would not be
burdened with unworkable disclosure requirements
was similarly prompted by concern that any
potential benefits would be outweighed by
compliance costs. Id. at 16119–21.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
purchaser, thereby further reducing
compliance costs.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
D. The Effect of the Rule on State and
Local Laws
Section 437.9(b) of the final Rule
provides that the Commission does not
intend to preempt state or local business
opportunity laws, except to the extent
that they conflict with the Rule. A law
does not conflict with the Rule if it
affords prospective purchasers equal or
greater protection, such as a
requirement for registration of
disclosure documents or more extensive
disclosures.
Although state laws offering equal or
greater protections are not preempted,
§ 437.6(c) of the final Rule, which
addresses extraneous materials,
prohibits sellers from providing
disclosures required under state law in
the same document with the disclosures
required under the final Rule. One of
the main goals of revising and tailoring
the disclosure requirements for business
opportunity sellers is to simplify and
streamline the disclosures into a singlepage document. The Commission has
determined, therefore, that allowing
business opportunity sellers to mix
federal and state disclosures into one
document would be a means for sellers
to present lengthy and confusing
information to prospective purchasers,
and would be contrary to the
Commission’s goal of requiring sellers to
provide a simple, clear, and concise
disclosure document.125
III. Section-by-Section Analysis of Part
437
The final Rule is divided into ten
sections. Section 437.1 defines 19 key
terms employed in the Rule’s text.
Section 437.2 establishes the business
opportunity seller’s obligation to furnish
prospective purchasers with material
information in the form of a written
basic disclosure document. Section
437.3 specifies the content and form of
the disclosure document. Section 437.4
sets forth the requirements that business
opportunity sellers must follow if they
elect to make representations regarding
earnings. Section 437.5 addresses sales
conducted in Spanish or other
languages besides English, and the
disclosure requirements for those sales.
Section 437.6 prohibits a number of
specific deceptive claims and other
deceptive practices in connection with
business opportunity sales. Section
437.7 sets forth the Rule’s recordkeeping
provisions. Section 437.8 expressly
exempts from the Rule those business
arrangements that are covered by the
125 73
FR at 16128.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
Amended Franchise Rule. Finally, two
administrative sections—437.9 and
437.10—address other laws, rules, and
orders, and severability. The sections
that follow discuss each of these rule
provisions in turn.
A. Section 437.1: Definitions
The final Rule begins with a list of
defined terms in alphabetical order. In
several instances, the final Rule’s
definitions closely track those contained
in the interim Business Opportunity
Rule or the Commission’s
interpretations of the Original Franchise
Rule.126 These include the definitions
for the terms ‘‘action,’’ ‘‘affiliate,’’
‘‘disclose or state,’’ ‘‘earnings claim,’’
‘‘person,’’ and ‘‘written or in writing.’’
In addition, the final Rule includes
definitions for the terms ‘‘business
opportunity,’’ ‘‘designated person,’’
‘‘exclusive territory,’’ ‘‘general media,’’
‘‘new business,’’ ‘‘prior business,’’
‘‘providing locations, outlets, accounts,
or customers,’’ ‘‘purchaser,’’
‘‘quarterly,’’ ‘‘required payment,’’ and
‘‘seller,’’ each of which was proposed in
the IPBOR and, in certain
circumstances, modified in the RPBOR
and the proposed Final Rule attached to
the Staff Report. Finally, the final Rule
includes two new definitions that were
recommended in the Staff Report: (1)
‘‘Material’’ and (2) ‘‘signature or
signed.’’ 127 Each definition, including
the record support for the definition and
the Commission’s analysis, is addressed
below.
1. Section 437.1(a): Action
The term ‘‘action’’ appears in
§ 437.3(a)(3), which requires business
opportunity sellers to disclose material
information about the business
opportunity seller’s litigation history.128
Specifically, § 437.3(a)(3) of the final
Rule requires the disclosure of material
information about certain civil or
criminal actions within the previous ten
years involving the business
opportunity seller, its directors, and
certain key employees,129 as well as its
126 See 16 CFR 437.1; Final Interpretive Guides
(‘‘Interpretive Guides’’) accompanying the Original
Franchise Rule, 44 FR 49966 (Aug. 24, 1978).
127 At the same time, the final Rule eliminates
nine of the interim Business Opportunity Rule’s
terms and their definitions, which are no longer
necessary: ‘‘prospective business opportunity
purchaser,’’ ‘‘business day,’’ ‘‘time for making of
disclosures,’’ ‘‘fractional business opportunity,’’
‘‘business opportunity broker,’’ ‘‘sale of a business
opportunity,’’ ‘‘cooperative association,’’ ‘‘fiscal
year,’’ and ‘‘personal meeting.’’
128 Section 437.3(a)(3) requires disclosure of ‘‘any
civil or criminal action for misrepresentation, fraud,
securities law violations, or unfair or deceptive
practices, including violations of any FTC Rule.’’
129 The final Rule covers ‘‘any sales managers, or
any individual who occupies a position or performs
PO 00000
Frm 00015
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76829
affiliates or prior businesses.
Information about litigation history
based on allegations of
misrepresentation, fraud, securities law
violations, or unfair or deceptive
practices is highly material to assessing
investment risk. Discovering that a
seller has a history of violating laws and
regulations is perhaps the best
indication that a particular business
opportunity is a high-risk investment.
The definition of ‘‘action’’ is intended
to make clear that disclosures involving
prior litigation include not only civil
actions brought before a court but also
matters before arbitrators.130 It also is
intended to make clear that an ‘‘action’’
includes all government actions,
including criminal matters and actions
brought to enforce FTC Rules, as well as
administrative law enforcement actions,
such as cease and desist orders or
assurances of voluntary compliance.131
During the Business Opportunity
workshop, a panelist representing the
DOJ suggested that bankruptcy is
another type of legal action that should
be disclosed to potential purchasers
because a bankruptcy filing could be a
red flag warning of potential risk
associated with a business
opportunity.132 A panelist from the
Maryland Attorney General’s Office
disagreed, arguing that this additional
disclosure would not benefit potential
business opportunity purchasers
because, in his experience, fraudulent
business opportunities do not typically
file for bankruptcy protection.133
Instead, in that panelist’s experience,
fraudulent business opportunity
promoters shutter their premises and
reopen as an entirely new fraudulent
entity. Another panelist posited that
disclosure of the existence of a
bankruptcy by the business opportunity
or its key personnel was not likely to
identify fraudulent or problematic
business opportunities that would not
already be identified through the
existing proposed categories of legal
actions.134
The Commission has determined not
to include bankruptcy as a type of legal
action that a business opportunity seller
must disclose. The Commission’s law
enforcement experience indicates that
when targeted by law enforcement,
a function similar to an officer, director, or sales
manager of the seller.’’ See § 437.3(a)(3)(i)(c).
130 71 FR at 19061.
131 Id.
132 Jost, June 09 Tr at 32. A second panelist
(Taylor, June 09 Tr at 35), and a commenter
(Brooks-Workshop comment) agreed that existence
of a bankruptcy might be relevant to a potential
purchaser.
133 Cantone, June 09 Tr at 37.
134 MacLeod, June 09 Tr at 33.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
76830
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
rather than file for bankruptcy,
fraudulent business opportunity sellers
tend to vanish and then simply reopen
under new company names.135 Thus,
there is little meaningful correlation
between filing for bankruptcy and
promoting a fraudulent business
opportunity. Yet, many legitimate
businesses have been forced by
circumstances to seek the protection of
bankruptcy courts. Therefore,
bankruptcy filing would not seem to be
a reliable marker for potential fraud, and
would not likely help business
opportunity purchasers avoid being
defrauded. Therefore, the final Rule’s
definition of action does not contain
reference to bankruptcy.136
Finally, the Staff Report noted that
some state administrative proceedings
result in parties entering into assurances
of voluntary compliance, while other
states refer to such orders as assurances
of discontinuance. The staff
recommended, therefore, adding
‘‘assurance of discontinuance’’ to the
categories of legal actions enumerated in
the proposed definition. The
Commission agrees with the staff’s
recommendation and the final Rule’s
definition of ‘‘action’’ now includes that
phrase. Accordingly, § 437.1(a) of the
final Rule defines ‘‘action’’ as follows:
‘‘A criminal information, indictment, or
proceeding; a civil complaint, cross
claim, counterclaim, or third party
complaint in a judicial action or
proceeding; arbitration; or any
governmental administrative
proceeding, including, but not limited
to, an action to obtain or issue a cease
and desist order, an assurance of
voluntary compliance, and an assurance
of discontinuance.’’
The definition of ‘‘action,’’ as
recommended in the Staff Report,
received no comment, and the final Rule
adopts this definition of ‘‘action’’ as
recommended.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
2. Section 437.1(b): Affiliate
The term ‘‘affiliate’’ appears in several
sections of the final Rule, most notably
in § 437.3(a)(3), which requires a
business opportunity seller to disclose
not only litigation in which the seller
was named as a party, but any litigation
naming any of the seller’s ‘‘affiliates’’ or
prior businesses. Section 437.1(b) of the
135 See, e.g., FTC v. Nat’l Vending Consultants,
Inc., CV–S–05–0160–RCJ–PAL (D. Nev. 2005); FTC
v. USA Beverages, Inc., CV–05–61682 (S.D. Fla.
2004); FTC v. Allstate Bus. Distribution Ctr., Inc.,
CV–00–10335AHM (C.D. Cal. 2001); FTC v.
O’Rourke, No. 93–6511–Civ–Gonzalez (S.D. Fla.
1993); FTC v. Inv. Dev., Inc., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6502 (E.D. La. June 7, 1989).
136 Similarly, the scope of 437.3(c)(3)(i) has
remained unchanged and does not require the
disclosure of bankruptcy filings.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
final Rule defines the term ‘‘affiliate’’ to
mean: ‘‘An entity controlled by,
controlling, or under common control
with a business opportunity seller.’’
This definition also covers litigation
involving a parent or subsidiary of the
business opportunity seller.
The definition of ‘‘affiliate,’’ as
proposed in the INPR and RNPR, and
recommended in the Staff Report,
received no comment, and the final Rule
adopts this definition of ‘‘affiliate’’ as
recommended.
3. Section 437.1(c): Business
Opportunity
The definition of ‘‘business
opportunity’’ delineates the scope of the
Rule’s coverage. Under the final Rule, a
‘‘business opportunity’’ is a commercial
arrangement that possesses three
required elements. First, a seller must
solicit a prospective purchaser to enter
into a new business.137 Second, the
prospective purchaser of the business
opportunity must make a ‘‘required
payment.’’ 138 And third, the seller must
represent that the seller or one or more
designated persons will provide any of
three types of business assistance: (1)
Providing locations for the purchaser’s
use or operation of equipment, displays,
vending machines, or similar devices;
(2) providing outlets, accounts, or
customers to the prospective purchaser;
or (3) buying back any or all of the
goods or services that the purchaser
makes, including providing payment for
such services as, for example, stuffing
envelopes from the purchaser’s home.
Because this section triggers the
strictures and requirements of the Rule,
the definition of ‘‘business
opportunity,’’ and in particular, its
specification of the types of ‘‘business
assistance’’ that characterize a covered
business, has generated substantial
comment throughout this proceeding.
After careful consideration of the
amassed record, the Commission has
crafted the final Rule’s business
opportunity definition to ensure that it
is broad enough to encompass many
business opportunities that historically
were not covered under the Original
Franchise Rule or the interim Business
Opportunity Rule, but which have
routinely been shown to be associated
with unfair or deceptive practices.139 At
137 Section 437.1(j) defines ‘‘new business’’ as ‘‘a
business in which the prospective purchaser is not
currently engaged, or a new line or type of
business.’’
138 See § 437.1(p) (defining ‘‘required payment’’).
139 As discussed supra in Section I.C, the
definition of business opportunity no longer
excludes transactions falling below a minimum
monetary payment threshold nor does it require
that the purchaser of the opportunity sell goods or
PO 00000
Frm 00016
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
the same time, the definition of
‘‘business opportunity’’ has been
narrowly tailored to avoid inadvertently
sweeping in other business
arrangements, such as traditional
product distribution. This has been
accomplished primarily through
narrowing the types of business
assistance that will trigger the Rule’s
coverage from the five categories
originally proposed in the IPBOR to the
three categories described above.
Consistent with the approach
proposed in the RPBOR, the final Rule’s
definition of business opportunity
eliminates two types of business
assistance that under the IPBOR would
have triggered the Rule’s strictures and
disclosure obligations: (1) Tracking or
paying, or purporting to track or pay,
commissions or other compensation;
and (2) providing other advice or
training assistance. The sections below
describe the evolution of the business
opportunity definition, including the
rationale for eliminating these types of
assistance from the definition of
business opportunity.
In the IPBOR, the proposed definition
of ‘‘business opportunity’’ was designed
to be broad enough to cover the sale of
virtually any type of business
opportunity, including two types in
particular that historically had fallen
outside the scope of the Original
Franchise Rule—work-at-home and
pyramid marketing opportunities.140 As
explained more fully in the INPR, the
Commission’s law enforcement
experience and consumer complaints
demonstrate that these two types of
opportunities are sources of prevalent
and persistent problems,141 which the
Commission has traditionally
challenged under Section 5 of the FTC
Act.142
In order to reach these two types of
opportunities, the INPR proposed a
broad definition of ‘‘business
opportunity’’ comprised of three
services directly to end-users other than the
business opportunity seller. These changes extend
the scope of coverage to many business
opportunities that previously escaped coverage.
140 71 FR at 19059.
141 In 2010, pyramid schemes generated
approximately 2,000 consumer complaints, while
work-at-home schemes generated over 8,000
complaints. See Consumer Sentinel Network
Databook (March 2011) at 76, 79, available at https://
ftc.gov/sentinel/reports/sentinel-annual-reports/
sentinel-cy2010.pdf.
142 Many of these schemes fell outside the ambit
of the Original Franchise Rule because: (1) The
purchase price was less than $500, the minimum
payment necessary to trigger coverage; (2) required
payments were primarily for inventory, which did
not count toward the $500 monetary threshold; (3)
the scheme did not offer location or account
assistance; or (4) the scheme involved the sale of
products to the business opportunity seller rather
than to end-users. See 71 FR at 19055, 19059.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
elements: (1) A solicitation to enter into
a new business; (2) payment of
consideration, directly or indirectly
through a third party; and (3) the
making of either an ‘‘earnings claim’’ or
an offer to provide ‘‘business
assistance.’’ 143 The IPBOR’s definition
of ‘‘business assistance’’ included
assistance in the form of ‘‘tracking or
paying, or purporting to track or pay,
commissions or other compensation
based upon the purchaser’s sale of
goods or services or recruitment of other
persons to sell goods or services.’’ 144
The Commission noted that many
pyramid schemes offer this type of
assistance, purporting to compensate
participants not only for their own
product sales but also for sales made by
their participants’ downline recruits.145
Under the IPBOR, ‘‘business assistance’’
also included providing other advice or
training assistance.146
In response to the INPR, many
commenters argued that the IPBOR
would have unintentionally swept in
numerous commercial arrangements
where there is little or no evidence that
fraud is occurring.147 Several
commenters contended that the IPBOR
would have regulated a wide range of
legitimate and traditional product
distribution arrangements that were not
associated with the types of fraud that
business opportunity laws are designed
to remedy. For example, one commenter
suggested that the IPBOR could be read
to cover product distribution through
retail stores simply because the retailer
pays for inventory and the manufacturer
provides sales training to its retail
accounts.148 The commenter suggested
that its business operations would meet
the IPBOR’s definition of business
opportunity because: (1) The ‘‘payment’’
prong of the definition did not exempt
voluntary purchases of inventory; and
(2) providing retail staff with sales
training would have satisfied the
‘‘business assistance’’ prong of the
definition.149 Other commenters noted
that even if a company provided no
‘‘business assistance,’’ it easily could
have fallen under the ‘‘business
opportunity’’ definition if the company
made some representation about sales or
profits sufficient to constitute an
earnings claim.150
Other commenters in response to the
INPR argued that the IPBOR would have
143 See
151 Venable-INPR
71 FR at 19087.
145 Id.
at 19063 & n.106.
at 19087 (IPBOR § 437.1(c)(v)).
147 See 73 FR at 16113–14.
148 Timberland-INPR at 2.
149 Id.
150 IBA–INPR at 4; see also PMI–INPR at 3.
146 Id.
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
at 2–3; NAA–INPR at 1–3.
addition, the RPBOR clarified that a
‘‘required payment’’ does not include payments for
the purchase of reasonable amounts of inventory at
bona fide prices. The final Rule incorporates this
clarification.
153 73 FR at 16124.
154 Id.
155 Id.
152 In
144 Id.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
been broad enough to cover other types
of commercial arrangements, such as
bona fide educational programs offered
by colleges and universities, the sale of
certain books by publishers or book
stores, and even the relationship
between newspapers and independent
carriers who distribute the newspapers
to homes and businesses.151
Recognizing the unintended
overbreadth of the Rule to sweep in
these types of commercial arrangements
as well as the unworkability of applying
the Rule to MLMs, the Commission
proposed the RPBOR with a narrower
definition of ‘‘business opportunity.’’
The RPBOR ‘‘business opportunity’’
definition narrowed the types of
‘‘business assistance’’ that would trigger
Rule coverage by deleting from the Rule
text: (1) Tracking payments or
commissions and (2) providing other
advice or training assistance.152 The
RPBOR definition also eliminated the
‘‘earnings claim’’ element from the
definition.153 But for this modification,
any business or commercial
arrangement that made an earnings
claim could have been a ‘‘business
opportunity,’’ as defined by the Rule. To
avoid transforming common commercial
transactions into ‘‘business
opportunities,’’ some commenters
suggested narrowing the definition of
‘‘earnings claim.’’ 154 In the RNPR,
however, the Commission determined
that the better approach to address
concerns about overbreadth was to tailor
the substantive scope of the Rule, in
part, by unlinking the definition of
‘‘business opportunity’’ from the making
of an earnings claim.155 The Staff Report
recommended that the Commission
adopt this modification in the final
Rule. No comments received in
response to the Staff Report addressed
this change.
In the RNPR, the Commission
solicited comment as to whether the
narrowed Rule would adequately reach
the field of business opportunity
promoters who are likely to engage in
unfair or deceptive practices, and
conversely, queried whether the newlyproposed narrowing of the definition,
and, hence, the scope of the RPBOR’s
coverage, was sufficient to exclude from
the rule traditional distributor
Jkt 226001
PO 00000
Frm 00017
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76831
relationships 156 that had been
inadvertently swept into the IPBOR.157
The majority of comments in response
to the RNPR focused on whether the
revisions to the proposed Rule would
capture MLMs.158 The majority of
commenters applauded the
Commission’s decision to narrow the
scope of the rule, while others
expressed concern that the MLM
industry would continue to be subject to
the RPBOR despite the more narrowed
definition of ‘‘business opportunity.’’ 159
For example, some commenters
expressed concern that the buy-back
provision, set forth in § 437.1(c)(3)(iii),
would sweep in MLM companies that
offer to buy back their distributors’
unused inventory.160 These commenters
suggested amending this provision to
strike the word ‘‘provides’’ from
§ 437.1(c)(3)(iii), so that the definition of
‘‘business opportunity’’ would clearly
not encompass a return of unused
materials or merchandise.161
The Commission is not persuaded
that such a change is necessary. In the
RNPR, the Commission made clear that
§ 437.1(c)(3)(iii) was intended to capture
work-at-home business opportunities in
which the seller provides the purchaser
with some supplies and the purchaser
converts those supplies into a product
156 For example, commenters to the INPR noted
that the IPBOR would cover ‘‘manufacturers,
suppliers and other traditional distribution firms
that have relied on the bona fide wholesale price
exclusion to avoid coverage’’ under the Rule.
Sonnenschein-INPR at 1–2. The Cosmetic, Toiletry
and Fragrance Association posited that the IPBOR
would cover the relationship between a
manufacturer and an independent contractor who
sells the product to beauty supply companies,
salons, and others. CTFA–INPR; see also LHD&L–
INPR at 2 (noting that the IPBOR could cover the
relationship between a manufacturer and a regional
distributor of products).
157 73 FR at 16133.
158 DSA–RNPR. In addition, the Commission
received more than 40 comments from various
MLMs that expressed support and concurrence with
DSA’s comments. See, e.g., Big Ear-RNPR; Jafra
Cosmetics-RNPR; Lia Sophia-RNPR; LongabergerRNPR; Princess House-RNPR; Shaklee-RNPR. Some
commenters expressed disappointment that the
Commission proposed to exclude MLMs from
coverage by the Rule. See, e.g., CAI–RNPR; DurandRNPR; PSA–RNPR; Aird-RNPR (Rebuttal);
Parrington-RNPR. As previously noted, the
Commission decided to narrow the scope of the
Rule to avoid broadly sweeping in MLMs.
159 See, e.g., DSA–RNPR; Avon-RNPR; BatesRNPR; IBA–RNPR; MMS–RNPR; Mary Kay-RNPR;
Melaleuca-RNPR; Primerica-RNPR; Pre-Paid LegalRNPR; IDS–RNPR; Tupperware-RNPR; VenableRNPR.
160 DSA requires that its members offer to buy
back, at 90% of the salesperson’s cost, all resalable
inventory and other sales materials. DSA–INPR at
35.
161 DSA–RNPR at 6 n.14 (noting that ‘‘the buyback provision is the cornerstone of the DSA’s self
regulatory regime and a valuable protection for
individual direct sellers’’); Mary Kay-RNPR at 6;
Babener-RNPR; Melaleuca-RNPR.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
76832
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
or other ‘‘good’’ for repurchase by the
seller or other person.162 As the Staff
Report noted, it would require a labored
reading of this section to suggest that
the word ‘‘provides’’ means ‘‘to return
unused inventory the purchaser bought
from the seller but was not able to
sell.’’ 163 Moreover, the Commission has
explicitly stated that this provision
‘‘would not include the offer to buy
back inventory or equipment needed to
start a business.’’ 164
In addition, some commenters argued
that § 437.1(c)(3)(i) would inadvertently
cover entities that offer, at no cost to
purchasers, the use of office space and
equipment for the operation of the
purchasers’ business.165 These
commenters were concerned that such
offers could be construed under
§ 437.1(c)(3)(i) to be providing
‘‘locations for the use or operation of
equipment * * * on premises neither
owned nor leased by the purchaser.’’ In
the RNPR, the Commission stated that
this provision was intended to capture
fraudulent vending machine and rack
display schemes,166 as well as schemes
where a purchaser is forced to lease
office space, telephones and other
equipment for operation of his or her
business.167 Noting that the Commission
did not intend to capture the incidental
use of office space and equipment that
the purchaser does not own, lease, or
control, and for which the purchaser
makes no payment, the Staff Report
recommended a slight modification to
§ 437.1(c)(3)(i), amending it to state:
‘‘provide locations for the use or
operation of equipment, displays,
vending machines, or similar devices,
owned, leased, controlled, or paid for by
the purchaser.’’ 168
162 See
73 FR at 16123.
Report at 34.
164 See 71 FR at 19062.
165 For example, Primerica, an MLM that sells
insurance products and services, requires that its
regional managers provide at no cost to ‘‘downline’’
sales agents the use of office space, supplies, and
equipment (such as computers and printers) for the
operation of his or her business. Primerica noted
that, as a practical matter, it must require this
assistance, as the regulatory structure in which
Primerica operates necessitates that regional
managers exercise compliance oversight functions
with respect to the agents in their downlines.
Primerica-RNPR; see also Avon-RNPR; TupperwareRNPR.
166 73 FR at 16123 (citing FTC v. Am. Entm’t
Distribs., No. 04–22431–CIV–Martinez (S.D. Fla.
2004); FTC v. Advanced Pub. Commc’ns Corp., No.
00–00515–CIV–Ungaro-Benages (S.D. Fla. 2000);
FTC v. Ameritel Payphone Distribs., Inc., No. 00–
0514–CIV–Gold (S.D. Fla. 2000); FTC v. Mktg. and
Vending Concepts, No. 00–1131 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
167 FTC v. Equinox, Int’l, No. CV–S–99–0969–
JAR–RLH (D. Nev. 1999).
168 The Staff Report recommended that the
Commission strike the final clause of this provision
of the RPBOR—‘‘on premises neither owned or
leased by the purchaser’’—noting that the clause is
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
163 Staff
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
No comments responding to the Staff
Report addressed this proposal. The
Commission adopts the change
recommended in the Staff Report. This
change clarifies that the third prong of
the ‘‘business opportunity’’ definition is
triggered only when the seller offers to
provide the purchaser, directly or
through an intermediary, with locations
in which to place equipment, displays,
vending machines, or similar devices
that the purchaser controls. This change
will not compromise the long-standing
coverage of the Rule, and will allow
legitimate sellers to offer beneficial
assistance to purchasers, at no cost to
those purchasers.169
4. Section 437.1(d): Designated Person
The term ‘‘designated person’’
appears in the definition of ‘‘business
opportunity’’ to ensure coverage over
those transactions in which a seller
refers a purchaser to a third party for the
provision of business locations,
accounts, or assistance such as buy-back
services, as specified in § 437.1(c)(3).
That section makes clear that in order to
fall within the scope of the business
opportunity definition, the business
assistance being offered need not be
provided to the purchaser by the seller
directly. Rather, a seller who represents
that business assistance may or will be
provided by a third party, such as a
locator or a supplier, will still be
covered by the Rule. Section 437.1(c)(3)
uses the term ‘‘designated person’’ to
refer to any third parties who would
provide business assistance to a
business opportunity purchaser and to
close a potential loophole. For example,
a fraudulent vending machine route
seller would not be able to circumvent
the final Rule by representing to a
prospective purchaser that a specific
locator will place machines for the
purchaser.170 The referral to a third
party would be sufficient to bring the
transaction within the ambit of the
Rule.171 Section 437.1(d) of the final
superfluous, as a buyer would never need a seller’s
assistance in identifying locations that the buyer
already owns or leases. The Commission agrees,
and the final Rule does not include this language.
169 In the final Rule, a non-substantive change
was made to the definition of ‘‘business
opportunity’’ proposed in the Staff Report—the
colon and number signaling the first element of the
definition was moved. This change simply makes
the sentence structure parallel.
170 The Commission’s law enforcement
experience demonstrates that closing this potential
loophole is necessary. For example, in FTC v.
Greeting Cards of Am., Inc., No. 03–60746–CIV–
Gold (S.D. Fla. 2003), the FTC alleged that the
business opportunity seller represented that a third
party locator would secure locations for the
prospective purchaser, and the locator failed to do
so.
171 See 71 FR at 19064.
PO 00000
Frm 00018
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Rule defines the term ‘‘designated
person’’ to mean ‘‘any person, other
than the seller, whose goods or services
the seller suggests, recommends, or
requires that the purchaser use in
establishing or operating a new
business.’’ 172
One commenter argued that the
proposed definition of ‘‘designated
person’’ was overbroad and that its
application would result in many multilevel marketing opportunities being
swept into the Rule.173 For instance, if
an MLM company requires its managers
to provide the use of office space,
equipment and supplies, and general
business advice to new agents (and
presumably to describe these types of
assistance to prospective purchasers as
part of a sales pitch),174 one could argue
that the company would be covered by
the Rule.175 The commenter offered
several suggested revisions to resolve
this problem, one of which was to
specify that ‘‘designated person’’ does
not include entities that receive no
payment from the purchaser in order to
receive the services provided.176 The
Staff Report noted that alternate
resolutions were more appropriate—
namely the modification to the
definitions of ‘‘business opportunity’’
and ‘‘providing locations, outlets,
accounts, or customers,’’ and
recommended, therefore, that the
definition of ‘‘designated person’’ be
adopted in the form proposed in the
RNPR. No comments in response to the
Staff Report addressed this definition,
and the final Rule adopts the definition
as recommended.
5. Section 437.1(e): Disclose or State
Section 437.1(e) of the final Rule
defines ‘‘disclose or state’’ to mean ‘‘to
give information in writing that is clear
and conspicuous, accurate, concise, and
legible.’’ 177 The purpose of this
definition is to ensure that a prospective
purchaser will receive complete
information in a form that a prospective
purchaser easily can read. For example,
the furnishing of a disclosure document
without punctuation or appropriate
172 This approach is consistent with the Amended
Franchise Rule’s analogous definitional elements,
extending the scope of that rule’s coverage to reach
transactions in which the franchisor provides to the
franchisee the services of a person able to secure
the retail outlets, accounts, sites, or locations. See
16 CFR 436.1(j).
173 Primerica-RNPR at 11.
174 The MLM company compensates managers for
this service; there is no cost to down-line agents.
Primerica-RNPR at 11.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 13.
177 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception,
appended to Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C.
110, 174 (1984) (discussing the standard for clear
and conspicuous disclosures).
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
spacing between words would not be
‘‘clear.’’ Similarly, required information
such as the number and percentage of
prior purchasers who obtained a
represented level of earnings would not
be ‘‘conspicuous’’ if set in small type,
printed in a low-contrast ink, or buried
amid extraneous information.
The proposed definition of ‘‘disclose
or state’’ received no comment. The
final definition, therefore, is adopted as
proposed.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
6. Section 437.1(f): Earnings Claim
The final Rule’s key feature is the
disclosure document, which provides a
potential purchaser of a business
opportunity with five items of material
information, including written
disclosure of all ‘‘earnings claims’’ made
by the seller, before the purchaser pays
any money or executes a contract. This
will allow a potential purchaser to
compare a seller’s written
representations with any oral
representations made. The term
‘‘earnings claim’’ is defined in the final
Rule as ‘‘any oral, written, or visual
representation to a prospective
purchaser that conveys, expressly or by
implication, a specific level or range of
actual or potential sales, or gross or net
income or profits.’’ 178 This
intentionally broad definition will cover
all variations of earnings representations
that the Commission’s law enforcement
experience shows are associated with
business opportunity fraud.179
For illustrative purposes, the
definition includes two examples of
communications that constitute
earnings claims. The first of these
examples describes common types of
potentially fraudulent earnings claims:
‘‘A chart, table, or mathematical
calculation that demonstrates possible
results based upon a combination of
variables.’’ This example is intended to
clarify that sales matrices that purport to
show income from an array of ‘‘vends’’
per day from a vending machine, for
example, would constitute an ‘‘earnings
claim’’ under the final Rule.180
The second example incorporates the
principle, as expressed in the
Interpretive Guides to the Original
Franchise Rule, that ‘‘any statements
from which a prospective purchaser can
reasonably infer that he or she will earn
a minimum level of income’’ constitute
an earnings claim.181 Given the
178 This definition is substantially similar to the
Amended Franchise Rule’s definition of ‘‘financial
performance representation,’’ which is the
Amended Franchise Rule’s equivalent of an
earnings claim. See 16 CFR 436.1(e).
179 71 FR at 19065.
180 Id.
181 44 FR at 49982.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
prevalence of earnings claims in
business opportunity sales, the
Commission believes that a broad
earnings disclosure requirement is
necessary to prevent fraud. Therefore,
the final Rule is not limited to express
earnings claims, but also includes
implied claims. Indeed, such implied
claims are at least as likely to mislead
prospective purchasers as express
claims.182 The final Rule’s definition
includes three specific examples
illustrative of this type of earnings
claim, as follows: ‘‘Earn enough to buy
a Porsche,’’ ‘‘earn a six-figure income,’’
and ‘‘earn your investment back within
one year.’’ Each of these three
illustrative examples implies a
minimum value—the cost of the lowest
priced Porsche in the first example; at
least $100,000 in the second; and an
amount equal to the purchaser’s initial
investment in the third. Accordingly,
this language makes clear that these
types of representations are
indistinguishable from direct, express
earnings claims.
Some commenters have argued that
the definition of ‘‘earnings claim’’ is
overly broad and that the Commission
should narrow the definition.183
Earnings claims, however, lie at the
heart of business opportunity fraud and
typically entice consumers into
investing their money. The Commission
has determined that narrowing the
definition of ‘‘earnings claim’’ could
allow business opportunity sellers to
avoid disclosing critical information to
prospective purchasers. Accordingly,
the definition of ‘‘earnings claim,’’ as
proposed in the RPBOR and
recommended in the Staff Report, is
adopted without change.
7. Section 437.1(g): Exclusive Territory
This term is defined because it is
referenced in § 437.6(n), which
prohibits misrepresentations concerning
territory exclusivity. Representations
about exclusive territories are material
because they purport to assure a
potential purchaser that he or she will
not face competition from other
purchasers of the same business
opportunity in his or her chosen
location, or from the seller offering the
same goods or services through
alternative channels of distribution.184
Exclusive territory promises go to the
viability of the business opportunity
and to the level of risk entailed in the
purchase.185 Indeed, misrepresentations
about territories have commonly been
182 Interpretive
Guides, 44 FR 49966.
FR at 16124.
184 See 71 FR at 19065.
185 Id.
183 73
PO 00000
Frm 00019
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76833
made by business opportunity sellers to
lure consumers into believing that a
purchase poses little financial risk.186
Section 437.1(g) of the final Rule
defines the term ‘‘exclusive territory’’ as
‘‘a specified geographic or other actual
or implied marketing area in which the
seller promises not to locate additional
purchasers or offer the same or similar
goods or services as the purchaser
through alternative channels of
distribution.’’ This definition reflects
the common industry practice of
establishing geographically delimited
territories—such as a city, county, or
state borders—as well as other
marketing areas, such as those
delineated by population.187 The
definition includes both representations
that other business opportunity
purchasers will not be allowed to
compete with a new purchaser within
the territory, as well as representations
that the business opportunity seller
itself or other purchasers will not
compete with the new purchaser
through alternative means of
distribution, such as through Internet
sales.
The definition also covers implied
marketing areas, such as representations
that the seller or other operators will not
compete with the purchaser, without
delineating a specific territory, or stating
a vague or undefined territory, such as
‘‘in the metropolitan area’’ or ‘‘in this
region.’’ If untrue, any of these kinds of
representations can mislead a prospect
about the likelihood of his or her
success.188
The definition of ‘‘exclusive territory’’
received no comment. Accordingly, the
definition of ‘‘exclusive territory,’’ as
proposed in the RNPR and
recommended in the Staff Report, is
adopted without change.
8. Section 437.1(h): General Media
The term ‘‘general media’’ appears in
§ 437.4(b), which prohibits business
opportunity sellers from making
unsubstantiated earnings claims in the
‘‘general media.’’ 189 Section 437.1(h) of
186 E.g., FTC v. Vendors Fin. Serv., Inc., No. 98–
1832 (D. Colo. 1998); FTC v. Int’l Computer
Concepts, Inc., No. 1:94CV1678 (N.D. Ohio 1994);
FTC v. O’Rourke, No. 93–6511–CIV–Ferguson (S.D.
Fla. 1993); FTC v. Am. Safe Mktg., No. 1:89–CV–
462–RLV (N.D. Ga. 1989).
187 71 FR at 19065.
188 Id.
189 This provision is based on an analogous
provision in the Amended Franchise Rule, 16 CFR
436.1(e). The Commission has challenged allegedly
unsubstantiated earnings claims made through the
general media in numerous cases, e.g., FTC v.
Wealth Sys., Inc., No. CV 05 0394 PHX JAT (D. Ariz.
2005); United States v. Am. Coin-Op Servs., Inc.,
No. 00–0125 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); United States v. Cigar
Factory Outlet, Inc., No. 00–6209–CIV–Graham-
Continued
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
76834
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
the final Rule defines ‘‘general media’’
to mean: ‘‘Any instrumentality through
which a person may communicate with
the public, including, but not limited to,
television, radio, print, Internet,
billboard, Web site, commercial bulk
email, and mobile communications.’’ 190
Due to the explosive growth of
advertising through mobile devices, the
Staff Report recommended adding the
phrase ‘‘mobile communications’’ to the
list of instrumentalities enumerated in
the definition.191
The definition of general media
recommended in the Staff Report
received no comment. The Commission
has determined to adopt the staff’s
recommendation and has therefore
modified the definition of general media
to include mobile communications.
Moreover, the definition of general
media is not intended to contain an
exhaustive list of instrumentalities, and
other current (and future) types of mass
communication could also fall within
the general media definition.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
9. Section 437.1(i): Material
The term ‘‘material’’ is used in several
sections of the final Rule.192 Section
437.3(a)(4) of the final Rule requires
sellers that offer refunds and
cancellations to ‘‘state all material terms
and conditions of the refund or
cancellation policy in an attachment to
the disclosure document.’’ The term
‘‘material’’ is also used in other
provisions of the Rule. For example,
under § 437.2 (the obligation to furnish
written documents), it is a violation of
the Rule for the seller to fail to disclose
the ‘‘material’’ information specified in
§ 437.3. Section 437.3, in turn, specifies
the items of ‘‘material’’ information that
must be disclosed. The definition of
‘‘material’’ at § 437.1(i) was added to the
final Rule because some workshop
participants expressed concern that
§ 437.3(a)(4) as originally proposed
would not provide sellers with
sufficient guidance about the types of
Turnoff (S.D. Fla. 2000); United States v. Emily
Water & Beverage Co., Inc., No. 4–00–00131 (W.D.
Mo. 2000); and United States v. Greeting Card
Depot, Inc., No. 00–6212–CIV–Gold (S.D. Fla. 2000).
190 See Interpretive Guides, 44 FR at 49984–85
(earnings claims made ‘‘for general dissemination’’
include ‘‘claims made in advertising (radio,
television, magazines, newspapers, billboards, etc.)
as well as those contained in speeches or press
releases’’). The Commission notes that the
Interpretive Guides recognize several exemptions to
the general media claim, such as claims made to the
press in connection with bona fide news stories, as
well as claims made directly to lending institutions.
Id. The Commission has proposed that future
Compliance Guides to the new Business
Opportunity Rule retain these standard general
media claims exemptions. See 71 FR at 19065.
191 Staff Report at 42–43.
192 See §§ 437.1, 437.2, 437.3, 437.4, 437.6, 437.7,
and 437.8.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
information that should be disclosed.193
In the Staff Report, the staff
recommended that ‘‘material’’ be
defined to mean as ‘‘likely to affect a
person’s choice of, or conduct regarding,
goods or services.’’ 194 This definition is
consistent with the definition of
‘‘material’’ used in the Telemarketing
Sales Rule (‘‘TSR’’).195
The definition of ‘‘material’’
recommended in the Staff Report
received one comment.196 The
commenter expressed concern that the
definition could be used by sellers as a
potential loophole. The commenter
suggested that the definition effectively
would permit a seller to avoid
disclosing the information required by
the Rule by arguing that such
information is not likely to affect a
buyer’s decision.197 The commenter
further stated that if the Commission
retained the recommended definition,
the Rule should contain the following
language: ‘‘Even though this Rule
imposes various requirements for
specific disclosures, sellers are
permitted to dispense with any
disclosures which would not be likely
to affect a buyer’s choice of, or conduct
regarding goods or services.’’ 198
The Commission disagrees with the
commenter. The final Rule mandates the
disclosure of certain types of
information, which the Commission has
determined are material to a purchaser’s
investment decision.199 The language
the commenter proposes does nothing to
close any perceived loophole. The
Commission is not persuaded that the
commenter’s suggested change will
improve clarity. In fact, it may obscure
the definition. The Commission is
persuaded by the Staff Report that a
definition of ‘‘material’’ is necessary and
adopts the definition as recommended.
10. Section 437.1(j): New Business
The term ‘‘new business’’ appears in
the first of three definitional elements of
193 Morrissey, June 09 Tr at 41; Taylor, June 09
Tr at 43; Cantone, June 09 Tr at 47.
194 Under the TSR, the Commission requires
sellers to disclose all material terms and conditions
of the seller’s refund policy if the seller makes a
representation about the refund policy. See 16 CFR
310.3(a)(1)(iii).
195 See 16 CFR 310.2(q) (defining ‘‘material’’ to
mean ‘‘likely to affect a person’s choice of, or
conduct regarding, goods or services or a charitable
contribution’’); see also FTC Policy Statement on
Deception, appended to Cliffdale Associates, Inc.,
103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984) (defining ‘‘material’’
misrepresentation or practice to mean ‘‘one which
is likely to affect a consumer’s choice of or conduct
regarding a product’’).
196 Dub-Staff Report.
197 Id. at 2–3.
198 Id. at 2.
199 See supra Section I.C.2 discussing the five
substantive disclosure items and why they are
material to consumers.
PO 00000
Frm 00020
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
the term ‘‘business opportunity.’’ 200
Section 437.1(j) of the final Rule defines
‘‘new business’’ as a ‘‘business in which
the prospective purchaser is not
currently engaged, or a new line or type
of business.’’ Because it is reasonable to
assume that a veteran businessperson
may need the final Rule’s protections as
much as a novice,201 the latter language
of the definition covers the sale of
business opportunities to persons who
may already be involved in some type
of business other than that which is
being offered by the seller.202
The proposed definition of ‘‘new
business’’ received no comment.
Accordingly, the Commission adopts
the definition of ‘‘new business,’’ as
proposed in the RNPR and
recommended in the Staff Report.
11. Section 437.1(k): Person
Section 437.1(k) of the final Rule
defines the term ‘‘person,’’ a term used
in many of the final Rule’s definitional
or substantive provisions.203 The Staff
Report recommended that the term be
defined as ‘‘an individual, group,
association, limited or general
partnership, corporation, or any other
entity.’’ 204
The Commission received no
comments related to the proposed
definition of ‘‘person.’’ The Commission
adopts the definition of ‘‘person’’ as
recommended in the Staff Report, with
one slight modification. To clarify that
the term encompasses entities that are
businesses, the Commission added the
word ‘‘business’’ to the last clause of the
definition. Accordingly, the final Rule
defines the term as ‘‘an individual,
group, association, limited or general
partnership, corporation, or any other
business entity.’’ 205 The term ‘‘person’’
is to be read broadly to refer to natural
persons, businesses, associations, and
other business entities. Where the Rule
refers to a natural person only, it uses
the term ‘‘individual.’’ 206
200 The first of the three definitional elements of
a ‘‘business opportunity’’ is a ‘‘solicitation to enter
into a ‘‘new business.’’ Section 437.1(c)(1). This
element distinguishes the sale of a business
opportunity from the ordinary sale or products and
services. 71 FR at 19066.
201 71 FR at 19066.
202 For example, an existing tire business owner
could purchase a vending machine route, or a
beverage vending machine route owner could
purchase an envelope stuffing opportunity.
203 E.g., §§ 437.1; 437.6(q).
204 This definition is consistent with the
definition of the term ‘‘person’’ in both the interim
Business Opportunity Rule and the Amended
Franchise Rule. See 16 CFR 436.1(n); interim
Business Opportunity Rule 437.2(b).
205 This definition is consistent with the
definition of the term ‘‘person’’ in the TSR. See
16 CFR 310.2(v).
206 71 FR at 19066.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
12. Section 437.1(l): Prior Business
The final Rule requires sellers to
disclose certain civil and criminal
actions against them, including actions
against a ‘‘prior business of the
seller.’’ 207 Section 437.1(l) of the final
Rule defines ‘‘prior business’’ to mean:
(1) A business from which the seller
acquired, directly or indirectly, the
major portion of the business’ assets; or
(2) Any business previously owned or
operated by the seller, in whole or in
part.
This definition is intended to include
not only an entity from which a seller
acquired the major portion of the seller’s
assets, but also businesses that the seller
previously owned or operated.208 A
broad definition of ‘‘prior business’’ is
necessary to capture all of a seller’s
prior operations.209 The Commission’s
law enforcement experience shows that
sellers of fraudulent business
opportunities frequently ply their trade
through multiple companies
simultaneously or sequentially,
disappearing in order to avoid
detection, and then reemerging in some
new form or in a different part of the
country under new names.210 The
definition thus requires a more
complete disclosure of the seller’s
business history.
The final definition of ‘‘prior
business’’ differs from the definition
included in the RPBOR.211 The Staff
Report recommended that the definition
eliminate a reference to the prior
businesses of the seller’s key personnel.
Namely, the second prong of the
original definition defined prior
business to include businesses owned or
operated by both the seller and the
seller’s key personnel.212 The
Commission agrees that this change is
necessary for two reasons. First,
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
207 § 437.3(a)(3).
208 The definition of prior business is broader
than the definition of ‘‘predecessor’’ found in the
Amended Franchise Rule, which covers only an
entity from which a seller acquired the major
portion of the seller’s assets. See 16 CFR 436.1(p).
209 71 FR at 19066.
210 E.g., FTC v. Nat’l Vending Consultants, Inc.,
No. 05–0160 (D. Nev. 2005); FTC v. Joseph Hayes,
No. 4:96CV06126 SNL (E.D. Mo. 1996); FTC v.
O’Rourke, No. 93–6511–CIV–Ferguson (S.D. Fla.
1993); FTC v. Inv. Dev. Inc., No. 89–0642 (E.D. La.
1989).
211 Proposed § 437.1(k) of the RPBOR would have
defined ‘‘prior business’’ to mean:
(1) A business from which the seller acquired,
directly or indirectly, the major portion of the
business’ assets, or
(2) Any business previously owned or operated
by the seller, in whole or in part, by any of the
seller’s officers, directors, sales managers, or by any
other individual who occupies a position or
performs a function similar to that of an officer,
director, or sales manager of the seller.
212 Id.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
§ 437.3(a)(3)(i)(B) requires disclosure of
legal actions pertaining to a prior
business ‘‘of the seller,’’ and so
including the seller’s key personnel in
the definition of ‘‘prior business’’ is
confusing. Second, § 437.3(a)(3)(i)(C)
separately requires disclosure of legal
actions pertaining to the seller’s key
personnel, namely, ‘‘the seller’s officers,
directors, sales managers, or by any
other individual who occupies a
position or performs a function similar
to that of an officer, director, or sales
manager of the seller.’’ The change,
therefore, does not affect the scope of
the required disclosure of legal actions,
but rather clarifies a term that is
otherwise confusing and somewhat
redundant. Accordingly, the
Commission adopts the definition of
‘‘prior business’’ with the modification
recommended by the staff.
13. Section 437.1(m): Providing
Locations, Outlets, Accounts, or
Customers
The definition of ‘‘providing
locations, outlets, accounts, or
customers’’ relates to the third prong of
the ‘‘business opportunity’’ definition,
which sets forth the types of assistance
the seller represents it will provide to
the purchasers of its business
opportunity.213 The Commission’s law
enforcement history shows that
fraudulent business opportunity sellers
often falsely promise to assist
purchasers in obtaining key elements
necessary for the success of the
proposed business: A source of
customers, locations, outlets, or
accounts. For example, deceptive
representations concerning location
assistance are the hallmark of fraudulent
vending machine and rack display
opportunities,214 while deceptive
representations concerning the
provision of accounts or customers are
typical of medical billing schemes.215 In
such schemes, the seller itself may
purport to secure locations, outlets,
accounts, or customers, or may
represent that third parties will do so.
Therefore, the final Rule defines
213 See
§ 437.1(c)(3).
FTC v. Am. Entm’t Distribs., No. 04–
22431–CIV–Martinez (S.D. Fla. 2004); FTC v.
Advanced Pub. Commc’ns Corp., No. 00–00515–
CIV–Ungaro-Benages (S.D. Fla. 2000); FTC v.
Ameritel Payphone Distribs., Inc., No. 00–0514–
CIV–Gold (S.D. Fla. 2000); FTC v. Mktg. and
Vending Concepts, No. 00–1131 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
215 E.g., FTC v. Mediworks, Inc., No. 00–01079
(C.D. Cal. 2000); FTC v. Home Professions, Inc., No.
00–111 (C.D. Cal. 2000); FTC v. Data Med. Capital,
Inc., No. SACV–99–1266 (C.D. Cal. 1999); see also
FTC v. AMP Publ’ns, Inc., No. SACV–00–112–AHS–
ANx (C.D. Cal. 2000).
214 E.g.,
PO 00000
Frm 00021
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76835
‘‘providing locations, outlets, accounts,
or customers’’ as:
furnishing the prospective purchaser with
existing or potential locations, outlets,
accounts, or customers; requiring,
recommending, or suggesting one or more
locators or lead generating companies;
providing a list of locator or lead generating
companies; collecting a fee on behalf of one
or more locators or lead generating
companies; offering to furnish a list of
locations; or otherwise assisting the
prospective purchaser in obtaining his or her
own locations, outlets, accounts, or
customers, provided, however, that
advertising and general advice about
business development and training shall not
be considered as ‘‘providing locations,
outlets, accounts, or customers.’’ 216
The proviso, underscored above, has
been added to the definition put forth in
the RNPR. As originally proposed in the
INPR, the definition ended immediately
after the clause ‘‘otherwise assisting the
prospective purchaser in obtaining his
or her own locations, outlets, accounts,
or customers.’’ In the RNPR, however,
the Commission stated that in
interpreting this unqualified clause, it
would ‘‘continue to apply its
longstanding analysis, which considers
the kinds of assistance the seller offers
and the significance of that assistance to
the prospective purchaser (e.g., whether
the assistance is likely to induce
reliance on the part of the prospective
purchaser).’’ 217 In the RNPR, the
Commission solicited comment on three
issues related to the ‘‘otherwise
assisting’’ clause of the definition: (1)
Whether the ‘‘otherwise assisting’’
clause adequately covered all of the
business opportunity arrangements that
should be within the scope of the rule;
(2) whether inclusion of the ‘‘otherwise
assisting’’ clause in the definition would
cause traditional product distribution
arrangements, educational institutions,
or how-to books to be subject to the
Rule; and (3) whether the clause would
result in the inclusion of multi-level
marketing relationships that otherwise
would not be covered by the Rule.218
The majority of commenters who
addressed this definition in response to
the RNPR focused on when the
‘‘otherwise assisting’’ clause of the
definition would be triggered.
Commenters from the MLM industry
216 The proposed definition was intended to
capture offers to provide locations that have already
been found, as well as offers to furnish a list of
potential locations; and includes not only directly
furnishing locations, but also ‘‘recommending to
prospective purchaser specific locators, providing
lists of locators who will furnish the locations, and
training or otherwise assisting prospects in finding
their own locations.’’ 71 FR at 19066.
217 73 FR at 16124.
218 Id. at 16133.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
76836
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
were concerned that various types of
optional or no-cost assistance that MLM
companies frequently offer their sales
representatives could be considered to
be ‘‘otherwise assisting.’’ 219 These
include such things as general advice
and training about how to succeed in a
new business venture,220 general
advertising for the purpose of promoting
the MLM’s products or services,221
occasional ad hoc referrals from
consumers who contact the company
directly,222 and optional business tools,
such as web templates and links to
corporate Web sites that some MLM
companies offer for sale to its sales
representatives. Additionally, one
commenter expressed concern that
because of this open-ended clause,
sellers of general training services, such
as training on how to start a new
business and advice about how to obtain
customers, would be covered by the
Rule.223
Commenters made a number of
suggestions to cure what they perceived
to be the overbreadth of this provision.
Some commenters suggested omitting
the word ‘‘customers’’ from the
‘‘otherwise assisting’’ provision and the
corresponding provisions of the
‘‘business opportunity’’ definition.224
Other commenters recommended that
the definition distinguish customers
from ‘‘near customers’’ so as to exclude
the provision of potential customers or
businesses that the seller obtains from
publicly available records.225 Others
suggested adding a statement that nocost general business advice is not
‘‘providing customers.’’ 226 Another
commenter suggested adding a new
clause to the definition of business
opportunity that would create an
exception when the assistance offered
by the seller is limited to advice or
219 E.g., DSA–RNPR at 5 (tools are intended to
maintain brand uniformity and promote effective
customer service).
220 E.g., Primerica-RNPR at 5 (provides advice and
training about how to identify potential customers
and how to make effective sales presentations);
Tupperware-RNPR at 4 (provides training about
how new representatives can develop own
customer bases); Venable-RNPR.
221 DSA–RNPR at 4 (5/27/2008); Primerica-RNPR
at 6.
222 E.g., Avon-RNPR at 3 (noting that this practice
is designed to help potential customers find a sales
representative, not to help sales representatives find
potential customers); Mary Kay-RNPR at 7
(suggesting that merely providing the ability to
search for a sales associate on the company’s Web
site should not trigger the ‘‘providing locations’’
factor of the ‘‘business opportunity’’ definition);
DSA–RNPR at 5; Melaleuca-RNPR at 2.
223 Venable-RNPR at 2.
224 DSA–RNPR at 5; Venable Rebuttal-RNPR at 3;
Primerica-RNPR at 5.
225 Venable-RNPR.
226 Primerica-RNPR at 8; Tupperware-RNPR at 6;
Avon-RNPR; Mary Kay-RNPR.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
training.227 Some commenters suggested
eliminating the concept of ‘‘potential
customers’’ from the scope of the
‘‘otherwise assisting’’ language.228
Finally, one commenter suggested
revising the definition of ‘‘business
opportunity’’ to require that the seller’s
assistance in providing outlets, accounts
or customers be a ‘‘material
inducement’’ to the purchaser.229
The Staff Report noted a concern with
narrowing the definition in the ways the
commenters suggested, because it would
allow promoters of fraudulent schemes
to craft their sales pitches carefully to
evade the Rule. The staff disagreed with
commenters who recommended
excising the word ‘‘customers’’ from the
definition or diluting it in some fashion.
Instead, the Staff Report recommended
that the Commission continue its longstanding policy of analyzing the
significance of assistance in the context
of the of the specific business
opportunity, focusing on whether the
seller’s offer is ‘‘reasonably likely to
have the effect of inducing reliance on
[the seller] to provide a prepackaged
business.’’ 230
While urging that the word
‘‘customers’’ remain in the definition,
the Staff Report did recommend new
qualifying language to address the
concern that the definition could be
read more broadly than intended.
Specifically, the Staff Report
recommended adding a short proviso to
the ‘‘otherwise assisting’’ clause as
follows: ‘‘provided, however, that
advertising and general advice about
business development and training shall
not be considered as ‘providing
locations, outlets, accounts, or
customers.’ ’’ 231
The language recommended in the
Staff Report received two comments.
DOJ strongly agreed that ‘‘customers’’
should remain in the definition, noting
that the allure of a business opportunity
is the purported ready cash flow to the
purchaser, which can come either from
locations or customers, depending on
the nature of the opportunity being
227 Pre-Paid
Legal-RNPR.
Kay-RNPR at 7 (as an alternative Mary
Kay suggests that in the commentary to the Final
Rule, the Commission make clear that passing on
ad hoc referrals of customers who contact the
company directly would not trigger this provision).
229 Melaleuca-RNPR.
230 Staff Advisory Opinion 95–10, Business
Franchise Guide (CCH) ¶ 6475 (1995).
231 For example, this new proviso was designed
to make clear that giving advice about how to
demonstrate products, complete product order
forms and how to process returns (TupperwareRNPR); or providing product advertising in the
general media and training in customer and
business development (Primerica-RNPR), would not
be considered as ‘‘providing locations, outlets,
accounts, and customers.’’
228 Mary
PO 00000
Frm 00022
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
offered.232 DOJ also agreed with the
staff’s recommendation to include the
proviso, but objected to further
narrowing of coverage, arguing that any
loophole would be vigorously exploited
by fraudulent business opportunity
sellers.233 Tupperware similarly
encouraged the Commission to adopt
the proviso as recommended, stating
that the proviso will allow businesses to
continue to provide general business
advice and training without the risk of
inadvertently falling under the aegis of
the Rule.234
The Commission is persuaded by the
Staff Report’s recommendation not to
eliminate the word ‘‘customers’’ from
the ‘‘otherwise assisting’’ clause of the
definition, and to add qualifying
language to the definition to tailor
coverage more appropriately. Providing
the prospective purchaser with
assistance in obtaining customers is a
feature common to many business
opportunities and should be included in
the definition. For instance, in the cases
the Commission has brought against
medical billing opportunities, it is
typical for sellers to offer to provide
assistance to the potential purchaser in
finding customers for the medical
billing service.235 Although the RNPR
made clear that the ‘‘otherwise
assisting’’ provision of the definition
was not intended to apply to
advertising, no-cost offers of general
business advice, and training described
by the various commenters,236 the
qualifying language is necessary to
prevent the definition from a broader
reading than the Commission intends.
The final Rule, therefore, contains the
proviso recommended in the Staff
Report.
14. Section 437.1(n): Purchaser
The final Rule defines the term
‘‘purchaser’’ to mean ‘‘a person who
buys a business opportunity.’’ By
operation of the definition of
‘‘person,’’ 237 a natural person, as well as
any other entity, would qualify as a
business opportunity purchaser. The
definition of ‘‘purchaser’’ received no
232 DOJ-Staff
Report at 1–2.
at 2.
234 Tupperware-Staff Report at 2.
235 See, e.g., FTC v. Med. Billers Network, Inc.,
No. 05–CV–2014 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); FTC v. Med.Billing.com, Inc., No. 3–02CV0702CP (N.D. Tex.
2002); FTC v. Electronic Med. Billing, Inc., No.
SACV02–368 AHS (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also FTC v.
Star Publ’g Group, Inc., No. 00cv–023D (D. Wyo.
2000) (offering to everything necessary to earn
money processing HUD refunds); FTC v. AMP
Publ’ns, Inc., SACV–00–112–AHS–Anx (C.D. Cal.
2000) (offering to provide list of companies in need
of consumer’s home-based computer services).
236 73 FR at 16123.
237 Section 437.1(k).
233 Id.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
comment, and the final Rule includes
the definition as proposed.
15. Section 437.1(o): Quarterly
To ensure accuracy and reliability of
disclosures, § 437.3 (instructions for
completing the disclosure document)
requires sellers to revise their
disclosures at least ‘‘quarterly.’’ 238 The
definition of ‘‘quarterly’’ sets forth a
bright line rule that is easy to follow and
that ensures uniformity of disclosures:
‘‘Quarterly’’ means ‘‘as of January 1,
April 1, July 1, and October 1.’’ Thus,
the final Rule requires sellers to update
their disclosure by those specific dates
each year. The definition of ‘‘quarterly’’
received no comment, and the final Rule
includes the definition as proposed.
16. Section 437.1(p): Required Payment
Under the final Rule’s definition of
‘‘business opportunity,’’ the Rule
reaches only those opportunities where
the prospective purchaser of a business
opportunity makes a ‘‘required
payment’’ to the seller. Section 437.1(p)
of the final Rule defines a ‘‘required
payment’’ to mean:
all consideration that the purchaser must pay
to the seller or an affiliate, either by contract
or by practical necessity, as a condition of
obtaining or commencing operation of the
business opportunity. Such payment may be
made directly or indirectly through a third
party. A required payment does not include
payments for the purchase of reasonable
amounts of inventory at bona fide wholesale
prices for resale or lease.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
The final definition of ‘‘required
payment’’ is the same as proposed in the
RNPR and is substantially similar to that
employed in the Amended Franchise
Rule. It differs in that it includes
language that reaches situations where a
payment is made directly to a seller or
indirectly through a third party. The
RPBOR included this definition because
without such a modification, fraudulent
business opportunity sellers could
circumvent the Rule by requiring
payment to a third party with which the
seller has a formal or informal business
relationship.239
The last sentence of the definition
excludes payments for reasonable
amounts of inventory at bona fide
wholesale prices.240 This effectuates the
Commission’s determination articulated
238 Section 437.3(b) requires that until a seller has
at least 10 purchasers, the list of references must be
updated monthly.
239 73 FR at 16122.
240 The inventory exemption was originally set
forth by the Commission in its 1979 Final
Interpretative Guide to the Franchise Rule. 44 FR
at 49967. The rationale for excluding payments for
inventory was to exclude ‘‘[a]gency relationships in
which independent agents, compensated by
commission, sell goods or services’’ (e.g., insurance
salespersons). Id at 49967–68.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
in the RNPR, that traditional product
distribution arrangements should not be
covered by the Business Opportunity
Rule.241 Manufacturers, suppliers, and
other traditional distribution firms
‘‘have relied solely on the bona fide
wholesale price exclusion to avoid
coverage as a franchise.’’ 242
The IPBOR had eliminated this
inventory exemption in an attempt to
bring pyramid schemes that engaged in
‘‘inventory loading’’ within the ambit of
the Rule.243 Several commenters
contended that the IPBOR would have
regulated a wide range of legitimate and
traditional product distribution
arrangements that were not associated
with the types of fraud that business
opportunity laws are designed to
remedy. For example, one commenter
suggested that the IPBOR could be read
to cover product distribution through
retail stores simply because the retailer
pays for inventory.244 This commenter
suggested that its business operations
would meet the IPBOR’s definition of
business opportunity because, among
other reasons, the ‘‘payment’’ prong of
the definition did not exempt voluntary
purchases of inventory.245
Because the application of the IPBOR
to these types of arrangements was
unintended, the RPBOR narrowed the
definition of ‘‘business opportunity’’ by
clarifying that a ‘‘required payment’’
does not include payments for the
purchase of reasonable amounts of
inventory at bona fide wholesale
prices.246 Moreover, in the RNPR, the
Commission determined that
challenging deceptive pyramid schemes
in targeted law enforcement actions
brought under Section 5 of the FTC Act
is a more cost-effective approach than
attempting to address pyramid schemes
through the elimination of the inventory
exemption as proposed in the IPBOR.247
In response to the RNPR, MLM
industry commenters urged the
Commission to expand the inventory
exemption additionally to exempt sales
of business materials, supplies, and
equipment to purchasers on a not-forprofit basis.248 Commenters stated that
241 73
FR at 16122.
242 Id.
243 71 FR at 19055. Inventory loading occurs
when a company’s incentive program forces recruits
to buy more products than they could ever sell,
often at inflated prices. If this occurs throughout the
company’s distribution system, the people at the
top of the pyramid reap substantial profits, even
though little or no product moves to market.
244 73 FR at 16113–14.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 16114.
247 73 FR at 16122.
248 Commenters suggested various ways to
expand the exemption. See DSA–RNPR at 4
(recommending that the exemption include
PO 00000
Frm 00023
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76837
the MLM business model often requires
that new sales representatives purchase
materials, supplies, or equipment to
facilitate his or her sales to
consumers.249 At least one commenter
also noted that individuals sometimes
pay to become sales consultants solely
to obtain the products that are part of
the company’s sales kit for personal use
at less than retail cost.250 These
commenters argued that without
expanding the exemption, MLMs would
be swept within the scope of the
Rule.251
The Staff Report noted these
concerns, but opined that they were
misplaced and that the suggested
changes to the definition of ‘‘required
payment’’ were unnecessary.252 The
staff recognized, however, that without
making the changes suggested by the
commenters, some MLM companies
could indeed meet the ‘‘required
payment’’ prong of the business
opportunity definition.253 But, as noted
previously, in order to be covered by the
Rule, an entity must meet each of the
three definitional components of the
term ‘‘business opportunity.’’ 254
Meeting one prong is insufficient to
come within the scope of the Rule.
‘‘business materials, supplies, and equipment sold
on a not-for-profit basis’’); Mary Kay-RNPR at 2
(same); Avon-RNPR at 2 (exemption should extend
to ‘‘sales aid or kits at cost’’); Tupperware-RNPR at
4 (required payment should not include payments
for the purchase of reasonable amounts of inventory
at bona fide wholesale prices, which may be used
for resale, lease or display, or payments for
products for personal use). Also, one commenter
expressed concern that under the proposed
definition, voluntary payments made to third
parties unaffiliated with the seller for items or
equipment to be used in a purchaser’s business
could be considered a ‘‘required payment.’’ See
IBA–RNPR at 4. The Commission disagrees. By its
very words, the definition is not intended to
capture payments of the type described by the
commenter, as such payments are not made directly
or indirectly to the seller.
249 DSA–RNPR at 4; Tupperware-RNPR at 2
(explaining that it requires purchase of a starter
Business Kit that contains a selection of
Tupperware products sold below retail value for
demonstration at parties); Mary Kay-RNPR at 4
(initial sales kit, sold to consultant at below cost,
is used to demonstrate products to customers);
Avon-RNPR at 2 (sales kits, which explain business
fundamentals and provide necessary equipment
such as sales brochures, sales receipts, a tote bag,
and product samples, are sold to independent sales
representatives without a profit).
250 Tupperware-RNPR at 2 (products in starter
Business Kit sold to sales consultants for $79 or
$129 have retail value of $350 and $550
respectively).
251 DSA–RNPR; Mary Kay-RNPR; TupperwareRNPR; Pre-Paid Legal-RNPR.
252 Staff Report at 58.
253 Id. at 57.
254 Id. Those components are: (1) A solicitation to
enter into a new business; (2) a required payment
made to the seller; and (3) a representation that the
seller will provide assistance in the form of
securing locations, securing accounts, or buying
back goods produced by the business. Id. at n.186.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
76838
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Furthermore, the other clarifications
and changes to the definitions of
‘‘business opportunity’’ and ‘‘providing
locations, outlets, accounts, or
customers’’ under the final Rule tailor
coverage appropriately, and make the
additional suggested changes to the
‘‘required payment’’ definition
unnecessary. Accordingly, the Staff
Report recommended that the definition
of ‘‘required payment’’ be adopted in
the form proposed in the RNPR.255
Moreover, the Commission is
concerned that expanding the
exemption as the commenters suggested
would create enforcement problems. For
example, when a ‘‘required payment’’
includes both an inventory and noninventory component, it would be
difficult to determine whether noninventory products—such as sales kits
or display-related materials—were, in
fact, being sold to purchasers at less
than the seller’s cost. Finally, the
suggested changes could have the
unintended effect of allowing some
fraudulent business operators to be
excluded from the Rule’s coverage.256
In response to the Staff Report, the
Commission received one comment
addressing the ‘‘required payment’’
definition. The commenter set forth the
same suggestion it had provided in
response to the RNPR—that a ‘‘required
payment’’ should not include situations
where the seller agrees to buy back from
the purchaser any unused inventory
within 12 months of purchase for at
least 90 percent of the purchaser’s
cost.257 The commenter, a large MLM
company, continued to argue that
incorporating this change into the
definition of ‘‘required payment’’ would
assist in creating regulatory certainty
that the Rule would not cover this
situation. The commenter disagreed
with one of the justifications given in
the Staff Report for urging no
modification of the definition—namely,
that satisfying the ‘‘required payment’’
definition, by itself, is insufficient to
bring an entity within the scope of the
Rule. The commenter argued that
legitimate companies that might satisfy
the ‘‘required payment’’ prong have too
much at stake to rely on one of the other
two prongs of the ‘‘business
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
255 Id.
256 For example, in United States v. Universal
Adver., Inc., No. 1:06–cv–152–DAK (D. Utah 2006),
the fraudulent business opportunity seller told
purchasers they could earn significant money by
signing up business owners to pay monthly fees to
display their business cards in rack display ‘‘profit
centers.’’ In that case, the entire purchase cost went
towards the rack display profit centers, which could
be characterized as ‘‘display-related materials.’’
257 Tupperware-Staff Report at 3.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
opportunity’’ definition to avoid
coverage under the Rule.258
This argument is not persuasive. The
definition of ‘‘required payment’’
already excludes payments for the
purchase of inventory at bona fide
wholesale prices. To the extent that the
business opportunity seller offers
inventory at prices above wholesale,
such a payment would generate profit to
the seller. If the Rule were modified to
exempt payments for inventory not just
at wholesale but also retail prices, such
a change would give sellers an incentive
to structure their payment schemes to
require only payment for inventory, in
order to avoid coverage by the Rule.
Moreover, granting an exemption to
sellers that offer to buy back some
percentage of unused inventory within
12 months is problematic in light of the
Commission’s experience that
fraudulent business opportunity sellers
could go out of business, change names,
or disappear during that time.259
Accordingly, the final Rule incorporates
the definition of ‘‘required payment’’ as
recommended in the Staff Report.
affirmative steps to authenticate his or
her identity.’’ It includes a person’s
handwritten signature, as well as an
electronic or digital form of signature to
the extent that such signature is
recognized as a valid signature under
applicable federal law or state contract
law.’’ 262 This definition effectively
permits business opportunity sellers to
comply with the Rule electronically,
consistent with the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. 7001,263 and
is consistent with other rules enforced
by the FTC.264 For example, a seller
could obtain the digital signature of a
purchaser by providing the disclosure
document to the purchaser as a word
processing document and require the
purchaser to type his or her name into
the form in the space provided for the
signature. Alternatively, the seller could
direct the purchaser to a web page that
contains an electronic version of the
disclosure document and require the
purchaser to input his or her name
before submitting the web-based form
electronically.
17. Section 437.1(q): Seller
The final Rule defines the term
‘‘seller’’ to mean: ‘‘A person who offers
for sale or sells a business opportunity.’’
Like the ‘‘purchaser’’ definition, it
contemplates that both natural persons
and entities may be business
opportunity sellers.260 The definition of
‘‘seller’’ is unchanged from the INPR,
received no comment, either in response
to the RNPR or the Staff Report, and the
final Rule adopts the definition as
recommended in the Staff Report.
19. Section 437.1(s): Written or In
Writing
18. Section 437.1(r): Signature or Signed
Under § 437.3(a)(6) of the final Rule,
business opportunity sellers are
required to attach a duplicate copy of
the disclosure document, which is to be
signed and dated by the purchaser. A
designation for the signature and date is
included at the bottom of the disclosure
document. The Staff Report
recommended adding a definition of
‘‘signature’’ to the Rule to clarify that a
signature may include any electronic or
digital form of signature to the extent
that such signatures are valid under
applicable law.261 The recommended
definition of ‘‘signature’’ received no
comment.
As recommended in the Staff Report,
§ 437.1(r) of the final Rule states:
‘‘Signature or signed’’ means ‘‘a person’s
258 Id.
259 See DOJ–Staff Report at 2 (noting that many
business opportunities begin and end within a short
period of time).
260 71 FR at 19067.
261 Staff Report at 59.
PO 00000
Frm 00024
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
The final Rule, like the version
proposed in the INPR, defines the terms
‘‘written’’ or ‘‘in writing,’’ which are
used throughout the Rule 265 as ‘‘any
document or information in printed
form or in any form capable of being
downloaded, printed, or otherwise
preserved in tangible form and read. It
includes: type-set, word processed, or
handwritten documents; information on
computer disk or CD–ROM; information
sent via email; or information posted on
the Internet. It does not include mere
oral statements.’’ This definition is
designed to capture information stored
on computer disks, CD–ROMs, or
through new or emerging technologies,
as well as information sent via email or
posted on the Internet. Nevertheless, the
definition seeks a balance, attempting to
minimize compliance costs while at the
same time preventing fraud. To that
end, the definition would make clear
that all electronic media must be in a
form ‘‘capable of being downloaded,
printed, or otherwise preserved in
tangible form and read,’’ thus ensuring
that a prospective purchaser who
receives disclosures electronically can
262 This definition is consistent with the
definition of signature in the TSR. See 16 CFR
310.3(a)(3).
263 See 71 FR at 19067 n.142.
264 See TSR, 16 CFR 310.3(a)(3)(i); Amended
Franchise Rule, 16 CFR 436.3(u) (containing similar
definitions).
265 E.g., §§ 437.2, 437.3(a), 437.4(a).
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
read them, share them with an advisor,
and retain them for future use.266
In response to the Staff Report, one
commenter expressed concern that the
Rule would be overly burdensome if
electronic compliance were not
permitted.267 As discussed above,
however, the definition of ‘‘written’’ or
‘‘in writing’’ and the definition of
‘‘signature’’ or ‘‘signed’’ each makes
clear that sellers can comply with the
Rule electronically.268 Thus, the
Commission adopts the definition as
recommended in the Staff Report.
B. Section 437.2: The Obligation To
Furnish Written Documents
The next section of the Rule, § 437.2,
imposes a core requirement of the
Rule—the obligation of sellers to furnish
prospective purchasers with a singlepage disclosure document before
purchasers execute a contract or pay any
money. As noted previously, the
disclosure document required under the
Original Franchise Rule and interim
Business Opportunity Rule was often
extremely lengthy, cumbersome, and in
some ways ill-suited to business
opportunity transactions. Through the
INPR and the RNPR, the Commission
sought to simplify and streamline this
document in order to make the
disclosures more meaningful to
consumers.
The disclosure document mandated
by § 437.2 must be furnished at least
seven calendar days before one of two
events: Either (1) the execution of any
contract in connection with the business
opportunity sale; or (2) the payment of
any consideration to the seller.269 This
provision is intended to ensure a
uniform standard for determining when
sellers must furnish disclosures before
potential purchasers must put their
money at risk. Section 437.2 clarifies
that ‘‘payment to the seller’’ refers to
payments made either directly to the
seller, or indirectly through a third
party, such as a broker, lead generator,
or locator.
The seven calendar-day period was
modeled on the Original Franchise
Rule’s requirement that sellers furnish
prospective purchasers with a
completed copy of the disclosure
document at least ten business days
266 71
FR at 19067.
Franchise-Staff Report.
268 See also supra note 261.
269 Section 437.1(s) allows the disclosure
document to be provided to purchasers
electronically, such as by posting in on the Internet,
sending it via email, etc. Providing the disclosure
document through one of these alternative methods
does not, however, relieve the seller of the
obligation to obtain and maintain copies of signed
and dated disclosure documents provided to
purchasers.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
267 NG
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
before a potential purchaser pays any
fee or executes any agreement in
connection with the sale.270 In the
INPR, the Commission proposed
shortening the period of time business
opportunity sellers would be required to
provide the disclosures to potential
purchasers.271 The Commission
determined that seven calendar days is
sufficient time to enable a prospective
purchaser to review the information
contained on the simplified and
streamlined basic disclosure document
and any earnings claims statements, as
well as to conduct a due diligence
review of the offering, including
contacting references.272 The seven day
time period was proposed in the
RNPR.273
Only one comment received in
response to the RNPR addressed this
provision. The commenter argued,
without providing any evidence, that
imposing a ‘‘waiting period’’ of any
length before a prospective purchaser
signs a binding agreement or makes a
payment to a seller would chill the sale
of legitimate business opportunities.274
The Commission is not persuaded by
this assertion, as both the Original
Franchise Rule and interim Business
Opportunity Rule have waiting periods
in excess of seven days.275 Furthermore,
a waiting period is particularly
necessary in the sale of business
opportunities, where consumers are
often rushed into making investment
decisions.276 No Staff Report comments
addressed this provision. The
Commission concludes that seven
calendar days is sufficient time for
purchasers to review the disclosure
information and to conduct due
diligence, and adopts § 437.2 as
recommended in the Staff Report.
C. Section 437.3: Disclosure Document
Section 437.3(a) of the final Rule
instructs business opportunity sellers
how to prepare the basic disclosure
document, identifies the categories of
required disclosure, and specifies what
information must be included in each of
270 See 71 FR at 19067. When the Original
Franchise Rule was amended, the time period was
extended to 14 calendar days. The interim Business
Opportunity Rule maintained the 10 business-day
period. See 72 FR at 15468, 15570.
271 See 71 FR at 19067.
272 Id.
273 See 73 FR at 16134.
274 Planet Antares-RNPR at 13–14.
275 See 16 CFR 436.2(a) (fourteen calendar days);
§ 437.2(g) of the interim Business Opportunity Rule
(ten business days).
276 See, e.g., FTC v. Bus. Card Experts, Inc., No.
06–CV–4671 (PJS/RLE) (D. Minn. 2006)
(representatives told consumers they must invest
within one or two weeks in order to take advantage
of special ‘‘promotional’’ rate).
PO 00000
Frm 00025
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76839
these categories. Section 437.3(a)
requires that sellers provide prospective
purchasers with information about the
seller, the seller’s litigation history, any
cancellation and refund policy, any
earnings claims, and references ‘‘in the
form and using the language set forth in
Appendix A’’ to the Rule. In addition,
the final Rule adds a clause to § 437.3(a)
requiring that if the offer for sale, sale,
or promotion of a business opportunity
is conducted in Spanish, the seller must
provide the Spanish version of the
disclosure document (Appendix B to the
Rule) and provide any required
disclosures in Spanish. For sales
conducted in a language other than
English or Spanish, the seller must use
the form and an accurate translation of
the language set forth in Appendix A.
All disclosures, regardless of the
language they are in, must be presented
in a ‘‘single written document.’’ The
Commission concludes that the single
written document requirement is
necessary to ensure that disclosures are
not furnished in piecemeal fashion that
easily could be overlooked or lost.277 In
addition, requiring that the disclosure
information be presented in the
specified format will prevent sellers
from circumventing the Rule by
presenting damaging information in a
format that is not sufficiently prominent
to be noticed or understood, or that is
not readily accessible.278 Failure to
follow the form and language of the
appropriate disclosure document would
constitute a violation of Section 5 of the
FTC Act.279
Section 437.3(a)(6) requires that a
seller provide the potential purchaser
with two copies of the disclosure
document, one of which is for the
prospective purchaser to sign, date, and
return to the seller to maintain in
accordance with § 437.7. Section
437.3(b) specifies that it is an unfair or
deceptive practice and a violation of
Section 5 of the FTC Act for a seller to
fail to update the required disclosures at
least quarterly to reflect changes in the
five required categories of information,
provided, however, that the list of
references must be updated monthly,
until the seller has 10 purchasers, after
which quarterly updates are required.
The sections that follow discuss the
evolution of the disclosure document’s
format and substance, the commentary
received about the disclosure document,
further revisions to the document
recommended in Staff Report, and the
Commission’s analysis of the comments
and recommendations.
277 71
FR at 19067.
id.
279 See § 437.3(a).
278 See
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
76840
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
1. The Format of the Disclosure
Document
a. Background
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
As noted above, a major goal of this
rulemaking has been to streamline the
lengthy disclosure document that was
appropriate in the sale of business
format franchises, but ill-suited to the
sale of traditional business
opportunities. The interim Business
Opportunity Rule, modeled on the
Original Franchise Rule, required sellers
to make more than 20 separate
disclosures to potential purchasers.280
Requiring sellers to make these
extensive disclosures imposes
significant compliance costs on covered
businesses, and many of the disclosures,
which are material in the context of
franchise sales are not well-suited to
business opportunity sales. The final
Rule aims to strike the proper balance
between prospective purchasers’ need
for pre-sale disclosure and the burden
imposed on those selling business
opportunities.281
Thus, the Commission proposed a
single-page disclosure document both in
the INPR and the RNPR. The
Commission invited public comment
about the form, including whether the
overall presentation of information
could be improved to make it more
useful and understandable, and whether
the substantive disclosure sections
would capture the information that
would most benefit potential
purchasers.282 The Commission
received no comments in response to
this request.
The Commission engaged a consultant
with expertise in document design and
comprehension to evaluate the proposed
disclosure document to ensure that it
adequately conveyed to consumers
information material to the prospective
business opportunity, and to determine
whether the overall presentation of the
information in the proposed document
could be improved to make it more
useful and understandable.283
Following publication of the initial
proposed disclosure document, the
consultant conducted extensive
280 These include but are not limited to
information about the seller; the business
background of its principals and their litigation and
bankruptcy histories; the terms and conditions of
the offer; statistical analyses of existing franchised
and company-owned outlets; prior purchasers,
including the names and addresses of at least 10
purchasers nearest the prospective buyer; and
audited financial statements. Additional disclosure
and substantiation provisions apply if the seller
chooses to make any financial performance
representations.
281 73 FR at 16130–32.
282 Id. at 16132–33.
283 See generally Macro Report.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
consumer testing that resulted in the
revised proposed disclosure document
that the Commission concluded
substantially improved both the layout
and the wording of the form.284
Some of the changes suggested by the
consultant included: Changing the title
of the form from ‘‘Business Opportunity
Disclosures’’ to ‘‘Disclosure of Important
Information about Business
Opportunity’’; revising the preamble of
the disclosure to make it more readable;
adding a description of the Federal
Trade Commission for consumers who
may not be familiar with the agency;
clarifying that the information on the
form relates specifically to the business
opportunity the reader is being offered;
reformatting the sections that address
earnings, legal actions, and cancellation
or refund policies, to make those
sections easier to understand; and
adding a note below the signature line
stating that the FTC requires that the
business opportunity seller give
potential buyers at least seven calendar
days before asking him or her to sign a
purchase contract.285 A copy of the
revised proposed disclosure document,
which incorporated the consultant’s
suggested revisions, was included in the
Workshop Notice announcing that the
FTC would hold a public workshop on
June 1, 2009.286
b. Public Workshop
On June 1, 2009, the staff held a oneday public workshop in Washington, DC
to get public input about the revised
proposed disclosure document.287 The
Workshop Notice invited interested
parties to submit a request to participate
as a panelist.288 Ultimately, the
workshop featured five panelists who
represented a range of interests in the
proposed Rule, including a federal law
enforcer,289 a state law enforcer,290 a
consumer advocate,291 the general
counsel of a national multilevelmarketing company,292 and a former
284 74
FR at 18714–15.
generally Macro Report.
286 74 FR at 18714.
287 Id. In response to the RNPR, three commenters
(DRA, Planet Antares, and Johnson) had originally
requested a hearing as permitted in the RNPR (see
73 FR at 16110), but later agreed that a public
workshop would address their issues and concerns
more efficiently.
288 The staff received requests to serve as
panelists from eight persons. It extended offers to
serve as panelists to each of these individuals, three
of whom declined.
289 Kenneth Jost (‘‘Jost’’), DOJ, Office of Consumer
Litigation.
290 Dale Cantone (‘‘Cantone’’), Maryland Attorney
General’s Office.
291 Jon Taylor (‘‘Taylor’’), Consumer Awareness
Institute.
292 Maureen Morrissey (‘‘Morrissey’’),
Tupperware.
285 See
PO 00000
Frm 00026
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
director of the FTC’s Bureau of
Consumer Protection.293
Workshop panelists uniformly
approved the revised proposed
disclosure document, and applauded
the Commission’s goal of streamlining
and simplifying the form.294 All
workshop panelists believed that the
disclosure document generally
accomplished the Commission’s stated
purposes of streamlining and
simplifying the form to make it more
useful to prospective business
opportunity purchasers, although they
did have some minor suggestions
related both to the proposed disclosure
document and some of the substantive
disclosure requirements, which are
discussed below.
2. Section 437.3(a): Disclosure
Requirements
Section 437.3 requires that business
opportunity sellers give prospective
purchasers five items of material
information, in a basic disclosure
document.295 Each required disclosure
is intended to help prospective
purchasers make informed investment
decisions. First, sellers must state their
name, business address, and telephone
number, the name of the salesperson
offering the opportunity, and the date
when the disclosure document is
furnished to the prospective purchaser.
Second, sellers must disclose whether
or not they make earnings claims and,
if so, must state the claim or claims in
a separate earnings claims statement
attached to the basic disclosure
293 William MacLeod (‘‘MacLeod’’). Although at
the workshop Mr. MacLeod represented only his
own views, he had previously filed comment to the
INPR and RNPR on behalf of Planet Antares, which
markets vending machine businesses.
294 See, e.g., Jost, June 09 Tr at 12–15 (noting that
the simplicity of the form is the key to it being
successful. ‘‘Having a one page document that
focuses on the key issues such as legal actions,
earnings claims, and references will put the most
important information in the hands of the
prospective purchaser.’’); MacLeod, June 09 Tr at 18
(same, and commending the staff for engaging a
consumer research expert to copy test the
disclosure document); Cantone, June 09 Tr at 20
(stating that the disclosure document captures the
major components of business opportunity fraud,
including fraudulent earnings claims and false
refund offers); Taylor, June 09 Tr at 23 (noting that
the disclosure document is ‘‘easy to understand and
short and accomplishes its purposes.’’).
295 Like the Franchise Rule and the interim
Business Opportunity Rule, the final Rule specifies
that only sellers of business opportunities have an
obligation to prepare and furnish a basic disclosure
document. Other persons involved in the sale of a
business opportunity—such as brokers, locators, or
suppliers—have no obligation to prepare basic
disclosure documents or to furnish such
documents. The ultimate responsibility to ensure
that disclosures are accurately prepared and
disseminated rests with the seller. See 71 FR at
19067.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
document.296 Third, sellers must
disclose prior civil or criminal litigation
involving claims of misrepresentation,
fraud, securities law violations, or
unfair or deceptive business practices
that involve the business opportunity or
its key personnel.297 Fourth, sellers
must disclose any cancellation or refund
policy.298 Finally, sellers must provide
contact information for at least 10 of
their purchasers nearest to the
prospective purchaser’s location.299 A
discussion of the record pertaining to
each of the required substantive
disclosures follows, along with changes
made in the final Rule and consistent
amendments made to the disclosure
document.300 The final disclosure
document is Appendix A to this Notice.
The Spanish translation of the
disclosure document is Appendix B to
this Notice.
a. Section 437.3(a)(1): Identifying
Information
The first required disclosure under
the final Rule is the seller’s identifying
information. Specifically, § 437.3(a)(1)
requires that the seller disclose the
name, business address, and telephone
number of the seller, the name of the
salesperson offering the opportunity,
and the date when the disclosure
document is furnished to the
prospective purchaser.301 The
Commission has long recognized the
materiality of a business opportunity
seller’s identifying information. For
example, when the Original Franchise
296 Section
437.3(a)(2).
437.3(a)(3). Key personnel include any
of the business opportunity seller’s principals,
officers, directors, and sales managers, as well as
any individual who occupies ‘‘a position or
performs a function similar to an officer, director,
or sales manager of the seller.’’
298 Section 437.3(a)(4). The IPBOR would have
required disclosure of the business opportunity
seller’s cancellation or refund request history. Some
commenters argued that requiring disclosure of the
seller’s refund history would have had the wayward
effect of discouraging legitimate businesses from
offering refunds. Because companies with liberal
refund policies were more likely to have refund
requests than those offering no refunds, disclosure
of refund requests could mislead consumers into
thinking that a company offering liberal refunds is
less reputable than the company offering no
refunds. The Commission was persuaded by these
commenters and omitted this required disclosure
from the RPBOR. See 73 FR at 16126.
299 Section 437.3(a)(5).
300 In response to the Staff Report, one commenter
suggested a myriad of additional changes to the
disclosure document such as fields for the buyer’s
contact information and additional fields for
information related to the salesperson. NG
Franchise-Staff Report at 4–5. The Commission
finds the suggested changes unnecessary.
301 Other Commission trade regulation rules
similarly require disclosure of identifying
information. E.g., Wool Products Labeling Rule, 16
CFR 300.14; Fur Products Labeling Rule, 16 CFR
301.43.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
297 Section
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:47 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
Rule was promulgated, the Commission
concluded that:
The failure to disclose such material
information * * * may mislead the
[prospect] as to the business experience of
the parties with whom he or she is dealing
and * * * could easily result in economic
injury to the [prospect] because of the * * *
dependence upon the business experience
and expertise of the [business opportunity
seller].302
This identifying information is
material because it enables a
prospective purchaser to contact the
seller and any salesperson for additional
information. This information also
enables a prospective purchaser to
perform additional, independent
research on the seller and salesperson.
At the same time, for law enforcement
purposes, this disclosure provides a
written record of who provided the
required disclosures and when they did
so.303
b. Section 437.3(a)(2): Earnings Claims
The final Rule permits sellers to make
an earnings claim, provided there is a
reasonable basis for the claim and that
the seller can substantiate the claim at
the time it is made.304 If the seller
makes no earnings claim, § 437.3(a)(2)
directs the seller simply to check the
‘‘no’’ box on the disclosure
document.305 Moreover, § 437.3(1)(4)
specifies items of information necessary
to substantiate an earnings claim. If the
seller does make an earnings claim, the
Rule requires the seller to check the
‘‘yes’’ box and attach to the basic
disclosure document a second
document, the earnings claim statement.
The disclosure document advises the
prospective purchaser of this
requirement: ‘‘If the statement is yes,
[the seller] must attach an Earnings
Claim Statement to this form.’’ 306
At the June 1, 2009 workshop, the
DOJ representative spoke approvingly of
the form and language of this disclosure,
302 43
FR at 59642.
Workshop panelists did not discuss this
required disclosure.
304 This is consistent with analogous provisions
in the Amended Franchise Rule, 16 CFR 436.9, and
the interim Business Opportunity Rule, 437.1(c).
305 One workshop panelist commented that an
earnings claim is the most important selling feature
of any business opportunity, and for that reason,
sellers should not be permitted to state they make
no earnings claim. Taylor, June 09 Tr at 68. The
Commission agrees that the earnings claim is
important to purchasers’ investment decisions, but
recognizes that there is an important distinction
between forcing sellers to make an earnings claims
and requiring them to substantiate any claims they
choose to make.
306 Business opportunity sellers must also make
the following prescribed cautionary statement in
close proximity to the ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ check boxes:
‘‘Read this statement carefully. You may wish to
show this information to an advisor or accountant.’’
303 The
PO 00000
Frm 00027
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76841
noting that if a seller had checked the
‘‘no’’ box, but had, in fact, made an
earnings claim, the misrepresentation
would be in violation of Section 5 of the
FTC Act, and the seller would be subject
to civil penalties.307 A couple of
workshop panelists, however, found the
language confusing and believed that a
potential purchaser reading this
disclosure might not know who should
be completing this section of the form—
the purchaser, or the seller.308 Two of
the panelists had some suggestions for
improving the language of the
disclosure.309
The Staff Report concluded that
revisions to the language of the earnings
disclosure were unnecessary. The
Commission agrees. The initial
proposed disclosure document,
including the earnings disclosure,
underwent substantial revision based
upon consumer testing. Testing of the
format and language of the earnings
disclosure revealed that, contrary to the
panelists’ concerns, consumers did
understand the meaning of the earnings
disclosure, and realized that ‘‘a check in
the ‘No’ box would contradict any
previous earnings claim that a
salesperson had made.’’ 310 Indeed, the
ultimate test for the effectiveness of the
disclosure document is whether, in
practice, the written form helps
consumers detect a contradictory oral
statement made by the seller. On that
point, the revised proposed disclosure
document proved effective—9 out of 10
participants in the FTC study who heard
a hypothetical oral sales presentation
understood that it had included an
earnings claim, and when they
subsequently reviewed the disclosure
document, correctly identified a written
contradiction of the oral presentation.311
Based on the results of the consumer
testing, the Commission is not
persuaded that the workshop panelists’
suggestions would improve the
comprehension of the earnings claim
disclosure, and therefore has not
adopted any changes to it.
c. Section 437.3(a)(3): Legal Actions
Section 437.3(a)(3) addresses
deceptive practices in the sale of
business opportunities by requiring
sellers to disclose material information
about certain prior legal actions.
Specifically, § 437.3(a)(3)(i) requires
business opportunity sellers to provide
prospective purchasers with
307 Jost,
June 09 Tr at 56.
June 09 Tr at 55; Taylor, June 09 Tr
308 Cantone,
at 56.
309 E.g., Taylor, June 09 Tr at 57; Cantone, June
09 Tr at 57.
310 Macro Report at 15.
311 Id.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
76842
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
information about legal actions of or
against the seller, the seller’s affiliates or
prior businesses, and certain key
personnel that involve
‘‘misrepresentation, fraud, securities
law violations, or unfair or deceptive
practices, including violations of any
FTC rule.’’ Key personnel include ‘‘any
of the seller’s officers, directors, sales
managers, or any individual who
occupies a position or performs a
function similar to an officer, director,
or sales manager of the seller.’’ 312 If the
seller has such information to disclose,
it must check the ‘‘yes’’ box on the
disclosure document. If there are no
actions to disclose, the seller must
check the ‘‘no’’ box.
Comments on this section centered on
two main issues.313 First, some
expressed concern that the legal action
disclosure might unfairly tarnish the
image of a seller who had meritless
lawsuits filed against it. Second, the
DOJ focused on enhancing the
government’s ability to prosecute
violations of the Rule, and to that end,
made recommendations to revise the
form of the disclosure.314 In addition,
DOJ submitted a comment in response
to the INPR advising the Commission to
add to the title of the disclosure
document a citation to the legal
authority requiring the seller to provide
the basic disclosure document.315 The
final Rule incorporates this suggestion.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
(1) Legal Action Disclosure Permits a
Brief Description
Section 437.3(a)(3)(ii) requires that if
the seller has litigation to disclose
pursuant to § 437.3(a)(3)(i), it must
provide an attachment to the disclosure
document with the full caption of each
legal matter (names of the principal
parties, case number, full name of court,
and filing date). The RPBOR would have
prohibited a seller from including any
additional information about the legal
312 In the RNPR, the Commission solicited
comment on whether this provision adequately
captures the types of individuals whose litigation
history should be disclosed. It received no
comments responsive to that request. In addition,
in the RNPR, the Commission determined that it
would not be appropriate to require the disclosure
of legal actions involving the seller’s sales
employees, which would have been required under
the IPBOR. The Commission reasoned that the
burden of collecting the litigation histories for every
sales person was not outweighed by the
corresponding benefit to prospective purchasers. 73
FR at 16126.
313 In addition, discussion at the workshop
focused on whether a seller’s bankruptcy history
should be considered a legal action and required to
be disclosed. As noted in Section III.A.1, discussing
the definition of ‘‘action,’’ the Commission has
determined not to require the disclosure of
bankruptcy actions.
314 See 73 FR at 16125.
315 Id.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
action including truthful statements
about the nature of the litigation or its
ultimate outcome.316 One commenter
stated that in some instances, litigation
may be meritless and disposed of by
means of short of formal adjudication—
for example through dismissal or
settlement of nuisance lawsuits—and
sellers should have the opportunity to
provide an explanation of any disclosed
legal actions.317 A panelist at the
workshop agreed and also noted that the
FTC’s expert report on the consumer
testing of the disclosure document
revealed that consumers had very
negative reactions to the existence of
legal actions against the seller.318 The
DOJ panelist, on the other hand,
expressed concern that, if allowed to
provide a description of disclosed legal
actions, sellers might craft misleading
descriptions.319 He stated that he has
seen such abuse in the context of the
Franchise Rule,320 although he did
acknowledge that it might be unfair to
prohibit sellers from providing an
explanation when they have been
sued.321
The Commission’s initial decision not
to allow inclusions of details regarding
the nature of each legal action, as is
provided in the Amended Franchise
Rule, was prompted by an attempt to
minimize compliance costs to sellers.322
Furthermore, the Commission reasoned
that if ‘‘armed with the full caption, a
prospective purchaser can seek
additional information if he or she so
chooses,’’ as ‘‘the public’s ability to
review complaints in legal proceedings
has become significantly easier since the
316 73
FR at 16125–26.
Hailey (‘‘Hailey’’), Venable LLP, June 09
Tr at 122.
318 MacLeod, June 09 Tr at 124. The panelist also
argued that lawsuits are often overpled and that
there may be instances where some claims (such as
constitutional claims) are not really of particular
materiality to a prospective purchaser.
319 Jost, June 09 Tr at 125.
320 The Amended Franchise Rule requires that
legal actions against franchise sellers be disclosed
to potential purchasers. 16 CFR 436.5(c)(3) requires
that franchisors summarize, ‘‘the legal and factual
nature of each claim in the action, the relief sought
or obtained, and any conclusion of law and fact,’’
and provide information about damages or
settlement terms, terms of injunctive orders, dates
of any convictions or pleas, and the sentence or
penalty imposed. The interim Business Opportunity
Rule requires that sellers disclose only: the identity
and location of the court or agency; the date of
conviction, judgment, or decision; the penalty
imposed; the damages assessed; the terms of the
settlement or the terms of the order; and the date,
nature, and issuer of each such ruling. A seller may
also include a summary opinion of counsel as to
any pending litigation, but only if counsel’s consent
to the use of such opinion is included in the
disclosure statement. Interim Business Opportunity
Rule § 437.1(a)(4)(ii).
321 Jost, June 09 Tr at 125.
322 71 FR at 19069.
317 Gary
PO 00000
Frm 00028
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
advent of the Internet * * * [because]
[m]any legal documents are now
routinely posted on court or related Web
sites.’’ 323 The Commission noted that
since the disclosure document itself
instructs potential purchasers that the
legal actions disclosed pertain to
misrepresentation, fraud, securities law
violation, or unfair or deceptive
practices, potential purchasers would
have a basic understanding of the
subject matter of the action.324
The existence of legal actions against
the seller is not necessarily proof of
fraud and that some legal actions may
be without merit. The Commission
concludes, however, that the existence
of legal actions of the type
enumerated—misrepresentation, fraud,
securities law violations, or unfair or
deceptive practices—against the
business opportunity seller or its key
personnel is critical to assessing the
financial risk of the proposed
investment.325 This is highly material
information. Indeed, discovering that a
seller has a history of violating laws and
regulations is perhaps the best
indication that a particular business
opportunity is a high-risk investment. In
fact, in the Commission’s law
enforcement experience, business
opportunity promoters routinely have
hidden such material information from
prospective purchasers, to the detriment
of those purchasers.326
The Staff Report cautioned that if the
Rule allowed sellers to provide a
description of the legal action, it would
provide an opportunity for dishonest
sellers to misrepresent or
mischaracterize such actions, including
their ultimate outcomes.327
Nevertheless, the Staff Report
acknowledged that legitimate sellers
potentially could be harmed if not
afforded the opportunity to address in
writing the legal action they are
323 Id.
at n.165.
at 19068.
325 See supra Section III.A.1.
326 E.g., FTC v. Nat’l Vending Consultants, Inc.,
No. CV–S–05–0160–RCJ–PAL (D. Nev. 2005)
(failure to disclose guilty plea for mail fraud of de
facto corporate officer); FTC v. Netfran Dev. Corp.,
No. 1:05–cv–22223–UU (S.D. Fla. 2005) (failure to
disclose FTC injunction against principal); FTC v.
Am. Entm’t Distribs., Inc., No. 04–22431–Civ–
Martinez (S.D. Fla. 2004) (failure to disclose prior
FTC injunction); United States v. We The People
Forms and Serv. Ctrs. USA, Inc., No. CV 04 10075
GHK FMOx (C.D. Cal. 2004) (failure to disclose
prior lawsuits); FTC v. Hayes, No. Civ.
4:96CV02162SNL (E.D. Mo 1996) (failure to disclose
prior state fines and injunctive actions); FTC v.
WhiteHead, Ltd, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH)
¶ 10062 (D. Conn. 1992) (failure to disclose fraud
action); FTC v. Inv. Dev. Inc., Bus. Franchise Guide
(CCH) ¶ 9326 (E.D. La. 1989) (failure to disclose
insurance fraud convictions).
327 Staff Report at 75.
324 Id.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
required to disclose.328 The staff
recommended, therefore, that
§ 437.3(a)(3)(ii) be revised to add the
following sentence: ‘‘For each action,
the seller may also provide a brief
accurate statement not to exceed 100
words that describes the action.’’ No
comments to the Staff Report addressed
this revision.
Upon consideration of the record, the
staff’s recommendation, and the
rationale for that recommendation, the
Commission adopts § 437.3(a)(3)(ii) as
recommended in the Staff Report. Noncompliance with the restriction of this
provision (i.e., statements that exceed
the word limitation or that
mischaracterize the action or its
outcome) is a violation of the Rule.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
(2) Amendment to the Disclosure
Document
The DOJ panelist advocated for a
small amendment to the ‘‘Legal
Actions’’ section of the proposed
disclosure document published prior to
the Workshop. Specifically, the DOJ
panelist recommended adding the
phrase ‘‘including violation of an FTC
Rule’’ after the phrase ‘‘or unfair or
deceptive act or practice * * *,’’ to
make clear to business opportunity
sellers that a violation of an FTC Rule
is an unfair or deceptive practice.329
The Staff Report agreed that this
recommended addition to the ‘‘Legal
Actions’’ section of the disclosure
document would assist enforcement
efforts by eliminating any significant
question as to whether the defendant
had actual or implied knowledge that
violation of an FTC rule is an unfair and
deceptive practice, and recommended
that the disclosure document include
this language.330 No comments to the
Staff Report addressed this addition.
Upon consideration of the record and
the rationale for the recommendation,
the Commission adopts the staff’s
recommendation. Accordingly,
§ 437.3(a)(3)(i) of the final Rule requires
disclosure of any civil or criminal action
for misrepresentation, fraud, securities
law violations, or unfair or deceptive
practices, ‘‘including violations of any
FTC Rule.’’ The disclosure documents
328 As the Commission previously noted in the
RNPR, however, nothing in the Rule would prevent
the seller from speaking with the consumer to
explain the nature or outcome of any legal action
disclosed on the form. 73 FR at 16125.
329 Jost, June 09 Tr at 36.
330 The DOJ, upon request of the FTC, has the
authority to seek civil penalties for violations of
trade regulation rules issued pursuant to the FTC
Act, but to obtain such penalties, the government
must prove ‘‘actual knowledge or knowledge fairly
implied on the basis of objective circumstances that
such act is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by
such rule.’’ See 15 U.S.C. 56(a)(1); 45(m)(1)(A).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
provided as Appendix A and Appendix
B have also been revised to include this
language.
d. Section 437.3(a)(4): Cancellation or
Refund Policy
Section 437.3(a)(4) pertains to a
common practice among fraudulent
business opportunity sellers: offering
prospective purchasers an illusory right
to cancel or to seek a whole or partial
refund.331 The Rule does not require
any seller to offer cancellation or a
refund; however, if the seller does offer
a refund or the right to cancel the
purchase, it must ‘‘state the material
terms of the refund or cancellation
policy in an attachment to the
disclosure document.’’ 332 The
disclosure requirement is
complemented by a prohibition, at
§ 437.6(l), against failing ‘‘to provide a
refund or cancellation when the
purchaser has satisfied the terms and
conditions pursuant to § 437.3(a)(4).’’
The disclosure requirement is also
complemented by prohibitions on other
misrepresentations.333
As discussed below, the Commission
adopts the staff’s recommendation that
sellers be required to state the
‘‘material’’ terms of the refund or
cancellation policy, and the term
‘‘material’’ is now included in the final
Rule provision. Under the final Rule, a
seller that offers a cancellation or refund
policy must check the ‘‘yes’’ box on the
disclosure document and also must
attach to the disclosure document a
written description of its policy. To
minimize compliance costs, the seller
may comply with this requirement by
attaching to the disclosure document a
copy of a pre-existing document that
details the seller’s cancellation or
refund policy. For example, a seller may
detail its refund policy in a company
brochure. If it does, the seller need only
attach to the disclosure document the
particular page setting forth the refund
policy. As in the other examples, if no
cancellation or refund is offered, then
the seller need only check the ‘‘no’’ box.
331 See, e.g., FTC v. AMP Publ’n., Inc., No. SACV–
00–112–AHS–ANx (C.D. Cal. 2001); FTC v. Home
Professions, Inc., No. SACV 00–111 AHS (Eex) (C.D.
Cal. 2001); FTC v. Innovative Prods., No. 3:00–CV–
0312–D (N.D. Tex. 2000); FTC v. Encore Networking
Servs., No. 00–1083 WJR (AIJx) (C.D. Cal. 2000);
FTC v. Mediworks, Inc., No. 00–01079 (C.D. Cal.
2000). Indeed, allegations that business opportunity
sellers misrepresented their refund policies rank
among the top 10 complaint allegations in
Commission business opportunity cases brought
under Section 5. See 71 FR 19069.
332 The Commission adopted a similar approach
in the TSR. 16 CFR 310.3(a)(1)(iii) (if a seller makes
a representation about a refund policy, it must
disclose ‘‘a statement of all material terms and
conditions of such policy’’).
333 See § 437.6.
PO 00000
Frm 00029
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76843
Workshop panelists raised two issues
related to the disclosure of refund and
cancellation policies. First, panelists
questioned whether information about
the percentage of purchasers requesting
and obtaining refunds should be part of
the disclosure, and second, whether
§ 437.3(a)(4) should specify particular
terms of a refund policy that must be
disclosed to potential purchasers. The
sections that follow address each of
these concerns.
(1) Percentage of Purchasers Requesting
and Obtaining Refunds
One panelist stated that information
concerning the percentage of purchasers
requesting and obtaining refunds would
be relevant information to potential
purchasers.334 Another panelist
disagreed, arguing that requiring
disclosure of this information might
have the unintended consequence of
harming purchasers by discouraging
sellers from offering refunds.335 The
Commission previously considered this
issue. The IPBOR would have required
a seller that had a cancellation or refund
policy to disclose the number of
purchasers who had asked to cancel or
who had sought a refund in the two
previous years.336 In the INPR, the
Commission specifically sought
comment on the proposed disclosure of
the seller’s refund history, particularly
on the likely effect this disclosure might
have on the willingness of sellers to
offer refunds.337 Based upon arguments
articulated in the comments to the
INPR, the Commission concluded that
this disclosure would not be useful to
consumers, and that disclosure of
refund history could be unduly
prejudicial to business opportunities
that offer and liberally provide refunds
to prior purchasers.338 Indeed, a
prospective purchaser might compare
the refund requests of a fraudulent seller
with no refund policy against a
legitimate seller with a liberal refund
policy and inaccurately conclude that
the legitimate seller offers a riskier
business venture. The requirement,
therefore, could create a perverse
incentive to discontinue refund
policies.339 The Commission concluded
that disclosure of refund history would
not reliably remedy deception on this
issue, and it was eliminated in the
RPBOR.340
334 Taylor, June 09 Tr at 48. One commenter
agreed. Brooks-Workshop comment.
335 MacLeod, June 09 Tr at 50.
336 71 FR at 19088 (IPBOR § 437.3(a)(5)).
337 Id. at 19070.
338 73 FR at 16126.
339 Id. at 16115.
340 Id. at 16126.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
76844
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Panelists in favor of requiring the
disclosure of seller’s refund histories
presented no arguments other than
those previously considered by the
Commission. Accordingly, the final
Rule does not require this disclosure.
(2) Information To Be Disclosed About
Refund and Cancellation Policies
Although workshop participants
agreed that information about a seller’s
cancellation and refund policies is an
important component of a potential
purchaser’s evaluation of a business
opportunity, they were universally
concerned that § 437.3(a)(4) did not
contain enough specificity about what
information must be disclosed to
potential purchasers and suggested that
additional guidance from the
Commission was necessary.341 The
panelist from the Maryland Attorney
General’s Office thought the Rule
should specify that all material terms of
a refund policy must be disclosed,
because in the context of business
opportunity sales, it has been his
experience that the requirements to
obtain a refund are often so onerous that
as a practical matter, no one is ever
eligible.342 Some panelists felt the Rule
should identify specific information to
be disclosed. For example, one
commenter noted that the period of time
a seller has to exercise a right to
cancellation or refund, or any
conditions on return of unsold goods are
material and should be required to be
disclosed to potential purchasers.343
One panelist suggested that the DSA
Code of Ethics’ refund requirements
might serve as a model to identify types
of information that should be disclosed
to potential purchasers.344
After considering these comments, the
Staff Report recommended modifying
§ 437.3(a)(4) to track closely a similar
disclosure requirement in the TSR.345
341 See
June 09 Tr at 39–53.
June 09 Tr at 47 (providing as an
example a company offering a 100% buy-back for
vending machines and noting the company’s failure
to disclose that the cost of sending back the vending
machine would be borne by the purchaser, and
would often exceed any refund due, thereby
rendering any potential refund worthless).
343 Taylor, June 09 Tr at 43.
344 Morrissey, June 09 Tr at 45. The Commission
has reviewed applicable provisions of the DSA
Code of Ethics, but does not find them applicable.
DSA dictates the specific terms of its members’
refund policies. The RPBOR, by contrast, did not
specify the requirements of a seller’s refund or
cancellation policy, or even whether the seller must
have such policies. Instead, it attempted to ensure
that if such policies existed, potential purchasers
were aware of how they can exercise their rights
under those policies.
345 Specifically, in describing its approach
regarding refund and cancellation policy
disclosures, the Commission noted that it ‘‘adopted
the same approach in the TSR.’’ 71 FR at 19069
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
342 Cantone,
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
The TSR requires that if the seller or
telemarketer makes a representation
about a refund, cancellation, exchange,
or repurchase policy, it must provide
the purchaser with a statement of all
material terms and conditions of its
policy.346 Requiring the disclosure of all
material terms of a refund or
cancellation policy most effectively
accomplishes the Commission’s stated
purpose of ensuring that potential
purchasers are provided with
information that would assist them in
assessing the financial risk associated
with the offer. Indeed, the commentary
to the IPBOR indicates that the
Commission, in fact, intended to require
sellers to disclose all material terms of
refund and repayment policies to
prospective purchasers.347
Therefore, upon consideration of the
record, the Commission adopts the
staff’s recommendation. Accordingly,
the penultimate sentence of § 437.3(a)(4)
of the final Rule has been clarified to
read: ‘‘If so, state all material terms and
conditions of the refund or cancellation
policy in an attachment to the
disclosure document.’’ As discussed in
Section III.A.9., the final Rule includes
a definition of ‘‘material’’ similar to the
definition used in the TSR. Specifically,
§ 437.1(i) defines, in relevant part,
‘‘material’’ to mean ‘‘likely to affect a
person’s choice of, or conduct regarding,
goods or services.’’ Examples of material
terms and conditions may include, for
example, the period of time the
purchaser has to cancel a purchase or
request a refund; the specific steps
necessary to cancel a purchase or
request a refund; any fees or penalties
incurred for cancellation; and where
unused inventory must be returned to
and by what method. The Commission
declines to enumerate in the final Rule
what terms are material, as materiality
may vary depending on the
circumstances of the opportunity and
the refund or cancellation policy.
e. Section 437.3(a)(5): References
(1) Background
The interim Business Opportunity
Rule required the disclosure of prior
purchasers’ name, street address, city,
state, and telephone number.348 In the
INPR, the Commission concluded that
prospects could readily contact a prior
purchaser if provided with the prior
purchaser’s name, city, state, and
n.166 (citing 16 CFR 310.3(a)(1)(iii) (if a seller
makes a representation about a refund policy, it
must disclose ‘‘a statement of all material terms and
conditions of such policy’’)).
346 16 CFR 310.3(a)(1)(iii).
347 See 71 FR 19069–70.
348 72 FR 15565.
PO 00000
Frm 00030
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
telephone number, and that this
approach enables prospects to contact
references while minimizing the
intrusion into prior purchasers’
privacy.349 Accordingly, neither the
IPBOR, nor the RPBOR would have
required sellers of business
opportunities to disclose prior
purchasers’ street address to potential
purchasers.350 As discussed below, the
final Rule requires that sellers disclose
only prior purchasers’ name, state, and
telephone number. Like the IPBOR and
the RPBOR, the final Rule limits the
disclosure of references to those who
purchased the business opportunity
within the three years prior to the date
of the disclosure document. Moreover,
the final Rule requires the seller to
disclose this information by listing each
prior purchaser (if fewer than 10), or
listing at least the 10 prior purchasers
nearest to the prospective purchaser’s
location. In order to minimize
compliance costs, the final Rule also
provides sellers with an alternative
disclosure option—in lieu of a list of the
10 prior purchasers nearest the
prospect, a seller may furnish a prospect
with a national list of all purchasers.351
In the INPR, the Commission noted that
this option would allow the seller to
maintain a master list of purchasers that
could be updated periodically, which
would allow the seller to avoid having
to tailor the disclosure to each
prospective purchaser.352 A seller that
chooses this option must insert into the
reference section of the disclosure
document the words ‘‘See Attached
List,’’ and attach a list of the references
to the disclosure document.353
Notwithstanding the fact that most of
the information required by the
reference disclosure is often available in
the public domain, in crafting this
section of the Rule, as discussed infra,
the Commission considered potential
privacy concerns raised by the use of
prior purchaser information.354 To
address these concerns, § 437.3(a)(5)(ii)
requires that the disclosure document
state the following language clearly and
in immediate conjunction with the list
of references: ‘‘If you buy a business
opportunity from the seller, your
349 71
FR at 19071 n.180.
FR at 19088; 73 FR at 16135.
351 See § 437.3(5)(i).
352 71 FR at 19071. In the RNPR, the Commission
solicited comment on whether giving sellers the
ability to provide prospective purchasers with a
national list was a viable option. It received no
comments responsive to that request.
353 Sellers that provide the disclosure document
electronically would be permitted to attach the
national list of references in electronic form as well.
354 71 FR at 19071.
350 71
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
contact information can be disclosed in
the future to other buyers.’’
(2) Privacy Concerns Raised in the
Record
In response to the INPR, a number of
commenters, primarily from the MLM
industry, expressed concern that the
reference disclosure requirement raised
privacy and security concerns.355 The
Commission, however, was and is not
persuaded that privacy concerns
outweigh the benefits of this disclosure.
The Commission finds that disclosure of
prior purchasers is important to prevent
fraud because it enables prospects to
evaluate the seller’s claims based on
information from an independent source
with relevant experience.356
Furthermore, the required reference
disclosures include no sensitive
personal information whatsoever—no
social security numbers, birth dates,
financial account information, or even
street addresses.357
Following publication of the RNPR,
one commenter continued to argue that
the disclosures enumerated in
§ 437.3(a)(5) would raise privacy and
data security concerns.358 The
commenter articulated three main
concerns: (1) That requiring the seller to
‘‘store purchasers’ personal information
in a single location or document creates
a target ripe for theft and improper
disclosure;’’ (2) that requiring disclosure
of information of prior purchasers
conflicts with the FTC’s Privacy of
Consumer Information Rule (‘‘Privacy
Rule’’ or ‘‘GLB Privacy Rule’’),359
promulgated under the Gramm-LeachBliley Act (‘‘GLB’’) 360 because it does
not allow those prior purchasers of the
business opportunity the right to opt out
of having their contact information
disclosed to potential purchasers;361
and (3) that the mandatory disclosure of
references violates privacy obligations
under the California Constitution.362
355 See
73 FR at 16126.
id.
357 See id.
358 Planet Antares-RNPR at 18–21.
359 16 CFR Part 313.
360 15 U.S.C. 6801 et seq.
361 The Commission received a few comments in
response to the INPR in support of allowing
individual business opportunity purchasers to opt
out of having their contact information disclosed.
The comment submitted by the DOJ however, urged
the Commission to reject any opt-out believing it
would be an easy matter for sellers to talk
purchasers into opting out, describing to them what
a hassle it becomes for those who do not opt out
because of all the demand that arises for their time
and attention. The Commission agreed with DOJ
and after analyzing all of the commentary to
§ 437.3(a)(5), declined to make any changes to that
section. See 73 FR at 16126–27.
362 Planet Antares-RNPR at 20.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
356 See
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
The Commission is not persuaded by
any of these contentions.363
First, the Commission rejects the
argument that the disclosure of
references creates an unnecessary risk of
theft or improper disclosure. As an
initial matter, the Commission notes
that a similar reference disclosure has
been required for business opportunities
and business format franchises covered
by the Original Franchise Rule for more
than 25 years, and it is required under
the interim Business Opportunity Rule
as well.364 Moreover, the information to
be collected and stored is not sensitive
(e.g., no financial information, social
security numbers, dates of birth, or
street addresses). The commenter has
not explained, nor does the Commission
understand, why the information would
be particularly attractive to thieves.
Second, the Commission is not
persuaded that § 437.3(a)(5) creates
potential conflicts with the GLB Privacy
Rule, because the protections afforded
by the Privacy Rule likely do not extend
to the contact information of business
opportunity purchasers. Congress
enacted GLB to protect personal
financial information of individual
consumers, but excluded from the ambit
of the law the protection of information
pertaining to businesses. The Privacy
Rule requires that a ‘‘financial
institution’’ provide, under specified
circumstances, notice to its consumers
and customers of its privacy policies
and practices,365 including the
consumers’ right to opt out of having
their personal information shared with
third parties.366 For purposes of the
Privacy Rule, a consumer is an
individual who obtains financial
products or services for personal, family
or household purposes.367 The
Commission need not consider the
limited circumstances where a business
opportunity seller might be considered
a financial institution, because the
Privacy Rule is aimed at protecting the
non-public personal financial
information of consumers, not
businesses.368
363 This same commenter argues that the required
reference information constitutes trade secrets that
should be afforded special protections, but offers no
support for this contention. Id. at 14.
364 16 CFR 437.1(a)(16)(iii).
365 73 FR at 16127.
366 16 CFR 313.1(a)(3).
367 16 CFR 313.3(e). Similarly, a customer is a
consumer with a continuing relationship with the
financial institution. See 16 CFR 313.3(h).
368 See 16 CFR 313.1(b) (expressly stating that the
Privacy Rule ‘‘does not apply to information about
companies or about individuals who obtain
financial products or services for business,
commercial, or agricultural purposes’’). Indeed,
federal law often focuses on privacy concerns
affecting individuals, not businesses. See, e.g., the
PO 00000
Frm 00031
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76845
The commenter argues that business
opportunity operators should be
considered consumers for purposes of
the Privacy Rule, and thus should have
the right to opt out of having their
contact information disclosed to
potential purchasers.369 The
commenter’s interpretation is contrary
to both prior Commission policy, and
the plain meaning of the language of the
Privacy Rule. As the Commission has
previously stated, by investing in a
business opportunity, purchasers are
entering the world of commerce and
embarking upon the establishment of a
business.370 Financing a business
venture is not ‘‘primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes.’’ 371 This
interpretation is consistent with
previous Commission guidance in an
analogous situation,372 and with the
Commission’s interpretation of
‘‘consumer’’ in the context of other rules
it enforces.373
Similarly, the reference disclosure is
not in conflict with the California
Constitution. A cause of action for
invasion of privacy under the California
Constitution exists only when a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy,
which cannot exist if the person has
been expressly informed that his or her
contact information will be shared with
prospective purchasers.374
Fair Credit Reporting Act (‘‘FCRA’’) 15 U.S.C.
1681(a)(4) (requiring various protections for
consumer information, including provisions
addressing identity theft). There is no comparable
statute that protects business information.
369 The commenter argues that the purchase of a
business opportunity might be intended to ‘‘provide
a revenue stream’’ to a purchaser and ‘‘not
necessarily a source of employment.’’ Planet
Antares-RNPR at 18–21. The Commission finds this
distinction immaterial to the analysis.
370 73 FR at 16127 & n.210.
371 The Commission has not issued guidance
about the meaning of ‘‘personal, family, or
household purposes’’ because the plain meaning of
the language seems abundantly clear. Courts’
interpretations of this phrase when used in other
consumer protection laws are instructive. See, e.g.,
In re Runski, 102 F.3d 744, 747 (4th Cir. 1996)
(noting in the bankruptcy context that courts have
uniformly concluded that debt incurred for a
business venture or with a profit motive does not
fall into the category of debt incurred for ‘‘personal,
family, or household purposes’’).
372 See ‘‘Frequently Asked Questions for the
Privacy Regulation,’’ Question B–2 (Dec. 2001),
https://www.ftc.gov/privacy/glbact/glb-faq.htm
(Privacy Rule does not apply when a financial
institution makes a business loan to a sole
proprietor; although an individual, a sole proprietor
is not a ‘‘consumer’’ for purposes of the Privacy
Rule where the financing is not for personal, family,
or household purposes).
373 See, e.g., Preservation of Consumer’s Claims
and Defenses, 16 CFR 433.1(b); Credit Practices, 16
CFR 444.1(d).
374 When personal information has been released
without consent, a cause of action for invasion of
privacy exists under the California Constitution
only if: (1) the individual had a reasonable
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
Continued
08DER2
76846
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Privacy concerns relating to the
reference disclosure were also
articulated at the June 1, 2009
workshop. A panelist representing a
large MLM company stated that at least
some of its representatives expressed
concern that under the proposed Rule,
their addresses and home telephone
numbers could be provided to persons
they did not know. The panelist noted
that representatives often use their
home telephone number as their
business number, and that the same
telephone number is also used by other
family members, including children.
The panelist wondered if additional
safeguards to protect purchasers’
privacy could be taken and suggested
requiring potential purchasers to contact
a seller’s references through a
centralized telephone number to be
administered by the seller.375 The DOJ
panelist opposed this suggestion,
arguing that communications with prior
purchasers could be subject to
manipulation by the seller.376
The Commission does not believe that
requiring sellers to provide and
administer a centralized phone number
to screen references is necessary or
advisable. The Commission agrees with
DOJ’s comment that such a system may
invite manipulation. It would also
create an unjustified financial and
administrative burden for sellers. As
noted above, the Commission does not
view the disclosure of a purchaser’s
name, state, and telephone number as
creating privacy or security concerns, as
this information is often available in the
public domain. The required disclosure
does not include street address
information, and therefore, does not
provide a ‘‘road map’’ to a purchaser’s
residence, as the commenter suggests.
Moreover, potential purchasers are
notified in writing, prior to the time of
purchase that their reference
information will be available to
expectation that the information would be kept
private, and (2) disclosure of the information is
serious in nature, scope, and or potential impact to
cause an ‘‘egregious breach of social norms.’’ See
Pioneer Elecs., Inc. v. Olmstead, 40 Cal. 4th 360,
370–71 (2007). Even when these criteria are met,
the individual’s privacy interest must be weighed
against legitimate and important competing
interests. Id. When measured against this standard,
disclosure of purchaser information pursuant to
proposed § 437.3(a)(5) would not give rise to a
privacy action. First, the disclosure document
plainly notifies potential purchasers that their
reference information will be provided to
subsequent purchasers, thus they have no
reasonable expectation that their information will
be kept private. Second, the reference disclosure
includes no sensitive personal information
whatsoever, and the value to potential purchasers
of information about prior purchasers outweighs
any potential detriment to those prior purchasers.
375 Morrissey, June 09 Tr at 87.
376 Jost, June 09 Tr at 88.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
subsequent purchasers. Purchasers who
have privacy concerns, therefore, can
take steps to minimize personal
exposure, such as, for example,
designating a separate phone number for
business purposes.
Nonetheless, the Staff Report noted
that the disclosure of information some
may consider private must be weighed
against the benefits of providing that
information to potential purchasers.
After considering the purpose of
providing reference information, the
Staff Report concluded that the
disclosure of the city where the
reference is located is not necessary.
The staff recommended, therefore, that
the city where previous purchasers
reside be eliminated from
§ 437.3(a)(5)(i), and correspondingly,
from the ‘‘References’’ section of the
disclosure document.
No comments in response to the Staff
Report addressed this recommended
modification. The Commission agrees
with the staff’s recommendation.
Accordingly, both § 437.3(a)(5)(i) of the
final Rule and the related section of the
disclosure document have been revised
to eliminate references to the city where
prior purchasers reside. The
Commission reiterates, however, that
this amendment is intended to alleviate
privacy concerns, and it does not relieve
a seller of its obligation to provide a list
of the ten purchasers within the past
three years that are nearest to the
potential purchaser as an alternative to
providing the full list of all prior
purchasers.
f. Section 437.3(a)(6): Receipt
Section 437.3(a)(6) sets forth a receipt
requirement for the disclosure
document. This requirement is designed
to document proper disclosure by the
seller. Specifically, the seller must
attach a duplicate copy of the disclosure
document, which is to be signed and
dated by the purchaser. A designation
for the signature and date is included at
the bottom of the disclosure
document.377 The Commission believes
that the receipt requirement is
especially important to prove proper
disclosure with respect to electronic
377 As noted previously, the Commission engaged
a consultant with expertise in document design and
comprehension to evaluate the initial proposed
disclosure document. One of the changes suggested
by the consultant included adding a note below the
signature line of the disclosure document stating
that the FTC requires that all business opportunity
sellers give the prospective purchaser at least seven
calendar days before asking him or her to sign a
purchase contract. A copy of the revised proposed
disclosure document, which incorporated this
change, was attached as Appendix A to the Federal
Register Notice announcing the June 1, 2009
workshop. See 74 FR at 18715.
PO 00000
Frm 00032
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
documents. A seller furnishing
disclosures online, either through email
or access to a Web site, has the burden
of establishing that the prospect was
actually able to access the electronic
document.378 Completion and
submission of the receipt serves that
purpose. The final Rule does not impose
any particular method of transmitting
the receipt. In order to minimize
compliance costs, sellers should have
flexibility to determine the best method
to comply with this provision of the
Rule.379 Accordingly, § 437.3(a)(6)
would permit the seller to inform the
prospective purchaser how to return the
signed receipts, for example, by sending
the receipt to a street address, to an
email address, or by facsimile.
As noted above, the Staff Report
recommended adding a new definition
of ‘‘signature’’ or ‘‘signed’’ to make clear
that the term ‘‘signature’’ or ‘‘signed’’
includes not only a person’s
handwritten signature, but also an
electronic or digital form of signature to
the extent that such signature is
recognized as a valid signature under
applicable federal law or state contract
law.380 The receipt requirement
received one comment. The commenter
noted that the requirement that a
purchaser be provided with a second
copy of the disclosure document
appears inconsistent with the Rule’s
recognition that the disclosure
document can be provided to potential
purchasers through electronic media.381
The Commission disagrees with the
commenter. Some sellers may post their
disclosure document on their Web sites,
and update it as needed. The
requirement to provide a copy of the
electronic disclosure ensures that the
prospective purchaser will retain the
document in a static format. This can be
accomplished as easily through
electronic means as it can through
paper. In fact, allowing electronic
distribution should greatly reduce
sellers’ compliance costs over the long
run, especially costs associated with
printing and distributing disclosure
documents. Nevertheless, the final Rule
enables sellers to determine for
themselves whether it is most efficient
and cost-effective to provide the
disclosure document to prospective
purchasers electronically or in printed
form. Accordingly, the Commission
adopts the receipt provision as
recommended in the Staff Report, with
one non-substantive modification: the
reference to a ‘‘disclosure page’’ has
378 71
FR at 19072.
379 Id.
380 See
§ 437.1(r).
381 Quixtar-INPR
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
at 27.
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
been changed to ‘‘disclosure document’’
to conform it to the title of § 437.3.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
3. Section 437.3(b): Updating the
Disclosure Document
To ensure that a seller’s disclosures
are current, § 437.3(b) requires sellers to
update their disclosures at least
quarterly. Modeled on the Original
Franchise Rule and interim Business
Opportunity Rule,382 the provision
states that it would be a violation of the
Rule and Section 5 of the FTC Act for
a seller to fail to update the disclosures
to reflect any material changes in the
information presented in the basic
disclosure document on at least a
quarterly basis. The Commission has
concluded that quarterly updating
strikes the right balance between the
need for accurate disclosure and the
costs and burdens more frequent
updating would entail.383
Section 437.3(b) includes a proviso
that would require more frequent
updating in one respect: the list of
references. Specifically, a seller is
required to update the list of references
monthly until such time that it is able
to include the full list of 10 references.
This is particularly necessary for startup opportunities that may have few or
no prior references when they
commence business opportunity sales.
The Commission has concluded that
prospective purchasers’ ability to
contact at least 10 references in their
due diligence investigations of business
opportunity offers outweighs any costs
of more frequent updating until the list
of 10 is compiled.384
No comments were directed to the
requirement of updating the disclosures,
and the final Rule contains § 437.3(b) as
recommended in the Staff Report.
D. Section 437.4: Earnings Claims
Section 437.4 of the final Rule
addresses earnings claims, and is
similar to the parallel sections of the
Amended Franchise Rule and the
interim Business Opportunity Rule.385
Like both of those rules, the final Rule
requires disclosure of earnings
information only if a business
opportunity seller chooses to make a
claim about potential earnings to
prospective purchasers.
Like the analogous provisions of the
Amended Franchise Rule and the
interim Business Opportunity Rule,
§ 437.4(a) requires a seller making an
earnings claim to: (1) Have a reasonable
382 16 CFR 436.7(b) and interim Business
Opportunity Rule § 437.1(a)(22).
383 71 FR at 19072.
384 Id.
385 See 16 CFR 436.9 and interim Business
Opportunity Rule §§ 437.1(b), (c) and (e).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
basis for the claim at the time the claim
is made; (2) have in its possession
written materials that substantiate the
claim at the time the claim is made; (3)
make the written material available to
the prospect and the Commission upon
request; and (4) furnish the prospect
with an earnings claim statement.
Section 437.4(b) sets forth disclosure
and other requirements for sellers
making earnings claims in the general
media. In § 437.4(c), the final Rule
addresses the use of industry financial
statistics or data to suggest or imply a
likely level of earnings. Finally,
§ 437.4(d) requires that sellers notify
prospects in writing of any changes in
earnings information before the prospect
enters into a contract or provides any
consideration to the seller, directly or
indirectly through a third party.386 Each
of these requirements is discussed in the
following sections.
1. Section 437.4(a)(1)–(3):
Substantiation for Earnings Claims
As noted throughout this proceeding,
the making of false or unsubstantiated
earnings claims is the most prevalent
problem in the offering of business
opportunities. To address this problem,
§ 437.4(a)(1) of the final Rule permits
sellers to make an earnings claim
provided there is a reasonable basis for
the claim at the time the claim is
made.387 Further, § 437.4(a)(2) requires
sellers that make earnings claims to
have in their possession written
substantiation for their earnings claims,
and § 437.4(a)(3) requires sellers to
make that written substantiation
available to the prospective purchaser,
or to the Commission, upon request.
Requiring that a prospective purchaser
can obtain and review, or have his or
her own advisor review, substantiation
for earnings claims increases the
likelihood that sellers will make claims
only for which they have a reasonable
basis.
2. Section 437.4(a)(4): Earnings Claim
Statement
Section 437.4(a)(4) prescribes the
content of the earnings claim statement,
which must be provided to a prospect
if a seller elects to make a representation
about potential earnings. To ensure ease
of review, each earnings claim statement
386 The Amended Franchise Rule contains similar
requirements. See 16 CFR 436.1(d)(2) and
436.1(e)(6) (each prospective franchisee to whom
the representation is made shall be notified of any
material change in the information contained in the
earnings claims document).
387 As discussed in the INPR, the Commission did
not propose a ‘‘geographic relevance’’ requirement
because that prerequisite is subsumed in the
‘‘reasonable basis’’ requirement. See 71 FR at 19072
n.185.
PO 00000
Frm 00033
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76847
must be a single written document. The
document must be titled ‘‘EARNINGS
CLAIM STATEMENT REQUIRED BY
LAW’’ in capital, bold type letters. This
ensures that the prospective purchaser
can readily determine from the face of
the document the importance of its text.
The title is followed by the name of the
person making the claim, and the date
of the claim. After the title and
identifying information, the Rule
requires the seller to state the specific
earnings claim or claims. The final Rule
does not specify any particular format or
formula for an earnings claim. This is
intended to allow flexibility in
presenting earnings information in the
manner that is appropriate for each
opportunity, provided that any such
claim has a reasonable basis and that
there is written substantiation for the
claim at the time it is made.388
The final Rule also requires a seller
making an earnings claim to disclose the
beginning and ending dates when the
represented earnings were achieved.389
This information is material because a
prospective purchaser cannot begin to
evaluate an earnings representation
without knowing how recently the
supporting data was collected. For
example, a seller may have conducted a
survey of purchasers of its business
opportunity in 2009. The Rule would
not necessarily prohibit the use of that
survey information in 2010, but the
prospect should be made aware of the
applicable time period in order to assess
the relevance of the claim to current
market conditions. Similarly, a prospect
may reasonably give greater weight to a
survey of purchasers over an extended
period of time (for example, over a
three-year period), than a more limited
survey (for example, over a three-month
period).390
Further, this section of the Rule
requires the disclosure of the number
and percentage of all purchasers who
purchased the business opportunity
prior to the end of the represented time
period who have achieved at least the
claimed earnings during that period.
This information is material because it
enables the prospect to determine
whether the claimed earnings of prior
purchasers are typical.391 For example,
a seller may claim that purchasers have
average earnings of $50,000 a year. Even
if true, this statement may not reflect the
experience of the typical purchaser
because a few purchasers with
unusually high earnings could skew the
average. Thus, the number and
388 71
FR at 19072.
437.4(a)(4)(iv).
390 71 FR at 19072.
391 Id.
389 Section
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
76848
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
percentage of purchasers earning
$50,000 a year might actually be very
low.392
In addition, this section of the final
Rule requires a seller making an
earnings claim to disclose any
characteristics that distinguish
purchasers who achieved at least the
represented level of earnings from those
characteristics of the prospective
purchasers.393 For example, a survey of
ice cream vending route purchasers
operating only in the South may not be
readily applicable to other regions, such
as the North. Similarly, a survey limited
to large urban areas may not be
applicable to smaller, rural areas.
Distinguishing characteristics of
purchasers who achieved a represented
level of earnings is material information
because it enables a prospect to assess
the relevance of an earnings claim to his
or her particular market.394
Finally, the Rule requires a seller
making an earnings claim to disclose to
the prospective purchaser that written
substantiation for the claim will be
made available upon request.395 As
noted above, requiring that a
prospective purchaser can obtain and
review, or have his or her own advisor
review, substantiation for earnings
claims increases the likelihood that
sellers will make claims only for which
they have a reasonable basis.396 This
requirement balances the prospective
purchaser’s need for material
information with the necessity of
minimizing the seller’s compliance
costs. Thus, a seller need only provide
such substantiation upon request.
In the RNPR, the Commission
solicited comment on various aspects of
the earnings claim statement including:
(1) Whether the requirement that sellers
disclose the number and percentage of
prior purchasers that achieved at least
the stated level of earnings would create
difficulties for sellers, or whether there
were alternative approaches that could
limit any such difficulties; and (2)
whether the requirement that sellers
disclose any materially different
characteristics of prior purchasers that
attained at least the stated level of
earnings adequately covered the
relevant earnings information that
should be disclosed.397
No comments were received in
response to the Commission’s specific
questions, nor were any comments
directed to this provision. The Staff
Report recommended that § 437.4(a) be
adopted in the form proposed in the
RPBOR, but sought additional comment
on §§ 437.4(a)(4)(iv) and (v), which
require any business opportunity seller
that makes an earnings claim to identify
the beginning and ending dates of the
time period when those earnings were
achieved (§ 437.4(a)(4)(iv)) and the
number and percentage of all purchasers
who purchased the opportunity before
the ending date and who achieved those
earnings in that time period
(§ 437.4(a)(4)(v)).398 Section
437.4(a)(4)(v) specifies that in
calculating the number and percentage
of purchasers who attained at least the
represented level of earnings, the
business opportunity seller must
include all purchasers who purchased
the opportunity prior to the ending date
of the time period on which the
representation is based. The Staff Report
solicited comment on whether the
results of such a calculation, which
would include the experience of those
who purchased the business
opportunity toward the end of the stated
time period, present consumers with a
realistic picture of their likely earnings
with the business opportunity. In
addition, the Staff Report sought
comment on whether this calculation
would present prospective purchasers
with information that would be useful
in making an informed purchasing
decision, and questioned whether there
were alternative approaches that might
be more useful.
Only one comment received in
response to the Staff Report addressed
these provisions. Specifically, DOJ
agreed that any substantiation for
earnings must be calculated using the
number of all purchasers of the
opportunity prior to the ending date of
the time period for which the earnings
representation is based, noting that:
In reality, many business opportunities
begin and end in a short period of time,
constantly reinventing themselves to avoid
association with previous failures. Requiring
inclusion of all purchasers who purchased
before the ending date in any statistics in an
earning claims document is necessary to
force the seller to have the document be at
all representative of the business as a whole.
Any wiggle room in this regard will be
exploited to create a document based on nonrepresentative sellers.399
The Commission agrees and the final
Rule includes § 437.4(a)(4) as
recommended in the Staff Report.
392 Id.
393 Section
437.4(a)(4)(vi).
FR at 17073.
395 Section 437.4(a)(4)(vii).
396 See, e.g., 16 CFR 436.1(b)(2); 436.1(c)(2).
397 73 FR at 16133.
394 71
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
398 Section 437.4(b)(3) requires similar
disclosures, calculated in the same way, in
conjunction with any earnings claim made in the
general media.
399 DOJ–Staff
PO 00000
Frm 00034
Report at 2.
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3. Section 437.4(b): Earnings Claims in
the General Media
Section 437.4(b) addresses the making
of earnings claims in the general media,
such as on television, radio, the
Internet, in newspapers, etc.
Specifically, a seller can make an
earnings claim in the general media
provided the seller: (1) Has a reasonable
basis for the claim at the time the claim
is made; (2) has written material that
substantiates the claim at the time the
claim is made; and (3) states in
immediate conjunction with the claim
the beginning and ending date when the
represented earnings were achieved and
the number and percentage of those who
have achieved the represented earnings
in the given time period. These
requirements are necessary to prevent
deceptive and misleading earnings
representations in advertisements, as
well as to enable a prospect to assess the
typicality of any advertised earnings
claim.400
The Commission received no
comments about this provision. Based
on the record as a whole and its
enforcement experience, the
Commission concludes that the
requirements of § 437.4(b) are necessary
to prevent misleading earnings
representations, and the final Rule
includes this provision as recommended
in the Staff Report.
4. Section 437.4(c): Dissemination of
Industry, Financial, Earnings, or
Performance Information
Section 437.4(c) is intended to
address a prevalent practice among
business opportunity sellers—the use of
real or purported industry statistics in
the marketing of business opportunity
ventures. The Commission’s law
enforcement experience reveals that it is
common for vending machine business
opportunity promoters, for example, to
tout what are purported to be industrywide vending sales statistics. A matrix
of potential earnings based upon an
industry-average sliding scale of ‘‘vends
per day’’ is typical.401 The use of such
industry statistics in the promotion of a
business opportunity creates the
impression that the level of sales or
earnings is typical in the industry, and
400 E.g., FTC v. Inspired Ventures, Inc., No. 02–
21760–CIV–Jordan (S.D. Fla. 2002); FTC v.
MegaKing, Inc., No. 00–00513–CIV–Lenard (S.D.
Fla. 2000).
401 E.g., FTC v. Tashman, 318 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir.
2003); FTC v. Nat’l Vending Consultants, Inc., No.
CV–S–05–0160–RCJ–PAL (D. Nev. 2005); FTC v.
Inspired Ventures, Inc., No. 02–21760–CIV–Jordan
(S.D. Fla. 2002); FTC v. Inv. Dev. Inc., No. 89–0642
(E.D. La. 1989).
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
implies that the prospective purchaser
will achieve similar results.402
To prevent deceptive use of such
earnings claims, § 437.4(c), as proposed
in the RNPR, prohibited the use of
industry financial, earnings, or
performance information ‘‘unless the
seller has written substantiation
demonstrating that the information
reflects the typical or ordinary financial,
earnings, or performance experience of
purchasers of the business opportunity
being offered for sale.’’ 403
In response to the RNPR, one
commenter noted that this provision
would prohibit sellers from using
industry statistics in ways that could
assist potential purchasers in making
informed decisions.404 For example,
hypothetically, the performance
experience of prior purchasers of a
business opportunity might contrast
favorably against the industry average
and, if so, that information might help
a prospective purchaser assess the value
of the investment against other
proposed businesses.
The Staff Report noted that there may
be a limited number of situations in
which providing industry statistics may
be beneficial to potential purchasers,
but expressed concern that industry
statistics can be, and have been, used to
imply to potential purchasers that their
likely earnings with the promoted
business opportunity will match the
industry averages.405
The Staff Report recommended a
small change to Section 437.4(c) to state
that it is an unfair or deceptive practice
to ‘‘disseminate industry financial,
earnings, or performance information
unless the seller has written
substantiation demonstrating that such
information reflects, or does not exceed,
the typical or ordinary financial,
earnings, or performance experience of
purchasers of the business opportunity
being offered for sale.’’ The Commission
received no comments on this
provision.
The Commission concludes that the
recommended change is warranted.
Section 437.4(c) of the final Rule thus
includes the staff’s recommended
language. Accordingly, under the final
Rule, a seller can use industry
information only if it is able to measure
the performance of existing purchasers
of that seller’s offered business
opportunity and document that those
existing purchasers’ typical performance
equals or exceeds the average
performance of purchasers of other
FR at 19073.
FR at 16135.
404 Planet Antares-RNPR at 25.
405 Staff Report at 99.
business opportunities available in the
industry. A start-up business
opportunity with no or very limited
prior sales, therefore, probably would
not be able to use industry statistics
because it would lack a sufficient basis
to demonstrate that the industry
statistics reflect the typical or ordinary
experience of the start-up’s prior
purchasers.
5. Section 437.4(d): Material Changes in
Earnings Claim Statement
Section 437.4(d) addresses postdisclosure changes in earnings
information. It prohibits any seller
making an earnings claim from failing to
notify the prospective purchaser, before
the prospect enters into a contract or
pays any consideration, of any material
change that has occurred and that calls
into question the relevance or reliability
of the information contained in its
earnings claim statement. For example,
‘‘[s]uch material changes include the
issuance of a new survey or other facts
that would lead the seller to conclude
that a prior survey is no longer
valid.’’ 406 In crafting § 437.4(d), the
Commission was cognizant of the high
degree of materiality of earnings
information for prospective purchasers,
but attempted to minimize compliance
costs during the time before the
prospective purchaser enters into a
contract or pays any consideration.407 In
the RNPR, the Commission explained
that ‘‘[t]he proposal would not require a
seller, for example, to prepare a revised
earnings claim statement immediately,
but would simply require written
notification of the change.’’ 408 No
comments in response to the RNPR or
the Staff Report were directed at this
provision. The Commission finds that
§ 437.4(d) strikes the right balance
between accurate disclosure to prevent
deception and the compliance costs that
would result from a more frequent than
quarterly updating requirement of the
full earnings claim document. The final
Rule includes this provision as
recommended in the Staff Report.
E. Section 437.5: Sales Conducted in
Spanish or Other Languages Besides
English
On its own initiative, the staff
recommended in the Staff Report adding
a provision that would require sellers to
provide the disclosure document and
the disclosures required by the Rule to
potential purchasers in the same
language that the seller uses to market
the business opportunity. This
402 71
403 73
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
406 Id.
at 100.
407 Id.
408 71
Jkt 226001
PO 00000
FR at 19073.
Frm 00035
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76849
recommendation was based, in part, on
a long-standing Commission
enforcement policy, which advises that
where a Commission order, rule, or
guide requires the clear and
conspicuous disclosure of certain
information in an advertisement or sales
material appearing in a non-English
language publication, the disclosures
should be made in the predominant
language of the publication in which the
advertisement or sales material
appears.409 This policy is the result of
the Commission’s recognition that ‘‘with
increasing intensity, advertisers are
making special efforts to reach foreign
language-speaking consumers.’’ 410
Under the policy, failure to provide the
required disclosures either in the
predominant language of the
publication or of the target audience
could result in a civil penalty or other
law enforcement proceeding for
violating the terms of any applicable
Commission order or rule.411
The staff’s recommendation to
address foreign-language sales also is
based on its belief that when a business
opportunity seller purposefully reaches
out to a particular population by
marketing in the foreign language
spoken by members of that community,
all of the disclosures required by the
Rule should be accessible and
comprehensible to each of those
potential purchasers.412 Accordingly,
the Staff Report recommended that
business opportunity sellers be required
to provide the disclosure document to
potential purchasers in the language the
seller uses to conduct the offer for sale,
sale, or promotion of the business
opportunity.
The Staff Report sought public
comment about whether this
requirement adequately promotes the
Commission’s goal of ensuring that
potential purchasers be provided with
information necessary to make an
informed purchasing decision. It also
solicited comment on what alternatives,
if any, the Commission should consider,
and the costs and benefits of each
alternative.
In response to the Staff Report, the
Commission received one comment
addressing the disclosure requirements
for foreign-language sales. Specifically,
DOJ agreed with the staff’s
409 FTC Enforcement Policy Statement
Concerning Clear and Conspicuous Disclosures in
Foreign Language Advertising and Sales Materials,
16 CFR 14.9(a). In the case of any other
advertisement or sales material, the Commission
policy states that the disclosures should appear in
the language of the target audience.
410 Id.
411 Id.
412 Staff Report at 101.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
76850
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
recommendation that the required
disclosures should be made in the same
language as the sale, noting that the
disclosures should be ‘‘as
comprehensible to would-be buyers as
is the [seller’s] sales pitch.’’ 413
After consideration of the record, the
Commission’s long-standing policy, and
the rationale behind the staff’s
recommendation, the Commission
agrees that an English disclosure
document for business opportunities
marketed in Spanish and other foreign
languages may have little utility for the
targeted prospects. Accordingly, the
final Rule contains disclosure
requirements for sales conducted in
Spanish or other languages besides
English.
Because the Commission’s law
enforcement history demonstrates that
fraudulent business opportunities have
specifically targeted Spanish-speaking
communities,414 the Staff Report
recommended that the Rule contain a
Spanish translation of the basic
disclosure document as Appendix B. In
the Staff Report, the staff solicited
comment on whether the Spanish
translation of the disclosure document
was adequate to convey to Spanishspeaking potential purchasers the
meaning of the required disclosures, or
whether different word choices would
make the disclosures more meaningful.
No comments addressed these issues.
Based on its law enforcement
experience with business opportunity
sellers specifically targeting Spanishspeaking consumers, the Commission
agrees that a Spanish translation of the
disclosure document is appropriate.
Accordingly, a Spanish version of the
disclosure document is included as
Appendix B to the final Rule.
Although business opportunities may
be marketed in dozens of languages
besides English and Spanish, the
Commission’s law enforcement
experience does not suggest that there
are other particular languages in which
business opportunity sales are
conducted. Moreover, the record is
silent as to whether translations into
other languages are necessary.
Therefore, the Commission has
determined not to provide translations
of the disclosure document into other
languages. Under § 437.5(b), should a
business opportunity seller use a
language other than English or Spanish,
the seller would be responsible for
413 DOJ-Staff
Report at 2.
supra note 99 and accompanying text. DOJ
also commented that in its experience, business
opportunities have been pitched to the Spanish
community. See DOJ-Staff Report at 2.
414 See
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
obtaining an accurate translation of the
disclosure document.
The Commission adopts the language
proposed in the Staff Report, with one
slight modification. Namely, § 437.5 of
the final Rule makes clear that all
earnings disclosures required by
§ 437.4—rather than those identified
only in § 437.4(a)—must be made in the
language in which the business
opportunity sales are conducted.
Section 437.5 of the final Rule, entitled
‘‘Sales conducted in Spanish and other
languages besides English’’ requires:
(a) If the seller conducts the offer for
sale, sale, or promotion of a business
opportunity in Spanish, the seller must
provide the disclosure document
required by § 437.3(a) in the form and
language set forth in Appendix B to this
part, and the disclosures required by
§§ 437.3(a) and 437.4 must be made in
Spanish; and
(b) If the seller conducts the offer for
sale, sale, or promotion of a business
opportunity in a language other than
English or Spanish, the seller must
provide the disclosure document
required by § 437.3(a) using the form
and an accurate translation of the
language set forth in Appendix A to this
part, and the disclosures required by
§§ 437.3(a) and 437.4 must be made in
that language.
Section 437.3(a) has been revised to
conform with this requirement.415
F. Section 437.6: Other Prohibited
Practices
Section 437.6 of the final Rule
prohibits sellers from engaging in a
number of deceptive practices, whether
directly or through a third party, that are
common in the sale of fraudulent
business opportunity ventures.
Violation of any provision of this
section would be a violation of the Rule
and an unfair or deceptive act or
practice in violation of Section 5 of the
FTC Act. Each of these prohibitions is
discussed below.
1. Section 437.6(a): Disclaiming Any
Required Disclosure
Section 437.6(a) prohibits a business
opportunity seller from disclaiming, or
415 Section 437.3 of the final Rule makes it an
unfair or deceptive act or practice for any seller to
fail to disclose to a prospective purchaser material
information required by §§ 437.3 and 437.4 in a
single written document in the form and using the
language set forth in Appendix A to the Rule; or if
the offer for sale, sale, or promotion of a business
opportunity is conducted in Spanish, in the form
and using the language set forth in Appendix B to
the Rule; or if the offer for sale, sale, or promotion
of a business opportunity is conducted in a
language other than English or Spanish, using the
form and an accurate translation of the language set
forth in Appendix A to the Rule.
PO 00000
Frm 00036
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
requiring ‘‘a prospective purchaser to
waive reliance on, any statement made
in any document or attachment that is
required or permitted to be disclosed
under this Rule.’’ 416 The purpose of this
provision is to preserve the reliability
and integrity of pre-sale disclosures.
Otherwise, the Rule’s very purpose
would be undermined by signaling to
prospects that they cannot trust or rely
on the Rule’s mandated disclosures.417
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report were
directed to this provision, and the final
Rule includes § 437.6(a) as
recommended in the Staff Report.
2. Section 437.6(b): Making Inconsistent
or Contradictory Claims
Section 437.6(b) prohibits sellers from
making any representation, whether
orally, visually, or in writing, that is
inconsistent with or that contradicts any
statement made in the basic disclosure
document or in any earnings claim
disclosures required by the Rule.418
Without this prohibition, a seller, for
example, would be free to show a
prospect a graph with earnings
information, even though the seller’s
disclosure document states that it does
not make an earnings claim.419 The
Commission’s law enforcement
experience shows that this is a prevalent
problem.420 This provision, like the
anti-disclaimer provision, is necessary
to preserve the reliability and integrity
of the required disclosures.
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report were
directed to this provision, and the final
Rule includes § 437.6(b) as
recommended in the Staff Report.
3. Section 437.6(c): Including
Extraneous Materials in Disclosure
Document
Section 437.6(c) prohibits the
inclusion of any additional information
in the disclosure document that is not
explicitly required or permitted by the
Rule. This prohibition is intended to
preserve the clarity, coherence,
readability, and utility of the disclosures
by ensuring that the seller does not
416 This provision is parallel to the antidisclaimer prohibition in the Amended Franchise
Rule. See 16 CFR 436.9(h).
417 71 FR at 19073.
418 This provision is similar to the Amended
Franchise Rule’s prohibition against making
statements that contradict any required disclosure.
See 16 CFR 436.9(a).
419 71 FR at 19074.
420 E.g., FTC v. Am. Entm’t Distribs., Inc., No. 04–
22431–CIV–Martinez (S.D. Fla. 2004); FTC v.
Inspired Ventures, Inc., No. 02–21760–CIV–Jordan
(S.D. Fla. 2002); FTC v. Mortgage Serv. Assocs., Inc.,
No. 395–CV–1362 (AVC) (D. Conn. 1995); FTC v.
Tower Cleaning Sys., Inc., No. 965844 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
clutter the disclosure document with
extraneous materials that may
overwhelm purchasers, distracting them
from the required disclosures.421 To
facilitate a prospective purchaser’s
ability to maneuver through an
electronic version of the disclosure
document, this provision expressly
permits the use of common navigational
tools, such as scroll bars and internal
links that facilitate review of an
electronic document. The provision
prohibits, however, other electronic
features—such as audio, video,
animation, or pop-up screens—that may
distract attention from the core
disclosures.422
The prohibition on including
extraneous materials extends to
information required or permitted by
state law. One important goal of revising
and tailoring the disclosure
requirements for business opportunity
sellers is to simplify and streamline the
disclosures into a single-page document.
Accordingly, the Commission has
concluded that allowing business
opportunity sellers to mix federal and
state disclosures into one document
would be an invitation to sellers to
present lengthy and confusing
information to prospective
purchasers.423 Such a result would be
contrary to the Commission’s goal of
providing a simple, clear, and concise
disclosure document. State laws offering
equal or greater protections are not
preempted by the final Rule. The final
Rule only prohibits any sellers from
providing any disclosures required
under state law together with the
disclosures required under the final
Rule. No comments received in
response to the RNPR or the Staff Report
were directed to this provision, and the
final Rule includes § 437.6(c) as
recommended in the Staff Report.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
4. Section 437.6(d): Making False
Earnings Claims
As previously noted, the making of
deceptive earnings claims is the most
prevalent problem in the offer and sale
of business opportunities. Accordingly,
§ 437.6(d) prohibits sellers from
misrepresenting the amount of sales, or
gross or net income or profits a
prospective purchaser may earn or that
421 Indeed, in response to the INPR, DOJ urged the
Commission to exclude state disclosures from the
proposed form. In DOJ’s experience, ‘‘[p]urveyors of
fraudulent business opportunities will seek every
opportunity to water down this document with
extraneous information to hide any negative
information it may contain.’’ 73 FR at 16128. The
Commission’s experience supports DOJ’s
conclusions.
422 This is the same approach used in the
Amended Franchise Rule. See 16 CFR 436.6(d).
423 See 73 FR at 16128.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
prior purchasers have earned. This
prohibition complements the final
Rule’s earnings substantiation
requirements in § 437.4. Thus, both
unsubstantiated and false earnings
claims are prohibited by the Rule.
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report addressed
this provision, and the final Rule
includes § 437.6(d) as recommended in
the Staff Report.
5. Section 437.6(e): Misrepresentations
Regarding the Law as to Earnings Claims
and the Identity of Other Business
Opportunity Purchasers
Section 437.6(e) prohibits sellers from
stating that any law or regulation
prohibits seller from furnishing earnings
information. This provision is intended
to address a recurring problem
identified in the rulemaking record—
that sellers often misrepresent that
federal law or the FTC prohibits the
making of earnings claims.424 In effect,
prohibiting these types of
misrepresentations ensures that
prospective purchasers are not misled
into believing that earnings information
is unavailable to them as a matter of
law.425 In addition, the RPBOR added a
second proposed prohibition to
§ 437.6(e) that would prevent sellers
from misrepresenting that any law or
regulation prohibits a seller from
disclosing to prospective purchasers the
identity of other purchasers of the
business opportunity. The Commission
proposed this change in response to a
request from DOJ, which noted that in
its experience, fraudulent business
opportunity sellers frequently deflect
potential purchasers’ requests for the
contact information of current
distributors by falsely claiming that the
law forbids disclosing those
identities.426 The Commission is
convinced that the prohibition is
appropriate because it will help
424 In the Amended Franchise Rule, the
Commission addressed this problem in the context
of sales of business format franchises through a new
requirement that franchise sellers include a specific
preamble in the financial performance section of
their disclosures. Among other things, the preamble
makes clear that franchisors can make financial
performance information available, assuming they
have a reasonable basis for their claims. See 16 CFR
436.5(s)(1). Although the same problem exists in the
sale of business opportunities, the Commission, in
an effort to streamline the business opportunity
disclosure document and reduce compliance costs,
proposed this different approach for the Business
Opportunity Rule, believing it sufficient to address
deceptive business opportunity sales. The
Commission noted that ‘‘whereas the Franchise
Rule seeks to encourage franchisors to make
earnings claims, no such encouragement is needed
in the business opportunity field, where such
claims are all too common.’’ 71 FR at 19075 n.211.
425 71 FR at 19075.
426 73 FR at 16127.
PO 00000
Frm 00037
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76851
consumers understand that if the seller
supplies no references, it is because
none exist, or because the seller chooses
not to make such information available
in contravention of the Rule.427
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report addressed
this provision, and the final Rule
contains § 437.6(e) as recommended in
the Staff Report.
6. Section 437.6(f): Failing To Provide
Written Substantiation for Earnings
Claims
Section 437.6(f) prohibits a seller who
makes an earnings claim from failing to
provide written substantiation to
prospective purchasers, and to the
Commission, upon request.428 Rather
than mandating that business
opportunity sellers routinely include
documentation for earnings claims—
which could be voluminous—in the
earnings claim statement itself, the final
Rule’s requirement is intended to
reduce compliance costs by requiring
only that such materials be provided
when requested. Purchasers could then
review the documentation if they so
choose. Therefore, although
substantiation for earnings claims must
exist, in writing, at the time any such
claims are made, that substantiation
need be provided to potential
purchasers (or to the Commission) only
upon request.
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report addressed
this provision, and the final Rule
contains § 437.6(f) as recommended in
the Staff Report.
7. Section 437.6(g): Misrepresenting
Commissions or Other Payments From
the Seller
Section 437.6(g) prohibits sellers from
misrepresenting how or when
commissions, bonuses, incentives,
premiums, or other payments from the
seller to the purchaser will be calculated
or distributed. The Commission’s law
enforcement experience shows that
these kinds of misrepresentations
underlie deceptive work-at-home
opportunities, where prospective
purchasers rely on the seller as the
source of income, or where the seller
manages the system’s cash flow.429 The
427 Id.
428 The Amended Franchise Rule and the interim
Business Opportunity Rule have similar
requirements. See 16 CFR 436.5(r)(3)(v); 437.1(b)(2);
and 437.1(c)(2).
429 E.g., FTC v. Indep. Mktg. Exch., Inc., No. 10–
CV–00568–NLH–KMW (D.N.J. 2010); FTC v.
Preferred Platinum Servs. Network, Inc., No.10–CV–
00538–MLC–LHG (D.N.J. 2010); FTC v. Sun Ray
Traders, Inc., No. 05–20402–CIV-Seitz/Bandstra
(S.D. Fla. 2005); FTC v. Castle Publ’g, No. A03CA
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
Continued
08DER2
76852
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Commission concluded that absent this
prohibition, the Rule would not address
false promises about the compensation
sellers will provide post-sale.430
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report addressed
this provision, and the final Rule
contains § 437.6(g) as recommended in
the Staff Report.
8. Section 437.6(h): Misrepresenting
Costs, Performance, Efficacy or Material
Characteristics of Business Opportunity
A common complaint of victims of
business opportunity fraud arises from
misrepresentations about the costs or
the performance, efficacy, nature, or
central characteristics of a business
opportunity offered to a prospective
purchaser, or the goods or services
needed to operate the business
opportunity. For example, a seller may
misrepresent the total costs involved in
purchasing or operating a business
opportunity.431 In other instances, a
seller may misrepresent the quality of
goods offered by the business
opportunity seller, either for use in
operating the business (e.g., vending
machines) or for ultimate resale to
consumers (e.g., novelty items).432
Section 437.6(h) makes such deception
actionable as a violation of the final
Rule.
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report addressed
this provision, and the final Rule
contains § 437.6(h) as recommended in
the Staff Report.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
9. Section 437.6(i): Misrepresenting
Post-Sale Assistance
Section 437.6(i) prohibits business
opportunity sellers from
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
10. Section 437.6(j): Misrepresenting
Locations, Outlets, Accounts, or
Customers
Section 437.6(j) prohibits sellers from
misrepresenting ‘‘the likelihood that a
seller, locator, or lead generator will
find locations, outlets, accounts, or
customers for the purchaser.’’
Fraudulent business opportunity sellers
often promise that the seller or some
other third party will find locations or
outlets for purchasers’ equipment, or
accounts or customers for the
purchasers’ services.437 Such
representations include claims that a
particular locator is successful in
433 71
FR at 19075 n.216.
Commission has recognized that promises
of assistance made to induce prospects to purchase
a franchise are material, especially to those
prospects with ‘‘little or no experience at running
a business.’’ 43 FR at 59676–77; see, e.g., FTC v.
Am. Entm’t Distribs., Inc., No. 04–22431–CIV–
Martinez (S.D. Fla. 2004); FTC v. USS Elder Enter.,
Inc., No. SA CV–04–1039 AHS (ANx) (C.D. Cal.
2004); FTC v. Kitco of Nev., 612 F. Supp. 1282 (D.
Minn. 1985); FTC v. Leading Edge Processing, Inc.,
No. 6:02–CV–681–ORL–19 DAB (M.D. Fla. 2003);
FTC v. Darrell Richmond, No. 3:02–3972–22 (D.S.C.
2003); FTC v. Elec. Med. Billing, Inc., No. SA02–368
AHS (ANX) (C.D. Cal. 2003); FTC v. Transworld
Enters., Inc., No. 00 8126–CIV–Graham (S.D. Fla.
2000); FTC v. Advanced Pub. Commc’ns Corp., No.
00–00515–CIV–Ungaro-Benages (S.D. Fla. 2000);
FTC v. Hi Tech Mint Sys., Inc., No. 98 CIV 5881
(JES) (S.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. QX Int’l, Inc.,
No. 398–CV–0453–D (N.D. Tex. 1998).
435 71 FR at 19075 n.218.
436 71 FR at 19075.
437 E.g., FTC v. Am. Entm’t Distribs., Inc., No. 04–
22431–CIV–Martinez (S.D. Fla. 2004); FTC v. Int’l
Trader, No. CV–02–02701 AHM (JTLx) (C.D. Cal.
2002); FTC v. Elec. Processing Servs., Inc., No. CV–
S–02–0500–L.H.–R.S. (D. Nev. 2002); FTC v. Home
Professions, Inc., No. SACV 00–111 AHS (Eex) (C.D.
Cal. 2001); FTC v. Encore Networking Servs., No.
00–1083 WJR (AIJx) (C.D. Cal. 2000); FTC v. AMP
Publ’n, Inc., No. SACV–00–112–AHS–ANx (C.D.
Cal. 2001); FTC v. Infinity Multimedia, Inc., No. 96–
6671–CIV–Gonzalez (S.D. Fla. 1996).
434 The
905 SS (W.D. Tex. 2003); FTC v. Trek Alliance, Inc.,
No. 02–9270 SJL (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. 2002); FTC v.
Terrance Maurice Howard, No. SA02CA0344 (W.D.
Tex. 2002); FTC v. Am.’s Shopping Network, Inc.,
No. 02–80540–CIV-Hurley (S.D. Fla. 2002).
430 71 FR at 19075.
431 E.g., FTC v. World Traders Ass’n, Inc., No.
CV05 0591 AHM (CTx) (C.D. Cal. 2005); FTC v.
Castle Publ’g, No. A03CA 905 SS (W.D. Tex. 2003);
FTC v. End70 Corp., No. 3 03CV–0940N (N.D. Tex.
2003); FTC v. Darrell Richmond, No. 3:02–3972–22
(D.S.C. 2003); FTC v. Carousel of Toys USA, Inc.,
No. 97–8587 CIV–Ungaro-Benages (S.D. Fla. 1997);
FTC v. Parade of Toys, Inc., No. 97–2367–GTV (D.
Kan. 1997); FTC v. Telecomm. of Am., Inc., No. 95–
693–CIV–ORL–22 (M.D. Fla. 1995). Pre-sale
disclosure of cost information is a remedial
approach taken in many Commission trade
regulation rules. E.g., 900 Number Rule, 16 CFR
308.3(b); TSR, 16 CFR 310.3; Funeral Rule, 16 CFR
453.2.
432 E.g., FTC v. Kitco of Nev., 612 F. Supp. 1282
(D. Minn. 1985); FTC v. Associated Record Distribs.,
Inc., No. 02–21754–CIV–Graham/Garber (S.D. Fla.
2002); FTC v. Home Professions, Inc., No. 00–111
(C.D. Cal. 2000); FTC v. Worldwide Mktg. & Distrib.
Co., No. 95–8422–CIV–Roettger (S.D. Fla. 1995); see
also FTC v. Med. Billers Network, No. 05 CV 2014
(RJH) (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
misrepresenting any material aspect of
assistance it represents it will provide to
purchasers.433 The Commission’s
enforcement experience shows that
misrepresentation of post-sale assistance
offered to a prospective purchaser is an
element common to many business
opportunity frauds targeted in
Commission cases.434 Also, consumer
complaints about misrepresentations
concerning the type and amount of
assistance promised but not received are
among the top categories of reported
deceptive business opportunity
practices.435 The Commission has
concluded that the best way to address
this deceptive practice is through a
direct prohibition.436
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report addressed
this provision, and the final Rule
contains § 437.6(i) as recommended in
the Staff Report.
PO 00000
Frm 00038
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
finding locations, as well as
representations that the seller or other
third party has already found and
entered into contracts with location
owners or customers.438 The
Commission has found that these types
of representations are material to a
prospective purchaser, because they
foster the expectation that a profitable
market exists for the goods or services
the purchaser will sell.439
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report addressed
this provision, and the final Rule
contains § 437.6(j) as recommended in
the Staff Report.
11. Section 437.6(k): Misrepresenting
Cancellation or Refund Policy
Section 437.6(k) prohibits a seller
from misrepresenting, directly or
through a third party, the terms and
conditions of any cancellation or refund
policy. This prohibition does not
compel any seller to offer a cancellation
or a refund, nor does it dictate the terms
and conditions under which a seller
may offer such relief. Rather, it simply
ensures that any cancellation or refund
offer a seller makes before the sale is
truthful and accurate. The
Commission’s law enforcement
experience demonstrates that, in many
instances, business opportunity sellers
falsely claim that they permit a
purchaser to cancel the purchase,
guarantee a 100% refund, or promise to
buy back some or all of the products
sold to a purchaser.440 These
representations have lured prospective
purchasers into believing that the
investment is either low-risk or even
risk-free.441
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report were
directed to this provision, and the final
Rule contains § 437.6(k) as
recommended in the Staff Report.
12. Section 437.6(l): Failing To Provide
a Refund or Cancellation
Section 437.6(l) prohibits a seller from
failing to cancel a purchase or make a
refund when the purchaser has qualified
for such relief under the seller’s
438 E.g., FTC v. Hart Mktg. Enters. Ltd., No. 98–
222–CIV–T–23 E (M.D. Fla. 1998); FTC v. Vendors
Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 98–1832 (D. Colo. 1998); FTC
v. Hi Tech Mint Sys., Inc., No. 98 CIV 5881
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); FTC v. Infinity Multimedia, Inc.,
No. 96–6671–CIV–Gonzalez (S.D. Fla. 1996).
439 71 FR at 19076.
440 E.g., FTC v. Med. Billers Network, No. 05 CV
2014 (RJH) (S.D.N.Y. 2005); FTC v. Castle Publ’g,
No. A03CA 905 SS (W.D. Tex. 2003); FTC v. Am.’s
Shopping Network, Inc., No. 02–80540–CIV–Hurley
(S.D. Fla. 2002); FTC v. Home Professions, Inc., No.
SACV 00–111 AHS (Eex) (C.D. Cal. 2001); FTC v.
Encore Networking Servs., No. 00–1083 WJR (AIJx)
(C.D. Cal. 2000).
441 71 FR at 19076.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
cancellation or refund policy.442 As
noted above, § 437.6(k) prohibits a seller
from misrepresenting, pre-sale, the
seller’s cancellation or refund policy.
Section 437.6(l) complements that
section and is intended to address
sellers’ post-sale conduct, prohibiting
the seller from failing to honor
cancellation or refund requests when
purchasers have satisfied all the terms
and conditions disclosed in the seller’s
disclosure document for obtaining such
relief.443 In the Commission’s
experience, the failure of business
opportunity sellers to make promised
refunds or to honor cancellation policies
ranks high among issues raised by
business opportunity purchasers.444
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report were
directed to this provision, and the final
Rule contains § 437.6(l) as
recommended in the Staff Report.
13. Section 437.6(m): Misrepresenting
Business Opportunity as an
Employment Opportunity
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Section 437.6(m) prohibits business
opportunity sellers from
misrepresenting a business opportunity
as an employment opportunity. The
Commission’s law enforcement
experience demonstrates that some
business opportunity sellers lure
unsuspecting consumers by falsely
representing that they are offering
employment when, in fact, they are
offering vending, work-at-home, or other
business opportunities. For example, in
some instances consumers have
responded to advertisements seeking
sales executives, only to discover that
the ‘‘position’’ requires them to
purchase equipment or products from
the seller and, in turn, to sell those
products.445 The Commission concludes
that this prohibition is necessary to
protect consumers against false
representations of employment
opportunities.
442 This is consistent with the interim Business
Opportunity Rule approach. See 16 CFR 437.1(h).
443 E.g., FTC v. AMP Publ’ns, Inc., No. SACV–00–
112–AHS–ANx (C.D. Cal. 2001) (failure to honor 90day money back guarantee); FTC v. Star Publ’g
Group, Inc., No. 00–023 (D. Wyo. 2000) (failure to
honor 90-day refund policy).
444 73 FR at 19076.
445 See, e.g., FTC v. Trek Alliance, Inc., No. 02–
9270 SJL (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. 2002) (defendants
placed ads in ‘‘Help Wanted’’ sections of newspaper
offering salaried position); FTC v. Leading Edge
Processing, Inc., No. 6:02–CV–681–ORL–19 DAB
(M.D. Fla. 2003) (defendants sent emails to job
seekers who posted their resumes on job Web sites,
falsely representing the availability of jobs and
guaranteeing a steady stream of work); FTC v. David
Martinelli, Jr., No. 3:99 CV 1272 (D. Conn. 2000)
(defendants sent unsolicited emails falsely offering
a $13.50 per hour position processing applications
for credit, loans, or employment).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report were
directed to this provision, and the final
Rule contains § 437.6(m) as
recommended in the Staff Report.
14. Section 437.6(n): Misrepresenting
the Exclusivity of Territories
Section 437.6(n) prohibits
misrepresentations about the terms of
any territorial exclusivity or limited
territorial protection offered to a
prospective purchaser.446 In the
Commission’s experience, false or
misleading promises about territories
are a common deceptive practice
reported by business opportunity
purchasers.447 The Commission has
stated that representations about
territorial exclusivity or more limited
territorial protections are material
because they often induce a prospective
purchaser into believing that he or she
will not be competing for customers
with the seller or other purchasers,
thereby increasing the purchaser’s
likelihood of success.448
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report were
directed to this provision, and the final
Rule contains § 437.6(n) as
recommended in the Staff Report.
15. Section 437.6(o): Assigning a
Purported Exclusive Territory to
Another Purchaser
Section 437.6(o) prohibits a seller
from assigning a single ‘‘exclusive’’
territory to more than one purchaser.
This prohibition complements
§ 437.6(n), which prohibit sellers from
misrepresenting territories. It is
intended to address sellers’ post-sale
conduct, and prohibits the seller from
failing to honor its promises regarding
exclusive or protected territories.
Consumer complaints indicate, and the
Commission’s law enforcement
experience confirms, that fraudulent
business opportunity sellers often sell
the same purportedly exclusive territory
to several unsuspecting purchasers.449
In these circumstances, purchasers who
have been lured to invest in an
opportunity on the basis of promises of
446 71
FR at 19076. In some instances, a business
opportunity seller may offer a prospect an exclusive
territory, in which no other person has the right to
compete within the territory. In other instances, a
seller may offer a more limited protection. For
example, the seller may prohibit other purchasers
from operating in the territory, but reserve to itself
the ability to conduct telemarking or Internet sales
in the territory. Regardless of the scope of the
territorial protection, § 437.6(n) prohibits business
opportunity sellers from misrepresenting the nature
of the territory.
447 Id. at 19065.
448 Id. at 19075.
449 E.g., FTC v. Am. Safe Mktg., No. 1:89–CV–
462–RLV (N.D. Ga. 1989).
PO 00000
Frm 00039
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76853
an exclusive territorial lock on their
market find that their chances of success
are materially reduced by competition
from the other purchasers.
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report were
directed to this provision, and the final
Rule contains § 437.6(o) as
recommended in the Staff Report.
16. Section 437.6(p): Misrepresenting
Third Party Endorsements or Other
Affiliation
Section 437.6(p) prohibits business
opportunity sellers from
misrepresenting that ‘‘any person,
trademark or service mark holder, or
governmental entity, directly or
indirectly benefits from, sponsors,
participates in, endorses, approves,
authorizes, or is otherwise associated
with the sale of the business
opportunity or the goods or services
sold through the business
opportunity.’’ 450 The Commission’s
enforcement experience indicates that
business opportunity frauds often lure
consumers by misrepresenting that their
opportunities have been approved or
endorsed by a government agency or
well-known third party.451 In other
instances, business opportunity sellers
falsely claim that their opportunities are
sponsored by or associated with a
charity, or that a charity will benefit
from a percentage of sales.452 The
Commission has concluded that such
claims are material to a purchaser
because an alleged endorsement or
shared-profit arrangement may create
the impression that the opportunity is
legitimate or that the affiliation will
enhance sales and profits.453
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report were
directed to this provision, and the final
Rule contains § 437.6(p) as
recommended in the Staff Report.
17. Section 437.6(q): Misrepresenting
References (the Use of ‘‘Shills’’)
Section 437.6(q) addresses one of the
most pernicious practices common in
fraudulent business opportunity sales—
450 Cf. TSR, 16 CFR 310.3(a)(vii) (prohibiting
misrepresentations concerning ‘‘affiliation with, or
endorsement or sponsorship by, any person or
government entity’’).
451 E.g., FTC v. Streamline Int’l, No. 01–6885–
CIV–Ferguson (S.D. Fla. 2001) (misrepresented FDA
approval); FTC v. Star Publ’g Group, Inc., No. 00–
023 (D. Wyo. 2000) (misrepresented HUD approval);
FTC v. Bus. Opportunity Ctr., Inc., No. 95 8429–
CIV–Zloch (S.D. Fla. 1995) (misrepresented FDA
approval); see also FTC v. Hawthorne Commc’ns,
No. 93–7002 AAH (JGX) (C.D. Cal. 1993) (order
restricting use of testimonials and endorsements in
the sale of business opportunities).
452 E.g., FTC v. Global Assistance Network for
Charities, No. 96–2494 PHX RCB (D. Ariz. 1996).
453 71 FR at 19077.
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
76854
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
the use of ‘‘shill’’ references to lure
unsuspecting consumers to invest in a
business opportunity.454 The
Commission has brought many actions
against business opportunity sellers
who provided prospects with the names
of individuals they falsely claimed were
independent prior purchasers or
independent third parties, but who, in
fact, were paid by the seller to give
favorable false reports confirming the
seller’s claims, especially their earnings
claims.455 The use of paid shills to give
false reports induces prospective
purchasers into believing that the
opportunity is a safe and lucrative
investment.
To address this deceptive practice,
§ 437.6(q) contains two related
prohibitions. First, it prohibits any
seller from misrepresenting that any
person ‘‘has purchased a business
opportunity from the seller.’’ This
prevents a seller, for example, from
claiming that a company employee,
locator, or other third party is a prior
purchaser of the opportunity, when that
is not the case. Second, the provision
prohibits a seller from misrepresenting
that any person—such as a locator,
broker, or organization that purports to
be an independent trade association—
‘‘can provide an independent or reliable
report about the business opportunity or
the experiences of any current or former
purchaser.’’ Providing a prospect with a
list of brokers who are paid to give
favorable reports, for example, would
violate this provision because any
statement a person on such a list makes
would not be independent and
reliable.456
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report were
directed to this provision, and the final
Rule contains § 437.6(q) as
recommended in the Staff Report.
Section 437.6(r) prohibits a seller from
failing to disclose payments to
individuals identified as references, as
well as any personal relationships the
seller has with such individuals. Such
prohibitions are necessary because an
individual with a personal relationship
with the seller, or who has been paid for
his or her assessment of an opportunity,
is likely to be biased, and any story of
success or high earnings from any such
person is suspect.457 The final Rule
clarifies that the term ‘‘consideration’’ is
to be interpreted broadly to include not
only direct cash payments, but indirect
financial benefits, such as forgiveness of
debt, as well as other tangible benefits
such as equipment, services, and
discounts.458
The RPBOR modified slightly the
language of this provision to make clear
that the information that must be
disclosed to a potential purchaser is not
only the payment of any consideration
to the reference by the seller, but also
the existence of any relationship
between the seller and the reference.459
Therefore, the RPBOR added clarifying
language to the opening clause of
§ 437.6(r) so that it prohibits a failure to
disclose any consideration paid, any
personal relationship, or other past or
current business relationship other than
as the purchaser of the business
opportunity being offered.
No comments, either in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report, addressed
this provision. Because the Commission
finds that the small clarification to
§ 437.6(r) more accurately identifies the
information that must be disclosed to a
potential purchaser, the Commission
adopts § 437.6(r) in the final Rule in the
form recommended in the Staff Report.
18. Section 437.6(r): Failing To Disclose
Consideration Paid to or Prior
Relationship With Prior Purchaser
Section 437.6(r) is intended to
complement the prohibition in
§ 437.6(q) regarding the use of ‘‘shills.’’
Section 437.7 establishes the minimal
record retention requirements necessary
to document compliance and permit
effective Rule enforcement. This section
applies to both the business opportunity
seller and its principals, to ensure that
records required by the Rule are not
destroyed if the seller goes out of
business or otherwise ceases
operations.460 As detailed below, sellers
and their principals must keep, and
make available to the Commission, the
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
454 See
id. at n.236 (‘‘After earnings claims, false
testimonials and shill references are the most
common Section 5 allegations in Commission
business opportunities cases.’’)
455 E.g., FTC v. Am. Entm’t Distribs., Inc., No. 04–
22431–CIV–Martinez (S.D. Fla. 2004); United States
v. Vaughn, No. 01–20077–01–KHV (D. Kan. 2001);
FTC v. Hart Mktg. Enters. Ltd., No. 98–222–CIV–T–
23 E (M.D. Fla. 1998); FTC v. Inetintl.com, No. 98–
2140 (C.D. Cal. 1998); FTC v. Infinity Multimedia,
Inc., No. 96–6671–CIV–Gonzalez (S.D. Fla. 1996);
FTC v. Allstate Bus. Consultants Group, Inc., No.
95–6634–CIV–Ryskamp (S.D. Fla. 1995).
456 E.g., FTC v. Affiliated Vendors Ass’n, Inc., No.
02–CV–0679–D (N.D. Tex. 2002); FTC v. Raymond
Urso, No. 97–2680–CIV–Ungaro-Benages (S.D. Fla.
1997); see also 71 FR at 19077 n. 238.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
G. Section 437.7: Record Retention
457 Indeed, the Commission has long held that the
failure to disclose compensation paid to an
endorser is a deceptive practice in violation of
Section 5. See 71 FR at 19077; see also Guides
Concerning the Use of Endorsements and
Testimonials in Advertising, 16 CFR 255 (Oct. 15,
2009).
458 71 FR at 19078.
459 73 FR at 16128, 16136.
460 71 FR at 19078.
PO 00000
Frm 00040
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
following five types of records for a
period of three years:
(1) Section 437.7(a): Each materially
different version of all documents
required by the Rule;
(2) Section 437.7(b): Each purchaser’s
disclosure receipt;
(3) Section 437.7(c): Each executed
written contract with a purchaser;
(4) Section 437.7(d): Each oral or
written cancellation or refund request
received from a purchaser; and
(5) Section 437.7(e): All substantiation
upon which the seller relies from the
time an earnings claim is made.
The Commission finds that these
limited recordkeeping requirements
strike the right balance, requiring no
more than necessary for effective law
enforcement, while minimizing
compliance costs.461 Moreover, records
can be retained electronically, helping
to further minimize compliance costs.
No comments received in response to
the RNPR or the Staff Report were
directed to this provision, and the final
Rule contains § 437.7 as recommended
in the Staff Report.
H. Section 437.8: Franchise Exemption
Section 437.8 is designed to eliminate
potential overlap between the final
Rule’s scope of coverage and that of the
Amended Franchise Rule, so that no
business would face duplicative
compliance burdens.462 Accordingly,
§ 437.8 exempts from the final Rule’s
coverage those business opportunities
that: (1) Satisfy the definitional
elements of the term ‘‘franchise’’ under
the Amended Franchise Rule; (2) entail
a written contract between the seller
and the business opportunity buyer; and
(3) require the buyer to make a payment
that meets the Amended Franchise
Rule’s minimum payment requirement.
These criteria were designed to
accomplish two ends: to ensure that
certain categories of businesses ‘‘carved
out’’ from the Amended Franchise Rule
are not inappropriately subjected to
coverage by the Business Opportunity
Rule; 463 and, simultaneously, to obviate
461 Id.
462 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. 57a(g) (authorizing the
Commission to exempt persons or classes from all
or part of rule coverage).
463 For example, businesses exempt from
Amended Franchise Rule coverage pursuant to the
exemption for fractional franchises would not be
subject to coverage by the Business Opportunity
Rule because such businesses would meet the
criteria of § 437.8. This is an appropriate result
because the same rationale underlying exemption of
these types of businesses from the Amended
Franchise Rule would also dictate that they not be
covered by the Business Opportunity Rule—i.e., the
franchisor is not likely to deceive the prospective
franchisee or to subject the prospective franchisee
to significant investment risk. Therefore, imposing
the requirements of either the Amended Franchise
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
any loophole that could be exploited by
certain other types of business
opportunities that are exempt from the
Amended Franchise Rule but that
should be regulated by the Business
Opportunity Rule.
On the other hand, certain businesses
carved out of Amended Franchise Rule
coverage should not escape regulation
by the final Rule—specifically, those
exempt from the Amended Franchise
Rule’s coverage due to the minimum
payment exemption 464 or the oral
agreement exemption.465 The
Commission has concluded that while
these two exemptions are warranted in
the franchise context to ensure that the
significant disclosure costs imposed by
the Amended Franchise Rule are costjustified, they do not apply to the final
Rule, with its significantly lighter
disclosure burden.466
In the RNPR, the Commission
solicited comment on whether the
exemption was overly broad or overly
narrow.467 In response to the RNPR,
some commenters, primarily from the
MLM industry, suggested limitations on
the Rule by granting a safe harbor to
exempt firms that require very low
registration fees; 468 firms that offer
refunds on inventory purchases; 469
firms that are publicly-traded; 470 firms
that have a high net worth; 471 or firms
that are members of a self-regulatory
body, such as the DSA.472 These are not
novel suggestions; each also was made
in response to the INPR.473 In the RNPR,
the Commission concluded that none of
these factors is determinative of whether
a company is, in fact, a pyramid scheme
or otherwise engaged in deceptive
conduct. Furthermore, the Commission
noted that the effort to craft a workable
rule using these criteria could
undermine law enforcement efforts, as it
would, at least in the case of minimum
payment thresholds, provide scam
operators with a means to circumvent
the Rule.474 The Staff Report
recommended that the Commission not
Rule or the Business Opportunity Rule would not
be justified. See 71 FR at 19078.
464 16 CFR 436.2(a)(3)(iii).
465 16 CFR 436.2(a)(3)(iv).
466 71 FR at 19078.
467 73 FR at 16133.
468 See, e.g., Babener–RNPR; Pre-Paid Legal–
RNPR.
469 See, e.g., Pre-Paid Legal–RNPR; Tupperware–
RNPR; IBA–RNPR.
470 Id.
471 See, e.g., IBA–RNPR.
472 See, e.g., DSA–RNPR.
473 73 FR at 16119–20. Moreover, none of the
commenters offered any new rationale for
expanding the proposed categories of exemption
that had not previously been considered by the
Commission.
474 Id. at 16120.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
expand the exemptions beyond those
identified in the RPBOR. The
Commission adopts § 437.8 as
recommended in the Staff Report.
I. Section 437.9: Outstanding Orders;
Preemption
1. Section 437.9(a): Effect on Prior
Commission Orders
Section 437.9(a) addresses the effect
the Rule may have on outstanding
Commission orders. The Commission
recognizes that the final Rule
significantly changes the disclosure
obligations for those sellers who are
now under order in prior Commission
actions. To enable business opportunity
sellers to take advantage of the final
Rule’s reduced disclosure obligations, as
well as to reduce any potential conflicts
between existing orders and the final
Rule, § 437.9(a) permits persons under
order to petition the Commission for
relief consistent with the provisions of
the new Rule. Under the RPBOR,
business opportunities required by FTC
or court order to follow the Franchise
Rule, 16 CFR Part 436, would have been
permitted to petition the Commission to
amend the order so that the business
opportunity could follow the provisions
of the Business Opportunity Rule
instead.475
Although no comments received in
response to the RNPR addressed this
provision, the Staff Report noted that
while the Commission could modify an
FTC administrative order, it would not
have the authority to modify any order
entered by a court.476 In the case of a
court order, the Commission could,
however, stipulate to an amendment of
the order by the court to allow the
business opportunity to follow the
provisions of the Business Opportunity
Rule. The Staff Report recommended,
therefore, that § 437.9(a) be revised to
add the phrase ‘‘or to stipulate to an
amendment of the court order’’ as
follows: ‘‘A business opportunity
required by prior FTC or court order to
follow the Franchise Rule, 16 CFR part
436, may petition the Commission to
amend the order or to stipulate to an
amendment of the court order so that
the business opportunity may follow the
provisions of this part.’’
In addition, the Staff Report noted
that the first sentence of § 437.9(a)
proposed in the RPBOR was
superfluous, and recommended deleting
it. No comments in response to the Staff
Report were directed at this provision.
Upon consideration of the staff’s
recommendation and the rationale for
475 Id.
at 16136 (RPBOR § 437.8(a)).
Report at 127.
476 Staff
PO 00000
Frm 00041
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76855
that recommendation, the Commission
has decided to modify the text of this
provision in the manner recommended
in the Staff Report. As the Commission
has stated previously, all determinations
under this provision regarding the
amendment of orders will be made on
a case-by-case basis.
2. Section 437.9(b): Preemption
Section 437.9(b) adopts a preemption
policy similar to that embodied in the
Amended Franchise Rule.477 It provides
that the Commission does not intend to
preempt state or local business
opportunity laws, except to the extent of
any conflict with the Rule. Further, a
law does not conflict if it affords
prospective purchasers equal or greater
protection, such as a requirement for
registration of disclosure documents or
more extensive disclosures.478
One commenter suggested that the
FTC should preempt conflicting state
business opportunity rules, noting its
belief that ‘‘enforcement of a nationwide
standard by the FTC is preferable to a
patchwork series of laws and
regulations.’’ 479 The Staff Report noted
that the commenter is suggesting that all
state laws and regulations that do not
mirror exactly the Business Opportunity
Rule would be in conflict with the Rule,
and should therefore be preempted. The
Commission has long recognized that
state laws and regulations that afford
equal or greater protections than do FTC
trade regulations are not subject to
preemption,480 and therefore declines to
follow this commenter’s
recommendation.
J. Section 437.10: Severability
Finally, § 437.10 adopts the
severability provision recommended by
the Staff Report with one nonsubstantive change: The Commission
removed the superfluous phrase, ‘‘it is
the Commission’s intention that’’ from
the provision. This provision makes
clear that, if any part of the Rule is held
477 16 CFR 436.10. This approach is consistent
with other Commission trade regulation rules. See,
e.g., Appliance Labeling Rule, 16 CFR 305.17;
Cooling-Off Rule, 16 CFR 429.2; Mail Order Rule,
16 CFR 435.3(b)(2).
478 Although state laws offering equal or greater
protections are not preempted, § 437.6(c) of the
final Rule prohibits providing state and federal
disclosures together in one document.
479 Tupperware–RNPR (5/28/2008). No other
comments were received. At the June 2009
Workshop, however, the panelist from the
Maryland Attorney General’s Office expressed
appreciation that states were not preempted from
requiring that business opportunity sellers provide
information in addition to that required by the
proposed Rule. Cantone, June 2009 Tr at 20.
480 See, e.g., Mail Order Rule, 16 CFR 435.3(b)(2)
(rule does not preempt state or local laws that afford
equal or greater protections).
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
76856
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
invalid by a court, the remainder will
still be in effect.481 No comments
received in response to the RNPR or the
Staff Report were directed to this
provision.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
IV. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Commission is submitting the
final Rule and a Supplemental
Supporting Statement to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for
review under the Paperwork Reduction
Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. 3501–21. The final
Rule amends a trade regulation rule
governing business opportunity sales.
The final Rule covers those business
opportunities currently covered by the
interim Business Opportunity Rule (and
formerly covered by the Original
Franchise Rule, as explained above), as
well as certain others not covered by the
interim Business Opportunity Rule,
such as sellers of work-at-home
programs. The final Rule requires
business opportunity sellers to disclose
specified information and to maintain
certain records relating to business
opportunity sales transactions. The
currently approved estimate for the
disclosure and recordkeeping burden
under the interim Business Opportunity
Rule is 16,750 hours for business
opportunity sellers. That estimate was
based on an estimated 2,500 business
opportunity sellers. As discussed below,
the final Rule reduces the existing
burden on business opportunity sellers
by streamlining disclosure requirements
to minimize compliance costs.
In the RNPR, Commission staff
estimated there were approximately
3,050 business opportunity sellers
covered by the RPBOR. This figure
consisted of an estimated 2,500 vending
machine, rack display, and other
opportunity sellers currently covered by
the interim Business Opportunity Rule,
and an estimated 550 work-at-home
opportunity sellers, which would be
newly covered entities under the final
Rule. Because the final Rule is no
different than the RPBOR regarding the
types of entities to which it applies, and
the Commission received no
information suggesting the need to
update these prior estimates, the
Commission retains them for the final
Rule. Additionally, Commission staff
estimates that approximately 174 of
those sellers market business
opportunities in Spanish and that
approximately 79 of the 3,050 business
481 This provision is comparable to the
severability provision in the Amended Franchise
Rule, 16 CFR 436.11, as well as the severability
provisions in other Commission rules. See, e.g.,
TSR, 16 CFR 310.9.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
opportunity sellers market in languages
other than English or Spanish.482
A. Disclosure Requirements
As discussed below, the final Rule is
designed to streamline and substantially
reduce the quantity of information
business opportunity sellers are
required to disclose under the interim
Business Opportunity Rule. The final
Rule impacts sellers differently,
depending upon whether they are
currently covered by the interim
Business Opportunity Rule and what
language they use to market the
business opportunities.
1. Mandatory Disclosures
For the 2,500 vending machine, rack
display, and other business opportunity
sellers currently covered by the interim
Business Opportunity Rule, the final
Rule substantially reduces the
disclosures from more than 20
categories of information to five—the
seller’s identifying information,
earnings claims, lawsuits, refund and
cancellation policies, and prior
purchasers. This streamlining also will
minimize compliance costs for the 550
business opportunity sellers that will be
newly subject to the Rule. Business
opportunity sellers must disclose
whether or not they make earnings
claims. The decision to make an
earnings claim, however, is optional.
While the disclosures of references and
earnings claims retain, for the most part,
the interim Business Opportunity Rule
requirements, the required disclosure of
lawsuits is reduced from the interim
Business Opportunity Rule.483
The final Rule imposes one additional
requirement that was not present in
either the interim Business Opportunity
Rule or the RPBOR, which was
introduced in the Staff Report. For
business opportunities marketed in
Spanish, § 437.5 of the final Rule
482 To estimate how many of the 3,050 sellers
market business opportunities in languages other
than English, staff relied upon 2009 United States
Census Bureau (‘‘Census’’) data. Calculations based
upon a recent Census survey reveal that
approximately 5.7% of the U.S. population speaks
Spanish or Spanish Creole at home and speak
English less than ‘‘very well.’’ Calculations based
upon that same survey reveal that approximately
2.6% of the U.S. population speaks a language other
than Spanish, Spanish Creole, or English at home
and speak English less than ‘‘very well.’’ Staff
therefore projected that 5.7% of all entities selling
business opportunities market in Spanish or
Spanish Creole and 2.6% of all entities selling
business opportunities market in languages other
than English, Spanish and Spanish Creole. https://
factfinder.census.gov/servlet/STTable?_bm=y&geo_id=01000US&qr_name=ACS_2009_1YR_G00_S1601&ds_name=ACS_2009_1YR_G00_&-_lang=en&redoLog=false.
483 See supra Section III.C.2.
PO 00000
Frm 00042
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
requires that sellers provide potential
purchasers with the Spanish version of
the disclosure document (Appendix B to
the Rule) and provide all other required
disclosures in Spanish. For sales
conducted in a language other than
English or Spanish, the final Rule
requires that sellers make the required
disclosures in the same language as the
sale, using the form and an accurate
translation of the language set forth in
Appendix A, as well as any additional
required disclosures. As discussed in
the Statement of Basis and Purpose, this
translation requirement is supported by
long-standing Commission policy, the
Commission’s law enforcement
experience, the rulemaking record, and
the rationale supporting staff’s
recommendation.
2. Incorporation of Existing Materials
The final Rule reduces collection and
dissemination costs from those imposed
by the interim Business Opportunity
Rule, by permitting sellers to reference
in their disclosure documents materials
already in their possession. For
example, a seller need not repeat its
refund policy in the text of the
disclosure document, but may
incorporate its contract or brochures, or
other materials that already provide the
necessary details.
3. Use of Electronic Dissemination of
Information
The final Rule defines the term
‘‘written’’ to include electronic media.
Accordingly, all business opportunities
covered by the final Rule are permitted
to use the Internet and other electronic
media to furnish disclosure documents.
Allowing this distribution method
should greatly reduce sellers’
compliance costs over the long run,
especially costs associated with printing
and distributing disclosure documents.
As a result of this proposal, the
Commission expects sellers’ compliance
costs will decrease substantially over
time.
4. Use of Computerized Data Collection
Technology
Finally, because of advances in
computerized data collection
technology, the Commission anticipates
that the costs of collecting information
and recordkeeping requirements
imposed by the final Rule will be
minimal. For example, a seller can
easily maintain a spreadsheet of its
purchasers, which can be sorted by
location. This would enable a seller to
easily comply with the reference
disclosure requirement (at least 10 prior
purchasers in the last three years who
are located nearest to the prospective
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
purchaser, or, if there are not 10 prior
purchasers, then all prior purchasers).
In the alternative, the final Rule permits
a seller to maintain a national list of
purchasers.
B. Recordkeeping Requirements
Section 437.7 of the final Rule
prescribes recordkeeping requirements
necessary for effective enforcement of
the Rule. Specifically, sellers of a
covered business opportunity, and their
principals, must retain for at least three
years the following types of documents:
(1) Each materially different version of
all documents required by the Rule; (2)
each purchaser’s disclosure receipt; (3)
each executed written contract with a
purchaser; and (4) all substantiation
upon which the seller relies for each
earnings claim made. The final Rule
requires that these records be made
available for the Commission’s
inspection, but does not otherwise
require their production. As previously
noted, because of advances in
computerized data collection
technology, the Commission anticipates
that the costs of collecting information
and recordkeeping requirements
imposed by the final Rule will be
minimal.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
C. Estimated Hours Burden and Labor
Cost
For the RNPR, the Commission
submitted the RPBOR and associated
documentation under the PRA for OMB
review.484 The Commission did not
receive any public comments regarding
staff’s PRA burden estimates. The
instant burden estimates differ from
those previously submitted in the RNPR
in two respects: (1) They account for the
final Rule’s requirement that sellers
must provide the disclosure document
and other required disclosures to
potential purchasers in the same
language the seller uses to market the
business opportunity; 485 and (2) they
incorporate the one hour recordkeeping
burden estimate included in the
currently approved interim Business
Opportunity Rule’s burden estimates
under the PRA.
Through the Staff Report, the
Commission sought comment on the
new foreign language disclosure
requirement, including the usefulness
and sufficiency of the added foreign
language disclosure requirement. The
Staff Report, however, did not address
484 73
FR at 16129.
discussed within the Statement of Basis
and Purpose, this requirement was not present in
the RNPR. Rather, it was recommended in the Staff
Report, and ultimately adopted in the final Rule.
485 As
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
the associated PRA burden.486 The
Commission received just one comment
on the new disclosure translation
requirement.487
1. Estimated Hours Burden: 10,533
The estimated 2,500 vending
machine, rack display, and related
opportunity sellers currently covered by
the interim Business Opportunity Rule
(and, previously, the Original Franchise
Rule) will have a disclosure document
that needs merely streamlining and
updating to comply with the final Rule.
Thus, FTC staff estimates that these
businesses likely will require no more
than 3 hours to complete those tasks.
Conversely, staff estimates that for
existing businesses that were not
covered by the interim Business
Opportunity Rule but will be covered by
the final Rule, e.g., work-at-home
opportunities, approximately 5 hours
will be required to prepare a new
disclosure document. Staff further
estimates that the total hours required in
the first year to develop a disclosure
document will be 10,250 [(2,500 entities
× 3 hours per entity) + (550 entities ×
5 hours per entity)]. In addition, all
these businesses likely will require
approximately one hour per year to file
and store records, for a total of 3,050
hours [3,050 entities × 1 hour per
entity]. Accordingly, the estimated total
hours burden for the first year of
implementation of these amendments
would be 13,300 hours [10,250 hours +
3,050 hours]. Commission staff
estimates that in subsequent years, the
3,050 existing businesses will require no
more than approximately two hours to
update the disclosure document [6,100
total hours] and approximately one hour
to file and store records [3,050 total
hours], for a total of 9,150 hours [6,100
hours + 3,050 hours] per year to meet
the final Rule requirements.
Thus, cumulative average annual
burden for affected sellers, based on a
prospective three-year OMB clearance is
10,533 hours [((13,300 hours) + 18,300
hours (2 years × 9,150 hours per year))
÷ 3].
486 See Bureau of Consumer Protection, Staff
Report to the Federal Trade Commission and
Proposed Revised Trade Regulation Rule (16 CFR
Part 437) (Nov. 2010) (‘‘Staff Report’’), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2010/october/
101028businessopportunitiesstaffreport.pdf. In
November, the Commission published a notice in
the Federal Register announcing the availability of,
and seeking comment on, the Staff Report. See 75
FR 68559 (Nov. 8, 2010).
487 DOJ Staff Report at 2. The comment, from the
Office of Consumer Litigation, U.S. Department of
Justice, registered strong support for the
requirement.
PO 00000
Frm 00043
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76857
2. Estimated Labor Cost: $2,633,333
Labor costs are determined by
applying applicable wage rates to
associated burden hours. Commission
staff assumes that an attorney likely
would prepare or update the disclosure
document at an estimated hourly rate of
$250. As noted above, Commission staff
estimates that 13,300 hours will be
needed to prepare, file, and store the
disclosure document and required
records in the first year, for a total cost
of $3,325,000 [13,300 hours × $250 per
hour].
As noted above, Commission staff
expects that there will be a reduction in
the annual hours burden after the first
year to approximately 9,150 hours.
Accordingly, staff estimates that the
labor cost burden for subsequent years
will be reduced to $2,287,500 [9,150
hours x $250 per hour]. Thus, the
average annual cost is approximately
$2,633,333 [(($3,325,000) + ($2,287,500
× 2)) ÷ 3], when averaged over a
prospective three-year OMB clearance.
Should disclosure or recordkeeping
obligations be performed by clerical
staff, the total labor costs would be
significantly less.
3. Estimated Capital and Other NonLabor Costs: $3,068,838
Business opportunity sellers must
also incur costs to print and distribute
the single-page disclosure document,
plus any attachments. These costs vary
based upon the length of the
attachments and the number of copies
produced to meet the expected demand.
Commission staff estimates that 3,050
business opportunity sellers will print
and mail approximately 1,000
disclosure documents per year at a cost
of $1.00 per document, for a total cost
of $3,050,000. This is a conservative
estimate because Commission staff
anticipates that these costs will be
reduced by many business opportunity
sellers electing to furnish disclosures
electronically, e.g., via email or the
Internet.
For sales conducted in a language
other than English and Spanish, the
final Rule requires that sellers use the
form appearing in Appendix A and
accurately translate it into the language
used for sale. Thus, sellers marketing in
languages other than English or Spanish
will incur costs to translate the
disclosure document, and these sellers
may also need to translate the other
required disclosures that may be
attached to the disclosure document.
Commission staff estimates that sellers
marketing business opportunities in
languages other than English and
Spanish will incur a cost of
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
76858
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
approximately $6,705 to translate the
disclosure document in the first year.
This figure is based upon Commission
staff’s estimate that it will cost
approximately 17.5 cents to translate
each word into the language the sellers
use to market the opportunities.488
There are 485 words in Appendix A.
Therefore, the total cost burden to
translate the disclosure document is
approximately $6,705 [79 sellers × (17.5
cents per word × 485 words)]. In
subsequent years, the existing business
opportunities sellers will not incur
additional costs to translate the
Appendix A as it will already have been
translated during the first year. The 174
sellers marketing business opportunities
in Spanish will not incur any additional
costs to translate Appendix A, as a
Spanish version of that document is
provided for them, as Appendix B to the
final Rule.
Commission staff estimates that in the
first year, sellers marketing business
opportunities in languages other than
English will incur a total cost burden of
approximately $27,672 [(79 sellers + 174
sellers) × (17.5 cents per word × 625
words)] to translate their responses to
the five mandatory disclosures required
in the disclosure document. This
estimate is based upon assumptions that
all sellers marketing business
opportunities in languages other than
English: (1) Are marketing in both
English and another language; (2) are
not incorporating any existing materials
into their disclosure document; (3) have
been the subject of civil or criminal
legal actions; (4) are making earnings
claims; (5) have a refund or cancellation
policy; and (6) because of all of the
above assumptions, require
approximately 625 words
(approximately 2.5 standard, doublespaced pages) to provide the required
information. In reality, because it is
unlikely that all such assumptions will
apply to every seller marketing business
opportunities in languages other than
English, the cost burden will likely be
much lower. In subsequent years, due to
the final Rule’s requirement that sellers
must update their disclosures,
Commission staff estimates that sellers
may incur an additional cost burden of
$11,069 [253 sellers × (17.5 cents per
word × 250 words—approximately one
standard, double-spaced page)] to
translate the updates.
Therefore, cumulative average cost for
affected sellers, based on a prospective
three-year OMB clearance, to print and
distribute the disclosure document and
any attachments and to translate both
488 17.5 cents is staff’s estimate of the current
market translation rate per word.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
the disclosure document and the
additional required disclosures would
be $3,068,838 [(($3,050,000 × 3) +
$6,705 + $27,672 + ($11,069 × 2)) ÷ 3].
V. Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory
Flexibility Act
Under Section 22 of the FTC Act, 15
U.S.C. 57b, the Commission must issue
a regulatory analysis for a proceeding to
amend a rule only when it: (1) Estimates
that the amendment will have an annual
effect on the national economy of
$100,000,000 or more; (2) estimates that
the amendment will cause a substantial
change in the cost or price of certain
categories of goods or services; or (3)
otherwise determines that the
amendment will have a significant effect
upon covered entities or upon
consumers. The Commission has
determined that the final Rule will not
have such an annual effect on the
national economy, on the cost or prices
of goods or services sold through
business opportunities, or on covered
businesses or consumers. As noted in
the Paperwork Reduction Act
discussion above, the Commission staff
estimates each business affected by the
Rule will likely incur only minimal
compliance costs.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act
(‘‘RFA’’), 5 U.S.C. 601–612, requires an
agency to provide an Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (‘‘IRFA’’) with a
proposed rule and a Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (‘‘FRFA’’) with the
final rule, if any, unless the agency
certifies that the rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.489
The FTC does not expect that the final
Rule will have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities and this document serves as
notice to the Small Business
Administration of the agency’s
certification of no significant impact.
The abbreviated disclosure and
recordkeeping requirements of the final
Rule are the minimum necessary to give
consumers the information they need to
protect themselves and permit effective
enforcement of the Rule. Companies
previously covered by the interim
Business Opportunity Rule will
experience a reduction in their
compliance burden, while companies
not previously covered will have
minimal new disclosure obligations. As
such, the economic impact of the final
Rule will be minimal. In any event, the
burdens imposed on small entities are
likely to be relatively small.
In the RNPR, the Commission
provided notice to the Small Business
489 See
PO 00000
5 U.S.C. 603–605.
Frm 00044
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Administration of the agency’s
certification of no significant impact.
Nonetheless, the Commission
determined that it was appropriate to
publish an IRFA in order to inquire into
the impact of the proposed Rule on
small entities. Based on the IRFA set
forth in the Commission’s earlier notice
of proposed rulemaking, a review of the
public comments submitted in response
to that notice and additional
information and analysis by
Commission staff, the Commission
submits this FRFA.
A. Need for and Objectives of the Final
Rule
The Commission’s law enforcement
experience provides ample evidence
that fraud is pervasive in the sale of
many business opportunities marketed
to consumers. Yet, the Commission
believes that the current requirements of
the interim Business Opportunity Rule
are more extensive than necessary to
protect prospective purchasers of
business opportunities from deception.
The pre-sale disclosures provided by the
final Rule will give consumers the
information they need to protect
themselves from fraudulent sales
claims, while minimizing the
compliance costs and burdens on
sellers.
The objective of the final Rule is to
provide consumers considering the
purchase of a business opportunity with
material information they need to
investigate the offering thoroughly so
they can protect themselves from
fraudulent claims, while minimizing the
compliance burdens on sellers. The
legal basis for the final Rule is Section
18 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 57a, which
authorizes the Commission to
promulgate, modify, and repeal trade
regulation rules that define with
specificity acts or practices in or
affecting commerce that are unfair or
deceptive within the meaning of Section
(5)(a)(1) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C.
45(a)(1).
B. Significant Issues Raised by Public
Comments, Summary of Agency’s
Assessment of These Issues, and
Changes, if Any, Made in Response
In crafting the final Rule, the
Commission has carefully considered
the comments received throughout the
Rule amendment proceeding. Section III
of this document provides a more
detailed discussion of the comments
received by the Commission and the
Commission’s response to those
comments.
In sum, in response to INRP, the
Commission received more than 17,000
comments, the overwhelming majority
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
of which came from the MLM industry.
The MLM industry urged the
Commission to exclude MLM plans
from the scope of IPBOR due to the
burdens imposed on them through the
IPBOR and the IPBOR’s failure to
differentiate between unlawful pyramid
schemes and legitimate companies
using an MLM model. In consideration
of the comments received in response to
the INPR, and a reassessment of the
Commission’s law enforcement history,
the Commission subsequently issued a
RNPR, in which the Commission
decided to narrow the scope of the
IPBOR to avoid broadly sweeping in all
sellers of MLM plans. In addition, the
Commission proposed a more narrowed
definition of ‘‘business opportunity’’
and also eliminated two required
disclosures—information about legal
actions pertaining to a business
opportunity seller’s sales personnel, and
the number of cancellation or refund
requests the seller received. The
Commission received fewer than 125
comments and rebuttal comments in
response to RNPR addressing these
changes. The Commission received
written comment from six individuals
and entities following the public
workshop held by the Commission.
Finally, the Commission received 27
comments in response to the Staff
Report. Many of those comments
opposed the Commission’s decision to
narrow the scope of the Rule to avoid
broadly sweeping in the MLMs.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
C. Description and an Estimate of the
Number of Small Entities to Which the
Final Rule Will Apply, or Explanation
Why No Estimate Is Available
The final Rule primarily applies to
‘‘sellers’’ of business opportunities,
including vending, rack display,
medical billing, and work-at-home (e.g.,
craft assembly, envelope stuffing)
opportunities. The Commission believes
that many of these sellers fall into the
category of small entities. Determining
the precise number of small entities
affected by the final Rule, however, is
difficult due to the wide range of
businesses engaged in business
opportunity sales. The staff estimates
that there are approximately 3,050
business opportunity sellers, including
some 2,500 vending machine, rack
display, and related opportunity sellers
and 550 work-at-home opportunity
sellers. Most established and some startup business opportunities would likely
be considered small businesses
according to the applicable Small
Business Administration (‘‘SBA’’) size
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
standards.490 The FTC staff estimates
that as many as 70% of business
opportunities, as defined by the Rule,
are small businesses.
D. Description of the Projected
Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other
Compliance Requirements of the Final
Rule, Including an Estimate of the
Classes of Small Entities That Will Be
Subject to the Requirements, and the
Type of Professional Skills That Will Be
Necessary To Comply
As discussed in the Paperwork
Reduction Act analysis of this notice
(Section IV), the final Rule will impose
compliance requirements (e.g.,
disclosure) and minor recordkeeping
requirements on those entities covered
by the final Rule. Specifically, the final
Rule imposes disclosure and
recordkeeping requirements, within the
meaning of the Paperwork Reduction
Act, on the ’’sellers’’ of business
opportunities and their principals.
The disclosure and recordkeeping
requirements are fewer in number and
lesser in extent than requirements
currently applicable to such entities
now covered by the interim Business
Opportunity Rule and formerly covered
by the Original Franchise Rule. Section
437.2 of the final Rule requires ‘‘sellers’’
of covered business opportunities to
provide potential purchasers with a onepage disclosure document, as specified
by § 437.3 and Appendix A and if
applicable, Appendix B, at least seven
calendar days before they sign a contract
or pay any money toward a purchase.
For business opportunities marketed in
Spanish, § 437.5 of the final Rule
requires that sellers provide potential
purchasers with the Spanish version of
the disclosure document (Appendix B to
the Rule) and provide any required
disclosures in Spanish. For sales
conducted in a language other than
English or Spanish, the final Rule
requires that sellers use the form and an
accurate translation of the language set
forth in Appendix A.
Section 437.7 of the final Rule
prescribes recordkeeping requirements
necessary for effective enforcement of
the Rule. Specifically, sellers of a
covered business opportunity, and their
principals, must retain for at least three
years the following types of documents:
(1) Each materially different version of
490 Since October 2000, SBA size standards have
been based on the North American Industry
Classification System (‘‘NAICS’’), in place of the
Standard Industrial Classification (‘‘SIC’’) system.
In general, a company in a non-manufacturing
industry is a small business if its average annual
receipts are $7 million or less. See https://
www.sba.gov/content/summary-size-standardsindustry.
PO 00000
Frm 00045
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76859
all documents required by the Rule; (2)
each purchaser’s disclosure receipt; (3)
each executed written contract with a
purchaser; and (4) all substantiation
upon which the seller relies for each
earnings claim made. The final Rule
requires that these records be made
available for inspection by the
Commission, but does not otherwise
require production of the records.
Commission staff assumes that sellers
will hire an attorney to complete,
update, file, and store the disclosure
documents. If applicable, sellers may
require translation services to comply
with the disclosure requirements.
E. Steps the Agency Has Taken in the
Final Rule To Minimize Any Significant
Economic Impact of the Final Rule on
Small Entities, Consistent With
Applicable Statutory Objectives,
Including the Factual and Legal Basis
for the Alternatives Adopted and Those
Rejected
As discussed throughout this
document, the Commission has
attempted to reduce compliance costs
wherever possible. Compliance with the
final Rule’s disclosure requirements is
significantly less burdensome than with
the interim Business Opportunity Rule.
The final Rule’s disclosure and
recordkeeping requirements are
designed to impose the minimum
burden on all affected business
opportunity sellers, regardless of size. In
formulating the final Rule, the
Commission has taken a number of
significant steps to minimize the
burdens it would impose on large and
small businesses. These include: (1)
Limiting the required pre-sale
disclosure to a one-page document, with
check boxes provided to simplify
disclosure responses; (2) allowing the
disclosure to refer to information in
other existing documents to avoid
needless duplication; (3) permitting the
disclosure document itself to be
furnished in electronic form to
minimize printing and distribution
costs; and (4) employing specific
prohibitions in place of affirmative
disclosures whenever possible.
Moreover, because the majority of
sellers covered by the final Rule are
already required to comply with the
Commission’s interim Business
Opportunity Rule and the business
opportunity laws in 22 states, FTC staff
anticipates that the final Rule will
drastically reduce their current
compliance costs, while imposing
exceedingly modest ongoing compliance
costs on all covered sellers.
Consequently, the Commission believes
that the final Rule will not have a
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
76860
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
significant economic impact upon small
businesses.
The final Rule requires business
opportunity sellers to provide only five
affirmative disclosures in a one-page
disclosure document. This is a
significant reduction from the more than
20 disclosures now required by the
Commission’s interim Business
Opportunity Rule, with which many
business opportunity sellers are now
obligated to comply.
VI. Final Rule Language
List of Subjects in 16 CFR Part 437
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Trade practices.
By direction of the Commission.
Donald S. Clark,
Secretary.
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, the Federal Trade
Commission amends title 16, Code of
Federal Regulations, by revising part
437 to read as follows:
PART 437—BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY
RULE
Sec.
437.1 Definitions.
437.2 The obligation to furnish written
documents.
437.3 The disclosure document.
437.4 Earnings claims.
437.5 Sales conducted in Spanish or other
languages besides English.
437.6 Other prohibited practices.
437.7 Record retention.
437.8 Franchise exemption.
437.9 Outstanding orders; preemption.
437.10 Severability.
Appendix A to Part 437—Disclosure of
Important Information About Business
Opportunity
Appendix B to Part 437—Disclosure of
Important Information About Business
Opportunity (Spanish-Language Version)
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 41–58.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
§ 437.1
Definitions.
The following definitions shall apply
throughout this part:
(a) Action means a criminal
information, indictment, or proceeding;
a civil complaint, cross claim,
counterclaim, or third party complaint
in a judicial action or proceeding;
arbitration; or any governmental
administrative proceeding, including,
but not limited to, an action to obtain
or issue a cease and desist order, an
assurance of voluntary compliance, and
an assurance of discontinuance.
(b) Affiliate means an entity
controlled by, controlling, or under
common control with a business
opportunity seller.
(c) Business opportunity means a
commercial arrangement in which:
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
(1) A seller solicits a prospective
purchaser to enter into a new business;
and
(2) The prospective purchaser makes
a required payment; and
(3) The seller, expressly or by
implication, orally or in writing,
represents that the seller or one or more
designated persons will:
(i) Provide locations for the use or
operation of equipment, displays,
vending machines, or similar devices,
owned, leased, controlled, or paid for by
the purchaser; or
(ii) Provide outlets, accounts, or
customers, including, but not limited to,
Internet outlets, accounts, or customers,
for the purchaser’s goods or services; or
(iii) Buy back any or all of the goods
or services that the purchaser makes,
produces, fabricates, grows, breeds,
modifies, or provides, including but not
limited to providing payment for such
services as, for example, stuffing
envelopes from the purchaser’s home.
(d) Designated person means any
person, other than the seller, whose
goods or services the seller suggests,
recommends, or requires that the
purchaser use in establishing or
operating a new business.
(e) Disclose or state means to give
information in writing that is clear and
conspicuous, accurate, concise, and
legible.
(f) Earnings claim means any oral,
written, or visual representation to a
prospective purchaser that conveys,
expressly or by implication, a specific
level or range of actual or potential
sales, or gross or net income or profits.
Earnings claims include, but are not
limited to:
(1) Any chart, table, or mathematical
calculation that demonstrates possible
results based upon a combination of
variables; and
(2) Any statements from which a
prospective purchaser can reasonably
infer that he or she will earn a minimum
level of income (e.g., ‘‘earn enough to
buy a Porsche,’’ ‘‘earn a six-figure
income,’’ or ‘‘earn your investment back
within one year’’).
(g) Exclusive territory means a
specified geographic or other actual or
implied marketing area in which the
seller promises not to locate additional
purchasers or offer the same or similar
goods or services as the purchaser
through alternative channels of
distribution.
(h) General media means any
instrumentality through which a person
may communicate with the public,
including, but not limited to, television,
radio, print, Internet, billboard, Web
site, commercial bulk email, and mobile
communications.
PO 00000
Frm 00046
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
(i) Material means likely to affect a
person’s choice of, or conduct regarding,
goods or services.
(j) New business means a business in
which the prospective purchaser is not
currently engaged, or a new line or type
of business.
(k) Person means an individual,
group, association, limited or general
partnership, corporation, or any other
business entity.
(l) Prior business means:
(1) A business from which the seller
acquired, directly or indirectly, the
major portion of the business’ assets; or
(2) Any business previously owned or
operated by the seller, in whole or in
part.
(m) Providing locations, outlets,
accounts, or customers means
furnishing the prospective purchaser
with existing or potential locations,
outlets, accounts, or customers;
requiring, recommending, or suggesting
one or more locators or lead generating
companies; providing a list of locator or
lead generating companies; collecting a
fee on behalf of one or more locators or
lead generating companies; offering to
furnish a list of locations; or otherwise
assisting the prospective purchaser in
obtaining his or her own locations,
outlets, accounts, or customers,
provided, however, that advertising and
general advice about business
development and training shall not be
considered as ‘‘providing locations,
outlets, accounts, or customers.’’
(n) Purchaser means a person who
buys a business opportunity.
(o) Quarterly means as of January 1,
April 1, July 1, and October 1.
(p) Required payment means all
consideration that the purchaser must
pay to the seller or an affiliate, either by
contract or by practical necessity, as a
condition of obtaining or commencing
operation of the business opportunity.
Such payment may be made directly or
indirectly through a third party. A
required payment does not include
payments for the purchase of reasonable
amounts of inventory at bona fide
wholesale prices for resale or lease.
(q) Seller means a person who offers
for sale or sells a business opportunity.
(r) Signature or signed means a
person’s affirmative steps to
authenticate his or her identity.
It includes a person’s handwritten
signature, as well as an electronic or
digital form of signature to the extent
that such signature is recognized as a
valid signature under applicable federal
law or state contract law.
(s) Written or in writing means any
document or information in printed
form or in any form capable of being
downloaded, printed, or otherwise
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
immediately preceding the date that the
business opportunity is offered, check
the ‘‘yes’’ box:
(A) The seller;
(B) Any affiliate or prior business of
the seller; or
(C) Any of the seller’s officers,
directors, sales managers, or any
§ 437.2 The obligation to furnish written
individual who occupies a position or
documents.
performs a function similar to an officer,
In connection with the offer for sale,
director, or sales manager of the seller.
sale, or promotion of a business
(ii) If the ‘‘yes’’ box is checked,
opportunity, it is a violation of this Rule disclose all such actions in an
and an unfair or deceptive act or
attachment to the disclosure document.
practice in violation of Section 5 of the
State the full caption of each action
Federal Trade Commission Act (‘‘FTC
(names of the principal parties, case
Act’’) for any seller to fail to furnish a
number, full name of court, and filing
prospective purchaser with the material date). For each action, the seller may
information required by §§ 437.3(a) and also provide a brief accurate statement
437.4(a) of this part in writing at least
not to exceed 100 words that describes
seven calendar days before the earlier of the action.
(iii) If there are no actions to disclose,
the time that the prospective purchaser:
check the ‘‘no’’ box.
(a) Signs any contract in connection
(4) Cancellation or refund policy. If
with the business opportunity sale; or
(b) Makes a payment or provides other the seller offers a refund or the right to
cancel the purchase, check the ‘‘yes’’
consideration to the seller, directly or
box. If so, state all material terms and
indirectly through a third party.
conditions of the refund or cancellation
§ 437.3 The disclosure document.
policy in an attachment to the
In connection with the offer for sale,
disclosure document. If no refund or
sale, or promotion of a business
cancellation is offered, check the ‘‘no’’
opportunity, it is a violation of this Rule box.
and an unfair or deceptive act or
(5) References. (i) State the name,
practice in violation of Section 5 of the
state, and telephone number of all
FTC Act, for any seller to:
purchasers who purchased the business
(a) Fail to disclose to a prospective
opportunity within the last three years.
purchaser the following material
If more than 10 purchasers purchased
information in a single written
the business opportunity within the last
document in the form and using the
three years, the seller may limit the
language set forth in appendix A to this
disclosure by stating the name, state,
part; or if the offer for sale, sale, or
and telephone number of at least the 10
promotion of a business opportunity is
purchasers within the past three years
conducted in Spanish, in the form and
who are located nearest to the
using the language set forth in appendix prospective purchaser’s location.
B to this part; or if the offer for sale, sale, Alternatively, a seller may furnish a
or promotion of a business opportunity
prospective buyer with a list disclosing
is conducted in a language other than
all purchasers nationwide within the
English or Spanish, using the form and
last three years. If choosing this option,
an accurate translation of the language
insert the words ‘‘See Attached List’’
set forth in appendix A to this part:
without removing the list headings or
(1) Identifying information. State the
the numbers 1 through 10, and attach a
name, business address, and telephone
list of the references to the disclosure
number of the seller, the name of the
document.
salesperson offering the opportunity,
(ii) Clearly and conspicuously, and in
and the date when the disclosure
immediate conjunction with the list of
document is furnished to the
references, state the following: ‘‘If you
prospective purchaser.
buy a business opportunity from the
(2) Earnings claims. If the seller
seller, your contact information can be
makes an earnings claim, check the
disclosed in the future to other buyers.’’
‘‘yes’’ box and attach the earnings
(6) Receipt. Attach a duplicate copy of
statement required by § 437.4. If not,
the disclosure document to be signed
check the ‘‘no’’ box.
and dated by the purchaser. The seller
(3) Legal actions. (i) If any of the
may inform the prospective purchaser
following persons has been the subject
how to return the signed receipt (for
of any civil or criminal action for
example, by sending to a street address,
misrepresentation, fraud, securities law
email address, or facsimile telephone
violations, or unfair or deceptive
number).
(b) Fail to update the disclosures
practices, including violations of any
required by paragraph (a) of this section
FTC Rule, within the 10 years
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
preserved in tangible form and read. It
includes: type-set, word processed, or
handwritten documents; information on
computer disk or CD–ROM; information
sent via email; or information posted on
the Internet. It does not include mere
oral statements.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
PO 00000
Frm 00047
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76861
at least quarterly to reflect any changes
in the required information, including,
but not limited to, any changes in the
seller’s refund or cancellation policy, or
the list of references; provided, however,
that until a seller has 10 purchasers, the
list of references must be updated
monthly.
§ 437.4
Earnings claims.
In connection with the offer for sale,
sale, or promotion of a business
opportunity, it is a violation of this Rule
and an unfair or deceptive act or
practice in violation of Section 5 of the
FTC Act, for the seller to:
(a) Make any earnings claim to a
prospective purchaser, unless the seller:
(1) Has a reasonable basis for its claim
at the time the claim is made;
(2) Has in its possession written
materials that substantiate its claim at
the time the claim is made;
(3) Makes the written substantiation
available upon request to the
prospective purchaser and to the
Commission; and
(4) Furnishes to the prospective
purchaser an earnings claim statement.
The earnings claim statement shall be a
single written document and shall state
the following information:
(i) The title ‘‘EARNINGS CLAIM
STATEMENT REQUIRED BY LAW’’ in
capital, bold type letters;
(ii) The name of the person making
the earnings claim and the date of the
earnings claim;
(iii) The earnings claim;
(iv) The beginning and ending dates
when the represented earnings were
achieved;
(v) The number and percentage of all
persons who purchased the business
opportunity prior to the ending date in
paragraph (a)(4)(iv) of this section who
achieved at least the stated level of
earnings;
(vi) Any characteristics of the
purchasers who achieved at least the
represented level of earnings, such as
their location, that may differ materially
from the characteristics of the
prospective purchasers being offered the
business opportunity; and
(vii) A statement that written
substantiation for the earnings claim
will be made available to the
prospective purchaser upon request.
(b) Make any earnings claim in the
general media, unless the seller:
(1) Has a reasonable basis for its claim
at the time the claim is made;
(2) Has in its possession written
material that substantiates its claim at
the time the claim is made;
(3) States in immediate conjunction
with the claim:
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
76862
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
(i) The beginning and ending dates
when the represented earnings were
achieved; and
(ii) The number and percentage of all
persons who purchased the business
opportunity prior to the ending date in
paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section who
achieved at least the stated level of
earnings.
(c) Disseminate industry financial,
earnings, or performance information
unless the seller has written
substantiation demonstrating that the
information reflects, or does not exceed,
the typical or ordinary financial,
earnings, or performance experience of
purchasers of the business opportunity
being offered for sale.
(d) Fail to notify any prospective
purchaser in writing of any material
changes affecting the relevance or
reliability of the information contained
in an earnings claim statement before
the prospective purchaser signs any
contract or makes a payment or provides
other consideration to the seller,
directly or indirectly, through a third
party.
§ 437.5 Sales conducted in Spanish or
other languages besides English.
(a) If the seller conducts the offer for
sale, sale, or promotion of a business
opportunity in Spanish, the seller must
provide the disclosure document
required by § 437.3(a) in the form and
language set forth in appendix B to this
part, and the disclosures required by
§§ 437.3(a) and 437.4 must be made in
Spanish.
(b) If the seller conducts the offer for
sale, sale, or promotion of a business
opportunity in a language other than
English or Spanish, the seller must
provide the disclosure document
required by § 437.3(a) using the form
and an accurate translation of the
language set forth in appendix A to this
part, and the disclosures required by
§§ 437.3(a) and 437.4 must be made in
that language.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
§ 437.6
Other prohibited practices.
In connection with the offer for sale,
sale, or promotion of a business
opportunity, it is a violation of this part
and an unfair or deceptive act or
practice in violation of Section 5 of the
FTC Act for any seller, directly or
indirectly through a third party, to:
(a) Disclaim, or require a prospective
purchaser to waive reliance on, any
statement made in any document or
attachment that is required or permitted
to be disclosed under this Rule;
(b) Make any claim or representation,
orally, visually, or in writing, that is
inconsistent with or contradicts the
information required to be disclosed by
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
§§ 437.3 (basic disclosure document)
and 437.4 (earnings claims document) of
this Rule;
(c) Include in any disclosure
document or earnings claim statement
any materials or information other than
what is explicitly required or permitted
by this Rule. For the sole purpose of
enhancing the prospective purchaser’s
ability to maneuver through an
electronic version of a disclosure
document or earnings statement, the
seller may include scroll bars and
internal links. All other features (e.g.,
multimedia tools such as audio, video,
animation, or pop-up screens) are
prohibited;
(d) Misrepresent the amount of sales,
or gross or net income or profits a
prospective purchaser may earn or that
prior purchasers have earned;
(e) Misrepresent that any
governmental entity, law, or regulation
prohibits a seller from:
(1) Furnishing earnings information to
a prospective purchaser; or
(2) Disclosing to prospective
purchasers the identity of other
purchasers of the business opportunity;
(f) Fail to make available to
prospective purchasers, and to the
Commission upon request, written
substantiation for the seller’s earnings
claims;
(g) Misrepresent how or when
commissions, bonuses, incentives,
premiums, or other payments from the
seller to the purchaser will be calculated
or distributed;
(h) Misrepresent the cost, or the
performance, efficacy, nature, or central
characteristics of the business
opportunity or the goods or services
offered to a prospective purchaser;
(i) Misrepresent any material aspect of
any assistance offered to a prospective
purchaser;
(j) Misrepresent the likelihood that a
seller, locator, or lead generator will
find locations, outlets, accounts, or
customers for the purchaser;
(k) Misrepresent any term or
condition of the seller’s refund or
cancellation policies;
(l) Fail to provide a refund or
cancellation when the purchaser has
satisfied the terms and conditions
disclosed pursuant to § 437.3(a)(4);
(m) Misrepresent a business
opportunity as an employment
opportunity;
(n) Misrepresent the terms of any
territorial exclusivity or territorial
protection offered to a prospective
purchaser;
(o) Assign to any purchaser a
purported exclusive territory that, in
fact, encompasses the same or
PO 00000
Frm 00048
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
overlapping areas already assigned to
another purchaser;
(p) Misrepresent that any person,
trademark or service mark holder, or
governmental entity, directly or
indirectly benefits from, sponsors,
participates in, endorses, approves,
authorizes, or is otherwise associated
with the sale of the business
opportunity or the goods or services
sold through the business opportunity;
(q) Misrepresent that any person:
(1) Has purchased a business
opportunity from the seller or has
operated a business opportunity of the
type offered by the seller; or
(2) Can provide an independent or
reliable report about the business
opportunity or the experiences of any
current or former purchaser.
(r) Fail to disclose, with respect to any
person identified as a purchaser or
operator of a business opportunity
offered by the seller:
(1) Any consideration promised or
paid to such person. Consideration
includes, but is not limited to, any
payment, forgiveness of debt, or
provision of equipment, services, or
discounts to the person or to a third
party on the person’s behalf; or
(2) Any personal relationship or any
past or present business relationship
other than as the purchaser or operator
of the business opportunity being
offered by the seller.
§ 437.7
Record retention.
To prevent the unfair and deceptive
acts or practices specified in this Rule,
business opportunity sellers and their
principals must prepare, retain, and
make available for inspection by
Commission officials copies of the
following documents for a period of
three years:
(a) Each materially different version of
all documents required by this Rule;
(b) Each purchaser’s disclosure
receipt;
(c) Each executed written contract
with a purchaser; and
(d) All substantiation upon which the
seller relies for each earnings claim from
the time each such claim is made.
§ 437.8
Franchise exemption.
The provisions of this Rule shall not
apply to any business opportunity that
constitutes a ‘‘franchise,’’ as defined in
the Franchise Rule, 16 CFR part 436;
provided, however, that the provisions
of this Rule shall apply to any such
franchise if it is exempted from the
provisions of part 436 because, either:
(a) Under § 436.8(a)(1), the total of the
required payments or commitments to
make a required payment, to the
franchisor or an affiliate that are made
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
any time from before to within six
months after commencing operation of
the franchisee’s business is less than
$500, or
(b) Under § 436.8(a)(7), there is no
written document describing any
material term or aspect of the
relationship or arrangement.
§ 437.9
Outstanding orders; preemption.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
(a) A business opportunity required
by prior FTC or court order to follow the
Franchise Rule, 16 CFR part 436, may
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
petition the Commission to amend the
order or to stipulate to an amendment
of the court order so that the business
opportunity may follow the provisions
of this part.
(b) The FTC does not intend to
preempt the business opportunity sales
practices laws of any state or local
government, except to the extent of any
conflict with this part. A law is not in
conflict with this Rule if it affords
prospective purchasers equal or greater
protection, such as registration of
PO 00000
Frm 00049
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
76863
disclosure documents or more extensive
disclosures. All such disclosures,
however, must be made in a separate
state disclosure document.
§ 437.10
Severability.
The provisions of this part are
separate and severable from one
another. If any provision is stayed or
determined to be invalid, the remaining
provisions shall continue in effect.
BILLING CODE 6750–01–P
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
16:03 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
PO 00000
Frm 00050
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
ER08DE11.000
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
76864
76865
[FR Doc. 2011–30597 Filed 12–7–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6750–01–C
VerDate Mar<15>2010
17:47 Dec 07, 2011
Jkt 226001
PO 00000
Frm 00051
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 9990
E:\FR\FM\08DER2.SGM
08DER2
ER08DE11.001
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 236 (Thursday, December 8, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 76816-76865]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-30597]
[[Page 76815]]
Vol. 76
Thursday,
No. 236
December 8, 2011
Part II
Federal Trade Commission
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
16 CFR Part 437
Business Opportunity Rule; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 236 / Thursday, December 8, 2011 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 76816]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
16 CFR Part 437
RIN 3084-AB04
Business Opportunity Rule
AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Commission is adopting final amendments to its Trade
Regulation Rule entitled ``Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions
Concerning Business Opportunities'' (``Business Opportunity Rule'' or
``Rule''). Among other things, the Business Opportunity Rule has been
amended to broaden its scope to cover business opportunity sellers not
covered by the interim Business Opportunity Rule, such as sellers of
work-at-home opportunities, and to streamline and simplify the
disclosures that sellers must provide to prospective purchasers. The
final Rule is based upon the comments received in response to an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (``ANPR''), an Initial Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (``INPR''), a Revised Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(``RNPR''), a public workshop, a Staff Report, and other information
discussed herein. This document also contains the text of the final
Rule and the Rule's Statement of Basis and Purpose (``SBP''), including
a Regulatory Analysis.
DATES: The provisions of the final Rule will become effective on March
1, 2012.
ADDRESSES: Requests for copies of the final Rule and the SBP should be
sent to Public Reference Branch, Room 130, Federal Trade Commission,
600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20580. The complete record
of this proceeding is also available at that address. Relevant portions
of the proceeding, including the final Rule and SBP, are available at
https://www.ftc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christine M. Todaro, (202) 326-3711,
Division of Marketing Practices, Room H-286, Bureau of Consumer
Protection, Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW.,
Washington, DC 20580.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The final Rule modifies the interim Business
Opportunity Rule in two significant ways. First, the final Rule
contains an expanded definition of ``business opportunity'' aimed at
extending the scope of the Rule to business opportunities previously
not covered, such as work-at-home programs. Second, although the final
Rule's scope is broader than the interim Business Opportunity Rule, the
compliance burden is reduced. Specifically, in contrast to the
extensive disclosures previously required, the final Rule now requires
that business opportunity sellers provide prospective customers with a
substantially simplified and streamlined one-page disclosure document.
The final Rule also adds affirmative prohibitions on misrepresentations
and omissions, as well as disclosure requirements for sales conducted
in Spanish and other languages besides English.
Statement of Basis and Purpose
Key Terms and Abbreviations Used Throughout This Statement of Basis and
Purpose
``Amended Franchise Rule'' refers to the amended Franchise Rule
published at 72 FR 15444 (Mar. 30, 2007) and codified at 16 CFR 436.
``ANPR'' refers to the Trade Regulation Rule on Franchising and
Business Opportunity Ventures: Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 62 FR 9115 (Feb. 28, 1997).
``Initial Proposed Disclosure Document'' refers to the original
version of the Disclosure Document that was proposed in the INPR in
2006.
``INPR'' refers to the Initial Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the
Business Opportunity Rule, 71 FR 9054 (Apr. 12, 2006).
``Interim Business Opportunity Rule'' refers to the Business
Opportunity Rule, codified at 16 CFR 437 that is currently in effect
and is the subject of these amendment proceedings.
``IPBOR'' refers to the Initial Proposed Business Opportunity Rule,
which was proposed in the INPR in 2006.
``Macro Report'' refers to Macro International, Inc.'s report to the
FTC on the Disclosure Form, available at https://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/bizopps/disclosure-form-report.pdf.
``Original Franchise Rule'' refers to the original Franchise Rule
published at 43 FR 59614 (Dec. 21, 1978).
``RNPR'' refers to the Revised Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the
Business Opportunity Rule, 73 FR 16110 (Mar. 26, 2008).
``RPBOR'' refers to the Revised Proposed Business Opportunity Rule,
which was proposed in the RNPR in 2008.
``Staff Report'' refers to FTC staff's Staff Report to the Federal
Trade Commission and Proposed Revised Trade Regulation Rule (16 CFR
Part 437). The Staff Report is available at https://www.ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2010/october/101028businessopportunitiesstaffreport.pdf.
``Workshop'' refers to the June 1, 2009, public workshop held in
Washington, DC, to discuss the proposed Disclosure Document and
other aspects of the Business Opportunity Rule.
``Workshop Notice'' refers to the Federal Register Notice announcing
the Workshop, 74 FR 18712 (Apr. 24, 2009).
I. Introduction
A. Overview of the Franchise Rule and the Evolution of the Interim
Business Opportunity Rule
1. The Franchise Rule
On December 21, 1978, the Commission promulgated a Trade Regulation
Rule entitled ``Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning
Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures'' (the ``Original
Franchise Rule''), to address deceptive and unfair practices in the
sale of franchises and business opportunity ventures.\1\ The Original
Franchise Rule covered, in a single Code of Federal Regulations part,
both franchises and certain business opportunity ventures. With
franchises, the franchisee sells goods or services that are associated
with the franchisor's trademark, and the franchisee is subject to
significant control by, or receives significant assistance from, the
franchisor. The franchisee typically distributes goods or services
supplied by the seller or an affiliate and receives accounts or
locations in which to conduct the business. By contrast, business
opportunities often do not involve a trademark. Vending machines or
rack display routes are typical examples of business opportunities.
Based upon the original rulemaking record, the Commission found that
unfair and deceptive practices were widespread in the sale of
franchises and business opportunities, causing serious economic harm to
consumers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 43 FR 59614 (Dec. 21, 1978).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission adopted the Original Franchise Rule to prevent
unfair and deceptive practices in the sale of franchises and business
opportunities through pre-sale disclosure of specified items of
material information. The purpose of the Original Franchise Rule was
neither to regulate the substantive terms of a franchise or business
opportunity agreement nor to regulate the relationship between the
seller and the buyer. Rather, it was to ensure that sellers disclose
material information to prospective buyers. The Original Franchise Rule
was posited on the notion that a fully informed prospective buyer can
determine whether a particular offering is in his or her best interest.
The Original Franchise Rule required extensive disclosures on a
score of specified topics, such as, information about the seller; the
business background of the seller's principals and their litigation and
bankruptcy histories; the terms and conditions of
[[Page 76817]]
the offer; statistical analyses of existing franchised and company-
owned outlets; information about prior purchasers, including the names
and addresses of at least 10 purchasers nearest the prospective buyer;
and audited financial statements.
The Commission recognized that requiring these extensive
disclosures would likely impose significant compliance costs on
businesses covered by the Original Franchise Rule. It therefore sought
to strike the proper balance between prospective purchasers' need for
pre-sale disclosure and the burden imposed on those selling business
ventures covered by the Rule. To achieve this balance, the Commission
limited the scope of the Original Franchise Rule's coverage in three
significant ways.
First, the Original Franchise Rule covered only those opportunities
that required a purchaser to make a payment of at least $500 within the
first six months of operation. In transactions where a purchaser may
incur high financial losses if the seller withholds material
information, the benefit for prospective purchasers of the Original
Franchise Rule's pre-sale disclosure requirements outweighs the
sellers' cost to make those disclosures. By contrast, when the
investment required to purchase a business opportunity is comparatively
small, prospective purchasers face a relatively small financial risk.
In such circumstances, compliance costs may outweigh the benefits of
pre-sale disclosure. Therefore, the Original Franchise Rule did not
reach opportunities that charged lower fees.
Second, the ``inventory exemption'' excluded certain types of
payments from the Original Franchise Rule's $500 minimum cost
threshold. The ``inventory exemption'' is the franchise industry's
shorthand term for the Commission's determination that, as a matter of
policy, voluntary purchases of reasonable amounts of inventory at bona
fide wholesale prices for resale do not count toward the required
threshold payment. An important consequence of this policy
determination was to eliminate from Original Franchise Rule coverage
many pyramid marketing plans because purchasers of such plans typically
do not make a required payment of or exceeding $500, but instead make
voluntary purchases of inventory in reasonable amounts and at bona fide
wholesale prices for resale.
Third, in addition to franchise opportunities, the Commission
focused the Original Franchise Rule on the types of business
opportunities that the record showed were likely to result in
significant consumer injury, such as vending machines, rack displays,
and similar opportunities, which frequently were sold through deceptive
conduct. A feature common to these types of opportunities was the
promise of assistance in securing locations or accounts. Thus, the
Commission incorporated this characteristic into the Original Franchise
Rule's definitional elements to ensure coverage of demonstrably
injurious schemes. Other forms of assistance that business opportunity
sellers frequently offer--such as training and the buy-back and resale
of goods assembled by the purchaser (an element of many craft assembly
opportunities) did not bring a business opportunity within the scope of
the Original Franchise Rule's coverage.
In addition to these limits on the scope of the Original Franchise
Rule's coverage--driven by balancing prospective purchasers' need for
pre-sale disclosure against the burden imposed on business opportunity
sellers--another aspect of the Original Franchise Rule's language
further limited the scope of coverage. Specifically, the Original
Franchise Rule provided that a business opportunity was covered only if
the purchaser of the opportunity sells goods or services directly to
end-users other than the business opportunity seller. The effect of
this limitation was to exclude many work-at-home opportunities--such as
envelope stuffing and craft assembly ventures--from Original Franchise
Rule coverage. In those opportunities, the purchaser typically performs
work for the seller or produces various goods for the seller, who then
purportedly distributes them to end-users.
In 1995, as part of its systematic review of FTC rules, the
Commission published in the Federal Register a request for comment on
the Original Franchise Rule to determine its continued effectiveness
and impact.\2\ Based upon the comments received during the rule review,
the Commission tentatively determined to retain the Original Franchise
Rule, but sought additional comment on possible amendments. To that
end, in February 1997, the Commission published an ANPR, seeking
comment on various issues, including whether the Commission should
separate the disclosure requirements for business opportunities from
those for franchises.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 60 FR 17656 (Apr. 7, 1995).
\3\ 62 FR 9115 (Feb. 28, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based upon comments responding to the ANPR, the Commission found
that the Original Franchise Rule continued to serve a vital purpose and
that pre-sale disclosure was necessary to protect purchasers of
franchises and business opportunities from fraudulent and deceptive
sales practices. At the same time, however, the Commission agreed with
the overwhelming view of the commenters who suggested that there are
material differences between franchises and business opportunities and
that these two types of distinct business arrangements require separate
disclosure approaches. For example, many of the Original Franchise
Rule's pre-sale disclosures, in particular those pertaining to the
structure of the parties' relationship, do not apply to the sale of
most business opportunities because those sales typically involve
comparatively simple contracts. In addition, the Commission recognized
that the Original Franchise Rule's detailed disclosure obligations may
create barriers to entry for legitimate business opportunity
sellers.\4\ Accordingly, in 1999, the Commission announced its
intention to conduct a separate rulemaking proceeding for business
opportunity sales.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ 64 FR 57296 (Oct. 22, 1999).
\5\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The Interim Business Opportunity Rule
Much of the information revealed by the Commission's regulatory
review of the Original Franchise Rule highlighted the differences
between franchises and business opportunity ventures, and the distinct
regulatory challenges presented by these two types of offerings--that
franchises typically are expensive and involve complex contractual
licensing relationships, while business opportunity sales are generally
less costly and involve comparatively simple purchase agreements that
pose less of a financial risk to purchasers. Based on the record
amassed during the review proceeding, the Commission concluded that the
Original Franchise Rule's extensive disclosure requirements imposed
unnecessary compliance costs on both business opportunity sellers and
buyers, and determined to bifurcate the Original Franchise Rule into
two separate parts--one covering the sale of business format franchises
\6\ and one to govern the sale of business opportunities. Accordingly,
in the ANPR, the Commission solicited
[[Page 76818]]
comment on several proposed regulatory modifications, including the
creation of a separate trade regulation rule governing the sale of
business opportunities.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The industry term ``business format franchise'' specifically
refers to franchises in which franchisees operate under a common
trademark or other commercial symbol and are required to adhere to
the specific business format or method of doing business prescribed
by the franchisor. Business format franchises are commonly called
``franchises'' by the general public, and the two terms are used
interchangeably here.
\7\ 62 FR at 9115. In response to the ANPR, the Commission
received 166 written comments. The staff also held six public
workshops on the issues raised in the comments, three of which
specifically addressed business opportunities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsequently, the Commission completed all procedural steps
prescribed by Section 18 of the FTC Act to finalize the Amended
Franchise Rule, along with a Statement of Basis and Purpose, in March
2007.\8\ At that time, the Amended Franchise Rule--no longer covering
business opportunities--was codified at Part 436 in Title 16 of the
CFR. The Original Franchise Rule with all definitional elements and
references regarding business format franchising deleted, was retained
and redesignated as Part 437. Part 437 was titled the ``interim
Business Opportunity Rule.'' \9\ The interim Business Opportunity Rule
contained no new substantive disclosure requirements or prohibitions,
and in all material respects was substantially identical to the
Original Franchise Rule. Until the final Rule becomes effective, Part
437 governs sales of non-franchise business opportunities.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ 72 FR 15444 (Mar. 30, 2007).
\9\ For example, references to ``franchisor'' and ``franchisee''
used in the Original Franchise Rule were changed in the interim
Business Opportunity Rule to ``business opportunity seller'' and
``business opportunity purchaser,'' and the Original Franchise
Rule's definition of ``franchise'' was changed to ``business
opportunity.'' See id.
\10\ 73 FR 16111, 16112 (Mar. 26, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Rule Amendment Proceedings
1. Initial Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Initial Proposed Business
Opportunity Rule
In 2006, having determined that a separate business opportunity
rule was necessary, the Commission published an Initial Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (``INPR''), announcing its intention to proceed
with its proposal for a separate Business Opportunity Rule (the
``initial proposed Business Opportunity Rule'' or ``IPBOR'').\11\ The
INPR proposed to amend the interim Business Opportunity Rule by
updating it, streamlining it, and expanding its scope of coverage.\12\
The IPBOR contained an expansive definition of ``business opportunity''
that encompassed business opportunities previously covered by the
Original Franchise Rule as well as work-at home, medical billing, and
multi-level marketing (MLM) \13\ operations. It also eliminated the
$500 threshold for Rule coverage.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ 71 FR 19054 (Apr. 12, 2006).
\12\ The INPR also specified the process the Commission would
follow in amending the Business Opportunity Rule. Pursuant to the
Commission's Rules of Practice, 16 CFR 1.20, the Commission
determined to use a modified version of the rulemaking process set
forth in section 1.13 of those Rules. Specifically, the Commission
announced that it would publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
with a 60-day comment period, followed by a 40-day rebuttal period.
In addition, pursuant to Section 18(c) of the FTC Act, the
Commission announced that it would hold hearings with cross-
examination and rebuttal submissions only if an interested party
requested a hearing. The Commission also stated that, if requested
to do so, it would contemplate holding one or more informal public
workshops in lieu of hearings. Finally, pursuant to 16 CFR 1.13(f),
the Commission announced that staff would issue a Report on the
Business Opportunity Rule (``Staff Report''), which would be subject
to additional public comment. 71 FR at 19079-80.
\13\ Multi-level marketing is one form of direct selling, and
refers to a business model in which a company distributes products
through a network of distributors who earn income from their own
retail sales of the product and from retail sales made by the
distributors' direct and indirect recruits. Because they earn a
commission from the sales their recruits make, each member in the
MLM network has an incentive to continue recruiting additional sales
representatives into their ``down lines.'' See Peter J. Vander Nat &
William W. Keep, Marketing Fraud: An Approach to Differentiating
Multilevel Marketing from Pyramid Schemes, 21 J. Pub. Pol'y &
Marketing 140 (Spring 2002).
\14\ Promoters of business opportunities were able to evade
coverage under the Original Franchise Rule and the interim Business
Opportunity Rule by pricing their offerings opportunities below
$500, the monetary threshold of coverage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Streamlining the interim Business Opportunity Rule and tailoring it
to fit business opportunities (as opposed to business format
franchises) has been a primary focus of this proceeding. Both the
Original Franchise Rule and the interim Business Opportunity Rule
require extensive disclosures covering over twenty specified topics. In
the INPR, the Commission recognized that these extensive disclosure
requirements entail disproportionate compliance costs for sellers of
comparatively low-cost business opportunity ventures.\15\ Therefore,
the Commission proposed to mitigate the compliance burden by
simplifying and streamlining the disclosure requirements.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ 71 FR at 19057.
\16\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specifically, the INPR proposed a one-page business opportunity
pre-sale disclosure document (the ``initial proposed disclosure
document'') with only six required material disclosures.\17\ The
initial proposed disclosure document was intended to provide
prospective purchasers with essential material information they could
use in making a purchase decision. The INPR proposed to require sellers
to use the exact form and language set forth by the Commission and to
include information regarding (1) the seller; (2) earnings claims; (3)
legal actions involving the offered business and its key personnel; (4)
the existence of cancellation or refund policies; (5) the number of
cancellation or refund requests; and (6) references.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ 71 FR at 19091.
\18\ 71 FR at 19068.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to the INPR, the Commission received more than 17,000
comments, the overwhelming majority of which came from individuals
active in the MLM industry.\19\ MLM companies, their representatives
and trade associations, as well as individual participants in various
MLM plans, expressed grave concern about the burdens the IPBOR would
impose on them and urged the Commission to exclude them from the scope
of the IPBOR, to implement various safe harbor provisions, and to
reduce the required disclosures.\20\ The Commission also received
approximately 187 comments, primarily from individual consumers or
consumer groups, in favor of the IPBOR.\21\ Only a handful of comments
came from non-MLM companies and industry groups, expressing various
concerns about obligations that the IPBOR would impose upon them.\22\
None of the comments addressed the form of the initial proposed
disclosure document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Comments responding to the INPR are available at https://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/businessopprule/index.shtm. References to
INPR comments are cited herein as: Name of the commenter-INPR (e.g.,
Avon-INPR).
\20\ Thousands of comments were form letters submitted by
participants in various MLM programs. 73 FR at 16113.
\21\ Numerous letters came from individuals having negative
experiences with various MLMs. 73 FR at 16113 n.37.
\22\ 73 FR at 16113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The Revised Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Revised Proposed
Business Opportunity Rule
Based on an extensive review of the comments received in response
to the INPR and the Commission's law enforcement history, the
Commission issued a revised Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (``RNPR'') on
March 28, 2008, that set forth a revised proposed Rule (the ``Revised
Proposed Business Opportunity Rule'' or ``RPBOR'') that was more
narrowly tailored than the IPBOR.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Id. at 16110.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the RNPR, the Commission recognized that there were two main
problems with the IPBOR's breadth of coverage. First, the IPBOR would
have unintentionally swept in numerous commercial arrangements,
including
[[Page 76819]]
retail product distribution, training and/or educational organizations,
where there was little or no evidence that fraud was occurring.\24\
Recognizing this legitimate concern, the Commission, in the RNPR,
proposed to narrow the definition of ``business opportunity.''
Specifically, the RPBOR provided that the ``required payment'' prong of
the business opportunity definition would not include payments for the
purchase of reasonable amounts of inventory at bona fide wholesale
prices; \25\ eliminated as an element of the business opportunity
definition the making of an earnings claim; \26\ and narrowed the types
of ``business assistance'' that would trigger the business opportunity
definition to just those types of assistance that are the hallmark of
business opportunity fraud: Location, account, and ``buy-back''
assistance.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Id. As one commenter described it, the IPBOR would have
swept in traditional arrangements for distribution of ``food and
beverages, construction equipment, manufactured homes, electronic
components, computer systems, medical supplies and equipment,
automotive parts, automotive tools and other tools, petroleum
products, industrial chemicals, office supplies and equipment, and
magazines.'' IBA-INPR at 5; see also Timberland-INPR (noting that
numerous manufacturers structure their retail distribution in this
manner).
\25\ This amendment was based on concerns raised by some
commenters that if a ``required payment'' did not exclude the
purchase of inventory, many traditional product distribution
arrangements could be brought within the scope of the Rule. 73 FR at
16113.
\26\ This amendment was based on concerns raised by some
commenters that a broad range of commercial arrangements easily
would fall under the business opportunity definition if the company
made some representation about sales or profits sufficient to
constitute an earnings claim. Id. at 16114; see also infra Section
III.A.3.
\27\ Id. at 16123. The Commission eliminated two additional
types of assistance that would have triggered the Rule's strictures
and disclosure obligations--tracking payments and providing
training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the Commission determined that the IPBOR was unworkable
with respect to MLMs and would have imposed greater burdens on the MLM
industry than other types of business opportunity sellers without
sufficient countervailing benefits to consumers. After careful
consideration of the record, the Commission decided to narrow the scope
of the RPBOR to avoid broadly sweeping in all sellers of MLM
opportunities. This decision was based on the overwhelming majority of
the approximately 17,000 comments that argued that the IPBOR failed to
differentiate between unlawful pyramid schemes--which the Commission
intended to cover--and legitimate companies using an MLM model.
Finally, the RPBOR eliminated two disclosures that would have been
required by the IPBOR--information about legal actions pertaining to a
business opportunity seller's sales personnel, and the number of
cancellation or refund requests the seller received.\28\ Eliminating
the disclosure of legal actions involving sales employees was based on
the Commission's recognition that the burden of collecting litigation
histories for every sales person was not outweighed by the
corresponding benefit to prospective purchasers.\29\ With respect to
the disclosure of the number of cancellation or refund requests
received, the Commission determined that such disclosure was not
useful, and further, may have had the perverse effect of discouraging
legitimate businesses from offering refunds.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Id. at 16125.
\29\ Id.
\30\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The RNPR sought public comment on issues relevant to the
Commission's consideration of the RPBOR, including whether the RPBOR
would adequately accomplish the Commission's stated purpose of
protecting consumers against fraud and, if it did not, what
alternatives the Commission could consider.\31\ In contrast to the
INPR, which generated more than 17,000 comments, the Commission
received fewer than 125 comments and rebuttal comments in response to
the RNPR.\32\ Again, however, the vast majority of commenters were from
the MLM industry, but this time they supported the Commission's
proposal to narrow the scope of the Business Opportunity Rule, albeit
with suggestions for fine-tuning.\33\ It is noteworthy that only one
comment came from a business opportunity seller.\34\ The Commission
also received comments from two consumer groups \35\ and approximately
twelve individuals \36\ who expressed their disappointment that the
FTC's proposed rule would exclude MLMs from coverage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Id. at 16133.
\32\ Comments responding to the RNPR are available at https://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/bizoprevised/index.shtm. References to RNPR
comments are cited herein as: Name of commenter-RNPR.
\33\ Some commenters suggested changes to the language of
certain definitions proposed in the RNPR to ensure that the multi-
level marketing industry was not inadvertently swept into the ambit
of the rule. See, e.g., DSA-RNPR; Babener-RNPR; IBA-RNPR.
\34\ Planet Antares-RNPR.
\35\ The two consumer groups are the Consumer Awareness
Institute (``CAI'') and Pyramid Scheme Alert (``PSA'').
\36\ Some letters came from individuals having negative
experiences with MLMs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Consumer Testing of Disclosure Document and Public Workshop
In the RNPR, the Commission announced that it had retained a
consultant to assess the proposed disclosure document, with the
objective of achieving the proper format and content for communicating
material information to consumers. Following publication of the RNPR,
Macro International, Inc. (``Macro''), the FTC's consultant, conducted
extensive consumer testing of the initial proposed disclosure document
that resulted in substantial improvement to both the layout and the
wording of the form.\37\ The Commission made Macro's report as well as
the revised proposed Business Opportunity Disclosure Document
(``revised proposed disclosure document'') \38\ public in a Federal
Register Notice (``Workshop Notice'') that also announced a one-day
public workshop in Washington, DC.\39\ The Workshop Notice focused on
whether the revised proposed disclosure document was an effective means
of conveying material information to prospective purchasers of business
opportunities. The Workshop Notice also sought comment to further
develop the public record on issues that had been raised in the
comments received in response to the RNPR. Five individuals who
represented a range of interests in the proposed Rule were chosen to
participate as panelists, including a federal law enforcer, a state law
enforcer, a consumer advocate, the general counsel of a national multi-
level marketing company, and a former director of the FTC's Bureau of
Consumer Protection.\40\ Staff convened the public workshop with these
five panelists in Washington, DC, on June 1, 2009. At the conclusion of
the workshop discussion of the revised proposed disclosure document,
panelists and audience members were invited to express their views
about other issues related to the RPBOR.\41\ Following
[[Page 76820]]
robust discussion on various topics, the Commission received follow-up
written comment from six individuals and entities.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ A copy of the expert's report to the FTC, ``Design and
Testing of Business Opportunity Disclosures,'' (``Macro Report'') is
available at https://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/bizopps/disclosure-form-report.pdf.
\38\ The version of the revised proposed disclosure document
that was tested by Macro inadvertently omitted the phrase ``or pay
any money'' from the conclusion of the penultimate sentence of the
revised proposed disclosure document. Macro determined that this
omission had no effect on the results of its testing. See Macro
Report at 2.
\39\ See 74 FR 18712 (Apr. 24, 2009).
\40\ Commission staff selected individuals as panelists based
upon their comments, backgrounds, and interest in the subject
matter.
\41\ A copy of the transcript of the June 1, 2009 workshop is
available at https://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/bizopps/index.shtml.
References to the transcript from the June 2009 Business Opportunity
Rule public workshop are cited herein as: Name of commenter, June 09
Tr at page no. (e.g., Jost, June 09 Tr at 12).
\42\ Comments received in response to the Workshop Notice are
available at https://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/bizoprulerevwrkshp/index.shtm. References to workshop comments are cited herein as:
Name of commenter-Workshop.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Staff Report
Pursuant to the Rule amendment process announced in the INPR, the
Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection issued a Staff Report on the
Business Opportunity Rule in November 2010.\43\ The Staff Report
explained in detail the history of the Rule amendment proceeding and
summarized the issues raised during the various notice and comment
periods, particularly those raised in response to the RNPR. It also
addressed the public workshop discussion and subsequent comments, as
well as additional issues that the staff raised on its own initiative,
based on the Commission's law enforcement experience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ See Bureau of Consumer Protection, Staff Report to the
Federal Trade Commission and Proposed Revised Trade Regulation Rule
(16 CFR Part 437) (Nov. 2010) (``Staff Report''). The Staff Report
is available at https://www.ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2010/october/101028businessopportunitiesstaffreport.pdf. In November, the
Commission published a notice in the Federal Register announcing the
availability of, and seeking comment on, the Staff Report. See 75 FR
68559 (Nov. 8, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Twenty-seven comments were submitted in response to the Staff
Report,\44\ including eleven comments submitted by consumer group
Consumer Awareness Institute (``CAI''). The Commission also received
comments from the Department of Justice (``DOJ''), the Direct Selling
Association (``DSA''), MLM companies,\45\ one franchise lead generator,
a consumer group named Pyramid Scheme Alert (``PSA''), and ten
individuals. A few commenters suggested changes to some of the Rule's
definitions and the scope of coverage,\46\ while others encouraged the
Commission to adopt the Rule as recommended in the Staff Report.\47\
The majority of comments submitted by individuals, and the comments
submitted by CAI and PSA, opposed the Commission's decision to narrow
the scope of the Rule to avoid broadly sweeping in MLMs.\48\ In
crafting the final Rule, the Commission has carefully considered the
comments received in response to the Staff Report and throughout the
Rule amendment proceeding.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Comments received in response to the Staff Report are
available at https://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/bizoppstaffreport/index.shtm. References to Staff Report comments are cited herein as:
Name of commenter--Staff Report.
\45\ Comments on behalf of the MLM industry were submitted by
Tupperware and Primerica.
\46\ E.g., Dub-Staff Report; Tupperware-Staff Report.
\47\ DOJ-Staff Report; Primerica-Staff Report; DSA-Staff Report.
\48\ E.g., CAI-Staff Report; PSA-Staff-Report; O'Handley-Staff
Report; Brooks-Staff Report; Johnson-Staff Report.
\49\ The Staff Report comments addressing specific provisions of
the Rule are discussed within the substantive discussions on the
relevant provisions. The comments regarding MLMs are discussed in
Subsection C.1.c below, addressing the Commission's decision to
exclude MLMs from coverage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Overview of the Final Rule
The final Rule significantly modifies the scope, disclosure
requirements, and prohibitions of the interim Business Opportunity
Rule. This proceeding was, in major part, prompted by the recognition
that the interim Business Opportunity Rule's extensive disclosure
requirements are ill-suited to many business opportunities and place
unnecessary compliance costs on both business opportunity sellers and
buyers. Similarly, commenters have observed that business opportunities
and business format franchises are distinct business arrangements that
pose very different regulatory challenges. To account for these
differences, to avoid unnecessary compliance burdens, and to ensure
that consumers are best protected against deceptive practices in the
sale of business opportunities, the Commission has amended the interim
Rule to:
(1) Expand its scope to cover many business opportunities that were
not covered under the interim Business Opportunity Rule;
(2) Streamline pre-sale disclosures;
(3) Prohibit various specific misrepresentations and other
misleading practices often engaged in by fraudulent business
opportunity sellers; and
(4) Require that for offers conducted in Spanish or other languages
besides English, that the disclosures be provided in the same language
as the offer is made. The sections that follow describe these four
aspects of the final Rule.
1. Scope of the Final Rule
The definition of ``business opportunity'' dictates the scope of
coverage under the final Rule. To ensure appropriate coverage, this
definition has been crafted to capture the sale of business
opportunities that historically have been associated with deceptive
practices. As discussed below, the final Rule (1) extends coverage to
those types of opportunities that previously were not covered under the
Original Franchise Rule and the interim Business Opportunity Rule; (2)
continues to cover business opportunities that previously were covered
under the Original Franchise Rule and interim Business Opportunity
Rule; and (3) avoids broadly sweeping in MLMs and certain other types
of arrangements that are not characterized by the deceptive and unfair
practices the final Rule aims to prevent.
a. The Final Rule Covers Many Business Opportunities That Previously
Escaped Coverage
The final Rule includes an expansive definition of ``business
opportunity'' aimed at extending the scope of the Rule to certain
business opportunities--namely work-at-home opportunities such as
envelope-stuffing, product assembly, and medical billing--that often
were not covered by the interim Business Opportunity Rule. The
Commission's law enforcement experience and complaint data show that
these types of business opportunities are sources of prevalent and
persistent problems. These opportunities, however, often escaped
coverage of the Original Franchise Rule and the interim Business
Opportunity Rule due to the following two limitations: (1) A minimum
payment threshold set at $500; and (2) coverage was limited to business
opportunities in which products were sold directly to third party end-
users, rather than back to the business opportunity seller.\50\ Each
limitation is discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ 73 FR at 16112.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, the Original Franchise Rule and the interim Business
Opportunity Rule covered only business opportunity ventures costing
$500 or more. Ventures such as product assembly, medical billing, and
envelope stuffing, however, often require payments of less than $500
and thus were not covered by the interim Business Opportunity Rule.\51\
[[Page 76821]]
Some commenters asserted that setting the threshold for coverage at a
specific dollar amount simply provides scam operators a means to
circumvent the Rule, noting that sellers of business opportunities may
charge less than $500 to skirt the interim Business Opportunity Rule's
disclosure requirements.\52\ The Commission has concluded that the
scope of the final Rule should be broad enough to reach business
opportunities that the Commission's law enforcement history and
consumer complaints show are a widespread and persistent problem,
regardless of the price at which they are offered. Accordingly, the
final Rule eliminates the monetary threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ See, e.g., FTC v. Med. Billers Network, Inc., No. 05 CIV
2014 (RJH) (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ($200-$295 fee); FTC v. Sun Ray Trading,
No. Civ. 05-20402-CIV-Seitz/Bandstra (S.D. Fla. 2005) ($160 fee);
FTC v. Wholesale Mktg. Group, LLC, No. 05 CV 6485 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
($65 to $175 registration fees); FTC v. Vinyard Enters., Inc., No.
03-23291-CIV-ALTONAGA (S.D. Fla. 2003) ($139 fee); FTC v. Leading
Edge Processing, Inc., 6:02-CV-681-ORL-19 DAB (M.D. Fla. 2002) ($150
fee); FTC v. Healthcare Claims Network, Inc., No. 2:02-CV-4569 MMM
(AMWx) (C.D. Cal. 2002) ($485 fee); FTC v. Stuffingforcash.com,
Corp., No. 92 C 5022 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ($45 fee); FTC v. Kamaco
Int'l, No. CV 02-04566 LGB (RNBx) (C.D. Cal. 2002) ($42 fee); FTC v.
Medicor LLC, No. CV01-1896 (CBM) (C.D. Cal. 2001) ($375 fee); FTC v.
SkyBiz.com, No. 01-CV-0396-EA (X) (N.D. Okla. 2001) ($125 fee); FTC
v. Para-Link Int'l, No. 8:00-CV-2114-T-27E (M.D. Fla. 2000) ($395 to
$495 fee); see also Consumer Fraud in the United States: The Second
FTC Survey (October 2007) at 48, available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/10/fraud.pdf (indicating a median payment for work-at-home
schemes of $200).
\52\ See 71 FR at 19079 (citing comments submitted in earlier
proceedings by NCL, SBA Advocacy, Finnigan, and Purvin).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A second limitation to the Original Franchise Rule and the interim
Business Opportunity Rule's scope of coverage was the requirement that
the purchaser of the opportunity had to sell goods or services directly
to third party end-users--someone other than the business opportunity
seller. The effect of this limitation was to exclude most work-at-home
opportunities--such as envelope stuffing and craft assembly ventures--
from coverage. Promoters of these types of opportunities often tell
prospective purchasers that they (1) will work directly for the seller
or a third party the seller identifies or (2) will produce various
goods for the seller, who will then purportedly distribute the goods to
end-users or retail markets.\53\ In order to reach these types of
business opportunities, coverage of the final Rule is not limited to
transactions where the purchaser of the opportunity sells goods or
services directly to individuals other than the business opportunity
seller.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ E.g., FTC v. Darling Angel Pin Creations, Inc., No. 8:10-
cv-00335-JSM-TGW (M.D. Fla. Feb. 2010); FTC v. Indep. Mktg. Exch.
Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00568-NLH-KMW (D.N.J. Feb. 2010); FTC v. Preferred
Platinum Svcs. Network LLC, No. 3:10-cv-00538-MLC-LHG (D.N.J. Feb.
2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. The Final Rule Continues To Cover Those Types of Opportunities
Covered Under the Original Franchise Rule and the Interim Business
Opportunity Rule
In addition to those types of business opportunities that often
evaded coverage under the Original Franchise Rule and Interim Business
Opportunity Rule, the final Rule continues to cover the types of
business opportunities that previously had been covered, such as
vending machine opportunities, rack display opportunities, and similar
arrangements. The Commission's law enforcement experience demonstrates
that sales of these types of opportunities are fraught with unfair and
deceptive practices, in particular, false or unsubstantiated earnings
claims. Indeed, such practices are widespread in promotion and sale of
such business opportunities. Since 1995, the Commission has brought
over 80 law enforcement actions \54\ in connection with more than ten
law enforcement sweeps \55\ that targeted business opportunity scams
involving the sale of vending machines,\56\ rack displays,\57\ public
telephones,\58\ Internet kiosks,\59\ and 900-number ventures,\60\ among
others. These persistent scams will continue to be covered under the
final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ In bringing these FTC law enforcement actions, the FTC
partnered with sister federal agencies--such as the DOJ and the
United States Postal Inspection Service--and with the various state
attorneys general, including the District of Columbia. Thus, these
``sweeps'' entailed many more actions besides those brought by the
FTC.
\55\ E.g., Project Fal$e Hope$, see FTC News Release: Federal,
State Law Enforcers Complete Bogus Business Opportunity Sweep (Dec.
12, 2006), available at https://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/projectfalsehopes.shtm; Project Biz Opp Flop, see FTC News Release:
Criminal and Civil Enforcement Agencies Launch Major Assault Against
Promoters of Business Opportunity and Work-at-Home Schemes (Feb. 22,
2005), available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/02/bizoppflop.htm;
Project Busted Opportunity, see FTC News Release: State, Federal Law
Enforcers Launch Sting on Business Opportunity, Work-at-Home Scams
(June 20, 2002), available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/06/bizopswe.shtm; Project Biz-illion$, see FTC News Release: State-
Federal Crackdown on Phony Business Opportunities Intensifies (March
6, 2000), available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/03/biz.shtm;
Operation Money Pit, see FTC News Release: ``Operation Money Pit''
Targets Fraudulent Business Opportunity Schemes (Feb. 20, 1998),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/02/moneypit.shtm; Project
Vend Up Broke, see FTC News Release: FTC Announces ``Operation Vend
Up Broke'' (Sept. 3, 1998), available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/09/vendup2.shtm; Project Trade Name Games, see FTC News
Release: Display Racks for Trade-Named Toys and Trinkets rre Lastest
in Business Opportunity Fraud Schemes (Aug. 5, 1997), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/08/tradenam.shtm; Operation Missed
Fortune FTC News Release: Operation Missed Fortune (Nov. 13, 1996),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/11/misdfort.shtm; Project
Telesweep, see FTC News Release: Major State-Fed Crackdown Targets
Business Opportunity Scam ``Epidemic'' (July 18, 1995), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/07/scam.shtm. Recent law enforcement
sweeps ``Operation Bottom Dollar'' and ``Operation Short Change,''
challenged, among other things, ``work-at-home'' opportunities. See
FTC News Release: FTC Cracks Down on Scammers Trying to Take
Advantage of the Economic Downturn (Feb. 17, 2010), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/02/bottomdollar.shtm; FTC News Release:
FTC Targets Scams Spawned by Economic Downturn (July 1, 2009),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/07/shortchange.shtm.
\56\ See, e.g., United States v. Lifestyle Vending, Inc., No.
CV-06-6421 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); FTC v. Am. Entm't Distribs., Inc., No.
04-22431-CIV-Huck (2004); FTC v. Inspired Ventures, Inc., No. 02-
21760-CIV-Jordan (S.D. Fla. 2002); FTC v. Essex Mktg. Group, Inc.,
No. 2:02-cv-03415-TCP-AKT (E.D.N.Y 2002); United States v. Univend,
LLC, No. 02-0433-P-L (S.D. Ala. 2002); FTC v. Pathway Merch., Inc.,
No. 01-CIV-8987 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United States v. Photo Vend Int'l,
Inc., No. 98-6935-CIV-Ferguson (S.D. Fla. 1998); FTC v. Hi Tech Mint
Sys., Inc., No. 98 CIV 5881 (JES) (S.D.N.Y. 1998); FTC v. Claude A.
Blanc, Jr., No. 2:92-CV-129-WCO (N.D. Ga. 1992); see also FTC News
Release: FTC Announces ``Operation Vend Up Broke'' (Sept. 3, 1998),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/09/vendup2.shtm (FTC and 10
states announce 40 enforcement actions against fraudulent vending
business opportunities).
\57\ See, e.g., United States v. Elite Designs, Inc., No. CA 05
058 (D.R.I. 2005); United States. v. QX Int'l, No. 398-CV-0453-D
(N.D. Tex. 1998); FTC v. Carousel of Toys, No. 97-8587-CIV-Ungaro-
Benages (S.D. Fla. 1997); FTC v. Raymond Urso, No. 97-2680-CIV-
Ungaro-Benages (S.D. Fla. 1997); FTC v. Infinity Multimedia, Inc.,
No. 96-6671-CIV-Gonzalez (S.D. Fla. 1996); FTC v. O'Rourke, No. 93-
6511-CIV-Ferguson (S.D. Fla. 1993); see also FTC News Release:
Display Racks for Trade-Named Toys and Trinkets are the Latest in
Business Opportunity Fraud Schemes (Aug. 5, 1997), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/08/tradenam.htm (FTC and 8 states filed
18 enforcement actions against sellers of bogus display
opportunities that use trademarks of well-known companies).
\58\ See, e.g., FTC v. Advanced Pub. Commc'ns Corp., No. 00-
00515-CIV-Ungaro-Benages (S.D. Fla. 2000); FTC v. Ameritel Payphone
Distribs., Inc., No. 00-0514-CIV-Gold (S.D. Fla. 2000); FTC v.
ComTel Commc'ns Global Network, Inc., No. 96- 3134-CIV-Highsmith
(S.D. Fla. 1996); FTC v. Intellipay, Inc., No. H92 2325 (S.D. Tex.
1992).
\59\ See, e.g., FTC v. Bikini Vending Corp., No. CV- S-05-0439-
LDG-RJJ (D. Nev. 2005); FTC v. Network Serv. Depot, Inc., No. CV-S0-
05-0440- LDG-LRL (D. Nev. 2005); United States v. Am. Merch. Tech.,
No. 05-20443-CIV-Huck (S.D. Fla. 2005); FTC v. Hart Mktg. Enter.
Ltd., Inc., No. 98-222-CIV-T-23 E (M.D. Fla. 1998); see also FTC v.
FutureNet, Inc., No. CV-98-1113 GHK (BQRx) (C.D. Cal. 1998); FTC v.
TouchNet, Inc., No. C98-0176 (W.D. Wash. 1998).
\60\ See, e.g., FTC v. Bureau 2000 Int'l, Inc., No. 2:96-cv-
01473-WMB-RC (C.D. Cal. 1996); FTC v. Genesis One Corp., No. CV-96-
1516-MRP (MCX) (C.D. Cal. 1996); FTC v. Innovative Telemedia, Inc.,
No. 96- 8140-CIV-Ferguson (S.D. Fla. 1996); FTC v. Ad-Com Int'l, No.
96-1472 LGB (VAP) (C.D. Cal. 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. The Final Rule Avoids Broadly Sweeping in MLMs
The final Rule's definition of business opportunity avoids broadly
sweeping in all sellers of MLM opportunities.\61\ The decision in the
RPBOR to exclude MLMs from the scope of the Rule's coverage was based
on the overwhelming majority of the approximately 17,000 comments that
argued that the IPBOR failed to differentiate between unlawful pyramid
[[Page 76822]]
schemes--which the Commission intended to cover--and legitimate
companies using an MLM model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ See 73 FR at 16120.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As detailed more fully in the RNPR, several common themes emerged
from the numerous comments submitted by the MLM industry. Many
commenters suggested that the low economic risks of participating in a
typical MLM do not justify imposing burdensome regulations that would
threaten to strangle the MLM industry.\62\ These commenters focused on
the low fees--often less than $100--that top MLM companies charge
prospective distributors for the right to sell their products, and on
the relatively low risk that consumers would lose money on large
purchases of inventory.\63\ In addition, industry commenters contended
that the various disclosure requirements were ill-suited for the MLM
business model and that many of the disclosure obligations would show
direct selling companies in a distorting negative light.\64\ For
example, according to one commenter, the requirement to disclose prior
legal actions would cast successful and long-established companies in a
worse light than fly-by-night frauds simply because larger companies
with more sales representatives and more years of operation are likely
to get involved in a larger number of lawsuits.\65\ Moreover, industry
commenters uniformly asserted that the cost of compliance with the
IPBOR would be extremely high for them--first, from the burden of
developing, providing and keeping records of proposed disclosures, and
second, from the impaired ability to recruit prospective
distributors.\66\ Finally, industry commenters argued that unlike
traditional business opportunities, the MLM industry is not permeated
with fraud.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Id. at 16114.
\63\ Id.
\64\ Id. at 16115.
\65\ Id.
\66\ Id. at 16116.
\67\ Id. at 16114.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In contrast to the overwhelming majority of comments that opposed
regulating MLMs through the Business Opportunity Rule, only a small
minority of commenters were in favor of a rule that would cover MLMs.
These commenters included two consumer groups, CAI and PSA, a few
consumer advocates, individuals who regretted becoming involved in
MLMs, and other MLM participants.\68\ Many of the consumer advocates
contended that the MLM industry is comprised primarily of pyramid
schemes masquerading as legitimate companies.\69\ The commenters also
asserted that MLMs deceptively market their distributorships as a low-
risk opportunity with high earnings potential, when in fact, the costs
of participating in an MLM can be high and the earnings comparatively
small.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ Id. at 16116.
\69\ CAI-INPR at 2 (``I can certify that MLM (sic) are not
direct selling programs, but chain selling programs''); CAI-INPR
Rebuttal of DSA Comments at 3 (``The Direct Selling Association
(DSA), recently taken over by chain sellers now promotes chain
selling (pyramid marketing)--even more than legitimate direct
selling''); see also Brooks-INPR at 2 (``In my opinion, most MLM
firms operate in a deceptive or fraudulent manner'').
\70\ PSA-INPR at 3-4; Brooks-INPR at 4; Johnson-INPR at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the RNPR, the Commission concluded that although there is
significant concern that some pyramid schemes may masquerade as
legitimate MLMs, assessing the incidence of such practices is difficult
and indeed, determining whether an MLM is a pyramid scheme requires a
fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis. Further, the record developed
was insufficient as a basis for crafting MLM disclosures that would
effectively help consumers make an informed decision about the risks of
joining a particular MLM.
Based on the record and the Commission's law enforcement
experience, the RNPR announced the Commission's determination that it
would not be practicable to apply the requirements of the proposed Rule
to MLM companies. Drawing on its law enforcement experience, the
Commission acknowledged that some MLMs do engage in unfair or deceptive
acts or practices, including operating pyramid schemes or making
unsubstantiated earnings claims that cause consumer harm. The
Commission, however, was not persuaded that workable, meaningful
disclosures could be devised that would help consumers identify a
fraudulent pyramid scheme. This being the case, the Commission decided
that the proposed Rule was too blunt an instrument to alleviate fraud
in the sale of MLMs. The Commission therefore determined to continue to
challenge unfair or deceptive practices in the MLM industry through law
enforcement actions alleging violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act and
not through the Business Opportunity Rule. The Staff Report's
recommendations were consistent with this decision.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ Staff Report at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to the Staff Report, the Commission received 24
comments addressing the Commission's decision to narrow the scope of
the Rule to avoid broadly sweeping in MLMs. Specifically, 19 comments
opposed the Commission's decision,\72\ one commenter agreed with the
decision to narrow the scope of the Rule, but suggested modifying the
Rule to contain bright line exemptions and to clarify the definition of
``required payment,'' \73\ and two commenters advocated that the
Commission adopt the Rule as recommended.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ These included eleven comments submitted by consumer group
CAI, as well as comments submitted by PSA and seven individuals. In
addition, two individuals submitted comments supporting the
statistical analysis provided by CAI President, Jon Taylor. See
McKee-Staff Report; Ashby-Staff Report.
\73\ Tupperware-Staff Report.
\74\ DSA-Staff Report; Primerica-Staff Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters opposing the decision to avoid sweeping MLMs within the
scope of the Rule's coverage set forth the same basic premise--that
MLMs frequently misrepresent the level of earnings achieved by their
distributors and therefore, should be subject to regulation.\75\ More
specifically, many of the commenters advocated that the MLM industry
should be required to disclose the average income of their
participants.\76\ The Commission has carefully considered the comments
submitted in response to the Staff Report on the issue of MLMs. While
some of the commenters provided an analysis of the MLM industry with
concrete examples of the types of problems that exist within that
industry,\77\ many did not. Instead, many commenters expressed in
general terms their low opinion of MLMs and their general opinion that
MLMs should be regulated.\78\ More to the point, none of the commenters
provided persuasive arguments for why the Business Opportunity Rule is
the proper vehicle to address the problems they identified within the
MLM industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ See, e.g., O'Handley-Staff Report (``I personally believe
that this industry is a borderline scam at best and needs MORE
oversight than everyone else-NOT LESS.''); Welling-Staff Report (``I
find it amazing that * * * the MLM industry has little or no
regulations.'').
\76\ See, e.g., Barrett-Staff Report (FTC should ``demand
truthful disclosure of income potentials for MLM''); Brooks-Staff
Report (MLMs should produce ``actual, verifiable data concerning the
earnings and losses of their distributors''); CAI-Staff Report at 7-
3 (advocating for the disclosure of ``information supporting
earnings claims'').
\77\ See, e.g., CAI-Staff Report (reporting research on the MLM
industry and quoting representations made by various MLMs).
\78\ See, e.g., Craig-Staff Report (there is ``ample evidence of
problems with MLM to warrant inclusion in the rule''); Afoa-Staff
Report (commenting on personal experience with one MLM).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Before discussing the comments in further detail, however, one
point in the rulemaking record requires clarification. Several comments
focused on the
[[Page 76823]]
following language contained in the Staff Report: ``Two key problems
emerged with the IPBOR's breadth of coverage. First, the IPBOR would
have unintentionally swept in numerous commercial arrangements where
there is little or no evidence that fraud is occurring.'' \79\ The
commenters suggest, incorrectly, that the quoted language reveals a
finding by the Commission that there is little or no evidence of fraud
occurring within the MLM industry.\80\ This language, however, referred
to a passage from the RNPR that addressed traditional product
distribution arrangements, not MLMs.\81\ The Commission has not made a
finding that there is little or no evidence of fraud within the MLM
industry; to the contrary, it has specifically recognized, through its
own law enforcement experience, that some MLMs may be pyramid schemes
in masquerade and may make false and unsubstantiated earnings
claims.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ See, e.g., CAI-Staff Report at 1, 10-41; PSA-Staff Report.
\80\ CAI-Staff Report at 10-41; PSA-Staff Report (``The basis of
the exclusion appears to be the extraordinary claim that there is
insufficient evidence of widespread fraud in the multi-level
marketing field.'').
\81\ Indeed, the language quoted by CAI and PSA contains a
footnote referencing the section of the RNPR that discussed
traditional product distribution arrangements. See Staff Report at
30 (citing 73 FR at 16113).
\82\ See 73 FR at 16119; see also Staff Report at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In any event, the comments submitted in response to the Staff
Report do not persuade the Commission that the Business Opportunity
Rule is the proper tool to address these problems.\83\ Two of the
affirmative disclosure requirements illustrate the difficulty in
applying the Rule to MLMs: (1) The disclosure of substantiation for
earnings claims; and (2) the disclosure of references.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ Indeed, one commenter recommended a completely separate set
of disclosures for MLM opportunities, further suggesting that the
Business Opportunity Rule is a poor fit for the MLM industry. See
Johnson-Staff Report