Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in Ex Parte, 72270-72299 [2011-29446]
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 225 / Tuesday, November 22, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark
Office
37 CFR Parts 1 and 41
[No. PTO–P–2009–0021]
RIN 0651–AC37
Rules of Practice Before the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences in Ex
Parte Appeals
United States Patent and
Trademark Office, Commerce.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO or Office)
amends the rules governing practice
before the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (Board or BPAI) in ex
parte patent appeals. The Office amends
the rules to: Remove several of the
briefing requirements for an appeal
brief, provide for the Board to take
jurisdiction over the appeal earlier in
the appeal process, no longer require
examiners to acknowledge receipt of
reply briefs, create specified procedures
under which an appellant can seek
review of an undesignated new ground
of rejection in either an examiner’s
answer or in a Board decision, provide
that the Board will presume that the
appeal is taken from the rejection of all
claims under rejection unless cancelled
by an applicant’s amendment, and
clarify that, for purposes of the
examiner’s answer, any rejection that
relies upon Evidence not relied upon in
the Office action from which the appeal
is taken shall be designated as a new
ground of rejection. The Office also
withdraws a previously published final
rule that never went into effect.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule is
effective on January 23, 2012 except
withdrawal of the final rule published
June 10, 2008 (73 FR 32938) and
delayed indefinitely on December 10,
2008 (73 FR 74972) is effective
November 22, 2011.
Applicability Date: This rule is
applicable to all appeals in which a
notice of appeal is filed on or after
January 23, 2012.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Linda Horner, Administrative Patent
Judge, Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences, by telephone at (571) 272–
9797, or by mail addressed to: Mail Stop
Interference, Director of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office,
P.O. Box 1450, Alexandria, VA 22313–
1450, marked to the attention of Linda
Horner.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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SUMMARY:
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Background
On July 30, 2007, the Office published
a notice of proposed rulemaking
governing practice before the Board in
ex parte patent appeals (72 FR 41472
(July 30, 2007)). The notice was also
published in the Official Gazette. 1321
Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 95 (Aug. 21, 2007).
The public was invited to submit
written comments. Comments were to
be received on or before September 28,
2007.
On June 10, 2008, a final rulemaking
was then published in the Federal
Register (73 FR 32938 (June 10, 2008)).
This final rule stated that the effective
and applicability date was December 10,
2008. On June 9, 2008, the Office
published a 60-day Federal Register
notice (73 FR 32559 (June 9, 2008))
requesting the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) establish a new
information collection for BPAI items in
the final rule and requesting public
comment on the burden impact of the
final rule under the provisions of the
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). On
October 8, 2008, the Office published a
30-day Federal Register notice (73 FR
58943 (Oct. 8, 2008)) stating that the
proposal for the collection of
information under the final rule was
being submitted to OMB and requesting
that comments on the proposed
information collection be submitted to
OMB. Because the information
collection process had not been
completed by the original effective and
applicability date of the final rule, the
Office published a Federal Register
notice (73 FR 74972 (Dec. 10, 2008))
notifying the public that the effective
and applicability date of the final rule
was not December 10, 2008, and that the
effective and applicability date would
be delayed until a subsequent notice.
On January 20, 2009, the Assistant to
the President and Chief of Staff
instructed agencies via a memorandum
entitled, ‘‘Regulatory Review,’’ (74 FR
4435 (Jan. 26, 2009)) to consider seeking
comments for an additional 30 days on
rules that were published in the Federal
Register and had not yet become
effective by January 20, 2009. On
January 21, 2009, the Office of
Management and Budget issued a
memorandum entitled,
‘‘Implementation of Memorandum
Concerning Regulatory Review,’’
(available at https://www.whitehouse
.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
agencyinformation_memor
anda_2009_pdf/m09–08.pdf) which
provided agencies further guidance on
such rules that had not yet taken effect.
For such rules, both memoranda stated
that agencies should consider reopening
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the rulemaking process to review any
significant concerns involving law or
policy that have been raised.
On December 22, 2009, the Office
published an Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM)
proposing further modifications to the
indefinitely delayed 2008 final rule and
seeking public comment via a public
roundtable and written comment (74 FR
67987 (Dec. 22, 2009)).
In light of the comments received to
these notices, the Office then published
a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) in the Federal Register (75 FR
69828 (Nov. 15, 2010)), which proposed
to rescind the indefinitely delayed 2008
final rule and proposed new changes to
the rules of practice before the Board in
ex parte appeals. The public was invited
to submit written comments. Comments
were to be received on or before January
14, 2011. Comments received on or
before January 14, 2011, were
considered.
The Office also considered three
comments received after January 14,
2011. The Office now publishes this
final rule taking into consideration the
comments received to the NPRM.
The Office received a comment
offering an alternative rendition of the
procedural history of these rules and
claiming that OMB rejected the Office’s
original Information Collection Request.
The Preamble of the NPRM accurately
reflects the history of this rule.
Accordingly, no changes have been
made to the description of the
procedural history in the Preamble of
the final rule. Furthermore, OMB
approved the Office’s original
Information Collection Request. See
Notice of Office of Management and
Budget Action, ICR Ref. No. 200809–
0651–003 (Dec. 22, 2009), https://
www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain
hyperlink; then search 0651–0063; then
follow ‘‘Approved with change’’
hyperlink. OMB has also pre-approved
the Information Collection Request
associated with these final rules. See
Notice of Office of Management and
Budget Action, ICR Ref. No. 201010–
0651–001 (Jan. 4, 2011), https://
www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain
hyperlink; then search 0651–0063; then
follow ‘‘Preapproved’’ hyperlink.
The Office received two comments
suggesting that the Board already
implemented the delayed 2008 final
rule (73 FR 32938 (June 10, 2008),
implementation of which was
indefinitely delayed by 73 FR 74972
(Dec. 10, 2008)). This is not true. The
Office has not implemented the
indefinitely delayed 2008 final rule.
One commenter suggested that the
fact that the Board sometimes has stated
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that an appellant must ‘‘map claims’’
indicates the delayed 2008 final rule is
already in effect. Since 2004, the Office
has used this language to indicate that
the appellant had not explained the
subject matter defined in each
independent claim by reference to the
specification by page and line number,
and to the drawing, if any, by reference
characters, as required by the 2004
regulations. The delayed 2008
regulations required annotation in
addition to mapping. Those regulations
have not been implemented or enforced
with respect to any applicant. Another
commenter suggested that the
indefinitely delayed 2008 regulations
must be in effect because the 2004
regulations permitted applicants to raise
arguments in either the appeal brief or
reply brief. This is an incorrect reading
of the 2004 regulations. The inability to
raise new arguments in a reply brief is
inherent in the nature of a reply brief;
it must reply to either an argument or
response in an answer or the failure to
include a response in an answer. The
indefinitely delayed 2008 regulations
made this requirement clearer, but it has
always been a requirement.
The Board rules as published in 37
CFR 41.1–41.81 (2010) will remain in
effect until the changes set forth in the
instant final rule take effect on the
effective date. The Office also
withdraws the indefinitely delayed 2008
final rule (73 FR 32938 (June 10, 2008))
that never went into effect. Therefore,
any appeal brief filed in an application
or ex parte reexamination proceeding in
which a notice of appeal is filed on or
after the instant effective date must be
filed in compliance with final Bd.R.
41.37 set forth in this final rule.
Purposes for the Rule Changes
One purpose of this final rule is to
ensure that the Board has adequate
information to decide ex parte appeals
on the merits, while not unduly
burdening appellants or examiners with
unnecessary briefing requirements. In
particular, the goal of this final rule is
to effect an overall lessening of the
burden on appellants and examiners to
present an appeal to the Board. For
example, statements of the status of
claims, the status of amendments, and
the grounds of rejection to be reviewed
on appeal are no longer required in the
appeal brief (final Bd.R. 41.37) or in the
examiner’s answer. Similarly, the final
rule no longer requires appellants to file
an evidence appendix or a related
proceedings appendix (final Bd.R.
41.37). Because much of this
information is already available in the
Image File Wrapper, it is unnecessary
for appellants or examiners to provide
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this information to the Board. Moreover,
by eliminating these briefing
requirements, the Office expects to
reduce the number of non-compliant
appeal briefs and the number of
examiner’s answers returned to the
examiner due to non-compliance, which
are a significant cause of delays on
appeal. See USPTO, Top Eight Reasons
Appeal Briefs are Non-Compliant,
https://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/
procedures/
top_8_reasons_appeal_brf_dec09.pdf.
Another purpose of this final rule is
to eliminate any gap in time from the
end of briefing to the commencement of
the Board’s jurisdiction. For example,
under the final rule, the Board takes
jurisdiction upon the earlier of the filing
of a reply brief or the expiration of the
time in which to file a reply brief (final
Bd.R. 41.35(a)). Examiners are no longer
required to acknowledge receipt of the
reply brief (Bd.R. 41.43 [removed]).
The final rule is also intended to
clarify and simplify petitions practice
on appeal. For example, except under
limited circumstances, any information
disclosure statement or petition filed
while the Board possesses jurisdiction
over the proceeding will be held in
abeyance until the Board’s jurisdiction
ends (final Bd.R. 41.35(d)). Also, in
response to public comments, and based
on a comprehensive survey of case law
from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit)
and United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (CCPA), the Office will
provide improved guidance in the
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP), discussed infra, as to what
constitutes a new ground of rejection in
an examiner’s answer. The final rule
explicitly sets forth the procedure under
which an appellant can seek review of
the Office’s failure to designate a new
ground of rejection in either an
examiner’s answer (final Bd.R. 41.40) or
in a Board decision (final Bd.R.
41.50(c)).
Another purpose of this final rule is
to reduce confusion as to which claims
are on appeal. For example, under the
final rule, the Board will presume that
the appeal is taken from the rejection of
all claims under rejection unless
cancelled by an applicant’s amendment
(final Bd.R. 41.31(c)). This rule
simplifies practice for appellants who
seek review of all claims under
rejection—the majority of appellants—
by obviating the need to enumerate the
rejected claims that are being appealed.
Under the previous practice, if an
appellant incorrectly listed the claims
on appeal, or was silent in the brief as
to some of the claims under rejection,
then the Office assumed that such
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claims were not on appeal, and noted
that those non-appealed claims should
be cancelled by the examiner. Ex parte
Ghuman, 88 USPQ2d 1478, 2008 WL
2109842 (BPAI 2008) (precedential)
(holding that when appellant does not
appeal some of the claims under
rejection and does not challenge the
Examiner’s rejection of these claims, the
Board will treat these claims as
withdrawn from the appeal, which
operates as an authorization for the
Examiner to cancel those claims from
the application). This final rule avoids
the unintended cancellation of claims
by the Office due to appellant’s mistake
in the listing of the claims in either the
notice of appeal or in the appeal brief.
This final rule replaces the Office’s
procedure under Ghuman and also
simplifies practice for examiners by no
longer requiring examiners to cancel
non-appealed claims.
The Supplementary Information in
this notice provides: (1) An explanation
of the final rule, (2) a discussion of the
differences between the final rule and
the proposed rule, (3) a discussion of
the comments received to the NPRM, (4)
a discussion of rule making
considerations and comments received
regarding the discussion of rule making
considerations in the NPRM and (5) a
copy of the amended regulatory text.
Rules in 37 CFR part 1 are
denominated as ‘‘Rule x’’ in this
supplementary information. A reference
to Rule 1.136(a) is a reference to 37 CFR
1.136(a) (2010).
Rules in 37 CFR part 11 are
denominated as ‘‘Rule x’’ in this
supplementary information. A reference
to Rule 11.18(a) is a reference to 37 CFR
11.18(a) (2010).
Rules in 37 CFR part 41 are
denominated as ‘‘Bd.R. x’’ in this
supplementary information. For
example, a reference to Bd.R. 41.3 is a
reference to 37 CFR 41.3 (2010) (as first
published in 69 FR 50003 (August 12,
2004)).
Changes proposed in the NPRM are
denominated as ‘‘proposed Bd.R. x’’ in
this supplementary information. A
reference to ‘‘proposed Bd.R. 41.30’’ is
a reference to the proposed rule as set
forth in 75 FR 69828, 69846 (Nov. 15,
2010).
Final rules are denominated as ‘‘final
Bd.R. x’’ in this supplementary
information. A reference to final Bd.R.
x is a reference to the rule that will take
effect on the effective date of this final
rule.
The Board has jurisdiction to consider
and decide ex parte appeals in patent
applications (including reissue, design
and plant patent applications) and ex
parte reexamination proceedings.
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The final rule does not change any of
the rules relating to inter partes
reexamination appeals. Nor does the
final rule change any of the rules
relating to contested cases.
For purposes of the NPRM, some
paragraphs that were proposed to be
deleted were shown as ‘‘reserved.’’
These ‘‘reserved’’ paragraphs have been
deleted entirely in the final rule, and the
remaining paragraphs in each section
have been renumbered, as appropriate.
Explanation of the Final Rule
The notable changes to the rules are:
(1) The Board will presume that an
appeal is taken from the rejection of all
claims under rejection unless cancelled
by an amendment filed by appellant
(final Bd.R. 41.31(c)); (2) the Board will
take jurisdiction upon the filing of a
reply brief or the expiration of time in
which to file such a reply brief,
whichever is earlier (final Bd.R.
41.35(a)); (3) the requirements to
include statements of the status of
claims, status of amendments, and
grounds of rejection to be reviewed on
appeal and the requirements to include
an evidence appendix and a related
proceedings appendix are eliminated
from the appeal brief (final Bd.R.
41.37(c)); (4) the Board may apply
default assumptions if a brief omits a
statement of the real party-in-interest or
a statement of related cases (final Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(i) and (ii)); (5) for purposes
of the examiner’s answer, any rejection
that relies upon Evidence not relied
upon in the Office action from which
the appeal is taken (as modified by any
advisory action) shall be designated as
a new ground of rejection (final Bd.R.
41.39(a)(2)); (6) an appellant can await
a decision on a petition seeking review
of an examiner’s failure to designate a
rejection in the answer as a new ground
of rejection prior to filing a reply brief
(final Bd.R. 41.40) and thereby avoid
having to file a request for extension of
time in which to file the reply brief; and
(7) the examiner’s response to a reply
brief is eliminated (final Bd.R. 41.43
[removed]). A more detailed discussion
of the final rule follows.
Further information relevant to
particular rules appears in the analysis
of comments portion of this final rule.
Part 1
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Termination of Proceedings
Final Rule 1.197 revises the title of
this section and deletes paragraph (a),
the provision that sets forth when
jurisdiction passes from the Board to the
examiner after a decision has been
issued by the Board. The operative
language of this paragraph has been
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incorporated into final Bd.R. 41.54,
except that ‘‘transmittal of the file’’ has
been omitted. Most patent application
files are electronic files (Image File
Wrapper files), not paper files.
Accordingly, a paper file is no longer
‘‘transmitted’’ to the examiner. The
changes to final Rule 1.197 and final
Bd.R. 41.54 are intended to more
accurately reflect the fact that files are
handled electronically within the
Office, and do not imply that there
would be a change in the practice for
passing jurisdiction back to the
examiner after decision by the Board—
the process remains the same under the
final rule.
Part 41
Authority
The listing of authority for Part 41 is
revised to add references to 35 U.S.C.
132, 133, 306, and 315. Section 132
states that the Director shall prescribe
regulations to provide for the continued
examination of applications for patent at
the request of the applicant. Section 133
provides that upon failure of the
applicant to prosecute the application
within six months after any action
therein, the application shall be
regarded as abandoned. Section 306
establishes the patent owner’s right to
appeal in an ex parte reexamination
proceeding. Section 315 establishes the
right to appeal in an inter partes
reexamination proceeding.
Subpart A
Citation of Authority
Bd.R. 41.12 is amended by deleting
the following requirements: (1) To cite
to particular case law reporters, and (2)
to include parallel citations to multiple
reporter systems. Because members of
the Board have access to both the West
Reporter System and the United States
Patents Quarterly, it is unnecessary for
appellants to cite to both reporters. The
rule indicates a Board preference, not a
requirement, for citations to certain
reporters and for limited use of nonbinding authority. The requirement to
include pinpoint citations, whenever a
specific holding or portion of an
authority is invoked, is retained.
The final rule states that appellants
should provide a copy of an authority if
the authority is not an authority of the
Office and is not reproduced in the
United States Reports or the West
Reporter System. This provision is
designed to ensure that a full record is
before the judges to allow an efficient
and timely decision to be made on the
merits of the case. A BPAI precedential
decision is binding on the Board and is
considered an ‘‘authority of the Office’’
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and thus does not fall within the ambit
of final Bd.R. 41.12(d).
Subpart B
Definitions
Bd.R. 41.30 is amended to add a
definition of ‘‘Record’’ so that, when
subsequent sections of Subpart B refer
to the ‘‘Record’’, it is clear what
constitutes the official record on appeal.
The final rule states that the official
record contains the items listed in the
content listing of the Image File
Wrapper or the official file of the Office
if other than the Image File Wrapper,
excluding any amendments, Evidence,
or other documents that were not
entered. Because an examiner’s refusal
to enter an amendment, Evidence, or
other documents is a petitionable matter
that is not subject to review by the
Board, the exclusion of such un-entered
documents from the definition of
‘‘Record’’ reflects the fact that the
Board’s review of patentability
determinations is properly based on the
record of all entered documents in the
file. An information disclosure
statement or petition that is held in
abeyance while the Board possesses
jurisdiction over the proceeding is not
an entered document and therefore is
excluded from the definition of
‘‘Record’’ until such time as it is
entered. The definition of ‘‘Record’’
includes the items listed in the content
listing of the Image File Wrapper
because, in some cases, physical items
that form part of the official file are not
able to be scanned into the Image File
Wrapper and are maintained elsewhere,
such as in an artifact file. Some
examples of such items include original
drawings in design patent applications
and sequence listings. In such cases, the
Image File Wrapper will include an
entry in the content listing that points
to this artifact file. The final rule further
clarifies that in the case of an issued
patent being reissued or reexamined, the
Record further includes the Record of
the patent being reissued or reexamined.
The Office further notes that all
references listed on an Information
Disclosure Statement (i.e., PTO–Form
PTO/SB/08a or 08b), which have been
indicated as having been considered by
the examiner, or listed on a PTO–Form
892 are included in the definition of
Record even if each of the so listed
references does not separately appear in
the content listing of the Image File
Wrapper.
Final Bd.R. 41.30 adopts the
definition of ‘‘Evidence’’ from Black’s
Law Dictionary to provide clarity
regarding the use of that term in Subpart
B. Toward that end, final Bd.R. 41.30
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makes clear that for the purposes of
Subpart B, ‘‘Evidence’’ does not
encompass dictionaries. Excluding
dictionaries from the definition of
‘‘Evidence’’ thus allows appellants to
refer to dictionaries in their briefs,
which would otherwise be precluded
under final Bd.R. 41.33(d)(2) (absent
existence of one of the enumerated
exceptions). It further allows examiners
to refer to dictionaries in the examiner’s
answers without automatically
rendering a rejection a new ground
under final Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2). Treating
dictionaries in this manner is consistent
with Supreme Court and Federal Circuit
precedent, which contemplate that such
materials may be consulted by tribunals
‘‘at any time.’’ See, e.g., Nix v. Hedden,
149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893) (citations
omitted) (admitting dictionaries to
understand the ordinary meaning of
terms ‘‘not as evidence, but only as aids
to the memory and understanding of the
court’’); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(‘‘[J]udges are free to consult
dictionaries and technical treatises at
any time in order to better understand
the underlying technology and may also
rely on dictionary definitions when
construing claim terms, so long as the
dictionary definition does not contradict
any definition found in or ascertained
by a reading of the patent documents.’’)
(citation omitted); In re Boon, 439 F.2d
724, 727–28 (CCPA 1971) (holding
citation to dictionary was not
tantamount to the assertion of a new
ground of rejection ‘‘where such a
reference is a standard work, cited only
to support a fact judicially noticed and,
as here, the fact so noticed plays a
minor role, serving only to fill in the
gaps which might exist in the
evidentiary showing made by the
Examiner to support a particular ground
for rejection.’’ (emphasis and internal
quotations omitted)). Thus, the Office
feels it is logical to permit the applicant
and examiner to submit them to the
Board during the briefing stage.
Appeal to the Board
Bd.R. 41.31(a) is amended to add
preamble language to make clear that an
appeal to the Board is taken by filing a
notice of appeal. This change is not
intended to change the current practice
of the Office. The Office continues to
require appellants to file a notice of
appeal in order to appeal an adverse
decision of the examiner to the Board.
Bd.R. 41.31(b) is amended to make
clear that the signature requirements of
Rules 1.33 and 11.18(a) do not apply to
the notice of appeal. This change adds
a reference to Rule 11.18(a) to avoid any
conflict between the rules of practice in
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ex parte appeals and the rules governing
practice by registered practitioners
before the Office.
Bd.R. 41.31(c) is amended so that an
appeal, when taken, is presumed to seek
review of all of the claims under
rejection unless claims are cancelled by
an amendment filed by the applicant
and entered by the Office. This change
obviates the need for the majority of
appellants who seek review of all claims
under rejection to affirmatively state (in
the notice of appeal and/or in the status
of claims section of the appeal brief)
which claims are on appeal. Rather,
under final Bd.R. 41.31(c), the Board
presumes that an appellant intends to
appeal all claims under rejection except
for those that have been cancelled. This
change avoids the unintended
cancellation of claims by the Office due
to an appellant’s mistake in the listing
of the claims in either the notice of
appeal or in the appeal brief. Under
previous practice, if an appellant
incorrectly listed the claims on appeal,
or was silent in the brief as to any of the
claims under rejection, then the Office
often assumed that such claims were not
on appeal, and noted that those nonappealed claims should be cancelled by
the examiner. Ex parte Ghuman, 88
USPQ2d 1478, 2008 WL 2109842 (BPAI
2008) (precedential) (holding that when
appellant does not appeal some of the
claims under rejection and does not
challenge the Examiner’s rejection of
these claims, the Board will treat these
claims as withdrawn from the appeal,
which operates as an authorization for
the Examiner to cancel those claims
from the application). The final rule
avoids potential unintended
cancellation of claims due to oversight
or mistake by appellants in listing the
claims on appeal. This final rule
replaces the Office’s procedure under
Ghuman and simplifies practice for
examiners by no longer requiring
examiners to cancel non-appealed
claims. Any appellant who wishes to
appeal fewer than all rejected claims
should file an amendment cancelling
the non-appealed claims. If an appellant
does not file an amendment cancelling
claims that the appellant does not wish
to appeal, but then also fails to provide
any argument in the appeal brief
directed to those claims, then the Board
has discretion to simply affirm any
rejections against such claims. See, e.g.,
Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (appellant waives any
argument about a ground of rejection
that he or she does not contest on
appeal to the Board, and the Board may
simply affirm the rejection).
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Amendments and Affidavits or Other
Evidence After Appeal
The title of Bd.R. 41.33 is revised by
replacing ‘‘evidence’’ with ‘‘Evidence’’
to refer to the definition added in final
Bd.R. 41.30.
Bd.R. 41.33(c) is revised to delete the
cross-reference to Bd.R. 41.50(c). As
noted infra, Bd.R. 41.50(c) is amended
so that it is no longer applicable to final
Bd.R. 41.33(c).
Bd.R. 41.33(d)(1) is revised to replace
‘‘evidence’’ with ‘‘Evidence’’ to refer to
the definition added in final Bd.R.
41.30.
Bd.R. 41.33(d)(2) is revised to replace
‘‘evidence’’ with ‘‘Evidence’’ to refer to
the definition added in final Bd.R.
41.30.
Bd.R. 41.33 is not substantively
changed except as to submission of
dictionaries after the date of filing an
appeal. Both Bd.R. 41.33 and final Bd.R.
41.33 otherwise restrict the types of
amendments and evidence that can be
filed after the date of filing an appeal.
This approach is designed to promote
efficiency of the Board in its review by
ensuring that the Board has the benefit
of the examiner’s final evaluation of the
weight and sufficiency of any evidence
relied upon by appellants prior to the
Board rendering a decision on appeal.
Jurisdiction Over Appeal
Bd.R. 41.35(a) is amended to add a
heading and to provide that jurisdiction
over the appeal passes to the Board
upon the filing of a reply brief or the
expiration of the time in which to file
such a reply brief, whichever is earlier.
This change is necessary because Bd.R.
41.35(a) provides that the Board
acquires jurisdiction upon transmittal of
the file to the Board. The large majority
of patent application files are electronic
files (Image File Wrapper files), not
paper files. Accordingly, in most cases
a paper file is no longer ‘‘transmitted’’
to the Board.
The Board intends to continue
sending a docket notice as a courtesy to
appellants to indicate that the Board has
assigned an appeal number to the
appeal. By having the Board’s
jurisdiction commence immediately
upon the filing of a reply brief or the
expiration of the time in which to file
such a reply brief, the Board must take
no affirmative steps prior to assuming
jurisdiction and no gap in time will
exist from the end of the briefing to the
commencement of jurisdiction by the
Board.
Bd.R. 41.35(b) is amended by moving
some text to final Bd.R. 41.35(e), adding
a new paragraph, and by adding new
text to make clear when the Board’s
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jurisdiction ends so that no gaps in time
exist between the end of the Board’s
jurisdiction and further action by the
examiner.
Bd.R. 41.35(c) is amended to add a
heading and a cross-reference to a
relevant section of the rule.
Final Bd.R. 41.35(d) is added to
provide that, except for petitions
authorized by part 41 of this title, the
Board will not return or remand an
application for consideration of an
information disclosure statement or a
petition filed while the Board possesses
jurisdiction, and that consideration of
such filings will be held in abeyance
until the Board’s jurisdiction ends. The
Board’s jurisdiction begins upon the
filing of the reply brief or upon the
expiration of the time for filing a reply
brief. Therefore, under both Bd.R.
41.33(d)(2) and final Bd.R. 41.33(d)(2),
the filing of an information disclosure
statement during the Board’s
jurisdiction constitutes the introduction
of untimely Evidence before the Board.
Similarly, because Rule 1.181 provides
that petitions must be filed within two
months of the mailing date of the action
or notice from which relief is requested,
and because the Board’s jurisdiction
begins up to two months after the
mailing date of the examiner’s answer
(assuming no petition under Rule 1.181
is filed), it follows that all petitions
relating to the examination phase of the
application or reexamination
proceeding ought to be filed prior to the
time the Board takes jurisdiction. It is in
the interest of compact prosecution that
the Office not delay a decision on
appeal for consideration of untimely
Evidence and petitions. Final Bd.R.
41.35(d) excludes ‘‘petitions authorized
by this part.’’ For example, petitions
authorized by part 41 include petitions
under Bd.R. 41.3 to the Chief
Administrative Patent Judge.
Final Bd.R. 41.35(e) is added with a
new heading and it contains the text
previously in Bd.R. 41.35(b). This
provision gives the Board the authority
to return an appeal to the examiner if
the Board deems that a file is not
complete or is not in compliance with
the requirements of Subpart B.
paragraph (c)(1) contain exceptions that
may result in an appeal brief containing
fewer than all items listed in paragraph
(c)(1). Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1) is further
amended to correct the cross-references
in light of further changes to this
section, discussed infra.
brief to contain an indication of the
status of claims.
Appeal Brief—Content of Appeal Brief—
Status of Amendments [Deleted]
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv) is amended to
delete the requirement for the appeal
brief to contain an indication of the
Appeal Brief—Content of Appeal Brief— status of amendments filed subsequent
Real Party in Interest
to final rejection.
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(i) is amended to
Appeal Brief—Content of Appeal Brief—
provide that the statement identifying
Summary of Claimed Subject Matter
the real party in interest should be
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(v) is renumbered as
accurate as of the date of filing of the
final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iii) and is further
appeal brief. Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(i) is also
amended to require that appellants
amended to allow the Board to assume
provide a concise explanation of the
that, if the statement of real party in
interest is omitted from the appeal brief, subject matter defined in each of ‘‘the
rejected independent claims’’ rather
then the named inventors are the real
than ‘‘each of the independent claims
party in interest. This final rule states
involved in the appeal.’’ Similarly, final
that the Office ‘‘may’’ make the
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iii) is amended to
assumption. Thus, the Office is not
further require that the concise
required to make the assumption if it is
explanation identify the corresponding
aware of information to the contrary.
structure, material, or acts for each
These changes are intended to decrease
‘‘rejected independent claim’’ when the
the burden on appellants by allowing
claim contains a means or step plus
appellants to omit this statement if the
function recitation as permitted by 35
named inventors are the real party in
U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. Under final
interest. The purpose of this section is
Bd.R. 41.31(c), discussed supra, the
to enable judges to determine whether
Board will presume that all rejections
they have a conflict of interest with the
made in the Office Action from which
real parties in the case and then to
appropriately recuse themselves if such the appeal was taken are before it on
appeal, unless appellant cancels the
a conflict of interest is found. The
claim(s) subject to a particular rejection.
information required in final Bd.R.
Final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iii) also
41.37(c)(1)(i) is the minimum
maintains the requirement that the
information needed by the Board to
concise explanation identify the
effectively make this determination.
corresponding structure, material, or
Appeal Brief—Content of Appeal Brief—
acts for each dependent claim argued
Related Appeals and Interferences
separately when the claim contains a
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(ii) is amended to
means or step plus function recitation as
limit the required disclosure of related
permitted by 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth
appeals, interferences and judicial
paragraph.
proceedings (collectively ‘‘related
Final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iii) is further
cases’’) to only those which: (1) Involve
amended to require that the concise
an application or patent owned by the
explanation refer to the specification ‘‘in
appellant or assignee, (2) are known to
the Record’’ by page and line number
appellant, the appellant’s legal
‘‘or by paragraph number.’’ The change
representative, or assignee, and (3) may
incorporates the definition of Record
be related to, directly affect or be
from final Bd.R. 41.30 and makes clear
directly affected by, or have a bearing on that reference to the specification by
the Board’s decision. Bd.R.
paragraph number in lieu of page and
41.37(c)(1)(ii) is also amended to allow
line number is permissible.
Additionally, final Bd.R.
appellants to omit the statement entirely
41.37(c)(1)(iii) is amended to clarify that
if there are no such related cases, and
reference to the pre-grant patent
to provide a default assumption for the
Appeal Brief—Timing and Fee; and
application publication is not sufficient
Office in the event the statement is
Failure to File a Brief
to satisfy the requirements of the
omitted, so that a statement that there
summary of claimed subject matter.
Bd.R. 41.37(a) and (b) are amended by are ‘‘no known related cases’’ is not
required and that fact ‘‘may’’ be inferred
adding new headings.
Appeal Brief—Content of Appeal Brief—
from the absence of a statement. The
Grounds of Rejection to be Reviewed on
Appeal Brief—Content of Appeal Brief—
final rule also no longer requires filing
Appeal [Removed]
Preamble
of copies of decisions in related cases.
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(vi) which required
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1) is amended to add a
Appeal Brief—Content of Appeal Brief— appellants to provide a statement of the
heading, and to add the introductory
grounds of rejection from the brief is
phrase ‘‘Except as otherwise provided in Status of Claims [Deleted]
removed. Under final Bd.R. 41.31(c),
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iii) is amended to
this paragraph’’ to clarify that several of
discussed supra, the Board will
delete the requirement for the appeal
the content requirements listed in
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This language in the final rule is
substantially the same as in Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(vii), which states that ‘‘[a]ny
arguments or authorities not included in
the brief or a reply brief filed pursuant
to § 41.41 will be refused consideration
by the Board, unless good cause is
shown.’’ Final Bd.R. 41.41, 41.47, and
41.52 have provisions allowing certain
new arguments in reply briefs, at oral
hearing, or in requests for rehearing
which ensure that appellants have a full
and fair opportunity to be heard before
the Board. The final rule clarifies that
the Board’s right to refuse consideration
of arguments not raised is ‘‘for purposes
of the present appeal’’ so as to clarify
that such right of refusal does not
extend to subsequent Board appeals in
the same or related applications. See
Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 300 F.3d
1367, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
Appeal Brief—Content of Appeal Brief—
(‘‘[P]recedent has long supported the
Argument
right of an applicant to file a
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(vii) is renumbered as continuation application despite an
final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Subparagraph unappealed adverse Board decision, and
(vii) is deleted. Final Bd.R.
to have that application examined on
41.37(c)(1)(iv) is amended to clarify that the merits. Where the Patent Office has
the argument section should specifically reconsidered its position on
explain why the examiner erred as to
patentability in light of new arguments
each ground of rejection contested by
or evidence submitted by the applicant,
appellants. The final rule also provides
the Office is not forbidden by principles
that, except as provided for in final
of preclusion to allow previously
Bd.R. 41.41, 41.47, and 41.52, any
rejected claims.’’ (internal citation
arguments not included in the appeal
omitted)).
brief will not be considered by the
Final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv) is also
Board ‘‘for purposes of the present
amended to clarify the proper use of
appeal.’’ Additionally, final Bd.R.
headings and to require the use of
41.37(c)(1)(iv) further requires that each subheadings in order to clearly set out
ground of rejection argued be set forth
the ground of rejection and the specific
in a separate section with a heading that claims to which each argument
reasonably identifies the ground being
presented applies. These headings and
argued therein. Further, the final rule
subheadings will make certain that
requires that any claim(s) argued
arguments are not overlooked by the
separately or as a subgroup be placed
examiner or the Board. The content
under a separate subheading that
requirements of this paragraph will not
identifies the claim(s) by number.
be interpreted as requiring verbatim
The Board will treat as waived, for
recitation of the ground being contested
purposes of the present appeal, any
and briefs will not be held nonarguments not raised by appellant. See
compliant for minor formatting issues.
Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1313–14
Appeal Brief—Content of Appeal Brief—
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (the Board may treat
Claims Appendix
arguments appellant failed to make for
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(viii) is renumbered
a given ground of rejection as waived);
as final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(v).
In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed.
Subparagraph (viii) is deleted. Final
Cir. 2004) (declining to consider the
appellant’s new argument regarding the Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(v) is identical to Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(viii) and requires appellants
scope of a prior art patent when that
to include a claims appendix with the
argument was not raised before the
appeal brief containing ‘‘a copy of the
Board); and In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d
1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (declining to claims involved in the appeal.’’ Because
final Bd.R. 41.31(c) requires the Board
consider whether prior art cited in an
to presume that all rejections made in
obviousness rejection was nonthe Office Action from which the appeal
analogous art when that argument was
was taken are before it on appeal unless
not raised before the Board).
appellant cancels the claim(s) subject to
The final rule permits the Board to
a particular rejection, the claims
refuse to consider arguments not raised
appendix must include all claims under
in the appeal brief, except as provided
rejection in the Office action from
in final Bd.R. 41.41, 41.47, and 41.52.
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presume that all claims under rejection
are before it on appeal, unless applicant
cancels the claim(s) subject to a
particular rejection. Under final Bd.R.
41.39(a)(1), discussed infra, the
examiner’s answer is deemed to
incorporate all of the grounds of
rejection set forth in the Office action
from which the appeal is taken (as
modified by any advisory action and
pre-appeal brief conference decision),
unless the answer expressly withdraws
a ground of rejection. Moreover, under
final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv), discussed
infra, the headings of the argument
section of the brief shall reasonably
identify the ground of rejection being
contested. Therefore, it is unnecessary
for the appeal brief to contain a separate
statement of the grounds of rejection on
appeal.
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72275
which the appeal is taken unless
cancelled by an amendment filed by the
applicant and entered by the Office.
Appeal Brief—Content of Appeal Brief—
Evidence Appendix
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(ix), which required
appellants to include an evidence
appendix with the brief, is deleted.
While it is no longer a requirement to
include an evidence appendix, the
Office strongly encourages and
appreciates receiving copies of the
evidence relied upon (e.g., copies of
declarations and affidavits, evidence of
secondary considerations, etc.). This
ensures that the Board is considering
the proper evidence and avoids any
confusion as to the particular evidence
referenced in the appeal brief. In the
alternative, the Board recommends that
appellants clearly identify in the appeal
brief the evidence relied upon using a
clear description of the evidence along
with the date of entry of such evidence
into the Image File Wrapper.
Appeal Brief—Content of Appeal Brief—
Related Proceedings Appendix
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(x), which required
appellants to include a related
proceedings appendix with the brief, is
deleted.
While it is no longer a requirement to
include a related proceedings appendix,
the Office appreciates receiving copies
of decisions or relevant papers from
related proceedings. This ensures that
the Board can efficiently consider the
related proceedings information. In the
alternative, the Board recommends that
appellants clearly identify in the appeal
brief any decisions or relevant
documents from related proceedings
using a clear description of the related
proceeding, so that the Board can
quickly and efficiently obtain copies of
any such relevant documents.
Appeal Brief—New or Non-Admitted
Amendments or Evidence
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(2) is amended to add a
sentence to make clear in the rule the
current Office procedure for review of
an examiner’s refusal to admit an
amendment or Evidence by petition to
the Director under Rule 1.181. Final
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(2) further replaces
instances of ‘‘evidence’’ with
‘‘Evidence’’ where appropriate to
incorporate the definition of ‘‘Evidence’’
provided in final Bd.R. 41.30.
Appeal Brief—Notice of NonCompliance
Bd.R. 41.37(d) is amended to add a
heading and to provide that under the
Office’s new streamlined procedure for
review of ex parte appeal briefs for
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compliance with the rule, review of a
determination of non-compliant appeal
brief should be requested via a petition
to the Chief Administrative Patent Judge
under Bd.R. 41.3.
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Appeal Brief—Extensions of Time
Bd.R. 41.37(e) is amended to add a
heading.
Examiner’s Answer
Bd.R. 41.39(a) is amended to add a
heading and preamble.
Bd.R. 41.39(a)(1) is amended to
provide that the examiner’s answer, by
default, incorporates all the grounds of
rejection set forth in the Office action
which is the basis for the appeal,
including any modifications made via
advisory action or pre-appeal brief
conference decision, except for any
grounds of rejection indicated by the
examiner as withdrawn in the answer.
Bd.R. 41.39(a)(1) is also amended to
delete the requirement that the answer
include an explanation of the invention
claimed and of the grounds of rejection,
since the Board will rely on appellant’s
specification and summary of claimed
subject matter for an explanation of the
invention claimed and will rely on the
statement of the rejection(s) in the
Office action from which the appeal is
taken, as modified by advisory action or
pre-appeal brief conference decision. In
light of the streamlined review of appeal
briefs for compliance with the rules,
Bd.R. 41.39(a)(1) is further amended to
delete the requirement for the primary
examiner to make any determination
that an appeal does not comply with the
provisions of final Bd.R. 41.31 and
41.37.
Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2) is amended to
provide that if a rejection set forth in the
answer relies on any Evidence not relied
on in the Office action from which the
appeal is taken, then the rejection must
be designated as a new ground of
rejection, and any answer that contains
such a new ground of rejection must be
approved by the Director. The Director
may choose to delegate this authority as
appropriate. Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2), as
amended, refers to ‘‘Evidence’’ as
defined in final Bd.R. 41.30.
Bd.R. 41.39(b) is amended to add a
heading.
Bd.R. 41.39(b)(1) is amended to
replace instances of ‘‘evidence’’ with
‘‘Evidence’’ where appropriate to refer
to ‘‘Evidence’’ as defined in final Bd.R.
41.30.
Bd.R. 41.39(b)(2) is amended to move
the phrase ‘‘each new ground of
rejection’’ to a different location in the
sentence to increase the clarity of the
sentence. Bd.R. 41.39(b)(2) is also
amended to replace instances of
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‘‘evidence’’ with ‘‘Evidence’’ where
appropriate to refer to ‘‘Evidence’’ as
defined in final Bd.R. 41.30. Bd.R.
41.39(b)(2) is further amended to
replace the cross-reference to Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(vii) with a reference to final
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv) in light of the
renumbering of paragraphs within final
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1).
Final Bd.R. 41.39(b)(1) and (b)(2)
continue to provide appellants the
option to reopen prosecution or
maintain the appeal by filing a reply
brief to respond to the new ground of
rejection.
Bd.R. 41.39(c) is amended to add a
heading.
Content requirements for the
examiner’s answer are not included in
the rule, because the Office needs to
retain flexibility to add content
requirements as needed by revision of
the MPEP. The Office plans to continue
to require that the examiner’s answer
contain a grounds of rejection section
that would set forth any rejections that
have been withdrawn and any new
grounds of rejection, and the answer
would further be required to contain a
response to the arguments section to
include any response the examiner has
to arguments raised in the appeal brief.
See MPEP § 1207.02. The answer would
no longer be required to restate the
grounds of rejection being maintained.
The Board would instead rely on the
statement of the grounds of rejection in
the Office action from which the appeal
was taken (as modified by any
subsequent advisory action or preappeal brief conference decision).
The following discussion provides
guidance to appellants and examiners as
to the Office’s view of what constitutes
a new ground of rejection. This
discussion is for the limited ‘‘purposes
of the examiner’s answer,’’ as per final
Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2). This discussion does
not apply to final rejections under Rule
1.113. The reason for this distinction is
that Rule 1.116 affords applicants the
opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence
after a final rejection but before or on
the same date of filing a notice of
appeal. An appellant’s ability to
introduce new evidence after the filing
of an appeal is more limited under final
Bd.R. 41.33(d) than it is prior to the
appeal. Thus, applicants are able to
present rebuttal evidence in response to
a final rejection, while they are not
permitted to do so in response to an
examiner’s answer on appeal, unless an
answer is designated as containing a
new ground of rejection.
If Evidence (such as a new prior art
reference) is applied or cited for the first
time in an examiner’s answer, then final
Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2) requires that the
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rejection be designated as a new ground
of rejection. If the citation of a new prior
art reference is necessary to support a
rejection, it must be included in the
statement of rejection, which would be
considered to introduce a new ground of
rejection. Even if the prior art reference
is cited to support the rejection in a
minor capacity, it should be positively
included in the statement of rejection
and be designated as a new ground of
rejection. In re Hoch, 428 F.2d 1341,
1342 n.3 (CCPA 1970).
Relying on new Evidence, however, is
not the only way to trigger a new ground
of rejection in an examiner’s answer. A
position or rationale that changes the
‘‘basic thrust of the rejection’’ will give
rise to a new ground of rejection. In re
Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1303 (CCPA
1976). However, the examiner need not
use identical language in both the
examiner’s answer and the Office action
from which the appeal is taken to avoid
triggering a new ground of rejection. It
is not a new ground of rejection, for
example, if the examiner’s answer
responds to appellant’s arguments using
different language, or restates the
reasoning of the rejection in a different
way, so long as the ‘‘basic thrust of the
rejection’’ is the same. In re Kronig, 539
F.2d at 1303; see also In re Jung, 637
F.3d 1356, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(additional explanation responding to
arguments offered for the first time ‘‘did
not change the rejection’’ and appellant
had fair opportunity to respond); In re
Noznick, 391 F.2d 946, 949 (CCPA
1968) (no new ground of rejection made
when ‘‘explaining to appellants why
their arguments were ineffective to
overcome the rejection made by the
examiner’’); In re Krammes, 314 F.2d
813, 817 (CCPA 1963) (‘‘It is well
established that mere difference in form
of expression of the reasons for finding
claims unpatentable or unobvious over
the references does not amount to
reliance on a different ground of
rejection.’’ (citations omitted)); In re
Cowles, 156 F.2d 551, 1241 (CCPA 1946)
(holding that the use of ‘‘different
language’’ does not necessarily trigger a
new ground of rejection).
The following examples are intended
to provide guidance as to what
constitutes a new ground of rejection in
an examiner’s answer. What constitutes
a ‘‘new ground of rejection’’ is a highly
fact-specific question. See, e.g., Kronig,
539 F.2d at 1303 (finding new ground
entered based upon ‘‘facts of this case’’
and declining to find other cases
controlling given ‘‘the distinctive facts
at bar’’); In re Ahlert, 424 F.2d 1088,
1092 (CCPA 1970) (‘‘[l]ooking at the
facts of this case, we are constrained to
hold’’ that a new ground was entered).
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If a situation arises that does not fall
neatly within any of the following
examples, it is recommended that the
examiner identify the example below
that is most analogous to the situation
at hand, keeping in mind that ‘‘the
ultimate criterion of whether a rejection
is considered ‘new’ * * * is whether
appellants have had fair opportunity to
react to the thrust of the rejection.’’
Kronig, 539 F.2d at 1302.
Factual Situations That Constitute a
New Ground of Rejection
1. Changing the statutory basis of
rejection from § 102 to § 103. If the
examiner’s answer changes the statutory
basis of the rejection from § 102 to § 103,
then the rejection should be designated
as a new ground of rejection. For
example, in In re Hughes, 345 F.2d 184
(CCPA 1965), the Board affirmed an
examiner’s rejection under § 102 over a
single reference. On appeal, the
Solicitor argued that the Board’s
decision should be sustained under
§ 103 over that same reference. The
court declined to sustain the rejection
under § 103, holding that a change in
the statutory basis of rejection would
constitute a new ground of rejection,
and observed that ‘‘the issues arising
under the two sections [§§ 102 and 103]
may be vastly different, and may call for
the production and introduction of quite
different types of evidence.’’ Hughes,
345 F.2d at 186–87.
2. Changing the statutory basis of
rejection from § 103 to § 102, based on
a different teaching. If the examiner’s
answer changes the statutory basis of
the rejection from § 103 to § 102, and
relies on a different portion of a
reference which goes beyond the scope
of the portion that was previously relied
upon, then the rejection should be
designated as a new ground of rejection.
For example, in In re Echerd, 471 F.2d
632 (CCPA 1973), the examiner rejected
the claims under § 103 over a
combination of two references. The
Board then changed the ground of
rejection to § 102 over one of those
references, relying on a different portion
of that reference for some claim
limitations, and asserted that the
remaining claim limitations were
inherently present in that reference. The
court held that the Board’s affirmance
constituted a new ground of rejection.
Echerd, 471 F.2d at 635 (‘‘[A]ppellants
should have been accorded an
opportunity to present rebuttal evidence
as to the new assumptions of inherent
characteristics. * * *’’ (citation
omitted)).
3. Citing new calculations in support
of overlapping ranges. If a claim reciting
a range is rejected as anticipated or
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obvious based on prior art that falls
within or overlaps with the claimed
range (see MPEP §§ 2131.03 and
2144.05), and the rejection is based
upon range values calculated for the
first time in the examiner’s answer, then
the rejection should be designated as a
new ground of rejection. For example,
in In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2005), the examiner rejected the claims
under § 103 based on overlapping
ranges of particle sizes and size
distributions. The Board affirmed the
rejection, but included in its decision an
appendix containing calculations to
support the prima facie case of
obviousness. The court held the Board’s
reliance upon those values to constitute
a new ground of rejection, stating that
‘‘the Board found facts not found by the
examiner regarding the differences
between the prior art and the claimed
invention, which in fairness required an
opportunity for response.’’ Kumar, 418
F.3d at 1368 (citation omitted).
4. Citing new structure in support of
structural obviousness. If, in support of
an obviousness rejection based on close
structural similarity (see MPEP
§ 2144.09), the examiner’s answer relies
on a different structure than the one on
which the examiner previously relied,
then the rejection should be designated
as a new ground of rejection. For
example, in In re Wiechert, 370 F.2d 927
(CCPA 1967), the examiner rejected
claims to a chemical composition under
§ 103 based on the composition’s
structural similarity to a prior art
compound disclosed in a reference. The
Board affirmed the rejection under § 103
over that same reference, but did so
based on a different compound than the
one the examiner cited. The court held
that the Board’s decision constituted a
new ground of rejection, stating, ‘‘Under
such circumstances, we conclude that
when a rejection is factually based on an
entirely different portion of an existing
reference the appellant should be
afforded an opportunity to make a
showing of unobviousness vis-a-vis
such portion of the reference.’’
Wiechert, 370 F.2d at 933.
5. Pointing to a different portion of the
claim to maintain a ‘‘new matter’’
rejection. If, in support of a claim
rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112, first
paragraph, based on new matter (see
MPEP § 2163.06), a different feature or
aspect of the rejected claim is believed
to constitute new matter, then the
rejection should be designated as a new
ground of rejection. For example, in In
re Waymouth, 486 F.2d 1058 (CCPA
1973), the claims included the
limitation ‘‘said sodium iodide * * *
present in amount of at least 0.17
mg./cc. of said arc tube volume.’’ The
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examiner’s rejection stated that the
claimed ‘‘sodium iodide’’ constituted
new matter because the specification
was alleged only to disclose ‘‘sodium.’’
The Board affirmed the rejection, but
did so on a ‘‘wholly different basis,’’
namely, that the specification failed to
disclose the claimed ‘‘0.17 mg./cc.’’
volume limitation. Waymouth, 486 F.2d
at 1060. The court held that the Board’s
rationale constituted a new ground of
rejection, ‘‘necessitating different
responses by appellants.’’ Id. at 1061.
Factual Situations That Do Not
Constitute a New Ground of Rejection
1. Citing a different portion of a
reference to elaborate upon that which
has been cited previously. If the
examiner’s answer cites a different
portion of an applied reference which
goes no farther than, and merely
elaborates upon, what is taught in the
previously cited portion of that
reference, then the rejection does not
constitute a new ground of rejection. For
example, in In re DBC, 545 F.3d 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2008), the examiner rejected
the claims under § 103 over a
combination of references, including the
English translation of the abstract for a
Japanese patent. The examiner cited the
English abstract for two claim
limitations: (1) Mangosteen rind, and (2)
fruit or vegetable juice. The Board
affirmed the rejection under § 103 over
the same references, but instead of
citing the abstract, the Board cited an
Example on page 16 of the English
translation of the Japanese reference,
which was not before the examiner.
DBC, 545 F.3d at 1381. Importantly, the
Board cited the Example for the same
two claim limitations taught in the
abstract, and the Example merely
elaborated upon the medicinal qualities
of the mangosteen rind (which
medicinal qualities were not claimed)
and taught orange juice as the preferred
fruit juice (while the claim merely
recited fruit or vegetable juice). Hence,
the Example merely provided a more
specific disclosure of the same two
generic limitations that were fully
taught by the abstract. The court held
that this did not constitute a new
ground of rejection because ‘‘the
example in the translation goes no
farther than, and merely elaborates
upon, what is taught by the abstract.’’
DBC, 545 F.3d at 1382 n.5.
2. Changing the statutory basis of
rejection from § 103 to § 102, but relying
on the same teachings. If the examiner’s
answer changes the statutory basis of
the rejection from § 103 to § 102, and
relies on the same teachings of the
remaining reference to support the § 102
rejection, then the rejection does not
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constitute a new ground of rejection. For
example, in In re May, 574 F.2d 1082
(CCPA 1978), a claim directed to a
genus of chemical compounds was
rejected under § 103 over a combination
of references. The primary reference
disclosed a species that fell within the
claimed genus. Both the examiner and
the Board cited the species to reject the
claim under § 103. The court affirmed
the rejection, but did so under § 102,
stating that ‘‘lack of novelty is the
epitome of obviousness.’’ May, 574 F.2d
at 1089 (citing In re Pearson, 494 F.2d
1399, 1402 (CCPA 1974)). Because the
court relied on the same prior art
species as both the examiner and Board,
the court held that this did not
constitute a new ground of rejection.
May, 574 F.2d at 1089.
3. Relying on fewer than all references
in support of a § 103 rejection, but
relying on the same teachings. If the
examiner’s answer removes one or more
references from the statement of
rejection under § 103, and relies on the
same teachings of the remaining
references to support the § 103 rejection,
then the rejection does not constitute a
new ground of rejection. For example,
in In re Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1302
(CCPA 1976), the examiner rejected the
claims under § 103 over four references.
The Board affirmed the rejection under
§ 103, but limited its discussion to three
of the references applied by the
examiner. Id. The Board relied upon the
references for the same teachings as did
the examiner. The court held that this
did not constitute a new ground of
rejection. Kronig, 539 F.2d at 1303
(‘‘Having compared the rationale of the
rejection advanced by the examiner and
the board on this record, we are
convinced that the basic thrust of the
rejection at the examiner and board
level was the same.’’). See also In re
Bush, 296 F.2d 491, 495–96 (CCPA
1961) (Examiner rejected claims 28 and
29 under § 103 based upon ‘‘Whitney in
view of Harth;’’ Board did not enter new
ground of rejection by relying only on
Whitney).
4. Changing the order of references in
the statement of rejection, but relying on
the same teachings of those references.
If the examiner’s answer changes the
order of references in the statement of
rejection under § 103, and relies on the
same teachings of those references to
support the § 103 rejection, then the
rejection does not constitute a new
ground of rejection. For example, in In
re Cowles, 156 F.2d 551, 552 (CCPA
1946), the examiner rejected the claims
under § 103 over ‘‘Foret in view of
either Preleuthner or Seyfried.’’ The
Board affirmed the rejection under
§ 103, but styled the statement of
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rejection as to some of the rejected
claims as ‘‘Seyfried in view of Foret,’’
but relied on the same teachings of
Seyfried and Foret on which the
examiner relied. The court held that this
did not constitute a new ground of
rejection. Cowles, 156 F.2d at 554. See
also In re Krammes, 314 F.2d 813, 816–
17 (CCPA 1963) (holding that a different
‘‘order of combining the references’’ did
not constitute a new ground of rejection
because each reference was cited for the
‘‘same teaching’’ previously cited).
5. Considering, in order to respond to
applicant’s arguments, other portions of
a reference submitted by the applicant.
If an applicant submits a new reference
to argue, for example, that the prior art
‘‘teaches away’’ from the claimed
invention (see MPEP § 2145), and the
examiner’s answer points to portions of
that same reference to counter the
argument, then the rejection does not
constitute a new ground of rejection. In
In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038 (Fed. Cir.
1986), the claimed invention was
directed to a process for sulfonating
diphenyl sulfone at a temperature above
127° C. Id. at 1039. The examiner
rejected the claims under § 103 over a
single reference. The applicant
submitted three additional references as
evidence that the prior art teaches away
from performing sulfonation above 127°
C, citing portions of those references
which taught lower temperature
reactions. The Board affirmed the
rejection, finding the applicant’s
evidence unpersuasive. On appeal, the
Solicitor responded to the applicant’s
‘‘teaching away’’ argument by pointing
to other portions of those same
references which, contrary to
applicant’s argument, disclosed
reactions occurring above 127° C. The
court held that this did not constitute a
new ground of rejection because ‘‘[t]he
Solicitor has done no more than search
the references of record for disclosures
pertinent to the same arguments for
which [applicant] cited the references.’’
Hedges, 783 F.2d at 1039–40.
Tolling of Time Period To File a Reply
Brief
Final Bd.R. 41.40 sets forth the
exclusive procedure for an appellant to
request review of the primary
examiner’s failure to designate a
rejection as a new ground of rejection
via a petition to the Director under Rule
1.181. This procedure should be used if
an appellant feels an answer includes a
new ground of rejection that has not
been designated as such and wishes to
reopen prosecution so that new
amendments or evidence may be
submitted in response to the rejection.
However, if appellant wishes to submit
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only arguments, the filing of a petition
under Rule 1.181 would not be
necessary because appellant may submit
the arguments in a reply brief.
Final Bd.R. 41.40(a) provides that any
such petition under Rule 1.181 must be
filed within two months from the entry
of the examiner’s answer and prior to
the filing of a reply brief.
Final Bd.R. 41.40(b) provides that a
decision granting such a Rule 1.181
petition requires appellants to file a
reply under Rule 1.111 within two
months from the date of the decision to
reopen prosecution. If appellant fails to
timely file a reply, then the appeal will
be dismissed.
Final Bd.R. 41.40(c) provides that a
decision refusing to grant such a Rule
1.181 petition allows appellants a twomonth time period in which to file a
single reply brief under final Bd.R.
41.41.
Final Bd.R. 41.40(d) provides that if a
reply brief is filed prior to a decision on
the Rule 1.181 petition, then the filing
of the reply brief acts to withdraw the
petition and maintain the appeal.
Jurisdiction passes to the Board upon
the filing of the reply brief, and the
petition under Rule 1.181 will not be
decided on the merits.
Final Bd.R. 41.40(e) provides that the
time periods described in this section
are not extendable under Rule 1.136(a)
and appellant must seek any extensions
of time under the provisions of Rules
1.136(b) and 1.550(c) for extensions of
time to reply for patent applications and
ex parte reexaminations, respectively.
Final Bd.R. 41.40 provides the proper
manner for appellants to address a
situation where an appellant believes
that an examiner’s answer contains an
undesignated new ground of rejection.
The rule does not create a new right of
petition—appellants have always had
the opportunity to file a petition under
Rule 1.181 if an appellant felt that the
examiner’s answer contained a new
ground of rejection not so designated.
This final rule merely lays out the
process to better enable appellants to
address such concerns. The final rule
also now tolls the time period for filing
a reply brief, so appellants can avoid the
cost of preparing and filing a reply brief
prior to the petition being decided, and
can avoid the cost altogether if the
petition is granted and prosecution is
reopened. Similarly, the tolling
provision will spare examiners the
burden of having to act on appellants’
requests under Rule 1.136(b) for
extension of the two-month time period
for filing a reply brief while the Rule
1.181 petition is being decided.
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Reply Brief
Bd.R. 41.41(a) is amended to add a
heading and to clarify that appellants
may file only one reply brief and that
such a reply brief must be filed within
the later of two months of either the
examiner’s answer or a decision
refusing to grant a petition under Rule
1.181 to designate a new ground of
rejection in an examiner’s answer.
Bd.R. 41.41(b) is amended to add a
heading and subsections, and to delete
the provision that a reply brief which is
not in compliance with the provisions
of the remainder of final Bd.R. 41.41
will not be considered by the Board.
Specifically, final Bd.R. 41.41(b)(1) is
added, which prohibits a reply brief
from including new or non-admitted
amendments or Evidence, which is the
same language as in Bd.R. 41.41(a)(2).
Final Bd.R. 41.41(b) refers to
‘‘Evidence’’ as defined in final Bd.R.
41.30. Final Bd.R. 41.41(b)(2) is also
added, which provides that any
arguments which were not raised in the
appeal brief or are not made in response
to arguments raised in the answer will
not be considered by the Board, absent
a showing of good cause. The final rule
allows new arguments in the reply brief
that are responsive to arguments raised
in the examiner’s answer, including any
designated new ground of rejection.
Bd.R. 41.41(c) is amended to add a
heading.
Examiner’s Response to Reply Brief
Bd.R. 41.43 is deleted.
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Oral Hearing
Bd.R. 41.47 is amended by removing
references to the supplemental
examiner’s answer in paragraphs (b) and
(e)(1), as the final rule does not allow for
supplemental examiner’s answers. Bd.R.
41.47(b) is further amended to change
the time period in which a request for
oral hearing is due to take into account
the potential for the time period for
filing a reply brief to be tolled under
final Bd.R. 41.40. Bd.R. 41.47(e)(1) is
further amended to replace instances of
‘‘evidence’’ with ‘‘Evidence’’ to
incorporate the definition provided in
final Bd.R. 41.30.
Decisions and Other Actions by the
Board
Bd.R. 41.50(a)(1) is amended by
adding a heading.
Bd.R. 41.50(a)(2) is amended by
allowing the examiner to write a
‘‘substitute’’ examiner’s answer in
response to a remand by the Board for
further consideration of a rejection.
Bd.R. 41.50(a)(2)(i) and 41.50(a)(2)(ii)
are amended by replacing instances of
‘‘evidence’’ with ‘‘Evidence’’ to
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incorporate the definition provided in
final Bd.R. 41.30. Bd.R. 41.50(a)(2)(i) is
further amended by replacing
‘‘supplemental’’ with ‘‘substitute’’
examiner’s answer.
Bd.R. 41.50(b) is amended by adding
a heading and is further amended to
clarify the Board’s authority to enter a
new ground of rejection. Bd.R.
41.50(b)(1) is amended by incorporating
the definitions of ‘‘Record’’ and
‘‘Evidence’’ provided in final Bd.R.
41.30, and by clarifying the language of
the rule. Bd.R. 41.50(b)(2) is amended to
incorporate the definition of ‘‘Record’’
as provided for in final Bd.R. 41.30.
Bd.R. 41.50(c) is amended by
removing the Board’s power to suggest
in a decision how a claim may be
amended to overcome a rejection and by
adding new language to the rule
explaining the procedure by which
appellants can seek review of a panel’s
failure to designate a decision as
containing a new ground of rejection.
The final rule provides that review of
decisions which appellants believe
contain a new ground of rejection
should be requested through a request
for rehearing consistent with the
provisions of final Bd.R. 41.52.
Bd.R. 41.50(d) is amended to add a
heading, and to delete the ‘‘nonextendable’’ limitation on the response
time period.
Bd.R. 41.50(e) is amended to add a
heading.
Bd.R. 41.50(f) is amended to add a
heading.
Rehearing
Bd.R. 41.52(a)(1) is amended to add
cross-references to relevant sections of
the rule and to clarify that arguments
which are not raised and Evidence
which was not previously relied upon
are not permitted in the request for
rehearing, except as provided in the
remainder of final Bd.R. 41.52(a). Bd.R.
41.52(a)(1) is further amended to
incorporate the definition of ‘‘Evidence’’
provided in final Bd.R. 41.30.
Bd.R. 41.52(a)(2) is amended to delete
the requirement for appellants to make
a showing of good cause to present new
arguments based on a recent relevant
decision of the Board or the Federal
Circuit. It is the Office’s position that a
new argument based on a recent
relevant decision would inherently
make a showing of good cause.
Bd.R. 41.52(a)(3) is amended to
change the word ‘‘made’’ to
‘‘designated’’ to clarify that new
arguments are permitted in response to
a new ground of rejection designated as
such in the Board’s opinion.
Final Bd.R. 41.52(a)(4) is added to
make clear that new arguments are
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72279
permitted in a request for rehearing for
appellants seeking to have the Board
designate its decision as containing a
new ground of rejection that has not
been so designated.
Thus, the final rule provides
appellants with a mechanism to address
Board decisions containing new
grounds of rejection through a request
for rehearing, whether or not designated
as such in a Board decision. Final Bd.R.
41.52(a)(3) allows for new arguments in
a request for rehearing responding to the
merits of a new ground of rejection
designated as such, and final Bd.R.
41.52(a)(4) allows for new arguments in
a request for rehearing to argue that the
Board’s decision contains an
undesignated new ground of rejection. If
such a request for rehearing under final
Bd.R. 41.52(a)(4) is granted, then the
Board would modify its original
decision to designate the decision as
containing a new ground of rejection
under final Bd.R. 41.50(b) and provide
appellants with the option to either
reopen prosecution under final Bd.R.
41.50(b)(1) or request rehearing on the
merits of the designated new ground of
rejection under final Bd.R. 41.50(b)(2).
The final Bd.R. 41.52(b) does not
modify Bd.R. 41.52(b).
Action following decision
Bd.R. 41.54 is amended to specifically
state that jurisdiction over an
application or a patent under ex parte
reexamination passes to the examiner
after a decision on appeal is issued by
the Board. This revision to the language
incorporates the language of Rule
1.197(a), which is deleted from the final
rule. By incorporating the language of
Rule 1.197(a) into final Bd.R. 41.54, the
rule for passing jurisdiction back to the
examiner after decision by the Board is
not substantively changed from the
previous practice.
Differences Between the Final Rule and
the Proposed Rule
Several changes have been made to
the rule as proposed in the NPRM.
Because some of these changes add
briefing requirements to the appeal brief
that the Office had proposed to remove
in the NPRM, the estimate of the burden
on applicants to produce the appeal
brief has also changed. The Office
previously estimated that the rules
proposed in the NPRM would reduce an
applicant’s paperwork burden from
34 hours to 31 hours. The Office
estimates that the Final Rule will reduce
the paperwork burden from 34 hours to
32 hours.
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 225 / Tuesday, November 22, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Response to Comments
The Office published a notice of
proposed rulemaking proposing changes
to the rules of practice before the Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences in
ex parte appeals. See Rules of Practice
Before the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences in Ex Parte Appeals;
Notice of proposed rulemaking, 75 FR
69828 (Nov. 15, 2010) (NPRM). The
Office received comments from six
intellectual property organizations, four
corporations and foundations, three law
firms, and 21 individuals in response to
this notice. The Office’s responses to the
comments follow.
Eight entities submitted written
comments solely to express the view
that they are wholeheartedly in favor of
the changes to the rules as proposed in
the NPRM. In light of all of the
comments received, the USPTO has
decided not to adopt a few of the
changes proposed in the NPRM and to
adopt a few other proposed changes
with slight clarification to the language
used to make the rule clearer. On
balance, however, the rule changes
proposed in the NPRM are being
adopted substantially as proposed.
Bd.R. 41.12
Comment 1: Two comments favored
extending the list of preferred citations
to include other sources, such as United
States Patent Quarterly, LEXIS, and
Pacer. Two other comments favored the
proposed rule changes.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt the suggestion to extend the list
of preferred citations to other sources.
This rule merely indicates to the public
which citation sources are ‘‘preferred’’
by the Board but it does not require
appellants to cite to any one particular
source.
Comment 2: One comment suggested
that paragraph (d) should be amended to
make clear that appellants are not
required to provide copies of the BPAI’s
own precedential decisions.
Response: A BPAI precedential
decision is binding on the Board and is
considered an ‘‘authority of the Office’’
and thus does not fall within the ambit
of paragraph (d). As such, the rule does
not require appellants to submit a copy
of a BPAI precedential decision.
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Bd.R. 41.20
Comment 3: While no change was
proposed to this section of the rule, one
comment was submitted suggesting that
the USPTO should not charge fees for
appeals that do not reach the BPAI for
decision.
Response: The suggestion is beyond
the scope of the NPRM and will not be
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adopted. The USPTO takes this
opportunity to note that 35 U.S.C. 42(d)
authorizes the USPTO to refund ‘‘any
fee paid by mistake or any amount paid
in excess of that required.’’ If an
applicant chooses to file a notice of
appeal and an appeal brief with the
accompanying fees, and the case does
not reach the Board for a decision,
either through actions taken by the
examiner or applicant, then the appeal
fees have not been paid by mistake or
in excess of that required, and the
USPTO lacks statutory authority to
refund these appeal fees.
Bd.R. 41.30
Comment 4: Two comments opposed
the proposed definition of ‘‘Record’’
because it did not address file wrappers
of older cases that are still maintained
in paper format.
Response: The USPTO creates an
Image File Wrapper for any appeal to
the Board that does not yet have one.
Further, the definition of ‘‘Record’’ in
final Bd.R. 41.30 addresses a situation
where the official file of the Office is
other than an Image File Wrapper.
Bd.R. 41.31
Comment 5: One comment requested
clarification of the term ‘‘twice rejected’’
as used in paragraph (a) of this section
because MPEP § 1204 is allegedly
narrower than the majority Board
decision in Ex Parte Lemoine, 46
USPQ2d 1420 (BPAI 1994).
Response: This comment is beyond
the scope of the NPRM. Bd.R. 41.31 rule
uses the same ‘‘twice rejected’’
language. No change will be made to
paragraph (a) as a result of this
comment.
Comment 6: One comment was in
favor of the proposed retention of the
provision in paragraph (b) allowing a
notice of appeal to be filed without a
signature. Another comment suggested
that paragraph (b) be revised to cite
more specifically to Rule 1.33(b).
Response: The USPTO declines to
make this change to the rule. Final Bd.R.
41.31(b) applies to ex parte appeals in
both applications and reexamination
proceedings. Rule 1.33(b) applies only
to amendments and other papers filed in
an application, while Rule 1.33(c)
applies to amendments and other papers
filed in a reexamination proceeding on
behalf of the patent owner. As such, the
USPTO will retain the rule as proposed
with the more general reference to Rule
1.33 to encompass both types of
appeals.
Comment 7: Three comments were in
favor of the proposal in Bd.R. 41.31(c)
that an appeal, when taken, is presumed
to be taken from the rejection of all
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claims under rejection unless cancelled
by applicant’s amendment, and two
comments were opposed. One comment
opposed to proposed Bd.R. 41.31(c)
suggested that claims declared cancelled
for purposes of the appeal be
automatically reinstated if prosecution
is reopened by the examiner.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt the suggested change to the
proposed rule. If an applicant chooses to
cancel a claim to avoid appeal of that
claim rejection, the claim remains
cancelled. Nothing in this rule prohibits
applicants from adding back these
cancelled claims by amendment should
prosecution be reopened.
Comment 8: Another comment
opposed to Bd.R. 41.31(c) proposed that
the USPTO allow appellants to appeal
less than all of the claims, and that
allowing the USPTO to cancel or deem
claims cancelled or requiring
cancellation as a quid pro quo for
appeal is ultra vires.
Response: It has long been USPTO
practice that an appellant must either
appeal from the rejection of all the
rejected claims or cancel those claims
not being appealed. See In re Benjamin,
1903 Dec. Comm. Pat. 132, 134 (1903).
Final Bd. R. 41.31(c) merely states that
an appeal is presumed to be taken from
the rejection of all rejected claims that
have not been cancelled. Nothing in the
rule would require applicants, as a quid
pro quo for appeal, to cancel claims.
Should an applicant desire to appeal
less than all the rejected claims without
actually cancelling the claims, applicant
may simply say nothing as to the claims
applicant does not wish to appeal and
the Board may simply affirm the
rejection of those claims.
Comment 9: One comment suggested
that the proposed revision to Bd.R.
41.31(c) violates the Paperwork
Reduction Act because the commenter
claimed the Office had not stated the
utility to be gained by presuming
applicants are appealing all rejected
claims. Additionally, the commenter
suggested that a better solution would
be to allow the appellant to appeal some
claims and leave some claims rejected
and pending.
Response: The NPRM explains that
the change to Bd.R. 41.31(c) will save
time and paperwork for the ‘‘majority of
appellants who seek review of all claims
under rejection’’ by eliminating the
requirement that each claim on appeal
be listed in the notice of appeal. See 75
FR 69828–01, 2010 WL 4568003, at
*69831 (Dep’t of Commerce Nov. 15,
2010). The NPRM further explains that
the utility of this change is in
‘‘avoid[ing] the unintended cancellation
of claims by the Office due to an
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appellant’s mistake in the listing of the
claims in either the notice of the appeal
or in the appeal brief.’’ Id. Furthermore,
the Office rejects the commenter’s
suggestion of allowing some claims to
remain pending. Allowing such a
piecemeal approach to appeals would
greatly decrease the efficiency of the
patent prosecution process.
Comment 10: One comment requested
clarification on the portion of Bd.R.
41.31(c) that states, ‘‘Questions relating
to matters not affecting the merits of the
invention may be required to be settled
before an appeal can be considered’’
because it is not clear whether this
sentence would apply to questions
created by the examiner, the appellant
or the Board, or by all three.
Response: This comment is beyond
the scope of the NPRM. This language
is in the 2004 version of Bd.R. 41.31(c),
and the proposed rule making did not
propose any changes to this portion of
the rule.
Comment 11: One comment suggested
adding a provision to Bd.R. 41.31(c) to
address appeals filed while petitions
under Rule 1.181 are pending,
specifically that the Chief Judge be able
to decide if the appeal can proceed
without the petition being decided or a
procedure for expediting the petition
decisions where that decision is
necessary prior to decision on appeal.
Response: This comment is beyond
the scope of the NPRM. The language in
the last sentence of paragraph (c) is in
the 2004 version of Bd.R. 41.31(c), and
the proposed rulemaking did not
propose any changes to this portion of
the rule.
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Bd.R. 41.33
Comment 12: One comment requested
clarification stating that the limitations
in Bd.R. 41.37(c)(2) and Bd.R.
41.41(b)(1) to preclude entry of a ‘‘new’’
or ‘‘non-admitted’’ amendments would
potentially bar submission of items
otherwise permitted under Bd.R. 41.33.
Response: Final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(2) and
final Bd.R. 41.41(b)(1) are intended to
preclude reliance on new or nonadmitted amendments that are not
otherwise admitted by the examiner
under final Bd.R. 41.33. If the examiner
enters an amendment under final Bd.R.
41.33, appellant may rely on that
amendment in the briefs. If the
amendment is filed concurrently with a
brief, and if it complies with final Bd.R.
41.33, then appellant may refer to the
amendment in the brief even prior to the
examiner rendering a decision on
whether to admit the amendment.
Should the examiner subsequently
refuse to enter the amendment, then the
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Board will require appellant to file a
substitute brief.
Comment 13: Four comments
opposed the rule in Bd.R. 41.33(d)
restricting affidavits or other evidence
filed after the date of filing an appeal.
One comment suggested allowing
appellants, with the payment of an
additional fee, to file rebuttal evidence
with an appeal brief.
Response: In response to the
comments opposed to any restrictions
on the amendments and evidence that
appellants can file after final and/or on
or after the filing of a brief, the USPTO
declines to make any additional changes
to the rule. Final Bd.R. 41.33(d) is
virtually identical to Bd.R. 41.33(d), the
only changes being to incorporate the
definition of Evidence from final Bd.R.
41.30. The USPTO rules provide
appellants with mechanisms for
introduction of new evidence and
amendments through petitions to
challenge the finality of a rejection,
petitions to challenge whether an
answer contains an undesignated new
ground of rejection, and/or through
request for continued examination
(RCE) practice. The available
mechanisms provide appellants with a
full and fair opportunity to present
amendments and/or evidence so that the
examiner can first consider them prior
to the case reaching the Board for
review. The Board’s main purpose is to
review adverse decisions of examiners.
The Board’s review is not a continuation
of the initial examination of a case. To
ensure that the Board reviews a
complete record that has been fully
considered first by the examiner, the
USPTO will maintain this rule as
proposed, except to add back in a crossreference to final Bd.R. 41.50(a)(2)(i)
and to replace instances of ‘‘evidence’’
with ‘‘Evidence’’ so as to incorporate the
definition provided in final Bd.R. 41.30.
Comment 14: One comment proposed
that Bd.R. 41.33(d) be amended to allow
appellants to reference encyclopedia or
dictionary definitions in the brief
because these are materials that may be
judicially or officially noticed without
being formally admitted into evidence.
Response: The USPTO agrees that
dictionaries can be judicially noticed
without being formally admitted into
evidence and thus adopts a definition of
‘‘Evidence’’ in final Bd.R. 41.30 for this
subpart that excludes dictionaries from
this definition. This exclusion allows
appellants to submit dictionaries for the
first time in an appeal brief, or for the
first time in a reply brief if the
arguments pertaining thereto are
responsive to an argument raised in the
examiner’s answer or if good cause is
shown. This exclusion will likewise
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allow examiners to cite to a dictionary
for the first time in the examiner’s
answer without such citation
automatically resulting in a new ground
of rejection under final Bd.R.
41.39(a)(2). The USPTO will determine
based on controlling case law and the
facts of each case whether citation to a
dictionary in the examiner’s answer or
a Board decision constitutes a new
ground of rejection. The USPTO notes
that its rules are designed so that the
scope of admissible evidence that can be
submitted by the applicant narrows as
the application progresses toward
appeal. In particular, the scope of
admissible evidence narrows after
mailing of a final rejection, and then
narrows further after applicant files a
notice of appeal, and then narrows even
further after appellant files an appeal
brief. Compare 37 CFR 1.116(e),
41.33(d)(1), and 41.33(d)(2). To ensure
that the USPTO is consistent in its
treatment of dictionaries and is not
more restrictive regarding admission of
dictionaries in after-final practice than
on appeal under final Bd.R. 41.33(d),
the USPTO will not treat dictionaries as
‘‘evidence’’ for purposes of Rule
1.116(e). However, the Office
encourages applicants and examiners to
cite dictionaries early in the prosecution
to aid in narrowing, and possibly
resolving, issues before the appeal stage.
Bd.R. 41.35
Comment 15: One comment suggested
that the Board take jurisdiction earlier
than proposed in Bd.R. 41.35(a), i.e., at
the time of filing of the notice of appeal.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt this suggestion. Since examiners
may choose to reopen prosecution or
allow applications after the filing of a
notice of appeal, changing the Board’s
jurisdiction to the point at which a
notice of appeal is filed would foreclose
the examiner’s options and could result
in applicants unnecessarily going
through a costly and lengthy appeal
process.
Comment 16: Two comments
suggested that the Board take
jurisdiction later, i.e., after the examiner
has had an opportunity to consider the
reply brief, to allow for the instance
where the examiner would find some or
all of the claims patentable in light of
the reply brief.
Response: USPTO data for the past
ten years (FY 2001–FY 2010) shows that
examiners allow applications in
approximately 1% of all appeals and
reopen prosecution in approximately
1% of all appeals after the filing of a
reply brief. It is most often the case that
once the examiner has held an appeal
conference on the case and prepared an
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examiner’s answer, the examiner simply
acknowledges and enters the reply brief
and the appeal proceeds to the Board for
review and decision. Meanwhile,
USPTO data shows over the same time
period that in those cases where the
examiner simply acknowledged and
entered the reply brief, the average
pendency from the filing of a reply brief
to the time the examiner acknowledged
and entered the reply brief was 55 days.
As such, the advantage in shorter
pendency received by all appellants
from the Board taking jurisdiction upon
filing a reply brief—at which point, the
examiner has held an appeal conference
on the case and prepared an examiner’s
answer—outweighs, in the view of the
USPTO, the advantage gained in those
rare instances where an appeal may
become unnecessary after filing of the
reply brief. For these reasons, the
USPTO will maintain the language of
Bd.R. 41.35(a) as proposed.
Comment 17: Three comments were
in favor of Bd.R. 41.35(a) as proposed.
Response: The USPTO adopts the
proposed changes to Bd.R. 41.35(a).
Comment 18: One comment suggested
that the USPTO adopt a default
assumption for Bd.R. 41.35(b)(5) that
appellant wants to proceed on appeal
for other appealed claims and abandon
claims subject to an action under Bd.R.
41.39 or 41.50 requiring response, akin
to the approach taken when some
claims are not dealt with in the appeal
brief context.
Response: Under final Bd.R. 41.39(b),
41.50(a)(2) and 41.50(b), if appellant
does not file a paper in response to a
new ground of rejection or in response
to a substitute examiner’s answer
prepared in response to a remand, the
Board will dismiss the appeal ‘‘as to the
claims subject to the new ground of
rejection’’ or ‘‘as to the claims subject to
the rejection for which the Board has
remanded the proceeding.’’ If there are
remaining claims not subject to the new
ground of rejection or remand, then the
appeal will proceed as to those
remaining claims. The Board’s
jurisdiction under final Bd.R.
41.35(b)(5) would end only if all of the
claims on appeal require action under
final Bd.R. 41.39(b), 41.50(a)(2), or
41.50(b) and the appellant fails to take
such required action, in which case the
Board would enter an order of dismissal
for the entire appeal. As to final Bd.R.
41.50(d), if an appellant fails to respond
to the Board’s request for briefing and
information, the Board is entitled, at its
discretion, to construe appellant’s
failure to respond as an indication that
appellant no longer wishes to pursue
the appeal, in which case the Board may
enter an order dismissing the appeal.
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Comment 19: One comment opposed
Bd.R. 41.35(c) because, though the
proposed rule removed the ability of the
Board to remand appeals, as the Director
can delegate the authority to remand,
this rule would not remedy the problem
created by remands, i.e., that examiners
can unduly draw out prosecution and
not do a complete examination the first
time around. The comment proposed
that remands take place only at the
appellant’s request.
Response: The rule provides for the
Director to sua sponte order a
proceeding remanded to the examiner
prior to entry of a decision on the
appeal by the Board. The USPTO
declines to adopt the suggestion to
change the rule to strip this power from
the Director.
Comment 20: One comment opposed
the proposed changes to Bd.R. 41.35(d)
because it would prevent consideration
by the examiner of newly discovered
evidence that is more pertinent than the
art used in the rejection on appeal.
Response: If an appeal needs to be
remanded for consideration of
Information Disclosure Statements, the
remand may result in lengthy delays in
the appeal process and ultimately result
in no change to the rejections that
eventually reach the Board on appeal.
As such, the USPTO will maintain the
language of proposed Bd.R. 41.35(d) in
this final rule.
Comment 21: One comment stated,
with respect to proposed Bd.R. 41.35(d),
that petitions filed while the Board
possesses jurisdiction are likely to be
untimely. The comment requested
reconsideration of the two-month
deadline for filing petitions.
Response: This suggestion is outside
the scope of the NPRM, and the USPTO
declines to adopt any rule changes
regarding the deadline for filing
petitions.
Comment 22: One comment suggested
that the USPTO adopt a ‘‘restatement’’
clarifying what constitutes appealable
subject matter to better enable the
examining corps to address procedural
issues.
Response: The USPTO will take this
restatement into account when revising
the MPEP in accordance with the final
rule.
Comment 23: Another comment was
in favor of the proposed changes to
Bd.R. 41.35(d).
Response: The USPTO adopts
proposed Bd.R. 41.35(d) as part of this
final rule.
Bd.R. 41.37
Comment 24: Two comments opposed
exempting pro se appellants from
providing a statement of the last entered
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amendment under proposed Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Response: The USPTO agrees with the
comments suggesting requiring pro se
appellants to provide the same
information as other appellants
regarding the claims on appeal. For
reasons discussed below, the USPTO
has decided to maintain the requirement
for a claims appendix in lieu of the
statement of last entered amendment.
As such, the final rule requires all
appellants, including pro se appellants,
to provide a claims appendix.
Comment 25: One comment requested
clarification as to whether pro se
appellants must comply with all the
requirements, but only substantially as
to some, or whether the pro se appellant
does not need to comply with all the
requirements and only substantially as
to the identified paragraphs.
Response: Final Bd.R. 41.37(c)
requires pro se appellants to
substantially comply with only the
requirements in the identified
subparagraphs, and pro se appellants
are not required to comply with the
requirements in the remaining
subparagraphs of final Bd.R. 41.37(c).
Comment 26: Two comments favored
the default assumption provided for in
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(i), and one comment
suggested that absent a statement to the
contrary, the Board should assume that
the real party in interest consists of one
or more of the inventors of the
application and/or the assignee of the
application as recorded at the USPTO.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt this suggested change. The default
provision is to address the situation in
which the inventor(s) is the real party in
interest. In such an instance, the Board
will not hold a brief non-compliant if
the statement of real party in interest is
omitted. In the past, appellants
mistakenly thought they could omit this
portion of the brief if the named
inventor(s) was the real party in interest.
This led to briefs being held to be noncompliant based on a technicality. The
default provision gives the USPTO the
flexibility to assume that the inventor(s)
are the real party in interest and avoid
having to hold a brief non-compliant.
Comment 27: One comment was in
favor of Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(ii) as proposed
and another comment suggested we
employ the phrase ‘‘controlled by’’
instead of ‘‘owned’’ and ‘‘real party in
interest’’ instead of ‘‘appellant or
assignee’’ as the real party in interest
may be in a better position to know of
related appealed cases.
Response: While under certain
circumstances, an entity other than the
appellant, appellant’s legal
representative, or assignee may be in a
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better position to know of related cases,
the USPTO declines to adopt the
suggested change, which would expand
the obligations to report related cases
beyond this enumerated group.
Comment 28: Five comments were in
favor of deleting the statement of the
status of claims from the 2004 version
of Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iii) and no
comments were received opposed to
this proposed change. One comment in
favor of the proposed change suggested
that appellants should be allowed to
cancel a claim in the brief itself, thereby
saving the cost of filing a separate
document formally cancelling the claim.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt this suggested change. The
USPTO requires that claim amendments
be filed in a separate Amendment under
final Bd.R. 41.33, so that they are
separately considered and separately
entered or refused entry as appropriate
by the examiner. Under the new
streamlined procedure for review of
appeal briefs, the Board now reviews
the appeal brief for entry into the
Record, but the examiner continues to
review Amendments under final Bd.R.
41.33 for entry into the Record.
Comment 29: One comment opposed
proposed Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv), another
comment suggested a change to the
proposed rule to make clear that the
statement should include the date of
filing of the last entered amendment of
the claims, as opposed to amendments
to the specification, and another
comment requested reconsideration of
the proposed rule because in reissue
and reexamination proceedings the full
set of claims is not reproduced in
amendments and thus in these instances
the latest entered amendments may not
reflect all the pending claims on appeal.
Response: The USPTO agrees with the
last comment, and has decided to delete
the requirement in proposed Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(iv) requiring a statement of
last entered amendment and to delete
the requirement in Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv)
for a statement of the status of
amendments. Compare 37 CFR 1.121
(requiring all claims ever presented),
with 37 CFR 1.173 (reissues) and 37
CFR 1.530 (ex parte reexaminations)
(requiring only claims being changed/
added). As discussed in further detail
below, the USPTO will maintain the
requirement in Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(viii)
(renumbered as final Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(v)) to provide a claims
appendix.
Comment 30: Five comments were
opposed to the proposed changes in
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(v), which required a
summary of the claimed subject matter
to include annotations for each claim
limitation ‘‘in dispute.’’ The comments
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were concerned that the phrase ‘‘in
dispute’’ was vague and unclear. Some
of the comments suggested eliminating
the summary of the claimed subject
matter requirement entirely, other
comments suggested limiting the
requirement to only those appeals
where the examiner raised a rejection
under 35 U.S.C. 112, while other
comments suggested amending the
proposed rule to require annotations for
each claim limitation. Another comment
was concerned that annotating only
those claim elements deemed to be ‘‘in
dispute’’ would amount to an implied
waiver or admission regarding those
claim limitations not annotated.
Another comment requested
clarification of the goal of this briefing
requirement.
Response: In light of the many
comments received that expressed
concern with determining which claim
limitations are ‘‘in dispute’’ and
expressed further concern with implied
waiver for those limitations not
annotated, the USPTO has decided not
to amend this portion of the rule
relating to the summary of claim subject
matter to limit the summary to only
those claims ‘‘in dispute.’’ Rather, the
USPTO maintains the language of the
2004 rule, which requires a concise
explanation of the subject matter
defined in each of the independent
claims. In light of the change to Bd.R.
41.35, the USPTO retains the proposed
change requiring the summary for ‘‘each
of the rejected independent claims’’,
whereas the 2004 rule requires the
summary for each of the independent
claims ‘‘involved in the appeal.’’ The
USPTO further retains the proposed
changes that clarify that citation to the
specification should be to the
specification ‘‘in the Record’’ and not to
the patent application publication. The
USPTO further retains the proposed
changes that permit appellant to refer to
the specification by page and line
number or ‘‘by paragraph number.’’ As
to the comment requesting clarification
about the goal of this section of the
brief, the goal is to familiarize the judges
with the claimed subject matter. This
summary is helpful to the Board to work
through cases as efficiently and
expeditiously as possible. It helps to
orient the judges so as to quickly and
efficiently focus on the determinative
aspects of the claims and the
corresponding disclosure in the
specification.
Comment 31: One comment suggested
amending the language of proposed
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(v) to clarify whether
annotation of separately argued
dependent claims is required, as the
language in the 2004 rule could be read
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as requiring annotation of dependent
claims only if they are both argued
separately and contain means plus
function language.
Response: The final rule requires a
concise explanation of the subject
matter of separately argued dependent
claims only if such claims include a
means plus function or step plus
function recitation as permitted by 35
U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph. However,
the rule does not prohibit an appellant
from providing a summary of claimed
subject matter for all dependent claims
argued separately, and the USPTO
considers it a best practice for
appellants to provide a summary of
claimed subject matter for all dependent
claims argued separately.
Comment 32: One comment opposed
adoption of a single format of the
summary in proposed Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(v) as being too rigid and
suggested that the drafter of the appeal
brief should be allowed to use whatever
format they deem to be the most
informative. The comment also
requested the BPAI to provide examples
of confusing and uninformative formats,
rather than a single compliant format.
Response: The USPTO has decided to
maintain the 2004 rule in substantial
part, which does not require a single
format for compliance. The rule does
require, however, that regardless of the
format provided by appellants, the
summary of claimed subject matter must
‘‘refer to the specification in the Record
by page and line number or by
paragraph number, and to the drawing,
if any, by reference characters.’’ The
Board will find briefs to be noncompliant if the summary of the
claimed subject matter does not include
references to the specification by page
and line number or by paragraph
number, and references to drawings, if
any, by reference characters. The Board
will post examples on its Web page of
both compliant and non-compliant
summaries.
Comment 33: One comment stated
that the language in proposed Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(v) requiring the summary to
be ‘‘sufficient to allow the Board to
understand the claim’’ is vague.
Response: The USPTO has decided to
maintain the 2004 rule in substantial
part. As such, this language is not
incorporated in the final rule
(renumbered as final Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(iii)).
Comment 34: One comment opposed
the proposed Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(v)
because it removed the requirement for
appellants to identify the structure for
all means plus function elements of the
independent claims and separately
argued dependent claims.
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Response: The USPTO has decided to
maintain the 2004 rule in substantial
part. The final rule requires: ‘‘For each
rejected independent claim, and for
each dependent claim argued separately
under the provisions of paragraph
(c)(1)(iv) of this section, if the claim
contains a means plus function or step
plus function recitation as permitted by
35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, then the
concise explanation must identify the
structure, material, or acts described in
the specification in the Record as
corresponding to each claimed function
with reference to the specification in the
Record by page and line number or by
paragraph number, and to the drawing,
if any, by reference characters.’’
Comment 35: Four comments were in
favor of the proposed change that
eliminates the statement of the grounds
of rejection in Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(vi), and
the USPTO received no comments
opposed to this proposed change.
Response: The USPTO adopts the
elimination of the requirement as set
forth in Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(vi) as
proposed.
Comment 36: Two comments
suggested that proposed Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(vii) be amended to prohibit
appellants from raising arguments in the
appeal brief that have not been raised
previously in prosecution.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt a rule prohibiting appellants from
raising arguments in the appeal brief for
the first time. In the indefinitely delayed
2008 final rule, the USPTO would have
limited appellant’s ability to raise new
arguments in the appeal brief based on
whether the argument had been raised
before the examiner. See 73 FR 32943
(Jun. 10, 2008). Numerous comments
were received in opposition to this
proposed change. Keeping in mind the
comments received in the prior rule
making activity, the USPTO declines to
set out a rule that limits appellants from
raising arguments in the appeal brief for
the first time.
Comment 37: One comment requested
further clarification of the proposed
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(vii) as it relates to
waiver. Specifically, the comment
requested the USPTO clarify on what
basis the Board will review the
examiner’s determination of
patentability and explain the basis for
that standard of review based on
statutory authority and judicial
precedent. The comment suggested that
the Board should act as a fact finder,
independently judge the examiner’s
findings, and conduct an independent
review of the entire record, without
presuming any part of the examiner’s
position to be correct. The comment
suggested that the Board should review
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the statement of rejection in the office
action from which the appeal is taken
and determine whether that establishes
a prima facie case of unpatentability,
and, only in the instance where the
Board determines that a prima facie case
has been established would the Board
proceed to review the appeal brief and
the answer. Another comment suggested
amending proposed subparagraph
(c)(1)(vii) to provide parity so that any
arguments presented by an appellant
and not addressed by the examiner in
the answer will be treated as waived by
the Board.
Response: The USPTO reiterates its
statements on waiver provided in the
NPRM. The Board may treat as waived,
for purposes of the present appeal, any
arguments not raised by appellant. See
Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1313–14
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (the Board may treat
arguments appellant failed to make for
a given ground of rejection as waived);
In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (declining to consider the
appellant’s new argument regarding the
scope of a prior art patent when that
argument was not raised before the
Board); In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473,
1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (declining to
consider whether prior art cited in an
obviousness rejection was nonanalogous art when that argument was
not raised before the Board). See also Ex
parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072 (BPAI
2010). Final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv)
permits the Board to refuse to consider
arguments not raised in the appeal brief,
except as provided in final Bd.R. 41.41,
41.47, and 41.52. This language in the
final rule is substantially the same as
the language of the 2004 version of
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(vii), which states that
‘‘[a]ny arguments or authorities not
included in the brief or a reply brief
filed pursuant to § 41.41 will be refused
consideration by the Board, unless good
cause is shown.’’ Any additional
discussion of ‘‘waiver’’ as well as
‘‘clarification’’ of how the Board will
review appeals is outside the scope of
this rule making. Issues of waiver and
how the Board will review appeals is
uniquely case-specific and thus best left
to discussion in future Board decisions
as warranted. See Ex parte Frye, 94
USPQ2d 1072 (BPAI 2010) and In re
Jung, 637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011) for
a general discussion of how the Board
conducts its review. As to the comment
suggesting that the Board review the
statement of the rejection in the Office
action from which the appeal is taken
and determine whether that establishes
a prima facie case of unpatentability,
and only in the instance where the
Board determines that a prima facie case
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has been established would the Board
proceed to review the appeal brief and
the answer, the USPTO declines to
adopt this suggestion. The Board is a
tribunal of appeal, where the appellant
is responsible for pointing out the
alleged error in the examiner’s decision
on appeal. See Ex parte Frye, 94
USPQ2d at 1075 (‘‘If an appellant fails
to present arguments on a particular
issue—or, more broadly, on a particular
rejection—the Board will not, as a
general matter, unilaterally review those
uncontested aspects of the rejection’’
(citations omitted)); Jung, 637 F.3d at
1365–66. The Board’s role is not to
reexamine the application. At the time
of filing the notice of appeal, an
appellant can request a panel review by
experienced examiners using the preappeal brief conference program. The
appellant can also challenge specific
aspects of the prima facie case and
merits of the rejection by argument and
evidence in the appeal brief. See
generally In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (discussing nature of
challenging rejections during Board
appeals).
Comment 38: One comment
questioned whether the Office was
shifting the burden of proof of
patentability to the applicants by
requiring an applicant to plead all
grounds for appeal in the appeal brief
and considering any grounds that were
not pled to be waived, and whether
such a rule was substantive and thus
outside the Office’s rule making
authority.
Response: The Office is not shifting
any burden of proof. The burden of
proof of unpatentability remains on the
Office. The Office is merely clarifying
an appellant’s responsibility to point
out what it is that the appellant wants
the Board to review and what the
examiner’s error is believed to be. See
In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1356–66 (Fed.
Cir. 2011). This requirement merely
governs the manner in which appellants
present their viewpoints to the agency;
it does not foreclose effective
opportunity to make one’s case on the
merits. See JEM Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 22
F.3d 320, 326 (DC Cir. 1994) (stating
that a ‘‘critical feature’’ of a procedural
rule ‘‘is that it covers agency actions
that do not themselves alter the rights or
interests of parties, although it may alter
the manner in which the parties present
themselves or their viewpoints to the
agency.’’).
Comment 39: Four comments were in
favor of elimination of the claims
appendix from Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(viii)
because it would decrease the burden
on appellants in drafting briefs. Three
comments opposed elimination of the
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claims appendix because it adds a
burden to the public and the Board to
search through the Image File Wrapper
for the last entered amendment, because
Briefs should be reasonably selfcontained, and because in reissues and
reexaminations the last entered
amendment may not include a complete
listing of the claims on appeal.
Response: In order to ensure that the
examiner and appellants are presenting
arguments as to the same set of claims
on appeal, and in light of the comments
raised regarding reissues and
reexaminations, the USPTO has
reconsidered the proposed deletion of
the claims appendix and will instead
maintain the requirement for appellants
to include a claims appendix in the
appeal brief (renumbered as final Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(v)).
Comment 40: Three comments were
in favor of elimination of the evidence
and related proceeding appendices from
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1). One comment
proposed that the rule regarding the
evidence appendix should clarify that it
is appropriate to include materials that
are not readily available to the Board
including dictionary definitions,
encyclopedias, unreported decisions,
and administrative materials.
Response: The USPTO declines to add
back the requirement for an evidence
appendix simply to clarify what
evidence is appropriate to include in
such an appendix. The USPTO notes
that elimination of this briefing
requirement does not prohibit
appellants from including an evidence
appendix, and that the USPTO views
inclusion of an evidence appendix,
where warranted, as a best practice.
However, the USPTO will determine on
a case-by-case basis whether evidence
referred to in and/or submitted with a
brief should be considered under final
Bd.R. 41.33. As discussed previously,
the USPTO has adopted a definition of
‘‘Evidence’’ that excludes dictionaries,
thus allowing appellants to refer to
dictionary definitions in the appeal
brief.
Comment 41: One comment requested
clarification as to the prohibition in
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(2) against including
‘‘new’’ or ‘‘non-admitted’’ amendments,
affidavits or other evidence in briefs,
because as written it could be construed
to bar the submission of items otherwise
permitted under Bd.R. 41.33.
Response: This comment is addressed
above in the response to Comment 12.
Comment 42: One comment
questioned why the proposed rules did
not incorporate in Bd.R. 41.37(d) the
current streamlined review of briefs for
compliance with the rules by the Chief
Judge or his designee.
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Response: The USPTO chose not to
codify the new streamlined procedure
since this procedure relates to an
internal management practice. Such
practices are not typically codified in
rules so as to provide the Office with the
flexibility to make changes to the
streamlined procedures should the need
arise.
Comment 43: One comment suggested
that the penalty for a non-compliant
appeal brief in Bd.R. 41.37(d) should be
that the non-compliant portion of the
brief not be considered for purposes of
the appeal. The comment suggested that
the ‘‘two strikes’’ rule is harsh and
capricious for something that may be a
de minimus error, and that this type of
response is not a default under the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt the suggested change. The penalty
for failure to overcome the reasons for
non-compliance, as set forth in final
Bd.R. 41.37(d), is the same penalty
provided for in the 2004 version of
Bd.R. 41.37(d). Further, the rule as
proposed clarifies that appellants can
petition the Chief Administrative Patent
Judge if they feel their brief has been
found to be non-compliant in error.
Bd.R. 41.39
Comment 44: One comment suggested
defining or deleting the use of ‘‘primary
examiner’’ in Bd.R. 41.39(a) and in
Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2), (b)(1), and (b)(2),
because this term is not defined in the
CFR or the MPEP.
Response: The suggestion is beyond
the scope of the NPRM and will not be
adopted. The term ‘‘primary examiner’’
is used in 35 U.S.C. 134, the 2004
version of Bd.R. 41.39 and previous
versions of the rule (e.g., Rule 1.193
(1959)). The USPTO is using ‘‘primary
examiner’’ in this paragraph to have the
same meaning as used in 35 U.S.C. 134.
Comment 45: One comment opposed
the removal in Bd.R. 41.39(a)(1) of the
requirement for the examiner to present
an integrated statement of the grounds
of rejection, because it would place an
undue burden on appellant and would
discourage the examiner from being
consistent.
Response: By not requiring examiners
to restate the grounds of rejection in the
answer, this rule will remove the
possibility of any inconsistencies
between the articulation of the grounds
of rejection as stated in the Office action
from which the appeal is taken and the
articulation of the grounds of rejection
in the answer, and will save appellants
and the Board the time of having to
compare the grounds of rejection in
each document to ensure that they are
the same. Under the final rule, the
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examiner will provide only a response
to arguments raised in the appeal brief
and/or a new ground of rejection,
designated as such. The caveat in final
Bd.R. 41.39(a)(1), which allows for
modification of the grounds of rejection
in an advisory action or pre-appeal brief
conference decision, was deemed
necessary because often appellants raise
new arguments after the Office action
from which the appeal is taken, i.e., in
a reply after final rejection or in a preappeal brief conference request, and any
modification to the rejections made by
the examiner, such as the withdrawal of
a ground of rejection, should be taken
into account in the grounds of rejection
on appeal. Therefore, the examiner
cannot reinstate a withdrawn rejection
in the examiner’s answer without
designating it as a new ground of
rejection.
Comment 46: One comment opposed
the portion of the proposed Bd.R.
41.39(a)(2) that allows modification of
the grounds of rejection in an advisory
action or pre-appeal brief conference
decision.
Response: The USPTO incorporates
by reference its response to comment 45
provided supra.
Comment 47: Two comments favored
proposed Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2) because the
proposed rule, along with the examples
provided in the discussion portion of
the notice of proposed rule making,
clarify when a new ground of rejection
is made in an examiner’s answer.
Another comment opposed this
proposed rule because it would increase
burdens to the USPTO and permit
delays in prosecution by appellants.
This comment suggested that it would
be better to address the issue of new
evidence by not allowing appellants to
make arguments in the briefs that were
not presented during prosecution, or, by
allowing examiners ‘‘by default’’ to
introduce new evidence in the answer.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt a rule prohibiting appellants from
raising arguments in the appeal brief for
the first time. In the indefinitely delayed
2008 final rule, the USPTO would have
limited appellant’s ability to raise new
arguments in the appeal brief based on
whether the argument had been raised
before the examiner. See 73 FR 32943
(Jun. 10, 2008). Numerous comments
were received in opposition to this
proposed change. Keeping in mind the
comments received in the prior rule
making activity, the USPTO declines to
set out a rule that limits appellants from
raising arguments in the appeal brief for
the first time.
Comment 48: One comment favored
the requirement in Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2) for
Director approval of answers containing
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new grounds of rejection, but suggested
that the rule should include a standard
for the approval to include a substantive
review of the pertinence of the newly
cited prior art.
Response: The USPTO declines to
codify a specific standard to be used by
the Director to approve a new ground of
rejection. The question of whether to
approve an answer that contains a new
ground of rejection is case-specific and,
as such, is not amenable to a single
standard. The USPTO notes that the text
of Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2) as contained in this
Final Rule reflects a minor modification
from the version in the NPRM. The
revision was made to clarify that the
rule requires that the examiner obtain
the Director’s approval of an answer
containing a new ground of rejection,
and that the Director is not required to
provide such approval.
Comment 49: One comment requested
clarification of ‘‘the references in this
rule to modification of a rejection by an
advisory action’’, the concern being that
the ‘‘continuation’’ portion of the
advisory action may be used to
substantially modify the rejection, and
could raise the issue of whether the
examiner has entered a new ground of
rejection in the advisory action even
before the filing of a notice of appeal.
The comment stated that it would be
especially important to have this
language clear because Bd.R. 41.39(a)(1)
would not require the examiner to
restate the grounds of rejection—which
could lead to confusion. The comment
suggested that the rule state that the
reference to a modification of a rejection
in an advisory action would be only
with regard to the status of the pending
rejections or which claims are subject to
a pending rejection, and that
modification beyond that should not be
encompassed by this rule, but should be
achieved through reopening
prosecution.
Response: The USPTO declines to
modify the rule to specifically limit the
content of an advisory action because it
is impossible for the USPTO to foresee
every situation that may arise during
prosecution, and certain statements may
be necessary in an advisory action to
make the Record clear on appeal in light
of actions, statements, or amendments
made by appellants in an after-final
amendment. To address the concern
regarding new grounds of rejection,
appellants who feel that an advisory
action contains a new ground of
rejection have the right to petition under
Rule 1.181 for supervisory review of the
examiner’s action to seek to have
prosecution reopened. See also the
response to comment 45 provided
supra.
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Comment 50: One comment requested
clarification of the term ‘‘new evidence’’
as used in Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2) and asked
whether new dictionary definitions first
used in an answer are included in the
term ‘‘new evidence.’’
Response: The USPTO has added a
definition of ‘‘Evidence’’ in final Bd.R.
41.30 to clarify that ‘‘Evidence’’ in this
subpart does not include dictionaries.
As such, the issue of whether citation to
a dictionary for the first time in an
answer or in a Board decision
constitutes a new ground of rejection
will be determined based on controlling
case law and the specific facts of each
case.
Comment 51: One comment opposed
allowing new grounds of rejection in an
answer because it creates a ‘‘quagmire’’
and allows the examiner not to be
diligent in conducting prosecution. The
comment suggested limiting new
grounds of rejection to prior art
references that first became publicly
available after the date of the Office
action from which the appeal is taken.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt this suggestion. There are many
reasons why an examiner might make a
new ground of rejection based on prior
art that was available at the time of the
initial prosecution, including:
Amendments made to the claims by
appellants, challenges to official notice,
etc. Further, the integrity of the patent
system depends upon the examiner
having the ability to rely on the best
prior art of which he/she is aware. See
BlackLight Power, Inc. v. Rogan, 295
F.3d 1269, 1273, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(‘‘The PTO’s responsibility for issuing
sound and reliable patents is critical to
the nation’’ and ‘‘[t]he object and policy
of the patent law require issuance of
valid patents’’); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(‘‘The Commissioner has an obligation
to refuse to grant a patent if he believes
that doing so would be contrary to
law.’’); see also In re Gould, 673 F.2d
1385, 1386 (CCPA 1982). For these
reasons, the USPTO declines to limit the
examiner’s ability to enter new grounds
of rejection as suggested. The final rule
provides appellants with adequate
safeguards by allowing appellants to
choose either to proceed with the appeal
or reopen prosecution in response to a
new ground of rejection raised in the
answer.
Comment 52: One comment opposed
Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2) to the extent it does
not provide a mechanism for appellants
to gain relief from new ground of
rejection entered in an advisory action.
Response: Just as in the case where a
final Office action contains an
undesignated new ground of rejection,
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appellants who feel that an advisory
action contains a new ground of
rejection have the right to petition under
Rule 1.181 for supervisory review of the
examiner’s action to seek to have
prosecution reopened.
Comment 53: One comment suggested
that examiners should not get a count
for new grounds of rejection issued in
an examiner’s answer due to the
examiner’s own error. Additionally, the
comment suggested that new grounds of
rejection in an answer should trigger a
reopening of prosecution by default.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt these suggested changes. As to the
suggestion not to award an examiner a
count for an answer containing a new
ground of rejection, this is a matter of
internal management within the agency
and is outside the scope of the proposed
rules. As to the suggestion that a new
ground of rejection should trigger
reopening of prosecution by default, the
USPTO’s view is that it is more
advantageous to appellants to give them
the flexibility to choose either to
proceed with an appeal or to reopen
prosecution, depending on the
circumstances of their particular case.
The USPTO declines to adopt a default
rule that would limit appellants’ options
in this situation.
Comment 54: One comment favored
allowing new grounds of rejection as a
‘‘necessary evil’’ in advisory actions,
decisions on pre-appeal conferences,
answers and BPAI decisions. The
comment suggested that appellants
should always have the opportunity to
respond to a new ground of rejection,
regardless of when the new ground of
rejection is entered in the prosecution
history because the new grounds of
rejection are most often a result of
examiner error in prosecution;
specifically violations of Chapter 2100
of the MPEP. The comment
recommended that the USPTO enforce
Chapter 2100 of the MPEP more
thoroughly.
Response: While the Office does not
agree with the comment that new
grounds of rejection are most often a
result of examiner error in prosecution,
the Office will take the comments into
consideration when revising the MPEP
in accordance with the final rule and in
providing guidance to the examining
corps in Chapter 1200 of the MPEP. The
Supplementary Information section of
the instant notice provides guidance to
appellants and examiners as to what
constitutes a new ground of rejection
under final Bd.R. 41.39.
Comment 55: One comment opposed
the explanation of new ground of
rejection contained in the NPRM as too
narrow and as failing to give examiners
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‘‘good guidance’’ because the examples
listed in the NPRM of new grounds for
rejection are not exhaustive. The
comment suggested deletion of the
second sentence of Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2)
because it could be interpreted by
examiners to imply that only a rejection
that relies upon any new evidence is a
new ground of rejection that must be
designated and approved.
Response: The USPTO intends the list
to be exemplary. Whether new grounds
of rejection have been raised is
dependent on the unique factual
circumstances of each application or
proceeding and any attempt to provide
an exhaustive list would be
counterproductive.
Comment 56: Another comment
opposed the explanation of new ground
of rejection in the notice of proposed
rule making and commented that In re
DeBlauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 706 n.9 (Fed.
Cir. 1984), contains a stronger limitation
than the NPRM with respect to what
constitutes a new ground of rejection.
This comment suggested that a ground
of rejection should be considered ‘‘new’’
whenever it departs from a previous
statement of a ground of rejection, be it
by relying on a different portion of the
same reference, a different reference or
merely different examiner reasoning.
The comment further stated that the
‘‘fact specific’’ approach proposed by
the Office invites abuse by the
examining corps.
Response: The USPTO appreciates the
comments submitted on the proposed
guidance on new grounds of rejection.
The USPTO will follow applicable law
in determining on a case-by-case basis
whether a new ground of rejection has
been made. While the examples
provided in the NPRM are intended to
provide sample factual situations based
on actual case law, as noted in the
notice of proposed rule making, the
inquiry of whether a new ground of
rejection has been made in each case is
highly fact specific. See, e.g., In re
Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1303 (CCPA
1976). The general test that the USPTO
will apply is to determine whether the
appellant has had a fair opportunity to
respond to the basic thrust of the
rejection. Id.
Comment 57: One comment suggested
that whether something constitutes a
new ground of rejection should be
handled the same whether it appears in
a final rejection, an answer, or in a
Board decision.
Response: For the reasons set forth in
the notice of proposed rule making, the
USPTO’s view is that the question of
whether an applicant has had a full and
fair opportunity to respond to a
rejection depends in part on the stage
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the application is in when the ground of
rejection is first raised (e.g., after final
rejection versus after filing an appeal
brief, versus in a Board decision).
Procedurally, an applicant’s opportunity
to fully and fairly respond to the
rejection differs at different stages of the
prosecution. For example, an applicant
may be able to submit evidence after a
final rejection to rebut a ground of
rejection that would not be admissible
at the time of filing an appeal brief.
Compare Rule 1.116(e) and final Bd.R.
41.33(d).
Comment 58: Two comments
suggested that approval by a Technology
Center Director be required for an
examiner to reopen prosecution after
filing of an appeal brief, and that the
reasons for reopening should be
delineated clearly for the Record. One
comment further suggested that the
rules or the MPEP include a
requirement that Office actions
reopening prosecution include an
authorization to search after a reversal.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt these suggestions because they are
outside the scope of the proposed rules.
The proposed rules do not address
reopening of prosecution by the
examiner after filing of an appeal brief.
Rather, subparagraph (a)(2) of proposed
and final Bd.R. 41.39 addresses only
new grounds of rejection raised in an
examiner’s answer, and subparagraph
(b)(1) of final Bd.R. 41.39 addresses the
appellant’s right to reopen prosecution
in this instance. MPEP § 1207.04 already
requires approval from the supervisory
patent examiner to reopen prosecution
after appellant’s brief or reply brief has
been filed. MPEP § 1214.04 also states
that the examiner should never regard a
reversal as a challenge to make a new
search and that if the examiner has
specific knowledge of the existence of a
particular reference(s) which indicate
nonpatentability of any claims, he or
she should submit the matter to the
Technology Center Director for
authorization to reopen prosecution. See
also 37 CFR 1.198 (after a Board
decision has become final, prosecution
will not be reopened without the
written authority of the Director, and
then only for the consideration of
matters not already adjudicated,
sufficient cause being shown).
Comment 59: One comment opposed
proposed Bd.R. 41.39(b) to the extent
that rights arising out of this paragraph
are dependent on the USPTO’s
designation of a new ground of
rejection. The comment suggested that
these rights should arise whenever the
action meets the definition of a new
ground of rejection.
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Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt this suggestion. The final rule
provides appellants with a full and fair
opportunity to respond to the rejections
and to petition if appellants feel that
such an opportunity has not been
provided.
Bd.R. 41.40
Comment 60: The majority of the
comments favored the proposed rule to
toll the time period to file a reply brief.
Several of those comments in favor of
the proposed rule expressed concern
that the rule could be used by
appellants in ex parte reexamination to
delay prosecution. One comment
proposed providing an expedited review
of ex parte patent reexamination
petitions by requiring these petitions be
filed within a non-extendable period of
time from the answer (less than the time
for submitting a reply brief) and require
that the USPTO make a decision within
a set time frame (i.e., 30 days). Another
comment suggested that petitions be
decided by a party removed from the
Technology Center that conducted the
examination.
Response: The USPTO appreciates the
concern raised in these comments. The
USPTO declines to adopt the suggestion
to set special expedited time limits for
ex parte reexamination proceedings
because depending on workloads and
budgetary issues facing the Office, the
USPTO cannot guarantee that such
petitions will be acted on within any
specific time frame; however, the
USPTO will take steps to ensure that
such petitions are handled
expeditiously to avoid the incentive to
abuse the petition process simply as a
delay tactic. As to the suggestion of how
such petitions are decided, the USPTO
declines to modify the rule, as this is a
matter of internal agency management.
Comment 61: One comment opposed
the petition procedure under Rule 1.181
because it ‘‘adds unnecessary cost and
delay to an already expensive and
lengthy appeal process’’ and creates
delay and inefficiencies at USPTO.
Response: Given the majority of
comments received in favor of proposed
Bd.R. 41.40, the USPTO has decided to
include this tolling provision in the
final rule. The USPTO’s past practice
has been for the BPAI to remand any
docketed appeal back to the examiner if
any undecided petition was pending
which had been filed prior to the BPAI’s
taking jurisdiction. This back-and-forth
will be eliminated under the current
rule, because the filing of a petition will
automatically toll the time for filing a
reply brief (and thus the start of the
BPAI’s jurisdiction). The need to
remand a docketed appeal due to a
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pending petition will therefore be
eliminated under the current rule.
Comment 62: One comment suggested
defining or deleting the use of ‘‘primary
examiner’’ in Bd.R. 41.40 because this
term is not defined in the CFR or the
MPEP.
Response: The suggestion is not
adopted. The term ‘‘primary examiner’’
is used in 35 U.S.C. 134, the 2004
version of Bd.R. 41.39 and previous
versions of the rule (e.g., Rule 1.193
(1959)). The USPTO is using ‘‘primary
examiner’’ in this section to have the
same meaning as used in 35 U.S.C. 134
and Bd.R. 41.39.
Comment 63: One comment opposed
Bd.R. 41.40(b) to the extent that it calls
for dismissing the entire appeal if the
petition is granted, and then appellant
fails to file a reply under Rule 1.111 in
the instance where the new ground of
rejection does not cover all the appealed
claims. The comment suggested in this
situation allowing the appeal to proceed
and allowing the appellant to treat the
newly designated new ground of
rejection in his reply brief. If appellant
failed to address the new ground of
rejection in the reply brief, then the
appeal would be terminated as to those
claims so rejected, but would continue
as to any other appealed claims.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt this suggestion. If an appellant
desires to simply respond to the
rejection (whether designated as a new
ground of rejection or not) in the reply
brief, then the appellant should simply
file the reply brief within the two-month
time period and not file a petition. The
rule is written so that appellants will
not use the petition process simply as a
means to obtain an extension of time on
filing a reply brief. There is no
advantage to be gained by appellants
from petitioning to have a rejection in
the answer designated as a new ground
of rejection and then simply filing a
reply brief to respond to such rejection.
Final Bd.R. 41.41 allows appellants to
include in reply briefs arguments that
are responsive to arguments raised in
the examiner’s answer.
Comment 64: One comment requested
clarification of the rule with respect to
tolling of time when ‘‘re-petitioning’’ or
requesting reconsideration of the
decision. The comment specifically
asked whether an appellant would still
be required to file a reply brief within
two months of the decision refusing to
grant the original Rule 1.181 petition.
Response: The rule tolls the time
period for filing a reply brief only until
the initial petition is decided. Under
this rule, the appellant would still be
required to file a reply brief within two
months of the decision on the initial
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petition, even if the appellant chooses to
request reconsideration of the decision.
Comment 65: One comment opposed
the new petition procedure because it
does not go far enough to allow for
tolling of time periods when petitioning
to have a new ground of rejection
designated that appears in an advisory
action or pre-appeal brief conference
decision.
Response: Appellants have a remedy
under Rule 1.181 to file a petition for
supervisory review of an examiner’s
final rejection, advisory action, or preappeal brief conference decision, should
any of those actions include statements
that appellants feel constitute a new
ground of rejection to which appellants
feel they have not had ‘‘a fair
opportunity to respond.’’
Comment 66: One comment stated
that there appears to be no separate
mechanism to ensure that examiners
fulfill the prima facie case requirement.
This comment suggested that the
USPTO implement a separate
mechanism to allow applicants to
request review of whether an examiner
has made a prima facie showing prior to
appellate review by the Board.
Response: This suggestion is outside
the scope of the proposed rules.
Applicants who believe the examiner
has failed to satisfy the notice-function
of 35 U.S.C. 132, and thus failed to
satisfy the Office’s burden of
establishing a prima facie case, can raise
that issue with the examiner in their
response to the office action, and by
conducting an interview with the
examiner early in the prosecution (e.g.,
after the first office action).
Alternatively, the applicant can
challenge the merits of the rejection. But
creating a mechanism by which the
applicant can first challenge the
procedural aspects of the rejection, and
then the merits if unsuccessful, is ‘‘both
manifestly inefficient and entirely
unnecessary.’’ See generally In re Jung,
637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(permitting applicant to ‘‘procedurally
challenge and appeal the prima facie
procedural showing before having to
substantively respond to the merits of
the rejection * * * is both manifestly
inefficient and entirely unnecessary.’’).
Bd.R. 41.41
Comment 67: One comment suggested
adding ‘‘within the later of’’ before ‘‘two
months’’ in Bd.R. 41.41(a).
Response: The USPTO appreciates the
suggested clarification to the language of
Bd.R. 41.41(a) and adopts this language
in the final rule as it is in keeping with
the intent of the proposed rule.
Comment 68: One comment suggested
that this section of the rule clearly state
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that there is no requirement to file a
reply brief, and that the absence of a
reply brief should not raise an inference
or presumption that the appellant
acquiesces to any new arguments made
by the examiner in the answer. The
comment stated that even with a
designated new ground of rejection, the
rule should not require appellants to
respond.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt this suggested change. To the
extent this comment suggests to make it
purely optional for appellants to file a
reply brief responding to new grounds
of rejection, the Board must receive
appellant’s explanation as to ‘‘why the
examiner erred’’ as to the new ground
of rejection appellants are contesting in
order to review the rejection. The rules,
however, do not require appellants to
respond to a new ground of rejection if
they wish not to challenge that ground
of rejection. If no arguments are raised
by appellants in response to a new
ground of rejection contained in the
answer, then the Board appropriately
will dispose of the appeal as to those
claims subject to the new ground, and
the appeal will proceed as to any
remaining claims. The USPTO declines
to amend the rule explicitly to provide
that the absence of a reply brief should
not raise an inference or presumption
that the appellant acquiesces to any new
arguments made by the examiner.
Comment 69: One comment requested
clarification on the prohibition against
including ‘‘new’’ or ‘‘non-admitted’’
amendments, affidavits or other
evidence in briefs, as set forth in Bd.R.
41.41(b)(1), would not bar the
submission of items otherwise
permitted under Bd.R. 41.33.
Response: This comment is addressed
above in the response to Comment 12.
Comment 70: One comment favored
proposed Bd.R. 41.41(b)(2) and
suggested a similar rule be adopted with
respect to appeal briefs, i.e., that
appellants not be able to raise
arguments in the appeal brief that have
not been raised after a non-final or final
action.
Response: This comment is addressed
above in the response to Comment 36.
The USPTO declines to adopt the
suggestion to limit the scope of
arguments that can be raised by
appellants in the appeal brief.
Comment 71: One comment opposed
proposed Bd.R. 41.41(b)(2) as being
overly restrictive and creating a burden
on appellants by applying a stricter
standard on appellants than on
examiners. The comment stated that this
limitation will prevent the Board from
having a full record on which to make
its decision. The comment requested
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clarification as to whether arguments in
response to a reworded rejection in an
examiner’s answer would be permitted
as falling within the ‘‘good cause’’
requirement of the proposed rule. The
comment suggested that, to allow the
Board to review a fully developed
record, the rule should permit
appellants to respond to all arguments
appearing in the answer that do not
appear in haec verbae in the rejection
from which the appeal is taken.
Response: The rule allows appellants
the option to raise arguments in the
reply brief which are ‘‘responsive to an
argument raised in the examiner’s
answer,’’ including those that do not
appear in haec verbae in the appealed
rejection. Thus satisfying the good cause
requirement would not be necessary.
Bd.R. 41.43
Comment 72: The USPTO received
three comments in favor of eliminating
Bd.R. 41.43, which requires the primary
examiner to acknowledge receipt and
entry of the reply brief and allows
examiners to enter a supplemental
examiner’s answer, and three comments
opposed to this change because it would
eliminate the examiner’s opportunity to
consider the reply brief and possibly
allow the case or reopen prosecution.
One comment requested clarification of
whether the Examiner would still
review the reply brief.
Response: In response to the
comments opposing elimination of this
section of the rule, USPTO data for the
past ten years (FY 2001—FY 2010)
shows that examiners allow
applications in approximately 1% of all
appeals and reopen prosecution in
approximately 1% of appeals after the
filing of a reply brief. It is most often the
case that once the examiner has held an
appeal conference on the case and
prepared an examiner’s answer, the
examiner simply acknowledges and
enters the reply brief and the appeal
proceeds to the Board for review and
decision. Meanwhile, USPTO data
shows over the same time period that in
those cases where the examiner simply
acknowledged and entered the reply
brief, the average pendency from the
filing of a reply brief to the time the
examiner acknowledged and entered the
reply brief is 55 days. As such, the
advantage in shorter pendency received
by all appellants from elimination of
this section of the rule—at which point,
the examiner has held an appeal
conference on the case and prepared an
examiner’s answer—outweighs, in the
view of the USPTO, the advantage
gained in those rare instances where an
appeal may become unnecessary after
filing of the reply brief. For these
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reasons, the final rule eliminates Bd.R.
41.43.
Bd.R. 41.50
Comment 73: One comment suggested
extending the Board’s role, as set forth
in proposed Bd.R. 41.50(a), to ‘‘allow’’
claims in an effort to simplify the
procedure after a reversal based on the
current power of the Board to act as a
‘‘de facto’’ examiner in entering new
grounds of rejection under Bd.R.
41.50(b).
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt this suggestion, which effectively
would turn the Board into an extension
of the examining corps. The Board’s
principal role is to ‘‘review adverse
decisions of examiners.’’ 35 U.S.C. 6(b).
While Bd.R. 41.50 permits the Board to
include a new ground of rejection of
which it has knowledge in its decision,
the Board is not charged with
performing the tasks necessary to
determine whether claims stand in
condition for allowance (e.g., perform
searches of prior art). Nor should it be
required to do so, given its statutory
charge to review adverse examiner
decisions.
Comment 74: One comment was in
favor of eliminating the Board’s
independent authority to remand
appeals in Bd.R. 41.50(a)(1). One
comment was opposed to stripping the
Board of its power to remand
applications because remands are the
best available remedy for inadequate
fact finding and incomplete
examination in some instances. Another
comment was opposed to this proposed
change to the extent that, even though
this proposed modification would
remove the independent ability of the
Board to remand cases to the examiner,
the Board would still be able to do so
with approval of the Director and the
Director would be reluctant to block the
Board’s request for a remand and thus
the remand process would be
complicated rather than simplified.
Response: In light of comments
received in response to this proposed
change and in light of considerations of
administrative efficiencies, the USPTO
has decided to retain the last sentence
of Bd.R. 41.50(a)(1) authorizing the
Board to remand an application to the
examiner. This change also necessitates
retaining Bd.R. 41.50(a)(2), (a)(2)(i), and
(a)(2)(ii) to address treatment of the case
when a ‘‘substitute’’ examiner’s answer
is written in response to a remand. The
USPTO will rely on internal
management controls to ensure that this
remand authority is used only in
situations where remand is proper.
Comment 75: One comment suggested
amending Bd.R. 41.50(a) to require the
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Board to decide all rejections on
appeal—including, for instance,
rejections under 35 U.S.C. 103 if there
is also a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101.
The comment stated that if the Board
decides only a § 101 rejection that is
easily remedied by a Request for
Continued Examination, and does not
address an art rejection, appellants
would be required to file another appeal
brief, thereby increasing the number of
appeals the Board has to decide.
Response: This comment is outside
the scope of the NPRM. The USPTO
declines to institute a rule dictating how
individual panels of the Board must
resolve issues in cases that come before
them.
Comment 76: One comment suggested
revising Bd.R. 41.50(b) so that the Board
is not allowed to issue decisions
containing an affirmance with a new
ground of rejection, because these types
of decisions preclude applicants from
gaining patent term protection that
would otherwise be provided by 35
U.S.C. 154(b)(1)(C)(iii). The comment
suggested that the Board should reverse
the examiner’s rejection and enter a new
ground of rejection, rather than
affirming. The comment also stated that
the use of an affirmance and a new
ground of rejection introduces
confusion about how many times a
claim has been rejected—which causes
difficulty in the case of RCEs.
Response: This comment is outside
the scope of the NPRM. The USPTO
declines to institute a rule dictating how
individual panels of the Board must
resolve issues in cases that come before
them.
Comment 77: One comment suggested
that Bd.R. 41.50(b)(1) be revised so that
after a decision containing a new
ground of rejection, prosecution could
be reopened based on appellant
argument alone—with no a requirement
to submit new evidence. The comment
further suggested that the examiner
should not be bound by a new ground
of rejection in a Board decision because
examination should take place in front
of the examining corps—not in front of
the Board.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt these suggestions. The Board,
having made the new ground of
rejection and thus having the most
complete understanding of the logic and
analysis that led to the new ground, is
in the best position to evaluate
appellant’s rebuttal arguments in a
request for rehearing. It is only in the
instance where appellant chooses to
amend the claims or submit new
evidence that prosecution must be
reopened and the case returned to the
examiner to consider the amendment
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and/or new evidence in the first
instance.
Comment 78: Three comments
opposed eliminating the Board’s power
to include a statement of how a claim
can be amended to overcome a rejection.
One comment stated that use of such a
statement would foster cooperation
between the Board and appellants.
Another comment stated that the
statement is merely a suggestion and
does not obligate the examiner or the
appellant in any way. The third
comment stated that the Board should
not forego opportunities to suggest how
prosecution can be concluded.
Response: To clarify, the 2004 version
of Bd.R. 41.50(c) allows the Board to
include a statement of how a claim on
appeal may be amended to overcome a
specific rejection. Under the 2004
version of Bd. R. 41.50(c), if the Board
includes such a statement, appellant has
the right to amend the claim in
conformity therewith, and such an
amendment will overcome the specific
rejection. Thus, the Board’s statement is
binding on the examiner, and the
examiner may reject a claim soamended only by instituting a new
ground of rejection. As such, this power
of the Board under the 2004 rule puts
the Board squarely in the shoes of the
examiner by allowing the Board to
mandate how a claim can be amended
to overcome a rejection. The USPTO
declines to adopt the suggestion to add
back the Board’s power to include a
statement as to how a claim on appeal
may be amended to overcome a specific
rejection. In the USPTO’s experience,
since the adoption of this rule in 2004,
this power has been used rarely by the
Board, and since the Board’s principal
function is to review adverse decisions
of examiners, and in light of the backlog
of appeals at the Board, the USPTO sees
no need for the Board to spend judicial
resources proposing amendments to the
claims.
Comment 79: One comment opposed
proposed Bd.R. 41.50(c), which
provides that failure of an appellant to
timely file a request for rehearing
seeking review of a panel’s failure to
designate a new ground of rejection in
its decision will constitute a waiver of
any arguments that a decision contain
an undesignated new ground, stating
that this waiver provision is ultra vires,
inappropriate because the Board is not
an Article III court, and incompatible
with the new grounds provisions
proposed in the NPRM.
Response: This comment is addressed
above in the response to Comment 37.
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Bd.R. 41.52
Comment 80: One comment favored
the ‘‘flexible approach’’ reflected in
Bd.R. 41.52(a)(4) that allows appellants
to present new arguments when they
believe the Board has made a new
ground of rejection that has not been so
designated.
Response: The final rule adopts Bd.R.
41.52(a)(4) as proposed.
Bd.R. 41.54
Comment 81: One comment opposed
proposed Bd.R. 41.54, which requires
the Board to return jurisdiction to the
examiner after decision by the Board
because it would not permit the Board
to allow applications and pass them to
issuance. The commenter would prefer
that the Board be able to review
applications and pass them to issuance
rather than returning jurisdiction to the
examiner.
Response: To the extent this comment
seeks to have the Board to allow
applications and pass them to issuance,
the USPTO declines to adopt the
suggestion to make the Board into an
extension of the examining corps. The
Board’s principal function is to review
adverse decisions of examiners.
Other Comments Not Related to a
Particular Proposed Rule Change
Comment 82: One comment noted
that some BPAI decisions have been so
brief that it was not possible to
determine what arguments the panel
found persuasive or unpersuasive. The
comment requested that the Board be
required by rule to state with
particularity their reasoning in reaching
a decision and to state which arguments
of which party were and were not
persuasive.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt a rule that dictates to a particular
panel of the Board a specific level of
detail of analysis that must be included
in each opinion. The level of specificity
of the panel’s reasons for affirming or
reversing a decision of the examiner
will vary depending on the particular
facts and nature of each appeal.
Comment 83: One comment noted a
disparity between the amount of time
that appellants have to respond and the
amount of time that the Board and
examiners have to respond. Specifically,
the comment suggested that ‘‘however
long it takes from the time a brief is filed
till an answer is received shall be such
length of time as appellant has to file a
reply brief’’ and that ‘‘however long it
takes from the time a reply brief is filed
till a board decision is received shall be
such length of time as appellant has to
file a request for rehearing.’’
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Response: The USPTO has considered
the comment but the Office declines to
adopt the suggested changes.
Comment 84: One comment requested
that the USPTO adopt a separate
mechanism to rigorously enforce Rule
1.104 and the prima facie case
requirement (i.e., a separate appellate
body, below the Board, which reviews
only whether the examiner made a
prima facie case). They further suggest
that examiners be required to use the
rationales set forth in MPEP § 2143
except if granted an exception from two
Supervisory Patent Examiners or a
Technology Center Director.
Response: The USPTO notes that it
has already adopted a separate
mechanism for review prior to appeal in
the Pre-Appeal Brief Conference pilot
program. The USPTO is considering a
different rule making initiative that
pertains to the pre-appeal brief
conference option. As such, the USPTO
declines to adopt these suggestions at
this time because they are outside the
scope of the present proposed rule
changes.
Comment 85: One comment requested
that Image File Wrappers be made text
searchable and that applicants be
allowed to submit .doc files to the
USPTO to reduce the burden on
applicants and examiners and to allow
the patent bar to prepare statistics on
success and failure rates for different
prosecution strategies, and to allow the
patent bar to identify outlier patent
agents, attorneys, examiners, art units,
and Board judges who receive or issue
either inordinate numbers of rejections
or allowances.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt this suggestion because it is
outside the scope of the proposed rule
changes.
Comment 86: Two entities
commented on the statistics presented
in the NPRM concerning pre-appeal
brief conferences and appeal
conferences. Specifically, one comment
noted that the statistics show that both
procedures have been reasonably
successful at preventing improper
rejections from reaching the Board, but
that it is surprising to see no significant
change for either type of conference in
the percent of cases proceeding to the
Board. The comment suggested that
USPTO should analyze what these
statistics mean with respect to the rest
of the examination process, including
training efforts to improve quality of
final rejections. The other comment
noted that the percentage of cases that
were reopened or allowed after filing a
request for a pre-appeal conference or
an appeal brief are ‘‘unacceptably high.’’
The comment requested the USPTO
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evaluate the entire appeal process,
including the steps that lead to an
appeal, i.e., final office actions and after
final practice.
Response: The USPTO thanks the
public for their thoughtful comments on
ways to improve the patent process.
While these suggestions are outside the
scope of the proposed rule making, the
USPTO appreciates this input.
Comment 87: One comment suggested
that the pre-appeal brief conference
option be included as part of the ex
parte appeal rules to reflect that this
option is an important and significant
part of the appeal process.
Response: The USPTO declines to
adopt this suggestion at this time
because it is outside the scope of the
proposed rule changes. The USPTO is
considering a different rule making
initiative that pertains to the pre-appeal
brief conference option.
Rule Making Considerations
Executive Order 12866: This rule
making has been determined to be
significant for purposes of Executive
Order 12866 (Sept. 30, 1993).
The Office received one comment
regarding Executive Order 12866.
Comment 88: The comment suggested
that the Office should designate all of its
rules as having an economically
significant effect under Executive Order
12866, either because ‘‘innovation and
invention is a substantial part of the
American economy,’’ or because the
commenter alleges the paperwork
burdens of the information collections
associated with some patent rules cost
more than the $100 million threshold
for an economically significant action.
Response: To the extent that this
comment is directed to regulatory
actions other than the BPAI rules, the
comment is outside the scope of this
rule making. To the extent that this
comment is directed to the instant
regulatory action, the Office notes that
it fully complied with Executive Order
12866 in the promulgation of this rule.
Moreover, the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) determines
whether the Office’s rules are
‘‘significant’’ and/or ‘‘economically
significant’’ under Executive Order
12866. See Exec. Order No. 12866, 58
FR 51735, § 6(b)(1) (Sept. 30, 1993).
OIRA determined that these rules are
‘‘significant,’’ but not ‘‘economically
significant.’’ Furthermore, there is
nothing in Executive Order 12866 that
requires that OIRA’s analysis begin with
the presumption that all rules are
economically significant. The Office
presents each proposed rule to OIRA,
which considers the economic
significance of each rule individually.
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The Office will continue this practice in
future rule makings.
Administrative Procedure Act: The
changes in the final rule relate solely to
the procedure to be followed in filing
and prosecuting an ex parte appeal to
the Board. Therefore, these rule changes
involve rules of agency practice and
procedure under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A), and
prior notice and an opportunity for
public comment are not required
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A) (or any
other law). See Bachow Commc’ns, Inc.
v. F.C.C., 237 F.3d 683, 690 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (rules governing an application
process are ‘‘rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice’’
and exempt from the Administrative
Procedure Act’s notice and comment
requirement); Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80
F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (the
rules of practice promulgated under the
authority of former 35 U.S.C. 6(a) (now
in 35 U.S.C. 2(b)(2)) are not substantive
rules to which the notice and comment
requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act apply); Fressola v.
Manbeck, 36 USPQ2d 1211, 1215
(D.D.C. 1995) (‘‘it is extremely doubtful
whether any of the rules formulated to
govern patent or trade-mark practice are
other than ‘interpretive rules, general
statements of policy, * * * procedure,
or practice’ ’’ (quoting C.W. Ooms, The
United States Patent Office and the
Administrative Procedure Act, 38
Trademark Rep. 149, 153 (1948)).
Because the rule is procedural, it is
not required to be published for notice
and comment. Nevertheless, the Office
published a notice of proposed rule
making in the Federal Register (75 FR
69828 (Nov. 15, 2010)) in order to solicit
public comment before implementing
this final rule.
The Office received the following
comments regarding the Administrative
Procedure Act.
Comment 89: The Office received
three comments suggesting that these
rules are substantive rather than
procedural, are required to be
promulgated through notice and
comment, and must be submitted to the
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) for approval and analysis under
Executive Order 12866 and to the Small
Business Administration (SBA) for
review under the Regulatory Flexibility
Act.
Response: These rules are procedural
because they are ‘‘rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice,’’
see 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A), and because they
do not ‘‘foreclose effective opportunity
to make one’s case on the merits,’’ JEM
Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 22 F.3d 320, 328
(DC Cir. 1994). The Office declines to
accept one commenter’s suggestion that
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any rule that mentions any statute,
regulation, or case automatically should
be designated as substantive because the
rule must automatically affect
substantive rights. Such a designation
would not comport with administrative
law and would render the distinction
between procedural and substantive
rules meaningless. See id. at 327 (‘‘Of
course, procedure impacts on outcomes
and thus can virtually always be
described as affecting substance, but to
pursue that line of analysis results in
the obliteration of the distinction that
Congress demanded. The issue,
therefore, is one of degree, and [a
court’s] task is to identify which
substantive effects are sufficiently grave
so that notice and comment are needed
to safeguard the policies underlying the
APA.’’ (internal quotations and citations
omitted)). Because these rules are
procedural, notice and comment were
not required under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) or any other
statute. Furthermore, to ensure
maximum efficacy of the rules and to
provide the public with an opportunity
to comment, the Office published notice
of the proposed rules in the Federal
Register, sought comment on the
proposed rules, and fully considered
and responded to all comments
received.
The Office submitted the proposed
and final rules to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for full
review prior to issuance. OMB
determined, and the Office agreed, that
the final rules are not economically
significant within the meaning of
Executive Order 12866. Additionally,
although analysis under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act is not mandatory for
procedural rules such as these, the
Office fully complied with the Act.
Under the Act, an agency need not
complete an Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis ‘‘if the head of the
agency certifies that the rule will not, if
promulgated, have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.’’ See 5 U.S.C.
605(b). For the reasons set forth at
length in the NPRM (75 FR 69828–01,
69843–44), the Deputy General Counsel
has certified to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy of the Small Business
Administration that this rule will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities,
in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 605(b). The
SBA’s Office of Advocacy did not
disagree with this certification.
Regulatory Flexibility Act: Prior notice
and an opportunity for public comment
are not required pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
553 or any other law. Neither a
Regulatory Flexibility Act analysis nor a
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certification under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) is
applicable to this final rule. See 5 U.S.C.
603.
Nonetheless, the Deputy General
Counsel for General Law of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office has
certified to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy of the Small Business
Administration that, for the reasons
discussed below, this final rule for the
Rules of Practice Before the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences in Ex
Parte Appeals [RIN 0651–AC37], will
not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities. See 5 U.S.C. 605(b) (Regulatory
Flexibility Act).
There are no fee changes associated
with the final rule. The estimates of
economic impact provided below are
based on agency expertise in patent
prosecution practice.
Claims on Appeal
In those instances where appellants
wish to appeal all claims under
rejection, which are the majority of
appeals, there will be a cost savings.
The final rule eliminates the
requirement for appellants to
affirmatively state (by eliminating the
status of claims section of the appeal
brief) all of the claims on appeal. There
may be a slight increase in cost,
however, to a small subset of appellants
who choose not to appeal all of the
rejected claims. For this small subset of
appellants, the final rule requires
cancellation of any non-appealed claims
by filing an amendment.
The Office estimates that, for those
appellants choosing to appeal fewer
than all of the rejected claims, this
change may result in two hours of
attorney time toward the preparation of
such an amendment. For purposes of
comparison, the 2011 report of the
Committee on Economics of Legal
Practice of the American Intellectual
Property Law Association (‘‘the AIPLA
2011 Report’’) notes that the median
cost for the preparation and filing of a
patent application amendment/
argument of minimal complexity is
$1,800. Using the AIPLA 2011 Report’s
median billing rate for attorneys in
private firms of $340 per hour, this cost
equates to approximately 5.3 hours of
attorney time. The Office’s estimate of
two hours of attorney time ($680) for an
amendment merely cancelling claims is
based on the fact that such an
amendment will not contain an
argument section, unlike a regular
patent application amendment/
argument. As such, the Office estimates
that the amendment to cancel claims
will be significantly less time-
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consuming than a regular patent
application amendment/argument.
Based on the Office’s experience, it
estimates that such an amendment
cancelling claims will only be filed in
approximately 1% of appeals. The
Board decided Ex parte Ghuman, 88
USPQ2d 1478, 2008 WL 2109842 (BPAI
2008) (precedential) in May 2008. Of the
approximately 2,056 reported Board
decisions and orders issued in the
remainder of FY 2008, only ten such
decisions and orders cited Ghuman in
noting that an appellant had withdrawn
claims from appeal. In FY 2009 (October
2008–September 2009), of the
approximately 5,612 reported Board
decisions and orders, only twenty cited
Ghuman in noting that an appellant had
withdrawn claims from appeal. In FY
2010 (October 2009—September 2010),
of the approximately 5,990 reported
Board decisions and orders, only
twenty-six cited Ghuman in noting that
an appellant had withdrawn claims
from appeal. In FY 2011 (October 2010–
September 2011), of the approximately
6,126 reported Board decisions and
orders, only thirty-five cited Ghuman in
noting that an appellant had withdrawn
claims from appeal. While these
numbers may not represent a precise
indication of the numbers of appeals
where appellants chose not to appeal all
of the rejected claims, these figures are
provided as an indication of the
relatively small number of appeals in
which appellants choose to appeal
fewer than all of the rejected claims
without cancelling such unappealed
claims prior to appeal. Based on this
data, the Office found that
approximately 0.46% of all appeals had
Ghuman issues, i.e., where fewer than
all of the rejected claims were appealed.
For purposes of calculating additional
cost to appellants from this rule change,
the Office rounded up to 1% and used
this as a conservative (high) estimate for
the number of amendments expected.
As this rule change will only impact 1%
of all appellants, this final rule will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
Additionally, for the majority of
appellants this final rule will likely
result in cost savings. Because the rule
had allowed appellants to appeal fewer
than all of the claims under rejection,
the rule also required appellants to
affirmatively state (in the status of
claims section of the appeal brief) all of
the claims on appeal. Under this final
rule, the Board will presume that
appellants intend to appeal all claims
under rejection unless those claims
under rejection for which review is not
sought are cancelled. This change to the
rule allows the Office to eliminate the
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requirement for appellants to separately
identify the claims on appeal in the
appeal brief. Thus, in those instances
where appellants wish to appeal all
claims under rejection, which
represents the majority of appeals, the
appellant’s burden is lessened by not
having to include a listing of the status
of all of the claims under rejection.
Changes to Appeal Brief Requirements
The Office also estimates a net cost
savings to all appellants as a result of
the changes to the appeal brief
requirements in the final rule. In
particular, the Office estimates a savings
due to the elimination of certain appeal
brief requirements and changes to other
requirements to make them more
flexible. The Office estimates a small
increase in cost to the subset of
appellants who choose to argue claims
separately or as a subgroup.
For the subset of appellants who
choose to argue claims separately or as
a subgroup, the small increase in cost
would merely be related to the addition
of subheadings before separately argued
claims or subgroups. The Office
estimates this added burden may
increase the time it takes to prepare an
appeal brief by 0.2 hours for those
appellants who choose to separately
argue claims. This estimate is based on
the Office’s view of the time it would
take to add subheadings based on
agency expertise in patent prosecution
practice. The estimated small increase
in cost would not apply to all appeal
briefs because some appellants choose
to argue all of the claims rejected under
a ground of rejection as a single group.
However, since the Office does not track
the number of appeals in which
appellants argue all claims as a single
group versus the number of appeals in
which appellants argue some claims
separately, the Office has applied this
increase to the estimate of all appeal
briefs filed. Applying this increase to
the estimate of all appeal briefs filed
still will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
Notably, the overall changes to the
appeal brief requirements in the final
rule will result in net savings to all
appellants. By allowing more flexibility
in how an appellant chooses to present
an appeal to the Board and by
eliminating many appeal brief
requirements, appellants will incur less
cost overall in preparation of appeal
briefs. As discussed infra in the
Paperwork Reduction Act section of the
notice, the Office estimates a net average
savings in preparation time under the
final rule of two hours of attorney time
as compared to the previous estimate
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under the 2004 rules. This estimate is
based on the Office’s view of the net
time saved in preparation of an appeal
brief as a result of the final rule based
on agency expertise in patent
prosecution practice. As such, the
overall average attorney time and cost it
will take to prepare an appeal brief
under the final rule will be reduced
from 34 hours ($11,560) to 32 hours
($10,880). Using the median billing rate
of $340 per hour, as published in the
AIPLA 2011 Report, the Office estimates
that the final rule will result in an
average savings of $680 per appeal brief.
This savings will apply equally to large
and small entities.
Accordingly, any costs related to the
filing of an amendment cancelling
claims and the addition of subheadings
to an appeal brief will not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
Moreover, this final rule as a whole will
likely result in a net cost savings to
appellants and, therefore, also will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
Unfunded Mandates: The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act requires, at 2
U.S.C. 1532, that agencies prepare an
assessment of anticipated costs and
benefits before issuing any rule that may
result in expenditure by State, local, and
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or
by the private sector, of $100 million or
more (adjusted annually for inflation) in
any given year. This rule would have no
such effect on State, local, and tribal
governments or the private sector.
Executive Order 13132: This rule
making does not contain policies with
federalism implications sufficient to
warrant preparation of a Federalism
Assessment under Executive Order
13132 (Aug. 4, 1999).
Executive Order 13563 (Improving
Regulation and Regulatory Review): The
Office has complied with Executive
Order 13563 (Jan. 8, 2011). Specifically,
the Office has: (1) Used the best
available techniques to quantify costs
and benefits, and has considered values
such as equity, fairness and distributive
impacts; (2) provided the public with a
meaningful opportunity to participate in
the regulatory process, including
soliciting the views of those likely
affected, by issuing a notice of proposed
rule making and providing on-line
access to the rule making docket; (3)
attempted to promote coordination,
simplification and harmonization across
government agencies and identified
goals designed to promote innovation;
(4) considered approaches that reduce
burdens and maintain flexibility and
freedom of choice for the public; and (5)
ensured the objectivity of scientific and
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technological information and
processes, to the extent applicable.
Paperwork Reduction Act: This final
rule involves information collection
requirements which are subject to
review by the Office of Management and
Budget under the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The
collections of information in the rule
have been reviewed and previously
approved by OMB under control
numbers 0651–0031 and 0651–0063.
As stated above in the Regulatory
Flexibility Act section of this notice,
while the majority of the changes to the
rule will either have no impact on or
will lessen the burden to the public as
compared to the collection of
information previously approved by
OMB, the Office has identified two
changes that may, in certain
circumstances, increase the burden to
the public.
Specifically, the Office has estimated
that final Bd.R. 41.31(c) will impose an
increased burden of two hours of added
time to a small subset of appellants (1%)
who choose not to seek review of all
claims under rejection by requiring such
appellants to file an amendment
cancelling any unappealed claims, or
otherwise have the Board treat all
rejected claims as being on appeal.
Additionally, the Office estimated that
the change to the briefing requirements
in final Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(iv)(renumbered) (requiring
appellants to place any claim(s) argued
separately or as a subgroup under a
separate subheading that identifies the
claim(s) by number) would result in 0.2
hours of added time for those appellants
who choose to separately argue their
claims. These estimates are based on the
Office’s expertise in patent prosecution
practice. This increase in burden hours
would not apply to all appeal briefs
because some appellants choose to
argue all of the claims rejected under a
ground of rejection as a single group.
However, since the Office does not track
the number of appeals in which
appellants argue all claims as a single
group versus the number of appeals in
which appellants argue some claims
separately, for purposes of estimating
the overall burden, the Office has
applied this 0.2 hour increase to the
estimate of all appeal briefs filed.
The Office has also specifically
identified below at least nine changes in
the final rule that will lessen the burden
to the public as compared to the 2004
rule.
1. Final Bd.R. 41.12(b) lessens the
burden on appellant by removing the
requirement for appellant to include
parallel citations (Bd.R. 41.12(a)(2)–(3))
to both the West Reporter System and to
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the United States Patents Quarterly for
any decision other than a United States
Supreme Court decision, and further
lessens the burden on appellant by no
longer requiring citation to a particular
reporter.
2. Final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(i) lessens
the burden on appellant because it
provides for a default in the event that
this item is omitted from the brief, such
that appellant is not required to include
this section in the brief if the inventors
are the real party in interest.
3. Final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(ii) lessens
the burden on appellant because it (a)
Limits the duty to provide information
as to only those related cases that
involve an application or patent coowned by appellant or assignee; (b)
provides a default assumption in the
event that this item is omitted from the
brief so that appellants are no longer
required to make a statement that ‘‘there
are no such related cases’’; and (c) no
longer requires filing of copies of
decisions in related proceedings.
4. The final rule lessens the burden on
appellant by eliminating the
requirement under the 2004 rule
(specifically Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iii)) for
appellant to identify the status of claims
in the appeal brief.
5. The final rule lessens the burden on
appellant by eliminating the
requirement under the 2004 rule
(specifically Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv)) for
appellant to include a statement of the
status of any amendments.
6. Final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iii)
(renumbered) lessens the burden on
appellant by providing more flexibility
than corresponding Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(v)
by allowing citation to paragraph
number (instead of limiting citation to
page and line number). The final rule
also clarifies the current Office policy,
which does not allow reference to the
patent application publication in the
summary of claim subject matter. Since
improper reference to the patent
application publication is a current
cause of defective briefs, this rule
change is intended to reduce confusion
and thereby reduce the number of
defective briefs.
7. The final rule lessens the burden on
appellant by eliminating the
requirement under the 2004 rule
(specifically Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(vi)) for
appellant to state the grounds of
rejection to be reviewed on appeal in
the appeal brief. The Board would look
to documents already of Record (i.e., the
Office action from which the appeal is
taken and any subsequent Advisory
Action or Pre-Appeal Conference
Decision) to determine the grounds of
rejection on appeal.
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8. Final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv)
(renumbered) lessens the burden on
appellant by allowing appellant’s
headings to ‘‘reasonably identify the
ground being contested (e.g., by claim
number, statutory basis, and applied
reference, if any).’’ The corresponding
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (the 2004 rule) has
occasionally been interpreted as a
verbatim requirement and resulted in
briefs being found defective for failure
to state the ground of rejection in the
heading exactly the same as stated in
the Office action from which the appeal
was taken. The final rule clarifies that
this is not a verbatim requirement and
allows more flexibility in the brief.
9. The final rule lessens the burden on
appellant by eliminating the
requirement under the 2004 rule
(specifically Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(x)) for
appellants to file a related proceedings
appendix containing copies of decisions
in related proceedings. The Board will
look to the records in the Office and
other publicly available sources to
locate and review decisions rendered in
any related proceedings.
In the approved information
collection [OMB Control Number 0651–
0063], the Office estimated the average
appeal brief took 34 hours to prepare. In
light of the changes in the final rule
(final Bd.R. 41.37) as compared to the
2004 rule for briefing requirements for
filing appeal briefs, and taking into
account the nine changes that will
lessen the burden and the one change
(i.e., addition of subheadings) that will
add a burden, the agency estimates that
the changes in the final rule as
compared to the 2004 rule will result in
a net average decrease of approximately
2 hours per appeal brief from the prior
estimate, thereby lowering the previous
average estimate of approximately 34
hours to 32 hours to prepare an appeal
brief. This estimate is based on the net
impact of the changes and time saved in
preparation of an appeal brief based on
agency expertise in patent prosecution
practice. Using the median billing rate
of $340 per hour, as published in the
AIPLA 2011 Report, the Office estimates
that these rule changes will result in an
average savings of $680 per appeal brief.
The Office notes that the number and
significance of these changes effecting a
lessening of the burden to appellants
substantially outweigh the changes that
may result, in certain circumstances, in
increased burden to appellants. The
Office submitted an information
collection package to OMB for its review
and approval at the same time as
publication of the NPRM and OMB preapproved the information collection.
The Office also submitted an updated
information collection package to OMB
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concurrently with this final rule for its
review and approval in light of the
changes made in the final rule as
compared to the rule as proposed in the
NPRM, and OMB approved the updated
information collection package.
The USPTO received several
comments regarding the information
collection submitted to OMB along with
the NPRM.
Comment 90: The Office received a
comment suggesting that it make clear
where the supporting statement for the
Information Collection Request for this
rule may be obtained.
Response: The supporting statement
is available at https://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/PRAMain under OMB control
number 0651–0063. See Proposed
Modification Supporting NPRM RIN
0651–AC37 (Rules of Practice Before the
Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences in Ex Parte Appeals), 2
(Nov. 4, 2010), https://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/PRAMain (OMB Control No.
0651–0063) (hereinafter ‘‘Supporting
Statement’’).
Comment 91: The Office received a
comment claiming that the Office had
not explained the practical utility of the
information it sought to collect through
amendments to appeal briefs, reply
briefs, and requests for rehearing.
Response: The Office fully explained
the need for this information in the
supporting statement accompanying this
information collection request, under
the section entitled ‘‘Needs and Uses,’’
which explained that the collections
were necessary so the Board could
identify the claims the appellant wanted
to appeal, and that the burdens for
collecting this information had changed
because the new rules decreased the
paperwork burden on appellants. See
Supporting Statement at 2.
Comment 92: The Office received two
comments suggesting that the burden
estimates in the Supporting Statement
were not supported by objective data
and allegedly based on opinion and
belief.
Response: In general, estimates of the
number of responses expected per year
for any particular item in the collection
are derived from the internal data
collected from PALM, and/or IFW and
the data from previous iterations of the
renewal process. If data from PALM or
IFW is available for a particular item in
the collection, the data is examined to
determine whether a trend exists that
can be used to provide annual estimates
for the item for the next three years. If
data from PALM or IFW is not available
for an item, e.g., if the item is a new
item, response estimates are arrived at
from an analysis of PALM or IFW data
for a closely analogous item(s) in the
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same or another collection. This data is
then combined with the Office’s
corporate planning and budget
estimations to forecast the estimates for
data for the next three years to include
considerations such as the Office’s
projections for the growth in the number
of patent applications. Agency expertise
in patent prosecution practice is relied
upon to confirm a reasonable basis for
any trend suggested by the data and to
identify the most closely analogous
item(s), and Agency expertise in
corporate planning is relied upon to
project estimates over the next three
years. Estimates of the hours per
response for items in the collection are
derived from data from the biennial
AIPLA economic survey report, data
from previous iterations of the renewal
process, and Agency expertise in patent
prosecution practice. To the extent that
the Office uses staff expertise in crafting
estimates, the BPAI on its own has
many years of combined USPTO and
non-USPTO patent prosecution
experience, and the BPAI is but one of
the offices involved in providing
information contained in the Supporting
Statement. Other offices include the
Office of Planning and Budget and the
Office of the Chief Economist. This
prosecution experience spans multiple
technologies and provides views from
various perspectives, including the
perspectives of former patent agents,
associate attorneys, and law firm
partners, working with both small and
non-small entity patent applicants. One
commenter suggested that the informed
expertise of the BPAI staff should be
replaced with the opinions and beliefs
of commenters of unverified expertise.
This suggestion would result in less
verifiable and less trustworthy data.
Accordingly, the Office does not adopt
this suggestion. The Supporting
Statement is substantively objective in
that it presents all information in an
‘‘accurate, clear, complete, unbiased
manner, and within the proper context.’’
USPTO’s Information Quality
Guidelines, § IV, 6, a, https://
www.uspto.gov/products/cis/
infoqualityguidelines.jsp (hereinafter
‘‘USPTO’s IQG’’).
Comment 93: The Office received a
comment suggesting that its reliance on
third party data such as the AIPLA
economic survey in determining the
burden estimates for the proposed
information collections associated with
this rule violated the Information
Quality Act (IQA).
Response: In providing estimates of
burden hours, the Office sometimes
referenced the AIPLA economic survey
report, as a benchmark for the estimates.
Under the Office’s Information Quality
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Guidelines (IQG), the AIPLA economic
survey report is not a ‘‘dissemination’’
of information. The Guidelines state that
‘‘dissemination’’ means an ‘‘agency
initiated or sponsored distribution of
information to the public.’’ USPTO’s
IQG, at § IV, A, 1. Subsection (a) further
defines ‘‘agency initiated distribution of
information to the public’’ to mean
‘‘information that the agency distributes
or releases which reflects, represents, or
forms any part of the support of the
policies of the agency.’’ Id. at § IV, A,
1, a. The Office did not distribute or
release the AIPLA economic survey
report. Likewise, the AIPLA economic
survey report does not qualify as an
‘‘agency sponsored distribution of
information’’ under Subsection (b) of
the Guidelines, which ‘‘refers to
situations where the agency has directed
a third party to distribute or release
information, or where the agency has
the authority to review and approve the
information before release.’’ Id. at § IV,
A, 1, b. The Office did not commission
the report, had no input into the
structure of the report and does not rely
exclusively upon the results of the
report to arrive at estimates. Thus, there
is no violation under the IQA because
the Office utilized the AIPLA economic
survey report in formulating some
burden estimations.
Comment 94: The Office received a
comment asking if these rules
inappropriately shift the paperwork
burden onto applicants and away from
the USPTO.
Response: As explained in the NPRM,
the vast majority of the changes to this
rule will either decrease the paperwork
burden on applicants or have no effect
on the paperwork burden. The only
changes that the Office estimates would
add to any applicant’s paperwork
burden are (1) The requirement that
appellants cancel any unappealed
claims and (2) the requirement that
subheadings with claim numbers be
used to identify the claims or groups of
claims argued in that particular section.
With regard to the first change, for 99%
of appellants, this change will shift the
paperwork burden away from appellants
because they will no longer need to
identify which claims they wish to
appeal. For the 1% of appellants who do
not pursue appeals of all of their claims,
this rule will result in a slight increase
in paperwork because they will be
required to identify which claims they
are not appealing. Both changes
appropriately place the burden on the
appellant because only the appellant is
in a position to know which claims the
appellant wants to appeal and the
appellant is in the best position to know
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which claims the appellant intends to
argue in each section of the appeal brief.
Comment 95: One commenter noted a
typographical error in the Supporting
Statement.
Response: The Office has corrected
this error so that the Supporting
Statement now reads, ‘‘The Information
Quality Guidelines * * * apply to this
information collection and this
information collection and its
supporting statement comply with all
applicable information quality
guidelines * * *.’’ See Supporting
Statement at 3.
Comment 96: The Office received two
comments suggesting it should have
used the mean rather than the median
when calculating the average hourly rate
and cost of the paperwork burden
created by these rules.
Response: OMB regulations do not
require a particular arithmetic technique
for calculating burden estimates.
Nothing in the plain text of the
regulation or the Office’s IQG suggests
that mean values are required or that an
agency’s use of median values is
inappropriate. See San Luis & DeltaMendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 2010
WL 5422597, at *88–93 (E.D. Ca. 2010)
(holding that nothing in the IQA or the
agency’s guidelines on the IQA
mandated how the agency conducted its
calculations). 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3)(iii)
simply requires an agency to provide
‘‘an estimate, to the extent practicable,
of the average burden of the collection.’’
The Office considers the median figure
to be an appropriate value upon which
to base estimates because attorneys
charging both above the median and
below the median would be expected to
participate in the process. Supporting
Statement at 9. Accordingly, the burden
calculations need no correction.
Comment 97: The Office received one
comment claiming that it must disclose
the data, models, and analyses used to
estimate the PRA burdens and
requesting correction of the supporting
statement to include that information.
Response: The basis for providing
various estimates is explained in the
Supporting Statement and further
detailed in the responses to these
comments. Under the IQA, certain
influential information must be
reproducible under certain
circumstances. The burden ‘‘estimates’’
of which the commenter complains do
not qualify as ‘‘information’’ within the
meaning of the IQA. ‘‘Information’’ is
defined as ‘‘any communication or
representation of knowledge such as
facts or data, in any medium or form,
including textual, numerical, graphic,
cartographic, narrative, or audiovisual
forms.’’ USPTO’s IQG, Section IV, A, 4.
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72295
By definition, estimates do not represent
knowledge such as facts or data.
‘‘Information,’’ not estimation, is subject
to certain reproducibility requirements.
See USPTO’s IQG, Section IV, 7
(‘‘reproducibility’’ means the
‘‘information is capable of being
substantially reproduced, subject to an
acceptable degree of imprecision.’’). No
correction is warranted for matters not
involving ‘‘information.’’ See USPTO’s
IQG, Section XI, A, 4, a.
Comment 98: The Office also received
a comment requesting the source of the
data in the NPRM on the number of
requests for pre-appeal brief conference
and appeal conference review the Office
receives each year.
Response: The Office tracks this
information in PALM.
Comment 99: The Office received a
comment suggesting it does not
adequately consider public comments
on Information Collection Requests
(ICRs).
Response: The Office greatly
appreciates the time and effort the
public expends commenting on ICRs
and proposed rules. The Office fully
considers all comments and strives to
incorporate these comments to the
greatest extent possible to improve the
ICRs and rules it promulgates.
Comment 100: The Office received a
comment on Bd.R. 41.33(d)(1)
suggesting that the rule precluding
affidavits filed after the date of filing an
appeal and prior to the date of filing a
brief under some circumstances does
not comply with the Paperwork
Reduction Act’s requirement to
minimize the paperwork burden on the
public because the precluded affidavit
may have convinced the examiner to
reconsider the rejection and obviated
the need for the appeal.
Response: First, no change has been
proposed to this long-standing practice
of the USPTO. Second, the Office is not
requesting information in the form of
late-submitted affidavits; in most cases
it will not even accept such information.
And finally, to the extent that the
commenter suggests that the Paperwork
Reduction Act issue comes not from the
affidavit itself but from the appeal that
may result from the inability to submit
the affidavit, the Office disagrees that
this affects the burden on the appellant.
Appellant may still request continued
examination under 37 CFR 1.114 rather
than pursue an appeal.
Comment 101: One commenter
suggested that the Office is required by
the Paperwork Reduction Act to submit
an Information Collection Request for
oral hearings before the BPAI.
Response: The Paperwork Reduction
Act does not apply to oral hearings.
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First, under the Act, a ‘‘collection of
information’’ is defined as collecting
information ‘‘by means of identical
questions posed to, or identical
reporting, recordkeeping, or disclosure
requirements imposed on, ten or more
persons * * *.’’ See 5 CFR 1320.3(c).
Oral hearings do not involve identical
questions posed to 10 or more persons
and thus are not ‘‘collections of
information.’’ Furthermore, the facts
and arguments recited at an oral hearing
do not constitute ‘‘information’’ under
the Paperwork Reduction Act because
the Act specifies that ‘‘ ‘[i]nformation’
does not generally include items in the
following categories * * *: (6) A
request for facts or opinions addressed
to a single person.’’ See 5 CFR
1320.3(h)(6). Accordingly, the Act does
not require the Office to submit an
Information Collection Request for oral
hearings and the Office has not
submitted such a request.
Comment 102: One commenter
suggested that the Office did not comply
with the Paperwork Reduction Act
because it allegedly did not seek public
comment on the estimation of burden
hours for the new rules before
publishing the NPRM in the Federal
Register.
Response: The commenter
misunderstands the Paperwork
Reduction Act. The Paperwork
Reduction Act clearly states that ‘‘[t]he
agency need not separately seek such
public comment for any proposed
collection of information contained in a
proposed rule to be reviewed under
§ 1320.11, if the agency provides notice
and comment through the notice of
proposed rulemaking for the proposed
rule * * *.’’ 5 CFR 1320.8(d)(3).
Because this collection associated with
these rules is a collection of information
in a proposed rule under 5 CFR 1320.11,
the Office was not required to seek
public comment beyond notice and
comment through the NPRM. Moreover,
the Office did seek public participation
prior to publishing the NPRM. The
USPTO conducted a roundtable
discussion with the public on the Board
rules.
Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, no person is required to respond
to nor shall a person be subject to a
penalty for failure to comply with a
collection of information subject to the
requirements of the Paperwork
Reduction Act unless that collection of
information displays a currently valid
OMB control number. The valid OMB
control number assigned to these final
regulations is OMB Control Number
0651–0063.
This final rule supersedes the rules
governing practice before the Board in
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ex parte patent appeals (as published in
69 FR 50003 (August 12, 2004)). See 37
CFR 41.1 et seq. (2010). The Office also
withdraws the indefinitely delayed 2008
final rule (73 FR 32938 (June 10, 2008))
that never went into effect.
List of Subjects
37 CFR Part 1
Administrative practice and
procedure, Courts, Freedom of
information, Inventions and patents,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Small businesses.
37 CFR Part 41
Administrative practice and
procedure, Inventions and patents,
Lawyers.
Amendments to the Regulatory Text
For the reasons discussed in the
preamble, under the authority of 35
U.S.C. 2(b)(2), the Under Secretary of
Commerce for Intellectual Property and
Director of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office withdraws the final
rule published June 10, 2008 (73 FR
32938) and amends Parts 1 and 41 of
title 37 of the Code of Federal
Regulations as follows:
PART 1—RULES OF PRACTICE IN
PATENT CASES
1. The authority citation for part 1
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 35 U.S.C. 2(b)(2), unless
otherwise noted.
2. Amend § 1.197 by revising the
section heading and removing and
reserving paragraph (a). The revision
reads as follows:
■
§ 1.197
*
*
Termination of proceedings.
*
*
*
PART 41—PRACTICE BEFORE THE
BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND
INTERFERENCES
3. Revise the authority citation for part
41 to read as follows:
■
Authority: 35 U.S.C. 2(b)(2), 3(a)(2)(A), 21,
23, 32, 41, 132, 133, 134, 135, 306, and 315.
Subpart A—General Provisions
■
4. Revise § 41.12 to read as follows:
§ 41.12
Citation of authority.
(a) For any United States Supreme
Court decision, citation to the United
States Reports is preferred.
(b) For any decision other than a
United States Supreme Court decision,
citation to the West Reporter System is
preferred.
(c) Citations to authority must include
pinpoint citations whenever a specific
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holding or portion of an authority is
invoked.
(d) Non-binding authority should be
used sparingly. If the authority is not an
authority of the Office and is not
reproduced in the United States Reports
or the West Reporter System, a copy of
the authority should be provided.
Subpart B—Ex parte Appeals
5. Amend § 41.30 by adding
definitions for ‘‘evidence’’ and ‘‘record’’
in alphabetical order to read as follows:
■
§ 41.30
Definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
Evidence means something (including
testimony, documents and tangible
objects) that tends to prove or disprove
the existence of an alleged fact, except
that for the purpose of this subpart
Evidence does not include dictionaries,
which may be cited before the Board.
*
*
*
*
*
Record means the items listed in the
content listing of the Image File
Wrapper of the official file of the
application or reexamination
proceeding on appeal or the official file
of the Office if other than the Image File
Wrapper, excluding amendments,
Evidence, and other documents that
were not entered. In the case of an
issued patent being reissued or
reexamined, the Record further includes
the Record of the patent being reissued
or reexamined.
■ 6. Amend § 41.31 by revising
paragraphs (a) introductory text, (b), and
the first sentence of paragraph (c) to
read as follows:
§ 41.31
Appeal to Board.
(a) Who may appeal and how to file
an appeal. An appeal is taken to the
Board by filing a notice of appeal.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) The signature requirements of
§§ 1.33 and 11.18(a) of this title do not
apply to a notice of appeal filed under
this section.
(c) An appeal, when taken, is
presumed to be taken from the rejection
of all claims under rejection unless
cancelled by an amendment filed by the
applicant and entered by the Office.
* * *
*
*
*
*
*
■ 7. Amend § 41.33 by revising the
section heading, and revising
paragraphs (c) and (d) to read as follows:
§ 41.33 Amendments and affidavits or
other Evidence after appeal.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) All other amendments filed after
the date of filing an appeal pursuant to
§ 41.31(a)(1) through (a)(3) will not be
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admitted except as permitted by
§§ 41.39(b)(1), 41.50(a)(2)(i), and
41.50(b)(1).
(d)(1) An affidavit or other Evidence
filed after the date of filing an appeal
pursuant to § 41.31(a)(1) through (a)(3)
and prior to the date of filing a brief
pursuant to § 41.37 may be admitted if
the examiner determines that the
affidavit or other Evidence overcomes
all rejections under appeal and that a
showing of good and sufficient reasons
why the affidavit or other Evidence is
necessary and was not earlier presented
has been made.
(2) All other affidavits or other
Evidence filed after the date of filing an
appeal pursuant to § 41.31(a)(1) through
(a)(3) will not be admitted except as
permitted by §§ 41.39(b)(1),
41.50(a)(2)(i), and 41.50(b)(1).
■ 8. Revise § 41.35 to read as follows:
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§ 41.35
Jurisdiction over appeal.
(a) Beginning of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the proceeding passes
to the Board upon the filing of a reply
brief under § 41.41 or the expiration of
the time in which to file such a reply
brief, whichever is earlier.
(b) End of jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction of the Board ends when:
(1) The Director or the Board enters a
remand order (see §§ 41.35(c), 41.35(e),
and 41.50(a)(1)),
(2) The Board enters a final decision
(see § 41.2) and judicial review is sought
or the time for seeking judicial review
has expired,
(3) An express abandonment which
complies with § 1.138 of this title is
recognized,
(4) A request for continued
examination is filed which complies
with § 1.114 of this title,
(5) Appellant fails to take any
required action under §§ 41.39(b),
41.50(a)(2), 41.50(b), or 41.50(d), and
the Board enters an order of dismissal,
or
(6) Appellant reopens prosecution
pursuant to § 41.40(b) or in response to
a new ground of rejection entered in a
decision of the Board (see § 41.50(b)(1)).
(c) Remand ordered by the Director.
Prior to the entry of a decision on the
appeal by the Board (see § 41.50), the
Director may sua sponte order the
proceeding remanded to the examiner.
(d) Documents filed during Board’s
jurisdiction. Except for petitions
authorized by this part, consideration of
any information disclosure statement or
petition filed while the Board possesses
jurisdiction over the proceeding will be
held in abeyance until the Board’s
jurisdiction ends.
(e) Administrative remands ordered
by the Board. If, after receipt and review
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of the proceeding, the Board determines
that the file is not complete or is not in
compliance with the requirements of
this subpart, the Board may relinquish
jurisdiction to the examiner or take
other appropriate action to permit
completion of the file.
■ 9. Amend § 41.37 by:
■ a. Adding headings to paragraphs (a),
(b), (c), (d) and (e);
■ b. Revising paragraph (c);
■ d. Revising the second sentence in
paragraph (d); and
■ e. Adding new third and fourth
sentences to paragraph (d).
The revisions and additions read as
follows:
§ 41.37
Appeal brief.
(a) Timing and fee. * * *
(b) Failure to file a brief. * * *
(c) Content of appeal brief. (1) Except
as otherwise provided in this paragraph,
the brief shall contain the following
items under appropriate headings and
in the order indicated in paragraphs
(c)(1)(i) through (v) of this section,
except that a brief filed by an appellant
who is not represented by a registered
practitioner need only substantially
comply with paragraphs (c)(1)(i),
(c)(1)(ii), (c)(1)(iv), and (c)(1)(v) of this
section:
(i) Real party in interest. A statement
identifying by name the real party in
interest at the time the appeal brief is
filed, except that such statement is not
required if the named inventor or
inventors are themselves the real party
in interest. If an appeal brief does not
contain a statement of the real party in
interest, the Office may assume that the
named inventor or inventors are the real
party in interest.
(ii) Related appeals and interferences.
A statement identifying by application,
patent, appeal or interference number
all other prior and pending appeals,
interferences or judicial proceedings
(collectively, ‘‘related cases’’) which
satisfy all of the following conditions:
Involve an application or patent owned
by the appellant or assignee, are known
to appellant, the appellant’s legal
representative, or assignee, and may be
related to, directly affect or be directly
affected by or have a bearing on the
Board’s decision in the pending appeal,
except that such statement is not
required if there are no such related
cases. If an appeal brief does not contain
a statement of related cases, the Office
may assume that there are no such
related cases.
(iii) Summary of claimed subject
matter. A concise explanation of the
subject matter defined in each of the
rejected independent claims, which
shall refer to the specification in the
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Record by page and line number or by
paragraph number, and to the drawing,
if any, by reference characters. For each
rejected independent claim, and for
each dependent claim argued separately
under the provisions of paragraph
(c)(1)(iv) of this section, if the claim
contains a means plus function or step
plus function recitation as permitted by
35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph, then the
concise explanation must identify the
structure, material, or acts described in
the specification in the Record as
corresponding to each claimed function
with reference to the specification in the
Record by page and line number or by
paragraph number, and to the drawing,
if any, by reference characters.
Reference to the patent application
publication does not satisfy the
requirements of this paragraph.
(iv) Argument. The arguments of
appellant with respect to each ground of
rejection, and the basis therefor, with
citations of the statutes, regulations,
authorities, and parts of the Record
relied on. The arguments shall explain
why the examiner erred as to each
ground of rejection contested by
appellant. Except as provided for in
§§ 41.41, 41.47 and 41.52, any
arguments or authorities not included in
the appeal brief will be refused
consideration by the Board for purposes
of the present appeal. Each ground of
rejection contested by appellant must be
argued under a separate heading, and
each heading shall reasonably identify
the ground of rejection being contested
(e.g., by claim number, statutory basis,
and applied reference, if any). For each
ground of rejection applying to two or
more claims, the claims may be argued
separately (claims are considered by
appellant as separately patentable), as a
group (all claims subject to the ground
of rejection stand or fall together), or as
a subgroup (a subset of the claims
subject to the ground of rejection stand
or fall together). When multiple claims
subject to the same ground of rejection
are argued as a group or subgroup by
appellant, the Board may select a single
claim from the group or subgroup and
may decide the appeal as to the ground
of rejection with respect to the group or
subgroup on the basis of the selected
claim alone. Notwithstanding any other
provision of this paragraph, the failure
of appellant to separately argue claims
which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any
argument that the Board must consider
the patentability of any grouped claim
separately. Under each heading
identifying the ground of rejection being
contested, any claim(s) argued
separately or as a subgroup shall be
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argued under a separate subheading that
identifies the claim(s) by number. A
statement which merely points out what
a claim recites will not be considered an
argument for separate patentability of
the claim.
(v) Claims appendix. An appendix
containing a copy of the claims involved
in the appeal.
(2) A brief shall not include any new
or non-admitted amendment, or any
new or non-admitted affidavit or other
Evidence. See § 1.116 of this title for
treatment of amendments, affidavits or
other evidence filed after final action
but before or on the same date of filing
an appeal and § 41.33 for treatment of
amendments, affidavits or other
Evidence filed after the date of filing the
appeal. Review of an examiner’s refusal
to admit an amendment or Evidence is
by petition to the Director. See § 1.181
of this title.
(d) Notice of non-compliance. * * *
If appellant does not, within the set time
period, file an amended brief that
overcomes all the reasons for noncompliance stated in the notification,
the appeal will stand dismissed. Review
of a determination of non-compliance is
by petition to the Chief Administrative
Patent Judge. See § 41.3.
(e) Extensions of time. * * *
■ 10. Amend § 41.39 by revising
paragraph (a); adding a heading to
paragraph (b) introductory text; revising
the first two sentences of paragraph
(b)(1); revising the second, third, and
fourth sentences of paragraph (b)(2); and
adding a heading to paragraph (c) to
read as follows:
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§ 41.39
Examiner’s answer.
(a) Content of examiner’s answer. The
primary examiner may, within such
time as may be directed by the Director,
furnish a written answer to the appeal
brief.
(1) An examiner’s answer is deemed
to incorporate all of the grounds of
rejection set forth in the Office action
from which the appeal is taken (as
modified by any advisory action and
pre-appeal brief conference decision),
unless the examiner’s answer expressly
indicates that a ground of rejection has
been withdrawn.
(2) An examiner’s answer may
include a new ground of rejection. For
purposes of the examiner’s answer, any
rejection that relies upon any Evidence
not relied upon in the Office action from
which the appeal is taken (as modified
by any advisory action) shall be
designated by the primary examiner as
a new ground of rejection. The examiner
must obtain the approval of the Director
to furnish an answer that includes a
new ground of rejection.
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(b) Appellant’s response to new
ground of rejection. * * *
(1) * * * Request that prosecution be
reopened before the primary examiner
by filing a reply under § 1.111 of this
title with or without amendment or
submission of affidavits (§§ 1.130, 1.131
or 1.132 of this of this title) or other
Evidence. Any amendment or
submission of affidavits or other
Evidence must be relevant to the new
ground of rejection. * * *
(2) * * * Such a reply brief must
address as set forth in § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)
each new ground of rejection and
should follow the other requirements of
a brief as set forth in § 41.37(c). A reply
brief may not be accompanied by any
amendment, affidavit (§§ 1.130, 1.131 or
1.132 of this of this title) or other
Evidence. If a reply brief filed pursuant
to this section is accompanied by any
amendment, affidavit or other Evidence,
it shall be treated as a request that
prosecution be reopened before the
primary examiner under paragraph
(b)(1) of this section.
(c) Extensions of time. * * *
■ 11. Add § 41.40 to read as follows:
§ 41.40
brief.
Tolling of time period to file a reply
(a) Timing. Any request to seek review
of the primary examiner’s failure to
designate a rejection as a new ground of
rejection in an examiner’s answer must
be by way of a petition to the Director
under § 1.181 of this title filed within
two months from the entry of the
examiner’s answer and before the filing
of any reply brief. Failure of appellant
to timely file such a petition will
constitute a waiver of any arguments
that a rejection must be designated as a
new ground of rejection.
(b) Petition granted and prosecution
reopened. A decision granting a petition
under § 1.181 to designate a new ground
of rejection in an examiner’s answer
will provide a two-month time period in
which appellant must file a reply under
§ 1.111 of this title to reopen the
prosecution before the primary
examiner. On failure to timely file a
reply under § 1.111, the appeal will
stand dismissed.
(c) Petition not granted and appeal
maintained. A decision refusing to grant
a petition under § 1.181 of this title to
designate a new ground of rejection in
an examiner’s answer will provide a
two-month time period in which
appellant may file only a single reply
brief under § 41.41.
(d) Withdrawal of petition and appeal
maintained. If a reply brief under
§ 41.41 is filed within two months from
the date of the examiner’s answer and
on or after the filing of a petition under
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§ 1.181 to designate a new ground of
rejection in an examiner’s answer, but
before a decision on the petition, the
reply brief will be treated as a request
to withdraw the petition and to
maintain the appeal.
(e) Extensions of time. Extensions of
time under § 1.136(a) of this title for
patent applications are not applicable to
the time period set forth in this section.
See § 1.136(b) of this title for extensions
of time to reply for patent applications
and § 1.550(c) of this title for extensions
of time to reply for ex parte
reexamination proceedings.
■ 12. Amend § 41.41 by revising
paragraph (a) and paragraph (b), and
adding a heading to paragraph (c) to
read as follows:
§ 41.41
Reply brief.
(a) Timing. Appellant may file only a
single reply brief to an examiner’s
answer within the later of two months
from the date of either the examiner’s
answer, or a decision refusing to grant
a petition under § 1.181 of this title to
designate a new ground of rejection in
an examiner’s answer.
(b) Content. (1) A reply brief shall not
include any new or non-admitted
amendment, or any new or nonadmitted affidavit or other Evidence.
See § 1.116 of this title for amendments,
affidavits or other evidence filed after
final action but before or on the same
date of filing an appeal and § 41.33 for
amendments, affidavits or other
Evidence filed after the date of filing the
appeal.
(2) Any argument raised in the reply
brief which was not raised in the appeal
brief, or is not responsive to an
argument raised in the examiner’s
answer, including any designated new
ground of rejection, will not be
considered by the Board for purposes of
the present appeal, unless good cause is
shown.
(c) Extensions of time. * * *
§ 41.43
[Removed]
13. Remove § 41.43.
14. Amend § 41.47 by revising
paragraph (b) and by revising the second
and third sentences of paragraph (e)(1)
to read as follows:
■
■
§ 41.47
Oral hearing.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) If appellant desires an oral
hearing, appellant must file, as a
separate paper captioned ‘‘REQUEST
FOR ORAL HEARING,’’ a written
request for such hearing accompanied
by the fee set forth in § 41.20(b)(3)
within two months from the date of the
examiner’s answer or on the date of
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filing of a reply brief, whichever is
earlier.
*
*
*
*
*
(e)(1) * * * At the oral hearing,
appellant may only rely on Evidence
that has been previously entered and
considered by the primary examiner and
present argument that has been relied
upon in the brief or reply brief except
as permitted by paragraph (e)(2) of this
section. The primary examiner may only
rely on argument and Evidence relied
upon in an answer except as permitted
by paragraph (e)(2) of this section.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 15. Revise § 41.50 to read as follows:
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§ 41.50
Board.
Decisions and other actions by the
(a)(1) Affirmance and reversal. The
Board, in its decision, may affirm or
reverse the decision of the examiner in
whole or in part on the grounds and on
the claims specified by the examiner.
The affirmance of the rejection of a
claim on any of the grounds specified
constitutes a general affirmance of the
decision of the examiner on that claim,
except as to any ground specifically
reversed. The Board may also remand
an application to the examiner.
(2) If a substitute examiner’s answer is
written in response to a remand by the
Board for further consideration of a
rejection pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of
this section, the appellant must within
two months from the date of the
substitute examiner’s answer exercise
one of the following two options to
avoid sua sponte dismissal of the appeal
as to the claims subject to the rejection
for which the Board has remanded the
proceeding:
(i) Reopen prosecution. Request that
prosecution be reopened before the
examiner by filing a reply under § 1.111
of this title with or without amendment
or submission of affidavits (§§ 1.130,
1.131 or 1.132 of this title) or other
Evidence. Any amendment or
submission of affidavits or other
Evidence must be relevant to the issues
set forth in the remand or raised in the
substitute examiner’s answer. A request
that complies with this paragraph (a)
will be entered and the application or
the patent under ex parte reexamination
will be reconsidered by the examiner
under the provisions of § 1.112 of this
title. Any request that prosecution be
reopened under this paragraph will be
treated as a request to withdraw the
appeal.
(ii) Maintain appeal. Request that the
appeal be maintained by filing a reply
brief as provided in § 41.41. If such a
reply brief is accompanied by any
amendment, affidavit or other Evidence,
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it shall be treated as a request that
prosecution be reopened before the
examiner under paragraph (a)(2)(i) of
this section.
(b) New ground of rejection. Should
the Board have knowledge of any
grounds not involved in the appeal for
rejecting any pending claim, it may
include in its opinion a statement to
that effect with its reasons for so
holding, and designate such a statement
as a new ground of rejection of the
claim. A new ground of rejection
pursuant to this paragraph shall not be
considered final for judicial review.
When the Board enters such a non-final
decision, the appellant, within two
months from the date of the decision,
must exercise one of the following two
options with respect to the new ground
of rejection to avoid termination of the
appeal as to the rejected claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an
appropriate amendment of the claims so
rejected or new Evidence relating to the
claims so rejected, or both, and have the
matter reconsidered by the examiner, in
which event the prosecution will be
remanded to the examiner. The new
ground of rejection is binding upon the
examiner unless an amendment or new
Evidence not previously of Record is
made which, in the opinion of the
examiner, overcomes the new ground of
rejection designated in the decision.
Should the examiner reject the claims,
appellant may again appeal to the Board
pursuant to this subpart.
(2) Request rehearing. Request that
the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52
by the Board upon the same Record. The
request for rehearing must address any
new ground of rejection and state with
particularity the points believed to have
been misapprehended or overlooked in
entering the new ground of rejection
and also state all other grounds upon
which rehearing is sought.
(c) Review of undesignated new
ground of rejection. Any request to seek
review of a panel’s failure to designate
a new ground of rejection in its decision
must be raised by filing a request for
rehearing as set forth in § 41.52. Failure
of appellant to timely file such a request
for rehearing will constitute a waiver of
any arguments that a decision contains
an undesignated new ground of
rejection.
(d) Request for briefing and
information. The Board may order
appellant to additionally brief any
matter that the Board considers to be of
assistance in reaching a reasoned
decision on the pending appeal.
Appellant will be given a time period
within which to respond to such an
order. Failure to timely comply with the
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order may result in the sua sponte
dismissal of the appeal.
(e) Remand not final action.
Whenever a decision of the Board
includes a remand, that decision shall
not be considered final for judicial
review. When appropriate, upon
conclusion of proceedings on remand
before the examiner, the Board may
enter an order otherwise making its
decision final for judicial review.
(f) Extensions of time. Extensions of
time under § 1.136(a) of this title for
patent applications are not applicable to
the time periods set forth in this section.
See § 1.136(b) of this title for extensions
of time to reply for patent applications
and § 1.550(c) of this title for extensions
of time to reply for ex parte
reexamination proceedings.
16. Amend § 41.52 by revising the
fourth sentence of paragraph (a)(1),
revising paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3), and
adding paragraph (a)(4) to read as
follows:
■
§ 41.52
Rehearing.
(a)(1) * * * Arguments not raised,
and Evidence not previously relied
upon, pursuant to §§ 41.37, 41.41, or
41.47 are not permitted in the request
for rehearing except as permitted by
paragraphs (a)(2) through (a)(4) of this
section. * * *
(2) Appellant may present a new
argument based upon a recent relevant
decision of either the Board or a Federal
Court.
(3) New arguments responding to a
new ground of rejection designated
pursuant to § 41.50(b) are permitted.
(4) New arguments that the Board’s
decision contains an undesignated new
ground of rejection are permitted.
*
*
*
*
*
■
17. Revise § 41.54 to read as follows:
§ 41.54
Action following decision.
After decision by the Board,
jurisdiction over an application or
patent under ex parte reexamination
proceeding passes to the examiner,
subject to appellant’s right of appeal or
other review, for such further action by
appellant or by the examiner, as the
condition of the application or patent
under ex parte reexamination
proceeding may require, to carry into
effect the decision.
Dated: November 8, 2011.
David J. Kappos,
Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual
Property and Director of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office.
[FR Doc. 2011–29446 Filed 11–21–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–16–P
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[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 225 (Tuesday, November 22, 2011)]
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[FR Doc No: 2011-29446]
[[Page 72269]]
Vol. 76
Tuesday,
No. 225
November 22, 2011
Part III
United States Patent and Trademark Office
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in Ex Parte Appeals; Final Rule
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Rules and Regulations
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
37 CFR Parts 1 and 41
[No. PTO-P-2009-0021]
RIN 0651-AC37
Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences in Ex Parte Appeals
AGENCY: United States Patent and Trademark Office, Commerce.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or
Office) amends the rules governing practice before the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (Board or BPAI) in ex parte patent appeals.
The Office amends the rules to: Remove several of the briefing
requirements for an appeal brief, provide for the Board to take
jurisdiction over the appeal earlier in the appeal process, no longer
require examiners to acknowledge receipt of reply briefs, create
specified procedures under which an appellant can seek review of an
undesignated new ground of rejection in either an examiner's answer or
in a Board decision, provide that the Board will presume that the
appeal is taken from the rejection of all claims under rejection unless
cancelled by an applicant's amendment, and clarify that, for purposes
of the examiner's answer, any rejection that relies upon Evidence not
relied upon in the Office action from which the appeal is taken shall
be designated as a new ground of rejection. The Office also withdraws a
previously published final rule that never went into effect.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule is effective on January 23, 2012
except withdrawal of the final rule published June 10, 2008 (73 FR
32938) and delayed indefinitely on December 10, 2008 (73 FR 74972) is
effective November 22, 2011.
Applicability Date: This rule is applicable to all appeals in which
a notice of appeal is filed on or after January 23, 2012.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Linda Horner, Administrative Patent
Judge, Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, by telephone at (571)
272-9797, or by mail addressed to: Mail Stop Interference, Director of
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, P.O. Box 1450,
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450, marked to the attention of Linda Horner.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On July 30, 2007, the Office published a notice of proposed
rulemaking governing practice before the Board in ex parte patent
appeals (72 FR 41472 (July 30, 2007)). The notice was also published in
the Official Gazette. 1321 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 95 (Aug. 21, 2007).
The public was invited to submit written comments. Comments were to be
received on or before September 28, 2007.
On June 10, 2008, a final rulemaking was then published in the
Federal Register (73 FR 32938 (June 10, 2008)). This final rule stated
that the effective and applicability date was December 10, 2008. On
June 9, 2008, the Office published a 60-day Federal Register notice (73
FR 32559 (June 9, 2008)) requesting the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) establish a new information collection for BPAI items in the
final rule and requesting public comment on the burden impact of the
final rule under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA).
On October 8, 2008, the Office published a 30-day Federal Register
notice (73 FR 58943 (Oct. 8, 2008)) stating that the proposal for the
collection of information under the final rule was being submitted to
OMB and requesting that comments on the proposed information collection
be submitted to OMB. Because the information collection process had not
been completed by the original effective and applicability date of the
final rule, the Office published a Federal Register notice (73 FR 74972
(Dec. 10, 2008)) notifying the public that the effective and
applicability date of the final rule was not December 10, 2008, and
that the effective and applicability date would be delayed until a
subsequent notice.
On January 20, 2009, the Assistant to the President and Chief of
Staff instructed agencies via a memorandum entitled, ``Regulatory
Review,'' (74 FR 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009)) to consider seeking comments for
an additional 30 days on rules that were published in the Federal
Register and had not yet become effective by January 20, 2009. On
January 21, 2009, the Office of Management and Budget issued a
memorandum entitled, ``Implementation of Memorandum Concerning
Regulatory Review,'' (available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/agencyinformation_memoranda_2009_pdf/m09-08.pdf) which provided agencies further guidance on such rules that had
not yet taken effect. For such rules, both memoranda stated that
agencies should consider reopening the rulemaking process to review any
significant concerns involving law or policy that have been raised.
On December 22, 2009, the Office published an Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) proposing further modifications to the
indefinitely delayed 2008 final rule and seeking public comment via a
public roundtable and written comment (74 FR 67987 (Dec. 22, 2009)).
In light of the comments received to these notices, the Office then
published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal
Register (75 FR 69828 (Nov. 15, 2010)), which proposed to rescind the
indefinitely delayed 2008 final rule and proposed new changes to the
rules of practice before the Board in ex parte appeals. The public was
invited to submit written comments. Comments were to be received on or
before January 14, 2011. Comments received on or before January 14,
2011, were considered.
The Office also considered three comments received after January
14, 2011. The Office now publishes this final rule taking into
consideration the comments received to the NPRM.
The Office received a comment offering an alternative rendition of
the procedural history of these rules and claiming that OMB rejected
the Office's original Information Collection Request. The Preamble of
the NPRM accurately reflects the history of this rule. Accordingly, no
changes have been made to the description of the procedural history in
the Preamble of the final rule. Furthermore, OMB approved the Office's
original Information Collection Request. See Notice of Office of
Management and Budget Action, ICR Ref. No. 200809-0651-003 (Dec. 22,
2009), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain hyperlink; then search
0651-0063; then follow ``Approved with change'' hyperlink. OMB has also
pre-approved the Information Collection Request associated with these
final rules. See Notice of Office of Management and Budget Action, ICR
Ref. No. 201010-0651-001 (Jan. 4, 2011), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain hyperlink; then search 0651-0063; then follow
``Preapproved'' hyperlink.
The Office received two comments suggesting that the Board already
implemented the delayed 2008 final rule (73 FR 32938 (June 10, 2008),
implementation of which was indefinitely delayed by 73 FR 74972 (Dec.
10, 2008)). This is not true. The Office has not implemented the
indefinitely delayed 2008 final rule.
One commenter suggested that the fact that the Board sometimes has
stated
[[Page 72271]]
that an appellant must ``map claims'' indicates the delayed 2008 final
rule is already in effect. Since 2004, the Office has used this
language to indicate that the appellant had not explained the subject
matter defined in each independent claim by reference to the
specification by page and line number, and to the drawing, if any, by
reference characters, as required by the 2004 regulations. The delayed
2008 regulations required annotation in addition to mapping. Those
regulations have not been implemented or enforced with respect to any
applicant. Another commenter suggested that the indefinitely delayed
2008 regulations must be in effect because the 2004 regulations
permitted applicants to raise arguments in either the appeal brief or
reply brief. This is an incorrect reading of the 2004 regulations. The
inability to raise new arguments in a reply brief is inherent in the
nature of a reply brief; it must reply to either an argument or
response in an answer or the failure to include a response in an
answer. The indefinitely delayed 2008 regulations made this requirement
clearer, but it has always been a requirement.
The Board rules as published in 37 CFR 41.1-41.81 (2010) will
remain in effect until the changes set forth in the instant final rule
take effect on the effective date. The Office also withdraws the
indefinitely delayed 2008 final rule (73 FR 32938 (June 10, 2008)) that
never went into effect. Therefore, any appeal brief filed in an
application or ex parte reexamination proceeding in which a notice of
appeal is filed on or after the instant effective date must be filed in
compliance with final Bd.R. 41.37 set forth in this final rule.
Purposes for the Rule Changes
One purpose of this final rule is to ensure that the Board has
adequate information to decide ex parte appeals on the merits, while
not unduly burdening appellants or examiners with unnecessary briefing
requirements. In particular, the goal of this final rule is to effect
an overall lessening of the burden on appellants and examiners to
present an appeal to the Board. For example, statements of the status
of claims, the status of amendments, and the grounds of rejection to be
reviewed on appeal are no longer required in the appeal brief (final
Bd.R. 41.37) or in the examiner's answer. Similarly, the final rule no
longer requires appellants to file an evidence appendix or a related
proceedings appendix (final Bd.R. 41.37). Because much of this
information is already available in the Image File Wrapper, it is
unnecessary for appellants or examiners to provide this information to
the Board. Moreover, by eliminating these briefing requirements, the
Office expects to reduce the number of non-compliant appeal briefs and
the number of examiner's answers returned to the examiner due to non-
compliance, which are a significant cause of delays on appeal. See
USPTO, Top Eight Reasons Appeal Briefs are Non-Compliant, https://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/procedures/top_8_reasons_appeal_brf_
dec09.pdf.
Another purpose of this final rule is to eliminate any gap in time
from the end of briefing to the commencement of the Board's
jurisdiction. For example, under the final rule, the Board takes
jurisdiction upon the earlier of the filing of a reply brief or the
expiration of the time in which to file a reply brief (final Bd.R.
41.35(a)). Examiners are no longer required to acknowledge receipt of
the reply brief (Bd.R. 41.43 [removed]).
The final rule is also intended to clarify and simplify petitions
practice on appeal. For example, except under limited circumstances,
any information disclosure statement or petition filed while the Board
possesses jurisdiction over the proceeding will be held in abeyance
until the Board's jurisdiction ends (final Bd.R. 41.35(d)). Also, in
response to public comments, and based on a comprehensive survey of
case law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (Federal Circuit) and United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA), the Office will provide improved guidance in the Manual
of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), discussed infra, as to what
constitutes a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer. The
final rule explicitly sets forth the procedure under which an appellant
can seek review of the Office's failure to designate a new ground of
rejection in either an examiner's answer (final Bd.R. 41.40) or in a
Board decision (final Bd.R. 41.50(c)).
Another purpose of this final rule is to reduce confusion as to
which claims are on appeal. For example, under the final rule, the
Board will presume that the appeal is taken from the rejection of all
claims under rejection unless cancelled by an applicant's amendment
(final Bd.R. 41.31(c)). This rule simplifies practice for appellants
who seek review of all claims under rejection--the majority of
appellants--by obviating the need to enumerate the rejected claims that
are being appealed. Under the previous practice, if an appellant
incorrectly listed the claims on appeal, or was silent in the brief as
to some of the claims under rejection, then the Office assumed that
such claims were not on appeal, and noted that those non-appealed
claims should be cancelled by the examiner. Ex parte Ghuman, 88 USPQ2d
1478, 2008 WL 2109842 (BPAI 2008) (precedential) (holding that when
appellant does not appeal some of the claims under rejection and does
not challenge the Examiner's rejection of these claims, the Board will
treat these claims as withdrawn from the appeal, which operates as an
authorization for the Examiner to cancel those claims from the
application). This final rule avoids the unintended cancellation of
claims by the Office due to appellant's mistake in the listing of the
claims in either the notice of appeal or in the appeal brief. This
final rule replaces the Office's procedure under Ghuman and also
simplifies practice for examiners by no longer requiring examiners to
cancel non-appealed claims.
The Supplementary Information in this notice provides: (1) An
explanation of the final rule, (2) a discussion of the differences
between the final rule and the proposed rule, (3) a discussion of the
comments received to the NPRM, (4) a discussion of rule making
considerations and comments received regarding the discussion of rule
making considerations in the NPRM and (5) a copy of the amended
regulatory text.
Rules in 37 CFR part 1 are denominated as ``Rule x'' in this
supplementary information. A reference to Rule 1.136(a) is a reference
to 37 CFR 1.136(a) (2010).
Rules in 37 CFR part 11 are denominated as ``Rule x'' in this
supplementary information. A reference to Rule 11.18(a) is a reference
to 37 CFR 11.18(a) (2010).
Rules in 37 CFR part 41 are denominated as ``Bd.R. x'' in this
supplementary information. For example, a reference to Bd.R. 41.3 is a
reference to 37 CFR 41.3 (2010) (as first published in 69 FR 50003
(August 12, 2004)).
Changes proposed in the NPRM are denominated as ``proposed Bd.R.
x'' in this supplementary information. A reference to ``proposed Bd.R.
41.30'' is a reference to the proposed rule as set forth in 75 FR
69828, 69846 (Nov. 15, 2010).
Final rules are denominated as ``final Bd.R. x'' in this
supplementary information. A reference to final Bd.R. x is a reference
to the rule that will take effect on the effective date of this final
rule.
The Board has jurisdiction to consider and decide ex parte appeals
in patent applications (including reissue, design and plant patent
applications) and ex parte reexamination proceedings.
[[Page 72272]]
The final rule does not change any of the rules relating to inter
partes reexamination appeals. Nor does the final rule change any of the
rules relating to contested cases.
For purposes of the NPRM, some paragraphs that were proposed to be
deleted were shown as ``reserved.'' These ``reserved'' paragraphs have
been deleted entirely in the final rule, and the remaining paragraphs
in each section have been renumbered, as appropriate.
Explanation of the Final Rule
The notable changes to the rules are: (1) The Board will presume
that an appeal is taken from the rejection of all claims under
rejection unless cancelled by an amendment filed by appellant (final
Bd.R. 41.31(c)); (2) the Board will take jurisdiction upon the filing
of a reply brief or the expiration of time in which to file such a
reply brief, whichever is earlier (final Bd.R. 41.35(a)); (3) the
requirements to include statements of the status of claims, status of
amendments, and grounds of rejection to be reviewed on appeal and the
requirements to include an evidence appendix and a related proceedings
appendix are eliminated from the appeal brief (final Bd.R. 41.37(c));
(4) the Board may apply default assumptions if a brief omits a
statement of the real party-in-interest or a statement of related cases
(final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(i) and (ii)); (5) for purposes of the
examiner's answer, any rejection that relies upon Evidence not relied
upon in the Office action from which the appeal is taken (as modified
by any advisory action) shall be designated as a new ground of
rejection (final Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2)); (6) an appellant can await a
decision on a petition seeking review of an examiner's failure to
designate a rejection in the answer as a new ground of rejection prior
to filing a reply brief (final Bd.R. 41.40) and thereby avoid having to
file a request for extension of time in which to file the reply brief;
and (7) the examiner's response to a reply brief is eliminated (final
Bd.R. 41.43 [removed]). A more detailed discussion of the final rule
follows.
Further information relevant to particular rules appears in the
analysis of comments portion of this final rule.
Part 1
Termination of Proceedings
Final Rule 1.197 revises the title of this section and deletes
paragraph (a), the provision that sets forth when jurisdiction passes
from the Board to the examiner after a decision has been issued by the
Board. The operative language of this paragraph has been incorporated
into final Bd.R. 41.54, except that ``transmittal of the file'' has
been omitted. Most patent application files are electronic files (Image
File Wrapper files), not paper files. Accordingly, a paper file is no
longer ``transmitted'' to the examiner. The changes to final Rule 1.197
and final Bd.R. 41.54 are intended to more accurately reflect the fact
that files are handled electronically within the Office, and do not
imply that there would be a change in the practice for passing
jurisdiction back to the examiner after decision by the Board--the
process remains the same under the final rule.
Part 41
Authority
The listing of authority for Part 41 is revised to add references
to 35 U.S.C. 132, 133, 306, and 315. Section 132 states that the
Director shall prescribe regulations to provide for the continued
examination of applications for patent at the request of the applicant.
Section 133 provides that upon failure of the applicant to prosecute
the application within six months after any action therein, the
application shall be regarded as abandoned. Section 306 establishes the
patent owner's right to appeal in an ex parte reexamination proceeding.
Section 315 establishes the right to appeal in an inter partes
reexamination proceeding.
Subpart A
Citation of Authority
Bd.R. 41.12 is amended by deleting the following requirements: (1)
To cite to particular case law reporters, and (2) to include parallel
citations to multiple reporter systems. Because members of the Board
have access to both the West Reporter System and the United States
Patents Quarterly, it is unnecessary for appellants to cite to both
reporters. The rule indicates a Board preference, not a requirement,
for citations to certain reporters and for limited use of non-binding
authority. The requirement to include pinpoint citations, whenever a
specific holding or portion of an authority is invoked, is retained.
The final rule states that appellants should provide a copy of an
authority if the authority is not an authority of the Office and is not
reproduced in the United States Reports or the West Reporter System.
This provision is designed to ensure that a full record is before the
judges to allow an efficient and timely decision to be made on the
merits of the case. A BPAI precedential decision is binding on the
Board and is considered an ``authority of the Office'' and thus does
not fall within the ambit of final Bd.R. 41.12(d).
Subpart B
Definitions
Bd.R. 41.30 is amended to add a definition of ``Record'' so that,
when subsequent sections of Subpart B refer to the ``Record'', it is
clear what constitutes the official record on appeal. The final rule
states that the official record contains the items listed in the
content listing of the Image File Wrapper or the official file of the
Office if other than the Image File Wrapper, excluding any amendments,
Evidence, or other documents that were not entered. Because an
examiner's refusal to enter an amendment, Evidence, or other documents
is a petitionable matter that is not subject to review by the Board,
the exclusion of such un-entered documents from the definition of
``Record'' reflects the fact that the Board's review of patentability
determinations is properly based on the record of all entered documents
in the file. An information disclosure statement or petition that is
held in abeyance while the Board possesses jurisdiction over the
proceeding is not an entered document and therefore is excluded from
the definition of ``Record'' until such time as it is entered. The
definition of ``Record'' includes the items listed in the content
listing of the Image File Wrapper because, in some cases, physical
items that form part of the official file are not able to be scanned
into the Image File Wrapper and are maintained elsewhere, such as in an
artifact file. Some examples of such items include original drawings in
design patent applications and sequence listings. In such cases, the
Image File Wrapper will include an entry in the content listing that
points to this artifact file. The final rule further clarifies that in
the case of an issued patent being reissued or reexamined, the Record
further includes the Record of the patent being reissued or reexamined.
The Office further notes that all references listed on an Information
Disclosure Statement (i.e., PTO-Form PTO/SB/08a or 08b), which have
been indicated as having been considered by the examiner, or listed on
a PTO-Form 892 are included in the definition of Record even if each of
the so listed references does not separately appear in the content
listing of the Image File Wrapper.
Final Bd.R. 41.30 adopts the definition of ``Evidence'' from
Black's Law Dictionary to provide clarity regarding the use of that
term in Subpart B. Toward that end, final Bd.R. 41.30
[[Page 72273]]
makes clear that for the purposes of Subpart B, ``Evidence'' does not
encompass dictionaries. Excluding dictionaries from the definition of
``Evidence'' thus allows appellants to refer to dictionaries in their
briefs, which would otherwise be precluded under final Bd.R.
41.33(d)(2) (absent existence of one of the enumerated exceptions). It
further allows examiners to refer to dictionaries in the examiner's
answers without automatically rendering a rejection a new ground under
final Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2). Treating dictionaries in this manner is
consistent with Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent, which
contemplate that such materials may be consulted by tribunals ``at any
time.'' See, e.g., Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893) (citations
omitted) (admitting dictionaries to understand the ordinary meaning of
terms ``not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and
understanding of the court''); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (``[J]udges are free to consult
dictionaries and technical treatises at any time in order to better
understand the underlying technology and may also rely on dictionary
definitions when construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary
definition does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained
by a reading of the patent documents.'') (citation omitted); In re
Boon, 439 F.2d 724, 727-28 (CCPA 1971) (holding citation to dictionary
was not tantamount to the assertion of a new ground of rejection
``where such a reference is a standard work, cited only to support a
fact judicially noticed and, as here, the fact so noticed plays a minor
role, serving only to fill in the gaps which might exist in the
evidentiary showing made by the Examiner to support a particular ground
for rejection.'' (emphasis and internal quotations omitted)). Thus, the
Office feels it is logical to permit the applicant and examiner to
submit them to the Board during the briefing stage.
Appeal to the Board
Bd.R. 41.31(a) is amended to add preamble language to make clear
that an appeal to the Board is taken by filing a notice of appeal. This
change is not intended to change the current practice of the Office.
The Office continues to require appellants to file a notice of appeal
in order to appeal an adverse decision of the examiner to the Board.
Bd.R. 41.31(b) is amended to make clear that the signature
requirements of Rules 1.33 and 11.18(a) do not apply to the notice of
appeal. This change adds a reference to Rule 11.18(a) to avoid any
conflict between the rules of practice in ex parte appeals and the
rules governing practice by registered practitioners before the Office.
Bd.R. 41.31(c) is amended so that an appeal, when taken, is
presumed to seek review of all of the claims under rejection unless
claims are cancelled by an amendment filed by the applicant and entered
by the Office. This change obviates the need for the majority of
appellants who seek review of all claims under rejection to
affirmatively state (in the notice of appeal and/or in the status of
claims section of the appeal brief) which claims are on appeal. Rather,
under final Bd.R. 41.31(c), the Board presumes that an appellant
intends to appeal all claims under rejection except for those that have
been cancelled. This change avoids the unintended cancellation of
claims by the Office due to an appellant's mistake in the listing of
the claims in either the notice of appeal or in the appeal brief. Under
previous practice, if an appellant incorrectly listed the claims on
appeal, or was silent in the brief as to any of the claims under
rejection, then the Office often assumed that such claims were not on
appeal, and noted that those non-appealed claims should be cancelled by
the examiner. Ex parte Ghuman, 88 USPQ2d 1478, 2008 WL 2109842 (BPAI
2008) (precedential) (holding that when appellant does not appeal some
of the claims under rejection and does not challenge the Examiner's
rejection of these claims, the Board will treat these claims as
withdrawn from the appeal, which operates as an authorization for the
Examiner to cancel those claims from the application). The final rule
avoids potential unintended cancellation of claims due to oversight or
mistake by appellants in listing the claims on appeal. This final rule
replaces the Office's procedure under Ghuman and simplifies practice
for examiners by no longer requiring examiners to cancel non-appealed
claims. Any appellant who wishes to appeal fewer than all rejected
claims should file an amendment cancelling the non-appealed claims. If
an appellant does not file an amendment cancelling claims that the
appellant does not wish to appeal, but then also fails to provide any
argument in the appeal brief directed to those claims, then the Board
has discretion to simply affirm any rejections against such claims.
See, e.g., Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(appellant waives any argument about a ground of rejection that he or
she does not contest on appeal to the Board, and the Board may simply
affirm the rejection).
Amendments and Affidavits or Other Evidence After Appeal
The title of Bd.R. 41.33 is revised by replacing ``evidence'' with
``Evidence'' to refer to the definition added in final Bd.R. 41.30.
Bd.R. 41.33(c) is revised to delete the cross-reference to Bd.R.
41.50(c). As noted infra, Bd.R. 41.50(c) is amended so that it is no
longer applicable to final Bd.R. 41.33(c).
Bd.R. 41.33(d)(1) is revised to replace ``evidence'' with
``Evidence'' to refer to the definition added in final Bd.R. 41.30.
Bd.R. 41.33(d)(2) is revised to replace ``evidence'' with
``Evidence'' to refer to the definition added in final Bd.R. 41.30.
Bd.R. 41.33 is not substantively changed except as to submission of
dictionaries after the date of filing an appeal. Both Bd.R. 41.33 and
final Bd.R. 41.33 otherwise restrict the types of amendments and
evidence that can be filed after the date of filing an appeal. This
approach is designed to promote efficiency of the Board in its review
by ensuring that the Board has the benefit of the examiner's final
evaluation of the weight and sufficiency of any evidence relied upon by
appellants prior to the Board rendering a decision on appeal.
Jurisdiction Over Appeal
Bd.R. 41.35(a) is amended to add a heading and to provide that
jurisdiction over the appeal passes to the Board upon the filing of a
reply brief or the expiration of the time in which to file such a reply
brief, whichever is earlier. This change is necessary because Bd.R.
41.35(a) provides that the Board acquires jurisdiction upon transmittal
of the file to the Board. The large majority of patent application
files are electronic files (Image File Wrapper files), not paper files.
Accordingly, in most cases a paper file is no longer ``transmitted'' to
the Board.
The Board intends to continue sending a docket notice as a courtesy
to appellants to indicate that the Board has assigned an appeal number
to the appeal. By having the Board's jurisdiction commence immediately
upon the filing of a reply brief or the expiration of the time in which
to file such a reply brief, the Board must take no affirmative steps
prior to assuming jurisdiction and no gap in time will exist from the
end of the briefing to the commencement of jurisdiction by the Board.
Bd.R. 41.35(b) is amended by moving some text to final Bd.R.
41.35(e), adding a new paragraph, and by adding new text to make clear
when the Board's
[[Page 72274]]
jurisdiction ends so that no gaps in time exist between the end of the
Board's jurisdiction and further action by the examiner.
Bd.R. 41.35(c) is amended to add a heading and a cross-reference to
a relevant section of the rule.
Final Bd.R. 41.35(d) is added to provide that, except for petitions
authorized by part 41 of this title, the Board will not return or
remand an application for consideration of an information disclosure
statement or a petition filed while the Board possesses jurisdiction,
and that consideration of such filings will be held in abeyance until
the Board's jurisdiction ends. The Board's jurisdiction begins upon the
filing of the reply brief or upon the expiration of the time for filing
a reply brief. Therefore, under both Bd.R. 41.33(d)(2) and final Bd.R.
41.33(d)(2), the filing of an information disclosure statement during
the Board's jurisdiction constitutes the introduction of untimely
Evidence before the Board. Similarly, because Rule 1.181 provides that
petitions must be filed within two months of the mailing date of the
action or notice from which relief is requested, and because the
Board's jurisdiction begins up to two months after the mailing date of
the examiner's answer (assuming no petition under Rule 1.181 is filed),
it follows that all petitions relating to the examination phase of the
application or reexamination proceeding ought to be filed prior to the
time the Board takes jurisdiction. It is in the interest of compact
prosecution that the Office not delay a decision on appeal for
consideration of untimely Evidence and petitions. Final Bd.R. 41.35(d)
excludes ``petitions authorized by this part.'' For example, petitions
authorized by part 41 include petitions under Bd.R. 41.3 to the Chief
Administrative Patent Judge.
Final Bd.R. 41.35(e) is added with a new heading and it contains
the text previously in Bd.R. 41.35(b). This provision gives the Board
the authority to return an appeal to the examiner if the Board deems
that a file is not complete or is not in compliance with the
requirements of Subpart B.
Appeal Brief--Timing and Fee; and Failure to File a Brief
Bd.R. 41.37(a) and (b) are amended by adding new headings.
Appeal Brief--Content of Appeal Brief--Preamble
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1) is amended to add a heading, and to add the
introductory phrase ``Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph''
to clarify that several of the content requirements listed in paragraph
(c)(1) contain exceptions that may result in an appeal brief containing
fewer than all items listed in paragraph (c)(1). Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1) is
further amended to correct the cross-references in light of further
changes to this section, discussed infra.
Appeal Brief--Content of Appeal Brief--Real Party in Interest
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(i) is amended to provide that the statement
identifying the real party in interest should be accurate as of the
date of filing of the appeal brief. Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(i) is also
amended to allow the Board to assume that, if the statement of real
party in interest is omitted from the appeal brief, then the named
inventors are the real party in interest. This final rule states that
the Office ``may'' make the assumption. Thus, the Office is not
required to make the assumption if it is aware of information to the
contrary. These changes are intended to decrease the burden on
appellants by allowing appellants to omit this statement if the named
inventors are the real party in interest. The purpose of this section
is to enable judges to determine whether they have a conflict of
interest with the real parties in the case and then to appropriately
recuse themselves if such a conflict of interest is found. The
information required in final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(i) is the minimum
information needed by the Board to effectively make this determination.
Appeal Brief--Content of Appeal Brief--Related Appeals and
Interferences
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(ii) is amended to limit the required disclosure
of related appeals, interferences and judicial proceedings
(collectively ``related cases'') to only those which: (1) Involve an
application or patent owned by the appellant or assignee, (2) are known
to appellant, the appellant's legal representative, or assignee, and
(3) may be related to, directly affect or be directly affected by, or
have a bearing on the Board's decision. Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(ii) is also
amended to allow appellants to omit the statement entirely if there are
no such related cases, and to provide a default assumption for the
Office in the event the statement is omitted, so that a statement that
there are ``no known related cases'' is not required and that fact
``may'' be inferred from the absence of a statement. The final rule
also no longer requires filing of copies of decisions in related cases.
Appeal Brief--Content of Appeal Brief--Status of Claims [Deleted]
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iii) is amended to delete the requirement for the
appeal brief to contain an indication of the status of claims.
Appeal Brief--Content of Appeal Brief--Status of Amendments [Deleted]
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv) is amended to delete the requirement for the
appeal brief to contain an indication of the status of amendments filed
subsequent to final rejection.
Appeal Brief--Content of Appeal Brief--Summary of Claimed Subject
Matter
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(v) is renumbered as final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iii)
and is further amended to require that appellants provide a concise
explanation of the subject matter defined in each of ``the rejected
independent claims'' rather than ``each of the independent claims
involved in the appeal.'' Similarly, final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iii) is
amended to further require that the concise explanation identify the
corresponding structure, material, or acts for each ``rejected
independent claim'' when the claim contains a means or step plus
function recitation as permitted by 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
Under final Bd.R. 41.31(c), discussed supra, the Board will presume
that all rejections made in the Office Action from which the appeal was
taken are before it on appeal, unless appellant cancels the claim(s)
subject to a particular rejection. Final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iii) also
maintains the requirement that the concise explanation identify the
corresponding structure, material, or acts for each dependent claim
argued separately when the claim contains a means or step plus function
recitation as permitted by 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.
Final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iii) is further amended to require that the
concise explanation refer to the specification ``in the Record'' by
page and line number ``or by paragraph number.'' The change
incorporates the definition of Record from final Bd.R. 41.30 and makes
clear that reference to the specification by paragraph number in lieu
of page and line number is permissible.
Additionally, final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iii) is amended to clarify
that reference to the pre-grant patent application publication is not
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the summary of claimed
subject matter.
Appeal Brief--Content of Appeal Brief--Grounds of Rejection to be
Reviewed on Appeal [Removed]
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(vi) which required appellants to provide a
statement of the grounds of rejection from the brief is removed. Under
final Bd.R. 41.31(c), discussed supra, the Board will
[[Page 72275]]
presume that all claims under rejection are before it on appeal, unless
applicant cancels the claim(s) subject to a particular rejection. Under
final Bd.R. 41.39(a)(1), discussed infra, the examiner's answer is
deemed to incorporate all of the grounds of rejection set forth in the
Office action from which the appeal is taken (as modified by any
advisory action and pre-appeal brief conference decision), unless the
answer expressly withdraws a ground of rejection. Moreover, under final
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv), discussed infra, the headings of the argument
section of the brief shall reasonably identify the ground of rejection
being contested. Therefore, it is unnecessary for the appeal brief to
contain a separate statement of the grounds of rejection on appeal.
Appeal Brief--Content of Appeal Brief--Argument
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(vii) is renumbered as final Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(iv). Subparagraph (vii) is deleted. Final Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(iv) is amended to clarify that the argument section should
specifically explain why the examiner erred as to each ground of
rejection contested by appellants. The final rule also provides that,
except as provided for in final Bd.R. 41.41, 41.47, and 41.52, any
arguments not included in the appeal brief will not be considered by
the Board ``for purposes of the present appeal.'' Additionally, final
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv) further requires that each ground of rejection
argued be set forth in a separate section with a heading that
reasonably identifies the ground being argued therein. Further, the
final rule requires that any claim(s) argued separately or as a
subgroup be placed under a separate subheading that identifies the
claim(s) by number.
The Board will treat as waived, for purposes of the present appeal,
any arguments not raised by appellant. See Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d
1307, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (the Board may treat arguments appellant
failed to make for a given ground of rejection as waived); In re Watts,
354 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (declining to consider the
appellant's new argument regarding the scope of a prior art patent when
that argument was not raised before the Board); and In re Schreiber,
128 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (declining to consider whether
prior art cited in an obviousness rejection was non-analogous art when
that argument was not raised before the Board).
The final rule permits the Board to refuse to consider arguments
not raised in the appeal brief, except as provided in final Bd.R.
41.41, 41.47, and 41.52. This language in the final rule is
substantially the same as in Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(vii), which states that
``[a]ny arguments or authorities not included in the brief or a reply
brief filed pursuant to Sec. 41.41 will be refused consideration by
the Board, unless good cause is shown.'' Final Bd.R. 41.41, 41.47, and
41.52 have provisions allowing certain new arguments in reply briefs,
at oral hearing, or in requests for rehearing which ensure that
appellants have a full and fair opportunity to be heard before the
Board. The final rule clarifies that the Board's right to refuse
consideration of arguments not raised is ``for purposes of the present
appeal'' so as to clarify that such right of refusal does not extend to
subsequent Board appeals in the same or related applications. See
Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(``[P]recedent has long supported the right of an applicant to file a
continuation application despite an unappealed adverse Board decision,
and to have that application examined on the merits. Where the Patent
Office has reconsidered its position on patentability in light of new
arguments or evidence submitted by the applicant, the Office is not
forbidden by principles of preclusion to allow previously rejected
claims.'' (internal citation omitted)).
Final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv) is also amended to clarify the proper
use of headings and to require the use of subheadings in order to
clearly set out the ground of rejection and the specific claims to
which each argument presented applies. These headings and subheadings
will make certain that arguments are not overlooked by the examiner or
the Board. The content requirements of this paragraph will not be
interpreted as requiring verbatim recitation of the ground being
contested and briefs will not be held non-compliant for minor
formatting issues.
Appeal Brief--Content of Appeal Brief--Claims Appendix
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(viii) is renumbered as final Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(v). Subparagraph (viii) is deleted. Final Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(v) is identical to Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(viii) and requires
appellants to include a claims appendix with the appeal brief
containing ``a copy of the claims involved in the appeal.'' Because
final Bd.R. 41.31(c) requires the Board to presume that all rejections
made in the Office Action from which the appeal was taken are before it
on appeal unless appellant cancels the claim(s) subject to a particular
rejection, the claims appendix must include all claims under rejection
in the Office action from which the appeal is taken unless cancelled by
an amendment filed by the applicant and entered by the Office.
Appeal Brief--Content of Appeal Brief--Evidence Appendix
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(ix), which required appellants to include an
evidence appendix with the brief, is deleted.
While it is no longer a requirement to include an evidence
appendix, the Office strongly encourages and appreciates receiving
copies of the evidence relied upon (e.g., copies of declarations and
affidavits, evidence of secondary considerations, etc.). This ensures
that the Board is considering the proper evidence and avoids any
confusion as to the particular evidence referenced in the appeal brief.
In the alternative, the Board recommends that appellants clearly
identify in the appeal brief the evidence relied upon using a clear
description of the evidence along with the date of entry of such
evidence into the Image File Wrapper.
Appeal Brief--Content of Appeal Brief--Related Proceedings Appendix
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(x), which required appellants to include a
related proceedings appendix with the brief, is deleted.
While it is no longer a requirement to include a related
proceedings appendix, the Office appreciates receiving copies of
decisions or relevant papers from related proceedings. This ensures
that the Board can efficiently consider the related proceedings
information. In the alternative, the Board recommends that appellants
clearly identify in the appeal brief any decisions or relevant
documents from related proceedings using a clear description of the
related proceeding, so that the Board can quickly and efficiently
obtain copies of any such relevant documents.
Appeal Brief--New or Non-Admitted Amendments or Evidence
Bd.R. 41.37(c)(2) is amended to add a sentence to make clear in the
rule the current Office procedure for review of an examiner's refusal
to admit an amendment or Evidence by petition to the Director under
Rule 1.181. Final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(2) further replaces instances of
``evidence'' with ``Evidence'' where appropriate to incorporate the
definition of ``Evidence'' provided in final Bd.R. 41.30.
Appeal Brief--Notice of Non-Compliance
Bd.R. 41.37(d) is amended to add a heading and to provide that
under the Office's new streamlined procedure for review of ex parte
appeal briefs for
[[Page 72276]]
compliance with the rule, review of a determination of non-compliant
appeal brief should be requested via a petition to the Chief
Administrative Patent Judge under Bd.R. 41.3.
Appeal Brief--Extensions of Time
Bd.R. 41.37(e) is amended to add a heading.
Examiner's Answer
Bd.R. 41.39(a) is amended to add a heading and preamble.
Bd.R. 41.39(a)(1) is amended to provide that the examiner's answer,
by default, incorporates all the grounds of rejection set forth in the
Office action which is the basis for the appeal, including any
modifications made via advisory action or pre-appeal brief conference
decision, except for any grounds of rejection indicated by the examiner
as withdrawn in the answer. Bd.R. 41.39(a)(1) is also amended to delete
the requirement that the answer include an explanation of the invention
claimed and of the grounds of rejection, since the Board will rely on
appellant's specification and summary of claimed subject matter for an
explanation of the invention claimed and will rely on the statement of
the rejection(s) in the Office action from which the appeal is taken,
as modified by advisory action or pre-appeal brief conference decision.
In light of the streamlined review of appeal briefs for compliance with
the rules, Bd.R. 41.39(a)(1) is further amended to delete the
requirement for the primary examiner to make any determination that an
appeal does not comply with the provisions of final Bd.R. 41.31 and
41.37.
Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2) is amended to provide that if a rejection set
forth in the answer relies on any Evidence not relied on in the Office
action from which the appeal is taken, then the rejection must be
designated as a new ground of rejection, and any answer that contains
such a new ground of rejection must be approved by the Director. The
Director may choose to delegate this authority as appropriate. Bd.R.
41.39(a)(2), as amended, refers to ``Evidence'' as defined in final
Bd.R. 41.30.
Bd.R. 41.39(b) is amended to add a heading.
Bd.R. 41.39(b)(1) is amended to replace instances of ``evidence''
with ``Evidence'' where appropriate to refer to ``Evidence'' as defined
in final Bd.R. 41.30.
Bd.R. 41.39(b)(2) is amended to move the phrase ``each new ground
of rejection'' to a different location in the sentence to increase the
clarity of the sentence. Bd.R. 41.39(b)(2) is also amended to replace
instances of ``evidence'' with ``Evidence'' where appropriate to refer
to ``Evidence'' as defined in final Bd.R. 41.30. Bd.R. 41.39(b)(2) is
further amended to replace the cross-reference to Bd.R.
41.37(c)(1)(vii) with a reference to final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv) in
light of the renumbering of paragraphs within final Bd.R. 41.37(c)(1).
Final Bd.R. 41.39(b)(1) and (b)(2) continue to provide appellants
the option to reopen prosecution or maintain the appeal by filing a
reply brief to respond to the new ground of rejection.
Bd.R. 41.39(c) is amended to add a heading.
Content requirements for the examiner's answer are not included in
the rule, because the Office needs to retain flexibility to add content
requirements as needed by revision of the MPEP. The Office plans to
continue to require that the examiner's answer contain a grounds of
rejection section that would set forth any rejections that have been
withdrawn and any new grounds of rejection, and the answer would
further be required to contain a response to the arguments section to
include any response the examiner has to arguments raised in the appeal
brief. See MPEP Sec. 1207.02. The answer would no longer be required
to restate the grounds of rejection being maintained. The Board would
instead rely on the statement of the grounds of rejection in the Office
action from which the appeal was taken (as modified by any subsequent
advisory action or pre-appeal brief conference decision).
The following discussion provides guidance to appellants and
examiners as to the Office's view of what constitutes a new ground of
rejection. This discussion is for the limited ``purposes of the
examiner's answer,'' as per final Bd.R. 41.39(a)(2). This discussion
does not apply to final rejections under Rule 1.113. The reason for
this distinction is that Rule 1.116 affords applicants the opportunity
to submit rebuttal evidence after a final rejection but before or on
the same date of filing a notice of appeal. An appellant's ability to
introduce new evidence after the filing of an appeal is more limited
under final Bd.R. 41.33(d) than it is prior to the appeal. Thus,
applicants are able to present rebuttal evidence in response to a final
rejection, while they are not permitted to do so in response to an
examiner's answer on appeal, unless an answer is designated as
containing a new ground of rejection.
If Evidence (such as a new prior art reference) is applied or cited
for the first time in an examiner's answer, then final Bd.R.
41.39(a)(2) requires that the rejection be designated as a new ground
of rejection. If the citation of a new prior art reference is necessary
to support a rejection, it must be included in the statement of
rejection, which would be considered to introduce a new ground of
rejection. Even if the prior art reference is cited to support the
rejection in a minor capacity, it should be positively included in the
statement of rejection and be designated as a new ground of rejection.
In re Hoch, 428 F.2d 1341, 1342 n.3 (CCPA 1970).
Relying on new Evidence, however, is not the only way to trigger a
new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer. A position or
rationale that changes the ``basic thrust of the rejection'' will give
rise to a new ground of rejection. In re Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1303
(CCPA 1976). However, the examiner need not use identical language in
both the examiner's answer and the Office action from which the appeal
is taken to avoid triggering a new ground of rejection. It is not a new
ground of rejection, for example, if the examiner's answer responds to
appellant's arguments using different language, or restates the
reasoning of the rejection in a different way, so long as the ``basic
thrust of the rejection'' is the same. In re Kronig, 539 F.2d at 1303;
see also In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(additional explanation responding to arguments offered for the first
time ``did not change the rejection'' and appellant had fair
opportunity to respond); In re Noznick, 391 F.2d 946, 949 (CCPA 1968)
(no new ground of rejection made when ``explaining to appellants why
their arguments were ineffective to overcome the rejection made by the
examiner''); In re Krammes, 314 F.2d 813, 817 (CCPA 1963) (``It is well
established that mere difference in form of expression of the reasons
for finding claims unpatentable or unobvious over the references does
not amount to reliance on a different ground of rejection.'' (citations
omitted)); In re Cowles, 156 F.2d 551, 1241 (CCPA 1946) (holding that
the use of ``different language'' does not necessarily trigger a new
ground of rejection).
The following examples are intended to provide guidance as to what
constitutes a new ground of rejection in an examiner's answer. What
constitutes a ``new ground of rejection'' is a highly fact-specific
question. See, e.g., Kronig, 539 F.2d at 1303 (finding new ground
entered based upon ``facts of this case'' and declining to find other
cases controlling given ``the distinctive facts at bar''); In re
Ahlert, 424 F.2d 1088, 1092 (CCPA 1970) (``[l]ooking at the facts of
this case, we are constrained to hold'' that a new ground was entered).
[[Page 72277]]
If a situation arises that does not fall neatly within any of the
following examples, it is recommended that the examiner identify the
example below that is most analogous to the situation at hand, keeping
in mind that ``the ultimate criterion of whether a rejection is
considered `new' * * * is whether appellants have had fair opportunity
to react to the thrust of the rejection.'' Kronig, 539 F.2d at 1302.
Factual Situations That Constitute a New Ground of Rejection
1. Changing the statutory basis of rejection from Sec. 102 to
Sec. 103. If the examiner's answer changes the statutory basis of the
rejection from Sec. 102 to Sec. 103, then the rejection should be
designated as a new ground of rejection. For example, in In re Hughes,
345 F.2d 184 (CCPA 1965), the Board affirmed an examiner's rejection
under Sec. 102 over a single reference. On appeal, the Solicitor
argued that the Board's decision should be sustained under Sec. 103
over that same reference. The court declined to sustain the rejection
under Sec. 103, holding that a change in the statutory basis of
rejection would constitute a new ground of rejection, and observed that
``the issues arising under the two sections [Sec. Sec. 102 and 103]
may be vastly different, and may call for the production and
introduction of quite different types of evidence.'' Hughes, 345 F.2d
at 186-87.
2. Changing the statutory basis of rejection from Sec. 103 to
Sec. 102, based on a different teaching. If the examiner's answer
changes the statutory basis of the rejection from Sec. 103 to Sec.
102, and relies on a different portion of a reference which goes beyond
the scope of the portion that was previously relied upon, then the
rejection should be designated as a new ground of rejection. For
example, in In re Echerd, 471 F.2d 632 (CCPA 1973), the examiner
rejected the claims under Sec. 103 over a combination of two
references. The Board then changed the ground of rejection to Sec. 102
over one of those references, relying on a different portion of that
reference for some claim limitations, and asserted that the remaining
claim limitations were inherently present in that reference. The court
held that the Board's affirmance constituted a new ground of rejection.
Echerd, 471 F.2d at 635 (``[A]ppellants should have been accorded an
opportunity to present rebuttal evidence as to the new assumptions of
inherent characteristics. * * *'' (citation omitted)).
3. Citing new calculations in support of overlapping ranges. If a
claim reciting a range is rejected as anticipated or obvious based on
prior art that falls within or overlaps with the claimed range (see
MPEP Sec. Sec. 2131.03 and 2144.05), and the rejection is based upon
range values calculated for the first time in the examiner's answer,
then the rejection should be designated as a new ground of rejection.
For example, in In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the
examiner rejected the claims under Sec. 103 based on overlapping
ranges of particle sizes and size distributions. The Board affirmed the
rejection, but included in its decision an appendix containing
calculations to support the prima facie case of obviousness. The court
held the Board's reliance upon those values to constitute a new ground
of rejection, stating that ``the Board found facts not found by the
examiner regarding the differences between the prior art and the
claimed invention, which in fairness required an opportunity for
response.'' Kumar, 418 F.3d at 1368 (citation omitted).
4. Citing new structure in support of structural obviousness. If,
in support of an obviousness rejection based on close structural
similarity (see MPEP Sec. 2144.09), the examiner's answer relies on a
different structure than the one on which the examiner previously
relied, then the rejection should be designated as a new ground of
rejection. For example, in In re Wiechert, 370 F.2d 927 (CCPA 1967),
the examiner rejected claims to a chemical composition under Sec. 103
based on the composition's structural similarity to a prior art
compound disclosed in a reference. The Board affirmed the rejection
under Sec. 103 over that same reference, but did so based on a
different compound than the one the examiner cited. The court held that
the Board's decision constituted a new ground of rejection, stating,
``Under such circumstances, we conclude that when a rejection is
factually based on an entirely different portion of an existing
reference the appellant should be afforded an opportunity to make a
showing of unobviousness vis-a-vis such portion of the reference.''
Wiechert, 370 F.2d at 933.
5. Pointing to a different portion of the claim to maintain a ``new
matter'' rejection. If, in support of a claim rejection under 35 U.S.C.
112, first paragraph, based on new matter (see MPEP Sec. 2163.06), a
different feature or aspect of the rejected claim is believed to
constitute new matter, then the rejection should be designated as a new
ground of rejection. For example, in In re Waymouth, 486 F.2d 1058
(CCPA 1973), the claims included the limitation ``said sodium iodide *
* * present in amount of at least 0.17 mg./cc. of said arc tube
volume.'' The examiner's rejection stated that the claimed ``sodium
iodide'' constituted new matter because the specification was alleged
only to disclose ``sodium.'' The Board affirmed the rejection, but did
so on a ``wholly different basis,'' namely, that the specification
failed to disclose the claimed ``0.17 mg./cc.'' volume limitation.
Waymouth, 486 F.2d at 1060. The court held that the Board's rationale
constituted a new ground of rejection, ``necessitating different
responses by appellants.'' Id. at 1061.
Factual Situations That Do Not Constitute a New Ground of Rejection
1. Citing a different portion of a reference to elaborate upon that
which has been cited previously. If the examiner's answer cites a
different portion of an applied reference which goes no farther than,
and merely elaborates upon, what is taught in the previously cited
portion of that reference, then the rejection does not constitute a new
ground of rejection. For example, in In re DBC, 545 F.3d 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), the examiner rejected the claims under Sec. 103 over a
combination of references, including the English translation of the
abstract for a Japanese patent. The examiner cited the English abstract
for two claim limitations: (1) Mangosteen rind, and (2) fruit or
vegetable juice. The Board affirmed the rejection under Sec. 103 over
the same references, but instead of citing the abstract, the Board
cited an Example on page 16 of the English translation of the Japanese
reference, which was not before the examiner. DBC, 545 F.3d at 1381.
Importantly, the Board cited the Example for the same two claim
limitations taught in the abstract, and the Example merely elaborated
upon the medicinal qualities of the mangosteen rind (which medicinal
qualities were not claimed) and taught orange juice as the preferred
fruit juice (while the claim merely recited fruit or vegetable juice).
Hence, the Example merely provided a more specific disclosure of the
same two generic limitations that were fully taught by the abstract.
The court held that this did not constitute a new ground of rejection
because ``the example in the translation goes no farther than, and
merely elaborates upon, what is taught by the abstract.'' DBC, 545 F.3d
at 1382 n.5.
2. Changing the statutory basis of rejection from Sec. 103 to
Sec. 102, but relying on the same teachings. If the examiner's answer
changes the statutory basis of the rejection from Sec. 103 to Sec.
102, and relies on the same teachings of the remaining reference to
support the Sec. 102 rejection, then the rejection does not
[[Page 72278]]
constitute a new ground of rejection. For example, in In re May, 574
F.2d 1082 (CCPA 1978), a claim directed to a genus of chemical
compounds was rejected under Sec. 103 over a combination of
references. The primary reference disclosed a species that fell within
the claimed genus. Both the examiner and the Board cited the species to
reject the claim under Sec. 103. The court affirmed the rejection, but
did so under Sec. 102, stating that ``lack of novelty is the epitome
of obviousness.'' May, 574 F.2d at 1089 (citing In re Pearson, 494 F.2d
1399, 1402 (CCPA 1974)). Because the court relied on the same prior art
species as both the examiner and Board, the court held that this did
not constitute a new ground of rejection. May, 574 F.2d at 1089.
3. Relying on fewer than all references in support of a Sec. 103
rejection, but relying on the same teachings. If the examiner's answer
removes one or more references from the statement of rejection under
Sec. 103, and relies on the same teachings of the remaining references
to support the Sec. 103 rejection, then the rejection does not
constitute a new ground of rejection. For example, in In re Kronig, 539
F.2d 1300, 1302 (CCPA 1976), the examiner rejected the claims under
Sec. 103 over four references. The Board affirmed the rejection under
Sec. 103, but limited its discussion to three of the references
applied by the examiner. Id. The Board relied upon the references for
the same teachings as did the examiner. The court held that this did
not constitute a new ground of rejection. Kronig, 539 F.2d at 1303
(``Having compared the rationale of the rejection advanced by the
examiner and the board on this record, we are convinced that the basic
thrust of the rejection at the examiner and board level was the
same.''). See also In re Bush, 296 F.2d 491, 495-96 (CCPA 1961)
(Examiner rejected claims 28 and 29 under Sec. 103 based upon
``Whitney in view of Harth;'' Board did not enter new ground of
rejection by relying only on Whitney).
4. Changing the order of references in the statement of rejection,
but relying on the same teachings of those references. If the
examiner's answer changes the order of references in the statement of
rejection under Sec. 103, and relies on the same teachings of those
references to support the Sec. 103 rejection, then the rejection does
not constitute a new ground of rejection. For example, in In re Cowles,
156 F.2d 551, 552 (CCPA 1946), the examiner rejected the claims under
Sec. 103 over ``Foret in view of either Preleuthner or Seyfried.'' The
Board affirmed the rejection under Sec. 103, but styled the statement
of rejection as to some of the rejected claims as ``Seyfried in view of
Foret,'' but relied on the same teachings of Seyfried and Foret on
which the examiner relied. The court held that this did not constitute
a new ground of rejection. Cowles, 156 F.2d at 554. See also In re
Krammes, 314 F.2d 813, 816-17 (CCPA 1963) (holding that a different
``order of combining the references'' did not constitute a new ground
of rejection because each reference was cited for the ``same teaching''
previously cited).
5. Considering, in order to respond to applicant's arguments, other
portions of a reference submitted by the applicant. If an applicant
submits a new reference to argue, for example, that the prior art
``teaches away'' from the claimed invention (see MPEP Sec. 2145), and
the examiner's answer points to portions of that same reference to
counter the argument, then the rejection does not constitute a new
ground of rejection. In In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1986),