United States v. Verifone Systems, Inc. and Hypercom Corporation; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 50254-50265 [2011-20534]

Agencies

• Antitrust Division
• Department of Justice

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 156 (Friday, August 12, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 50254-50265]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-20534]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


United States v. Verifone Systems, Inc. and Hypercom Corporation; 
Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement

    Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and 
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment, 
Stipulation and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia in United 
States of America v. Verifone Systems, Inc. and Hypercom Corporation, 
Civil Action No. 1:11-cv-00887. On June 27, 2011, the United States 
filed an Amended Complaint alleging that the proposed acquisition by 
Verifone Systems, Inc. of the business assets of Hypercom Corporation 
would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The proposed 
Final Judgment, filed on August 4, 2011, requires the Defendants to 
divest Hypercom's U.S. business, along with certain tangible and 
intangible assets.
    Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment and Competitive 
Impact Statement are available for inspection at the Department of 
Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Documents Group, 450 Fifth 
Street, NW., Suite 1010, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-514-
2481), on the Department of Justice's Web site at https://www.usdoj.gov/atr, and at the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia. Copies of these materials may be obtained 
from the Antitrust Division upon request and payment of the copying fee 
set by Department of Justice regulations.
    Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this 
notice. Such comments, and responses thereto, will be published in the 
Federal Register and filed with the Court. Comments should be directed 
to James J. Tierney, Chief, Networks and Technology Enforcement 
Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Washington, DC 
20530 (telephone: 202-307-6200).

Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil Enforcement.

In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

United States of America, United States Department of Justice, 
Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 7100, Washington, 
DC 20530, Plaintiff, v. Verifone Systems, Inc., 2099 Gateway Place, 
Suite 600, San Jose, CA 95110, and Hypercom Corporation, 8888 East 
Raintree Drive, Suite 300, Scottsdale, AZ 85260, Defendants.

Case: 1:11-cv-00887.
Assigned to: Kessler, Gladys.
Assign. Date: 5/12/2011.
Description: Antitrust.

Amended Complaint

    The United States of America, acting under the direction of the 
Attorney General of the United States, brings this civil action against 
VeriFone Systems Inc. (``VeriFone''), and Hypercom Corporation 
(``Hypercom'') pursuant to the antitrust laws of the United States to 
enjoin VeriFone's proposed acquisition of Hypercom, and to obtain such 
other equitable relief as the Court deems appropriate. The United 
States alleges as follows:

I. Nature of Action

    1. Point of sale (``POS'') terminals enable retailers and other 
firms to accept a wide range of non-cash payment types, such as credit 
cards and debit cards, at millions of locations nationwide. Given the 
increasing popularity of electronic payments, the vast majority of 
merchants need to accept such cards and use POS terminals to handle 
billions of dollars of on-site electronic payments daily. This 
complaint seeks to enjoin Defendants

[[Page 50255]]

VeriFone and Hypercom from proceeding with a transaction that, if 
permitted, would eliminate nearly all competition in the sale of POS 
terminals in the United States.
    2. VeriFone and Hypercom are two of the three leading providers of 
POS terminals in the United States. If the Verifone-Hypercom 
transaction is not enjoined, Hypercom would cease to exist as an 
independent competitor in this concentrated market. The proposed 
transaction would result in VeriFone and the third leading provider of 
POS terminals in the United States, Ingenico, S.A. (``Ingenico''), 
becoming a duopoly in full control of the sale of POS devices in the 
United States.
    3. POS terminals can operate on a standalone basis, connected to 
payment networks by a standard telephone line or by wired or wireless 
internet protocol technologies. POS terminals of this type are commonly 
referred to in the industry as ``countertop'' machines, and are 
typically used by small- or medium-sized businesses or retailers to 
enable them to accept credit and debit cards. POS terminals can also be 
connected to an electronic cash register or similar device as part of 
an integrated point of sale system. POS terminals of this type are 
often referred to in the industry as ``multi-lane'' or ``consumer-
facing'' machines, and are typically used by large retailers to accept 
credit and debit cards. Each of these industry segments constitutes an 
antitrust market. The countertop POS terminals market and the multi-
lane POS terminals market are the two relevant markets that would be 
affected by the proposed transaction challenged in this Complaint. The 
line of business including both relevant markets is referred to as the 
``POS terminals industry.''
    4. The POS terminals industry, both in the United States and on a 
worldwide basis, is extremely concentrated and dominated by VeriFone, 
Hypercom, and Ingenico. In 2009, according to a leading market analyst 
report, VeriFone had a 48 percent share of the sale of all POS 
terminals in the United States, while Hypercom had an 18 percent share 
and Ingenico had a 26 percent share.
    5. Similarly, each of the relevant markets is extremely 
concentrated in the United States and there is little timely prospect 
of either of them becoming less concentrated. VeriFone and Hypercom 
together control over 60 percent of the countertop POS terminals market 
in the United States. VeriFone, Hypercom, and Ingenico together control 
well over 90 percent of the multi-lane POS terminals market in the 
United States. Their position in the relevant markets is also protected 
by the high barriers to entry that characterize these markets.
    6. In November 2007, VeriFone's CEO, Douglas G. Bergeron, projected 
that the worldwide POS terminals industry was trending towards a ``very 
benevolent duopoly'' consisting solely of VeriFone and Ingenico. 
Bergeron's description of such a potential duopoly as ``very 
benevolent'' has led VeriFone to eschew robust and vibrant competition 
in favor of cooperation with, and benevolence toward, competitors. 
Consummation of the proposed transaction would achieve Mr. Bergeron's 
vision.
    7. On November 17, 2010, following approximately eighteen months of 
negotiations, VeriFone agreed to purchase Hypercom in a $485 million 
deal that would combine two of only three significant sellers of POS 
terminals in the United States.
    8. VeriFone's proposed acquisition of Hypercom would substantially 
extend VeriFone's position as the largest seller of all POS terminals 
in the United States. Ingenico would be the only remaining substantial 
competitor to VeriFone. Post-transaction, VeriFone and Ingenico 
together would dominate the multilane POS terminals market--the very 
duopoly envisioned by VeriFone's CEO four years ago. The acquisition 
would reduce competition in the relevant markets by eliminating 
Hypercom as an independent source of competitive discipline and by 
reducing impediments to successful coordination. This would inevitably 
lead to higher prices, inferior service, a reduction in the variety of 
products sold, and reduced innovation.
    9. The United States requests that the Court enjoin VeriFone's 
acquisition of Hypercom to protect consumers throughout United States 
from the loss of competition in the provision of devices used to 
facilitate billions of retail transactions each year.

II. Defendants

    10. VeriFone is a corporation organized and existing under the laws 
of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business located 
in San Jose, California. In the fiscal year ending October 31, 2010, 
VeriFone earned more than $1 billion in revenues worldwide.
    11. Hypercom is a corporation organized and existing under the laws 
of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business located 
in Alpharetta, Georgia. In 2010, Hypercom earned more than $450 million 
in revenues worldwide.

III. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Commerce

    12. The United States brings this action pursuant to Section 4 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 4 to prevent and restrain Defendants from 
violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and pursuant to 
Section 15 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 25, to prevent and 
restrain Defendants from violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. 18.
    13. The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 4, Section 15 of 
the Clayton Act, as amended, and 28 U.S.C. 1345. The Court also has 
subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1337(a), as 
Defendants sell POS terminals and/or other products and services in the 
United States, and sell products and services in the flow of interstate 
commerce. Defendants' products and services involve a substantial 
amount of interstate commerce. Sales of countertop POS terminals and 
multi-lane POS terminals each exceeded $150 million in the United 
States in 2010.
    14. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant and 
venue is proper over VeriFone and Hypercom in this District under 
Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 22, because Defendants 
VeriFone and Hypercom both transact business and are found within this 
District.

IV. Adverse Competitive Effects

    15. VeriFone's proposed acquisition of Hypercom would reduce 
competition in two antitrust markets: The sale of countertop POS 
terminals and the sale of multi-lane POS terminals. VeriFone and 
Hypercom are two of only three companies with substantial sales in the 
countertop POS terminals market; the third company with significant 
sales is First Data Corporation (``First Data''), which is vertically 
integrated and only sells devices to customers of its merchant 
processing services. VeriFone and Hypercom are two of the only three 
substantial competitors in the multi-lane POS terminals market; 
Ingenico is the third competitor in that market. The proposed 
acquisition would eliminate all competition between VeriFone and 
Hypercom, and would increase the likelihood of coordination in the POS 
terminals markets.

A. Relevant Product and Geographic Markets

1. Countertop POS Terminals Market
    16. The sale of countertop POS terminals suitable for use in the 
United States is a relevant antitrust market for purposes of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act and a relevant antitrust market and

[[Page 50256]]

line of commerce for purposes of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
    17. Other types of payment devices are not adequate substitutes for 
countertop POS terminals. Purchasers of countertop POS terminals would 
not switch to other types of payment systems in sufficient numbers to 
render unprofitable a price increase imposed by a hypothetical 
monopolist in the sale of countertop POS terminals suitable for use in 
the United States.
    18. A hypothetical monopolist of countertop POS terminals suitable 
for use in the United States could profitably raise prices by at least 
a small but significant, non-transitory amount. Purchasers of 
countertop POS terminals located in the United States would not be able 
to switch to other products, including to countertop POS terminals made 
for non-U.S. markets, to defeat such a price increase by a hypothetical 
monopolist.
    19. The relevant geographic market is the United States, where the 
customers for countertop POS terminals suitable for use in the United 
States are located. Countertop POS terminals suitable for use in the 
United States may be manufactured anywhere in the world.
    20. Countertop POS terminals sold in other parts of the world will 
not work unmodified in the United States. Countertop POS terminals sold 
in the United States must be customized for the demands of U.S. 
purchasers and must comply with distinct U.S. technical specifications 
and certification requirements.
2. Multi-lane POS Terminals Market
    21. The sale of multi-lane POS terminals suitable for use in the 
United States is a relevant antitrust market for purposes of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act and a relevant antitrust market and line of commerce 
for purposes of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
    22. Other types of payment devices are not adequate substitutes for 
multi-lane POS terminals. Purchasers of multi-lane POS terminals would 
not switch to other types of payment systems in sufficient numbers to 
render unprofitable a price increase imposed by a hypothetical 
monopolist in the sale of multi-lane POS terminals suitable for use in 
the United States.
    23. A hypothetical monopolist of multi-lane POS terminals suitable 
for use in the United States could profitably raise prices by at least 
a small but significant, non-transitory amount. Purchasers of multi-
lane POS terminals located in the United States would not be able to 
switch to other products, including to multi-lane POS terminals made 
for non-U.S. markets, to defeat such a price increase by a hypothetical 
monopolist.
    24. The relevant geographic market is the United States, where the 
customers for multi-lane POS terminals suitable for use in the United 
States are located. Multi-lane POS terminals suitable for use in the 
United States may be manufactured anywhere in the world.
    25. Multi-lane POS terminals sold in other parts of the world will 
not work unmodified in the United States. Multi-lane POS terminals sold 
in the United States must be customized for the demands of U.S. 
purchasers and must comply with distinct U.S. technical specifications 
and certification requirements.

B. Market Concentration

    26. VeriFone's proposed acquisition of Hypercom would increase 
market concentration in the POS terminals markets.
    27. As articulated in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by 
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (``HHI'') is a measure of market 
concentration.\1\ Market concentration is often one useful indicator of 
the level of competitive vigor in a market and the likely competitive 
effects of a merger. The more concentrated a market, and the more a 
transaction would increase concentration in a market, the more likely 
it is that a transaction would result in a meaningful reduction in 
competition harming consumers. Mergers resulting in highly concentrated 
markets (with an HHI in excess of 2500) that involve an increase in the 
HHI of more than 200 points are presumed to be likely to enhance market 
power under the merger guidelines.
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    \1\ See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
Sec.  5.3 (2010), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html. The HHI is calculated by squaring the 
market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing 
the resulting numbers. For example, for a market consisting of four 
firms with shares of 30, 30, 20, and 20 percent, the HHI is 2,600 
(30\2\ + 30\2\ + 20\2\ + 20\2\ = 2,600). It approaches zero when a 
market is occupied by a large number of firms of relatively equal 
size and reaches a maximum of 10,000 points when a market is 
controlled by a single firm. The HHI increases both as the number of 
firms in the market decreases and as the disparity in size between 
those firms increases.
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    28. The countertop POS terminals market and the multi-lane POS 
terminals market are already highly concentrated, even before the 
effect of the proposed transaction is taken into account. VeriFone's 
proposed acquisition of Hypercom would result in a substantial increase 
in the HHI in both markets in excess of the 200 points presumed to be 
anticompetitive under the merger guidelines.

C. VeriFone's Proposed Acquisition of Hypercom Would Result in 
Competitive Harm

    29. VeriFone's proposed acquisition of Hypercom would reduce 
competition in the relevant markets, leading to unilateral and 
coordinated effects such as an increase in prices and a reduction in 
innovation, quality, product variety, and service.
    30. VeriFone's proposed acquisition of Hypercom would eliminate all 
competition between the two companies. VeriFone is the largest provider 
of both countertop and multi-lane POS terminals. Hypercom is one of 
only two other companies currently selling a significant number of 
countertop POS terminals and is the third-largest provider of multi-
lane POS terminals. The competition between VeriFone and Hypercom is 
therefore especially important to consumers, and the elimination of 
that competition would substantially reduce the overall level of 
competition in each market.
    31. The acquisition would result in unilateral effects in each 
relevant market as VeriFone would be able to raise the price of both 
VeriFone and Hypercom products because it would recapture some sales 
that would have been lost absent the acquisition as purchasers reacted 
to such price increases by switching between VeriFone and Hypercom 
products.
    32. Eliminating competition between Verifone and Hypercom would 
also reduce the number of significant competitors from three to two in 
the POS terminals markets, resulting in the very ``duopoly'' projected 
by VeriFone's CEO and heightening the potential for coordinated 
behavior. Coordination, whether tacit or explicit, is especially likely 
because the acquisition would enhance each company's ability to deter 
competitive behavior in one market by retaliating across a range of 
other product and geographic markets, if necessary.

D. Absence of Countervailing Factors

1. Entry
    33. Supply responses from competitors or potential competitors 
would not prevent the likely anticompetitive effects of the proposed 
transaction.
    34. Industry participants have described the POS terminals industry 
as highly concentrated, with high barriers to entry. These entry 
barriers include the need to obtain certifications, keeping up with 
changing payment

[[Page 50257]]

regulations, having sufficient scale, being in close proximity to 
customers, and having a broad portfolio of customer applications. These 
factors are entry barriers for both the countertop and multi-lane POS 
terminals markets. Given these and other significant barriers to entry 
or expansion, entry or repositioning would not be likely, timely, or 
sufficient to prevent the anticompetitive effects that would result 
from the proposed transaction.
    35. Hypercom's CEO, Philippe Tartavull, has emphasized the 
difficulty of entering the POS terminals industry, explaining that 
``[s]maller regional manufacturers who enter the business find it 
difficult because a typical product cycle is often too long for them to 
support'' and they are ``limited in the number of products they can 
bring to market.'' When these factors are combined with the ``high 
costs of certifying new products,'' Tartavull concluded, ``it can be 
very difficult to enter a new market geography or market segment. It's 
not impossible, but it's not easy. Other companies have tried, but when 
all is said and done, there are two primary providers to the North 
American market, and Hypercom is one of them.''
    36. The only firm to enter the U.S. market in recent years and 
achieve any non-trivial amount of sales is First Data, a leading 
provider of electronic payment networks and services. Despite being as 
well placed as any company to break into the countertop POS terminals 
market given its complementary lines of business and its position as 
the largest merchant acquirer, and despite the fact that it purchased a 
small provider of U.S. POS terminals, First Data's sales are limited 
entirely to customers using its own network and First Data therefore 
has a very minimal ability to further expand its presence in the 
countertop POS terminals market. Smaller merchant processors would have 
less incentive and ability than First Data to place their own terminals 
on their network simply as a result of their significantly smaller 
volume of sales. First Data has no significant presence in the multi-
lane POS terminals market.
    37. Even after First Data entered the market, VeriFone's CEO 
expressed the view that the overall POS terminals business was likely 
to continue to consolidate until it was controlled by a duopoly 
consisting solely of VeriFone and Ingenico. Hypercom's statements 
regarding the difficulty of entry that are quoted in paragraph 36 were 
also made after First Data's entry.
    38. Ingenico, an otherwise significant competitor in the POS 
terminals markets around the world, has faced significant difficulty in 
entering and expanding in the countertop POS terminals market in the 
United States. Ingenico has itself explained to investors that the POS 
terminals industry is ``highly concentrated,'' has ``consolidated in 
recent years,'' and is characterized by ``high barriers to entry.'' 
Ingenico has detailed a number of these entry barriers, including the 
need to obtain certifications, the ``[c]onstant intensification of the 
Global Card Regulation over the last 10 years,'' and the importance of 
``[s]cale,'' ``[p]roximity,'' and a ``[p]ortfolio of customer 
application[s].'' These barriers to entry have affected Ingenico's 
ability to expand in the countertop POS terminals market.
    39. The countertop and multi-lane POS terminals markets are 
characterized by a number of common barriers to entry, including those 
identified above. Amongst the most significant other general entry 
barriers are the importance of reputation and a proven track record of 
success serving customers generally and certain types of customers in 
particular. Customers are reluctant to entrust their sales process to a 
company without the proven ability to operate in their type of 
environment, especially since service and software maintenance are 
critical factors in the decision-making process.
    40. In addition, a new producer's countertop POS terminals must be 
certified to work with the various payment processors in order for the 
processor to be willing to fully support that producer's terminals. 
This certification is costly and time-consuming, and payment processors 
are unlikely to prioritize the terminals of a new company with no 
committed customers. Without this certification, it is very difficult 
for a producer to sell a significant number of countertop POS 
terminals.
    41. In the multi-lane POS terminals market, new entrants face an 
additional entry barrier relating to the need to demonstrate that a 
terminal can interoperate with the electronic cash register and 
integrated payment system used by each potential customer. As there are 
a range of integrated systems on the market and their providers are 
again unlikely to spend significant effort to work with a fledgling 
company with no customer base, new entrants face an uphill challenge. 
Even if a new entrant has a device with features comparable to those of 
VeriFone, Hypercom, and Ingenico, at an attractive price point, the 
consumer may not even consider bids from the company if it cannot 
demonstrate that its terminal already works with the integrated system 
used by that consumer.
2. Efficiencies
    42. The anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are not 
likely to be eliminated or sufficiently mitigated by any efficiencies 
that may be achieved by the proposed transaction.

V. Violation Alleged

    43. The United States incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 
through 42 above.
    44. The proposed acquisition of Hypercom by VeriFone likely would 
substantially lessen competition in interstate trade and commerce, in 
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18, in that:
    a. Actual and potential competition between VeriFone and Hypercom 
in the sale of countertop and multi-lane POS terminals in the United 
States would be eliminated; and
    b. competition in the sale of countertop and multi-lane POS 
terminals in the United States likely would be lessened substantially.

VI. Relief Requested

    45. The United States requests that:
    a. The proposed acquisition of Hypercom by VeriFone be adjudged to 
violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18;
    b. VeriFone and Hypercom be enjoined from carrying out the proposed 
acquisition of Hypercom by VeriFone or carrying out any other 
agreement, understanding, or plan by which VeriFone and Hypercom would 
acquire, be acquired by, or merge with each other, in whole or in part;
    c. The United States be awarded their costs of this action; and
    d. The United States receive such other and further relief as the 
case requires and the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: June 15, 2011.

Respectfully submitted,

For Plaintiff United States.

Christine A. Varney (DC Bar 411654),
Assistant Attorney General.

Joseph F. Wayland,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General.

Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil Enforcement.

James J. Tierney (DC Bar 434610),
Chief.

Scott A. Scheele (DC Bar 429061),
Assistant Chief, Networks and Technology Enforcement Section.

Ryan S. Struve (DC Bar 495406),
Attorney, Networks and Technology Enforcement Section, Antitrust 
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 
7100, Washington, DC 20530.

[[Page 50258]]

Telephone: (202) 514-4890. Fax: (202) 616-8544. E-mail: 
ryan.struve@usdoj.gov.

Sanford M. Adler,
Aaron D. Hoag,
Ihan Kim,
Adam T. Severt,
Jennifer A. Wamsley (DC Bar 486540),
Attorneys for the United States.

In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Verifone Systems, Inc., and 
Hypercom Corporation, Defendants.
Case: 1:11-cv-00887.
Assigned to: Kessler, Gladys.
Assign. Date: 5/12/2011.
Description: Antitrust.

Competitive Impact Statement

    Plaintiff United States of America (``United States''), pursuant to 
Section 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (``APPA'' or 
``Tunney Act''), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), files this Competitive Impact 
Statement relating to the proposed Final Judgment submitted for entry 
in this civil antitrust proceeding.

I. Nature and Purpose of This Proceeding

    On November 17, 2010, VeriFone Systems, Inc. (``VeriFone'') entered 
into a $485 million merger agreement to acquire Hypercom Corporation 
(``Hypercom'') that would combine two of only three significant sellers 
of Point of Sale (``POS'') terminals in the United States. On April 1, 
2011, VeriFone and Hypercom entered into an agreement whereby 
Hypercom's United States POS business would be licensed to Ingenico 
S.A. (``Ingenico''), the only other substantial provider of POS 
terminals. The United States filed a civil antitrust Complaint on May 
12, 2011, seeking to enjoin VeriFone's proposed acquisition of Hypercom 
and the related licensing agreement with Ingenico because the likely 
effect of the transactions would be to lessen competition substantially 
for POS terminals in the United States in violation of Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. This loss of competition likely would result 
in less innovation and higher prices for POS terminals. On May 19, 
2011, Defendants announced they would abandon the agreement to license 
certain Hypercom assets to Ingenico. Therefore, the United States filed 
an Amended Complaint on June 22, 2011 to dismiss Ingenico as a 
defendant in this matter
    On August 4, 2011, the United States filed a Hold Separate 
Stipulation and Order (``Hold Separate'') and proposed Final Judgment, 
which are designed to eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the 
acquisition in the United States. Under the proposed Final Judgment, 
which is explained more fully below, VeriFone and Hypercom are required 
to divest Hypercom's entire business engaged in the development, 
production, distribution, and sale of POS terminals in the United 
States (hereafter, the ``Divestiture Assets''). Under the terms of the 
Hold Separate, VeriFone and Hypercom will take certain steps to ensure 
that the Divestiture Assets are operated as a competitive independent, 
economically viable and ongoing business that will remain independent 
and uninfluenced by the consummation of the acquisition, and that 
competition is maintained during the pendency of the ordered 
divestiture.
    The United States and Defendants have stipulated that the proposed 
Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA. Entry of 
the proposed Final Judgment would terminate this action, except that 
the Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or enforce the 
provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish and remedy 
violations thereof.

II. Description of the Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violation

A. The POS Terminal Industry

    POS terminals enable retailers and other firms to accept a wide 
range of non-cash payment types, such as credit cards and debit cards, 
at millions of locations nationwide. Given the increasing popularity of 
electronic payments, the vast majority of merchants need to accept non-
cash payment options and use POS terminals to handle on-site electronic 
payments. POS terminals can be operated as standalone machines, 
commonly referred to in the industry as ``countertop'' machines, or 
connected to an electronic cash register or similar device as part of 
an integrated point of sale system, commonly referred to in the 
industry as ``multi-lane'' machines.
    Countertop POS terminals can be connected to payment networks by a 
standard telephone line, by wired or wireless Internet protocol 
technologies, or cellular networks. Countertop POS terminals are 
typically sold to small- or medium-sized businesses or retailers to 
enable them to accept credit and debit cards.
    Multi-lane POS terminals are connected to an electronic cash 
register or similar device as part of an integrated point of sale 
system. POS terminals of this type are typically used by large 
retailers such as a multi-lane retail merchant or department store to 
accept credit and debit cards.

B. The Defendants and the Proposed Transaction

    VeriFone, a Delaware corporation, is the leading seller of both 
countertop and multi-lane POS terminals in the United States. VeriFone 
offers POS terminals and related software designed for numerous 
applications, including financial, retail, petroleum, government, and 
healthcare. VeriFone markets dial-up, IP-enabled, and wireless POS 
terminals. In addition, VeriFone provides POS operating systems for its 
POS terminals. Merchants using VeriFone terminals vary in size and 
transaction volume from small, local businesses to national, multi-lane 
retail chains. In the fiscal year ending October 31, 2010, VeriFone 
earned more than $1 billion in revenues worldwide.
    Hypercom, a Delaware corporation, is the third largest provider of 
POS terminals in the United States, with a large presence in the 
countertop POS terminals market and an emerging presence in the multi-
lane POS terminals market. Its customers include financial 
institutions, electronic payment processors, transaction network 
operators, retailers, system integrators, independent sales 
organizations, and distributors. It also sells products to companies in 
the hospitality, transportation, healthcare, and restaurant industries. 
Hypercom's products include POS terminals and peripheral devices, 
including a range of PIN pads and keyboards, card readers, and payment 
controllers designed to permit the efficient integration of payment 
functionality in a variety of self-service environments, such as 
transportation ticketing, gasoline station pumps, parking machines, and 
general purpose kiosks. In 2010, Hypercom earned more than $450 million 
in revenues worldwide.
    On November 17, 2010, following approximately eighteen months of 
negotiations, VeriFone agreed to purchase Hypercom in a $485 million 
deal that would combine two of only three significant sellers of POS 
terminals in the United States. The proposed acquisition would extend 
VeriFone's position as the largest seller of POS terminals in the 
United States. This transaction would substantially lessen competition 
in the market for POS terminals and is the subject of the Amended 
Complaint and proposed Final Judgment filed by the United States in 
this matter.

[[Page 50259]]

C. Relevant Markets

    Antitrust law, including Section 7 of the Clayton Act, protects 
consumers from anticompetitive conduct, such as firm's acquisition of 
the ability to raise prices or reduce choice. Market definition assists 
antitrust analysis by focusing attention on those markets where 
competitive effects are likely to be felt. Well-defined markets 
encompass actors including both sellers and buyers whose conduct most 
strongly influences the nature and magnitude of competitive effects. To 
ensure that antitrust analysis takes account of a broad enough set of 
products to evaluate whether a transaction is likely to lead to a 
substantial lessening of competition, defining relevant markets in 
merger cases frequently begins by identifying a collection of products 
or set of services over which a hypothetical monopolist profitably 
could impose a small but significant and non-transitory increase in 
price.
    Here, the United States's investigation revealed two distinct 
markets for POS terminals. The first market consists of countertop POS 
terminals, which are directly connected to credit card processors 
through a telephone line, Internet connection or cellular network. The 
second market consists of multi-lane POS terminals, which are 
integrated into a merchant's cash register and integrated point of sale 
system. There are no reasonable alternative payment devices to 
countertop or multi-lane POS terminals to which merchants could turn to 
defeat a price increase. Accordingly, both countertop and multi-lane 
POS terminals are relevant product markets.
    Antitrust analysis must also consider the geographic dimensions of 
competition. Here, the relevant markets exist within the United States 
and are not affected by competition outside the United States. POS 
terminals sold in the United States must be customized for the demands 
of the United States purchaser and comply with distinct technical 
specifications and certifications unique to the United States. 
Therefore, the competitive dynamic for POS terminals market is 
distinctly different outside the United States.

D. Competitive Effects

    The POS terminals industry in the United States is extremely 
concentrated, and would become substantially more so if VeriFone were 
to acquire Hypercom. VeriFone and Hypercom are two of only three 
dominant providers of POS terminals in the United States. In 2009, 
according to a leading market analyst report, VeriFone had a 48 percent 
share of the sale of all POS terminals in the United States, while 
Hypercom had an 18 percent share. The only other significant company to 
offer POS terminals in the United States is Ingenico, representing a 26 
percent share of the sale of all POS terminals in the United States.
    In the United States, VeriFone and Hypercom together control over 
60 percent of the countertop POS terminals market. VeriFone, Hypercom 
and Ingenico together control well over 90 percent of the multi-lane 
POS terminals market in this country. Using a measure of market 
concentration called the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (``HHI''), the 
proposed transaction would substantially increase the HHI in each 
relevant market in excess of the 200 points presumed to be 
anticompetitive under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
    The vigorous competition between VeriFone and Hypercom in the 
development, distribution and sale of countertop and multi-lane POS 
terminals has benefitted customers through better prices and increased 
innovation, quality, product variety and service. The proposed 
transaction would eliminate this competition between VeriFone and 
Hypercom and likely result in unilateral and coordinated effects. The 
acquisition would likely result in unilateral effects in each relevant 
market as VeriFone would be able to raise the price of both VeriFone 
and Hypercom products because it would recapture some sales that would 
have been lost absent the acquisition as purchasers reacted to such 
price increases by switching between VeriFone and Hypercom products. 
The elimination of Hypercom as a competitor would also reduce the 
number of significant competitors from three to two in the POS 
terminals markets, resulting in a duopoly and heightening the potential 
for coordinated behavior. Coordination, whether tacit or explicit, is 
especially likely because the acquisition would enhance each company's 
ability to deter competitive behavior in one market by retaliating 
across a range of other product and geographic markets.
    The POS terminals markets are protected by high barriers to entry. 
These barriers include the need to obtain certifications for countertop 
POS terminals or the ability for the multi-lane POS terminal to work 
with a merchant's integrated payment system, keeping up with changing 
payment regulations, having sufficient scale, being in close proximity 
to customers, having a broad portfolio of customer applications, and 
the need for a reputation for reliability.
    As a result of these barriers to entry, entry or expansion by any 
other firms into the countertop or multi-lane POS terminals markets 
would not be timely, likely, or sufficient to prevent the 
anticompetitive effects that would result from the proposed 
transaction.

III. Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment

    The divestiture requirement of the proposed Final Judgment will 
eliminate the likely anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in the 
development, production, distribution, and sale of POS Terminals in the 
United States by establishing a new, independent and economically 
viable competitor. The proposed Final Judgment requires defendants to 
divest Hypercom's entire business engaged in the development, 
production, distribution, and sale of POS Terminals in the United 
States. The assets must be divested in such a way as to satisfy the 
United States in its sole discretion that the operations can and will 
be operated by the purchaser as a viable, ongoing business that can 
compete effectively in the relevant markets.
    The proposed Final Judgment designates Gores as the company to 
which the divested assets must be sold.\2\ The Final Judgment will 
enable Gores to become a new, independent, economically viable 
competitor in the sale of POS Terminals in the United States. In 
addition to defining the assets to be divested to Gores, the Final 
Judgment requires VeriFone to (1) license the intellectual property 
necessary to compete in the provision of POS Terminals in the United 
States to Gores; (2) provide access to Hypercom employees; and (3) 
provide transitional support to Gores.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ The Hold Separate requires that until the assets being 
divested are sold according to the terms of the Final Judgment, 
VeriFone and Hypercom must continue to operate their entire 
businesses as independent, ongoing, and economically viable 
businesses that are held entirely separate, distinct and apart. 
VeriFone and Hypercom shall not coordinate their production, 
marketing or terms of sales until the assets being divested are 
sold. It is necessary to keep Hypercom's entire business separate 
from VeriFone's business in the event the divested assets are not 
sold to Gores for any reason. If the assets are not sold to Gores, 
VeriFone and Hypercom will be unable to combine their operations, 
thus preserving Hypercom as an independent competitor in the POS 
Terminals markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The United States typically requires that ownership of intellectual 
property is divested to the acquirer and if required a license to the 
intellectual property is granted back to the seller.

[[Page 50260]]

The structure of the intellectual property transfer in this instance is 
unique due to the nature of the divestiture relative to the entire 
global market. VeriFone will retain ownership of Hypercom's 
international POS Terminals business which relies on similar, and in 
some instances the same, intellectual property rights relied upon in 
Hypercom's United States POS Terminals. Therefore, VeriFone retaining 
ownership of Hypercom's intellectual property and licensing those 
rights to Gores allows Gores to compete effectively in the United 
States and VeriFone to utilize the Hypercom intellectual property 
abroad.
    The Final Judgment allows Gores access to Hypercom employees and 
prohibits VeriFone interfering with any negotiations by Gores to employ 
any current or former Hypercom employee who is responsible in any way 
for the design, production and sale of POS Terminals in the United 
States. It also requires VeriFone to waive any non-compete agreements 
for current and former Hypercom employees involved in the design, 
production or sale of POS Terminals in the United States. These 
provisions will provide Gores will access to the engineering and sales 
talent at Hypercom which will help to ensure that Gores can operate 
effectively as a standalone competitor to VeriFone.
    Gores may require assistance in transitioning the databases, 
software, and technical support that relates to the divested assets and 
may require time to develop their own capabilities to manage these 
items on a ongoing bases. Therefore, the Final Judgment allows for 
Gores to enter into a transitional support agreement for up to one year 
after the sale of the divestiture assets. These transition services 
will enable Gores to compete effectively in providing POS Terminal in 
the United States. In addition, the Final Judgment forecloses VeriFone 
from taking any action to impede the operation of the transitional 
support services agreement.
    Gores, a privately held acquisition and management company, is well 
suited to acquire the divestiture assets. Gores specializes in 
acquiring technology organizations and managing them for growth and 
profitability. In addition, it has experience in the POS Terminal 
industry. In 2001, Gores purchased VeriFone from Hewlett-Packard 
Company. Gores and another firm recapitalized VeriFone, focused the 
company on its POS Terminals products and services, and made VeriFone a 
profitable company. In 2005, VeriFone launched an initial public 
offering and became an independent company. Given Gores' financial 
resources, management expertise and POS Terminals industry knowledge, 
Gores is well positioned to successfully compete with the merged firm 
in the development, production, distribution, and sale of POS Terminals 
in the United States
    In the event that Defendants do not accomplish the divestiture to 
Gores as prescribed in the proposed Final Judgment, the Final Judgment 
provides that the Court will appoint a trustee selected by the United 
States to effect the divestiture. If a trustee is appointed the 
proposed Final Judgment provides that defendants will pay all costs and 
expenses of the trustee. The trustee's commission will be structured so 
as to provide an incentive for the trustee based on the price obtained 
and the speed with which the divestiture is accomplished. After his or 
her appointment becomes effective, the trustee will file monthly 
reports with the Court and the United States setting forth his or her 
efforts to accomplish the divestiture. At the end of six months, if the 
divestiture has not been accomplished, the trustee and the United 
States will make recommendations to the Court, which shall enter such 
orders as appropriate, in order to carry out the purpose of the trust, 
including extending the trust or the term of the trustee's appointment.
    The divestiture provisions of the proposed Final Judgment will 
eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in the 
development, production, distribution, and sale of POS terminals in the 
United States.

IV. Remedies Applicable to Potential Private Litigants

    Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any 
person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the 
antitrust laws may bring suit in Federal court to recover three times 
the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither 
impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action. 
Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
16(a), the proposed Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any 
subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against Defendants.

V. Procedures Applicable For Approval Or Modification of the Proposed 
Final Judgment

    The United States and Defendants have stipulated that the proposed 
Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance with the 
provisions of the APPA, provided that the United States has not 
withdrawn its consent. The APPA conditions entry upon the Court's 
determination that the proposed Final Judgment is in the public 
interest.
    The APPA provides a period of at least 60 days preceding the 
effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any person 
may submit to the United States written comments regarding the proposed 
Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so within 60 
days of the date of publication of this Competitive Impact Statement in 
the Federal Register, or the last date of publication in a newspaper of 
the summary of this Competitive Impact Statement, whichever is later. 
All comments received during this period will be considered by the 
United States, which remains free to withdraw its consent to the 
proposed Final Judgment at any time prior to the Court's entry of 
judgment. The comments and the response of the United States will be 
filed with the Court and published in the Federal Register.
    Written comments should be submitted to: James J. Tierney, Chief, 
Networks & Technology Enforcement Section, Antitrust Division, United 
States Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 7100, 
Washington, DC 20530.
    The proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court retains 
jurisdiction over this action, and the parties may apply to the Court 
for any order necessary or appropriate for the modification, 
interpretation, or enforcement of the Final Judgment.

VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment

    The United States considered, as an alternative to the proposed 
Final Judgment, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions against 
Defendants' transaction and proceeding to a full trial on the merits. 
The United States is satisfied, however, that the relief in the 
proposed Final Judgment will preserve competition in the markets for 
countertop and multi-lane POS Terminals. Thus, the proposed Final 
Judgment would protect competition as effectively as would any remedy 
available through litigation, but avoids the time, expense, and 
uncertainty of a full trial on the merits.

VII. Standard of Review Under the APPA for Proposed Final Judgment

    The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed 
consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be 
subject to a 60-day comment period, after which the Court shall 
determine whether entry of the

[[Page 50261]]

proposed Final Judgment ``is in the public interest.'' 15 U.S.C. 
16(e)(1). In making that determination, the Court, in accordance with 
the statute as amended in 2004, is required to consider:
    (A) The competitive impact of such judgment, including termination 
of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, 
duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies 
actually considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and any other 
competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment 
that the court deems necessary to a determination of whether the 
consent judgment is in the public interest; and
    (B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the 
relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and individuals 
alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint 
including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived 
from a determination of the issues at trial.

15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A) & (B). In considering these statutory factors, 
the Court's inquiry is necessarily a limited one as the United States 
is entitled to ``broad discretion to settle with the Defendant within 
the reaches of the public interest.'' United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
56 F.3d 1448, 1461 (DC Cir. 1995); see generally United States v. SBC 
Commc'ns, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (assessing public 
interest standard under the Tunney Act); United States v. InBev N.V./
S.A., 2009-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ] 76,736, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, 
No. 08-1965 (JR), at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that the court's 
review of a consent judgment is limited and only inquires ``into 
whether the government's determination that the proposed remedies will 
cure the antitrust violations alleged in the complaint was reasonable, 
and whether the mechanism to enforce the final judgment are clear and 
manageable'').\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The 2004 amendments substituted ``shall'' for ``may'' in 
directing relevant factors for a court to consider and amended the 
list of factors to focus on competitive considerations and to 
address potentially ambiguous judgment terms. Compare 15 U.S.C. 
16(e) (2004), with 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1) (2006); see also SBC Commc'ns, 
489 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (concluding that the 2004 amendments 
``effected minimal changes'' to Tunney Act review).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the APPA a court considers, among other things, the 
relationship between the remedy secured and the specific allegations 
set forth in the United States's complaint, whether the decree is 
sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, and 
whether the decree may positively harm third parties. See Microsoft, 56 
F.3d at 1458-62. With respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by 
the decree, a court may not ``engage in an unrestricted evaluation of 
what relief would best serve the public.'' United States v. BNS, Inc., 
858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Bechtel 
Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d 
at 1460-62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 
(D.D.C. 2001); InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3. Courts have 
held that:

    [t]he balancing of competing social and political interests 
affected by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the 
first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The 
court's role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring 
that the government has not breached its duty to the public in 
consenting to the decree. The court is required to determine not 
whether a particular decree is the one that will best serve society, 
but whether the settlement is `within the reaches of the public 
interest.' More elaborate requirements might undermine the 
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.

Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).\2\ In 
determining whether a proposed settlement is in the public interest, a 
district court ``must accord deference to the government's predictions 
about the efficacy of its remedies, and may not require that the 
remedies perfectly match the alleged violations.'' SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. 
Supp. 2d at 17; see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (noting the need 
for courts to be ``deferential to the government's predictions as to 
the effect of the proposed remedies''); United States v. Archer-
Daniels-Midland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that 
the court should grant due respect to the United States's prediction as 
to the effect of proposed remedies, its perception of the market 
structure, and its views of the nature of the case).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Cf. BNS, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the court's 
``ultimate authority under the [APPA] is limited to approving or 
disapproving the consent decree''); United States v. Gillette Co., 
406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way, the 
court is constrained to ``look at the overall picture not 
hypercritically, nor with a microscope, but with an artist's 
reducing glass''). See generally Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 
(discussing whether ``the remedies [obtained in the decree are] so 
inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall outside of the 
`reaches of the public interest.' '').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, ``a proposed decree must be approved even if it falls 
short of the remedy the court would impose on its own, as long as it 
falls within the range of acceptability or is `within the reaches of 
public interest.''' United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 
131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975)), aff'd sub nom. 
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also United States 
v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 622 (W.D. Ky. 1985) 
(approving the consent decree even though the court would have imposed 
a greater remedy). To meet this standard, the United States ``need only 
provide a factual basis for concluding that the settlements are 
reasonably adequate remedies for the alleged harms.'' SBC Commc'ns, 489 
F. Supp. 2d at 17.
    Moreover, the Court's role under the APPA is limited to reviewing 
the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has 
alleged in its Complaint, and does not authorize the court to 
``construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree 
against that case.'' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459; see also InBev, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (``[T]he `public interest' is not to be 
measured by comparing the violations alleged in the complaint against 
those the court believes could have, or even should have, been 
alleged.''). Because the ``court's authority to review the decree 
depends entirely on the government's exercising its prosecutorial 
discretion by bringing a case in the first place,'' it follows that 
``the court is only authorized to review the decree itself,'' and not 
to ``effectively redraft the complaint'' to inquire into other matters 
that the United States did not pursue. Microsoft, 56 F.3d. at 1459-60. 
Courts ``cannot look beyond the complaint in making the public interest 
determination unless the complaint is drafted so narrowly as to make a 
mockery of judicial power.'' SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
    In its 2004 amendments, Congress made clear its intent to preserve 
the practical benefits of utilizing consent decrees in antitrust 
enforcement, adding the unambiguous instruction that ``[n]othing in 
this section shall be construed to require the court to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to 
intervene.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2). This language effectuates what 
Congress intended when it enacted the Tunney Act in 1974, as Senator 
Tunney explained: ``[t]he court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or 
to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect of 
vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement through the 
consent decree process.'' 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement of 
Senator Tunney). Rather, the procedure for the public interest 
determination is left to the discretion of the Court, with the 
recognition that the

[[Page 50262]]

court's ``scope of review remains sharply proscribed by precedent and 
the nature of Tunney Act proceedings.'' SBC Commc'ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d 
at 11.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ See United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17 
(D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the ``Tunney Act expressly allows the 
court to make its public interest determination on the basis of the 
competitive impact statement and response to comments alone''); 
United States v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ] 
61,508, at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (``Absent a showing of corrupt 
failure of the government to discharge its duty, the Court, in 
making its public interest finding, should * * * carefully consider 
the explanations of the government in the competitive impact 
statement and its responses to comments in order to determine 
whether those explanations are reasonable under the 
circumstances.''); S. Rep. No. 93-298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 
(1973) (``Where the public interest can be meaningfully evaluated 
simply on the basis of briefs and oral arguments, that is the 
approach that should be utilized.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. Determinative Documents

    There are no determinative materials or documents within the 
meaning of the APPA that the United States considered in formulating 
the proposed Final Judgment.

Dated: August 4, 2011.
Respectfully submitted,
For Plaintiff, United States of America.
Ryan Struve,
Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth 
Street, NW., 7th Floor, Washington, DC 20530. Tel: (202) 514-4890. 
Fax: (202) 616-8544. E-mail: ryan.struve@usdoj.gov.

In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Verifone Systems, Inc., and 
Hypercom Corporation, Defendants.

Case: 1:11-cv-00887.
Assigned to: Kessler, Gladys.
Assign. Date: 5/12/2011.
Description: Antitrust.

Proposed Final Judgment

    Whereas, Plaintiff United States of America (``United States'') 
filed its Amended Complaint on June 22, 2011, the United States and 
Defendants VeriFone Systems, Inc. and Hypercom Corp., by their 
respective attorneys, have consented to entry of this Final Judgment 
without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and without 
this Final Judgment constituting any evidence against or admission by 
any party regarding any issue of fact or law;
    And whereas, Defendants agree to be bound by the provisions of the 
Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court;
    And whereas, the essence of this Final Judgment is the prompt and 
certain divestiture of certain rights or assets by the Defendants, to 
assure that competition is not substantially lessened;
    And whereas, the United States requires Defendants to make certain 
divestitures for the purpose of remedying the loss of competition 
alleged in the Amended Complaint;
    And whereas, Defendants have represented to the United States that 
the divestitures required below can and will be made and that 
Defendants will later raise no claim of hardship or difficulty as 
grounds for asking the Court to modify any of the divestiture 
provisions contained below;
    Now therefore, before any testimony is taken, without trial or 
adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and upon consent of the 
parties, it is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed:

I. Jurisdiction

    This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and each of 
the parties to this action. The Amended Complaint states a claim upon 
which relief may be granted against Defendants under Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 18).

II. Definitions

    As used in the Final Judgment:
    A. ``Acquirer'' means Gores or a buyer designated by a trustee to 
whom Defendants shall divest the Divestiture Assets.
    B. ``Defendants'' means VeriFone and Hypercom, as defined below, 
and any successor or assign to all or substantially all of the business 
or assets of VeriFone or Hypercom involved in the provision of Point of 
Sale Terminals.
    C. ``Divestiture Assets'' means Hypercom's entire business engaged 
in the development, production, distribution, and sale of POS Terminals 
in the United States, including, but not limited to:
    1. All facilities used in the operation of Hypercom's United States 
POS Terminal business, including Hypercom's repair facility located in 
Delegacion Benito Juarex, Mexico.
    2. All existing inventory of Hypercom's POS Terminal devices 
including parts.
    3. All tangible assets used to operate the Divestiture Assets, 
including, but not limited to, all research and development activities; 
all manufacturing equipment, tooling and fixed assets, personal 
property, inventory, office furniture, materials, supplies and other 
tangible property; all licenses, permits and authorizations issued by 
any governmental organization; all contracts, teaming arrangements, 
agreements, leases, commitments, certifications, and understandings, 
relating to the Divestiture Assets, including supply agreements and 
current POS Terminal certifications; all customer lists, customer 
contracts, accounts, and credit records; all repair and performance 
records and all other records relating to the Divestiture Assets.
    4. Irrevocable, exclusive, transferable, fully paid, royalty free, 
non-sub licensable license to all patents and other intangible assets 
related to the development, production, distribution, and sale of POS 
Terminals in the United States, including, but not limited to, all 
licenses and sublicenses, software and hardware intellectual property, 
copyrights, trademarks, trade names, service marks, service names, 
technical information, computer software and related documentation, 
know-how, trade secrets, drawings, blueprints, designs, design 
protocols, specifications for materials, specifications for parts and 
devices, safety procedures for the handling of materials and 
substances, all research data concerning historic and current research 
and development relating to the Divestiture Assets, quality assurance 
and control procedures, design tools and simulation capability, all 
manuals and technical information Defendants provide to their own 
employees, customers, suppliers, agents or licensees, and all research 
data concerning historic and current research and development efforts 
relating to the Divestiture Assets, including, but not limited to, 
designs of experiments, and the results of successful and unsuccessful 
designs and experiments.
    5. In the event that a trustee is appointed, the trustee may, at 
the trustee's sole discretion, include any assets, including tangible 
assets as well as patents and other intangible assets that extend 
beyond the United States, if the trustee finds it necessary to enable 
the Acquirer to compete effectively in the POS Terminals Industry in 
the United States and accomplish the divestiture of Hypercom's POS 
Terminals business.
    D. ``Gores'' means The Gores Group, LLC., with headquarters in Los 
Angeles, California, its successors and assigns, and its subsidiaries, 
divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and 
their directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees.
    E. ``Hypercom'' means Defendant Hypercom Corp., a Delaware 
corporation, with headquarters in Scottsdale, Arizona, its successors 
and assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, 
partnerships, and joint ventures, and their directors, officers, 
managers, agents, and employees.

[[Page 50263]]

    F. ``Gores'' means The Gores Group, LLC., with headquarters in Los 
Angeles, California, its successors and assigns, and its subsidiaries, 
divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships, and joint ventures, and 
their directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees.
    G. ``Point of Sale (POS) Terminals'' means devices tha