Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations, 72560-72600 [2011-29735]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 226 (Wednesday, November 23, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 72560-72600]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-29735]



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Vol. 76

Wednesday,

No. 226

November 23, 2011

Part III





Nuclear Regulatory Commission





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10 CFR Parts 50 and 52





Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 226 / Wednesday, November 23, 2011 / 
Rules and Regulations

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Parts 50 and 52

[NRC-2008-0122]
RIN 3150-AI10


Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) 
is amending certain emergency preparedness (EP) requirements in its 
regulations that govern domestic licensing of production and 
utilization facilities. The final rule adds a conforming provision in 
the regulations that govern licenses, certifications, and approvals for 
new nuclear power plants. The final rule codifies certain voluntary 
protective measures contained in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events,'' and 
generically applicable requirements similar to those previously imposed 
by Commission orders. In addition, the final rule amends other licensee 
emergency plan requirements based on a comprehensive review of the 
NRC's EP regulations and guidance. The requirements enhance the ability 
of licensees in preparing to take and taking certain EP and protective 
measures in the event of a radiological emergency; address, in part, 
security issues identified after the terrorist events of September 11, 
2001; clarify regulations to effect consistent emergency plan 
implementation among licensees; and modify certain EP requirements to 
be more effective and efficient.

DATES: This final rule is effective on December 23, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You can access publicly available documents related to this 
document using the following methods:
     NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine 
and have copied, for a fee, publicly available documents at the NRC's 
PDR, O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland 20852.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC 
are available online in the NRC Library at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain entry into ADAMS, 
which provides text and image files of the NRC's public documents. If 
you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing 
the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR reference staff 
at 1-(800) 397-4209, (301) 415-4737, or by email to 
pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
     Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Public comments and 
supporting materials related to this final rule can be found at https://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID NRC-2008-0122. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher, telephone: (301) 492-
3668; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Beall, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001; telephone: (301) 415-3874, email: Robert.Beall@nrc.gov; or 
Don Tailleart, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 
(301) 415-2966, email: Don.Tailleart@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Background
II. Discussion
III. Public and Stakeholder Input to the Final Rule
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
V. Implementation
VI. Guidance
VII. Criminal Penalties
VIII. Agreement State Compatibility
IX. Availability of Documents
X. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XIII. Regulatory Analysis: Availability
XIV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XV. Backfit Analysis
XVI. Congressional Review Act

I. Background

    After the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC 
determined that it was necessary to require certain modifications of EP 
programs for operating power reactor licensees to ensure continued 
adequate protection of public health and safety. These modifications 
were issued to licensees by NRC Order EA-02-026, ``Order for Interim 
Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures,'' (Order EA-02-026), 
dated February 25, 2002. Order EA-02-026 was issued to the license 
holders of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors in the U.S. This 
order required licensees to implement interim compensatory measures 
(ICMs) for the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment and take 
actions such as:
    (1) Review security and emergency plans to maximize compatibility 
between the plans;
    (2) Assess the adequacy of staffing plans at emergency response 
facilities, and for licensees with an onsite emergency operations 
facility (EOF), identify alternative facilities capable of supporting 
emergency response;
    (3) Develop plans, procedures and training regarding notification 
(including non-emergency response organization (ERO) employees), 
activation, and coordination between the site and offsite response 
organizations (OROs);
    (4) Conduct a review of staffing to ensure that collateral duties 
are not assigned to responders that would prevent effective emergency 
response; and
    (5) Implement site-specific emergency action levels (EALs) to 
provide an anticipatory response to a credible threat.
    Following the issuance of Order EA-02-026, the NRC conducted 
inspections of licensee EP programs and held meetings with nuclear 
power industry representatives to discuss the inspection results and 
the modifications licensees had made to their EP programs.
    Also following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC 
evaluated the EP planning basis for nuclear power reactors given the 
changed threat environment. In SECY-03-0165, ``Evaluation of Nuclear 
Power Reactor Emergency Preparedness Planning Basis Adequacy in the 
Post-9/11 Threat Environment,'' issued on September 22, 2003 (not 
publicly available), the NRC staff reported to the Commission that the 
EP planning basis remained valid, including scope and timing issues. 
However, the NRC staff also recognized that security events differ from 
accident events due to the planned action to maximize damage and loss 
of life and that the EP response to such events also differed. The NRC 
staff noted several EP issues that required further action to better 
respond to the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment.
    On December 14, 2004, the NRC staff briefed the Commission on EP 
program initiatives. During the briefing, the NRC staff informed the 
Commission of its intent to conduct a comprehensive review of EP 
regulations and guidance. On February 25, 2005, in response to the 
Commission's staff requirements memorandum (SRM), SRM-M041214B, 
``Briefing on Emergency Preparedness Program Initiatives, 1 p.m., 
Tuesday, December 14, 2004, Commissioners' Conference Room, One White 
Flint North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated 
December

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20, 2004, the NRC staff provided the Commission with a schedule of 
activities for the completion of the comprehensive review. The NRC 
staff, through SECY-05-0010, ``Recommended Enhancements of Emergency 
Preparedness and Response at Nuclear Power Plants in Post-9/11 
Environment,'' issued on January 10, 2005 (not publicly available), 
requested Commission approval of the NRC staff's recommendations for 
enhancing, through new guidance documents, EP in the post-September 11, 
2001, threat environment. In its SRM to SECY-05-0010, dated May 4, 2005 
(not publicly available), the Commission directed the staff to provide 
the results of a comprehensive review of EP regulations and guidance. 
The SRM to SECY-05-0010 also approved the staff's recommendation to 
proceed with enhancements to address EP issues as described in SECY-05-
0010. As a result, the NRC staff issued Bulletin 2005-02 (BL-05-02), 
``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based 
Events,'' dated July 18, 2005, which recommended enhancements that 
licensees could integrate into EP programs at power reactors. Bulletin 
BL-05-02 also sought to obtain information from licensees on their 
actions taken to implement Order EA-02-026 and to modify their EP 
programs to adjust to the current threat environment. Based on the 
results of the post-BL-05-02 inspections, meetings with members of the 
nuclear power industry, and licensees' responses to BL-05-02, the NRC 
determined that licensees were implementing strategies to satisfy Order 
EA-02-026 and enhance their programs to address the changed threat 
environment.
    As directed by the Commission SRMs discussed above, the NRC staff 
conducted a comprehensive review of the EP regulatory structure, 
including reviews of regulations and guidance documents. As part of 
this review, the NRC staff met with internal and external stakeholders 
through several public meetings in 2005 and 2006 to discuss the 
elements of the EP review and plans to update EP regulations and 
guidance. Section III of this document provides a list of the public 
and other stakeholder meetings.
    On September 20, 2006, the NRC staff provided the results of its 
review to the Commission in SECY-06-0200, ``Results of the Review of 
Emergency Preparedness Regulations and Guidance,'' dated September 20, 
2006. In that paper, the NRC staff discussed the activities it had 
conducted to complete the review and provided its recommendation to 
pursue rulemaking for enhancements to the EP program. The NRC staff 
explained that the comprehensive review of the EP program identified 
several areas where the implementation of EP regulations and guidance, 
recent technological advances, and lessons learned from actual events, 
drills, and exercises had revealed to the NRC areas for potential 
improvement and increased clarity for the EP program. The staff divided 
the potential enhancements into two categories: security-based EP 
issues and other EP issues. The NRC staff evaluated each issue and 
assigned it a priority of high, medium, or low based on an analysis of 
the issue's relationship to reactor safety, physical security, EP, NRC 
strategic goals of openness and effectiveness, and stakeholder impact.
    The NRC staff's outreach efforts, data gathering, research, and 
analysis led to the identification of 12 issues with a high priority, 
including six security EP issues and six non-security EP issues. In 
SECY-06-0200, the staff presented a framework for the potential 
enhancements to the EP regulations and guidance to address these 
issues, including steps for implementation, prioritization, and 
resource estimates. Based on its review, the NRC staff recommended that 
the Commission approve rulemaking as the most effective and efficient 
means to ensure that the high priority EP issues were resolved with an 
opportunity for participation by all interested stakeholders.
    In its SRM to SECY-06-0200, dated January 8, 2007, the Commission 
approved the NRC staff's recommendation to pursue rulemaking and 
guidance changes for enhancements to the EP program. On April 17, 2007, 
the staff provided its rulemaking plan to the Commission. During the 
development of the plan, the NRC staff assessed the issues identified 
in SECY-06-0200 and discussed the feasibility of conducting rulemaking 
and updating guidance on all issues. The staff determined that the best 
course of action was to conduct rulemaking on the 12 issues identified 
in SECY-06-0200 as having a high priority, and to reassess the 
remaining issues at a later date. The decision to conduct rulemaking on 
the highest priority issues was made to allow a timelier rulemaking 
effort to occur and enable the staff to more completely assess the 
remaining lower priority issues.
    Due to the similarities between two issues known in the rulemaking 
plan as ``collateral duties'' and ``shift staffing and augmentation,'' 
these issues have been partially combined in this final rule. 
Additionally, the Commission directed the NRC staff in SRM-M060502, 
``Staff Requirements--Briefing on Status of Emergency Planning 
Activities, (Two sessions) 9:30 a.m. and 1 p.m., Tuesday, May 2, 2006, 
Commissioners' Conference Room, One White Flint North, Rockville, 
Maryland (Open to public attendance),'' dated June 29, 2006, to 
coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop 
emergency planning exercise scenarios that would ensure that EP drills 
and exercises will be challenging and will not precondition participant 
responses. This direction was incorporated into the rulemaking issue 
regarding the conduct of hostile action drills and exercises because it 
was so closely related. Bulletin BL-05-02 provided a definition of 
``hostile action'' for use in EP programs: ``An act toward an NPP 
[nuclear power plant] or its personnel that includes the use of violent 
force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the 
licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water 
using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to 
deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent 
may be included.''
    In an effort to conduct a rulemaking that would be transparent and 
open to stakeholder participation, the NRC engaged stakeholders through 
various means during the development of this rule. The NRC discussed 
the proposed improvements to the EP regulations and guidance at several 
conferences with key stakeholders present including the 2007 NRC 
Regulatory Information Conference (RIC) and the 2008 National 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness (NREP) Conference. These meetings 
are discussed more fully in Section III of this document.
    The NRC posted draft rule language on the Federal rulemaking Web 
site, https://www.regulations.gov, on February 29, 2008, and solicited 
stakeholder comments. The NRC considered the comments received on the 
draft rule language in the process of developing the proposed rule. The 
NRC continued the use of public meetings as a method to foster open 
communication with stakeholders when it held public meetings on March 
5, 2008, and on July 8, 2008. At the March 5, 2008 meeting, the NRC 
staff discussed the draft preliminary rule language for the rulemaking 
on enhancements to EP regulations and guidance and answered 
stakeholders' questions on the rule language. At the July 8, 2008, 
meeting, the NRC staff discussed the public comments on the draft 
preliminary rule language and answered stakeholders'

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questions on how these comments may be addressed in the proposed rule.
    On January 9, 2009, the NRC staff provided the proposed rule to the 
Commission in SECY-09-0007, ``Proposed Rule Related to Enhancements to 
Emergency Preparedness Regulations (10 CFR [Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations] part 50).'' In its SRM to SECY-09-0007, dated 
April 16, 2009, the Commission approved the publication of the proposed 
rule. The NRC published the proposed rule on the enhancements to EP 
regulations for public comment in the Federal Register on May 18, 2009 
(74 FR 23254). Because it received several requests to lengthen the 
public comment period, the NRC extended the deadline for the public 
comment period from August 3, 2009, to October 19, 2009. During the 
public comment period, the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) jointly held 11 public meetings to discuss the proposed 
rule and related guidance documents. The NRC received a total of 94 
submittals and from these submittals, 687 individual comments were 
identified.
    On December 8, 2009, NRC and FEMA staff briefed the Commission on 
the status of the EP rulemaking and comments received during the public 
comment period. In addition, a panel of external stakeholders briefed 
the Commission on their comments and views regarding the proposed rule. 
In SRM-M091208, ``Staff Requirements--Briefing on the Proposed Rule: 
Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations, 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, 
December 8, 2009, Commissioners' Conference Room, One White Flint 
North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to Public Attendance),'' dated January 
13, 2010, the Commission directed the NRC staff to continue working 
with FEMA in considering comments from State and local officials, and 
other interested stakeholders, to enhance the EP regulations and 
guidance. The Commission also directed the NRC staff to address the 
impacts of the rule and to consider providing a public draft of the 
rule language and guidance documents via the NRC public Web site while 
working with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards on the draft 
final rule.
    On November 15, 2010, the NRC and FEMA held a public meeting to 
discuss the proposed implementation dates for the EP final rule. The 
feedback from this meeting, as well as all the previous interactions, 
informed the NRC's schedule for the implementation of the new EP 
requirements.

II. Discussion

    The final rule applies to 10 CFR part 50 licensees that are 
currently subject to the EP requirements. The final rule similarly 
applies to certain applicants for construction permits under Part 50 
with respect to their discussion of preliminary plans for coping with 
emergencies (Sec.  50.34(a)(10)), operating licenses under Part 50 
(Sec.  50.34(b)(6)(v)), early site permits under Part 52 that choose to 
propose either major features of an, or a complete and integrated, 
emergency plan (Sec.  52.17(b)(2)), and combined licenses under Part 52 
(Sec.  52.79(a)(21)). A discussion of which applicants may defer 
compliance with the requirements of this final rule is provided in 
Section V of this document.
    An effective EP program decreases the likelihood of an initiating 
event at a nuclear power reactor proceeding to a severe accident. 
Emergency preparedness cannot affect the probability of the initiating 
event, but a high level of EP increases the probability of accident 
mitigation if the initiating event proceeds beyond the need for initial 
operator actions. As a defense-in-depth measure, emergency response is 
not normally quantified in probabilistic risk assessments. However, the 
level of EP could affect the outcome of an accident in that the 
accident may be mitigated by the actions of the ERO or, in the worst 
case, consequences to the public could be reduced through the effective 
use of protective actions. Enhancements to the level of EP in this 
manner enhance protection of public health and safety through 
improvements in the response to unlikely initiating events that could 
lead to severe accidents without mitigative response.
    The NRC's EP requirements are based on 16 planning standards in 
Sec.  50.47(b) that apply to onsite and offsite emergency response 
plans. The planning standards apply to onsite and offsite plans 
because, in making its licensing decision, the NRC looks at the 
application (or the licensee's activities in the case of existing 
facilities), the current State and local government emergency plans, 
and FEMA's recommendation, which is based on the content of the State 
and local plans. The FEMA regulations in 44 CFR part 350 also contain 
these planning standards, which are used to make its recommendation on 
the adequacy of the plans and capability of the State and local 
governments to implement them; however, FEMA's regulations address only 
offsite (State and local government) plans. The changes to Sec.  
50.47(b) in this final rule are designed to affect the onsite plans, 
not the offsite plans. The changes have been written in a way that is 
expected to limit the chance of unintended impacts on FEMA regulations.
    This final rule does not affect the findings necessary for issuance 
of a renewed nuclear power operating license under 10 CFR part 54. As 
the Commission explained in the license renewal final rule (56 FR 
64943; December 13, 1991) and again in revisions to that final rule (60 
FR 22461; May 8, 1995), the scope of license renewal is limited to 
those issues that have a specific relevance to protecting the public 
health and safety during the license renewal period (i.e., age-related 
degradation). Issues relevant to current plant operations, like 
emergency planning, fall within the purview of the current regulatory 
process and continue into the extended operation period of a license 
renewal. See also NUREG-1412, ``Foundation for the Adequacy of the 
Licensing Bases,'' dated December 1991. The Commission has affirmed 
repeatedly that ``emergency preparedness need not be reviewed again for 
license renewal,'' 71 FR 74848, 74852; December 13, 2006 (referencing 
56 FR at 64966). The Commission stated that ``[t]hrough its standards 
and required exercises, the Commission ensures that existing plans are 
adequate throughout the life of any plant even in the face of changing 
demographics and other site-related factors.'' 71 FR at 74852 (quoting 
56 FR at 64966). This basic determination is reflected in the NRC's 
regulations at Sec.  50.47(a), in which a new finding on emergency 
planning issues is not required for license renewal.
    The discussion of the amendments in this final rule is divided into 
two sections: Section II.A for security-related EP issues and Section 
II.B for non-security related EP issues. The security-related issues 
are topics that address subjects similar to certain requirements in 
Order EA-02-026 and the guidance in BL-05-02. The non-security related 
issues are high priority items that resulted from the comprehensive 
review of EP regulations and guidance.

A. Security-Related EP Issues

    The NRC is enhancing its EP regulations by incorporating changes 
that clearly address EP actions for hostile action. Some of the changes 
are based on requirements in Order EA-02-026 that was issued to ensure 
adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense 
and security. After the issuance of Order EA-02-026, however, the 
Commission took several additional steps to ensure

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adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense 
and security, including the issuance of Order EA-02-261, ``Access 
Authorization Order,'' issued January 7, 2003 (68 FR 1643; January 13, 
2003); Order EA-03-039, ``Security Personnel Training and Qualification 
Requirements (Training) Order,'' issued April 29, 2003 (68 FR 24514; 
May 7, 2003); Order EA-03-086, ``Revised Design Basis Threat Order,'' 
issued April 29, 2003 (68 FR 24517; May 7, 2003); the Design Basis 
Threat (DBT) final rule (72 FR 12705; March 19, 2007); and the Power 
Reactor Security Requirements final rule (74 FR 13926; March 27, 2009). 
As a result of these adequate protection requirements, the Commission 
has determined that the existing regulatory structure ensures adequate 
protection of public health and safety and common defense and security. 
Therefore, the EP changes in this final rule that are based on the 
requirements of Order EA-02-026 are not necessary to ensure adequate 
protection during hostile action. These amendments are considered 
enhancements to the current EP regulations. However, licensees' 
implementation of these enhancements will result in a substantial 
increase in EP and the protection of public health and safety.
1. On-Shift Staffing Analysis
    The NRC is concerned that on-shift ERO personnel who are assigned 
to emergency plan implementation functions may have numerous tasks or 
multiple responsibilities that would prevent timely performance of 
their assigned emergency plan tasks. The requirements for on-shift 
responsibilities are addressed in Sec.  50.47(b)(2) and Part 50, 
Appendix E, Section IV.A. The former regulations did not specifically 
require that on-shift personnel assigned to emergency plan 
implementation must be able to implement the plan effectively without 
having competing responsibilities that could prevent them from 
performing their primary emergency plan tasks. The NRC regulations and 
guidance concerning licensee EROs are general in nature to allow some 
flexibility in the number of on-shift staff required for response to 
emergency events. This sometimes has resulted in the inadequate 
completion of emergency functions required during an emergency event. 
The NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 91-77, ``Shift Staffing at 
Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated November 26, 1991, to alert licensees to 
problems that could arise from insufficient on-shift staff for 
emergency response. The IN highlighted the following two events:
     A fire at one plant in April 1991 resulted in the 
licensee's failure to notify some key emergency response personnel 
(communication function). The need to staff the fire brigade and 
perform numerous response actions required by the event resulted in a 
heavy workload for the shift staff.
     A fire, loss of offsite power, and reactor trip at another 
plant in June 1991 resulted in difficulties in classifying the event, 
notifying required personnel, implementing emergency operating 
procedures, and staffing the fire brigade. Insufficient staff 
contributed to the licensee's failure to make a timely Notification of 
Unusual Event.
    The NRC issued IN 93-81, ``Implementation of Engineering Expertise 
On-Shift,'' dated October 12, 1993, to alert licensees of ineffective 
implementation of the requirement to provide adequate engineering 
expertise on shift. Each nuclear power plant is required to have a 
shift technical advisor (STA) to provide engineering and accident 
assessment expertise. However, some licensees had assigned additional 
response duties to STAs, such as communicator or fire brigade member, 
which could have resulted in overburdening the control room staff 
during an emergency event. One licensee had assigned the STA as fire 
brigade leader, which could have hindered the STA from performing the 
primary duty of providing accident assessment and engineering 
expertise.
    After issuance of IN 91-77, event follow-up inspections indicated 
that challenges involving shift staffing and task allocation continued. 
The NRC initiated a study in 1995 to assess the adequacy of shift 
staffing for emergency response. The NRC published IN 95-48, ``Results 
of Shift Staffing Study,'' dated October 10, 1995, which cited several 
observations of inadequate staffing and also concluded that there could 
be a large workload for radiological support personnel during 
emergencies. Data was collected on the adequacy of nuclear power plant 
staffing practices for performing response activities during two 
accident scenarios, which were (1) a fire leading to reactor trip with 
complications, and (2) either a control room fire leading to evacuation 
and remote shutdown or a station blackout. Items of interest included 
the following:
     Licensees surveyed did not use a systematic process for 
establishing site-specific shift staffing levels.
     Licensees surveyed frequently assigned additional plant-
specific tasks that were not specified by regulation to be performed by 
licensed and non-licensed operators during an event.
     Five of the seven licensees surveyed used licensed 
personnel to staff the fire brigade.
     Procedures varied significantly concerning licensed and 
non-licensed personnel staffing levels, and the number of non-licensed 
operators used on the night-shift varied greatly.
     Radiation protection and chemistry technicians of all the 
licensees surveyed had a high workload during the scenarios.
    Multiple NRC inspection findings also indicate the need for 
regulatory clarity in the assignment of multiple responsibilities to 
on-shift ERO personnel. For example, in February 2003, one licensee 
revised its emergency plan to delete one of three communicators and 
assigned the communicator function to the STA as an additional duty. As 
previously stated, the primary emergency plan duty of the STA is to 
provide engineering and accident assessment expertise. The NRC 
determined that this emergency plan change was an inappropriate 
reduction in on-shift staff and assessed the change as a decrease in 
effectiveness of the emergency plan in violation of Sec.  50.54(q). In 
April 2005, another licensee revised its emergency plan to allow the 
assignment of the on-shift health physics technician (HP Tech.) as the 
interim operations support center coordinator, a 30-minute augmented 
ERO responder. The HP Tech. had assigned emergency plan tasks including 
in-plant surveys, in-plant protective actions, and rescue/first aid. 
The NRC determined that this emergency plan change was an inappropriate 
assignment of augmentation staff duties to an on-shift responder and 
assessed the change as a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency 
plan in violation of Sec.  50.54(q).
    These findings demonstrated the need for amended regulations to 
explicitly limit on-shift ERO response duties to ensure that these 
emergency responders do not become overburdened during an emergency 
event. Having additional duties beyond the assigned emergency plan 
implementation functions could result in on-shift responders being 
overburdened, resulting in inadequate or untimely response.
    The ICMs in Order EA-02-026 addressed on-shift staff 
responsibilities by requiring licensees to ensure that a sufficient 
number of on-shift personnel are available for integrated security plan 
and emergency plan implementation. Prior to issuance of the order, some 
licensees were utilizing security

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personnel to implement the emergency plan when many of these responders 
would likely not be available due to a hostile action.
    The NRC considered several options to resolve this issue. One 
option was to take no action, but this alternative would not have 
subjected new nuclear power reactor licensees to Order EA-02-026's 
requirement of an assessment to ensure adequate staff for integrated 
security plan and emergency plan implementation. Additionally, the 
shift staffing study referenced in IN 95-48 found that the licensees 
surveyed did not use a systematic process for establishing shift 
staffing levels and additional tasks, not required by regulation, were 
assigned to the licensed and non-licensed operators. This practice, if 
permitted to continue, could have resulted in operators being 
overburdened during an emergency. A second option was to allow 
licensees to use a voluntary program to ensure adequate shift staffing. 
However, many licensees have requested NRC permission to reduce on-
shift staffing levels and the NRC would have expected this practice to 
continue. This could have increased the risk of over-burdening on-shift 
responders and resulted in inadequate or untimely response. Therefore, 
both of these options were considered unacceptable.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC would have required nuclear power 
plant licensees to provide a detailed analysis to show that on-shift 
personnel assigned emergency plan implementation functions were not 
assigned any responsibilities that would prevent them from performing 
their assigned emergency plan functions. The NRC received several 
comments on this proposal, questioning the need for this regulation and 
suggesting that the proposed rule methodology should be placed in a 
regulatory guide, NUREG, or some other guidance document. The NRC 
disagrees with these comments and believes that a regulation is 
necessary to ensure consistent licensee implementation of on-shift 
emergency response staffing that is enforceable and not merely 
guidance. Therefore, the NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section 
IV.A, to address this issue, as discussed in Section IV of this 
document.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC asked for public comment on whether 
the NRC should enhance its regulations to be more explicit in the 
number of ERO staff necessary for response to nuclear power plant 
emergencies. Specifically, the NRC requested comments on a draft 
staffing table that provided proposed staff functions and minimum 
staffing levels for the on-shift and augmenting ERO. The table was a 
modification of the guidance found in Table B-1 of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-
1, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency 
Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,'' 
dated November 1980, and incorporated lessons learned from years of NRC 
EP experience. Of the comments the NRC received, some comments 
supported and some opposed the inclusion of the table into regulations. 
The NRC acknowledges that because each site is different and site 
characteristics may dictate the size of the ERO staff, requiring 
compliance with standard staffing requirements would be an unreasonable 
approach to resolving this issue. For example, the NRC has approved 
some emergency plans with additional ERO staff due to site-specific 
circumstances, such as the lack of a local fire department or hospital. 
Therefore, the NRC is not specifying a standard ERO staffing table in 
its regulations.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC asked for public comment on whether 
the NRC should add a requirement for non-power reactor licensees to 
perform a detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel can 
perform all assigned emergency plan implementation functions in a 
timely manner without having competing responsibilities that could 
prevent them from performing their emergency plan functions. The NRC 
received several comments that opposed a regulation imposing this 
requirement. The NRC agrees that this requirement is not necessary for 
non-power reactor licensees. Staffing at non-power reactors is 
generally small, which is commensurate with the need to operate the 
facility in a manner that is protective of public health and safety. 
The NRC reviews the staffing as part of initial reactor licensing. The 
functions of emergency staff are outlined in emergency plans and are 
tested through drills and exercises in accordance with NUREG-0849, 
``Standard Review Plan for the Review and Evaluation of Emergency Plans 
for Research and Test Reactors,'' dated October 1983. Results are 
reviewed by the NRC during routine inspections. Therefore, the NRC has 
not included this requirement in the final rule.
2. Emergency Action Levels for Hostile Action
    Section 50.47(b)(4) stipulates that emergency plans must include a 
standard emergency classification and EAL scheme. Part 50, Appendix E, 
Section IV.B, specifies that emergency plans shall include EALs that 
are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification of 
State and local agencies, and participation of those agencies in 
emergency response. However, the former regulations did not require 
EALs for hostile action and did not address the issue of anticipatory 
response to hostile action. Although Order EA-02-026 and BL-05-02 
addressed these issues, those improvements to the EAL requirements to 
address hostile action were only in orders and guidance. Thus, the NRC 
could not ensure consistent and effective implementation of these 
enhancements among existing and future licensees.
    Order EA-02-026 required the declaration of at least a Notification 
of Unusual Event in response to a credible hostile action threat. In 
2005, the NRC issued BL-05-02, which provided EAL enhancement examples 
for hostile action up to the General Emergency level. Bulletin BL-05-02 
provided examples of EALs for all three EAL methodologies that could be 
implemented immediately without prior NRC approval (i.e., NUREG-0654, 
NUMARC/NESP-007, ``Methodology for Development of Emergency Action 
Levels,'' and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, ``Methodology for 
Development of Emergency Action Levels''). It also pointed out that 
because of improvements in Federal agencies' information-sharing and 
assessment capabilities, hostile action emergency declarations can be 
accomplished in a more anticipatory manner, based on a credible threat, 
than the current method of making declarations for accidental events. 
This would enable earlier implementation of emergency response actions.
    Although all nuclear power reactor licensees have implemented both 
the credible threat EAL required by Order EA-02-026 and the EAL 
enhancements specified in BL-05-02, licensees were not required to 
maintain the enhancements identified in the bulletin. This could have 
resulted in inconsistent EAL implementation among licensees for 
response to hostile action. Also, future licensees would not have been 
required to include these enhancements in their emergency plans. This 
final rule establishes consistent EALs across the nuclear power 
industry for hostile action. The ICMs and BL-05-02 provided 
enhancements to EAL schemes that would allow event declarations to be 
accomplished in a more anticipatory manner. This timeliness is of the 
utmost importance because EALs are used as criteria for determining the 
need for notification and participation of State and local agencies. 
The NRC is

[[Page 72565]]

codifying these enhancements to the EAL requirements addressing hostile 
action by revising Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B, as discussed in 
Section IV of this document.
    The NRC considered other options to attempt to resolve these 
issues, such as taking no action or allowing voluntary action by 
licensees. These options were rejected since there would have continued 
to be no regulatory requirement for current or future licensees to 
incorporate EALs for hostile action in their emergency plans, nor would 
there be a consistent minimum level of implementation that the NRC had 
determined to be adequate.
    In the proposed rule, the NRC asked for public comment on whether 
the NRC should expand to non-power reactor licensees the requirement 
for power reactor licensees to have hostile action EALs. Appendix E to 
10 CFR part 50 cites Regulatory Guide (RG) 2.6, ``Emergency Planning 
for Research and Test Reactors,'' dated March 1983, as the guidance for 
the acceptability of research and test reactor emergency plans. 
Regulatory Guide 2.6 endorses ANSI/ANS 15.16-1982, ``Emergency Planning 
for Research Reactors,'' as an acceptable approach to non-power reactor 
emergency plans. The newly updated ANSI/ANS 15.16-2008 includes hostile 
action EALs. The NRC has commenced the process to update RG 2.6 to 
endorse ANSI/ANS 15.16-2008. The NRC has also determined that further 
analysis and stakeholder interactions are needed prior to changing the 
requirements for non-power reactor licensees. Therefore, the NRC has 
not included a requirement in the final rule for non-power reactor 
licensees to have hostile action EALs.
3. Emergency Response Organization Augmentation and Alternative 
Facilities
    Section 50.47(b)(2) and Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C, require 
licensees to have the capability to augment the on-shift staff within a 
short period of time after the declaration of an emergency to assist in 
mitigation activities. To accomplish this, ERO members typically staff 
an onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) that relieves the control room 
(CR) of emergency response duties and allows CR staff to focus on 
reactor safety. The ERO members also staff an onsite Operational 
Support Center (OSC) to provide an assembly area for damage repair 
teams. Lastly, ERO members staff an EOF, usually located in close 
proximity to the plant, to function as the center for evaluation and 
coordination activities related to the emergency and the focal point of 
information provided to Federal, State, and local authorities involved 
in the response.
    Section 50.47(b)(8) and Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E, require 
licensees to have adequate emergency facilities and equipment to 
support emergency response. However, Sec.  50.47(b)(8) and the former 
Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E, did not require licensees to 
identify alternative facilities to support ERO augmentation during 
hostile action. During hostile action, ERO members would likely not 
have access to the onsite emergency response facilities, or the EOF if 
it is located within the licensee's owner-controlled area. Nevertheless 
these events still warrant timely ERO augmentation so responders can 
travel quickly to the site once access is allowed.
    Order EA-02-026 required that licensees assess the adequacy of 
staffing plans at emergency response facilities during hostile action, 
assuming the unavailability of the onsite TSC, and identify alternative 
facilities capable of supporting event response. These facilities would 
function as staging areas for augmentation staff until the site was 
secured, which would minimize delays in overall site response by 
permitting ERO assembly without exposing responders to the danger of 
hostile action. The NRC inspections to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the implementation of the ICMs revealed variations in the 
identification and staffing of alternative emergency response 
facilities.
    Bulletin BL-05-02 described how alternative locations for onsite 
emergency response facilities support EP functions during hostile 
action. It stated that the ERO is expected to be staged in a manner 
that supports rapid response to limit or mitigate site damage or the 
potential for an offsite radiological release. It also pointed out that 
some licensees have chosen not to activate elements of the ERO during 
hostile action until the site was secured. However, the NRC considers 
it prudent, for hostile action events outside of normal working hours, 
to fully activate ERO members to promptly staff alternative facilities, 
in order to minimize delays in overall site response. Bulletin BL-05-02 
conveyed that, even during normal working hours, licensees should 
consider deployment of onsite ERO personnel to an alternative facility 
near the site during hostile action.
    To resolve this issue, the NRC considered taking no regulatory 
action or continuing the voluntary implementation currently in place as 
a result of BL-05-02 and the guidance endorsed by NRC Regulatory Issue 
Summary (RIS) 2006-12, ``Endorsement of Nuclear Energy Institute 
Guidance `Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs for Hostile 
Action,' '' dated July 19, 2006. If no action had been taken, there 
would have continued to be no explicit regulatory requirement regarding 
the actions necessary during hostile action for the ERO to staff an 
alternative facility. The ERO members would likely not have access to 
the site during hostile action, but timely augmentation would still be 
necessary for adequate response. Taking no regulatory action may have 
resulted in inconsistent implementation of ERO augmentation guidelines, 
and less effective overall site response. The NRC also considered using 
a voluntary program; however, voluntary programs, such as those 
developed per the NEI guidance endorsed by RIS 2006-12, would not 
provide a consistent, NRC-approved means for addressing needed 
enhancements for hostile action. The use of voluntary programs would 
not have ensured long-term continuity of the enhancements for both 
licensees and applicants. Thus, the NRC is codifying the ICM 
requirement and the enhancement examples described in BL-05-02 
concerning ERO augmentation to alternative facilities during hostile 
action in Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E, to maximize the 
effectiveness of the site response. These changes are discussed in 
Section IV of this document.
4. Licensee Coordination With Offsite Response Organizations During 
Hostile Action
    A unique challenge posed by hostile action at a nuclear power plant 
is the increased demand on local law enforcement agencies (LLEAs) that 
are expected to implement portions of ORO emergency plans, as well as 
respond to the plant. The former Sec.  50.47(b)(1) and Appendix E to 
Part 50 did not explicitly require licensees to coordinate with OROs to 
ensure that personnel are available to carry out preplanned actions, 
such as traffic control and route alerting by LLEAs, during hostile 
action directed at the plant.
    Licensees are required to identify ORO support for emergency 
response as well as demonstrate that various ORO capabilities exist 
through biennial evaluated exercises. Licensees and OROs have 
successfully demonstrated these capabilities for many years. However, 
the NRC recognized that hostile action may challenge OROs in ways 
unforeseen at the time the current regulations were developed. For 
example, local law enforcement personnel may be assigned both

[[Page 72566]]

evacuation plan and armed response duties during hostile action. The 
NRC acknowledged this challenge when it issued Order EA-02-026 and 
included provisions that licensees address coordination with OROs for 
hostile action. Specifically, the order required that licensees develop 
plans, procedures, and training regarding coordination between the site 
and OROs and directed licensees to review emergency plans to ensure 
sufficient numbers of personnel would be available during hostile 
action.
    The NRC subsequently became aware through inspections and 
communications with licensees that ORO plans must be reviewed to ensure 
sufficient numbers of personnel would be available to respond during 
hostile action. The NRC communicated this need to licensees and OROs 
through RIS 2004-15, ``Emergency Preparedness Issues: Post-9/11,'' 
dated October 18, 2004, which provided information on EP issues based 
on NRC staff observations from the EP component of force-on-force (FOF) 
exercises and lessons learned from the telephonic walk-through drills 
conducted with all power reactor sites between August and October 2005. 
In addition, DHS initiated the Comprehensive Review Program that 
conducted a review of site and ORO response to hostile action at every 
nuclear plant site. This review often identified a gap in ORO resource 
planning. Based on these findings and lessons learned from hostile 
action pilot program drills (see Section II.A.6 of this document), the 
NRC believes there is inconsistent implementation among licensees 
concerning effective coordination with OROs regarding the availability 
of adequate resources to respond to hostile action at a nuclear power 
plant.
    Licensees and the supporting OROs have taken various actions to 
respond to this issue, but criteria for determining the adequacy of the 
licensee and ORO actions have not been established. The NRC considered 
encouraging industry to develop and implement a voluntary program; 
however, voluntary programs do not provide a consistent, NRC-approved 
means for addressing the needed enhancements in the post-September 11, 
2001, threat environment. A voluntary approach would not have ensured 
consistent industry-wide implementation of the ICM requirements and 
there would have been no requirement for new licensees to incorporate 
the changes into their emergency plans.
    The NRC is amending Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7, to 
explicitly include hostile action at the site as one of the types of 
emergencies that define the State, local, and Federal agencies that 
licensees must identify in their emergency plan along with the 
assistance licensees expect from them. These changes are discussed in 
Section IV of this document.
5. Protection for Onsite Personnel
    The former Sec.  50.47(b)(10) and Appendix E to Part 50 did not 
require specific emergency plan provisions to protect onsite emergency 
responders and other onsite personnel in emergencies resulting from 
hostile action at nuclear power plants. Licensees are required to 
provide radiological protection for emergency workers and the public in 
the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ), including 
actions such as warning of an emergency, providing for evacuation and 
accountability of individuals, and providing for protective clothing 
and/or radio-protective drugs. Many of these personnel are required by 
the site emergency plan that the licensee must follow and maintain. The 
emergency plan requires responders with specific assignments to be 
available on-shift 24 hours a day to minimize the impact of 
radiological emergencies and provide for the protection of public 
health and safety. However, in analyses performed after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC staff determined that a lack of 
protection for emergency responders who are expected to implement the 
emergency plan could result in the loss of those responders and thus an 
inability to effectively implement the emergency plan.
    The normal response actions for personnel protection, such as site 
evacuation, site assembly and accountability, and activation of onsite 
emergency response facilities, may not be appropriate in this instance 
because these actions may place at risk the response personnel 
necessary to mitigate plant damage resulting from the hostile action. 
Bulletin BL-05-02 pointed out that actions different than those 
normally prescribed may be more appropriate during hostile action, 
particularly an aircraft attack. This may include actions such as 
evacuation of personnel from potential target buildings and 
accountability of personnel after the attack has concluded. Precise 
actions would depend on site-specific arrangements, such as the 
location of personnel in relation to potential targets. Procedures 
would need to be revised to ensure plant page announcements are timely 
and convey the onsite protective measures deemed appropriate.
    The NRC considered other options to attempt to resolve this issue. 
The NRC considered taking no additional regulatory action and relying 
upon continuation of the voluntary initiatives currently being 
implemented by licensees as a result of BL-05-02. Taking no action 
could have resulted in the vulnerability of onsite personnel during 
hostile action. Action is necessary to ensure effective coordination to 
enable licensees to more effectively implement their pre-planned 
actions. Voluntary programs do not provide a consistent, NRC-approved 
means for addressing needed enhancements. Further, the implementation 
of voluntary actions would not have ensured that these measures would 
be incorporated into emergency plans at new sites.
    The NRC is revising Appendix E by creating new Section IV.I, to 
require licensees to protect onsite personnel during hostile action and 
to ensure the continued ability of the licensee to safely shut down the 
reactor and perform the functions of the licensee's emergency plan, as 
discussed in Section IV of this document.
6. Challenging Drills and Exercises
    A basic EP principle is that licensees conduct drills and exercises 
to develop and maintain key skills of ERO personnel. Drill and exercise 
programs contribute to the NRC determination of reasonable assurance 
that licensees can and will implement actions to protect public health 
and safety in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency. 
Implementation of the current regulations provides reasonable assurance 
of adequate protection of public health and safety at every nuclear 
plant site.
    In the unlikely event that a licensee faces hostile action, the 
response organization will encounter challenges that differ 
significantly from those practiced in long-standing drill and exercise 
programs because these programs have not included hostile action 
scenarios. The former NRC regulations addressing this issue were 
general in nature and did not explicitly require licensees to include 
hostile action scenarios in drills and exercises, nor did they directly 
allow the NRC to require specific scenario content. The NRC is amending 
its regulations to do so.
    Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC 
conducted a review of the EP planning basis in view of the changed 
threat environment and concluded that the EP planning basis remains 
valid. The NRC observed licensee performance during numerous

[[Page 72567]]

hostile action EP exercises and tabletop drills as well as several 
security FOF exercises. The NRC also discussed security-based EP issues 
with licensees and Federal, State, and local EP professionals and 
advocacy groups and issued BL-05-02 to collect information from 
licensees on the enhancements to drill and exercise programs to address 
the hostile action contingency.
    Through these efforts, the NRC concluded that, although EP measures 
are designed to address a wide range of events, response to hostile 
action can present unique challenges not addressed in licensee and ORO 
drills and exercises, such as:
     Extensive coordination between operations, security, and 
EP personnel;
     Use of the alternative emergency response facilities for 
activation of the ERO;
     Execution of initial response actions in a hostile 
environment (i.e., during simulated hostile action);
     The need to shelter personnel from armed attack or 
aircraft attack in a manner very different from that used during 
radiological emergencies;
     Conduct of operations and repair activities when the site 
conditions prevent normal access due to fire, locked doors, security 
measures, and areas that have not yet been secured;
     Conduct of operations and repair activities with large 
areas of the plant damaged or on fire;
     Rescue of, and medical attention to, significant numbers 
of personnel; and
     Prioritization of efforts to protect plant equipment or to 
secure access to plant areas for repairs.
    In response to BL-05-02, all nuclear power reactor licensees stated 
that they would develop and implement an enhanced drill and exercise 
program. Program elements were captured in NEI 06-04, Rev. 1, 
``Conducting a Hostile Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,'' a 
guidance document developed by NEI. The NRC endorsed this document for 
use in a pilot program in RIS 2008-08, ``Endorsement of Revision 1 to 
Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance Document NEI 06-04, `Conducting a 
Hostile Action-Based Emergency Response Drill,' '' dated March 19, 
2008. However, implementation of these enhancements was voluntary, and 
the NRC could not require licensees to maintain these enhancements, 
absent issuance of an order or a regulation.
    The NRC also became aware of a related issue regarding EP exercise 
scenarios. The NRC inspects licensee response during these exercises 
and FEMA evaluates the capabilities of OROs. Licensees have performed 
many evaluated EP exercises and understand NRC and FEMA expectations. 
Licensees design scenarios in coordination with State and local 
agencies to demonstrate all key EP functions in a manner that 
facilitates evaluation. As a result, scenarios have become predictable 
and may precondition responders to sequential escalation of emergency 
classifications that always culminate in a large radiological release. 
Current biennial exercise scenarios do not resemble credible reactor 
accidents in that the timing is improbable and the intermittent 
containment failure typically used is unlikely. Typical scenarios used 
by licensees in biennial exercises involve simulated accidents, such as 
a loss of coolant accident or a steam generator tube rupture. However, 
certain predictable artifacts emerge in almost all biennial exercise 
scenarios, including the following:
     The ERO will not be allowed to mitigate the accident 
before a release occurs;
     The release will occur after a General Emergency is 
declared;
     The release will be terminated before the exercise ends; 
and
     The exercise will escalate sequentially through the 
emergency classes.
    In short, responders may be preconditioned to accident sequences 
that are not likely to resemble the accidents they could realistically 
face.
    In SRM-M060502, dated June 29, 2006, the Commission directed the 
NRC staff to develop exercise scenarios in conjunction with DHS, as 
follows:

    The staff should coordinate with DHS to develop emergency 
planning exercise scenarios which would help avoid anticipatory 
responses associated with preconditioning of participants by 
incorporating a wide spectrum of releases (ranging from little or no 
release to a large release) and events, including security-based 
events. These scenarios should emphasize the expected interfaces and 
coordination between key decision-makers based on realistic 
postulated events. The staff should share experiences of 
preconditioning or ``negative training'' with DHS.

    As a result of the SRM, a joint NRC/FEMA working group was formed 
to review the development of emergency planning exercise scenarios. The 
working group was assigned the task of identifying the NRC and FEMA 
regulations that would require revision to enhance exercise scenarios 
and guidance to assist in the effective implementation of these 
regulations. The working group recommended several changes to the FEMA 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Manual that comport 
with this final rule to address preconditioning and the incorporation 
of hostile action exercise scenarios.
    The FEMA held focus group meetings in several FEMA regions to 
discuss potential policy changes to the REP Program Manual. The NRC 
supported these meetings to facilitate questions as they related to the 
EP rulemaking issue of challenging drills and exercises. For example, 
stakeholders voiced opinions on the requirements for the development 
and review of exercise scenarios, whether all emergency classification 
levels (ECLs) must be included in each exercise or if one or more ECLs 
can be skipped, how radiological release conditions and options could 
vary, and if a spectrum of scenarios will be varied to create more 
realistic and challenging exercises. Comments received from the 
different focus groups and stakeholders informed this rulemaking, new 
guidance documents associated with this rulemaking, and an update to 
the REP Program Manual.
    A regulatory change is necessary to enhance scenario content to 
include hostile action scenarios and reduce preconditioning through a 
wide spectrum of challenges. This change will improve licensee ERO 
capability to protect public health and safety under all accident 
scenarios as well as reverse any trend toward preconditioning.
    The NRC also considered not making any change to the regulations, 
but rejected that option because it would not adequately address the 
concerns previously discussed. The NRC also discussed the use of 
voluntary programs and although this option could be successful, the 
NRC could not require that changes made would be permanent and 
consistent across all sites.
    The NRC is revising Appendix E, Section IV.F, to address these 
issues, as discussed in Section IV of this document.

B. Non-Security Related EP Issues

    The remaining changes are new or amended requirements that result 
in a substantial increase to public health and safety because they 
maintain or strengthen the ability of licensees to effectively 
implement their emergency plans.
1. Backup Means for Alert and Notification Systems
    The regulations for alert and notification system (ANS) 
capabilities are found in Sec.  50.47(b)(5) and Part 50, Appendix E, 
Section IV.D.3, and require licensees to establish the capability to 
promptly alert and notify the public if there is an emergency event 
while meeting certain ANS design objectives.

[[Page 72568]]

The former regulations did not require backup power for sirens or other 
backup ANS alerting capabilities when a major portion of the primary 
alerting means is unavailable. The regulations also did not address 
backup notification capabilities. If a major portion of a facility's 
ANS is unavailable and no backup exists, then the public may not be 
promptly alerted of an event at the facility and the protective actions 
to be taken, which could affect the public's response to the event.
    An ANS provides the capability to promptly alert the populace 
within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of a nuclear power plant in case 
of an emergency event and to inform the public what protective actions 
may need to be taken. The predominant method used around U.S. nuclear 
power plants for alerting the public is an ANS based on sirens to 
provide an acoustic warning signal. Some sites employ other means, such 
as tone alert radios and route alerting, as either primary or 
supplemental alerting methods. The public typically receives 
information about an event and offsite protective actions via emergency 
alert system (EAS) broadcasts or other means, such as mobile 
loudspeakers.
    In several instances, nuclear power plants have lost all or a major 
portion of the alert function of an ANS for short time periods for 
various reasons, such as damage to ANS components caused by severe 
weather, loss of offsite alternating current (AC) power, malfunction of 
ANS activation equipment, or unexpected problems resulting from ANS 
hardware/software modifications. In other situations, the notification 
capability has been lost (e.g., the inability to activate tone alert 
radios, which are used to provide both an alert signal and notification 
function).
    The NRC has issued multiple INs to document the circumstances when 
ANS failures have occurred, including IN 2002-25, ``Challenges to 
Licensees' Ability to Provide Prompt Public Notification and 
Information During an Emergency Preparedness Event,'' dated August 26, 
2002; IN 2005-06, ``Failure to Maintain Alert and Notification System 
Tone Alert Radio Capability,'' dated March 30, 2005; and IN 2006-28, 
``Siren System Failures Due to Erroneous Siren System Signal,'' dated 
December 22, 2006. The inability to activate some tone alert radios 
because of a shorter tone activation signal permitted as part of EAS 
implementation was addressed in IN 1996-19, ``Failure of Tone Alert 
Radios to Activate When Receiving a Shortened Activation Signal,'' 
dated April 2, 1996. Without the ability to warn the population, the 
effectiveness of the notification element may be significantly reduced. 
Having a backup means in place would lessen the impact of the loss of 
the primary ANS.
    Other events impacting ANS operability have involved the widespread 
loss of the electrical grid providing power to siren based systems, 
such as the electrical blackout in several areas of the northeastern 
U.S. and portions of Canada in August 2003. As discussed in RG 1.155, 
``Station Blackout,'' dated August 1988, although the likelihood of 
failure of the onsite AC [alternating current] power system 
coincidental with the loss of offsite power is small, station blackout 
events may be substantial contributors to core damage events for some 
plants.
    The U.S. Congress recognized that all emergency notification 
systems may not operate in the absence of an AC power supply and 
encouraged the use of newer alerting and notification technology. In 
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations (House 
Appropriations Committee) Report 107-740, FEMA was directed to update 
its guidance on outdoor warning and mass notification systems and 
require all warning systems to be operable in the absence of an AC 
power supply. The House Appropriations Committee also urged FEMA to 
consult with other relevant agencies and revise the national standard 
for outdoor warning and mass notification to reflect state-of-the-art 
technology. Moreover, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the 
Commission to require backup power for the emergency notification 
system, including siren systems, for nuclear power plants located where 
there is a permanent population, as determined by the 2000 decennial 
census, in excess of 15,000,000 within a 50 mile radius of the power 
plant. Therefore, it was appropriate that the NRC also considered 
changes to its existing regulations and guidance regarding warning 
systems for all nuclear power reactor licensees.
    The NRC considered several options to attempt to resolve this 
issue, including reliance on ANS design review standards and related 
guida